

Dictionary of Western Philosophy

尼古拉斯·布宁 余纪元 编著

西方哲学
英汉对照辞典

English-Chinese
人民出版社

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译者（按姓氏笔画顺序）：

王柯平 江 怡 余纪元 陈 波 张祥龙
周晓亮 段忠桥 胡新和 徐开来 徐友渔
陶秀放 唐热风 龚 群

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责任编辑:陈亚明

装帧设计:曹 春

版式设计:赵迎珂

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Preface

After the early sessions of the Philosophy Summer School in China, British and Chinese Summer School colleagues agreed that further scholarly projects could augment the role of the Summer School in promoting and shaping philosophical studies in China. They judged that an authoritative English-Chinese dictionary of western philosophy would be the most effective additional tool to assist philosophers, students, general readers and translators in their approach to philosophy. On this basis, Nicholas Bunnin (Chairman of the British Committee of the Summer School) and Qiu Renzong (Chairman of the Chinese Committee of the Summer School) prepared a successful application to the Leverhulme Trust to fund the dictionary project at the Centre for Modern Chinese Studies, University of Oxford. A generous Leverhulme grant provided financial support from November 1994 to October 1997 and included funds for a research post and other crucial expenses. In Oxford, Nicholas Bunnin directed the project, and Jiyuan Yu was the project researcher.

The dictionary has emerged from this collaboration. Although entries are presented alphabetically, they were prepared in different sections. The dictionary also has an appendix listing major western philosophers and their principal publications. Although the dictionary covers a wide historical range and explores many subject areas, it focuses on terms involved in current philosophical discussion and gives special emphasis to contemporary analytic philosophy. All entries begin with a philosophical term, in some cases leading to a cross reference to another entry, but otherwise leading to a full entry. Each full entry is intended to provide a clear and challenging exposition to give readers access to major philosophical issues associated with the term. Queries and objections are often included to capture the perplexity arising from philosophical questions and to encourage readers to be active and critical in their response to the dictionary as a whole. Many entries give the derivation of their terms from Greek, Latin, French or German. All entries conclude with an illustrative quotation from a classical or modern source. The English version of each entry is accompanied by a translated

Chinese version, a feature which should help philosophical translators as well as other scholars. Many readers will consult the dictionary for help in understanding individual terms, but others will explore a given philosophical issue or area by reading a range of related entries. A philosopher browsing through the text or reading it cover to cover will learn much about the history and structure of western philosophy and its sources of creative dispute.

Jiyuan Yu and Nicholas Bunnin compiled the dictionary together. The director designed the project, but the researcher was responsible for most of the work of preparing the list of headwords and the bulk of the entries themselves. Nicholas Bunnin edited the English text, with assistance from James Kinch (Wolfson College, Oxford). The Chinese translation of the text was prepared by Jiyuan Yu, who edited the Chinese text, and by twelve other philosophers dealing with their own specialist areas:

Chen Bo (Peking University)

Philosophical Logic

Duan Zhongqiao (People's University of China)

Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of History

Gong Qun (People's University of China)

Ethics

Hu Xinhe (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Philosophy of Science

Jiang Yi (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Philosophy of Language, Epistemology

Tang Refeng (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Philosophy of Mind

Tao Xiiao (Beijing Foreign Studies University)

Kant, Hegel and Marx

Wang Keping (Beijing 2nd Foreign Languages University)

Aesthetics

Xu Kelei (Sichuan University)

Medieval Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion

Xu Youyu (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Russell and Wittgenstein, Logical Positivism

Yu, Jiyuan (University of Oxford)

Greek Philosophy, Metaphysics

Zhang Xianglong (Peking University)

Modern European Philosophy

Zhou Xiaoliang (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

Empiricism, Rationalism

In preparing entries, we aimed to provide a clear, balanced and sophisticated picture of philosophy derived from primary works, leading scholarly authorities and our own philosophical insights. The quotations and appendix indicate the extensive range of primary sources consulted, but the entries themselves also reflect our gratitude to an excellent range of contemporary philosophical encyclopedias, dictionaries, reference works and textbooks, including Paul Edwards, ed.: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols (Macmillan, 1967); J. O. Urmson & Jonathan Rée, eds.: *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy & Philosophers*, new ed. (Routledge, 1989); Stuart Brown, et al, eds.: *Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth Century Philosophers* (Routledge, 1996); Robert Audi, ed.: *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); G. Vesey & P. Foulkes: *Collins Dictionary of Philosophy* (Collins, 1990); Antony Flew, ed.: *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Pan, 1979); A. R. Lacey: *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 1986); Thomas Mautner, ed.: *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1996); Peter A. Angeles: *The HarperCollins Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (HarperCollins, 1992); Simon Blackburn: *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1994); J. O. Urmson: *The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary* (Duckworth, 1990); A. C. Grayling, ed.: *Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject* (Oxford University Press, 1995); Nicholas Bunnin & E. P. Tsui-James, eds.: *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1996); Ted Honderich, ed.: *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1995); the *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy* series; the *Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries* series; and the *Cambridge Companions to Philosophers* series. Edward Craig, ed.: *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 10 vols (Routledge, 1998) appeared only when the dictionary was ready to hand over to People's Press for publication.

The compilers wish to thank all who helped to make the dictionary possible. In addition to those mentioned above, we wish to thank the British, Chinese and Australian Committees of the Summer School and its sponsoring bodies; the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; the Royal Institute of Philosophy; the Centre for Modern Chinese Studies, University of Oxford; the Australian Academy of the Humanities; and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia; and our publishers the People's Publishing House. The Philosophy Library and the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford made their philosophical riches available to

the project. Edward Craig and Chad Hansen were referees for the project. Sir Peter Strawson assessed the initial list of headwords. Our editors Ms. Chen Yaming and Mr. Jiang Yi gave splendid support in preparing the manuscript for publication and saved us from many errors. We are, however, responsible for the final judgement of the contents and translations. We both enjoyed our intensive work in compiling the dictionary, and each learned so much from the philosophical insights of the other. We end by thanking the Leverhulme Trust for transforming the dream of the dictionary to the concrete volume before you.

Nicholas Bunnin

Jiyuan Yu

序 言

在中国举办了最初几期暑期哲学学院之后，暑期学院中英双方的同事们一致认为，进一步的学术项目将能够扩大暑期学院在促进和影响中国哲学研究方面的作用。他们认为，一部权威性的西方哲学英汉对照辞典将是最有效的辅助工具，以帮助哲学家、学生、一般读者以及译者对哲学的理解。基于这种认识，尼古拉斯·布宁（暑期学院英方委员会主席）和邱仁宗（暑期学院中方委员会主席）成功地向利弗霍姆信托公司申请到一笔资金，以支持牛津大学现代中国研究中心对本辞典的编撰计划。从1994年11月到1997年10月，该公司慷慨地对此项目提供了财政支持，并且还包括支付一个研究职位的经费以及其他必不可少的开支。在牛津，尼古拉斯·布宁指导了这个项目，余纪元是该项目的研究员。

本辞典就是这次合作产生的结果。尽管全书条目是按英文字母顺序排列的，但撰写它们时是按不同的主题进行的。本辞典的附录开列了西方主要的哲学家及其代表作。虽然本辞典覆盖了广阔的历史范围，探讨了许多学科领域，但它重点关注的是当前哲学讨论中所涉及的术语，并且特别强调了当代分析哲学。所有条目都从一个哲学术语开始，在某些情况下，会以参照的方式引导到另一个条目，但主要是引出一个完整的条目。每个完整的条目都力图提供清晰且富有挑战性的阐释，以便让读者理解与该条目有关的主要哲学争论。（条目中）经常反映了争论和对立的意见，使读者能把握产生于哲学问题的复杂性，并鼓励读者对整个辞典做出积极的、批判性的回应。许多条目都给出了它们在希腊语、拉丁语、法语或德语中的衍生词。所有条目都包括一段引自古典文献或现代文献的例证性文字。每个条目的英文原文都伴随有一个中文译文，这一特点将有助于哲学译者以及其他学者。许多读者通过参看本辞典，将帮助他们理解单个的术语，但更多的读者将通过阅读（本辞典中）一系列相关条目，去探索哲学的某个问题或领域。哲学家通过浏览本辞典或反复阅读本书，将会从中学到许多关于西方哲学的历史、结构以及许多创造性论战的来源的知识。

余纪元和尼古拉斯·布宁共同编撰了本辞典。布宁主任策划了这个项目，余纪元研究员则负责准备辞条目录以及整个条目本身的大部分撰写工作。尼古拉斯编辑了英文文本，并由詹姆斯·金奇（牛津大学沃尔弗森学院）协助完成。中文译文由余纪元负责组织（他编辑了中文文本），由以下 12 位来自不同专业的哲学家共同完成：

陈波（北京大学）

哲学逻辑

段忠桥（中国人民大学）

政治哲学、社会科学哲学、法哲学、历史哲学

龚群（中国人民大学）

伦理学

胡新和（中国社会科学院哲学所）

科学哲学

江怡（中国社会科学院哲学所）

语言哲学、认识论

唐热风（中国社会科学院哲学所）

心的哲学

陶秀敖（北京外国语大学）

康德、黑格尔和马克思

王柯平（北京第二外国语大学）

美学

徐开来（四川大学）

中世纪哲学和宗教哲学

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罗素和维特根斯坦、逻辑实证主义

余纪元（牛津大学）

希腊哲学、形而上学

张祥龙（北京大学）

现代欧洲哲学

周晓亮（中国社会科学院哲学所）

经验主义、理性主义

在准备条目的过程中，我们的目标旨在第一手文献、一流的学术权威和我们自己的哲学洞察力的基础上，提供一幅清晰、全面、深邃的哲学图画。引文和附录表明我们参考了广泛的第二手资料，但条目本身也反映了我们受惠于相当广泛的当代哲学百科全书、词典、参考书以及教科书，其中包括：保罗·爱德华编辑的《哲学百科全书》（8 卷本，麦克米兰公司，1967）；J. O. 乌姆森和约纳德编辑的《简明西方哲学和哲学家百科全书》（新版，罗特雷奇公司，1989）；斯图亚特·布劳恩及其他人合编的《20 世纪哲学家传记辞典》（罗特雷奇，1996）；罗伯特·奥迪编辑《剑桥哲学词典》（剑桥大学出版社，1995），G. 维奇和 P. 弗克斯编辑的《科林斯哲学词典》（科林斯公司，1990）；安冬尼·弗鲁编辑的《哲学词典》（潘，1979）；A. R. 莱西的《哲学词典》（第二版，罗特雷奇公司，1986）；托马斯·毛特纳编辑的《哲

学词典》(布莱克威尔公司, 1996); 彼德·A. 安吉雷斯的《哈泼科林斯哲学词典》(第二版, 哈泼科林斯公司, 1992); 西蒙·布莱克伯恩编辑的《牛津哲学词典》(牛津大学出版社, 1994); J. O. 乌姆森的《希腊哲学词汇》(达克沃斯, 1990); A. C. 格雷林编辑的《哲学: 主题指南》(牛津大学出版社, 1995); 尼古拉斯·布宁和E. P. 蔡-詹姆斯编辑的《布莱克威尔哲学指南》(布莱克威尔, 1995); 特德·亨德里奇编辑的《牛津哲学指南》(牛津大学出版社, 1995); 《布莱克威尔哲学指南》丛书; 《布莱克威尔哲学家词典》丛书; 剑桥《哲学家指南》丛书。爱德华·克里格编辑的《罗特雷奇哲学百科全书》(10 卷本, 罗特雷奇公司, 1998) 是本辞典准备交送人民出版社出版之时方才面世的。

编者对一切使本辞典成为可能的人士表示衷心感谢。除上述提到的之外, 我们要感谢暑期学院的英方、中方和澳方委员会以及学院的赞助者: 中国社会科学院哲学所、英国皇家哲学研究所、牛津大学现代中国研究中心、澳大利亚人文科学院、澳大利亚社会科学院以及本辞典的出版者人民出版社。牛津大学的哲学图书馆和包德莱图书馆为本项目提供了丰富的哲学资料。爱德华·克里格和查德·汉森是本项目的推荐人。皮特·斯特劳森爵士审阅了最初的辞条目录。本辞典的编辑陈亚明女士和江怡先生为本书的出版提供了巨大的帮助, 为我们避免了许多错误。不过, 对本辞典的全部内容和译文, 我们将承担全部责任。我们俩人都感到编辑本辞典的紧张工作是一种享受, 而且彼此从对方学到了许多哲学上的真知灼见。最后, 我们要感谢利弗霍姆信托公司, 使本辞典由梦想变成了现实。

尼古拉斯·布宁
余纪元

(江怡译)

使用说明

一、组成

本书是一部以英汉对照的形式向读者阐释西方哲学、特别是现当代西方哲学主要概念、术语或短语的工具书。

本书主要由条目、附录及索引组成，共设条目约 2911 条。

二、编排

条目顺序按英文字母排列；先后顺序按逐个字母比较排列；中文译文顺序随英文顺序。

三、条目

条目是全书的主体，主要包括条目标题、释文和引文。每个完整的条目力求给出与该条目相关的主要哲学问题概括而清晰的阐释。许多条目还给出了它们派生于希腊语、拉丁语、德语、法语中的衍生词。

条目与条目之间以“见……”条的方式相联系，互为补充。

同一术语的异称，或不同术语具有同一名称，分别设条。

四、附录

附录按英文字母顺序、以英汉对照形式向读者提供了 442 位主要西方哲学家的生卒年、生平简介及主要代表作。

五、索引

为便于读者方便、快捷地查阅，本书附有三个索引：一是按英文字母顺序排列的英汉对照条目索引；二是按英文字母顺序排列的英汉对照条目分类索引；三是汉语拼音条目索引。

六、其他

本书充分尊重中文译者对条目的理解，对译者的说明和注释用〔 〕标出，以便和原文相区别。

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A

A fortiori

[Latin; for a stronger reason, even more so or with more certainty] An argument that if everything which possesses A will possess B, then if a given thing possesses A to a greater degree, it has a stronger reason (*a fortiori*) to possess B. For example, if all old men who are healthy can run, then *a fortiori* a young man who has greater health than old men can run.

"All the so-called relational (or *a fortiori*) syllogisms depend on the transitivity of relations." —Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*.

A priori/a posteriori

[Latin; *a priori*, from what is earlier; *a posteriori*, from what comes after] This epistemological distinction was originally applied to two kinds of arguments in Aristotle and in medieval logic. If an argument proceeds from a cause to its effect, it is called *a priori*, and if it proceeds from an effect to its cause it is *a posteriori*. The distinction was later applied to concepts, propositions, knowledge and truth. Leibniz distinguishes truth *a priori* (truth of reason) from truth *a posteriori* (truth established by experience). This corresponds to Hume's distinction between knowledge about matters of fact and knowledge about relations of ideas. For Kant, knowledge is *a priori* if it is independent of experience and does not require experience to establish its truth, and is *a posteriori* if it is based on experience. He also connects this dichotomy with the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, and claims that all analytic judgements are *a priori*. His major concern in the *Critique Of Pure Reason* is how synthetic *a priori* judgement is possible. The distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is also related to the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. But the relations among these distinctions pose various problems. Philosophers have been debating whether *a priori* propositions must be necessary, or universal, and whether *a posteriori* propositions must be contingent. Kripke argues that *a posteriori* necessity is logically possible.

"There are two kinds of cognition. An *a priori* one, which is independent of experience; and an *a posteriori* one, which is grounded on empirical principles." —Kant, *Lectures On Logic* (ed. Young), 1992, p. 252.

更有理由

[拉丁语,意指“更有理由”,“更加”,“更为肯定”]一种论证方式。假如任何包含甲的事物也包含乙,然后假如一件已知的事物在更大的程度上包含甲的话,那它更有理由包含乙。譬如说,假如所有健康的老年人能够跑步的话,那么更加健壮的年轻人要比这些老年人更有理由能够跑步。

“一切所谓的关系(或更有理由)的三段论有赖于诸关系的可递性。”——柯亨和内格尔:《逻辑与科学方法导论》。

先天/后天

[在拉丁文中,“先天”是指“来自先前的东西”;“后天”是指“来自后来的东西”]这种认识论上的区分最初用于亚里士多德和中世纪逻辑中的两种论证。如果一个论证是从原因到结果,它就会被称作是“先天的”;如果一个论证是从结果到原因,那么它就会被称作是“后天的”。这个区分后来被用于概念、命题、知识和真理。莱布尼茨区分了先天真理(理性真理)和后天真理(由经验确立的真理),这对应于休谟对关于事实的知识与关于观念关系的知识的区分。在康德看来,如果知识不依赖于经验而且无须由经验确立真理,那么它就是先天的;如果知识基于经验,那么它就是后天的。他还把这种二分法与分析 and 综合的区分联系起来,认为一切分析判断都是先天的。他在《纯粹理性批判》中主要关心的就是,先天综合判断是如何可能的。先天与后天的区分同样与必然和偶然的区分有关。但这些区分之间的关系提出了各种问题。哲学家们一直在争论,先天命题是否一定是必然的或普遍的,而后天命题是否一定是偶然的。克里普克认为,后天必然在逻辑上是可能的。

“存在两种认识,即一种是先天的,它独立于经验;另一种是后天的,它建立在经验原则的基础之上。”——康德:《逻辑讲义》(杨编辑),1992年,第252页。

A priori knowledge

Knowledge which is believed to be universally certain and necessarily true. It is known and justified independent of experiential evidence. *A priori* knowledge is in contrast to empirical or *a posteriori* knowledge. Rationalism assumes the existence of *a priori* knowledge mainly from the necessity of mathematical and logical truths. This is elaborated in detail by Kant who also argues that *a priori* knowledge can be synthetic. His three distinctions, i.e. *a priori* / *a posteriori*, necessary / contingent, analytic / synthetic, have been the focus of the contemporary discussion of *a priori* knowledge.

Some empiricists admit the existence of *a priori* knowledge, but claim that it is trivial and only expresses the relations between our ideas (Hume), or that it can only be analytic truth based on the meanings of the words rather than knowledge about the world. Other empiricists tend to reject the existence of this form of knowledge, by claiming that prominent examples of *a priori* knowledge such as mathematical truths can be inductively justified (Mill), or that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is not tenable, and that no necessity can be known other than empirically (Quine). Kripke and Putnam also deny the internal relation between necessity and the *a priori*.

The proponents of *a priori* knowledge usually claim that we have a faculty of intuition by which we may ascertain the truth of *a priori* propositions. On the other hand, the opponents of *a priori* knowledge insist that there is no psychological evidence to suggest that we have such a mysterious cognitive faculty.

"An instance of knowledge is *a priori* if and only if its justification condition is *a priori* in the sense that it does not depend on evidence from sensory experience."—Moser (ed.), *A Priori Knowledge*, 1987, p. 1.

A priori proposition

A proposition or statement whose truth is not based on empirical investigation. In contrast to empirical or *a posteriori* propositions which are known through experience. Mathematical axioms, logical laws and metaphysical propositions are generally regarded as examples of *a priori* propositions. If all the concepts in an *a priori* proposition are *a priori* concepts, the proposition is called an absolutely *a priori* proposition. Otherwise, it is called a relatively *a priori* proposition. Empiricism holds that all knowledge must be based on experience. Consequently, it tends to reject speculative metaphysics, although it then becomes a major task to provide a satisfactory empiricist account of mathematical and logical truths.

"It is traditional to say that an *a priori* proposition is a proposition that is 'independent of experience', and is such that 'if you understand it, then you can see that it is true'."—Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 80.

先天知识

被认为是普遍确定的、必然为真的知识。它不依赖于经验的证据而得到并加以证明。先天知识相对于经验知识或后天知识。理性主义主要从数学和逻辑真理的必然性来确定先天知识的存在。这是由康德详尽阐发的,他还认为,先天知识可以是综合的。他的三个主要区分,即先天与后天、必然与偶然、分析与综合,一直是当代讨论先天知识问题的焦点所在。

某些经验主义者承认先天知识的存在,但认为它是微不足道的,仅仅表达了我们观念之间的关系(休谟),或者认为,它只是基于语词意义的分析性真理,而不是关于世界的知识。其他经验主义者试图否定这种知识形式的存在,认为诸如数学真理这样的先天知识的主要例证是可以通过还原加以证明的(密尔),或者认为,分析与综合的区分并不可靠,任何必然性都只能从经验上得知(奎因)。克里普克和普特南同样否定必然性与先天性之间的内在关系。

先天知识的拥护者通常认为,我们拥有一种直觉能力,我们可以用它确认先天命题的真。但另一方面,先天知识的反对者则坚持认为,没有任何心理上的迹象表明,我们具有这种神秘的认识能力。

"一种知识是先天的,当且仅当它的证明条件是先天的,也就是说,它并不依赖于感觉经验的证据。"——莫泽(编):《先天知识》,1987年,第1页。

先天命题

即它的真并不依赖于经验研究的命题或陈述,与之相对的是通过经验而得知的经验命题或“后天”命题。数学公理、逻辑定理和形而上学命题一般被看作是先天命题的例证。如果先天命题中的所有概念都是先天概念,那么,这个命题就被称作绝对先天命题。否则,它就只能被称作相对先天命题。经验主义认为,一切知识都必须基于经验。结果,它试图反对思辨的形而上学,尽管这样一来,对数学真理和逻辑真理提供令人满意的经验主义说明成了它的一个主要任务。

"从传统上说,先天命题是‘不依赖于经验’的命题的,就是说,‘如果你理解了它,那么你就会明白它是真的’。"——齐硕姆:《人与物》,1976年,第80页。

A this

[Greek: *tode ti*, sometimes translated as *thisness*. Unlike *tode* (this), which is simply a pronoun which can refer to everything, *tode ti* is a technical term introduced by Aristotle. In the *Categories* he defines it as “individual and numerically one” and takes it as a mark of a primary substance (sensible particular). In contrast, a secondary substance (species and genus) is marked by *poion ti* (a kind). In the *Metaphysics*, *tode ti* is one criterion for primary substance. In contrast, the universal is not substance and is labelled *toiouto* (Greek: such, the equivalent of *poion ti*). Aristotle claimed that among form, matter and the composite of form and matter, form best meets the criterion of *tode ti*, with the composite second. Since *tode ti* seems straightforwardly to denote a particular thing, Aristotle’s form appears to be a particular. But this is a disputable point, for many who believe that Aristotelian form is a kind of universal maintain that *tode ti* is not necessarily a particular, but can mean a determination and that an *infima species* can also be *tode ti*. The morphology *tode ti* suggests that one of its two constituent words is a class-name and that the other restricts the class to a single member, but it is disputable which function should be assigned to which word.

“Everything that is common indicates not ‘a this’, but ‘such’, but substance is ‘a this’.”— Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a6-7.

Abandonment

An experience gained through realising that there are no objective principles or authorities to guide one’s life. According to existentialism, this experience helps us to recognise that one cannot attain authenticity by appeal to God or to philosophical systems. We should each understand our own unique existential condition, reject bad faith, and assume full responsibility for life. The conception of abandonment is hence related to the existentialist account of the autonomy of the agent.

“When we speak of ‘abandonment’—a favourite word of Heidegger—we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequence of his absence right to the end.”—Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, 1989, pp. 32-3.

Abduction

C. S. Peirce’s term for the logic of discovery, a creative process which is one of the three fundamental types of reasoning in science, along with induction and deduction. When we encounter a new phenomenon which cannot be explained through the application of a general law, we should pick out certain characteristic features of this new phenomenon and attempt to find relations among these features. After forming

这一个

[源自希腊词, *tode ti* 有时也译作 *thisness*] 与可指称任何事物的代词 *tode* (这) 不同, “这一个”是亚里士多德所构造的专有名词。在《范畴》中, 他将之定义为是“个别的且数量上为一个”, 并把它看作是第一本体(可感殊相)的一个标志, 以相对于第二本体(属和种), 后者以 *poion ti* (一类) 为标志。在《形而上学》中, “这一个”成为第一本体的一个标准, 而其对立面为不是本体的共相, 以 *toiouto* (希腊词, 这一类, 等同于 *poion ti*) 表示。亚里士多德认为, 在形式、质料及形式与质料的复合物三者之间, 形式最合乎“这一个”的标准, 复合物次之。由于“这一个”的直接意义是指一个特殊事物, 它便意味着亚里士多德的形式是一个殊相。但这是广为争议之点。因为许多相信亚里士多德的形式是一种共相的人坚持认为, “这一个”并不一定是殊相, 也可以指一个规定, 因此最下层的属也可以是“这一个”。该表述的形态表明在它的两个构成成分 (*tode* 及 *ti*) 中, 一个是类名, 另一个则是把这一类名限制到该类的某一成员上。但学者们一直争论究竟哪个是类名, 哪个表示个体。

“每个共同的事物都表示‘这一类’, 而非‘这一个’, 但本体是‘这一个’。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1003a6-7。

放达

意识到不存在指导人生之客观原理或权威而感受到的一种体验。根据存在主义学说, 这种体验有助于人们认识如下事实: 人若乞灵于上帝或哲学体系是无法获得可靠性的。每个人都应当知解各自独特的生存条件, 应当摒弃不良的信仰, 同时应当为生活承担全部责任。因此, 放达这一概念与存在主义对主动者之自律性的阐述相关。

“当我们谈论‘放达’(海德格尔喜用该词)时, 我们只是想上帝不存在了, 因此有必要直接了结上帝缺场时所产生的后果。”——萨特:《存在主义和人道主义》, 1989年版, 第32—33页。

假说推理

C. S. 皮尔士的术语, 用以指发现的逻辑, 一种创造性过程。它与归纳和演绎并列, 为科学中三种基本的推理类型之一。当我们遇到不能通过应用一般规律加以说明的新现象时, 应当找出这一新现象的若干独特的特征, 尝试去发现这些特征之间的关系, 并在形成的几个用以说明这一现象的理论或假说中, 挑选其中之一

several theories or hypotheses which might explain the phenomenon, we should select one of them to test against experience. Such a process of reasoning to form empirical theories or hypotheses for testing is called abduction. Peirce also called it retrodution, hypothesis or presumption, but other philosophers have normally called it induction. Peirce distinguished abduction from induction by defining induction as the experimental testing of a theory. He held that abduction is what Aristotle discussed as *apagago* (Greek: leading away, substituting a more likely premise for a less acceptable one).

"Presumption, or more precisely, abduction ... furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies."—Peirce, *Collected Works*, II, p. 277.

Abortion

The intentional killing of a foetus or fertilised human egg by causing its expulsion from the mother's womb before its birth. Whether abortion should be morally permitted has been intensively debated in the past few decades and has become a major political and legal issue in many industrialised countries. One focus of the debate is on the moral status of a foetus. Is a foetus a person with a substantive right to life? The anti-abortion argument holds that a foetus is already a person and therefore should be within the scope of the moral rule that "you should not kill". This view leads to a discussion concerning the concept of personhood, that is at what stage between conception and birth does a foetus become a person. Another focus concerns the rights of the pregnant woman. Does she have a right to bodily autonomy, including the right to decide what happens to her own body? Even if a foetus is a person, how shall we balance its rights and the woman's rights? Still another problem concerns the extent to which we should take into account the undesirable consequences of the prohibition of abortion, such as poverty and overpopulation. Different sides of the debate hold different positions resulting in part from the moral principles they accept. There is currently no common basis to solve all the disagreement. Nevertheless, abortion, which was legally permitted only in Sweden and Denmark until 1967, has become accepted in the majority of western countries.

"Few ethical issues are as bitterly fought over today as abortion, and, while the pendulum has swung back and forth, neither side has had much success in altering the opinions of its opponents."—Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 1993, p. 135.

Absolute, the

[from Latin: *absolutus*, in turn originating from *ab*, away, from and *solvere* free, loosen; free from limitations, qualifications or conditions] To call something absolute is to say that it is unconditional or universal, in contrast to what is relative, comparative or varying according to circum-

对照经验加以检验。这样一种形成经验理论或假说用以检验的推理过程,就称作假说推理。皮尔士也称之为“溯因推理”、“假说”或“推测”,而其他哲学家通常称之为归纳。皮尔士则通过定义归纳为对一个理论的实验检验以与假说推理相区别。他相信假说推理就是亚里士多德在 *apagago* (希腊语,从字面上说,为“引开去”,意即用一個更为可能的前提取代另一个较不易接受的前提)的名称下所讨论的东西。

“推测,或者更准确地说,假说推理……提供给推理者以用归纳加以证实的或然性理论。”——皮尔士,《文集》,第2卷,第277页。

堕胎

在分娩前把一个胚胎或受精卵从母亲子宫中驱除出去而进行的有意杀害。在过去的几十年中,对堕胎是否在道德上是许可的,一直进行着激烈的争论,并且在许多工业化的国家中,已经成为一个主要的政治和法律问题。争论的一个焦点就是胎儿的道德地位问题。一个胎儿有一个人所有的实质性的生命权吗?反堕胎的论证是,一个胎儿已经是一个人,因此,应当包括在“不应被杀”的道德规则的范围内。这个论点导致了一场有关人的概念的讨论,即在怀孕和诞生的什么阶段,一个胎儿成为一个人。另一个焦点是在怀孕的母亲的权利上。她有身体的自主权,有权决定那出现在她自己身上的东西吗?即使一个胎儿是一个人,我们应该怎样平衡胎儿的权利和母亲的权利?还有另一个问题就是,在什么程度上我们应该考虑禁止堕胎的不良后果,如贫穷、人口过剩等等。论争的不同方面所持有的不同观点,来自于他们所信奉的不同道德原则。目前尚没有解决所有这些分歧的共同的基础。不过,直到1967年,在法律上允许堕胎的,只有瑞典和丹麦,而现在在大多数西方国家,堕胎都成为合法的了。

“今天,很少有伦理问题像堕胎这样有辛辣的争斗,然而,钟摆摆来又摆去,没有一方在改变对手的观点上是成功的。”——辛格,《实用伦理学》,1993年,第135页。

绝对

[源自拉丁文 *absolutus*, 后者源自 *ab* (离去, 来自) 加 *solvere* (放, 松懈); 字面意义是没有界定、限制或条件] 称某物为绝对的是说它是无条件的或普遍的, 反之则是相对的、相比较而言的或随环境变化而变化的事物。在形而上学中,

stances. In metaphysics, the Absolute, as a technical term, is a single entity which is ultimate, unchanging, overriding and all-comprehensive. Nicholas of Cusa uses this expression to refer to God. Subsequently, the Absolute is always associated with concepts such as the one, the perfect, the eternal, the uncaused and the infinite and has been regarded as the reality underlying appearance and providing rational ground for appearance.

The revival of the notion of the Absolute in modern philosophy derives from the debate in the 1770s between Mendelssohn and Jacobi about Spinoza's definition of substance. Schelling, employing Spinoza's notion of substance, defines the absolute as a neutral identity which underlies both subject (mind) and object (nature). Everything that is mental or physical is an attribute of the Absolute or of "indefinite substance". He further claims that the Absolute is a living force, an organism, and something that is self-generating rather than mechanistic. Hegel claimed that the Absolute is the unity of substance and its modes, of the infinite and the finite. Such an Absolute is both a substance and a subject, developing from the underlying reality to the phenomenal world and reaching absolute knowledge as its highest phase. Thus, the Absolute is a self-determining activity, a spirit, and a concrete dynamic totality. Its development mirrors the development of knowledge. Hegel's metaphysics sought to work out the process and implications of this development.

In this century, this term is particularly associated with Bradley, who conceives the Absolute to be a single, self-differentiating whole. Anti-metaphysical thought argues for the elimination of the Absolute as an entity which cannot be observed and which performs no useful function in philosophy.

"Absolutes are the limits of explanation, and as such they have been the main theme of traditional philosophy."

Findlay, *Ascent to the Absolute*, 1970, p. 19.

Absolute conception

A term introduced by Bernard Williams in his study of Descartes for a conception of reality as it is independent of our experience and to which all representations of reality can be related. To gain such a conception requires overcoming the limitations of our enquiry and any systematic bias, distortion or partiality in our outlook. Such a conception may enable us to view our representations as one set among others and to avoid assessing the views of others from our own standpoint. Williams claims that our notion of knowledge implies that such a conception is possible.

"This notion of an absolute conception can serve to make effective a distinction between 'the world as it is independent of our experience' and 'the world as it seems to us'." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1986, p. 139.

"绝对"作为一个专门术语,是指那终极的、不变的、主宰性的以及包罗万象的单一实体。库萨的尼古拉用这一术语指上帝。此后,"绝对"始终是与诸如一、完美、永恒、自因以及无限等概念联系在一起的,并一直被认为是在现象背后并为现象提供理性根据的实在。

绝对概念在近代哲学中的复兴归因于17世纪70年代门德尔松和雅各比之间关于斯宾诺莎本体定义的争论。谢林采用斯宾诺莎的本体观念把"绝对"定义为是支撑主体(心灵)和客体(自然)的中性同一体。每一心灵的或物理的东西都是"绝对"或"不定本体"的属性。他还进一步认为,"绝对"是一种生命力,一个有机体,是自我生成的而不是机械的。黑格尔认为,"绝对"是本体和它的样式的统一,是有限和无限的统一。这样一个"绝对"既是本体,又是主体,从支撑性的实在发展到现象世界并以绝对知识为最高阶段。因此,"绝对"是一种自主的活动,一种精神,是具体的、充满活力的整体。它的发展反映了知识的发展。黑格尔的形而上学旨在阐发这一发展的过程及其意义。

在这一世纪,这一术语特别与布拉德雷相联系。他把"绝对"设想成是一个单一的、自我分化的大全。而反形而上学者则主张,"绝对"是一个观察不到的实体,对哲学没有用处,所以应予拒斥。

"绝对是解释的界限,因而它们一直是传统哲学的中心主题。" — 芬德雷:《上升到绝对》,1970年,第19页。

绝对概念

B. 威廉姆斯在他的笛卡尔研究中第一次采用的词。这是一个把实在看作是独立于我们的经验,而所有关于实在的表象都与它相关的概念。获得这样一个概念需要克服我们研究的局限,以及我们世界观中的任何系统的偏见、扭曲或偏爱。这样一个概念能够使我们把我们的表象看做是许多表象中的一组,并且使我们避免从自己的立场上去评价其他人的观点。威廉姆斯宣称,我们关于知识的观念隐含着这样一个概念的可能。

"这样一个绝对概念的观念能够用来有效地区分'独立于我们经验的世界'与'我们所看到的世界'。" — 威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1986年,第139页。

Absolute idea

The absolute idea, for Hegel, is equivalent to absolute truth in his *Phenomenology of Mind* and to the absolute in his *Logic*. It is also called absolute spirit. For Hegel, an idea is not something mental or separate from particulars, but is the categorical form of spirit. The absolute idea is the idea in and for itself, an infinite reality and an all-embracing whole. It exists in a process of self development and self-actualisation. As a metaphysical counterpart of the Christian God, it is the basis for the teleological development of both the natural and social worlds. Its determinate content constitutes reality. The absolute idea is what truly is, and the final realisation of truth. For Hegel, the absolute idea is a dynamic self, involving inner purposiveness and normative ideals. By characterising reality as the absolute idea, Hegel showed that his notion of reality is fundamentally conceptual. It is a unity of the ideal of life with the life of cognition. The core of Hegel's idealism is the claim that the being of all finite things is derived from the absolute idea. In terms of this notion, Hegel integrated ontology, metaphysics, logic and ethics into one system.

"The defect of life lies in its being only the idea implicit or natural, whereas cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious idea, or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the Absolute Idea, which is both in itself and for itself." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 236.

Absolute identity

As traditionally understood, identity is a rigorous notion which cannot have variant forms, and the identity relation is taken absolutely. According to Frege, this absolute notion of identity can be expressed in two theorems: (1) reflexivity; $x = x$ (everything is identical with itself) and (2) the indiscernibility of identicals (or Leibniz's law): if a and b are identical, whatever is true of a is true of b , and vice versa. Hence, " a is identical with b " means simply " a is the same as b ".

Peter Geach calls this account the classical theory of identity and believes that it is mistaken. Instead, he claims that identity is always relative, so that a is not simply the same as b , but rather that a can be the same as b relative to one concept but not the same as b relative to another concept. In response, some argue that relative identity is qualitative identity, while numerical identity remains absolute.

"Absolute identity seems at first sight to be presupposed in the branch of logic called identity theory." — Geach, *Logic Matters*, 1972, p. 238.

Absolute spirit, another term for absolute idea

绝对理念

对于黑格尔来说,绝对理念等同于他的《精神现象学》中的绝对真理,和他的《逻辑学》中的绝对。它也称为绝对精神。在黑格尔看来,理念不是某种心理的东西,或与殊相分离的东西,而是精神的范畴形式。绝对理念是自在自为的理念,无限的实在和无所不包的全体,它存在于自我发展和自我实现的过程中。作为基督教上帝的形而上学复本,它是自然界和社会的目的性发展的基础。它的确定内容构成了实在。绝对理念是真实的东西,是真理的最终实现。对黑格尔来说,绝对理念是一能动的自我,具有内在的目的和标准的理想。黑格尔把实在描述为绝对理念,用以表明,他的实在观念根本上是概念的。它是生命理念与认识理念的统一。黑格尔唯心主义的核心就是主张一切有限事物的存在都来源于绝对理念。黑格尔用这个概念把本体论、形而上学、逻辑学和伦理学结合为一个体系。

"生命的缺陷就在于它的存在只是潜在的或自然的理念,然而认识也同样是片面的,只是有意识的理念或自为的理念。这两者的统一和真理就是绝对理念,即自在和自为存在的理念。"——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,236节。

绝对同一性

按照传统的理解,同一性是不能有变化形式的严格概念。同一性关系被看作是绝对的。根据弗雷格的说法,这一同一性的绝对概念可以表达为两个定理:(1)反身性; $x = x$ (任何事物都同一于它自身)和(2)同一体的不可区分性(或莱布尼茨定律):如果 a 与 b 同一,则任何对 a 为真者对 b 亦为真,反之亦然。因此," a 同一于 b "其实就意味着" a 与 b 相同"。

P. 吉奇称这样一个描述为"关于同一性的经典理论",并认为它是错误的。相反,他声称同一性总是相对的,就是说一物 a 不是简单地与一物 b 相同,而是 a 可以相对于某一概念而不是另一概念与 b 相同。针对这一批评,有人辩称相对同一性是性质同一性,而数的同一性依然是绝对的。

"绝对同一性最初看起来是在被称为同一性理论的逻辑分支中预先假定的。"——吉奇:《逻辑问题》,1972年,第238页。

绝对精神

"绝对理念"的另一说法。

Absolutism

A term with different references in different areas. In metaphysics, it is opposed to subjectivism and relativism and claims that there is an ultimate, eternal and objective principle which is the source and standard of truth and value. Ethical absolutism holds that there is a basic universal principle of morality which every rational being should follow, despite their different empirical circumstances. Moral absolutism is opposed to moral relativism, which denies that any single moral principle has universal validity. In political theory, it is the view that the government's power and rights are absolute and that they always have priority when they come into conflict with the rights, interests, needs, preferences or desires of citizens or groups in society.

"In ethics, the rejection of absolutism leads initially to the recognition of multiple moral authorities, each claiming its own local validity."—Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, 1972, p. 66.

Abstract / concrete

[from Latin: *abstrahere*, to remove something from something else and *concrevere*, to grow together] At the outset of a process of recognition our concepts are likely to be vague or superficial. We must first abstract them in order to understand their diverse determinations. Being abstract is the product of abstraction, that is of drawing away something common from diverse perceptible or sensory items and disregarding their relatively inessential features. Concepts and universals are thus formed. To say that something is abstract means that it is conceptual, universal, essential or a matter of principle, while to say that something is concrete means that it is contextual, particular, personal, sensible. To be concrete is equivalent to being rich and vivid. Since what is abstract is drawn from what is concrete, to be abstract is equated with lacking the detail and individuality of the concrete and is thought to be meagre, dependent and lifeless. The existence and nature of abstract entities such as numbers and universals has long been a matter of dispute.

In another usage, which is especially prominent in Hegel's philosophy, being abstract means being cut off from thoughts or from other sensory items, while being concrete is to be relational. Hence, a particular is abstract if it is isolated from other particulars, while a concept or universal is concrete if it is related to other concepts or universals and is one item in an organic system. Hegel called such a concept a "concrete concept" or "concrete universal".

"What we abstract from are the many other aspects which together constitute concrete objects such as people, economies, nations, institutions, activities and so on." Sayers, *Method in Social Science*, 1992, p. 87.

绝对主义

这一术语在不同的领域有不同的指称。在形而上学中,它反对主观主义和相对主义,认为有一终极的、永恒的和客观的原则,作为真理和价值的源泉与标准。伦理绝对主义确信存在每理性动物不管其处于什么经验环境都应遵从的根本性的普遍的道德原则。道德绝对主义与否认任何道德原则具有普遍有效性的道德相对主义相对立。在政治理论中,绝对主义主张,政府的权力与权利是绝对的;它们在与公民或社会集团的权利、利益、需要、喜好或愿望相冲突时总是具有优先地位。

"在伦理学中,对绝对主义的驳斥从一开始就导向对多种道德权威的承认。每个这样的权威都声称其局部有效性。"——图尔敏:《人类理智》,1972年,第66页。

抽象/具体

[源自拉丁文:*abstrahere*(从某物中移掉另一物)和 *concrevere*(一起生长)]在认识过程开始时,我们的概念可能是模糊的或表面的。我们必须首先把它们抽象化以理解它们的多种多样的规定。抽象化是抽象的产物,即从丰富多样的可感的或感知内容中抽出共同的东西,相对非本质的特征则忽略不计,由此形成概念和普遍性。说某物是抽象的,意思是指它是概念的,普遍的,本质的,或有关原理的,而说某物是具体的,意思是指它是有语境的,特殊的,个人的,可感的。具体的等同于丰富生动的。既然抽象的东西是从具体的东西中抽出来的,那么,抽象的就等同于缺乏细节和具体的个性,并被认为是贫乏的,从属的和无生命的。像数目和共相这样的抽象存在体的本性和存在,长久以来一直是争论的问题。

这两个词也有另一种用法,在黑格尔哲学中特别突出的抽象是指与其他思想或感性内容相脱离的,而具体的是指与它们有联系的。因此,如果某个殊相与其他的殊相相隔离,它就是抽象的,而如果某一概念或共相与其他概念或共相是相联系的,并且是处于一个有机体系中的概念,那么它就是具体的。黑格尔把这样的概念称为"具体概念"或"具体共相"。

"我们所抽象的东西是共同构成具体对象的许多其他方面,这些对象如人群,经济,民族,制度,活动,如此等等。"——塞耶斯:《社会科学中的方法》,1992年,第87页。

Abstract entities

Objects which are not actualised somewhere in space and time, that is non-particulars such as numbers, properties, relations, proposition and classes. They stand in contrast to spatio-temporal physical objects. Whether these entities actually exist — whether we should ascribe reality to them — is a question of persistent dispute in philosophy. Empiricists and nominalists try to conceive of abstract entities as having merely a linguistic basis. However, if mathematics embodies general truths about the world and has abstract entities as its subject matter, abstract entities would be objects of reference and hence real existents. This is the claim of Platonism and is also a position admitted by Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. The discussion of abstract entities is related to the problem of being, to the problem of universals and also to the theory of meaning.

"Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc." (Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, 1947, p. 205).

Abstract ideas

How can an idea stand for all individuals of a given kind even though the individuals vary in their properties? How can we form general statements about kinds of things and reason with regard to them? Locke introduced the notion of abstract ideas, also called general ideas, and claimed that they are universal concepts generated as a result of a process of abstraction from our ideas of individual exemplars of a kind, by leaving out their specific features and keeping what is common to all. As an empiricist, Locke believed that only particulars exist in the world. An abstract idea does not refer to something individual or particular, but is a special kind of mental image. This image is the meaning of the abstract general term. The function of abstract ideas is to classify individuals into different kinds for us. As classically understood in Locke, abstraction is something in the mind between reality and the way we classify it. He believed that an abstract idea encompasses a whole kind of thing. This claim was rejected by Berkeley who insisted that all ideas are particular and only become general through our use of them. Berkeley's criticism of Locke's notion of abstract ideas, like his criticism of Locke's theory of real essence, has been very influential, but it is a matter of dispute whether his criticism is sound.

"This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their name general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2:11:9.

抽象实体

不是现实地存在于时空中某处的对象,也就是说,是像数、性质、关系、命题和类这样非殊相的东西。它们与时空中的物理对象相对立。这样的实体是否实际存在——我们是否要把实在性赋予它们——是一个哲学中长期争论不休的问题。经验主义者和唯名论者力图把抽象实体理解为只具有语言的基础。但是,如果数学体现了关于世界的普遍真理,并以抽象实体为其主题,那么抽象实体就是指称的对象,因而是真实的存在物。这是柏拉图主义的主张,也是奎因的本体论承诺标准所承认的立场。关于抽象实体的讨论与存在问题、共相问题及意义理论有关。

“一般而言,经验主义者对于任何抽象实体,诸如性质、类、关系、数、命题等等都敬而远之。”——卡尔纳普:《意义与必然性》,1947年,第205页。

抽象观念

一个观念如何能代表一定种类事物的全部个体,即使这些个体的性质各不相同?我们怎样能形成有关各种事物的普遍陈述,并对它们进行推理?洛克引入了亦称为“普遍观念”的“抽象观念”的概念,认为它们是由于对该类事物的各个例证观念所进行的抽象过程而产生出来的普遍概念。这个抽象过程是通过排除该类事物各个例证观念的独具特征,保持对全体共同的东西而达到的。作为一个经验论者,洛克相信世界上只有特殊的东西存在。一个抽象观念并不指称某个个别或特殊的东西,它只是心中的一种特殊影像。这个影像是这个抽象的普遍词的意义。抽象观念的作用在于为我们划分事物的不同的类。按照洛克的经典理解,抽象是心中的某种东西,处在实在和我们对实在进行分类的方式之间。他认为,一个抽象观念包含了一整类事物。这个观点遭到了巴克莱的反驳。巴克莱坚持认为,一切观念都是特殊的,只有当我们运用它们时,它们才变成普遍的。巴克莱对洛克的抽象观念概念的批判就像他对洛克的实在本质理论的批判一样,很有影响。不过,这个批判是否恰当仍是一件有争议的事情。

“这一过程被称作抽象,借助于它,由个别存在物中得到的观念变成了同类全部存在物的一般表象;它们的名称变成了普遍名称,可应用于与这样的抽象观念相一致的任何存在物。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第11章,第9节。

Abstract particular

An individual property that is peculiar to the individual or particular possessing it, for example the white colour possessed only by Socrates and not shared by any other white things. A property is generally regarded as being universal, that is capable of being exemplified in many individuals or particulars. But some philosophers believe that there are also particularised qualities or property instances. These are abstract particulars.

The issue can be traced to Aristotle. He classified all the realities into four kinds in his *Categories*: (1) that which is neither predicated of a subject nor inherent in a subject, namely, primary substances; (2) that which is predicated of a subject but not inherent in a subject, namely, secondary substances such as species and genus; (3) that which is predicated of a subject and also inherent in a subject, namely, universal attributes or properties; and (4) that which is not predicated of a subject, but which is inherent in a subject. For this last kind of reality, Aristotle's example is a particular piece of grammatical knowledge. He seems to be distinguishing universal properties and particular properties. In contemporary metaphysics, some philosophers claim that individual properties are constitutive of concrete particulars, that is of events and physical objects, while others apply Ockham's Razor to deny their existence. Alternative terms for abstract particulars are perfect particulars, particularised qualities, unit of properties, tropes, cases and property instances.

"Stout calls particulars which he postulates 'abstract particulars'. In calling them 'abstract' it is not meant that they are other worldly... It is simply that these particulars are 'thin' and therefore abstract by comparison with the 'thick' or concrete particulars which are constituted out of the abstract particulars." —D. M. Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism*, 1978, pp. 78-9.

Abstract terms

The terms naming abstract entities, such as 'natural number', 'real number', 'class' or 'property'. Different abstract terms can name the same abstract entity, and abstract terms can be either singular or general. Such terms have been used in mathematics and physics. In relation to the problem of the ontological status of abstract entities, it is also disputed whether the use of these terms will indicate the truth of Platonic realism. For according to Quine's theory, to admit names of abstract entities commits us to the existence of the abstract entities named by them.

"The distinction between meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract terms." Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 21.

抽象殊相

一种为拥有它的个别或殊相所独有的个别属性,例如,只为苏格拉底所拥有而不为任何其他白的事物所分享的白色。一般认为,属性是普遍的,能够体现在许多个别或殊相之中。但有些哲学家认为,它也存在特殊化的性质或属性个例。它们就是抽象殊相。

这一论点可以追溯到亚里士多德。在《范畴》中,他把所有的实在分成四类:(1)那既不述说于一个主体也不内居于一个主体之中的事物,即第一本体。(2)那述说一个主体但不内居于一个主体之中的事物,即第二本体,如属和种。(3)那述说一个主体而且也内居于一个主体之中的事物,即普遍的属性或性质。(4)那不述说于一个主体但内居于一个主体之中的事物。对于后一类实在,亚里士多德的例子乃是一种特定的语法知识。他似乎是在区分普遍的属性与特殊的属性。在当代形而上学中,有些哲学家主张个别属性是具体殊相即事件或物理对象的构成物,而另一些哲学家则通过应用奥康的剃刀而否认它们的存在。抽象殊相的其他名称包括“完美殊相”、“特殊化的性质”、“属性单位”、“比喻”、“情形”以及“特性个例”等。

“斯都特把他所设定的殊相叫做‘抽象殊相’。把它们称作‘抽象’,并不意味着它们处于另一世界……只不过与‘厚的’或具体殊相相比较而言,它们是‘薄的’,所以是抽象的。具体殊相由抽象殊相所构成。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯名论和唯实论》,1978年,第78-79页。

抽象词项

命名抽象实体的词项,例如“自然数”、“实数”、“类”或“性质”。不同的抽象词项可以命名相同的抽象实体,抽象词项可以是单称的,也可以是全称的。这样的词项用于数学和物理学中。关于抽象实体的本体论地位问题,使用这些词项是否会说明柏拉图的实在论是真理,也有争论。因为根据奎因的理论,承认抽象实体的名称就使我们承诺它们所命名的抽象实体的存在。

“意义和命名的区别在抽象词项的层次上决非不重要。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第21页。

Abstracta

[plural of Latin: *abstractum*] Abstract entities or objects, which are not perceptible and have no spatio-temporal location. Because we cannot point to them, *abstracta* are not objects of ostensive definitions. It is generally thought that *abstracta* do not have causal powers, but this point is controversial in contemporary epistemology. *Abstracta* are contrasted with *concreta* (plural of Latin: *concretum*) which are the things that make up the observable world. It is widely held that *abstracta* are dependent on *concreta*.

"Abstracta...are combinations of concreta and are not directly observable because they are comprehensive totalities." - Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, 1951, p. 263.

Abstraction

[from Latin *abs.* away from + *trahere*, draw, draw away from] A mental operation which forms a concept or idea (an abstract idea) by picking out what is common to a variety of instances and leaving out other irrelevant properties. This is a process of deriving universals and establishing classifications. From this mental act we may form concepts, and then build them up into judgements involving combinations of concepts, and further join judgements into inferences. In ancient philosophy there was a persistent problem about the ontological status of abstract things, and this is also the central point in Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. Aristotle also refers to abstraction as a mental analysis which separates form from matter. Locke takes abstraction as the means of making ideas represent all objects of the same kind by separating ideas from other existence. For him it is the capacity for abstraction which distinguishes between human beings and animals. His theory of abstract ideas is criticised by Berkeley.

"This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas." - Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, xi, 9.

Absurdity

[from Latin *absurdus*, out of tone] Used as a synonym for 'the irrational'. In epistemology, an obvious and undeniable contradiction or incoherence in a belief or a proposition, such as "the square is a circle". Absurdity is stronger than an error arising from a misapplication of a name to an object. The aim of a *reductio ad absurdum* argument is to reveal the absurdity of a proposition and by these means to show the truth of its negation. Absurdity is associated primarily with language and hence with human beings. Philosophical absurdities can arise from using terms belonging to one category as though they belonged to another category. Gilbert Ryle called

抽象物

[拉丁文 *abstractum* 的复数]抽象的实体或对象,它们不能被感觉到,而且没有时间空间的场所。因为我们不能指明它们,所以它们不是实指定义的对象。一般认为,抽象物不具有因果能力,不过,这个观点在当代认识论中是有争议的。抽象物是与“具体物”(拉丁文为 *concreta*, 单数 *concretum*) 相对照的。后者是构成可观察世界的东西。据广泛的看法,抽象物依赖于具体物。

“抽象物……是具体物的结合,而且它们是不能被直接观察到的,因为它们是包含广泛的整体。” - 赖兴巴赫:《科学哲学的兴起》,1951年,第263页。

抽象

[源自拉丁文 *abs* (离去) 和 *trahere* (牵引), 因此意为“抽离出”] 一种理智运作,挑出诸种事例中共同的东西,对其余无关性质略而不计,以此形成概念或观念(抽象观念)。这是一种获得共相和确立分类的过程。我们可以从这种理智活动中形成概念,然后以此建立包含概念结合的判断,并进而将判断联接成推论。在古代哲学中,关于抽象事物的本体论地位问题是一个恒久的问题。这也是亚里士多德批评柏拉图形式论时的一个核心论点。亚里士多德也认为抽象是指将形式与质料分离的理智分析。洛克把抽象当做这样的方法:把观念和其他存在分离,从而使观念反映属于同一种类的全部对象。对他而言,正是这种抽象能力才将人类和动物区别开。他的抽象观念理论受到巴克莱的批判。

“这就称之为抽象,由特殊事物而来的观念在此作用之下成为同种事物的一般反映;这些观念的名称是通名,适用于符合这些抽象观念的任何存在物。” - 洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第十一章,9节。

荒诞

[源自拉丁语: *absurdus*, 意指“走调”] 用作“非理性”的同义词。在认识论里,荒诞是指一种信仰或命题中显然不可否认的矛盾或无条理现象,譬如“矩形是圆形”之类的说法。荒诞在强度上大于对某个对象滥用名称所犯的错误。归谬法旨在揭示一个命题的荒诞,并且藉此表明否定这一命题的真。荒诞主要与语言,因而也与人类相关。哲学上的荒诞源自张冠李戴地乱用术语,也就是在使用属于此范畴的术语时好像它们属于彼范畴似的。G. 赖尔称这类荒诞为“范畴错误”。

such absurdities “category mistakes”.

For existentialism, there are two other uses of “absurdity”. The first concerns the meaninglessness of human existence which derives from its lack of ground or ultimate purpose. In the second use, absurdity transcends the limitations of the rational and requires our whole power of conviction and feeling to be embraced. As an equivalent of the transcendental, the absurd is profound and valuable. Absurdity in this latter sense is derived from existentialist criticism of the absolute claims of reason and displays the characteristic irrationalism of existentialism.

“This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.” --Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, (trans. O'Brien), 1955, p. 13.

Academic freedom

The free performance of academic activities, especially research and teaching, without externally imposed constraints. Academic freedom is a necessary condition for the pursuit of unknown truths and for passing them on by teaching. Academic freedom needs protection because the search for new ideas and knowledge is crucial for the development of any society. Historically, academic activities, especially regarding controversial and unpopular subjects, have always been interfered with by authorities and other forces, who characteristically claim that developing this kind of knowledge is harmful to society. Various original and creative scholars in each generation have therefore been suppressed and even prosecuted for the new ideas they have developed. But history has repeatedly proved that such interference is mistaken. Since nobody and no organisation can decide beforehand which knowledge is harmful, we have no reason to censor any scholarly performance on the grounds that it will produce harm. Academic freedom also requires justice in distributing research and teaching facilities, including job security for academics, research support, publication space and appropriate ways of evaluating teaching.

“The greatest external threats to academic freedom come from ideologies and governments; and most of all from governments in the service of ideologies.” Kenny, *The Ivory Tower*, 1984, p. 122.

Academy

The school that Plato founded around 385 BC, so named because it was located near a park with a gymnasium sacred to the hero Academus. The Academy was like a college in an ancient university, with all members sharing the same religious connections and the ideal of a common life. It was a progenitor of European educational institutions. The curriculum of the Academy is generally believed to have been similar to the scheme presented by Plato in the *Republic* for training rulers.

在存在主义看来,“荒诞”一词还有另外两种用法:一是指人生的无意义,因为人生缺乏根本的或终极的目的;二是指荒诞对理性局限的超越以及对整个信仰与情感力量的要求。作为超验事物的同等物,荒诞性事物也是深刻的和有价值的。荒诞的第二义来自存在主义对理性绝对主张的批判,因此表现出只有存在主义特色的非理性主义思想。

“人与其生活的背离、演员与其布景的背离,恰恰就是荒诞的感受。” 加缪:《西西弗斯神话》(奥布雷恩译),1955年,第13页。

学术自由

学术活动,特别是研究和教学的自由进行而没有从外面强加的约束。学术自由对于追求未知的真理和通过教学传递它们是一种必要条件。学术自由必须得到保护,因为新的观念和知识的研究对于任何社会的发展是至关重要的。历史地看,学术活动,尤其是涉及到有争议的和不为人所欢迎的课题的研究,总是受到权威和其他力量的干涉。他们的典型借口是,发展这种知识对于社会是有害的。因此,在每一代中,不同的原创性的和创造性的学者,因为提出了新思想而受到压制甚至被起诉。但历史一次又一次地证明,这种干涉是错误的。既然没有任何人和任何组织能够预先决定哪一种知识是有害的,那就没有任何理由从它将产生毒害的角度来审查任何学术活动。学术自由也要求在研究及教学设备分配中的公正,包括学术工作的安全感、研究支持、出版空间和评估教学的适当方法等。

“对于学术自由的最大的外在威胁来自于意识形态和政府,尤其是来自于为意识形态服务的政府。”——肯尼:《象牙之塔》,1984年,第122页。

学园

柏拉图在大约公元前385年建立的学校。它之所以得名,是因为它坐落于一个有着体育馆的公园的附近,而这个体育馆是献给英雄阿克德谟斯的。它像是在一座古代大学里的学院,所有的成员分享着共同的宗教联系和共同生活的观念。它是欧洲教育制度的一个先驱。学园的课程一般被认为是与柏拉图在《国家篇》中提出训练统治者的方案相似。

“学园”一词也用来指柏拉图和他的追随者

"Academy" is a term also used to refer to the philosophy of Plato and his followers. Historians differ regarding the history of the Academy. Some divide it into the Old Academy [Plato (427-347 BC), Speusippus (407-339 BC) and Xenocrates (396-314 B. C)] and the New Academy [Arcesilaus of Pitane (316-241) and Carneades (c. 214-129 BC)]. Some prefer to ascribe Arcesilaus to the Middle Academy, and Carneades to the New Academy. Others want to add a Fourth Academy [Philo of Larissa (160-80 BC)], and a Fifth Academy [Antiochus of Ascalo (130-68 BC)]. The general position of the Academy was to explain and defend Plato's doctrines. Plato's successors in the Old Academy were more interested in his "Unwritten Doctrines". The leaders of the Middle and New Academies were sceptics. Philo tried to reconcile their position with that of the Old Academy, and Antiochus is known for his eclecticism.

Aristotle studied with Plato in the Academy for 19 years and left only when Plato died in 347 BC. Much of our information about the Old Academy comes from his writings. The Academy should be distinguished from Middle Platonism and Neo-Platonism, although it was one of the main proponents of Neo-Platonism. Along with other pagan schools, the Academy was closed by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I in 529.

During the Renaissance, the intellectual circle led by Ficino in Florence was also called the Platonic Academy. Most of its activities involved commenting on Plato's works. From the eighteenth century, all societies organised for advanced learning, and subsequently all universities and colleges, have also been called academies.

"The Academy that Aristotle joined in 367 was distinguished from other Athenian schools by two interests: mathematics ... and dialectic, the Socratic examination of the assumptions of mathematicians and cosmologists." --Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, 1986, p. 153.

Accedie

[Latin; generally, but inadequately, translated as sloth; also spelled *accidie*] One of the "seven deadly sins", a spiritual attitude which rejects all the pleasures of life and turns away from what is good. In *accedie* the mind is stagnant and the flesh a burden. *Accedie* resembles apathy, but they are not the same. *Accedie* concerns the lack of feeling and has a negative sense, while apathy concerns mental states in which emotion is governed by reason and is regarded as a virtue.

"*Accedie* ... is sadness over a spiritual value that troubles the body's case." --Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia 2ae, 84, 4.

Acceptability

Philosophers of science disagree about what it means for

的哲学。关于学园的历史,不同的历史学家有不同的观点,有人把它划分为老学园[柏拉图(公元前427年—前347年),斯彪西波(公元前407年—前339年)和克塞诺格拉底(公元前396年—前314年)]和新学园[皮塔里的阿西塞劳(公元前316年—前241年)及卡尔尼德(公元前214年—前129年)]。有人则把阿西塞劳归之于中期学园,把卡尔尼德归之于新学园。其他人想要增加第四学园[拉雷莎的斐诺(公元前160年—前80年)],和第五学园[阿斯卡龙的安提贞(公元前130年—前68年)]。学园的一般立场在于解释和护卫柏拉图的学说。老学园的柏拉图的继承者对于他的“未著文字的学说”更感兴趣。中期学园和新学园的领袖都是怀疑论。斐诺力图使他们的观点与老学园一致,安提贞因他的折衷主义而著名。

亚里士多德在学园里追随柏拉图学习了19年,只是到了公元前347年柏拉图逝世他才离开。我们关于老学园的许多资料来自于他的著作。应当把学园与中期柏拉图主义和新柏拉图主义区分开来,虽然学园是新柏拉图主义的主要拥护者之一。与其他异教的学校一道,学园在公元529年为东罗马皇帝查士丁尼一世所关闭。

在文艺复兴时期,佛罗伦萨的费其诺领导的一个知识分子群体也称为柏拉图学园,其活动的大部分涉及到对于柏拉图的著作的注释。从18世纪以来,所有高层次的学术团体组织和后来的所有大学和学院也称为“学园(学院)”。

“亚里士多德在公元前367年加入的学园与雅典的其他学校相区分在于两个兴趣,一是数学(……),一是辩证法,即对于数学家和宇宙学家的假定所做的苏格拉底式的拷问。”——欧文:《逻辑、科学和辩证法》,1986年,第153页。

冷漠

[拉丁语,一般不恰当地译作怠惰,也写成 *accidie*] 它被列为“七大罪恶”之一,是一种拒斥生活的一切快乐,逃避善物的精神状态。在冷漠中,心灵是不动的,肉体是负担。冷漠与“不动情”相似,但并不相同,因为冷漠与感情的缺乏有关,有一种消极的意味,而不动情涉及的则是情感被理智支配的心理状态,并被当做一种德性。

“冷漠……是悲哀,它淹没精神价值,扰乱肉体快乐。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia 2ae, 84, 4。

可接受性

当我们说一个理论是可接受的时候,我们

a theory to be acceptable and about what determines degrees of acceptability. In this debate, the degree of acceptability is closely associated with issues concerning the degree of confirmation and the degree of probability. Some hold that to be acceptable a theory has to be proven. Others claim that a theory is acceptable if it is rendered probable by the available evidence. Others argue that the acceptability has nothing to do with reliability, but is simply related to the fact that a theory performs more successfully than its competitors when undergoing testing.

"If we mean by the degree of acceptability of a theory the degree to which is satisfactory from the point of view of empirical knowledge—that is, from the point of view of the aims of empirical science—then acceptability will have to become topologically equivalent to corroboration." — Popper, *Realism and the Aims of Science*, p. 243.

Accident

[from Latin: *accidens*, something which happens, related to the Greek: *sumbebekos*, from the verb *sumbainein*; to come together, to happen, and better translated coincident or concomitant] For Aristotle, a technical term which contrasts with essence and has three major meanings: (1) the permanent features of a thing which are inherent and inseparably bound up with it, but which do not constitute part of its essence. Aristotle sometimes called these features properties (Greek: *idia*); (2) the features which belong to the subject only for a time, with their addition or loss not affecting whether the subject remains the same thing. These correspond to the modern notion of accidental properties, which contrast with essential properties, the loss of which will change the identity of a thing; (3) the secondary categories (categories other than substance) which are accidents to substance. In another sense, they are essential, for example white is an accident to Socrates, but it is essentially a colour. Accidents of this sort are more properly called attributes or properties, although they still do not contribute to the identity of individual substances. They can only inhere in a substance and do not have independent existence.

Medieval philosophers distinguished accident *per se*, which as an attribute is itself an entity, from accident *per accidens*, which is a way of talking about something inessential to an object. Modern philosophy has tended to reject the distinction between substance and accident and has understood accident, in a manner similar to Aristotle's third sense, as an attribute, quality or property. Accordingly, Descartes claimed that there is no science except the accidental, Locke distinguished primary qualities from secondary qualities, and Berkeley claimed that substance itself is nothing but a set of accidents.

"Accident means that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor

的确切意思是什么？是什么决定了可接受性的程度？科学哲学家对此颇有争议。在这种争论中，可接受性程度与有关确证度和或然度的问题密切相关。有些人主张可接受意味着一个理论已被证明；有些人认为理论的可接受，仅当可得到的证据表明它多少是很有可能；其他人争辩说理论的可接受性与它的可靠性无关，而仅仅相关于这一事实，即当经受检验时，它比其竞争者表现得更为成功。

“如果我们用一个理论的可接受性程度来意指从经验知识的观点、亦即从经验科学目标的观点来看的满意程度，那么可接受性就必须在形态上等价于确认。”——波普：《实在论与科学的目的》，第243页。

偶性

源自拉丁语 *accidens*，“发生的事”，相应于希腊语 *sumbebekos*，来自动词 *sumbainein*，“聚合”或“发生”，译为“相合”或“相伴”更好！亚里士多德把偶性当成一个与本质相对应的专门术语使用，有三层主要的含义。（1）虽不成为事物的本质部分，却是该物固有的、不可分地连在一起的恒常特征。亚里士多德有时也用“特性”（希腊词：*idia*）一词来表达这层意思。（2）仅仅暂时性地属于主体，其增损并不影响主体保持同一的那些特征。相当于现今所说的“偶然特性”，与如果损失将会改变事物之同一性的“本质特性”相反。（3）第二位的范畴（即实体之外的范畴），是实体的偶性。在另一种意义上，它们也是本质性的，例如，白是苏格拉底的偶性，但在本质上是颜色。把这类偶性称为属性或特性更合适，虽然它们对特殊实体的同一依然无助。它们只能内居于实体，没有独立存在。

中世纪哲学家把“本来的”偶性和“生发的”偶性区别开来，认为前一种属性自身也是一类实在，后一类属性则只是谈论对于客体无关紧要的某种东西的方式。近代哲学则倾向于消除实体和偶性之间的区别，并在某种意义上视偶性为相同于亚里士多德的第三层含义，即属性、性质或特性。因此，笛卡尔指出，如无偶然事，便无科学，洛克区分出了第一性质与第二性质，巴克莱宣称，实体本身只是一系列偶性。

“偶性的意思是，它依附于某物并能被真实地说明，不过既非出于必然，也非经常发生。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，1025 a13—14。

usually.” —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1025a13-14.

Accidental property

A property which is not a defining or essential feature of a particular. The identity of a particular is not affected by the change or loss of its accidental properties. For instance, the colour of a wall or roof is an accidental property of a house. The relationship between an accidental property and the particular of which it is a property is external rather than internal. Accidental properties are contrasted to “essential properties”, the change or loss of which alters the identity of the particular. Traditionally, rationality has been taken to be an essential property of being a human being. When people mention a particular, it is its essential properties rather than its accidental properties which are crucial in determining the identity of that particular and the kind of thing that it is. Although the discussion of accidental and essential properties goes back to Aristotle, the revival of essentialism in the work of Kripke and Putnam has renewed interest in the distinction.

“P is an accidental property of members of class A, if ‘A’ is not defined in terms of ‘p’.” —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 479.

Achievement verbs

For Ryle, some verbs merely signify actions, such as reading or hunting. Ryle calls these task verbs. Other verbs do not merely signify actions, but also indicate that the actions are suitable or correct. Not only has some performance been gone through, but also something has been brought off by the agent in going through it. Verbs for these acts and operations, which have had certain positive results, are called achievement verbs by Ryle. A mark of an achievement verb such as “see” is that as soon as it is correct to say that a person sees something it is also correct to say that he has seen it. Such verbs are also called success verbs or success words. Correspondingly, there are failure verbs, such as lose or misspell. All perception verbs are achievement verbs since they involve an acquiring of knowledge about the physical world.

“There was another motive for desiderating a mistake-proof brand of observation, namely that it was half-realised that some observation words, such as ‘perceive’, ‘see’, ‘detect’, ‘hear’, and ‘observe’ (in its ‘final’ sense) are what I have called ‘achievement verbs’.” —Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 226.

Achilles and the tortoise

The most widely discussed of Zeno’s paradoxes, which were designed to show that the concept of motion is incoherent. Achilles, the Olympic champion in running, can never catch up with the slow-moving tortoise if the latter is given a head start. Achilles has to take some time to reach the place

偶然性质

此一性质不是一殊相的规定性、本质性特征。该殊相的同一性不受它的偶然性质变化或失去的影响,例如,墙壁或屋顶的颜色就是一房屋的偶然性质。偶然性质和具有此性质的殊相之间的关系是外在的而非内在的。偶然性质和“本质性质”不同,改变它或失去它会改变殊相的同一性。从传统上说,理性一直被当做人类的根本性质。当人们提到一殊相时,对于确定该殊相及它所属的那类事物的同一性至关重要的,是它的根本性质,而不是其偶然性质。虽然对偶然性质和根本性质的讨论可回溯到亚里士多德,在克里普克和普特南的著作中再度出现的本质主义使人们恢复了对此区分的兴趣。

“P 是类 A 元素的偶然性质,如果 ‘A’ 不是由 ‘P’ 来定义的话。” ——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949 年,第 479 页。

成就动词

赖尔认为,有些动词只是表示活动,例如“阅读”、“狩猎”。赖尔称它们为任务动词。其他的动词所表示的不仅是活动,而且是适宜或正确的活动。换句话说,它们不但意味着某项任务已被完成,而且意味着完成这一任务的主体已经做成了某件事。这些动词所表示的行为或操作已经产生某种结果,因此被赖尔称为“成就动词”。一个成就动词(例如“看”)的标志是,只要我们说一个人在看某物是正确的,那么说他已经看到了那物就也是正确的。这些动词也被称为“成功动词”或“成功语汇”。相应地,还有像“失去”或“拼写错误”这样的“失败动词”。所有的知觉动词都是成就动词,因为它们包含着对关于物理世界的知识的获得。

“希求得到一种无误观察的另一个动机在于,人们部分地认识到,某些观察语汇,诸如‘知觉’、‘看见’、‘觉察’、‘听见’和‘观察’(在其‘最终’涵义上)是我所说的‘成就动词’。” ——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949 年,第 226 页。

阿基里斯与乌龟

芝诺悖论中最广为讨论的一个。它旨在表明运动概念是不一致的。奥林匹克赛跑冠军阿基里斯永远追不上慢慢移动的乌龟,如果让后者先走一小段路的话。因为阿基里斯需要一些时间才能到达乌龟开始的地方,但当他达到那

where the tortoise started, but when he reaches that place, the tortoise will have moved to a further point. The same is true when Achilles reaches that further point, because the tortoise will again have moved on. This process will be repeated endlessly, and the gap, which may get smaller and smaller, will remain. So as long as the tortoise keeps moving forward, Achilles cannot possibly overtake it, yet the paradox arises because we know that faster runners do overtake slower ones. The difficult problem is to explain the concepts of space, time and motion in a way which shows what goes wrong in Zeno's reasoning. This paradox, which is closely connected with the dichotomy paradox, depends on the assumption that space and time are continuous and infinitely divisible. Our source for all of Zeno's paradoxes is Aristotle's account in *Physics*.

"Zeno's paradoxes of motion, such as his 'Achilles and the Tortoise', revealed grave and subtle difficulties in the notion of infinite divisibility." — Copi, *The Theory of Logical Types*, 1971, p. 2.

Acosmism

[from Greek: *a*, not; *cosmos*, world, order] Spinoza's identification of God and world has often been interpreted as an assertion of atheism, but Hegel interpreted Spinoza as claiming that God rather than the world really exists. He entitles this position "acosmism". This position does not mean that God and the world are two distinct entities, but Hegel believed that it left unsolved questions about the appearance of the world and of the philosophising subject.

"[T]he system of Spinoza was not Atheism but acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in true reality." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 50.

Acquaintance

The way in which a knowing subject is aware of an object by experiencing it directly and immediately. Acquaintance contrasts with description, where an object is known through an intermediary process of inference. There is controversy over what are the objects of acquaintance. Among the items proposed for this role are sense data, memories, and universals such as redness, roundness. The notion of acquaintance has been used to constrain what we can be said to experience. Russell calls the knowledge derived through acquaintance knowledge by acquaintance, which is the direct knowledge of things and is distinguished from knowledge by description, which reaches truth through inference.

"Acquaintance: an animal is said to be acquainted with an object when the object, or an image of it is part of the animal at the moment." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, IX, p. 15.

个地方时, 乌龟又往前移了一段; 同样, 当阿基利斯又向前移动, 乌龟也已经向前了, 这一过程不断继续。阿基利斯和乌龟间的距离会越来越短, 但总是存在。故只要乌龟在不断往前爬, 阿基利斯就不可能超越它。可是我们知道跑快者总是越过慢跑者, 故悖论产生了。难题在于解释时间、空间及运动概念, 说明芝诺的推论是错误的。这一悖论与二分法悖论紧密联系。其所依靠的设定是, 时间和空间都是连续的和无限可分的。我们关于芝诺悖论的所有资料来源皆出于亚里士多德在其《物理学》中的记载。

"芝诺的运动悖论, 如他的 '阿基利斯和乌龟', 揭示了无限可分性概念的极严重又细微的困难。" — 柯比: 《逻辑类型论》, 1971 年, 第 2 页。

无世界论

[源自希腊语: *a* (非) + *cosmos* (世界, 秩序)] 斯宾诺莎使上帝和世界同一的命题常常被解释为一种无神论的主张, 但黑格尔把斯宾诺莎的思想解释为以下论点: 真实存在的是上帝而不是世界。他把这种立场命名为 "无世界论"。这种立场并不意味着上帝和世界是两个不同的实体, 但是黑格尔认为, 它留下了关于世界的现象和使主体哲学化的现象这些未解决的问题。

"斯宾诺莎的体系不是无神论而是无世界论, 因为他把世界规定为没有真实实在性的现象。" — 黑格尔: 《小逻辑》, 50 节。

亲知

能知主体通过直接和当下地体验一对象而知之的方式。亲知与摹状相对, 在后一种情况下, 得知一对象是通过推论的中介过程。对于何为亲知对象的问题, 存在着争论。不同哲人所提出的可作为亲知对象的事物包括感觉材料、记忆以及像红、圆这样的共相。亲知这个概念被用来限制据说我们能够经验的东西。罗素把通过亲知而得到的知识称为亲知的知识。它是对于事物的直接知识, 不同于其真实性由推论而来的摹状的知识。

"亲知: 当一物体或物体的影像是—动物在某时刻的一个部分时, 可以说此动物亲知此物体。" — 罗素: 《罗素文集》, 第九卷, 第 13 页。

Acroama

[from Greek: *akousma*, a thing heard] For Kant, a basic principle, especially of philosophy. In contrast, an axiom is a basic principle of mathematics or science. This is a distinction between axioms and discursive principles or between mathematical and philosophical principles. An axiom requires the intuition of objects and thus considers the universal in the particular, while an acroama is discursive and considers the particular in the universal. All principles of pure understanding are acroama, for they are established by the analysis of language and a discursive process of proof. Kant drew this distinction to criticise the tendency in traditional metaphysics to apply mathematical principles to philosophy.

"I should therefore prefer to call the first kind acroamatic (discursive) proofs, since they may be conducted by the agency of words alone (the object in thought), rather than demonstrations which, as the term itself indicates, proceed in and through the intuition of the object." - Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A735/B763.

Act, see action

Act and omission

To act is to do something, while an omission is a failure to act in circumstances where one has the ability and opportunity to act. In euthanasia, one acts if one actively kills a patient, but this can be distinguished from omitting to act, where not acting allows a death which intervention could have prevented. In contrast to killing, an omission lets die or does not strive to keep alive. To send poisoned food to the starving is an act which kills them, while failing to aid them is an omission which lets them die. In these and other similar moral situations, objectionable acts are open to moral condemnation. What then is the moral status of apparently parallel omissions? Are they equally wrong or are they permissible? Are such omissions something that morally ought not to be allowed? This question gives rise to a complex debate regarding the moral significance of the distinction between act and omission. Consequentialism denies the importance of the distinction, while deontology holds on to it.

"It [the acts and omissions doctrine] holds that there is an important moral distinction between performing an act that has certain consequences—say, the death of a disabled child—and omitting to do something that has the same consequences." - Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 1993, p. 206.

Act token

Alvin Goldman has distinguished between act-tokens and act-types. An act-type is a kind of action, such as driving a car or writing a paper. An act-token is a particular act or action which is performed by a particular person in a par-

论理

[源自希腊语: *akousma*, 意为所听到的事情]康德赋予它以基本原理的意义, 特别作为哲学的基本原理, 相比之下, 公理是指数学或科学的基本原理。这是公理和辩论的原理之间的区别, 或数学原理与哲学原理之间的区别。公理要求诸对象的直观, 因而在特殊中考虑普遍, 而论理是论证的, 仅在普遍中考虑特殊。所有纯粹知性的原理都是论理, 因为它们都是通过对语言的分析 and 辩论的论证过程而建立的。康德作出这个区别来批评传统形而上学把数学原理用于哲学的倾向。

“因此我宁可把第一种知识 (按……即哲学) 称为论理的 (辩论的) 证明, 因为它们仅通过语言的媒介 (思维中的对象) 来进行, 而不把它称为推演证明, 因为这种证明顾名思义是通过对象的直观来进行, 并且就在它们之中来进行”。——康德:《纯粹理性批判》, A735/B763。

行为

见“活动”条。

行为与忽略

行为就是做某事, 而忽略则是在一定的环境下没有做某事, 虽然本来行为者有机会有能力做。在安乐死中, 一个人如果以某种行动杀死一个病人, 他是在行动, 但这要与忽略区别开来, 忽略则是一个本来能够干涉而却没有以行动去阻止这种死亡。与杀害相对照, 忽略是让他死或没有努力使他活。送有毒的食物给饥饿的人是杀他们的行动, 而没有帮助他们则是让他们去死的忽略。在这些和其他类似的道德情形中, 行为一般在道德上是可谴责的, 那么, 怎样看待相对应的忽略在道德上的地位? 它是同样错的, 还是可允许的? 忽略也是那种我们在道德上不应有的事情? 这个问题引起了关于两者相区分的道德意义的一个长久的争议。效果论否定它, 而义务论则坚持它。

“它 [行为和忽略的学说] 认为, 在履行某种产生一定后果 (如残疾儿童的死) 的行动和因忽略做某事而有同样的后果即不做某事之间, 有一重要的道德上的区分。”——辛格:《实用伦理学》, 1993年, 第206页。

行为单例

A. 哥尔德曼区分了行为单例与行为类型。行为类型指一种行为, 像“开车”、“写一篇论文”等等。一个行为单例是特定情境下一个特定的人所进行的特定的行为或活动。例如, “昨天

ticular circumstance. For instance, driving my Ford Escort yesterday afternoon or writing my paper about Aristotle's concept of substance. An act-type is an action property, while an act-token is an exemplification of such a type. An act-token is the performance of an act. If an act type is wrong, all act tokens that belong to it are wrong. There has been a debate about the identity conditions for actions. Generally, two act-tokens are thought to be identical if and only if they involve the same agent, the same property, and the same place and time.

"A particular act, then, consists in the exemplifying of an act-property, by an agent at a particular time. I shall call such particular acts 'act-tokens'." —Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, 1970, p. 12.

Act type, see act token

Act-consequentialism

Consequentialism is generally divided into act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism. Act-consequentialism holds that an action is right if it produces a better consequence than alternative actions available to the agent. Rule-consequentialism, on the other hand, claims that the rightness of an action depends not on its direct consequences but on whether it conforms to a set of rules which lead to better consequences than other alternative rules. Act-utilitarianism is the most typical and familiar form of act-consequentialism. But there are also other forms of act-consequentialism which hold that pleasure or happiness are not the only factors by which we assess the goodness of the consequences. Like act-utilitarianism, act-consequentialism is criticised for considering all things from an impersonal standpoint.

"Different act-consequentialist theories incorporate different conceptions of the overall good ... but all such theories share the same conception of the right which requires each agent in all cases to produce the best available outcome overall." —Scheffler, *The Rejection of Consequentialism*, 1994, p. 2.

Act-object theory

An analysis of sensation introduced by Moore and Russell in their sense-data theory, which suggests that sensation consists of sense-data (objects) and the act of sensing. Sense-data are entities which are distinct from the act of seeing. A sensation is a genuine relation between a subject and a really existent object. Objects exist independently of acts. Moore uses this distinction in criticising Berkeley's idealist thesis that *esse est percipi* by saying that it fails to distinguish between the object sense-datum and the act of consciousness

下午开着我的福特车"或"写一篇关于亚里士多德的实体概念的论文"。一个行为类型是一个活动性质,而一个行为单例则是这样一个类型的一个例示。一个行为单例是一个行为的实施。如果一个行为类型是错误的,那么所有属于它的行为单例都是错误的。关于行为同一性的条件一直存在争议。一般地说,只有当两个行为单例包含相同的主体、相同的性质和相同的地点和时间时,它们才被认为是同一的。

"一个特定的行为,包含着——一个主体在一个特定时间对一个行为性质的例示。我将称这样的特定行为为'行为单例'。" 哥尔德曼:《关于人类行为的一种理论》,1970年,第12页。

行为类型

见“行为单例”条。

行为效果论

效果论一般可分为行为效果论和规则效果论。行为效果论认为,一个行为相对于行为者可选择的其他行为而言,如果能够产生较好的后果,就是正当的。规则效果论则主张,一个行为的正当性不取决于它的直接后果,而是要看它与其相一致的那套规则与其他可选择的规则相比,是否是可导致较好后果的规则。行为功利主义是行为效果论最典型和熟知的形式。但行为效果论也有其他形式,它们认为,快乐或幸福不是我们评估后果的善的惟一因素。行为效果论也像行为功利主义一样,被批评为以一种非个人的立场来考虑一切事情。

"不同的行为效果论理论融合了有关整体善的不同的观念,……但所有这些理论在关于什么是正当的问题上有着共同的立场,即要求每个行为者在任何情况下产生最好的可能实现的结果。" ——谢弗:《拒斥效果论》,1994年,第2页。

行动—对象理论

摩尔和罗素在其感觉予料理论中提出的对于感觉的分析,认为感觉由感觉予料(对象)和感觉行动构成。感觉予料是与感觉行动有区别的东西。感觉是主体和实际存在的对象之间的真正关系。对象独立于行动存在。摩尔用这个区分来批判巴克莱的存在就是被感知的唯心主义论点,说这未能区分对象感觉予料和指向它的意识行动。“黄”是经验对象,“黄”的感觉是一种感知或经验。罗素认为,知觉和其他认知过程

which is directed upon it. "Yellow" is object of experience, and the sensation of "yellow" is a feeling or experience. Russell claims that perceiving and other cognitive processes are acts of attention, directed at some object. But under the influence of adverbial analysis, Russell later abandons this act object analysis. For Broad, *sensa* data cannot exist independent of the act of sensing, and he call them "*sensa*".

"The *sensum* theory... holds that this [sensation] is a complex, and that within it there can be distinguished two factors: X itself, which is the *sensum* and is an object, and a subjective factor, which is called the 'act of sensing'." -- Broad, *Scientific Thought*, 1969, p. 264.

Action

[from Latin: *agere*, to do] Some philosophers draw a distinction between acts and actions and suggest that while an act is the deed that is done, an action is the doing of it. But most believe that this distinction is hard to maintain and take an act as a synonym for an action.

Although there are actions in nature, such as the action of a river on its bank, an action is generally defined as what is intentionally done by a human rational agent. Natural action is described as a mere process, happening or occurrence. Action has been the focus of much discussion in recent philosophy of mind, especially concerning human intention and deliberation. Many theories have been developed to explain what it means to act intentionally and to show how to distinguish actions from other events involving persons. On one standard account, an action is an event by which an agent brings about changes through bodily movement. A rival mental action theory argues that not all actions involve bodily movement and identifies actions with primary mental events in the causal chain between the agent and behavioural events. According to the causal theory of action developed by Davidson, Searle and Goodman among others, actions are the effects of primary mental events. Other philosophers reject such primary mental events and deny that actions are events at all.

One bodily movement can bring about, directly and indirectly, many changes and the consequences of this for identifying and explaining actions are unclear. X moves his hand; by moving his hand, he turns the steering wheel; and by turning the steering wheel, he drives his car; and so on. Is there one action in this case or are there many? When should we distinguish an action from its consequences? Some philosophers suggest that we can deal with these problems by identifying basic actions which cause other actions but which are not themselves caused by actions. But there is much dispute regarding how to identify basic action.

Actions can be discussed in isolation, but they often occur in a pattern of activity either in a single life or involving

是注意行动,指向某种对象。但是,在词语分析的影响之下,罗素后来抛弃了这种行动-对象分析。对于布劳德而言,感觉予料不能独立于感觉行动存在,他将其称为“感觉材料”。

“感觉材料理论……主张,这[感觉]是个复合体,在其中可以区分出两种因素:X本身,它是感觉材料,是对象,以及主观因素,它被称为‘感觉行动’。”——布劳德:《科学思想》,1969年,第264页。

活动

[源自拉丁语动词 *agere* (去做)] 有的哲学家将行为与活动加以区分并提议行为是所做之事,而活动则是做本身。但大多数人认为这种区分很难成立,因而将行为视为活动的同义语。

尽管自然中也存在活动,像河流对河岸的活动,不过活动还是通常被定义为人类的理性主体有意去做的事。自然活动仅仅被描述为过程、事件或事变。活动已成为新近的心的哲学的许多讨论(尤其是关于人类意向与意愿的讨论)的焦点。人们提出了许多理论来说明有意地行为是什么意思以及如何区分活动和个人介入其中的其他事件。根据标准的描述,活动是主体通过身体运动而带来变化的事件。一个相反的活动理论辩称,并非所有的活动都包含身体运动,因而将活动等同于主体与行为事件之间因果链中的原初的心的事件。根据戴维森、塞尔和古德曼等人所提出的活动的因果理论,活动是原初的心的事件的效应。另外一些哲学家拒斥这样的原初的心的事件并否认活动是事件。

一个身体运动可以直接或间接地产生许多变化,而我们并不清楚这对于确定和解释活动的意义。X 移动他的手;通过移动他的手,他转动了汽车的方向盘;而通过转动方向盘,他又开动了汽车;如此等等。在这种情况下,是有一个活动还是有許多活动呢?在什么时候我们应当将一个活动和它的结果区分开来?有些哲学家提议,我们在处理这些问题时,可以确定那些导致其他活动却不由其他活动所导致的基本活动。但在如何确定基本活动的问题上存在很多争议。

活动可以被单独讨论,但它们经常发生于个体生活或有他人参与其中的一活动类型中。韦伯对于社会活动作了深入的探讨。

如果我们试图对活动作因果描述的话,活动是产生于理由、欲念还是二者都有?以另外的框架来解释或理解因果描述或与之相反的描述中的活动是否会更合适?我们也不清楚用一种

others. Social action was profoundly explored by Weber.

If we seek a causal account of action, are actions caused by reason, desire or both? Would another framework be more appropriate for explaining or understanding action either within a causal account or as a rival to it? It is unclear whether an explanation by reasons which is not a form of causal explanation is coherent. Answering such questions requires the analysis of many key notions, such as motivation, intention, voluntary and involuntary action, practical reason, wanting and desiring. The question of explaining action is closely associated with the problem of freewill and determinism and the problem of responsibility.

Another much debated problem in philosophy of law and moral philosophy is the relation between action and omission, inaction or negligence.

"The word 'action' does not very often occur in ordinary speech, and when it does it is usually reserved for fairly portentous occasions. I follow a useful philosophical practice in calling anything an agent does intentionally an action, including intentional omission." —Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 5.

Action (Aristotle)

[Greek: *praxis*, from the verb *prattein*: to do] Broadly, everything that an agent does intentionally, in contrast to speech and to being acted upon. Humans, including children, and some non-human animals are capable of this sort of action. More strictly, action is confined to carrying out rational choice, something which non-humans cannot do. It is doing what is or could be the outcome of deliberation on the part of the agent or for what the agent is held responsible. This sense, which is central to moral philosophy, is related to the problem of free will and responsibility. Only in this sense is action open to moral praise and blame. Aristotle also used *praxis* narrowly for rational action which is its own end, and which is not done merely for the sake of some further end. This sense contrasts with production (Greek: *poiesis*), which is for the sake of some end product. According to this contrast, ethical actions, unlike technical performances, are done and valued for their own sake. Philosophers also discuss the conceptual relations between these sorts of action and action in nature which does not involve intention, reason or purpose, such as the action of a river on its bank.

"[An unconditional goal is] what we achieve in action, since doing well in action is the goal." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b3-4.

Action at a distance

Action at a distance is contrasted to action by contact or local action. Whether one thing can act on another at a distance without postulating some kind of intervening medium as involved in the interaction has been a topic of debate in

不是因果解释形式的理由所做的解释是否一致。回答这样的问题需要分析许多关键的概念,像动机、意图、有意与无意行为、实践理性、意愿与欲念。对于活动的解释问题与自由意志和决定论问题及责任问题密切相关。

在法哲学和道德哲学中的另一个颇有争议的问题是活动和遗漏、不活动或疏忽之间的关系。

“‘活动’一词在日常言语中不常出现,而当它真的在日常言语中出现的时候,它通常被用于相当重大的场合。我遵循一种有效的哲学惯例,将主体有意所做的任何事情都称为活动,包括有意的疏忽在内。”——戴维森:《关于行为与事件的论文集》,1980年,第5页。

行为(亚里士多德)

[希腊词: *praxis*, 源于动词 *prattein*, “做”] 广义地讲,指动作者有意所做的任何事情,与之对应的是言说和被作用。人类(包括儿童)及人以外的其他动物都能有这种行为。较为严格地说,行为仅限于执行理性的选择,仅限于只有人才能做的事情。因为做乃是或应该是行为者深思熟虑的结果,或者要对所做之事负责任。这层含义是道德哲学的中心,也与自由意志和义务问题相关。仅仅是在这一层含义上,行为才易受道德赞美或谴责。亚里士多德也在更为狭窄的意义上使用 *praxis*, 意指以自身为目的,而不仅仅为了某种另外目的所进行的理性行为。这层含义对应于生产(希腊词: *poiesis*),即为了某种目的而生产。按照这种对应,伦理行为不同于技艺行为,它们是由于自身的缘故而进行并被评判的。哲学家们也讨论这些行为与自然中的行为的概念关系。自然中的行为不涉及意图、理性或目的,例如,河作用于河岸的行为。

“[无条件的目的就是]我们在行为中所实现的东西,因为良好的行为乃是目的。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1139b3—4。

间距作用

间距作用与触发作用或地点作用不同。一物能否作用于一段距离之外的另一物,而不以相互作用中存在介质为条件,是自古希腊以来在物理学和哲学中一直争论的话题。主要倾向

physics and philosophy since ancient Greece. The dominant tendency is to reject any such possibility. Atomism claims that atoms cannot interact without contact. Aristotle believes that every object in local motion must have a conjoined mover. This is also the main attitude in physics and philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Descartes, Newton, Locke and Leibniz all reduce actions at a distance to actions through a medium of some sort, yielding actions which are continuous, although there is no agreement about what the medium is. In contemporary field theory the question is still disputed. The problem of action at a distance is related to the question of whether causality is something more than correlation.

"The formula by which we determine what will happen in a given region will contain references to distant regions, and it may be said that this is all we can mean by 'action at a distance'." --Russell, *Analysis of Matter*, 1927, p. 327.

Active intellect

Aristotle claimed in *De Anima* III, 5 that, as with anything else, one can draw a distinction between form and matter and between actuality and potentiality within the soul. The formal and actual aspect of the soul is active intellect, and the material and potential aspect of the soul is passive intellect. Passive intellect amounts to ordinary apprehension which is receptive of the sensible and intelligible forms of objects. This kind of knowing is only potential. Passive intellect will perish at the death of an individual. Active intellect is the agent which brings the passive intellect's potential knowledge of objects to actuality. Active intellect is separable, unmixed and impassable. The distinction between active and passive intellect and the nature and function of active intellect are ambiguous in Aristotle's writings and gave rise to many debates among commentators in the later Hellenistic and medieval periods and in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship as well. Controversial questions include: Is the distinction between active and passive intellect realised only within the human soul, or does active intellect exist outside human beings? Is active reason identical with God as described in the *Metaphysics*? If active intellect is entirely independent of body, how can we reconcile it with Aristotle's standard view that soul is the form of body?

"Intellect in this sense of it is separable, impassable, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms)." -- Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 5, 430a17-9.

Active reason, another name for active intellect

是否定任何这样的可能性。原子论主张,没有接触,原子不能相互作用。亚里士多德认为,地点运动中的每一物必定有一相关的推动者。这也是17世纪和18世纪物理学和哲学中占主要地位的态度。笛卡尔、牛顿、洛克和莱布尼茨都把间距作用归结为通过某种中介,产生连续作用的作用,虽然他们对于这种中介是什么的问题并没有一致意见。在当代的场论中,这个问题仍然是有争论的。间距作用问题与因果性是否比关联性更强的问题有关系。

"我们据以决定在一已知区域会发生什么的公式将包括对远距离区域的指称,可以说,这正是我们谈论'间距作用'时所指的内容。"——罗素:《物的分析》,1927年,第327页。

主动理智

亚里士多德在《论灵魂》III, 5中认为,如同对其他事物一样,我们也可以在灵魂中划分形式和质料,以及潜能和现实。其形式的和现实的方面一般叫做主动理智,而其质料的和潜能的方面则叫被动理智。被动理智即是日常的理解;它接收对象的可感的和理智的形式。这类认知只是潜能的。被动理智随个人的死亡而消逝。主动理智是把由被动理智产生的关于对象的潜在知识转变为现实的原因。主动理智是可分离的、纯净的、不可摧毁的。主动理智和被动理智这一区分自身以及主动理智的性质和功能在亚里士多德著作中很模糊,所以在从晚期希腊到中世纪的注释家乃至当代亚里士多德学者中引起了许多争议。争论的问题包括:这一区分只是局限于人类灵魂中,还是主动理智也存在于人类之外?主动理智即是在《形而上学》中所描绘的神吗?如果主动理智完全独立于人体,我们如何将这一观点与亚里士多德关于灵魂是肉体的形式这一主要观点相调和?

"理智在这一意义上是可分离的、不可摧毁的和纯净的,因它在其本性上是主动活动(主动因素总是高于被动因素,原发性力量总是高于它赋予其形式的质料)。"——亚里士多德:《论灵魂》, III, 5, 430a17-19.

主动理性

"主动理智"的另一名称。

Actual idealism, see actualism

Actualisation, see actuality / actualisation

Actualism

Actualism has several senses. First, it is the actual idealism of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile. This theory claims that the pure act of spirit (that is the transcendent subject as opposed to the empirical subject) is the only real thing in the dialectical process. Such acts are acts of self-affirmation and constitute a synthesis of the self and the world.

Secondly, actualism (also called factualism) is the view, proposed by Plantinga, Stalnaker and Armstrong, that only the actual world exists. The world is wholly composed of actual entities, including concrete individuals and instantialised abstractions. All sorts of potentialities, tendencies, forces and unexampled essences are not admitted. This view contests those theories of possible worlds which accept the existence of possible worlds and their contents as well as the existence of the actual world.

Thirdly, actualism as a theory of choice claims that an agent should choose the best option that he or she *will actually* do, rather than the best option that he or she *can* do. This latter view is called possibilism.

"I assume the truth of what may be called actualism. According to this view, we should not postulate any particular except actual particulars, nor any properties and relations (universals) save actual, or categorical, properties and relations." — Armstrong, *What is a Law of Nature?*, 1983, pp. 8-9.

Actuality (Hegel)

[German: *Wirklichkeit*, from *wirken*, to be active, or effectual] In the preface to *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel claimed that "what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational". This has been criticised as a conservative doctrine which allows no attack on existing political systems and institutions, however tyrannical or perverse they might be. But this response is based on a mistaken understanding of Hegel's notion of actuality. Hegel employed the standard contrast between actuality and possibility or potentiality, but also contrasted actuality to mere existence or appearance, so that not everything existing is actual. In his *Logic*, actuality is the unity of existence and essence, of inward reality and outward reality. Something actual is fully developed according to the inner rationality of the species to which it belongs. For Hegel, everything has its own teleological necessity and can be said to be actual only when this necessity has been fully worked out. Hence, an infant, although it exists, is not actual with respect to the essence of human species.

现实唯心主义

见“现实主义”条。

实现

见“现实/实现”条。

现实主义

现实主义有几种意义。首先,它指意大利哲学家 G. 金蒂莱的“现实唯心主义”。这一理论认为,作为超验主体而非经验主体的纯精神活动乃是辩证过程中惟一真实的事物。这种活动是自我肯定的活动:它们构成了自我与世界的综合。

其次,现实主义(也叫“事实主义”)指为普兰汀格、斯托奈克、阿姆斯特朗等所主张的观点,即只有现实世界才存在。世界完全是由现实事物组成的,包括具体个体和个例化的抽象。各种可能性、趋向性、力以及不能例化的本质都不被承认。这种学说与那些除现实世界外,也认可可能世界及其内容的存在的可能世界理论相对立。

第三,现实主义也作为一种选择理论,认为一个行动者应选择他或她“确实”会做的最佳选择,而不是他或她“可能”会做的最佳选择。持后一种观点的叫“可能主义”。

“我确定那叫做现实主义的观点的真理性。根据这一理论,除了现实特殊外,我们不应设定其他任何特殊;除了现实的或实然的属性与联系外,也不应设定其他任何属性与联系(普遍)。”——阿姆斯特朗,《什么是自然法?》,1983年,第8-9页。

现实(黑格尔)

[德语词: *Wirklichkeit*, 来自动词 *wirken*, 活动, 生效] 在《法哲学》序言中,黑格尔提出,“凡是合乎理性的就是现实的,凡是现实的就是合乎理性的”。这一直被批评为保守的学说,不允许攻击现存的政治体制和制度,不管它们可能是多么残暴和邪恶。但是这种反应是基于对黑格尔现实概念的误解。黑格尔既应用了现实性和可能性或潜在性之间的标准对立,但也把现实与现存或现象相对立,因此并非一切现存的东西都是现实的。在他的《小逻辑》中,现实是现存与本质、内和外的统一。某种现实的事物是按照它所从属的种的内在合理性而充分发展的。对黑格尔来说,一切事物有它们自己的内在目的的必然性,只有当这种必然性已经充分展开,这些事物才能说是现实的。因此,一个婴儿,虽然是现存的,但对于人种的本质而言并非现实的。

“现实是本质与现存,或内和外所直接形成

"Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward."—Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 142.

Actuality / actualisation

[Greek: *energeia*, actuality, from *ergon*, function or action, etymologically associated with motion or activity; *entelecheia* (Greek), actualisation, from *enteles echein*, having an end within, etymologically associated with the completion of an action or a process] Aristotle used these two terms interchangeably and ignored their different etymologies. In many places, he contrasted *energeia* with motion (*kinesis*), saying that motion is an incomplete activity which aims at some end beyond itself, while *energeia* is a complete activity which is its own end. Both *energeia* and *entelecheia* are used in contrast to potentiality for the fulfilment or realisation of different kinds of potentiality. In Aristotle's discussion of substantial change, actuality or actualisation is identical with form, and sometimes even with the composite of matter and form, that which has been shaped out of the matter.

"The word 'actuality' which we connect with actualisation has in the main been extended from motion to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with motion."—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1047a30-32.

Actus reus, see *mens rea*

Ad hoc hypothesis

[Latin: *ad hoc*, for this, to this] Something that is *ad hoc* is only for the purpose at hand. A theory might be saved from a challenge that is inspired by contrary evidence if we introduce an additional hypothesis. Such an hypothesis, if it has no independent rationale but is used merely to preserve the theory, is called an *ad hoc* hypothesis. An *ad hoc* hypothesis is generally rejected by a satisfactory scientific explanation, for it is not testable independently of the effect to be explained, and hence does not have any theoretical power. In another sense, *ad hoc* also means an explanation introduced to account for some fact after that fact had been established.

"A satisfactory explanation is one which is not *ad hoc*."—Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, 1972, p. 203.

Additive fallacy, an alternative expression for the additivity assumption

Additivity assumption

Also called the additive fallacy. Utilitarianism argues that we can add individual utilities together to make up a total utility and that any action which results in a larger

的统一。”——黑格尔：《小逻辑》，142节。

现实/实现

「现实是对希腊词 *energeia* 的翻译，*energeia* 出自 *ergon* (功能或行为)，在字根意义上与运动或活动相联系。实现是对希腊词 *entelecheia* 的翻译。*entelecheia* 出自 *enteles echein* (有目的在其中)，在字根意义上它涉及到一个活动或一个过程的完成」亚里士多德交替使用这两个概念，无视它们在字根意义上的差别。他在许多地方把 *energeia* 与运动 (*kinesis*) 相对立，说运动是不完整的活动，因为它趋于一个超越其自身的目的，而 *energeia* 则是一个自身即是目的的活动。*energeia* 和 *entelecheia* 都用来作潜能的对立面，都是指不同种类的潜能的满足或实现。在亚里士多德对本体变化的讨论中，现实或实现等同于形式，有时等同于质料和形式的组合物，即已经赋形式予质料的事物。

“我们将之与‘实现’一词相连的‘现实’一词，在主要意义上已经从运动伸展到其他事物上；虽然现实在严格（字根）意义上被认为是等同于运动。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，1047a30—32。

犯罪行为

见“犯罪心态”条。

当下假设

[*ad hoc* 为一拉丁语，意思是“为这，关于这”] 说某事是“*ad hoc*”，意思是：仅仅是对于当下的目的而言。如果我们增加一个假设，一个理论可能因此而能从相反证据而引起的挑战中解救出来。这样一个假设，如果没有独立的理由，而仅仅是为了保存这个理论，就称为当下假定。一个当下假设一般为一种令人满意的科学解释所拒绝，因为对它的检验不能独立于所解释的东西，因此没有任何理论的力量。在另一种意义上，“*ad hoc*”也意味着在一种事实已经确立之后而引入一种解释来说明该事实。

“一个令人满意的解释即不是当下的假设。”——波普：《客观知识》，1972年，第203页。

累加谬误

“累加假定”的另一种表述。

累加假定

也称为“累加谬误”。功利主义相信，我们能够把个别的功利累加在一起而构成一个总的功利，任何导致较大量总功利的行为比那种导

amount of total utility is morally more acceptable than other actions which result in less total utility. Here a working hypothesis is assumed that individual utilities can be quantitatively measured, compared and combined into an overall outcome. This is the additivity assumption. It is not only central to utilitarianism, but is also active in many other moral theories, insofar as they appeal to notions such as “balancing”, “weighing” and “simple-complex”. Critics, however, maintain that individual utilities are always qualitatively different and incommensurable and therefore that it is impossible to compare and contrast them. Furthermore, even if an aggregation is possible, this would not be sufficient to establish the moral status of an action, for a larger amount of utility does not entail an equal or just distribution.

“The view that the moral status of an act is the sum of individual positive and negative contributions—the particular reasons for and against performing the act—is, as I suggested, a familiar and attractive one. Nonetheless, I believe that the additive assumption should be rejected.” — Kegan, “Additive Fallacy”, *Ethics* 99 (1988), p. 18.

Adequacy conditions on definitions of truth, see material adequacy

Adequate ideas

For Spinoza, adequate ideas are the ideas from the second grade of cognition, reason, and from the third grade of cognition, intuitive knowledge, in contrast to the ideas formed from the first grade of cognition, sense experience. Adequate ideas are wholly caused from within individual minds, either by seeing them to be self-evident or by deriving them from other ideas which are self-evident. Adequate ideas are co-extensive with true ideas, and bear all the internal marks of truth. In Leibniz, adequate ideas are those which are clearly and distinctly conceived.

“By adequate idea I understand an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the properties or internal marks of a true idea.” — Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, definition 4.

Adventitious ideas

[from Latin: *ad*, to — *venire*, to come] Descartes' term for those ideas which we get through senses and which are caused by things existing outside one's mind. Adventitious ideas contrast both to innate idea and to fictitious ideas. Innate ideas are not obtained by experience, but are carried by mind from birth. Fictional ideas are created by mind in imagination. Descartes argued that it is impossible for all ideas to be adventitious. In contrast, British empiricists claimed that all ideas can be reduced to adventitious ideas and specifically denied the existence of innate ideas. On their account, all universals result from the operation of mind on the basis of

致较少量总功利的行为在道德上更可接受。因此,便有了一种可行的假设,即个别的功利能够在量上被测定、被比较和结合进一种总的结果中。这就是累加假定。这不仅对功利主义是一个中心观念,而且在其他许多诉诸于“平衡”、“权重”、“简单—复杂”等概念的道德理论中起作用。不过,批评家认为,个别的功利在质上总是不同的,而且是不可通约的。因此不可能比较和对照它们。进一步说,即使一种聚集是可能的,这对于确立一个行为的道德地位也是不充分的。因为较大量的功利并不意味着一种平等的或公正的分配。

“一个行为的道德地位在于个别积极贡献和消极贡献的累加,这乃是赞成和反对从事这种活动的具体理由。这样一种观点,正如我所认为的,是一种人所熟悉的和有吸引力的观点。不过,我认为,累加假定应被拒绝。”——卡根,《累加谬误》,《伦理学》第99期(1988年),第18页。

真定义的充分性条件

见“实质充分性”条。

恰当的观念

在斯宾诺莎看来,与认识的第一等级即感觉经验所形成的观念不同,恰当的观念是从认识的第二等级(理性)和认识的第三等级(直觉知识)那里来的观念。恰当的观念全都发生在单个别的心灵中,或是由于观察到它们是自明的,或是从其他自明的观念中引出的。恰当的观念与真观念有共同的范围,它们带有真理的全部内在标记。在莱布尼茨哲学中,恰当的观念是那些被清楚明晰地构想的观念。

“我把恰当的观念理解为这样一种观念:单就它本身而不涉及对象来说,它具有真观念的一切性质和内在标志。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第二部分,定义4。

外来的观念

[源自拉丁文: *ad* (向) — *venire* (来)] 笛卡尔哲学术语,指那些我们通过感觉得到的,由在人们心灵之外而存在的事物而引起的观念。外来的观念相对于天生的观念和虚构的观念而言。天生的观念不是通过经验而获得的,而是心灵与生俱来的。虚构的观念是心灵通过想像而创造的。笛卡尔证明,一切观念不可能都是外来的。反之,英国经验论者主张一切观念都可归结为外来的观念,并且尤其否认天生观念的存在。他们的理由是,一切共相都是来自心灵在外来的观念的基础上所进行的操作。对外来的观念

adventitious ideas. The treatment of adventitious and innate ideas became one of the major divergences between rationalism and empiricism.

"I marvel indeed at the train of reasoning by which you try to prove that all our ideas are adventitious and none of them constructed by us, saying—because the mind has the power not only of perceiving these very adventitious ideas, but, besides this, of bringing together, dividing, reducing, enlarging, arranging, and everything similar to this." — Descartes, *Reply to Objection V*, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* (eds. Haldane and Ross), II, p. 211.

Adverbial materialism

A theory of mind which combines the adverbial analysis of sense-experience with materialism or physicalism, developed by the American philosopher J. W. Cornman. In the spirit of adverbial analysis, the theory claims that when people perceive something red in the appropriate conditions, they do not sense red sense-data, but rather they sense redly. It further takes this sensing event to be identical with a brain event. Every sensing event is reduced to a physical event. The theory is opposed to phenomenalism and is compatible with direct materialism. Critics suggest that this analysis leaves out the most central element of perception, the perceptual experience itself.

"This [theory of adverbial materialism] is the theory that each sensory experience consists in an objectless sensing event that is not only identical with but also nothing but some physical event, presumably a neuronal brain event." — James W. Cornman, *Perception, Common Sense, and Science*, p. 275.

Adverbial theory

An analysis of sensing which intends to convert the objects of sensation into sense experience characterised in an adverbial way. An adverb is introduced to describe the way a sensing activity is taking place; thus, "I sense a red colour patch" should be regarded as a statement of how I sense, that is "I sense redly". The purpose of this analysis is to deny that sense-data are independent entities; rather, it takes them as sense-contents which cannot exist independent of the act of sensing of them. Sense-data are considered as modes of awareness instead of internal objects of awareness. The starting-point of this theory is the idea that sensations cannot exist when not sensed. It eliminates mental objects by reducing all statements about sensations to statements about the way or mode in which a subject is sensing. The analysis influenced both Moore and Russell with regard to their act-object theory of sensation and was later advocated by C. J. Ducasse, Ayer and Chisholm. The analysis becomes difficult once a complex sensation is involved, such as "I sense a red colour patch to the left of a blue colour patch". It is also

和天生的观念的态度成为唯理论和经验论之间的一个主要分歧。

"我对你的推论过程确实惊叹不已,你以这种推论过程来企图证明:我们的一切观念都是外来的,没有任何观念是我们所构造的,我这样说是因为,心灵不仅有感知这些外来的观念的能力,而且除此之外,还有集合,划分,归类,扩大,排列和一切诸如此类的能力。"——笛卡尔:《对反驳五的答辩》,见《笛卡尔哲学著作》(霍尔戴恩和罗斯编) II,第211页。

副词唯物论

一种将对于感觉经验的副词分析与唯物论或物理主义结合起来的理论,由美国哲学家柯尔曼提出。根据副词分析的精神,这一理论声称,当人们在适当条件下知觉某种红色的东西时,他们并没有感觉到红色的感觉材料,而是以红色的方式感觉。这一理论还将这一感觉事件等同于一个大脑事件。每个感觉事件都被还原为物理事件。这一理论与现象论相对立而与直接唯物论相一致。批评者指出这一分析遗漏了知觉的最为核心的因素,即知觉经验本身。

"这一理论[副词唯物论]认为每一感觉经验都由一个不但等同于而且仅仅是某个物理事件的无对象的感觉事件所组成,这个物理事件一般推测为是一个神经大脑事件。"——柯尔曼:《知觉、常识与科学》,第275页。

状语理论

对感觉行动的一种分析,它意在把感觉对象转变为用状语方式表征的感觉经验。一个状语被引入,以描述正在发生的感觉活动的方式;这样,"我感觉到一块红色斑块"应被当做对我是如何感觉的陈述,即"我红色地感觉"。这种分析的目的在于要否定感觉材料是独立的东西,它宁可将其当做感觉内容,不能独立于对其感觉的行动而存在。感觉材料被认为是意识的方式,而不是意识的内在对象。该理论的出发点是这样的看法:当未被感觉时,感觉不可能存在。它消除了精神对象,把一切关于感觉的陈述还原为关于主体感觉时的方式或样态的陈述。这种分析影响了摩尔和罗素关于感觉的行动—对象理论,后来为C. J. 杜卡斯、艾耶尔和齐硕姆所提倡。此分析在涉及到复杂的感觉时有困难;比如"我感觉到一块红斑在一块兰斑的左面"。它也因为不能区分感觉经验和纯心理想像而受到挑战。

"如果状语理论是正确的,它告诉我们我是

challenged for its inability to distinguish sense experience from purely mental imaging.

"If the adverbial theory is right, it tells us how I am sensing and does not require for its truth that there be an object being sensed." — Jackson, *Perception*, 1977, p. 87.

Aesthetic attitude

A special attitude with which to approach art, nature and other objects. First, it differs from a practical attitude and has no concern with practical (sensual, intellectual or moral) utilities. An aesthetic attitude takes nature or a work of art "for its own sake". In this sense it is "disinterested", as Kant emphasised in his *Critique of Judgement*. Secondly, it does not involve personal desires, motives or feelings in dealing with an object. This freedom from desire or emotion is called "aesthetic distance" or "aesthetic detachment". Thirdly, in contrast to a cognitive or scientific attitude, it is indifferent to the real existence, the content or the meaning of a thing. It does not appreciate an object through bringing it under concepts. Instead it is a pure appreciation or contemplation of the perceptual qualities of an object as an object of sensation. It is claimed that in this way we can live in the work of art as an embodiment of our feeling. Schopenhauer and Heidegger ascribe a metaphysical importance to the aesthetic attitude by saying that it can reveal the essence of reality more profoundly than conceptualisation. The possible existence and role of a pure aesthetic attitude are topics of dispute.

"All appreciation of art — painting, architecture, music, dance, whatever the piece may be — requires a certain detachment, which has been variously called the 'attitude of contemplation', the 'aesthetic attitude', or the 'objectivity' of the beholder." — Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 1953, p. 318.

Aesthetic autonomy

The idea that art has its own sphere demarcated from other human activities and determines its own principles or rules. Art cannot be replaced by others activities without loss. Aesthetic experience should be explained by aesthetic terms or attributes, and art should be valued by itself alone. The idea is intended to protect art from being assimilated to scientific, religious or moral functions and to insist that art has a different domain from science and morality. The position demands that human beings should be liberated from various instrumental attitudes towards art and that the development of art should not be unjustifiably subjected to the service of extra-aesthetic concerns. In this century, aesthetic autonomy has gained popularity in the face of the danger of submerging the aesthetic attitude into the cognitive attitude.

"The only answer, in short, is in terms of aesthetic val-

如何感觉的,而不要求这一点是真的;存在一个被感觉的对象。" — 杰克逊:《知觉》,1977年,第87页。

审美态度

审视艺术、大自然与其他对象的一种特殊态度。首先,审美态度有别于实用态度,与实用的(感官享受的,理智的或道德的)功利性无涉。审美态度专注于大自然或艺术品本身而不旁牵它涉。在此意义上,审美态度诚如康德在《判断力批判》中所言,是“无利害性的”。其次,审美态度不包含个人在对待某一对象时的欲望、动机或感受。这种摆脱欲望或情绪的自由状态被称之为“审美距离”或“审美超脱”。再次,与认知态度或科学态度相比,审美态度漠视一事物物的现实存在、内容或意义,而且不是凭借该物的概念来欣赏这一对象。与此相对照,审美态度凝神观照或专注于对象作为感性对象的感性特征。据说通过这种观赏方式我们方可栖居在体现我们感受的艺术作品之中。叔本华与海德格尔赋予审美态度一种形而上学意义,认为这种态度能比概念化更为深刻地揭示现实的本质。目前,纯然的审美态度是否可能存在以及其自身的作用成了众说纷纭的话题。

“举凡对艺术——包括绘画、建筑、音乐、舞蹈或其他所有作品——的鉴赏,需要某种超然物表的心境,这种心境被分别称之为‘凝神观照的态度’,‘审美态度’或者‘观众的客观性’等等。” — 朗格:《情感与形式》,1953年版,第318页。

审美自律性

这种思想认为艺术有别于其他人类活动,它自成一体,确定自身的原理与法则。艺术若被其他活动取代就不可能没有损失。审美经验理应依据审美术语或审美属性予以阐释,艺术也应当凭借自身得以评价。审美自律性的思想旨在保护艺术,以免艺术被同化为科学、宗教或道德的职能,同时坚持艺术是一种不同于科学与道德伦理的领域。这一立场要求人类应当摆脱各种对待艺术的工具主义态度,同时还主张,艺术的发展不应屈从于任何不合理的要求,不应服务于那些超审美的目的。在本世纪,面对审美态度沉沦为认知态度的危险困境,审美自律性开始流行起来。

“总之,解决问题的惟一答案是依据我们所不能超越的审美价值而定。我们认定审美自律

ue beyond which we cannot go. We assume the autonomy of aesthetics and all we can do is to see where this assumption will lead to." -Saw, *Aesthetics*, 1972, p. 205.

Aesthetic detachment, see aesthetic attitude

Aesthetic distance, see aesthetic attitude

Aesthetic education

Education directed at developing a person's aesthetic capacities and experiences of art. Its purpose is to educate a person's feeling and to enhance the harmony between emotion and reason in order to elevate our character. Its function regarding one's soul is analogous to the function of physical education for one's body. As early as Plato's *Republic*, there is a detail discussion to show that education should have an aesthetic concern. An account of this education is most systematically developed in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*. There are contrasting views of what such an education should be, according to different theories of art.

"Aesthetic education is possible only if it involves criticism; art edifices only when its mirror images are not merely produced or consumed, but when they are critically grasped and appropriated." Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 1992, p. 163.

Aesthetic imagination

The imagination which plays a role in the production and appreciation of artworks. Aesthetic imagination explores the possibilities suggested by the connection of aesthetic experience. It accompanies indispensably our interactions with art. While scientific imagination is bound by agreement with reality and is in the service of theoretical work, aesthetic imagination is free and operates in the service of aesthetic feeling. Its purpose is the satisfaction of the feeling which inspires it. It broadens our understanding, gives rise to emotional identification with the object, and enable us to experience a wider range of feelings than we can experience in actual life. For Kant, aesthetic experience involves a free play of the imagination and the understanding.

"Aesthetic imagination can perceive the ennobling beauty and truth of past art produced in more harmonious times." -Shusterman, *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, 1992, p. 153.

Aesthetic judgement

The ascription of an aesthetic property or value to an object, as distinguished from cognitive or logical judgement which gives us knowledge. The determining ground for such an ascription has been hotly disputed. For objectivism, an aesthetic judgement attributes an objective property to a

性的假设, 我们所能做的事情就是看看这种假设究竟会产生什么结果。”——索尔:《美学》, 1972年, 第205页。

审美超脱

见“审美态度”条。

审美距离

见“审美态度”条。

审美教育

旨在培养个人的审美能力与艺术体验的教育, 它旨在通过陶冶性情和提高情感与理性和谐的方式来提升我们的品格。美育的职能在于塑造人的心灵, 犹如体育的职能在于增强人的体魄。早在柏拉图的《国家篇》里, 就对教育应当关注审美的问题有过详细的论述。席勒在《美育书简》中对审美教育有过相当系统的论述。根据不同的艺术理论, 存在不同的审美教育观念。

“审美教育惟有包括批评才是可能的; 就是说, 只有当审美教育的典型形象不仅得到生产或消费, 而且得到批评式的把握与挪用时, 艺术大厦才是可能的。”——舒斯特尔曼:《实用主义美学》, 1992年, 第163页。

审美想像

这种想像在艺术品的创作与鉴赏活动中发挥着作用。审美想像探讨由审美经验的关联所提供的各种可能性。审美想像必然伴随着我们与艺术的互动作用。比较说来, 科学想像局限于对实在的认同, 并且服务于理论性工作, 而审美想像则是自由自在的, 是服务于审美情感的, 旨在满足激发这种想像的情感。审美想像能够拓宽我们的理解, 能够引发情与物的契合, 能够使我们体验到比我们在实际生活中所能体验到的更为广泛的情感。在康德看来, 审美经验包括想像力与知性的自由发挥。

“审美想像能够感受到那些创作于和谐时代的以往艺术所包含的高尚美与真理性。”——舒斯特尔曼:《实用主义美学》, 1992年, 第153页。

审美判断

审美判断将一种审美特性或审美价值归于某一对象, 因此有别于给予我们知识的认知判断或逻辑判断。审美判断的决定性根据一直引起人们热烈的争论。在客观论看来, 审美判断赋予被判断事物一种客观性, 因此在本质上不掺

thing judged and does not essentially involve the feelings of the person who is judging. It is hence a universal judgement. For subjectivism, the feelings, such as liking or disliking, of the person who judges are the decisive ground, and hence aesthetic judgement is not universal. The most influential frameworks of analysis of aesthetic judgements were developed by Hume and Kant. According to Hume, although aesthetic properties are not inherent in things, aesthetic judgements are not merely an expression of personal pleasure or displeasure. Like judgements of colour, they are determined by contingent causal relations between object and subject, although their ultimate ground is the sensibility of human beings. Kant claims that aesthetic judgements do not depend on a set of formulated rules or principles. Unlike objective knowledge claims, they rest on subjective response and personal acquaintance. He suggests that in a broad sense aesthetic judgements include empirical aesthetic judgements and "judgements of taste". An empirical aesthetic judgement judges the agreeable or the pleasant and concerns that which simply gratifies desire. A judgement of taste is an aesthetic judgement in its narrow sense. It is the judgement of beauty and is "disinterested", in the sense that it is independent of all personal desires and motivations. Hence, a person making such a judgement expects other people to have similar responses under the same circumstance. Hence, judgements of taste have a type of subjective validity or universality.

"Aesthetic judgements, just like theoretical (i.e. logical) ones, can be divided into empirical and pure. Aesthetic judgements are empirical if they assert that an object or a way of presenting it is agreeable or disagreeable; they are pure if they asserts that it is beautiful. Empirical aesthetic judgements are judgements of science (material aesthetic judgements); only pure aesthetic judgements (since they are formal) are properly judgements of taste." — Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Part 1, division 1, book 1, sect. 14.

Aesthetic pleasure

Distinguished from both sensual pleasure and intellectual pleasure, aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic enjoyment is the emotional element in our response to works of art and natural beauty. It can vary from pleasure in its mildest form to rapturous enthusiasm. To characterise the peculiar nature of aesthetic pleasure has been a challenging job for aestheticians. Since Kant, many theorists have accepted that aesthetic pleasure is a result of a disinterested and non-conceptual engagement with an object. But it is a point of dispute whether this pleasure arises from apprehending the formal character of the object, its content, or both. It is also unclear how much subjective elements contribute to this process. Other major issues concern the relation between aesthetic pleasure and the aesthetic attitude and the distinction, if there is one, between aesthetic pleasure in response to nature and to art.

杂判断者的感受。所以,这样的判断是普遍性的判断。但在主观论看来,判断者的感受,譬如好恶之类,是决定性的基础,因此审美判断并非普遍性的判断。休谟与康德对审美判断所作的分析是最有影响的理论框架。据休谟所言,审美特性尽管不是事物中固有的东西,但审美判断也不仅仅是个人之快感或不快的表现。譬如对色彩的判断,就取决于主客体之间的偶然因果关系,尽管其终极依据是人类的敏感性。康德则声称,审美判断并不依赖于一套程式化的法则或原理,与客观认识的要求不同,审美判断有赖于主体的反应与个人的了解。康德认为,审美判断在广义上包括经验性的审美判断与“鉴赏力判断”。经验性的审美判断是对惬意事物或愉快事物的判断,关涉到反对欲望的满足程度。而鉴赏力判断在狭义上则是一种审美判断,是对美的判断,是“无利害感的”,因此与个人的欲望和动机无关。所以,从事这种判断的人期望他人在同样情况下做出相同的反应。由此可见,鉴赏力判断具有一种主观的有效性或普遍性。

“审美判断,诚如理论(即逻辑)判断一样,可以分为经验与纯粹两种类型。审美判断如果断言一个对象或其表现方式是否惬意,那就是经验型的;如果断言它是美的,那么它们就是纯粹型的。经验型审美判断是对科学的判断(即物质的审美判断);只有纯粹的审美判断(因为是形式上的)才是确确实实的鉴赏力判断。”——康德:《判断力批判》,第一篇,第一部分,上册,第14节。

审美愉悦

与感性愉悦和理性愉悦不同,审美愉悦或审美享受是我们在对艺术品和自然美所做出的反应中的情感因素。从最为温和的愉悦到欣喜若狂有着程度上的差异。对美学来讲,阐述审美愉悦的特定本质向来是一道难题。自康德以来,许多理论家承认审美愉悦是以无利害的和非概念的方式观赏某一对象的结果。然而,审美愉悦是源自对这一对象客体形式特征的理解还是对其内容的理解或者是兼有两者,这些便成了该问题的争论要点。在此过程中主体因素到底起多大作用的问题也不清楚。另外,还有其他一些疑问,一方面涉及到审美愉悦与审美态度之间的关系,另一方面涉及到欣赏自然与艺术时审美愉悦之间的差别。

“审美愉悦是在想要继续或重复这种体验

"Aesthetic pleasure is manifested in a desire to continue or repeat the experience." —Sheppard, *Aesthetics*, 1987, p. 64.

Aesthetic property

A quality that contributes to determining the aesthetic value of an artwork. Such properties can be subject either to positive evaluation, such as being beautiful, charming, elegant, sublime, balanced, graceful or majestic, or to negative evaluation, such as being ugly, boring, clumsy, garish or lifeless. There can, of course, be beautiful depictions of ugly objects or lifeless depictions of beautiful ones. Some aesthetic qualities, such as being sad or joyful, can be non-evaluative. It is widely agreed that we require a special sensitivity, "taste", to perceive them. Aesthetic properties are the ultimate sources of "aesthetic value", and contribute to determining the nature of artworks. Positively aesthetic properties make artefacts into works of art and figure in a subject's account of why an artwork pleases him. Some philosophers argue that as emergent properties aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties, but others insist that aesthetic properties must be seen as entirely independent of nonaesthetic properties.

"I imaged explaining my emotional response to the painting by pointing out some of its aesthetic properties; the colours, although pastel, are warm rather than faded, the faces of the saints 'sweet and gentle'." —Mothersill, *Beauty Restored*, 1984, p. 410.

Aesthetic value

The properties rendering a work of art good or successful, such as balance, charm, elegance, grace, harmony, integrity or unity. Aesthetic value is whatever contributes to the "beauty" of a piece of art, in contrast to that which contributes to its usefulness, truth or moral goodness. "Beauty" is the supreme name for aesthetic value, and "ugliness" is the supreme name for aesthetic disvalue. The history of aesthetics has been characterised by disputes whether aesthetic value is waiting to be discovered objectively in the objects, independent of the responses of observers, or exists subjectively in the experiences of human agents, or lies in the connection between the object and the feelings of its observers.

"Instead of saying that an aesthetic object is 'good', they [philosophers] would say that it has aesthetic value. And correspondingly, instead of saying that one object is better than another, but not because it has a higher cognitive or moral value, they would say that it has a higher aesthetic value, or is aesthetically more valuable." —Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 1981, p. 501.

Aestheticism

The position that art should be valued only according to

的欲望中显现出来的。”——舍帕德：《美学》，1987年，第64页。

审美特性

这种特性的作用在于决定一件艺术品的审美价值。审美特性抑或受到正面的评价，诸如美丽，漂亮，飘逸，均衡，优雅或宏伟等等，抑或受到反面的评价，诸如丑陋，乏味，笨拙，俗气或单调等等。当然，可能存在对丑陋对象的优美描写或者对优美对象的单调描写。有些审美特性，譬如悲欢等等，是无法估价的。人们普遍认为，需要一种特殊的敏感性或“鉴赏力”来感知那些审美特性。审美特性乃是“审美价值”的根源，其效用在于确定艺术品的本质。积极的审美特性使人工制品成为艺术作品，并且包含着主体对艺术作品为何使人感到愉悦的原因说明。有些哲学家争辩说，审美特性作为突然出现的特性总是伴随着非审美特性；但是，另有一些哲学家则坚持认为，审美特性务必视为完全独立于非审美特性的东西。

“我试想通过指出一幅绘画的某些审美特性来解释自己对此画的情感反应；各种色彩，尽管是轻淡的，但是暖洋洋的而非褪色的，圣徒的面部表情是‘柔和恬静的’。”——莫塞西尔：《修复之美》，1984年，第410页。

审美价值

审美价值是指那些使艺术作品取得成功的特性，诸如均衡，魅力，飘逸，优雅，和谐，完整或统一等等。审美价值有助于增加一件艺术作品的“美”，而非其实用性、真理性或道德意义上的善。“美”是审美价值的最高名称，而“丑”则是无审美价值的最高名称。审美价值是在对象中静候人们客观地发现，不依赖观者的反应呢？还是主观地存在于人类的经验中，或者存在于对象与观者感受之间的联系中呢？所有这些问题在美学史上一直争论不休。

“他们（哲学家们）不是说某件审美对象是‘善的’，而是说该对象具有审美价值。相应地，他们不是说这个对象胜过另一对象，而是说这一对象具有更高的审美价值，或者在审美意义上更有价值，但不是由于它具有更高的认识或道德价值。”——比尔斯利：《美学》，1981年，第501页。

唯美主义

这种论点认为艺术只能根据诸如美、和谐、

its intrinsic aesthetic properties, such as beauty, harmony, unity, grace or elegance. It maintains the supreme value of art over everything else. A work of art is nothing more than a work of art and should not be viewed as a means to further ends. Its internal aesthetic value is supreme. Pure beauty has nothing to do with utility. The pursuit of such beauty is the supreme source of human happiness and should not be constrained by moral or other considerations. In its extreme form, aestheticism claims that any art that has external functions or purposes is ugly. The slogan of aestheticism is "art for art's sake" (French: *L'art pour l'art*). An art critic should not be concerned with art for the sake of citizenship, patriotism or anything else. Aestheticism is rooted in Kantian aesthetic formalism and flourished in the nineteenth century, first in French literature, represented by Flaubert, and then in English literature, represented by Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde. Aestheticism opposes society's interference with artistic creation. For artworks characterised by adventurousness are always subject to criticism based on customs and established modes of thought and feeling. But it is problematic whether an artwork can be completely isolated from its environment and social consequences. The opposite view, which can be called "instrumentalism", proposes that art should serve the needs of the people and the community.

"[Aestheticism] is the view that aesthetic objects are not subject to moral judgements, that only aesthetic categories can be, or ought to be, applied to them." Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 1981, p. 561.

Aesthetics

Although many problems discussed in contemporary aesthetics as a branch of philosophy can be traced to Plato's dialogues (especially *Ion*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic* and *Philebus*) and Aristotle's *Poetics*, aesthetics did not become an independent discipline until the eighteenth century. The term was coined by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten in his *Reflections on Poetry* (1735), based on the Greek word *aisthesis* (sensation, perception). Baumgarten defines it as "the science of sensitive knowing" which studies both art and sensible knowledge. Kant inherited these two senses. The first part of *Critique of Pure Reason*, the "Transcendental Aesthetic", deals with *a priori* sensible form; the first part of *Critique of Judgement*, called "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement", is a critique of taste, concerning the judgement of beauty and the sublime and the "autonomy of taste".

Nowadays the word "aesthetics" is confined to the study of experience arising from the appreciation of artworks and covers topics such as the character of aesthetic attitude, aesthetic emotions and aesthetic value; the logical status of aesthetic judgements; the nature of beauty and its allied notions; and the relation between moral education and works of

art. Aesthetics is the study of the intrinsic aesthetic properties of art, such as beauty, harmony, unity, grace or elegance. It maintains the supreme value of art over everything else. A work of art is nothing more than a work of art and should not be viewed as a means to further ends. Its internal aesthetic value is supreme. Pure beauty has nothing to do with utility. The pursuit of such beauty is the supreme source of human happiness and should not be constrained by moral or other considerations. In its extreme form, aestheticism claims that any art that has external functions or purposes is ugly. The slogan of aestheticism is "art for art's sake" (French: *L'art pour l'art*). An art critic should not be concerned with art for the sake of citizenship, patriotism or anything else. Aestheticism is rooted in Kantian aesthetic formalism and flourished in the nineteenth century, first in French literature, represented by Flaubert, and then in English literature, represented by Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde. Aestheticism opposes society's interference with artistic creation. For artworks characterised by adventurousness are always subject to criticism based on customs and established modes of thought and feeling. But it is problematic whether an artwork can be completely isolated from its environment and social consequences. The opposite view, which can be called "instrumentalism", proposes that art should serve the needs of the people and the community.

"[唯美主义]认为,审美对象不受道德判断的影响,只有审美范畴才会或者才应当应用于道德判断。"——比尔斯利:《美学》,1981年,第561页。

美学

当代美学作为哲学的一个分支,其中所探讨的许多问题尽管可以上溯到柏拉图的对话集(尤其是《伊翁》,《会饮篇》,《费得罗篇》,《国家篇》和《费利布篇》)与亚里士多德的《诗学》,但是美学直到18世纪才成为一门独立的学科。美学这一术语是德国哲学家A. 鲍姆加登在他所著的《对诗的反思》(1735)一书中提出来的,其词源自希腊语的 *aisthesis* (意指“感性”,“感知”)。鲍姆加登将美学界定为“感性知识的科学”,其研究的对象是艺术与感性知识。康德继承了这两种含义。《纯粹理性批判》的开篇,讨论的是研究先验感性形式的“先验美学”;《判断力批判》的开篇,讨论的是“审美判断力批判”,也就是鉴赏力批判,关涉到对美与崇高的判断以及“鉴赏力的自律性”。

如今,“美学”一词限于研究来自艺术品鉴赏活动的经验,所讨论的话题包括审美态度、审美情感与审美价值的特质;审美判断的逻辑地位;美的本质及其相关的思想观点;道德教育与艺术作品之间的关系等等。另外,美学也涉及那些“艺术哲学”所探讨的问题,譬如艺术的本质与感知,艺术作品的解释与评价等等。艺术哲学

art. It also encompasses problems dealt with by the “philosophy of art” such as the nature of art and the perception, interpretation and evaluation of artworks. Philosophy of art is thus a part of aesthetics. The development of aesthetics in the twentieth century has been deeply influenced by developments in the philosophy of mind, theories of meaning and hermeneutics.

“The Germans are the only people who currently make use of the word ‘aesthetic’ in order to signify what others call the critique of taste. This usage originated in the abortive attempt made by Baumgarten, that admirable analytical thinker, to bring the critical treatment of the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science.” —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A21/B35.

Aeterni Patris, see neo-scholasticism

Aether

A rarified element believed to fill the heavens. Anaxagoras considered aether to be derived from *aithein* (Greek: to ignite, to blaze) and identified it with fire. Some other pre-socratic philosophers considered aether to be derived from *aei thein* (Greek: runs always), and took it to be a divine element, different from other basic elements. Aristotle developed their idea by arguing that aether is a fifth element in addition to the usual four elements: fire, air, earth and water. He divided the cosmos into two levels. While the lower world, which is within the sphere of the moon, is composed out of the four elements, the upper world, from the moon upwards to the first heaven, is composed of aether. Aether has no property in common with the four simple elements in the lower world and cannot be transformed into them, and the four elements cannot go up to the outer region. Aether as a divine body has no movement except uniform circular motion and is indestructible. This cosmology became the foundation of the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. Seventeenth-century science postulated aether as the medium of interactions in the heavens. Nineteenth-century science postulated aether as the medium of transmission in the wave theory of light. This term is also retained in contemporary quantum field theory.

“They [natural philosophers], believing that the primary body was something different from earth and fire and air and water, gave the name aether to the uppermost region, choosing its title from the fact that it ‘runs always’ and eternally.” —Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 270b21-4.

Affirmative method

[From Latin: *via affirmativa* or *via positiva*] a Christian theological method for obtaining knowledge of God, in contrast to negative method (*via negativa*). The affirmative

因此是美学的组成部分。在 20 世纪，美学的发展深受心的哲学、意义理论和解释学之发展的影响。

“目前，只有德国人使用‘美学’一词来表示其他人所谓的鉴赏力批判。这种用法源自鲍姆加登那一天折了的企图，即：这位令人佩服的分析思想家，企图把对美的批判研究置于理性的原则之下，以便使其法则上升到科学的地位。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A21/B35。

永恒之父

见“新经院学派”条。

以太

一种被认为是充满宇宙的精微元素。阿那克萨戈拉认为以太得自希腊文中的 *aithein* (希腊文：点燃，燃烧)，故将之等同于火。而其他前苏格拉底哲学家则认为以太得自 *aei thein* (希腊文：总是在流动)，并把它看作是一个不同于其他基本元素的神圣元素。亚里士多德发展了他们的思想，认为以太是在传统的四元素(火，气，土，水)之外的第五元素。他把宇宙分成二个等级。处于月亮层以内的低等世界是由传统四元素组成的；而从月亮层往上直至第一重天的上部世界则是由以太组成的。以太与下部世界的四种元素没有共同性质，所以不能与它们转换。而四元素也不能上达到上部世界。以太作为一种神圣物体除了单一的圆周运动之外无别的运动，而且是不可摧毁的。这一宇宙论成为托勒密天体系统的基础。17 世纪的科学设定以太为天体相互作用的媒介。19 世纪的科学在光波理论中把以太设定为是传播媒介。这一观念也保存在本世纪的量子场论中。

“他们[自然哲学家们]相信第一物体是不同于土火气水的东西，所以把以太这一名称给了最上部的地区。选择这一名称是基于它‘始终’并永恒地‘在流动’这一事实。”——亚里士多德：《论天》，270b21-24。

肯定方法

[源自拉丁语：*via affirmativa* 或 *via positiva*] 基督教神学获得上帝知识的方法之一，与此相对的是否定方法(*via negativa*)。肯定方法

method rejects the claim of the *via negativa* that God cannot be apprehended by human concepts and discourse. On the basis of the doctrine that man is made in the image of God, it claims that the highest human qualities are pointers and signs of the perfection of God. We can, therefore, deduce divine attributes through analogy to these qualities. The basic procedure is to start with the highest human categories and to proceed through intermediate terms to particular divine titles. In this way we can indicate how human terms such as goodness, wisdom and power are applicable to God in a manner which transcends our experience. Because knowledge obtained in this way is pre-eminent, the *via positiva* is also called the *via eminentiae*. Some Theologians, such as Aquinas, claim that the *via negativa* cannot be used in isolation, but is a necessary preliminary step to the *via positiva*. There are difficulties in applying a method of analogy like the affirmative method beyond the possibility of our experience.

"The affirmative method means ascribing to God the perfections found in creatures, that is, the perfections which are compatible with the spiritual nature of God, though not existing in Him in the same manner as they exist in creatures." Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, II, 1950, p. 94.

Affirming mode, another term for *modus ponens*

Affirming the consequent

A logical fallacy of the form "If p then q; q; therefore p", that is the categorical premise affirms the consequent of the conditional premise, while the conclusion affirms its antecedent. For instance, "if he is sick, he does not come to work; he does not come to work; therefore he is sick". This is invalid because in the conditional premise the truth of the consequent does not entail the truth of the antecedent. The correct form should infer from the antecedent of a true implication to its consequent; that is it should be of the form "If p then q; p; therefore q". This was called *modus ponens* by the medieval logicians and is also called the affirming mood.

" $P \supset Q$, Q, therefore P' bears a superficial resemblance to the valid argument form *modus ponens* and was labelled the fallacy of affirming the consequent." — Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, p. 296.

Afterlife, see disembodiment

Agape

[Greek; love; its Latin translation: *carita*; hence charity] In contrast to other terms for love, such as *eros* and *philia*, *agape* is used for Christian love and is one of the primary

否认否定方法关于上帝不能被我们人的概念和论说所理解的主张。以人成为上帝的影像为依据,这种方法相信,最高等级的人之品性是上帝完满性的指征和标记。所以,我们能推演出与这些品性类似的神性。基本的程序是,先从最高的人类范畴开始,然后经由中介性语词,进到特殊的神圣名目。依靠这种方法,我们就能指出诸如善、智、力等人类语词如何以一种超然于我们经验的方式适用于上帝。因为以这种方式获得的知识是卓越的,所以,肯定方法也被称作 *via eminentiae*。有些神学家(譬如阿奎那)宣称,否定方法不能被单独地使用,但它是到达肯定方法必不可少的预备步骤。把类似肯定方法这样的方法用于我们可能的经验之外,有些困难。

“肯定方法意欲把在创造物中发现的完满性,即与上帝的神圣本性适合的那些完满性归于上帝,虽然它们在上帝那里和在创造物中的存在方式并不相同。”——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》,I, 1950年,第94页。

肯定式

“肯定前件式”的另一术语。

肯定后件式

形式为“如果p则q; q; 所以p”的逻辑谬误,即是说,直言前提肯定条件前提的后件,而结论肯定它的前件。举例来说,“如果他生病了,则他不来上班;他不来上班;所以他生病了。”这一推理是无效的,因为在条件前提中后件的真并不衍推前件的真。正确的形式应该从真蕴涵式的前件推出其后件,即是说,它应该具有形式“如果p则q; p; 所以q”。中世纪逻辑学家将其称为“*modus ponens*”,亦称“肯定式”。

“ $P \supset Q$, Q, 所以 P’与有效论证形式肯定前件式具有表面的相似性,它被称为肯定后件的谬误。”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,1986年,第296页。

来世

见“无壳”条。

爱

[希腊语,意为“爱”。它的拉丁译文是 *carita*,因此就有了 charity——博爱] *agape* 区别于 *eros* 和 *philia* 等表示“爱”的其他语词的地方,

virtues in Christian ethics. Its content is expressed in two Biblical injunctions: "Love the lord your God with all your heart, and all your soul, and all your mind" (Matthew 22, 39, but adapted from Leviticus 19 : 18), and "Love your neighbour as yourself" (Matthew 22, 37, but previously Deuteronomy 6 : 5). *Agape* is wholly unselfish, but there has been some dispute whether it includes rational self-love. The relationship of *agape* to justice is also problematic. In comparative religion, *agape* has been compared with Confucian *ren*; humanity.

"Agape is that form of love in which God loves us, and in which we are to love our neighbour, especially if we do not like him." - Tillich, *Ultimate Concern*, 1965, p. 198.

Age of adventure, another name for the Renaissance

Age of reason, another name for the Enlightenment

Agent

[from Latin: *agens*, what is acting, referring to a rational human being who is the subject of action] An agent can decide to act or not. Having decided to act, an agent can deliberate how to act. Once the means of acting are chosen, an agent can apply the means to bring about certain changes. The kind of capacity intrinsic to an agent is called agency. The change caused by an agent is called agent causation, in contrast to event causation in which one thing is caused externally by another. In ethics, only agents are members of a moral community and bearers of moral responsibility.

"The way a cause operates is often compared to the operation of an agent, which is held responsible for what he does." - von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, 1971, p. 64.

Agent-centred morality

Also called agent related ethics. It demands that moral consideration should be given to moral agents rather than merely to the consequences of the agent's acts. It is a thesis opposed to consequentialism, in particular to utilitarianism, which it labels outcome-centred ethics. It accuses consequentialism of ignoring the integrity of the characters of moral agents, for consequentialist ethics requires that what an agent is permitted to do in any situation is limited strictly to what would have the best overall outcome impersonally judged. In contrast, agent-centred morality focuses on the agent's rights, duties or obligations. It holds that our primary responsibility as agents is to guarantee that our actions conform to moral rules and do not violate our obligations towards others. Agents should perform such actions even if they know

在于它被用于指基督徒的爱,而且,在基督教伦理学中,它是首要的德性之一。它的内容被表述在《圣经》的两句训谕中。一句是“你要尽心、尽性、尽意,爱主你的神”(《马太福音》22,39,但改于《利未记》19:18),另一句是“爱邻如己”(《马太福音》22,37,在前的是《申命记》6:5)。*Agape*是完全无私无我的,但它是否包括理性的自爱,有过某种争论。*agape*与正义的关系,也是个问题。在比较宗教中,也把*agape*和孔夫子的“仁爱”(ren)进行比较。

“*Agape*是这样一种形式的爱:在其中,上帝爱我们,我们应爱邻人,尤其是如果我们并不喜欢他。”——蒂利希:《终极关怀》,1965年,第198页。

冒险时代

“文艺复兴”时期的另一种称谓。

理性时代

“启蒙运动”的另一种称谓。

行动者

[源自拉丁语 *agens* (正在行为),指作为行为主体的理性人] 一个行动者能够决定是否行动。一旦决定行动,行动者会思考如何行动。一旦行动的途径确定,行动者会实施它们以造成某种变化。这类内在于行动者之中的能力叫做“能动性”。由行动者引起的变化叫做“能动因果关系”,以区别于由一个事物外在引起另一个事物的“事件因果关系”。在伦理学中,一般认为只有行动者才是道德共同体的成员,是道德责任的承担者。

“一个原因起作用的方式常常被比作是一个行动者的作为,而后者要为自己的行为负责。”——冯·赖特:《解释与理解》,1971年,第64页。

行为者中心道德论

也称“行为者相关伦理学”。它要求道德考虑应该关切到道德行为者而不是仅仅考虑到行为者的行为后果。这个论点是与效果论相对的,尤其是它与贴标签为“结果中心伦理学”的功利主义相对。它指责效果论忽视道德行为者的品格的完整性,因为效果论要求一个行为者在任何情况下所做的,被严格地限定在从非个人的判断看是最好的总的结果的东西上。相反,行为者中心道德论集中考虑的是行为者的权利、责任或义务。它认为,我们作为行为者的主要责任在于确保我们的行为与道德规则一致,而不侵犯对其他人的义务。即使是行为者们知道,如果他们愿意在原则上妥协,他们的后果将较好,他们仍应该履行与道德规则一致的行为。行为者

that the consequences of what they do would be better if they were willing to compromise their principles. Major issues for this view are to classify the forms of agent-relativity, to justify agent-relative principles and to offer an adequate rationale for agent-centred restrictions.

"Agent-centred morality gives primacy to the question of what to do, a question asked by the individual agent, and does not assume that the only way to answer it is to say what it would be best if he did." —Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, 1979, p. 205.

Agent-neutral reason

The evaluation of something objectively, independently of one's own interests. This is in contrast to "agent-relative reason" which values things by taking one's situations into consideration. Agent-neutral reason cares about everyone, while an agent relative reason cares more particularly about oneself. The introduction of this dichotomy of reasons for acting is credited to Derek Parfit, but Thomas Nagel borrows it (using the terms objective reason and subjective reason) and uses it widely. It plays a great role in the contemporary debate between "consequentialism" and "agent-centred ethics". Consequentialism is generally characterised as "agent-neutral", for it requires that everyone should act so as to maximise the amount of happiness for all involved. Some philosophers therefore claim that it asks moral agents to consider their actions from an impersonal point of view and is thus in conflict with common-sense. On the other hand, agent-centred ethics is believed to be based on "agent-relative reason" because it allows moral agents to base their moral aims on their moral characters. Consequentialism is also called "agent-neutral morality" or "act-centred ethics", and its opposite is called "agent related morality" or "agent-centred ethics".

"Nagel calls a reason objective if it is not tied down to any point of view. Suppose we claim that there is a reason to relieve some person's suffering. This reason is objective if it is a reason for everyone—for anyone who could relieve this person's suffering. I call such reasons agent-neutral. Nagel's subjective reasons are reasons only for the agent. I call these agent-relative." —Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 1984, p. 143.

Agent-related ethics, another expression for agent-centred morality

Agent-relative reason, see agent neutral reason

Agglomeration principle

A term introduced by Bernard Williams and now used as a rule of inference in deontic logic. According to the princi-

中心道德论所面临的主要问题在于对行为者相关性的诸形式的分类, 证明行为者相关原则的合理性, 以及提供对于以行为者为中心的种种限制的一种适当理由。

“行为中心道德论把由个体行为者提出的做什么的问题放在首位, 而且并不设定回答它的惟一方式是说明他怎样做是最好的。”——内格尔:《人的主要问题》, 1979年, 第205页。

行为者中立的理由

客观地评价某事, 独立于行为者自己的利益。它是与“行为者相关理由”相对的, 后者即是在评价事情时把自己的处境考虑在内。行为者中立理由关心的是每一个人, 而行为者相关理由更特别地关心的是自己。这个行为理由的区分应归于D. 帕菲特, 而T. 内格尔借用了它(所用的词是客观理由和主观理由)并广泛地使用了它。它在当代的“效果论”和“行为者中心伦理学”两者的争论中起了很大的作用。效果论一般被描述为“行为者中立”论, 因为它要求每一个人的行为应当能够最大化与该行为相涉的所有人的幸福。因此某些哲学家主张, 它要求道德行为者从非个人的观点考虑他们的行动, 因而是与常识相冲突的。另一方面, 行为者中心伦理学被认为是以“行为者相关理由”为基础的。因为它允许道德行为者把他们的道德目标建立在他们的道德品格上。效果论也称为“行为者中立道德论”或“行为中心伦理学”, 与此相反, 则称之为“行为者相关道德论”或“行为者中心伦理学”。

“如果一种理由不系于任何观点, 内格尔称这个理由是客观的, 假设我们主张, 有一种理由解除某人受难。如果这理由是对每一个人的, 即任何人能够解除这个人受难, 这个理由就是客观的。我称这种理由是行为者中立的。内格尔的主观理由是仅对行为者而言的理由。我称这些为行为者相关。”——帕菲特:《理性与人》, 1984年, 第143页。

行为者相关伦理学

“行为者中心道德论”的另一种表述。

行为者相关理由

见“行为者中立的理由”条。

聚合原则

由B. 威廉姆斯提出的一个术语, 现被用作义务逻辑中的一个推理规则。根据这一原则,

ple, if one has duty to do a and if one also has a duty to do b, then one has a duty to do a and b. The principle also extends to cover all situations in which a property can be conjoined out of two other properties. The validity of the principle has been a matter of controversy because it needs to be reconciled with the principle that ought implies can. In some cases, a person can do a and can do b separately, but cannot do both of them and will therefore not have a duty to do both.

There is a converse to the principle of agglomeration, called the division principle, which states that if one has a duty to do both a and b, then one has a duty to do a and has a duty to do b.

"... that 'I ought to do a' and 'I ought to do b' together imply 'I ought to do a and b' (which I shall call the *agglomeration principle*). " — Williams, "Ethical consistency", *Problems of the Self*, 1973, p. 180.

Agnosticism

[from Greek: *a*, not + *gnostikos*, one who knows] A term used by T. H. Huxley for a position which neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist and denies that we can have any knowledge about the nature of God. Agnosticism is contrasted both to theism, which holds that we can know the existence and nature of God, and to atheism, which denies the existence of God. Many agnostics argue that human reason has inherent and insuperable limitations, as shown by Hume and Kant. Therefore, we cannot justify any claims supporting either theism or atheism and should suspend our judgement over these issues. The attitude of agnosticism has persisted in many periods, but it became important philosophically in nineteenth century debates concerning science and religious belief. Agnosticism is also used more generally for the suspension of judgement about the truth or falsity of claims going beyond what we directly sense or commonly experience.

"Agnosticism: this is the theory that we have no means of telling what are the characteristics of those relatively permanent things and processes which manifest themselves partially to us by the interrelated sensa which we from time to time sense." Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, 1923, p. 423.

Agreeable

[German: *das Angenehme*] For Kant, what the senses find pleasurable in sensation, that is the feeling of pleasure evoked by the presence of a sensible object. Whatever is liked is agreeable. This feeling gratifies desire and offers a pathologically conditioned delight, not only for man, but also for non-rational animals. In contrast, the good evokes delight by pure rational determination. Kant believed that the nature of this delight is both agreeable and good. Judgement about the agreeable implies no universality, but universal a-

如果一个人有义务去做 a, 并且如果他也有义务去做 b, 那他就有义务去做 a 和 b。这一原则还扩展到用于一种特性可由两种其他特性结合而成的所有情况。这一原则的有效性始终是一个有争议的问题, 因为它需要与“应当”包含着“能够”这一原则相一致。在某些情况下, 一个人可以分别地做 a 和 b, 但不能两者都做, 因此也就没有做这两者的义务。

聚合原则有一个反题, 叫做分解原则, 后者提出, 如果一个人有义务既做 a 又做 b, 那他就有义务做 a 并且有义务做 b。

“…… ‘我应当做 a’ 与 ‘我应当做 b’ 合起来含有 ‘我应当做 a 和 b’ 的意思 (我把这叫做 ‘聚合原则’)。” — 威廉姆斯: 《伦理的一致性》, 见《自我问题》, 1973 年, 第 180 页。

不可知论

[源自希腊词: *a* (非) 和 *gnostikos* (正在认识的人)] T. H. 赫胥黎所用的术语, 指这样一种立场: 它既不相信上帝存在也不相信上帝不存在, 并且否认我们能够有任何关于上帝本性的知识。不可知论既相对于认为我们能认识上帝存在和本性的有神论; 又相对于否认上帝存在的无神论。不可知论者认为, 人类理性有着固有的和不可逾越的界限, 正如休谟和康德所表明的。我们不能证明任何支持有神论或无神论主张的合理性, 因而应该中止我们对这些问题的判断。不可知论的态度许多时代以来一直经久不衰, 但它在 19 世纪关于科学与宗教信仰的论争中在哲学上变得重要起来。不可知论也更一般地用来表示, 对超越我们直接感知或共同经验的东西这类主张的真假问题应中止判断。

“不可知论是这样一种理论: 我们没有任何办法来说出那些相对持久的事物和过程的特征是什么, 这些事物和过程通过我们经常感知的相互联系的感觉材料向我们部分地表现自身。”——布劳德: 《心灵及其在自然中的位置》, 1923 年, 第 423 页。

适意

[德语为 *das Angenehme*] 康德以此词来指感官在感觉中感到愉快的状态, 即由于感觉对象的存在而引起的愉快的情感。任何被喜欢的东西都是适意的。这种情感使欲望满足, 产生生理状态的欣喜。它不仅适用于人, 而且也适用于非理性的动物。相比之下, 善是由纯粹理性决定引起的欣喜。康德相信, 欣喜的本性既是适意的又是善的。对适意的判断不包含普遍性, 但当它要求普遍的赞同时便转变为道德上的善。

greement is required where the judgement is transferred to the morally good.

"Agreeable is what the senses like in sensation." — Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, 3, p. 205.

AI, abbreviation of artificial intelligence

Algorithm

[from the name of the Islamic mathematician al-Khuwarizmi (c. 830)] A step-by-step procedure for reaching a sound result. The steps are finite in number, and each has instructions for its proper implementation, so that the whole procedure can be carried out in a mechanical fashion. An algorithm can be a calculative procedure to compute the value of a function for any argument within a domain. It can also be a decision procedure to determine whether a specific object has a particular property. The truth table test of the truth-value of a formula is one paradigm of an algorithm. It is important to know whether an algorithm is possible for a given kind of problem.

"An algorithm is a procedure, brutish or not, that guarantees solution." —Boden, *Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man*, 1977, p. 346.

Alienation

[German: *Entfremdung*, from *fremd*, alien or *Entäusserung*, from *entäussern*, to make outer or external, which is associated with Latin: *alius*, another. Also translated as estrangement] A state in which a thing is separated, through its own act, from something else which used to belong to it, so that this other thing becomes self-sufficient and turns against its original owner.

The idea of alienation may be traced to the Christian doctrine of original sin and to Rousseau's theory of the social contract, in which individuals in a state of nature relinquish their natural freedom in favour of civil freedom upon entering a social state. It is explicated by Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. For Hegel, the development of the absolute idea is a process of alienating or eternalising ideas in the natural world and then de alienating or recovering them at a higher stage. Each category develops into its contrary which is originally contained in it. It thus enters a state of alienation, followed by reconciliation into a higher unity. This unity itself proceeds to further alienation. Nature is an alienation of the absolute idea. Each individual will be alien to social substance and also to his particular self although he is identified with the universal substance. The process of alienation and de-alienation corresponds to the process of the growth of human knowledge. Feuerbach held that God is nothing but the alienated human self. Marx claimed that alienation is a universal phenomenon of capitalist societies, rooted in the alienation of

"适意是感官在感觉中所喜欢的东西。"——康德:《判断力批判》,第3节,第205页。

AI

"人工智能"的缩写。

算法

[这一词语衍生自伊斯兰教数学家阿尔·库瓦里兹米(约公元830年)的姓名]指一种一步一步地达到可靠结果的程序。这些步骤在数目上是有限的,并且对其中每一步的恰当完成都有指令,使得整个程序可以被机械地执行。算法可以是计算某域中任意自变量的函数值的计算程序,也可以是确定一特殊对象是否具有一特定性质的判定程序。一个公式的真值的真值表检验是算法的一个范例。知道算法是否对一类既定问题是可能的,这很重要。

"算法是一种程序,无论你愚钝与否,它保证有解。"——博登:《人工智能与自然》,1977年,第346页。

异化

[德语: *Entfremdung*, 来自 *fremd* 一词,意为“异己的”,或 *Entäusserung*, 来自 *entäussern* 一词,意为使……成为外部的、外在的,它与拉丁文 *alius* (别的) 一词有关联。也译为“疏远”]指某物通过自己的活动而与某种曾属于它的他物相分离,以致于这个他物成为自足的并与本来拥有它的某物相对立的一种状态。

异化观念可追溯到基督教的原罪说和卢梭的社会契约论,这个理论表明,自然状态的个人由于赞成公民自由以进入社会状态从而放弃天然自由。它由黑格尔、费尔巴哈和马克思加以引申发展。对黑格尔来说,绝对理念的发展是使理念异化或外化为自然界,然后在更高阶段克服异化或使它们返回自身的过程。每个范畴都发展为它的对立面,这个对立面原先包含于这个范畴之中,这样,它便进入异化状态,通过调解而达到更高的统一。这个统一自身又进展到更进一步的异化。自然是绝对理念的异化。每个人都异化于社会实体,也异化于他的特殊自我,虽然他与普遍实体同一。异化和扬弃异化的过程相应于人类认识的发展过程。费尔巴哈认为,上帝无非就是异化的人类自我。马克思主张,异化是资本主义社会的普遍现象,它根源于工人与他们的劳动产品的异化。在资本主义社会,这些产品采取了商品、货币和资本的形式。对于马克思来说,异化只能以共产主义代替资本主义才

workers from the products of their labour. In capitalism these products take the form of commodities, money and capital. For Marx, alienation can only be overcome by replacing capitalism with communism. The concept of alienation gained wide currency in this century, largely due to the influence of Marx's *Economic and philosophical Manuscripts*, which was written in 1844 and published in 1932. Neo-Marxists, especially Lukács, used the notion to provide a new interpretation of Marxism. Existentialism and the Frankfurt school take alienation to be a basic malaise of modern society and some Marxist theorists have looked for theoretical grounds to explain alienation in socialist societies. Alienation is discussed not only in philosophy, but also in other social sciences and daily life, to deal with disunities, bifurcations or dichotomies affecting human well-being.

Alienation has various forms, but the self-alienation of human beings has attracted particular attention. Self-alienation refers to the separation of individuals from their real self, their nature and their consciousness. It is a state in which a person loses individual integrity and independence and becomes a stranger to oneself.

"This 'otherness', this acting of a role imposed upon one, imposed perhaps by the unintended consequences of the behaviour of one's self or one's fellows in the past, which comes to threaten and coerce one as if it were a real entity menacing one from outside—this is the phenomenon of alienation, to which Rousseau and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx, and much modern psychology and sociology have given a central role." —Berlin, *The Magus of the North*, 1993, p. 84.

Alternation

A complex statement in the form "p or q", also called disjunction in contrast to conjunction. The logical word "or" in such a statement admits of both exclusive or non-exclusive interpretations in ordinary language. When it is used in an exclusive sense, "p or q" is true if only one of its components is true. It means either p or q, but not both. In a non-exclusive sense, "p or q" is true if at least one of its components is true. It means either p or q, or both. While alternation can include both senses of "or", some logicians prefer to confine alternation to the exclusive sense of "or", and others prefer to confine it to the non-exclusive sense.

"Whereas a conjunction is true if and only if its components are all true, an alternation is false if and only if its components are all false." —Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1962, p. 5.

Altruism

[from Latin: *alter*, other or another] A term introduced into ethics by Auguste Comte and imported into England by Herbert Spencer. Altruism is the disinterested or benevolent

能得到克服。异化概念在本世纪获得广泛流传，主要是由于马克思的《经济学—哲学手稿》的影响，该手稿写于1844年，出版于1932年。新马克思主义者，特别是卢卡奇，使用这一概念来对马克思主义作出新的解释。存在主义和法兰克福学派把异化作为现代社会的通病，而某些马克思主义理论家已在寻找说明社会主义社会中的异化的理论根据。异化不仅在哲学中，而且也在其他社会科学和日常生活中得到讨论，以研究影响人类幸福的分裂、对抗或分化问题。

异化有各种形式，但是人类存在的自我异化已经引起了特别的注意。自我异化是指个人与他们的真实自我、他们的本性和他们的意识的分离。它是个人失去了个体的完整性、独立性，成为陌生于自我的一种状态。

“这个‘他物’，这个角色的扮演影响到某人身上，或许是由某人自己或他过去伙伴的行为的无意后果所影响，逐渐威胁和强制着某人，就好像它是从外部来危及某人的真实实体——这就是异化现象，卢梭和黑格尔、克尔凯郭尔和马克思、很多现代心理学和社会学已对此现象赋予一种主要的作用。”——柏林：《北方的名哲》，1993年，第84页。

择取式

形式为“p 或者 q”的复合陈述，亦称“析取式”，与合取式形成对照。这类陈述中的逻辑词“或者”在日常语言中允许两种解释：相斥的和相容的。当在相斥的意义上使用时，“p 或者 q”为真如果它只有一个支命题为真。这意味着或者 p 或者 q 但并非两者。在相容的意义上使用时，“p 或者 q”为真如果它至少有一个支命题为真，这意味着或者 p 或者 q 或者两者。尽管择取式能够包含“或者”的两种意义，但有些逻辑学家偏爱把择取式限于相斥意义的“或者”，另外一些逻辑学家则偏爱将其限于相容意义的“或者”。

“一合取式为真当且仅当它的支命题全都为真，而一择取式为假当且仅当它的支命题全都为假。”——奎因：《逻辑方法》，1962年，第5页。

利他主义

[源自拉丁词 *alter*，意为“其他”，“另一个”] 这一术语为 A. 孔德引入伦理学，并由 H. 斯宾塞把它输入到英国。它指涉的是对他人的

concern for other people, that is a regard to promote the welfare of others for their own sake rather than to promote one's own interest or a placing of the interests of others ahead of those of oneself. It opposes egoism, which tries to reduce morality to self interest. Altruism has been a perennial problem for ethics. Greek ethics believed that it is one among many equally important values, but the mainstream of modern moral theory claims that it is the most important concern of ethics. On the other hand, some anti-traditionalist philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard condemn altruism on the grounds that it will lead to low self-esteem and self-negation.

The strength of altruism lies in the facts that altruistic acts undeniably occur in any society and that moral codes universally advocate altruism or benevolence and condemn selfishness. The issues surrounding altruism include the following. Given the self-preserving tendency of human nature, how are we to account for the existence of altruism? Even if we can understand how altruism occurs, is it morally justified? Are altruistic acts merely apparent and really motivated by self-interest? Since one should reasonably pursue one's own interests, does the good of others itself provide reason for an agent to promote that good? Given the difficulty in understanding another person, how can altruism really serve the good of others? Is there an adequate distinction between altruism and paternalism?

" 'Altruism' means, not 'doing good to others for a duty's sake', but 'doing good to others for its own sake' or 'doing good to others for the sake of doing good to others'." Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 246.

Ambiguity

To say that a word or expression is ambiguous means that different senses or references are associated with the word or expression, and that it is not clear from the given context which of these senses is meant. This is called lexical or semantic ambiguity. To say a sentence or statement is ambiguous means that the sentence is confusing in its whole meaning, although each word in it is clear, because of the grammatical structure among the words. This is ambiguity of construction which is also called structural or syntactic ambiguity or amphiboly. The grammatical relations which most often produce syntactic ambiguity include misplaced modifiers, loosely applied adverbs, elliptical constructions and omitted punctuation. Other major types of ambiguity include process-product ambiguity arising from the confusion between a process (behaviour or movement) and a corresponding product; act-object ambiguity, in which a statement can refer to either an act or an object and it is not clear which is intended in the given context; and type-token ambiguity, in which an expression can refer to either a type or a token and it is not clear which is intended in the given context. The ide-

无私心或仁慈的关心,即因他人的缘故,而不是作为一种增进自己利益的方式来促进他人的福利,或把他人利益放在自己的利益之先的一种考虑。它是与力图把道德归结为自我利益的利己主义相对的。利他主义是伦理学中的一个恒久的问题。希腊伦理学相信,它是许多同等重要价值中的一种,而现代道德理论的主流则宣称,它是最重要的伦理问题。另外,某些反传统的哲学家像尼采和克尔凯郭尔则基于它导致对自尊的损害和自我否定而谴责利他主义。

利他主义的强度在于这个事实:利他主义的行动在任何社会都是不容否认的现象,而道德准则普遍提倡利他主义或仁慈而谴责自私。围绕着利他主义所讨论的问题有:既然人性中有着自我保护的倾向,那怎样说明利他主义的存在?即使我们能理解利他主义是如何产生的,它在道德上证明是合理的吗?利他主义行为仅仅是外表性的并且为自我利益这种真正的动机所推动吗?既然一个人应该合理地追求自我利益,他人的善本身是否为一个行为者提供了促进这种善的理由?由于要理解另一个人是困难的,利他主义怎能真正为他人的善效力?在利他主义和家长主义之间有没有一个适当的区分?

" '利他主义'意为,不是 '因责任的缘故而做有利于他人的事',而是 '因行为自身的缘故而做有益于他人的事',或因 '做这事有益于他人而做有益于他人的事'。"—诺威尔-史密斯:《伦理学》,1954年,第246页。

模糊性

说一个词或一个表达式是模糊的,意味着存在各种不同的与这个词或表达式相关联的意思或指谓,而且从给定的语境来看,不清楚是在指哪种意义。这被称为词汇的或语义的模糊性。说一个句子或一个陈述是模糊的,意味着这个句子由于各个词之间的语法结构而在整个意义上是混淆的,尽管其中的每个词都是清楚的。这是一种结构上的模糊性,同样也被称作结构的或句法的模糊性或者意义上的模棱两可。最常见的产生句法模糊性的语法关系包括误置的修饰词,随意使用的副词,省略了的结构,去掉了的标点符号等等。模糊性的其他主要种类包括:由于混淆了过程(行为、运动)与相应结果的过程—结果的模糊性;行为—对象的模糊性,这是指一个陈述既可以指一个行为也可以指一个对象,但在给定的语境中它究竟指哪一种并不清楚;类型—殊型的模糊性,这是指一个表达式既可以指一个类型也可以指一个殊型,但在给定的语境中它究竟指哪一种并不清楚。理想语言的哲学家们如弗雷格和卡尔纳普声称,自然语

al language philosophers such as Frege and Carnap claim that natural language is full of ambiguities, and hence that it must be replaced by a logically perfect language which is free of ambiguity. In literature, ambiguity is a prized feature rather than something to be eliminated.

"Semanticists and philosophers usually call a word 'ambiguous' only when there is some uncertainty about which meaning is being used in a particular instance. A word is not ambiguous by itself, it is used ambiguously." —Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, 1967, p. 14.

Ambiguous middle, fallacy of, another term for four term fallacy

Âme collective, see group mind

Amoralism

In Greek, *a* is a negative prefix, and "amoral" literally means not moral. Amoralism is distinguished from immorality (evil, wrong), where "amoral" is synonymous with "non-moral", referring to actions which are morally value-free and which are neither moral nor immoral and neither right nor wrong. In another sense, the amoral is distinguished from both the immoral and the non-moral, referring to actions which are not the concern of standard moral or social concepts of good or bad. Generally "amoralism" is used in this latter sense for an attitude which ignores or rejects the ways in which morality governs human lives and is sceptical of the necessity of ethical life. Hence it becomes a task of ethics to justify morality by showing that ethical life is rational.

"[W]hen an amoralist calls ethical considerations into doubt, and suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality, what can we say to him?" —Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1986, p. 22.

Amour de soi

[French: self-love or love of self] Rousseau's term for the instinctive sentiment or disposition of self-preservation which human beings have in the state of nature. It is born to humans, but also belongs to other animal creatures. *Amour de soi* and the natural feeling of pity are two supreme principles governing human behaviour prior to the formation of society. Acts out of *amour de soi* tend to be for individual well-being. They are naturally good and not malicious because *amour de soi* as self-love does not involve pursuing one's self-interest at the expense of others. The sentiment does not compare oneself with others, but is concerned solely with oneself as an absolute and valuable existence. It is related to an awareness of one's future and can restrain present im-

言充满了模糊性,因而必须替换为一种完全没有模糊性的逻辑上完善的语言。可在文学中,模糊性则是受欣赏的特征,而不是要被消除的东西。

"语义学家和哲学家通常把一个词称作'模糊的',只是当这个词被用在具体情形中时它的意义有某种不确定性。一个词本身并不是模糊的,它只是被模糊地使用了。"——霍斯培斯:《哲学分析引论》,1967年,第14页。

中项歧义谬误

"四词项谬误"的另一种说法。

团体意识

见"团体意识(group mind)"条。

非道德主义

"非道德"一词在字面上的意思是"不是道德的"(*a*是一个希腊词的否定性前缀)。它有两个意思。一是把非道德与不道德(恶、错)区分开来,在这里,"非道德"与"无道德"是同义的,指涉的是无道德价值的行为,既不是道德的,也不是不道德的,既不是正当的,也不是错误的。另一个意思是既与不道德亦与无道德相区分,指涉的是不与善恶标准的道德概念或与善恶的社会概念有关的行为。一般而言,"非道德主义"被用在后一种意义上,指的是一种忽视或拒绝那些道德支配人类生活的方式,并怀疑伦理生活的必要性的一种态度。因此,伦理学便有了一种任务,即通过证明伦理生活是合理的来证明道德的合理性。

"当一个非道德主义者称伦理的考虑值得怀疑,并提出没有理由遵循道德的要求时,我们能对他说什么?"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1986年,第22页。

自爱

[法语:自爱或爱自己]卢梭用来表述人类在自然状态下具有的本能情感或自我保护倾向的用语。自爱是人生来具有的,而且也是其他动物具有的。*Amour de soi*和自然的怜悯情感是在社会形成之前支配人类行为的两条最高原则。出于*amour de soi*的行为倾向于为了个人的幸福。它们是自然的善而不是恶,因为作为自爱的*amour de soi*并不包括在损害他人的情况下追求自我的利益。这种情感不在自身与他人之间做比较,它唯一关心的是作为绝对有价值的存在物的自我。它与对人的未来的意识相联系,并且能克制当下的冲动。在卢梭看来,*amour de soi*与*amour-propre*即自尊不同,后

pulse. For Rousseau, *amour de soi* contrasts with *amour-propre*, a self-love which presupposes a comparison between oneself and others and consequently generates all the vicious and competitive passions.

"Amour de soi-meme is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue." — Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, p. 217.

Amour-propre

[French: literally self-love, although self-aggrandizement might be better] A term introduced by Rousseau in contrast to *amour de soi* [French: self-love]. *Amour de soi* is an instinctive disposition of self-preservation which is possessed by human beings in the state of nature and which contains no desire to surpass others. *Amour-propre* is generated after the formation of society or association and leads one to pursue superiority over others, even at the expense of the interests of others. For *amour-propre*, the well-being of the self relies on one's standing relative to other selves and on comparisons between oneself and others. It impels one to seek power and dominance, giving rise to relentless competition and conflict. It engenders deception, aggression, hypocrisy, malice and all other evils that appear in human relationships. The immorality of *amour-propre* leads to the corruption of society. To avoid this, according to Rousseau, one should withdraw from society and return to nature.

"Amour-propre is only a relative and factitious sentiment which is born in society, which leads each individual to make more of himself than of every other, which inspires in men all the evils they perpetrate on each other, and is the real source of the sense of honour." — *The Political Writing of Rousseau*, p. 217.

Amphiboly

A kind of sentential ambiguity arising from the different combinations of the words in a sentence. For instance, the sentence "The brave son's mother is kind" can be understood either as saying that the son is brave or that the son's mother is brave. Hence this sentence is amphibolous. Amphiboly is also called syntactical or structural ambiguity. Under many circumstances an amphibolous sentence is true on one interpretation and false on another. If in one argument, a person uses the correct interpretation of the sentence as a premise, but infers using the false interpretation, he is committing the fallacy of ambiguity.

"A statement is amphibolous when its meaning is indeterminate because of the loose or awkward way in which its words are combined." — Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, p. 115.

者是以自我与他人之间的比较为前提的,因而会产生出所有邪恶的和竞争的欲望。

“自爱心是一种自然的情感,它使所有的动物都注意自我保存。在人类中,由于自爱心为理性所指导,为怜悯心所节制,从而产生人道和美德。”——卢梭:《论不平等》,第217页。

自尊

[法语,字面的意思是自爱,但更贴切的含义是自尊] 卢梭提出的一个与“*amour de soi*”[法语:自爱]相对照的用语。*amour de soi*是一种天生的自我保护的性情,这一性情是人在自然状态下具有的,它不包含胜过他人的要求。*amour-propre*是在社会或社会交往形成之后产生的,它使人追求优越于他人,甚至以损害他人的利益为代价。对*amour-propre*而言,自我的幸福依赖一个人与他人相关的地位和自己与他人的比较。它驱使人追求权力和统治,导致产生缺乏怜悯的竞争和冲突。它造成了人际关系中出现的欺骗、侵略、虚伪、怨恨和所有其他罪恶。*amour-propre*的不道德使社会腐化。卢梭认为,为了避免这一点,人应当从社会退出,返回自然。

“自尊只是一种在社会中产生的相对的和人为的情感,它使每一个人重视自己甚于重视其他任何人,它促使人们彼此间做出种种罪恶,它是荣誉感的真正根源。”——《卢梭政治文论》,第217页。

模棱两可

产生于句子中不同语词组合的一种句子的模糊性。譬如,“这个勇敢的儿子的母亲是善良的”这个句子,既可以理解为是说“这个儿子是勇敢的”,也可以理解为是说“这个儿子的母亲是勇敢的”。因此这个句子是模棱两可的。模棱两可也被称作“句法上的”或“结构上的模糊性”。在许多情形中,一个模棱两可的句子根据某个解释是真的,而根据另一个解释就是假的。如果人们在同一论证中使用对这个句子的正确解释作为前提,但却使用错误的解释进行推论,那么,他就是在犯“模糊性错误”。

“当一个陈述的意义由于连接语词的方式不严格或奇特而不确定时,这个陈述就是模棱两可的。”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,1986年,第115页。

Ampliative induction

[from Latin; *ampliatio*, broadening] A term introduced by Kneale for reasoning which proceeds from the observed to the unobserved or from the particular to the universal. Since its conclusion goes beyond what is contained in the premises, it is ampliative. Kneale claims that this is the method characteristic of natural sciences in establishing general propositions and that it is distinguished from summative induction, which characterises work in social sciences; intuitive induction; and recursive induction which operates in mathematics.

"One of the most striking characteristics of the induction used in natural sciences is that it goes in some sense beyond its premises, which are the singular facts of experience; I propose, therefore, to call it ampliative induction." Kneale, *Probability and Induction*, 1949, p. 44.

Ampliative judgement, see ampliative reasoning

Ampliative reasoning

[from Latin; *ampliatio*, broadening; in contrast to *restrictio*: narrowing] In medieval logic, the broadening of a term's extension. For Peirce, ampliation is ampliative reasoning in which the conclusion goes beyond what is contained in the premises. For example, we infer from "some x are y" to "all x are y". Ampliative induction, in contrast to other forms of induction, reasons in this way. In contrast, the conclusion of deductive reasoning is generally thought to be already contained in the premises. For Kant, a synthetic judgement is an ampliative judgement, because its predicate adds something new to its subject, in contrast to analytic or clarificatory judgements, in which the predicate can be derived through analysis of the subject term.

"In ampliative reasoning the ratio may be wrong, because the inference is based on but a limited number of instances; but on enlarging the same the ratio will be changed till it becomes approximately correct." —Peirce, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 710.

Analogies of experience

Kant introduced four groups of categories, with each group having principles or rules to show its objective validity in employment. Analogies of experience are these rules for the categories of relation, that is the categories of substance, causality and interaction. The analogies correspond to three temporal modes, namely duration, succession and co-existence. The first analogy is the principle of the permanence of substance; the second is the principle of the fixed order of succeeding states; and the third is the law of reciprocity or community. Kant held that these principles are necessary conditions for the possibility of temporal experience. They

扩充性归纳

[源自拉丁文 *ampliatio*, 扩大, 加宽] 一个由涅尔引入的术语, 用于从已观察到的东西到未观察到的东西、或从特殊事物到普遍事物所进行的推理。由于其结论超出了前提所包含的内容, 所以它是扩充性的。涅尔认为这是自然科学在建立一般命题时所特有的方法, 它有别于作为社会科学研究特征的求和归纳、直观归纳和运用于数学中的递归归纳。

“运用于自然科学中的归纳的最惊人的特征之一, 就是它在某种意义上超出了它的前提, 即那些单称的经验事实; 因此, 我提出称它为扩充性归纳。”——涅尔:《概率与归纳》, 1949年, 第44页。

扩充性判断

见“扩充性推理”条。

扩充性推理

[源自拉丁文 *ampliatio* 一词, 意为扩大, 加宽, 对比于 *restrictio*, 即收缩, 变窄一词] 在中世纪的逻辑中指一个术语外延的拓展。对皮尔士来说, 扩充是指扩充性推理, 在这种推理中, 结论超出了前提所包含的内容。例如, 我们从“某些 x 是 y”中推出“所有的 x 都是 y”。对比于其他形式的归纳, 扩充性归纳即如此推理。这与演绎推理形成对照, 在后者中一般认为结论已包含在前提中。康德称综合判断为“扩充性判断”, 因为其谓项对主项增加了新的东西, 而与之形成对比的是分析或澄清判断, 其中谓项可由主项的分析得出。

“在扩充性推理中, 比率可能是错误的, 因为这种推断仅建立在有限数目的例证上, 而通过扩大这相同例证的数目, 比率将发生变化, 直至它近似于正确。”——皮尔士:《文集》, 第二卷, 第710页。

经验之类推

康德引入了四组范畴, 每一组都有原理或规则来表明其应用的客观有效性。经验之类推是关系范畴的诸种规则, 即实体性、因果性和相互作用的范畴。这些类推相应于三种时间样式, 即绵延、持续和共存。第一类推是实体永恒性原理。第二类推是持续状态的确定秩序的原理, 而第三类推是交相作用或共同相处的法则。康德认为这些原理是时间经验可能性的必要条件。它们能使对象的知觉在时间中相互必然地联结, 因而使经验成为可能。但经验之类推只是规定性原理, 而不是构造性原理。它们并不告诉我

enable our perceptions of objects in time to relate necessarily to one other, and hence make experience possible. The analogies of experience are merely regulative, not constitutive, principles, and they do not tell us whether there is an objective substance, causal relation or interaction.

"An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A180/B222.

Analogy

[From Greek: *ana*, up, throughout + *logos*, reason] (Originally meaning a mathematical proportion between different things, the term has been extended to refer to similarities and likenesses between different things. An expression has an analogical sense when it extends its application to additional things that are similar in certain respects to the original things covered by the term. An analogical argument states that because a thing *a* is like another thing *b* in some respect, it is possible that *a* is like *b* in other respects as well. Typical examples include the argument from design and certain responses to the other minds problem. In religion it is often held that a transcendent God can only be described analogically by human language. Analogical argument is metaphorical and correlative. It is suggestive but not conclusive.

"Analogy is the inference that a not very large collection of objects which agree in various respects may very likely agree in another respect." Peirce, *Collected Works*, I, p. 68.

Analysandum, see analysis

Analysans, see analysis

Analysis

[From Greek: *ana*, up — *lyein*, loose, untie] The mental process of dissolving a whole into its components and the relations between its components. The analysis into constituents is called material analysis, while the analysis of the manner of combination of the constituents is called formal analysis. The item to be analysed is called the *analysandum*, and the item which does the analysis is called the *analysans*.

In this century, analysis has become the central method of Anglo-American analytical philosophy shaped by the development of modern logic. Its central characteristic is that we must investigate our language to make clear our thinking about the world. We approach the world through thought, and on this view the only way to approach the structure of our thought is to study what we say. Analysis is not a set of unified doctrines, but a style or manner of philosophy. Because different philosophers have different notions of analy-

们是否存在着客观的实体或因果关系或相互作用。

“因此经验之类推只是据此才能从知觉中产生经验之统一的规则。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A180/B222。

类比

[由希腊文 *ana* (起来、通过) 和 *logos* (理性) 结合而成] 这个词原来指不同事物之间的数学比例，现在已推广来指不同事物之间的类似和相像。如果一个表述被推广用于另一些事物，这些事物与该表述所适用的原来那些事物在某些方面相似，那么，这个表述就具有了类比的意義。类比论证是说，因为一件事情 *a* 在某个方面与另一件事情 *b* 相像，所以在其他方面 *a* 可能与 *b* 也相像。这种论证的典型例子包括“设计证明”和关于“他人心灵”问题的某些回答。在宗教中，人们常常认为，对超验的上帝只能用人类语言类比地描述。类比论证是隐喻性的、相关性的。它是示意性的而不是决定性的。

“类比是如下推断：一组数目不大的对象如果在许多方面都一致，很可能在另一方面也一致。”——皮尔士：《文集》，第一卷，第 68 页。

被分析项

见“分析”条。

分析项

见“分析”条。

分析

[源自希腊文 *ana* (向上) + *lyein* (放松，松绑)] 将一个整体分解成其构成部分及构成部分间的关系的理智过程。对构成因素的分析叫做“实质分析”，而对这些因素间的联系方式的分析叫做“形式分析”。被分析的叫做被分析项，而用来分析的则是分析项。

在本世纪，分析乃是奠基于现代逻辑发展之上的英美分析哲学的主要方法。这种哲学的主要特征是说，我们必须研究我们的语言才能澄清我们对世界的思想。我们通过思想来探究这一世界。而根据这一观点，探索思想结构的唯一途径是研究我们的说话方式。分析不是一套统一的学说，而是一种哲学的风格或方式。由于不同哲学家有不同的分析观念，分析哲学内部形成了不同的流派。对弗雷格、摩尔、罗素以及早期维特根斯坦而言，分析旨在以陈述的真实

sis, there are different schools in analytical philosophy itself. For Frege, Moore, Russell and early Wittgenstein, analysis aimed to overcome traditional philosophical problems through replacing the apparent structure of statements by their real and underlying logical structure. For them, as for Logical Positivism, analysis involves a reduction of complex discourse to simple elementary propositions. This sort of analysis is also called logical analysis. For later Wittgenstein and Oxford ordinary language philosophers, the notion of an underlying logical structure of language is unnecessary, but we still need to analyse our ways of talking to establish an understanding of our conceptual scheme. This sort of analysis is also called linguistic analysis.

"Analysis may be defined as the discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 119.

Analysis, paradox of

A paradox, originally formulated by C. H. Langford in his discussion of Moore's notion of analysis, leads to the conclusion that all analysis is either trivial or false. For an analysis states relations between an *analysandum* (the expression to be analysed) and an *analysans* (the analyzing expression). These expressions are either synonymous or not synonymous. If they are synonymous, the analysis does not convey any information and is trivial. If they are not synonymous, the analysis is false. Therefore, analysis is either trivial or false and is not a significant philosophical or logical procedure. This paradox involves an analysis of the notion of analysis. The standard response to it involves the use of Frege's distinction between sense and reference. The truth of the analysis is a matter of the different expressions having the same reference, but triviality is avoided if the expressions have difference senses.

"And the paradox of analysis is to the effect that, if the verbal expression representing the *analysandum* has the same meaning as the verbal expression representing the *analysans*, the analysis states a bare identity and is trivial; but if the two verbal expressions do not have the same meaning, the analysis is incorrect." — Langford, in Schilpp (ed), *Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, 1968, p. 323.

Analytic (Kant)

Analytic is a term Aristotle used for his syllogism and for the discussion of the conditions of demonstrative knowledge presented in his *Prior Analytics* and *Posterior Analytics*. In contrast, Aristotle presented what he called dialectic in the *Topics*, another part of his *Organon*. Since the sixteenth century, it has been common practice to divide logic into two parts: analytic, which concerns the elements of judgement, and dialectic, which concerns the persuasive force of syllo-

的和深层的逻辑结构取代它们的表面结构,从而克服传统哲学问题。对他们来说,正如对逻辑实证主义一样,分析在于把复杂的论述归结为简单的基本命题。这类分析也叫做逻辑分析。对后期维特根斯坦及牛津日常语言哲学家来说,所谓语言有深层逻辑结构这种观念是不必要的,但我们仍然需要分析我们说话的方式来理解我们的概念构架。这类分析也叫做语言分析。

“分析可以定义作是对一个既定复合体的构成成分及联系方式的发现。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第七卷,第119页。

分析的悖论

最初由 C. H. 朗格福特在讨论摩尔的分析概念时提出的悖论。它引出了一切分析要么是琐屑的,要么是虚假的结论。因为一个分析陈述了被分析项(要被分析的表达式)和分析项(用来分析的表达式)之间的关系。这些表达式要么是同义的,要么不是同义的。如果它们是同义的,该分析不传达任何信息,因而是琐屑的;如果它们不是同义的,该分析是虚假的。因此,分析要么是琐屑的,要么是虚假的,它不是有意义的哲学程序或逻辑程序。这个悖论涉及到对分析概念的分析。处理这个悖论的标准方式包括了运用弗雷格对意义和指称的区分。分析的真是一个关于具有同样指称的不同表达的问题,而如果这些表达式具有不同的意义,琐屑就被避免了。

“分析的悖论大意是说,如果代表被分析项的言语表达与代表分析项的言语表达有同样的意义,那么该分析陈述了一个明白的同一性,因而是琐屑的;但如果这两个言语表达不具有同样的意义,那么该分析就是不正确的。”——朗格福特,载施尔普(编):《G. E. 摩尔的哲学》,1968年,第323页。

分析论(康德)

亚里士多德以“分析”来指称他的三段论法和他在《前分析》和《后分析》中提出的对证明知识的条件的讨论。分析与亚里士多德在《工具论》的另一部分《正位篇》中提出的“辩证法”相对照。自16世纪以来一个通行的做法是把逻辑划分为两个部分:分析论(它揭示判断的要素)和辩证论(它表明三段论式的说服力)。这种做法也影响了德国哲学。康德在他的《纯粹理

gism, and this practice influenced German philosophy. In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant adopted this usage and divided his transcendental logic into the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. Analytic, in his understanding, is an analysis of the form of understanding and of reason. It seeks to determine the necessary rules of all formal truth and is a canon for deciding on the formal connectives of our knowledge. Kant practiced such an analytic in all of his three *Critiques*. In the first *Critique*, the transcendental analytic, including an analytic of concepts and an analytic of principles, seeks to uncover the concepts and principles of theoretical reason. In the second and third *Critique*, Kant used analytic to discover the principles of pure practical reason and of the power of aesthetic judgement.

"The analytic brings to light, by sundering them, all acts of reason that we exercise in thinking." —Kant, *Logic*, introduction, II.

Analytic ethics

A term for any analysis of moral concepts, but as a distinct approach it starts with G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903). It claims that the fundamental task of ethics is not to discuss substantive moral questions and to seek solutions for them, but rather to examine the meaning of moral terms such as "good", "duty", "right", "ought" and to make them as clear and precise as possible. It then evolved into the linguistic analysis of moral judgements, their types and their functions. This development was represented by Ayer's account of morality, Stevenson's emotivism and Hare's prescriptivism. Another dimension of analytic ethics is to examine moral reasoning and the basis for distinguishing moral judgements from other value judgements. This is represented especially in the work of Stephen Toulmin. Analytic ethics can be viewed as synonymous with meta-ethics. In the 1960s, as the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics came into question, analytic ethics as a distinctive approach also lost favour. Many moral philosophers now believe that ethics should investigate both moral terms and moral questions. Nevertheless, analytic ethics, through its sharply defined analysis of moral terms, has had a lasting influence on ethics through raising the precision and theoretical level of ethical discussion.

"Analytic ethics as a branch of philosophy should, then, be clearly distinguished from empirical ethics, from a genetic or descriptive study of moral valuations, and from propagandistic morals." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 16.

Analytic Marxism

A term not for a body of doctrine, but for a tendency or style developed during the past decade which attempts to bring Marxism into the web of contemporary political theory

性批判》中也采用了这种惯例,并把他的先验逻辑划分为先验分析论和先验辩证论。分析论,按他的理解,是对知性和理性的形式的分析。它旨在规定一切形式真理的必然规则,并且是决定我们知识的形式联结的法规。康德在他整个三大批判中实施了这样的分析。在第一批判中,他提出了著名的先验分析论(包括概念的分析 and 原理的分析),力求揭露理论理性的概念和原理,在第二和第三批判中,他以分析论来揭示纯粹实践理性和审美判断力的原理。

"分析论通过对我们在思维中所进行的一切理性活动进行分离,从而阐明它们。"——康德:《逻辑》,"导言 I"。

分析伦理学

这一术语指涉对于道德概念的分析,但它作为一种独特的方法,开始于 G. E. 摩尔的《伦理学原理》(1903 年)。它宣称伦理学的基本任务不是讨论实质性的伦理问题和寻求对于这些问题的解答,而是考察道德词语诸如"善"、"责任"、"正当"、"应当"等的意义,使它们尽可能清楚和精确。随后分析伦理学发展成为对于道德判断、道德判断的类型和它们的功能的语言分析。艾耶尔对道德的论述、斯蒂文森的情感主义和黑尔的规定主义代表了这种发展。分析伦理学的另一个范围是考察道德推理,以及把道德判断与其他价值判断区分开来的基础。这尤其表现在 S. 图尔敏的工作中。"分析伦理学"也被看作是"元伦理学"的同义词。在 20 世纪 60 年代,由于开始质疑元伦理学与规范伦理学的区分,分析伦理学作为一种独特的方法也不成为时尚。许多道德哲学家现在相信,伦理学既应该研究道德概念,也应该研究道德问题。不过,分析伦理学,通过它对伦理概念的严格分析,极大地提高了伦理问题讨论的精确性和理论水平,从而对伦理学有着恒久的影响。

"分析伦理学作为哲学的一个分支,应该清楚地与经验伦理学区分开来,与对道德评价的发生学和描述性研究区分开来,与宣传性的道德说教区分开来。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949 年,第 16 页。

分析的马克思主义

这一概念指的不是一组学说,而是在过去十年发展起来的一种趋向或风格,这种趋向或风格试图把马克思主义纳入当代政治哲学之

in order to benefit from rigorous critical standards and further development. It characteristically employs the conceptual tools and methods of analytical philosophy, game theory and decision theory in its discussion of Marxism. Analytic Marxism is inspired by Marxist questions such as alienation, exploitation, class, social theory, theory of justice, theory of history and Marx's theory of surplus value. Unlike conventional Marxism or Western Marxism, analytic Marxism does not stress Marxist exegesis, but it does seriously consider Marx's ideas as philosophy and discusses them with clarity and rigour. It is mainly directed to the underlying principles of Marxist theory and examines questions such as "Is socialism in the interest of workers in modern capitalism?", "Why is exploitation wrong?" In general, it rejects Marx's methodological collectivism in favour of methodological individualism, which seeks to explain social arrangements and life by appeal to the rational behaviour of differently endowed individuals. The major representatives of analytic Marxism include G. A. Cohen, John Elster, John Roemer and Alan Wood. The tendency is also called neo-classical Marxism, rational choice Marxism and game theory Marxism. Analytic Marxists might in principle reject many of the main features of the traditional theory of Marxism, but proponents argue that this pattern of development through rational criticism is characteristic of science in general.

"The project of Analytic Marxism is to clarify, criticise and develop the theory of Marxism, using the methods and techniques of analytical philosophy." - Sayers, in Ware and Nielsen, (eds), *Analyzing Marxism*, 1989, p. 81.

Analytic philosophy

Also called analytical philosophy, analytic philosophy arose from Russell and Moore's criticism of Bradley's absolute idealism at the beginning of the twentieth century and developed out of the combination of Frege's logic and the British empirical tradition. The philosophers of the first generation of analytic philosophy held on to the distinction between fact and value and between analytic and synthetic propositions. They rejected traditional metaphysics and normative ethics as the products of confusions generated by the surface grammar of language, and concentrated on the reductive logical analysis of the deep structure of language. Philosophy was understood as nothing but conceptual analysis. The early Wittgenstein, who did not share Russell's empiricism, held that such analysis also revealed the structure of the world. For logical positivists, analysis was focused on the logical forms of scientific discourse and much traditional philosophical discourse was rejected as nonsense.

After the second world war, the main object of logical analysis became ordinary language, the view being that philosophy should concern itself with language *per se* rather than with its alleged essence. This tendency was influenced

网, 以使其从严格的、批判的标准中受益并获得进一步的发展。它的特征是在讨论马克思主义时运用了分析哲学、博弈论和决策论的概念工具和方法。分析的马克思主义受到马克思主义的一些问题的激励, 如异化、剥削、阶级、社会理论、公正理论、历史理论和马克思的剩余价值理论等方面的问题。与传统的马克思主义或西方马克思主义不同, 分析的马克思主义并不强调对马克思主义的注释, 而是严肃地把马克思的思想看作哲学并对它们做清晰严谨的论述。它主要针对的是马克思主义理论的那些基本原则, 并且检验诸如“社会主义对当代资本主义社会的工人有利吗?” “为什么剥削是错的?” 这类问题。一般说来, 它拒绝马克思的方法论的整体主义而赞同方法论的个人主义, 即试图通过求助具有不同禀赋的个人的理性行为来解释社会的构成和生活。分析的马克思主义的主要代表人物有 G. A. 柯亨、J. 爱尔斯特、J. 罗默和 A. 伍德。这一倾向也被称为新古典的马克思主义、理性选择的马克思主义和博弈论的马克思主义。分析马克思主义也许在原则上抛弃了传统的马克思主义的许多特征, 但它的倡导者争论说, 这一通过理性批判的发展方式是科学的一般特征。

“分析的马克思主义的方案是运用分析哲学的方法和手段, 来澄清、批判和发展马克思主义的理论。”——塞耶斯:《分析马克思主义》, 见韦尔和尼尔森(编), 1989年, 第81页。

分析哲学

分析哲学产生于20世纪初罗素和摩尔对布拉德雷绝对唯心主义的批判, 这是结合弗雷格逻辑和英国经验论传统的产物。第一代分析哲学家们坚持事实与价值、分析命题与综合命题之间的区分。他们把传统形而上学和规范伦理学看作是混淆了语言表层语法的产物而加以抛弃, 关注于对语言深层语法的还原的逻辑分析。哲学被理解为只是概念分析。早期维特根斯坦不同于罗素的经验论, 他认为, 这种分析同样可以揭示世界的结构。而在逻辑实证主义者看来, 这完全是对科学话语的逻辑形式的分析, 而许多传统的哲学话语被视为无意义的而加以抛弃。

第二次世界大战后, 逻辑分析的主要对象成为日常语言。这种观点认为, 哲学应该首先关心语言, 而不是它所谓的本质。这种倾向来自后期维特根斯坦的影响, 但主要是通过赖尔、奥斯汀、斯特劳森等人的工作而在牛津得到发展。赖尔对心灵的行为主义分析规定了心灵哲学的范围。奥斯汀的言语行为理论使语言哲学与心灵哲学成为相互关联的学科。斯特劳森的“描述的

by the later Wittgenstein, but was mainly developed in Oxford through the work of such figures as Ryle, Austin and Strawson. Ryle's behaviourist analysis of mind set the agenda for the philosophy of mind. Austin's speech-act theory made the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind interrelated disciplines. Strawson's notion of descriptive metaphysics restored the position of metaphysics in analytic philosophy. From the middle of the 1940s to the 1960s, analytic philosophy was regarded by many as synonymous with Oxford philosophy or linguistic philosophy though this is not precisely correct. Ayer, for example, was critical of the emphasis on ordinary language especially in Austin's work. In the United States, Quine rejected the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions which was essential to early analytic philosophy and saw philosophy as a continuing enterprise of science. This has changed the landscape of analytic philosophy.

As a movement, analytic philosophy carries with itself a large variety of methods and doctrines. What unifies this movement is the spirit of the respect for rationality, the suspicion of dogmatic assumptions, and the pursuit of argumentative rigour and clarity on the model of the natural sciences. On these grounds, many recent innovations in philosophy, such as functionalism, the causal theory of reference, various theories of meaning and truth, the post-positivist philosophy of science, Rawls' theory of justice and virtue ethics, can be seen as developments within analytic philosophy.

Analytic philosophy is often contrasted with continental philosophy, but this distinction should not be understood to be a geographical one. Although analytic philosophy is the dominant tendency in English-speaking countries, it is also practised in many European countries, and was also contributed to greatly by continental philosophers such as Brentano, Frege and the members of the Vienna Circle. The single most influential analytic philosopher, Wittgenstein, was from Austria.

"The basic tenet of analytical philosophy, common to such disparate philosophers as Schlick, early and later Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, Ayer, Austin, Quine and Davidson, may be expressed as being that the philosophy of thought is to be equated with the philosophy of language." — Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, 1981, p. 148.

Analytic philosophy of history, see philosophy of history

Analytic-synthetic

This dichotomy is first explicated by Kant. In an analytic judgement the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, and we can tell that the proposition is true by analysing the relevant subject concept. An analytic

形而上学”概念恢复了形而上学在分析哲学中的地位。从本世纪40年代中期到60年代,分析哲学基本上被看作是“牛津哲学”或“语言哲学”的同义语,虽然严格地说这并不正确。例如,艾耶尔就特别批评了奥斯汀的工作对日常语言的强调。在美国,奎因抛弃了对早期分析哲学至关重要的分析命题与综合命题的区分,把哲学确立为科学事业的延续。这就改变了分析哲学的景观。

作为一种运动,分析哲学自身有着各种不同的方法和理论主张。而统一这个运动的则是理性方面的精神、对独断假设的怀疑以及追求严格的论证和自然科学模式的清晰性。根据这种基础,哲学的所有最新发展,诸如功能主义、指称的因果理论、各种意义和真理理论、后实证主义的科学哲学、罗尔斯的正义论和德性伦理学等等,都可以看作是分析哲学内的发展。

分析哲学通常是与“大陆哲学”相对而言的,但这不应被理解为地域上的差别。尽管分析哲学是说英语国家的主要倾向,但它同样出现在欧洲大陆的许多国家,而且诸如布伦塔诺、弗雷格和维也纳小组成员等对此同样做出了很大的贡献。最有影响的个别分析哲学家维特根斯坦就是来自奥地利。

“对诸如石里克、前期和后期维特根斯坦、卡尔纳普、赖尔、艾耶尔、奥斯汀、奎因和戴维森等这些各不相同的哲学家来说,他们共同具有的分析哲学的基本信条可以表达为这样一种观念,即关于思想的哲学必须看作是等同于关于语言的哲学。”——达米特:《弗雷格哲学解说》,1981年,第148页。

分析的历史哲学

见“历史哲学”条。

分析-综合

这个区分首先是由康德阐发的。在分析判断中,谓词概念包含在主词概念之中,我们可以通过分析相关的主词概念而确定该命题为真。分析判断就是重言式,它的否定也就包含了自

judgement is tautologous, and its negation involves self-contradiction. In a synthetic judgement, the concept of the predicate adds something new to the concept of the subject, and the truth or falsity of the proposition cannot be determined by analysis. Such a judgement provides a synthesis of two concepts and tells us something about the world. Kant connects this dichotomy with the distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. He claims that all analytic judgements are *a priori*, and he is concerned with how synthetic *a priori* judgement is possible.

The adequacy of Kant's account of this distinction has been a topic of much dispute, in particular because it is unclear what it means to say that a predicate is "contained" or "included" in the subject and because the distinction thus formulated can only be applied to the sentential structure "S is P". Various other accounts have been developed this century. Many of them concentrate on the idea that a negation of an analytic proposition is self-contradictory, and that an analytic proposition cannot be false. Others suggest that a proposition P is analytic iff P is true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents of P, or that P is analytic iff it is true in all possible worlds, or that P is analytic iff P can be proved by logic and definition alone, or that P is analytic in a language L iff P is true in virtue of the semantic rules of L.

Quine famously criticises this distinction as a dogma of empiricism. He argues that the explication of the notion of analyticity is unsatisfactory since it appeals to the equally unclear notions of "necessity", "semantic rules", "synonym", etc. The explanation of these later notions either involves circularity or Platonic realism. He does not believe that this distinction, which plays such a great role in the development of modern philosophy, is sound. But P. F. Strawson and others argue that it is valid since the use we make of semantic meanings is indispensable.

"In all judgements in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought... this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the other synthetic."—Kant, *Critique Of Pure Reason*, A7.

Analytical behaviourism

A type of behaviourism, proposed by Hempel and others, in which all sentences containing sensation terms or psychological terms can be translated or reformulated into sentences containing only physicalistic terms. Hence, psychological terms do not refer to mental objects, events or states. This theory extensively employs meaning analysis and contextual definition, and its goal is to deny the existence of

相矛盾。在综合判断中,谓词概念为主词概念增添了新的东西,这个命题的真假是不能通过分析确定的。这种判断综合了两个概念,告诉了我们有关世界的东西。康德把这个区分与“先天”和“后天”的区分联系起来。他认为,一切分析判断都是先天的,而他关心的是,先天综合判断是如何可能的。

康德对这个区分的论述是否恰当,这一直是许多争论的话题。这特别是因为,它并没有清楚地表明,说谓词“包含在”或“包括在”主词之中,究竟是什么意思;也因为这样构成的区分只能用于“S 是 P”这样的句子结构。本世纪提出了各种不同的说明,其中许多说明都集中到这样一种观念,即一个分析命题的否定是自相矛盾,而分析命题又不可能是假的。其他人则认为,命题 P 是分析的,当且仅当 P 由于其组成部分的意义而为真,或者当且仅当它在一切可能世界中都为真,或者当且仅当 P 可以仅仅用逻辑和定义加以证明,或者当且仅当它在语言 L 中由于 L 的语义规则而为真。

奎因的著名批评把这个区分视为经验主义的教条。他认为,对分析性概念的解释是不能令人满意的,因为它求助于同样并不清楚的“必然性”、“语义规则”、“同义性”等等概念。而解释后面这些概念就会陷入循环论证或柏拉图的实在论。他并不相信这种在现代哲学中起着巨大作用的区分的确有道理。但 P. F. 斯特劳森和其他人则认为这是可信的,因为我们赋予语义学意义的用法是必不可少的。

“在一切所能想到的关于主词与谓词关系的判断中……这种关系在两个方面是可能的。或者是谓词 B 属于主词 A,就像是(暗地里)包含在这个概念 A 中一样;或者 B 存在于概念 A 之外,尽管它与 B 的确处于某种关系之中。在前一个方面,我把这个判断称做分析的,而在后一个方面,则是综合的。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A7。

分析行为主义

一种行为主义,由亨佩尔等人提出,认为所有包含感觉语汇或心理语汇的语句都可以被转译或重述为只包含物理语汇的语句。因此,心理语汇并不指称心的客体、事件或状态。这一理论广泛使用意义分析与语境定义,其目标是否认心的实体的存在。其主要问题是有些心理学语句很难用行为语汇来分析。

mental substance. The major problem it faces is its difficulty in analysing some psychological sentences in behavioural terms.

"Analytical behaviourism is the theory that all sentences using psychological or mentalistic terms are transformable by analysis of what they mean into sentences using no psychological terms, but containing only terms used to describe bodily behaviour and bodily dispositions to behave." —Cornman, *Materialism and Sensations*, 1971, p. 132.

Analytical definition

A definition of a word which can be derived purely by explaining the property ascribed to the word in linguistic usage. For example, an analytical definition of "uncle" is "a man who has the same parents as a parent of another person", because this *definiens* gives the property that English ascribes to the word "uncle". Such a definition is necessarily true. To reject an analytical definition involves a violation of a rule of meaning for the language.

"Analytic definitions of concepts can give rise to analytic statements." — Arthur Pap, "Theory of Definition", *Philosophy of Science*, XXXI (1964).

Analytical jurisprudence

John Austin first brought out the distinction between analytical jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence. Analytical jurisprudence is the branch of legal theory or philosophy that is concerned with the linguistic and logical elucidation of legal concepts. It deals with the articulation and analysis of concepts, rules and structures of law as it is. Normative jurisprudence, on the other hand, is concerned with the evaluative criticism of legal practices and with the prescription of what law ought to be. Analytical jurisprudence does not aim at ascertaining the meaning of a term in a particular text. It intends to reveal the conceptual framework which is common to all properly constituted legal systems and thus to achieve an improved understanding of legal ideas and legal rules. After John Austin, the approach was further developed in this century by the American jurist W. N. Hohfeld and by the Oxford legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart in association with the development of linguistic philosophy.

"Analytic jurisprudence is concerned with the logical analysis of the basic concepts that arise in law, e. g. duty, responsibility, excuse, negligence, and the concept of law itself." —Murphy and Coleman, *The Philosophy of Law*, 1984, p. 1.

Analytical phenomenism, see phenomenism

Analytical priority

The priority in the order of philosophical analysis. If X

"分析行为主义是这样—一个理论：它认为所有使用心理或心的语汇的语句都可以通过对其意义的分析而转化为不使用心理语汇而只包含用以描述身体行为和身体行为倾向的语汇的语句。"——柯尔曼：《唯物论与感觉》，1971年，第132页。

分析定义

一种词的定义，它完全可以通过解释语词在语言用法中被赋予的属性而得到。例如，“舅舅”的分析定义是“与父或母有着同一个父母的男人”。因为这个定义正是英语赋予“uncle”这个词的属性。这种定义是必然为真的。抛弃分析定义，就会违反语言的意义规则。

“概念的分析定义可以导致分析陈述。”——帕普：《定义理论》，载《科学哲学》，第31期，1964年。

分析的法哲学

J. 奥斯汀最先阐明了分析的法哲学和规范的法哲学的区别。分析的法哲学是法学理论或法哲学的一个分支，它涉及的是对法学概念的语言和逻辑解释。分析的法哲学论述的是对法律自身的概念、准则和结构的阐明和分析。而规范的法哲学论述的则是对法律实践的价值评判以及对法律应当是什么的规定。分析的法哲学的目的不是弄清某一概念在一特定语境中的涵义，它试图展现的是所有严格意义上制定的法律体系的共同的概念框架，从而获得对法律思想和法律规范的更好的理解。在J. 奥斯汀之后，随着语言哲学的发展，美国法理学家W. N. 霍费耳德和牛津大学法哲学家H. L. A. 哈特在本世纪又使这一研究方法有了进一步的发展。

“分析的法哲学涉及的是对出现于法律中的基本概念，如义务、责任、赦免、过失，以及法律概念本身的逻辑分析。”——墨菲和科耳曼：《法哲学》，1984年，第1页。

分析现象主义

见“现象主义”条。

分析的在先性

哲学分析方面的在先性。如果在解释Y时

must be appealed to in explaining Y, while the explanation of X itself does not need to involve Y, then X has analytical priority over Y. One of the main characteristics of analytical philosophy is the view that language is analytically prior to thought, and that we should focus on the analysis of language. The philosophy of thought, on the other hand, holds that thought is analytically prior to language. That is, the meaning of a language should be explained in terms of the thought that the language is used to express. Analytical priority is distinguished from ontological priority in which X is prior to Y because Y depends on X for its existence, while X does not exist because of Y. It is also distinguished from epistemological priority in which X is prior to Y because the knowledge of Y presupposes the knowledge of X, but not vice versa.

"To say that the notion of X is analytically prior to the notion of Y is to say that Y can be analysed or elucidated in terms of X, while the analysis or elucidation of X itself does not have to advert to Y."—Davis, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 97.

Analytical Thomism, see Thomism

Anamnesis, Greek term for recollection

Anarchism

[from Greek: *a*, not + *arche*, ruling, governing, literally the lack of government] In a popular sense, pejoratively understood as a position opposing all existing authority and institutions and associated with lawlessness, chaos, violence and terrorism.

Proudhon (1809-65) was the first to identify himself as an anarchist. In his sense, anarchism is a theory which advocates that voluntary and contractual social and economic organisations should replace the existing authoritarian and coercive state and state-like institutions. Accordingly, anarchism is a political theory which rejects authoritarianism and demands the establishment of a better society on the basis of free competition, co-operation and equality. For anarchism, state power is not legitimate and does not have satisfactory justification. Authority involves oppression and domination and entails the promotion of privilege and wealth for a certain minority of the population. It is not helpful in achieving social goals, but produces undesirable consequences. Hence, a society may need certain forms of organisation, but should remove all authoritarian and coercive regulations. Political obligation to the state should vanish. Such a view can be traced to Greek Stoicism and Chinese Taoism. It was fully expressed in modern time in William Godwin's *An Inquiry*

必须诉诸于X, 而对X本身的解释则不必涉及Y, 那么, X对Y就有分析的在先性。分析哲学的主要特征之一就是认为, 语言在分析上是先于思想的, 我们应该关注对语言的分析。而另一方面, 关于思想的哲学则认为, 思想在分析上是先于语言的。这就是说, 语言的意义应该用它所表达的思想加以解释。分析的在先性区别于“本体论的在先性”, 即认为X先于Y, 是由于Y依赖于X而存在, 同时X并不由于Y而存在。它同样区别于“认识论的在先性”, 即认为X先于Y, 是由于关于Y的知识预先假定了关于X的知识, 而反之则不然。

“说关于X的概念在分析上先于关于Y的概念, 就是说Y可以用X加以分析或阐明, 而同时对X本身的分析或阐明则不必提到Y。”——戴维斯, 载布宁和崔-詹姆斯(编):《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》, 1996年, 第97页。

分析的托马斯主义

见“托马斯主义”条。

回忆

“回忆 (recollection)” 的希腊词。

无政府主义

「源自希腊文: *a* (不) 和 *arche* (统治、管理), 字面的意思是没有政府」在一般人的心目中, 无政府主义被贬义地理解为一种反对所有现存的权威和制度, 与无法无天、秩序混乱、暴力横行和恐怖主义相联系的主张。

蒲鲁东(1809—1865)是第一个自认为是无政府主义者的人。在他看来, 无政府主义是这样一种理论, 它提倡应以自愿的、契约性的社会经济组织取代现存的权威主义的、强制性的国家和类似国家的机构。因此, 无政府主义是一种反对权威主义的政治理论, 它要求在自由竞争、合作和公平的基础上建立一个更好的社会。对无政府主义而言, 国家权力是不合理的, 而且不具有令人满意的、正当的理由。权威包含压迫和统治, 并且必须有助于某些少数人的特权和财富。它无助于社会目标的实现, 而且产生不受欢迎的结果。因此, 一个社会也许需要某些组织形式, 但要消除所有权威主义的和强制性的规定。对国家的政治义务应当废除。这种观点可以上溯到希腊的斯多亚哲学和中国的道家学说。在近代, 它在 W. 高德温的《政治正义探究》(1793)一书中有充分的表达。对于实现所期望的无政府状态的手段, 不同的无政府主义者有

Concerning Political Justice (1793). With regard to the means to realise the desired anarchic state, different anarchists have different plans. For example, Proudhon and Max Stirner (1806-56) believed that anarchism should be achieved through the peaceful change of the existing coercive institutions, while M. Bakunin (1814-76) called for a violent revolution to destroy the current machinery of the state.

Anarchism has met tremendous difficulties, for it cannot find an acceptable means of maintaining social order and rectifying degenerate or evil societies. But in theoretical terms it is a significant source for the critique of authoritarianism. It also poses fundamental questions about the justification of political power and political obligation.

"The forms of anarchism anchored in social and philosophical theories do not deny the value of security and order, but they believe that these are maintainable without a state, without a government, without a monopoly of power." — Gans, *Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience*, 1992, p. 11.

Anarchism (scientific)

A position concerning the growth of science, associated in particular with Paul Feyerabend, who denied that there is an overall methodology of science. It is an illusion to believe that there are transcultural norms of rationality of science which guide scientific activities. Hence all attempts to seek universal paradigms of scientific development and its rules are futile. The success of science depends on rhetoric, persuasion and propaganda, rather than on rational argument. To adhere to a set of theories and to demand consistency and invariable meaning discourages development. We should rather advocate the proliferation of conflicting and competing theories. Science should be an anarchistic enterprise which proceeds according to the maxim "anything goes". Feyerabend also called his position theoretical pluralism and claimed that pluralism is essential for the growth of knowledge.

"Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise; theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and order alternatives." — Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 1974, p. 9.

Anarchy, see anarchism

Anatomic property

[from Greek: *ana*, up — *atomos*, indivisible, not atomic] If a property of something is not peculiar to that thing, but is also possessed by at least one more thing, this property is anatomic. For instance, weighing 70 pounds is an anatomic property, for it is not the case that there is only one thing in the world which weighs 70 pounds. An anatomic

不同的方案。例如，蒲鲁东和 M. 施蒂纳 (1806—1856) 认为，无政府主义应通过对现存的强制性机构的和平改变来实现，而 M. 巴枯宁 (1814—1876) 则号召以暴力革命打碎现存的国家机器。

由于找不到一个可接受的维持社会秩序和纠正堕落或邪恶的社会的手段，无政府主义遇到了极大的困难。但就理论而言，它仍是批判权威主义的一个重要来源。它还提出了关于政治权力和政治义务合理性的根本性问题。

“社会和哲学理论中的各种无政府主义并不否认安全和秩序的价值，但它们认为，这些没有国家、没有政府、没有权力独裁也可以维持。”——甘斯：《哲学上的无政府主义和政治上的不服从》，1992 年，第 11 页。

无政府主义 (科学的)

一种关于科学成长的见解，特别与 P. 费耶阿本德相关联。他否认有一种普遍适用的科学方法论，认为相信存在超文化的用以指导科学活动的科学理性准则，只是一种幻觉。因此所有寻求科学发展的普遍范式及其规则的企图都是徒劳的。科学的成功依赖于修辞、劝告及宣传，而不是理性论证。执著于一组理论，要求一致性和意义的不变性，就阻碍了发展。相反，我们应当提倡相冲突和相竞争的理论的扩散。科学应当是一种无政府主义的事业，它所依据的准则是“怎么都行”。费耶阿本德也称自己的立场为理论多元论，并宣称多元论对于知识的成长是必不可少的。

“科学是一种本质上无政府主义的事业；理论上的无政府主义比起它的注重规则和秩序的对手而言，更富有人文精神，更有可能鼓励进步。”——费耶阿本德：《反对方法》，1974 年，第 9 页。

无政府状态

见“无政府主义”条。

结构特性

[源自希腊文 *ana* (向上) 和 *atomos* (不可区分的)、非原子的] 如果一个事物的特性不仅仅是这个事物特有的，而是为至少一个以上的事物所拥有，这个特性就是结构的。譬如，重 70 磅就是一个结构特性，因为在这个世界上不可能只有一个事物重 70 磅。结构特性是与原子特

property contrasts with an atomic or punctuate property, which can be instantiated only by one thing, but is the same as a holistic property, which is a property such that if anything has it, then other things have it. The distinction between anatomic and atomic properties is significant for the discussion of meaning holism. While traditional British empiricism, logical positivism and behaviourism emphasise the relation between a symbol and what is symbolised in the non-linguistic world and hence treat properties atomistically, contemporary semantic holism claims that the meaning of a symbol is determined by its role in a language and is accordingly anatomic.

"A property is anatomic just in case if anything has it, then at least one other thing does." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 1.

Androcentrism

[from Greek; *andro*, the stem of the word man] Androcentrism is a male-centred perspective. According to many feminists, Western culture is androcentric because it is preoccupied with theoretical rather than practical issues and with reason rather than experience. It devalues women's experience and does not take women's concerns seriously. On this view, an androcentric bias is implicit in virtually every aspect of social life. One of the goals of feminism is to deconstruct the traditional androcentric philosophical framework. Androcentrism is opposed by gynocentrism [from Greek; *gyne*, woman], a female-centred perspective.

"The radical feminist position holds that the epistemologists, metaphysicians, ethics, and politics of the dominant forms of science are androcentric." —Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, p. 9.

Anglo-American philosophy, another term for analytic philosophy

Angst, German term for anxiety

Anguish

[French; *angoisse*, also translated as dread] One of the typical existentialist attitudes toward the world, similar to anxiety. A person is both free to act as he or she chooses and to be conscious of this freedom. The feeling of anguish arises when a person is brought face to face with this consciousness or recognition of freedom. If a choice is original and cannot be justified by reasons outside one's own choice, then a person will always enter upon self-questioning concerning the rightness of the choice or the failure to choose and, hence, will experience a sort of uncertainty. Anguish is connected with the absurdity of the world, rather than directed at any

性或精细特性相对而言的,后者只为一个事物所表明,但结构特性与整体特性是一致的,后者把特性定义为,如果某物具有这个特性,那么许多事物都具有。结构特性与原子特性的区分对意义整体论的讨论非常重要。英国经验论传统、逻辑实证主义和行为主义强调符号与符号所描述的非语言世界之间的关系,因而把属性看作是原子的;而当代语义学的整体论则认为,符号的意义是由它在语言中的作用决定的,因而它是结构上的。

"一个特性只有在这种情形中才是结构上的,即如果某物具有这个特性,那么至少有另一个事物也具有这个特性。"——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第1页。

男性中心主义

[源自 *andro*, 希腊词“人”的词根] 男性中心主义就是以男性为中心的立场。根据女性主义,西方文化是男性中心的,因为它专注于理论问题而不是实践问题,看重理性而不是经验。它贬抑妇女的经验,并不把妇女的问题看得很重要。在这种观点看来,男性中心主义的偏见事实上存在于社会生活的每一个方面。女性主义的目标之一就是解构传统的男性中心主义的哲学架构。与男性中心主义相对立的被称之为“女性中心主义”[源自 *gyne*, 希腊词“妇女”],它是以女性为中心的立场。

“激进的女性主义观点认为,占主宰地位的各种科学形式的认识论家、形而上学家、伦理学家和政治学家都是男性中心主义的。”——哈丁:《女性主义的科学问题》,第9页。

英美哲学

“分析哲学”的另一种说法。

畏惧 [或译“恐惧”,“畏”]

“畏惧 (anxiety)”的德文用语。

焦虑

[法文为 *angoisse*, 英文也译作“dread”] 存在主义面对世界的典型态度之一,类似于“畏惧”。当一个人做选择时,他或她既是自由的,又意识到这种自由。当此人面对面地意识到或辨认出这自由时,就出现了这种焦虑之感。如果一个选择是原发的,不能从外在于此选择的理由那里得到辩护,那么,当事人就对于做某种选择或不去做这个选择的正当性产生了自我疑问,并因此而体验到一种不确定性。焦虑与这个世界的荒谬性相关,而不是出自任何特殊的危险情境。绝大多数人依靠自欺或伪劣信仰而避开

particular danger. Most people flee from anguish through bad faith, while an authentic person is aware, through this feeling, of the gap between what is present and what is possible for him or her, and proceeds to increased creativity in the use of his own potentiality. Some existentialists also call this feeling "ontological guilt", a sense of guilt arising not from the violation of some particular prohibitions, but from the self-awareness of free choice. Both the moral psychology and the ontology of this central existentialist notion can be called into question.

"It is by anguish that man becomes conscious of his freedom, or in other words, anguish is the manner of existence of freedom as consciousness of existing." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 66.

Anima, Latin term for soul

Anima mundi, Latin term for world-soul

Animal

[from Latin; *anima*, soul, corresponding to Greek; *psyche*; Aristotle's *Peri Psyche* (On the Soul) is generally translated as *De Anima*] The distinction between living and non-living things lies, according to Aristotle, in the fact the former have souls, although there is a hierarchy of souls, from vegetative, locomotive, and sensory to rational souls. Only man has a rational soul, and plants have no more than vegetative souls. The Bible says that living things are animated with "the breath of life". Thus, the mark of living things is that they are animated or ensouled. Nowadays we distinguish between plants and animals, with humans considered to be a special kind of animal. Descartes, as a consequence of his dualism, described animals as mechanical automata and preferred to call them beasts rather than animals. The normal way to distinguish between human beings and non-human animals appeals to the fact that humans alone are self-conscious and genuine language-users.

"In my opinion the main reason for holding that animals lack thought is the following ... It has never been observed that any brute animal has attained the perfection of using real speech, that is to say, of indicating by word or sign something relating to thought alone and not to natural impulse." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al), III, 1991, p. 366.

Animal-centred ethics, see animal liberation, environmental ethics

Animal liberation

The term comes from the title of a book by Peter Singer

焦虑;但真正的人则通过这种感觉而意识到现存者与可能者对于他或她的区别,并进而在开发自己的潜能中增加创造性。某些存在主义者也称这种感觉为“存在论之罪感”,一种由自由选择意识而非由于违反了某种特殊禁律而引起的罪感。当然,这个存在主义的中心观念所包含的道德心理学和存在论(本体论)也可以受到质疑。

“正是通过焦虑,人意识到其自由;换句话说讲,焦虑是自由生存的方式,而这种自由就是对于〔人的根本〕生存境况的意识。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯译),1957年,第66页。

灵魂

“灵魂(soul)”的希腊词。

世界灵魂

“世界灵魂(world-soul)”的拉丁词。

动物

[源自拉丁文 *anima* (灵魂),与希腊文 *psyche* 对应。亚里士多德的书 *Peri Psyche* (《论灵魂》)一般被译作 *De Anima*] 按亚里士多德所说,活的东西和死的东西的区别就在于这样的事实:前者有灵魂,尽管灵魂按等级分为植物的灵魂、运动的灵魂、感觉的灵魂和理性的灵魂。只有人有理性的灵魂,植物只有植物的灵魂。《圣经》说,活的东西洋溢着“生命的气息”。因而,活的东西的标志是它们被赋予了生命或灵魂。如今我们把植物和动物区分开来,认为人是一种特殊的动物。笛卡尔由于其二元论把动物说成是机械的自动机,宁愿把它们称作“兽类”而不称作“动物”。把人类和非人类的动物区分开来的通常办法是诉诸如下事实:只有人类有自我意识,是真正的语言使用者。

“按照我的看法,人们之所以认为动物缺乏思想的主要理由如下:……人们从来没有看到任何动物达到完美地实际说话的程度,也就是说,达到完美地用词或记号表示只与思想有关而与自然刺激无关的事情。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第三卷,1991年,第366页。

动物中心伦理学

见“动物解放”、“环境伦理学”条。

动物解放

这一术语出自于P. 辛格1975年的一本书

in 1975. The movement to liberate slaves demanded the cessation of prejudice and discrimination against black people on the grounds of skin colour. The women's liberation movement demanded the cessation of prejudice and discrimination against women on the grounds of gender. Analogically, the animal liberation movement calls for an end to prejudice and discrimination against animals on the grounds of species. Traditional ethics excludes animals from the ethical community because they lack the full range of human rationality, and animals have been exploited for food, in experiments and as the victims of hunting. Singer accuses this tradition of speciesism. He argues that animals are capable of suffering and should be included in the community of beings that merit moral consideration. We need a new ethics to deal with human relationships with non-human animals. He claims that abusing and killing animals is not morally justified. Although there is controversy whether animals can have rights and whether these rights would entail that humans should be vegetarians, the animal liberation movement has greatly influenced human attitudes and behaviour towards animals. It is widely accepted that we should at least avoid unnecessary animal suffering and avoid killing animals in brutal ways.

"Animal liberation is human liberation too." —Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 2nd ed., 1990, vii.

Animal spirits

A term Descartes adopted from scholasticism for the principle of movement in automata rather than something spiritual. It was a key term in his theory of animal movement. "Animal" here included both humans and other animals. "Animal spirits" were claimed to be a subtle matter, something in the blood which is distributed through the pineal gland and moves the limbs causing various internal muscular motions. They were likened to "the fire without light in the heart". Animal spirits could be lively or sluggish, coarse or fine, and it was claimed that due to this fact an animal machine could move itself.

"The parts of the blood which penetrate as far as the brain serve not only to nourish and sustain its substance, but also and primarily to produce in it a certain very fine wind, or rather a very lively and pure flame, which is called the animal spirits." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (Cottingham et al, eds), 1, 1985, p. 100.

Animal symbolicum

A term used by the German neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. The tradition since Aristotle has defined a human being as *animal rationale* (a rational animal). However, Cassirer claimed that man's outstanding characteristic is not in his metaphysical or physical nature, but rather in his work. Humanity cannot be known directly, but has to be known

的标题。黑奴解放运动要求停止基于肤色的理由对黑人的偏见和歧视。妇女解放运动要求停止基于性别的理由而对妇女的偏见和歧视。与此相类似的是，动物解放运动要求我们停止基于物种的理由而对动物的偏见和歧视。传统伦理学把动物排除在伦理共同体之外，因为它们缺乏完满的人类理性。动物作为食物、试验物和狩猎物而被人们所宰割。辛格把这一传统谴责为物种主义。他认为，动物有感受痛苦的能力，应该包括在应得到道德考虑的存在者的共同体内。我们需要一种新的伦理学来处理人类与非人类的动物的关系。他认为，虐待和杀害动物在道德上都是不公正的。虽然对于动物是否应有权利、而这些权利是否意味着人类应是素食主义者，还有争议，动物解放运动极大地影响了人类对待动物的态度和行为。现在大家广泛地接受，我们至少应该避免使动物不遭受必要的受苦，避免以残酷的方式杀死他们。

"动物解放也是人类的解放。" ——辛格：*《动物解放》*，第二版，1990年，第vii页。

精气

笛卡尔从经院哲学接受过来的术语，指自动机的运动原理而不是指某种精神的东西。在他的动物运动理论中这是一个关键词。这里的"animal"一词既包括人类也包括其它种类的动物。据认为，"精气"是精细的物质，是血液中的某种东西，分布于松果腺中，并驱动肢体，引起各种各样的内部肌肉运动。它被比作"心中的无光之火"。精气可以是活跃的或呆滞的，粗糙的或精致的，正是由于这个事实，一个动物机器可以自己运动。

"血液的这些部分一直渗透到大脑，它们不仅滋养和维持着脑的本身，而且首要的是，它们在脑中产生出一股十分精细的风，或更恰当地说，一股非常活泼而纯粹的火焰，这就是所谓的精气。" ——笛卡尔：*《哲学著作集》*（科庭汉姆等译），第一卷，1985年，第100页。

符号化的动物（或译“制作符号的动物”）

德国新康德主义者E. 卡西尔所使用的一个词。按照亚里士多德以来的传统，人被定义为“理性的动物”。但是，卡西尔认为人的突出特点不在于他的形而上学的或物理的本性方面，而在于他的劳作。人性不能直接地被知晓，而只能通过分析人在历史中创造的符号世界而得到了

through the analysis of the symbolic universe which man has created historically. Thus man should be defined as *animal symbolicum* (a symbol-making or symbolising animal). On this basis, Cassirer sought to understand human nature by exploring symbolic forms in all aspects of a human being's experience. His work is represented in his three-volume *Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen* (1923-9, translated as *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*) and is summarised in his *An Essay on Man*.

"Hence, instead of defining man as an *animal rationale*, we should define him as an *animal symbolicum*." - Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, 1944, p. 26.

Animism, another term for panpsychism

Anomalous monism

[from Greek; *a*, not + *nomos*, law, order] Donald Davidson's term for his theory about the relationship between the mental and the physical. There is only one fundamental kind of thing, physical objects, upon which all mental events are supervenient. Hence this theory is a type of monism rather than a dualism. This theory asserts that there are no psychophysical laws which relate mental phenomena to physical ones. It is therefore impossible to reduce all mental phenomena to physical phenomena, or to explain mental events fully in terms of the physical structure of the brain. For this reason, Davidson calls this monism anomalous. Davidson contrasts his theory with three possible alternative theories about the mind-body relationship; nomological monism which affirms the existence of laws correlating the mental and the physical; nomological dualism which is ontologically dualist and which assumes a conceptual correlation between mind and body; and anomalous dualism which is ontologically dualist but denies the possibility of mental reduction. Anomalous monism is a combination of ontological monism and conceptual non-reductionism. It considers mental events not as types but as particulars, as individual token events, and therefore replaces the widely accepted type-type identity theory by the token-token identity theory.

"Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects the thesis usually considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomenon can be given purely physical explanations." - Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 214.

Anthropological holism

A thesis derived from the later Wittgenstein, Austin and others, claiming that there is an internal relation between a symbol and its non-linguistic role in conventions, rituals, practices and performances. Hence, language cannot be narrowly understood as a set of sentences and linguistic philoso-

解。因此,人应被定义为“符号化的动物”(制作符号的、进行符号化活动的动物)。在这个基础上,卡西尔试图通过探索人类各种经验的符号形式而理解人的本性。他的代表作是三卷本的《符号形式的哲学》(1923—1929,英译本的题目是 *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*),此书内容被简述于《人论》这本书中。

“因此,与将人定义为理性的动物的做法不同,我们应将人定义为符号化的动物。”——卡西尔:《人论》,1944年,第26页。

泛灵论

“泛心论”的另一个名称。

变异一元论

[源自希腊文 *a* (不) 和 *nomos* (规则,秩序)]戴维森为其关于心物关系理论而创造的术语。只有一种基本的东西,那就是所有的心事件都伴随其上的物理客体。因此,这一理论是一种一元论而不是二元论。这一理论断言不存在联系心的现象与物的现象的心物定律。因此就不可能将所有的心的现象还原为物的现象,或用大脑的物理结构来充分解释心的事件。因此,戴维森称这种一元论为“变异的”。戴维森将这一理论对立于关于身心关系的其他三种可能的理论:认为存在联系心与物的定律的自然法则一元论;在本体论上是二元论而又认为心与物之间存在概念联系的自然法则二元论;以及在本体论上是二元论且否认心的还原的可能性的变异二元论。变异一元论是本体论的一元论与概念上的非还原论的结合。它不是将心的事件视为类型而是视为个别事例、单例的事件,因此就以“单例—单例同一论”取代曾被广泛接受的类型—类型同一论。

“变异一元论像唯物论一样声称所有的事件都是物理的,但拒斥那个通常被视为对于唯物论是本质性的论点:心的现象能够得到纯粹的物理解释。”——戴维森:《关于行为与事件的论文集》,1980年,第214页。

人类学的整体论

这是由后期维特根斯坦、奥斯汀和其他人提出的一个论题,认为在符号与它在约定、礼仪、实践、实施中的非语言作用之间存在着一种内在的关系。因而,语言不能狭隘地理解为一整套句子,语言哲学家也不应只是关注为句子建

phers should not concentrate only on establishing phrase-structure trees for sentences. Instead, they should take language as belonging to forms of life and explore the relation between linguistic symbols and their cultural and practical background.

"Anthropological holism is distinct from semantic holism only in so far as it concerns the relation between language and its intentional background—that is, the relation between language and the cultural background of beliefs, institutions, practices, conventions, and so forth upon which, according to anthropological holists, language is ontologically dependent." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 6.

Anthropomorphism

[from Greek: *anthropos*, man, human kind + *morphe*, shape, form, figure] The ascription of human forms and qualities to non-human things, in particular God. In Homer and Hesiod, gods are described in terms of human characteristics and feelings. This type of religious anthropomorphism was first attacked by the Greek philosopher Xenophanes, who claimed that if horses or oxen had hands and could produce works of art, they too would represent the gods after their own fashion. Others replied to this objection by claiming that we can talk of God in terms of human attributes because man is made in the image of God. Man is the medium through which God manifests or reveals himself. According to this understanding, anthropomorphism, while explaining God in terms of man, ascribes man a theomorphic nature. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation is a typical example of anthropomorphism because God himself becomes a human being. According to G. H. Lewes (1817–1878), anthropomorphism describes animals, plants and the universe in terms of such attributes as consciousness, feelings, thought and communication, which are ordinarily thought to belong only to human beings.

"Anthropomorphism... is the attribution to things not human of characteristics that apply only to humans." —Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 30.

Anticipation

[German: *Vorlaufen*, an existential attitude towards one's death and the future] Heidegger distinguished anticipation from expectation [German: *Erwarten*]. In the face of death, that is in confronting that one's existence is limited and finite, expectation seeks a secure and stable relationship with other human beings and the world of the "they", forgetting one's past and passively awaiting the occurrence of death. Anticipation, on the other hand, views death as revealing one's uttermost possibility and seeks the meaning of what lies ahead. In anticipation *Dasein* finds itself moving towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. It faces up to one's past. Rather than maintaining or continuing the pro-

立短语结构之树。相反,他们应该把语言看作属于生活形式,探究语言符号与它们的文化背景和实践背景之间的关系。

"人类学的整体论有别于语义学的整体论,只是由于它关注语言与其意向背景之间的关系——即语言与关于信仰、制度、实践、约定等诸如此类的文化背景之间的关系,在人类学整体论者看来,语言在其存在上依赖于这些文化背景。"——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第6页。

拟人说

[源自希腊语 *anthropos* (人、人类) 和 *morphe* (形状、形式、外貌)] 把人的形式和性质归给非人的事物,尤其是神。在荷马与赫西俄德那里,是用人的特性及情感来描述诸神的。宗教拟人说的这种风格,首先受到了希腊哲学家克塞诺芬尼的攻击,他宣称,假如马或牛有手并能创造艺术品,那么,它们也会仿照自己的样式描绘神。但是,其他人用下述主张回答了这种异议:我们能够依据人的属性谈论神,因为人是神的影像。人是神用以表明或显现自身的介体。根据这种理解,当拟人说依照人来阐释神时,又把人归为拟神的本性。基督教的化身说是拟人说的一个典型例证,因为上帝自身变成一个人。按照 G. H. 刘易斯 (1817–1878) 的看法,拟人说是依照意识、情感、思想、交流等等通常被认为仅仅属于人类的属性来描述动物、植物和宇宙。

"拟人说,……是将仅仅适用于人的特征归属于非人的事物。"——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第30页。

先行

[德文为 *Vorlaufen*, 一种对于自己的死亡和未来的生存论态度] 海德格尔将先行与预期(德文为 *Erwarten*) 区别开来。在面对死亡、也就是面对人的生存有限性时,预期(状态中的人)寻求与其他人或"人们"(das Man) 的世界的安全稳妥的关系,忘记了自己的过去,被动地等待着死亡的发生。与此不同,先行(状态中的人)则将死亡视为对于自己最终的可能性揭示,并寻求那先在者的含义。在先行中,缘在(*Dasein*) 趋向自身,即最切身的能存在(potentiality-for-Being, 德文为 *Seinkönnen*)。它直面自己的过去,却并非维持或继续那在过去

cess already dominant in the past and present, anticipation contains the possibility of drastic changes in one's future life. While the authentic future is called "anticipation", the authentic present is called "moment-of-vision", and the authentic past is called "repetition".

"Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence." Heidegger, *Being and Time* (trans. by Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 307.

Anticipations of perception

[German: *Antizipationen*, Kant's translation of Epicurus' Greek: *prolepsis*, a preconception which renders perception possible] For Kant, the rules intended to show the objective employment of the categories of quality: reality, negation and limitation. Kant extended the meaning of anticipations to all knowledge which determines *a priori* the qualitative form of empirical knowledge. The leading principle for these categories is that any given perception will have an intensive magnitude, that is a degree of reality. The qualities we sense must come in degrees, for example, the acuteness of a pain or the loudness of a noise. According to Kant, it is impossible for us to perceive appearances unless they possess this intensive magnitude. Anticipations of perception are contrasted to axioms of intuition, whose leading principle is that any perception has extensive magnitude. Both anticipations of perception and axioms of intuition are mathematical principles, in contrast to the dynamic principles of the analogies of experience and the postulates of empirical thought. By anticipations of perception, Kant claimed that the mathematics of intensity must apply to our experience. However, he did not specify what these anticipations are, and his discussion linking the principles to the categories remained vague.

"The principle which anticipates all perceptions, as such is as follows: In all appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object (*realitas phaenomenon*), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree." —Kant, *Critical of Pure Reason*, A166.

Anti-individualism

A term used in contrast to individualism. In social philosophy, it is the claim that the value of community is prior to individual freedom. In political theory, it is the view that a society should have a common goal and that the individual should be subordinate to this goal. Social coherence and uniformity of view are emphasised, rather than diverse individual voices. Anti-individualism does not accept the value of individual experience and is intolerant of difference. In some versions, the existence of an individual is regarded as being determined by his place in society, and individual existence is considered to be a fiction. This position is reinforced through

和现在中占主导地位的进程。相反,先行总孕含着在自己的未来生活中出现重大转变的可能。真正切己的 (authentic, 德文为 *eigentlich*) 未来为“先行”,真正切己的现在为“眼下” (moment-of-vision, *Augenblick*), 真正切己的过去为“反复” (repetition, *Wiederholung*)。

“先行说到底领会人的最切身和最终极的能存在的可能性,也就是切己生存的可能性。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第307页。

知觉之预想

[德语为 *Antizipationen*, 是康德用来翻译伊壁鸠鲁的 *prolepsis* 这一概念的。后者乃是使知觉得以可能的预想]在康德看来,规则意在表明质的范畴(实在性、否定性和限制性)的客观应用,康德把预想的意义扩大到先天地规定经验知识的质的形式的一切知识中去。这些范畴的主导原理是,任何给予的知觉都有内涵的量,即实在的度。我们感觉的质必定表现为度,例如,一种痛苦的剧烈程度或噪音的响度。按康德的观点,没有这种内涵的量要感知现象是不可能的。知觉之预想与“直观之公理”形成对比,后者的主导原理是,任何知觉都有外延的量。知觉之预想和直观之公理都是数学原理,它们共同对比于“经验之类推”和“经验思维之公准”的动态原理。康德以知觉之预想力图主张,强度的数学必须应用于我们的经验。然而,他没有详细说明这些预想是什么。他对原理与范畴相关联的讨论是含糊不清的。

“预想一切知觉的原理就是:在一切现象知觉以及对象中相应于它的实在(实在现象),具有内涵的量,那就是度。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A166。

反个人主义

相对于个人主义而言的一个术语。在社会哲学中,它主张共同体的价值先于个人的自由。在政治理论中,它认为社会应有一个共同的目标,个人应当服从这一目标。它强调的是社会的一致和观点的统一,而不是各种不同的个人意见。反个人主义不承认个人经验的价值,并且不容忍差异。在一些看法中,个人的存在被认为是由他的社会地位决定的,个人的存在被视为一种虚构。这一主张通过与社会达尔文主义结合而得到加强,后者提出,个人经验对人类进步没有什么贡献。别的反个人主义者也主张要限制

combination with social-Darwinism, which suggests that individual experience contributes little to the progress of mankind. Other anti-individualist positions also involve claims limiting the role of individuals in social explanation as well as claims limiting the value of individuals.

In another use, anti-individualism in the philosophy of mind is the view that a person's mental events are fundamentally related to his social and linguistic contexts and hence cannot be individuated solely by appeal to the properties of their owner.

"His [Comte's] 'organic' interpretation of society involves the extremist anti-individualism, derealization of the human individual, worship of Humanity as the only real individual." —Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason*, 1968, p. 68.

Antilogism

A term for any situation in which three propositions cannot all be true simultaneously and at least one of them must be false. In a strict sense, it involves syllogistic reasoning whereby the conjunction of two premises implies the negation of the conclusion. Seeking an antilogism was a basic method to test the validity of a syllogism. A syllogism can only be valid when its two premises and the negation of its conclusion are inconsistent. Such an inconsistency is also called an inconsistent triad.

"When limited to three propositions constituting a disjunctive trio, the antilogism may be formulated in terms of illustrative symbols as follows: 'the three propositions p, q, and r cannot be true together'." —Johnson, *Logic*, II, 1922, p. 78.

Antinomianism

[from Greek: *anti*, against + *nomos*, law or rule, hence, against law] A term introduced by Luther for the position which rejects all regulations and laws. The position was embraced by certain early Christian sects which believed that divine grace enables Christians to determine which conduct is right or wrong. Hence law should be superseded by the gospel. The term is now also used for the extreme relativist position that rejects all moral norms and claims that only sensitivity to a particular given situation can provide it with an ethical solution. The resolution of moral conflicts should depend upon the circumstances. Existentialist ethics is sometimes described as a type of antinomianism.

"Antinomianism... is the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation armed with no principles or maxims whatever, to say nothing of rules." —Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, 1966, p. 22.

个人在社会解释中的作用,也认为要限制个人的价值。

反个人主义的另一用法,是心的哲学中的反个人主义,它认为人的精神活动从根本上来讲是与他的社会关系和语言环境相联系的,因此,不能通过诉诸于它们的主体的特性而被单独地个体化。

"他的[孔德]对社会的'有机的'解释包含极端的反个人主义、对人类个体的现实感的丧失和把人类作为惟一真实个体来崇拜。"——科拉科夫斯基:《理性的异化》,1968年,第68页。

前后矛盾

这一术语指任何这样一种情形:三个命题不能同时为真,其中至少有一个必定为假。在严格的意义上,它是指这样的三段论推理:其两个前提的合取蕴涵其结论的否定。寻求前后矛盾成为检验一个三段论的有效性的基本方法。当它的两个前提和其结论的否定不相容时,一个三段论才能是有效的。这样一种不相容被称为不相容三元组。

"当前后矛盾限于指构成三重析取的三个命题时,它可以用例示性符号表述如下:'三个命题 p, q 和 r 不能都是真的。'"——约翰逊:《逻辑》,第二卷,1922年,第78页。

反法律主义

[源自希腊文, *anti* (反对) 和 *nom* (法律或法规), 意即 "反对法律"] 路德提出的一个术语,指的是那种拒绝一切法规和法律的主张。这一主张为某些早期基督教派别所信奉,他们认为,神的感化能够使基督徒断定一种行为是对的还是错的,因此,法律应当为"福音"所取代。这一术语现在也被用来指称那种极端的相对主义的态度,即拒绝一切道德规范,并声称对某一特定情况而言,惟有感受才能提供对其的伦理学的解释。道德冲突的解决应取决于特定的环境。存在主义的伦理学有时被说成是反法律主义的一种类型。

"反法律主义……指的是人们在进入做出决定的情况下不具有任何原则或准则,不讲任何法规这样一种方法。"——弗莱特席:《情境伦理学》,1966年,第22页。

Antinomy

[from Greek: *anti*, against + *nomos*, law, an extreme form of paradox] A pair of opposed propositions, called a thesis and antithesis, each of which seems to be supported by formally valid argument, but which are inconsistent with one another. Quintilian (35-100 AD) presented antinomies as conflicting arguments side-by-side. Kant used this form, which was widely adopted in sixteenth century jurisprudence, in the dialectic of all three *Critiques* to show that reason will inevitably lead to antinomies when it extends beyond the limits of experience in the hope of finding completeness and unity in explanation.

Kant's most influential account of antinomies appears in the Transcendental Dialectic of his first *Critique*. He claimed that the rational cosmology of traditional metaphysics inevitably leads to antinomies. These are four sets of dialectical inferences about the nature of the world, corresponding to the four groups of categories. (1) quantitative antinomy: thesis: the world is finite in space and time; antithesis: the world is infinite. (2) qualitative antinomy: thesis: everything is made up of simple constituents; antithesis: nothing is made up of simple constituents. (3) relational antinomy: thesis: everything has a cause, and there is no freedom; antithesis: not all things have a cause, and there is freedom. (4) modal antinomy: thesis: a necessary being exists that explains the universe; antithesis: no necessary being exists.

In the second *Critique*, Kant presented the practical antinomy: thesis: the desire for happiness must be the motive for maxims of virtue; antithesis: the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause for happiness. In the third *Critique*, he presented the antinomy of aesthetic judgement: thesis: the judgement of taste is not based on concepts; antithesis: the judgement of taste is based on concepts. All of these Kantian antinomies are drawn from opposing positions in the history of philosophy. According to Kant, once we show how these antinomies are generated from malfunctions of reason, they are shown to be illusory and preventable. Logical positivists were indebted to this aspect of Kant's thought.

Hegel claimed that antinomies are not confined to those uncovered by Kant, but appear in each area of thought. This contributed to the development of Marx's materialist account of dialectic, and the notion of antinomy continues to be employed by Western Marxists and others as a tool for criticising society.

"The second kind of pseudo-rational inference is directed to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance ... The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall entitle the antinomy of pure reason." - Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B398.

二律背反

[源自希腊词 *anti* (反, 排斥) 和 *nomos* (法则), 悖论的极端形式]指一对称的正题和反题的对立命题, 其中每个命题都似乎为形式可靠的证明所支持, 但它们却相互不一致。昆蒂良 (公元 35—100) 提出二律背反作为相互并列的冲突论证。这种形式在 16 世纪的法学中被广泛采用。康德在整个三大批判的辩证论中使用了这种形式, 以表明当理性超出了经验的界限去希望寻求解释的完整性和统一性时, 它就不可避免地导致二律背反。

康德在第一批判的“先验辩证论”中所提出的四组二律背反最具有影响。他主张, 传统形而上学的理性宇宙学不可避免地导致这些二律背反。它们是相应于四组范畴的关于世界本性的四组辩证推理。(1) 量的二律背反: 正题: 世界在空间和时间上是有限的; 反题: 世界是无限的。(2) 质的二律背反: 正题: 一切事物是由单纯的成分所构成; 反题: 没有任何事物由单纯的成分所构成。(3) 关系的二律背反: 正题: 一切事物都有其因, 没有自由; 反题: 并非一切事物都有原因, 存在着自由。(4) 样式二律背反: 正题: 有一能说明世界的必然的存在物存在; 反题: 不存在必然的存在物。

在第二批判中, 康德提出了实践的二律背反, 其命题为: 正题: 追求幸福的欲望必定是德性准则的动机; 反题: 德性准则必定是获取幸福的有效原因。第三批判中的审美判断的二律背反为: 正题: 鉴赏判断不是以概念为基础; 反题: 鉴赏判断是以概念为基础。康德的所有这些二律背反都来自于哲学史上的对立立场。按康德的观点, 一旦我们表明这些二律背反是如何由于理性的功能失误而产生的, 它们就被表明为虚幻的和可加以防止的东西。逻辑实证主义受惠于康德的这一思想。

黑格尔主张, 二律背反并不限于康德所揭示的几组, 而是呈现于思维的每个方面。这导致了马克思的唯物主义辩证法。二律背反观念也是西方马克思主义者等人用于批判社会的武器。

“第二类虚假理性推理指向关于任何给予现象的条件系列之绝对总体的先验概念……理性在这种辩证推理中的位置, 我将名之为纯粹理性的二律背反。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》, B398.

Anti-realism

Anti-realism opposes realism, but its meaning varies according to how we formulate realism. Various sorts of realism argue for the objective existence of different objects and properties, such as the external world, mathematical objects, universals, moral and aesthetic properties, other minds, scientific laws or theoretical entities. Correspondingly, anti-realism has many forms involving the denial of the objective existence of these objects and properties. Realism claims that the items under dispute exist independent of our experience, knowledge and language and that the world is more than we can know. Anti-realism argues that since we know the world only through our mind-related perceptual and conceptual faculties, we cannot sensibly talk about a mind-independent world. The debate between realism and anti-realism takes different forms for different issues. For example, materialists and idealists debate the existence of the external world, and realists and nominalists debate the existence of universals.

An influential kind of anti-realism, particularly associated with M. Dummett, C. Wright and J. McDowell, is sometimes called semantic anti-realism. According to this view, realism has an arbitrary metaphysical assumption that an objective reality exists independent of our knowledge. The position is characterised by following intuitionist logic in denying the principle of bivalence. Truth and falsity are not exhaustive, as they would be according to realism, because truth or falsity are determined by the conditions under which we can correctly assert or deny a sentence. Because there are circumstances in which neither assertion nor denial is justified, bivalence and realism fail. This position is influenced by Frege and by later Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning and is seen by critics as being closely related to verificationism.

"The general argument Dummett has given for anti-realism starts from the following thesis: that the content of a sentence is determined by the class of recognizable situations with respect to which it would be acknowledged as true and the class of recognizable situations with respect to which it would be acknowledged as false." —Pococke, *Thought: An Essay on Content*, 1986, p. 27.

Anti-theory

A contemporary ethical movement represented by figures such as Annette Baier, Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty and Stuart Hampshire. The "theory" that this movement opposes is modern moral theory, which takes as its central task constructing and justifying a set of abstract universal moral rules and principles to guide and evaluate the moral behaviour of all rational beings. These principles are completely context-free and can be applied in

反实在论

反实在论与实在论对立, 但它的意义却取决于我们怎样解释实在论。各种各样的实在论论证了不同对象和属性的客观存在, 诸如外在的世界、数学对象、共相、道德属性和美学属性、他人的心灵、科学规律或理论实体。与此相应的是, 反实在论的许多形式就涉及到否定这些对象和属性的客观存在。实在论声称, 以上所争论的内容是独立于我们的经验、知识和语言而存在的, 这个世界超出了我们对它的认识。而反实在论则认为, 由于我们只能通过与心灵相关的概念和知觉能力认识这个世界, 所以我们无法从认知上谈论一个独立于心灵的世界。实在论与反实在论之争在不同的问题上采取了不同的形式。例如, 唯物主义者 and 唯心主义者争论外在世界的存在, 而唯实论者和唯名论者则争论共相的存在。

一种较有影响的反实在论与 M. 达米特、C. 赖特和 J. 麦克多威尔有特殊的联系, 有时这也被称作“语义学的反实在论”。根据这种观点, 实在论有一个武断的形而上学假定, 即认为客观实在是独立于我们的知识而存在的。这种立场的特点是追随直觉主义逻辑, 否定二值原则。真和假并不像实在论所说的那样是包揽无遗的, 因为真和假是由我们可以正确地肯定或否定句子的条件所决定的。因为存在对句子的肯定和否定都没有得到证实的情况, 故二值与实在论不适用。这种立场来自弗雷格和后期维特根斯坦关于意义的用法理论的影响, 它也被看作来自与证实理论密切相关的批评。

“达米特对反实在论的一般论证开始于以下这样一个论题: 句子的内容是由一类可以承认为真的可认知场景和一类可以承认为假的认知场景所决定的。” — 皮考克:《思想: 论内容》, 1986年, 第27页。

反理论

以 A. 培尔、B. 威廉姆斯、J. 麦克多威尔、M. 纽斯堡姆、C. 泰勒、A. 麦金太尔、R. 罗蒂、S. 亨普舍尔等为代表的一场当代伦理学运动, 这个运动反对的“理论”指的是现代道德理论。现代道德理论认为, 其中心任务是建构和论证一套抽象的普遍性道德规则和原则来指导和评价理性主体的道德行为。这些原则完全脱离环境, 而几近于以一种计算的方式运用于任何具体情况。正确的道德判断和实践似乎能够从这

an almost computational way to any particular case. Correct moral judgements and practices seem to be deducible from these timeless principles, and all moral values are commensurable with respect to a single standard. Any moral conflict can be solved in a rational way. The anti-theory movement claims that moral theory of this sort is unnecessary, narrow and impossible, for it cannot specify moral norms embedded in cultural and historical traditions, it cannot account for virtue which is culturally informed and it is incompatible with the fact that there are irresolvable moral conflicts and dilemmas. In contrast, this movement suggests that ethics should return to Aristotelian virtue ethics, claims the primacy of social moral practice over rational principles and the primacy of ethical perception over rules, and emphasises the plurality of social conventions and customs. It is united in its opposition to modern moral theory, but varies in its positive doctrines. Authors supporting this movement have their own versions of what ethics should be. In many cases, this movement leads to moral contextualism, conservatism or communitarianism.

"The expression 'anti-theory' emphasises opposition to any assertion (whether in the form of a substantive moral principle or a meta-ethical theory about the nature of moral claims) that morality is rational only insofar as it can be formulated in, or grounded on, a system of universal principles." — S. G. Clarke and E. Simpson (eds.), *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*, 1989, pp. 2-3.

Anxiety

[German: *Angst*, also translated as dread or uneasiness.] A type of existential experience similar to Sartre's "anguish". The topic was introduced into philosophy by Kierkegaard in his *The Concept of Dread* (1844). Heidegger distinguished anxiety from fear. Fear arises from a specific threat, and there is some external entity about which to be afraid. Anxiety, on the other hand, is a state of mind arising not from any particular and determinate affliction, but from one's own indefinite existence. Anxiety comes to us from nowhere and in the face of nothing. For Heidegger, it is simply concerned with our "thrownness in the world", that is with Being-in-the-world itself. Anxiety reveals to us how we are in the world and brings us to face the alienated, not-home-like world. The framework in which we make sense of our own existence and of the world is not given once and for all. For each of us, anxiety makes our individuality, our determinate self and our own possibility. In particular, it reveals to us that no individual can escape death with the aid of the public. For Heidegger, anxiety is closely related to *Dasein* (the Being of human beings, which is Being-in-the-world). Thus through individuating *Dasein*, anxiety is a distinctive way in which *Dasein* is disclosed. Anxiety discloses *Dasein* as Being-possible, and in the meantime, as a state

些永恒的原则中推演出来,并且所有的道德价值对照一种单一的标准可以通约。任何道德冲突都可以以一种理性的方式来解决。反理论宣称,这样一种道德理论是不必要的、狭隘的和不可能的,因为它不能说明根植于文化和历史传统中的道德规范,不能说明有着文化内蕴的德性,而且不相容于存在着不可解决的道德冲突和两难困境的事实。与此相对照,这个运动则提出,伦理学应该返回到亚里士多德的德性伦理学,主张社会道德实践优于理性原则,伦理的知觉先于规则,强调社会习惯和习俗的多样性。反理论运动在反对现代道德理论上是一致的,但在它的肯定性的学说上,则是多样的。支持这一运动的作者关于伦理学应当是什么都有自己的说法。在大多数情形中,这个运动导致道德具体环境论,保守主义或共同体主义。

“‘反理论’这一表述强调反对任何如下断言(不论是以一种具有实质性意义的道德原则的形式,还是一种关于道德主张性质的元伦理学理论);道德就其能够以一种普遍原则的系统公式化或以这种普遍原则为基础而言,是理性的。”——克拉克和辛普森合编:《伦理学中的反理论和道德保守主义》,1989年,第2—3页。

畏惧

[德文为 *Angst*, 也可译为“恐惧”、“忧虑”] 一种类似于萨特讲的“焦虑”的生存体验。这个话题由克尔凯郭尔在其《恐惧的概念》(1844年)一书中引入哲学。海德格尔将这畏惧与害怕区别开来。害怕来自某个特殊威胁,而且有某个让人害怕的外在存在者。与之相对,畏惧是一种与特定的折磨无关的处身情境,来自人的不确定的生存状态。它源自无,让我们面对无。在海德格尔看来,这畏惧所关切的便是我们的“被抛投于世界之中”的状态,也就是“在此世界中存在”(Being-in-the-world)这个状态本身。畏惧向我们揭示出,我们如何存在于世,并让我们直面这个异化了的、不像家园的世界,我们借以使自己的生存及世界有意义的构架不会一劳永逸地被给予。对我们每个人来说,畏惧造成了我们的个人性、我们的有限自我和我们自己的可能性。它特别向我们揭示:任何个人都不能凭借[混同于]公众而逃避[自己的]死亡。对于海德格尔,畏惧与缘在或 *Dasein* (人类存在者的存在,即“在此世界中存在”)紧密相关。正是通过个体化了的缘在,畏惧成为开显缘在状态的突出方式。畏惧将缘在开显为能存在[Being-possible, *Seinkönnen*]; 同时,它作为

of mind it is also a basic kind of Being-in-the-world. The affirmative or passive attitude towards anxiety may lead respectively to authentic or inauthentic existence.

"That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such." --Heidegger, *Being and Time* (trans. by Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 230.

Apathy

[from Greek: *a*, not -- *patheia*, affection, passion, emotion] A state of indifference to pleasure or pain in which one gains peace of mind or tranquillity by being emotionally unaffected by the external sensible world. In apathy, the control of emotion by reason is justified on the grounds that emotion is irrational, and it therefore stands in contrast to ordinary indifference or insensitivity. For Stoicism, apathy is the highest virtue, with the Stoic sage characterised as being emotionally detached and acting purely out of reason. This ideal is echoed in religions which despise worldly pleasures and in philosophical systems which devalue the role of emotion. Critics claim that at least some emotions are rational, thus undermining the general claim for the value of indifference.

"Apathy is a sort of depression which stops us doing anything, a weariness with work, a torpor of spirit which delays getting down to anything good." -- Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (tr. McDermott), II, 10, 1989, p. 365.

Apeirion

[Greek: from *a*, not -- *peras*, limit or boundary, hence unbounded, infinite] The unbounded was contrasted with *peras* or *kosmos* (world), which was widely believed by the Greeks to be bounded. The Milesian philosopher Anaximander took the unbounded to be the first principle or ultimate generative force for all the things and events in the world. The *apeirion* is immortal and imperishable, unbounded both in space and in time, and does not have the characteristics of ordinary elements and their composites. Aristotle interpreted the *apeirion* of Anaximander as a material cause, analogous to Thales' water or Anaximenes' air. But because *apeirion* appears to be more abstract than other material elements, what Anaximander meant by this term has been a subject of debate. Pythagoreans took *apeirion* and *peras* as two principles from which the world evolved and considered *peras* to be good and *apeirion* to be evil. Parmenides believed that what is cannot be incomplete and infinite and thus confined his ontology to *peras* and denied *apeirion*. For Anaxagoras, mind is *apeirion*, that is infinite or indefinite in extent.

"[Anaximander] said that the *apeirion* was the principle

of a certain state of mind [state of mind, *Befindlichkeit*] is also a basic kind of "being-in-the-world". For the affirmative or passive attitude towards anxiety may lead respectively to authentic or inauthentic existence. The affirmative or passive attitude towards anxiety may lead respectively to authentic or inauthentic existence.

"That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such." -- Heidegger, *Being and Time* (trans. by Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 230.

不动情

[源自希腊语: *a* (不) 和 *patheia* (性情、激情、情绪)] 不关心快乐或痛苦, 情绪上不受外部感性世界的影响, 获得心灵的安宁或平静的状态。不动情是理智对情感的正当控制, 因为情感是非理性的, 所以, 不动情与普通的冷漠或麻木很不一样。对斯多亚派而言, 不动情是最高德性。斯多亚式贤哲的特征是分离了情感, 其行为纯粹出于理智。这种观念在蔑视世俗快乐的许多宗教和贬低情感作用的许多哲学体系中引起了共鸣。批评家们认为, 至少有些情感是理性的, 因而对不动情之价值的一般主张提出了挑战。

"不动情是妨碍我们做事情的一种压抑, 一种对劳作的厌倦, 一种降低对善物热情的精神麻痹。" -- 阿奎那: 《神学大全》(麦克德莫特译本), II, 10, 1989年, 第365页。

无定

[源自希腊词: *a* (不, 没有) 加 *peras* (限制, 界限), 通常译作“无界定”或“无限”] 无定与 *peras* 或 *kosmos* (宇宙) 相对立。因为希腊人普遍认为宇宙是有界定的。米利都哲学家阿那克西曼德把无定看作是世界上一切事物和事件的第一原则或终极生成力量。无定是不朽的, 不灭的, 在时间和空间上都无限定。它不具有一般元素及其组合物的特征。亚里士多德把阿那克西曼德的无定解释作是一种质料因, 与泰勒的水或阿那克西美尼的气地位相同。可因为它比其他物质元素显得更为抽象, 阿那克西曼德的无定究竟是什么意思, 一直是一个有争论的问题。毕达哥拉斯派把无定和界定看作是界定的善而无定是恶。巴门尼德认为存在(是)不可能是不完美的和无限的, 因此把他的本体论(存在论)限制于界定, 并排斥无定。不过, 阿那克萨戈拉的心灵也是无定, 即在范围上是无限的或不定的。

"[阿那克西曼德]说, 无定是事物的原则

and element of things.” —Simplicius, *Physics*, 24. 14.

Apodeictic

[from Greek: *apo*, from + *deiktikos*, to be able to show] Also spelled apodictic, that which is demonstrable, necessarily true or absolutely certain. Aristotle contrasted the apodeictic (beyond dispute) with the eristic (subject to dispute). Kant distinguished the apodeictic (necessary) from the problematic (possible) and the assertoric (actual). All three belong to the modal categories. An apodeictic judgement has the form of “X must be Y” or “X cannot be Y”.

“Geometric propositions are one and all apodeictic, that is, are bound up with the consciousness of their necessity.” —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B41.

Apodeictic practical principle, another expression for categorical imperative

Apodictic, another expression for apodeictic

Apollonian, see Dionysian/Apollonian

Apologetics

[from Greek: *apologia*, defence against a charge, answering back; hence Plato's *Apology* describes Socrates' defence against accusations in an Athenian court] A dimension of Christian theology aimed at defending orthodox theistic beliefs against external criticism or against other world views. While theology is a rational inquiry by the faithful for the faithful, apologetics is a discourse between the faithful and those outside the faith which seeks to defend the validity of belief with reasons which will be meaningful to those who do not share the same faith. Historically, apologetics has had different forms and has employed different standards of judgement in expounding and defending religious belief according to its intended audience. Each generation has developed an apologetics in response to the criticism of religion of its time. For example, Augustine's *City of God* was written in reply to the pagans; Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* is an argumentative work directed at Muslim theology; and Butler wrote *The Analogy of Religion* to refute deism. The contemporary apologetic, represented by Paul Tillich, is characterised by its appeal to value as against fact. The practice of apologetics has impact upon hermeneutics.

“The essential task of apologetics is the defence or ‘answering back’ of religion, and particularly the Christian faith against the doubts or accusations of its ‘cultured despisers’.” —Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 10.

和元素。”——辛普里丘：《物理学》，24，14。

必然的

[源自希腊语 *apo* (从, 由于) + *deiktikos* (能够表明)] 也拼写为 apodictic。意为可证明的, 必然是真的或绝对确实的。亚里士多德把必然的 (“不容争辩”) 与辩论术 (“属于争论的”) 相对比。康德区分了必然性与或然的 (可能的) 和实然的 (现实的)。这三个概念都属于样式范畴。必然判断的形式是: “X 必然是 Y” 或 “X 不能是 Y”。

“几何命题永远是必然的, 即必联系于这些命题之必然性的意识。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》, B41。

必然的实践原理

“绝对命令”的另一种名称。

必然的

“必然的 (apodeictic)” 的另一种表达。

阿波罗的

见“狄俄尼索斯的/阿波罗的”条。

护教论

[源自希腊语 *apologia*, “对指控的辩护”, 或“辩答”。因此, 柏拉图描述苏格拉底在雅典的法庭上针对对他的控告所作辩护的那篇对话就冠名为 *Apology*] 基督教神学的目的在于为正统的有神论信仰辩护, 反对外来的批评或其他世界观。如果说神学是信徒为信徒所作的理性探究, 那么, 护教论则是信徒与那些教外信仰之间的对话。它试图通过论证, 为信仰的确当性辩护, 而这些论证, 对于那些不具有同样信仰的人, 意义深远。历史上, 护教论的表现形式有所不同, 而且在阐释和辩解宗教信条时, 也根据不同的听众, 使用了不同的判断标准。为回应自己时代对宗教的批评, 每代人都提出一种护教论。例如, 奥古斯丁的《上帝之城》是为应答异教徒而写; 阿奎那的《反异端大全》是一部针对穆斯林神学的论战性著作。巴特勒的《宗教类推》则是为了反驳自然神论。以 P. 蒂利希为代表的当代护教论, 其特点是诉诸价值以对抗事实。护教论的实践对解释学深有影响。

“护教论的本质任务是辩护或‘回应’宗教信仰, 尤其是基督教信仰, 以对付其对它的‘有教养的轻蔑者’的怀疑或指责。”——费勒:《现代宗教哲学基础》, 1968年, 第10页。

Apophatic theology, another expression for apophaticism

Apophaticism

Also called apophatic theology or negative theology, a doctrine rejecting our capacity to know God. It belongs mainly to Neo-platonism and eastern Christian thought. Clement of Alexandria is credited with its formulation, and its major exponents include Meister Eckhart and Moses Maimonides. Apophaticism claims that God cannot be conceptualised in any way, nor can God be an object of intellect or sense. No language provides us with real knowledge of God, for he is beyond positive human understanding. The soul can come close to God only through faith and prayer.

"Apophaticism teaches us to see above all a negative meaning in the dogmas of the church; it forbids us to follow natural ways of thought and to form concepts which would usurp the place of spiritual realities." —Lossky, *The Metaphysical Theology of the Eastern Church*, 1957, p. 42.

Aporia

[from Greek: *a*, not + *poros*, path, passage; literally, no way through, a puzzle or perplexity] In the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates raises various problems without offering solutions to them whilst showing that the people he questions are unable to offer acceptable solutions either. This aporetic method leads to the development of the dialectical method, by which Socrates elicits truth through questioning. The term "*aporia*" is introduced by Aristotle for puzzles concerning incompatibilities which arise either among the views we hold without prompting, or among the reputable beliefs adopted commonly or by the wise. His approach is to seek the minimal adjustments needed to reconcile these conflicting views. According to him, philosophy exists to solve these kinds of *aporia*. Recently, "*aporia*" has also been used to refer to a text or an approach which contains contradictory lines of thinking.

"The *aporia* of our thinking points to a knot in the object; for in so far as our thought is in *aporia*, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III, 995230-32.

Apparent variable, Russell and Whitehead's term for bound variable

Appeal to authority

[Latin: *argumentum ad verecundiam*, argument to reverence or respect] A fallacious argument which tries to establish its conclusion by appeal to the opinion of an expert or authority. It is a misuse of authority. For instance, "Something is true because some expert says that it is true". This

阿波发神学

“阿波发主义”的另一名称。

阿波发主义

也称作阿波发神学或否定神学，一种否认我们有能力认识上帝的学说。主要属于新柏拉图主义和东方基督教思想。它的创立归功于亚历山大里亚的克莱门德，主要代表人物包括 M. 艾克哈特和 M. 迈蒙尼德。阿波发主义主张，上帝不能以任何方式被概念化，也不是理智或感觉的对象。没有任何语言能为我们提供上帝的真实知识，因为他超越了肯定的人类理解力。只有通过信仰和祈祷，灵魂才能接近上帝。

“阿波发主义教导我们，在教堂的教义中，最重要的是要看出里面的否定意义；它禁止我们跟随自然的思想方式，禁止形成可能僭夺精神实在地位的概念。”——洛斯基：《东方教派的形上神学》，1957年，第42页。

迷阵

[源自希腊文 *a* (没有) + *poros* (路径，通道)；字面上讲是“无路通行”，它是指一种困惑或迷惑]在柏拉图的早期对话中，苏格拉底提出了各种问题，但没有给出它们的答案，他由此来表明，他所询问的人们也不可能提出可以接受的答案。这种迷阵式的方法导致了辩证法的发展，苏格拉底正是用这种方法通过询问而引出真理。“迷阵”这个词是由亚里士多德提出的，用来指那些与不相容性相关的困惑，这些不相容性或者出自我们未经考察的看法，或者出自众口皆碑的信念或智者之见。他的方法是要寻求所需的最小调整，以调和这些相互冲突的看法。根据他的观点，哲学的存在就是要解决这些迷阵。近年来，“迷阵”也一直用于指包含了矛盾思路的文章或方法。

“我们思想的迷阵是指对象中的结；当我们的思想处于迷阵之中时，就像是那些受缚的人一样，无论哪种情形都不可能前进。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，Ⅲ，995230—32。

表面变元

罗素和怀特海用以指“约束变元”的术语。

诉诸权威

[拉丁语 *argumentum ad verecundiam*；诉诸崇敬或尊重的论证]一种虚假论证，它试图通过诉诸专家或权威的意见来确立其结论。这是对权威的滥用。例如，“某物是真实的，因为有专家说它是真实的”。这种论证在日常生活中被

argument is widely employed in everyday life, but it is logically fallacious because it uncritically accepts anything an expert or a great figure says rather than proving the conclusion by appeal to positive evidence. The view of a trained or legitimate expert nevertheless carries some weight although it is open to challenge. An argument of this form is especially poor if its conclusion goes beyond the field for which the authority has expertise.

"The appeal to authority typically involves three persons: the arguer, the listener or reader, and the person whom the arguer cites as an authority." —Hurley, *A Concise Introduction to Logic*, 1982, p. 77.

Appearance

[from Latin: *a, ad*, to, toward + *parere*, come forth, become visible; what is seen or what is immediately given to consciousness, equivalent to Greek: *phainomenon*, to appear to be so, but also to be so manifestly. Thus Aristotle took the opinion of the majority, especially of wise men, as *phainomenon*] Appearance, what things seem to be, is often contrasted to reality, what things are themselves. It is a major distinction in philosophy; and different philosophers offer different accounts of the relationship between appearance and reality. Some philosophers, such as Plato, say that appearance is an incomplete and imperfect copy of reality. Some, such as Aristotle, say that reality is in appearance. Some, such as Descartes, say that appearance is regrettable and even spurious. Some, such as Kant, say that our knowledge is restricted to appearance (*phenomena*), but that for morality we can make sense of a more fundamental reality (*noumena*). And some, such as Hegel and Bradley, say that appearance is a partial aspect of reality. In metaphysics appearance is generally regarded as less valuable than reality. Contemporary linguistic philosophers distinguish two groups of appearance idioms. Seeming idioms, such as "appears to be" or "gives the appearance", are not strictly related to senses, while looking idioms, such as "looks" or "feels", are strictly related to senses.

"Appearance means that one perceives it so." —Plato, *Theatetus*, 152b.

Appearance (Kant)

Traditionally, appearance (*phenomenon*) is contrasted to reality. Appearance is thought to be the object of perception or belief, while reality is characterised as the object of knowledge. Kant transformed this contrast in his distinction between appearance (*phenomenon*) and thing-in-itself (*noumenon*). Appearances are objects as we experience them with our spatial and temporal forms of sensibility and our categories of understanding, while things-in-themselves are those objects as they might be in themselves and known by a pure intellect. He further claimed that appearance (German;

广为使用,但它在逻辑上是虚假的,因为它不加批判地接受专家或大人物所说的任何东西,而不是通过诉诸肯定证据来证明其结论。不过,训练有素或真正够格的专家的意见也能增加论证的分量,尽管也是可以向这些意见挑战的。当所达到的结论超出了该权威赖以成名的领域时,这种形式的论证就显得特别没有说服力。

"诉诸权威典型地涉及到三个人:论证者,听众或读者,论证者引为权威的那个人。"——赫尔利:《简明逻辑导论》,1982年,第77页。

现象

[源自拉丁词 *a, ad* (到,趋向于) 和 *parere* (出现,可见),字面意思为“可以见到的”,或“直接呈现于意识的”。其在希腊文中的对应词为 *phainomenon*,“显得是如此”,但也意为“显然是如此”。因而亚里士多德把大多数人的意见,尤其是有智慧的人的意见,叫做 *phainomenon*] 现象,即“事物看起来之所是”,通常相对于实在,即“事物本来之所是”。现象与实在的区分在哲学中是根本的。不同哲学家对它们间的关系有不同论述。有些哲学家,如柏拉图,说现象是实在的不完整的和不完美摹本。有些哲学家,如亚里士多德,说实在就在现象之中。有些哲学家,如笛卡尔,说现象是令人遗憾的甚至是虚假的。有些哲学家,如康德,说我们的知识只限于现象 (*phenomena*),但就道德而言我们可以领会一个更根本的实在 (*noumena*)。还有一些哲学家,如黑格尔和布拉德雷,说现象是实在的一个部分。在形而上学中,现象一般被认为在价值上低于实在。当代语言哲学家区分了两类现象术语。一类是不严格与感官相连的外表术语,如“显得是”或“给出这一现象”。另一类是严格与感官相连的检视术语,如“看起来是”,“感觉是”。

“现象的意思为所感到是如此。”——柏拉图:《泰阿泰德篇》,152b。

现象 (康德)

在传统意义上,现象相对于实在。现象被认为是知觉的或信念的对象,而实在则表示知识的对象。康德通过区分现象和物自身(本体)而改变了这种对比。前者乃是我们以感性的时空形式和我们的知性范畴来经验的对象,而后者则是指那些可自在存在并由纯粹理智而认识的对象。他进一步主张,现象(德语: *Erscheinung*)应当区别于幻象(*Schein*)。幻象是对实际呈现的对象的反常的知觉,指一种没有任何事物与之相应的表象。相反,现象总是一

Erscheinung) should be distinguished from illusion (*Schein*). Illusion is an abnormal perception of an actually present object and signifies a representation to which nothing real corresponds. In contrast, appearance is always the appearance of a given object and is constant and universal. Contrary to the traditional view, he argued that appearance is the only object of science and is that to which the concepts of the understanding apply. In contrast, the thing-in-itself is beyond knowledge, although Kant argued that its existence is a necessary condition for an object of one's awareness to count as an appearance, for appearance itself presupposes that there is something which appears. He held that if the objects of experience were not appearances, then all the problems of reason falling into conflict with itself would re-emerge. Nevertheless, this claim and the relation between appearance and thing in itself remain matters of dispute.

"The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B24/A20.

Apperception

[from Latin: *ad*, to, towards + *percipere*, perceive] In contrast to perception, which refers to the external world, apperception is introspection, conscious thought, or the consciousness of internal states. It is at the same time consciousness of, or reflection on the "I" or the self, that is the subject of these states. In apperception the self is aware of itself as being a unity and as possessing the power to act. For Leibniz, all monads have perception, but only a special kind of monad which he called "rational soul" has apperception. According to him, it is by virtue of this consciousness that we become persons, or members of a moral world. Leibniz's distinction implies that there can be unconscious perception. The concept of apperception played a central role for Kant. Kant distinguished between empirical apperception (inner sense) which amounts to introspection and the transcendental unity of apperception (I think) which accompanies all of our representations and combines concepts and intuitions in knowledge.

"It is well to make the distinction between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of this internal state itself and which is not given to all souls nor at all times to the same soul." —Leibniz, *Principles of Nature and Grace*, par. 4.

Application

Application in the scientific world applies general knowledge or a universal law to particular instances by subsuming the instances under a general concept and rule. In the humanities, on the other hand, application is not so straightforward, for the distance between general laws (if there are

个给予对象的现象,它是持久的和普遍的。相对于传统的观点,他论证说,现象是科学的对象和知性概念应用的领域。相反,物自身超出了认识的范围,尽管康德认为,物自身的存在乃是人们的意识对象可算作现象的必要条件,因为现象本身预定了存在着某种显现的东西。他认为如果经验对象不是现象,则理性的一切与自身相冲突的问题就会再现。尽管如此,这一论点及现象与物自体之间的关系仍是争论的问题。

"经验直观的未规定的对象泛称为现象。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B24/A20。

统觉

[由拉丁文 *ad* (往,到,向) 和 *percipere* (知觉,感知) 结合而成] 与有关外部世界的知觉相对,统觉是内省、是被意识到的思想、或是对内在状态的意识。同时,它又是对"我"或"自我",即这些状态的主体的意识或反省。在统觉中,自我意识到自身是一个统一体,意识到自身具有行动的能力。在莱布尼茨那里,所有的单子都有知觉,但是只有他称作"理性灵魂"的一类特殊单子有统觉。依他之见,正由于这种意识,我们才变成人,才变成道德世界的成员。莱布尼茨的区分意味着,也可能有无意识的知觉存在。统觉概念在康德那里起着核心作用。康德区分了经验的统觉("内在感觉")和统觉的先验统一("我想")。前者相当于内省,后者伴随我们的一切表象,将概念和直觉在知识中结合了起来。

"把知觉和统觉区分开来是恰当的。知觉是表现外部事物的单子的内在状态;统觉是对此内在状态本身的意识或反省认识,而且它既非给予一切灵魂,也非任何时候都给予同一个灵魂。"——莱布尼茨:《自然的原则与神恩》,第4段。

应用

在(自然)科学世界中,应用意味着将一般知识或普遍规律应用于特殊实例;要做到这一点,就需要将实例纳入某个一般概念和规则之下。然而,在人文学科中,应用不会如此直截了当,因为一般规律(如果毕竟有的话)与它们的

any) and their instances is very great. Application is rather a process of intertwining theory and practice. Traditional hermeneutics classifies application as the third fundamental element in the act of understanding, besides "understanding" and "interpretation". In Gadamer's hermeneutics, application becomes an essential and integral part involved in all interpretative understandings. Aristotle argues that ethical or practical knowledge must be tied to particular circumstances and modified to suit these circumstances. The meaning of an ethical norm can only be shown in a concrete situation of action. Analogically, Gadamer claims that all understanding must be historically situated. A text can only be understood in relation to the present and through modifications in accordance with changed historical circumstances. This is the moment of application in understanding. Understanding is always applied understanding, even when application is not the intended purpose. Understanding that is independent of the particular situation to which it is applied must be abstract and reductive. Since the situations in which applications occur are constantly changing, an historical text must be understood in every situation in a new and different way. According to Gadamer, application therefore involves the distinction between past and present, rather than the distinction between general and particular.

"We consider application to be as integral a part of the hermeneutical act as are understanding and interpretation."
—Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (trans. by Glen Doepel), 1975, p. 275.

Applied ethics

Also called practical ethics. The study of how to apply ethical principles, rules and reasons to analyse and deal with moral concerns arising in practical and social areas. Such a practical application of ethical theory has been a dimension of traditional ethics. Aristotle claimed that all universal moral standards must be adjusted and modified through their application to particular circumstances. However, applied ethics as a distinctive discipline, in contrast to other aspects of ethics, such as meta-ethics, normative ethics and ethical theory, started to flourish in the middle of this century. Thus far, relatively well-established branches of applied ethics include academic ethics, agricultural ethics, bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, legal ethics, medical ethics and nursing ethics. Since the moral principles to be applied are derived from different ethical systems, and are hence various and subject to conflict, applied ethics can seldom provide fixed answers to practical problems. It can, however, contribute to making discussion of these problems as clear and rigorous as possible. The development of applied ethics has also led philosophers to involve themselves in committees dealing with policy-making, decision-making and evaluation.

实例之间跨度极大。毋宁说,应用是一个理论和实践交织的过程。传统的诠释学 (hermeneutics, 又译为“解释学”) 将应用列为领会行为的第三种基本要素,处于“理解”和“解释”之后。在伽达默尔的诠释学中,应用成为一个涉及所有的解释性理解的本质的、不可缺少的部分。亚里士多德认为,伦理的或实践的知识必须与具体的环境相关联,并按照这些环境的要求加以修正。一条伦理准则的意义只能在某个行为的具体情况中显露出来。与此类似,伽达默尔主张所有的理解必须处于历史的形势之中。一个文本只有在涉及到当前并按照变化的历史环境而加以修改的情况下才能得到理解。这就是在理解中的应用契机。理解总是在应用中的理解,即便应用并非目的。与其所应用的特殊情况绝缘的理解肯定是抽象的和干瘪的。由于应用所涉及的情况总在变化,一个历史文本在每种情况中都只能以一种新鲜独特的方式得到理解。因此,对于伽达默尔,应用涉及过去与现在的区分,而不是普遍与特殊的区分。

“我们将应用视为与理解和解释一样是诠释学行为中的必要部分。”——伽达默尔:《真理与方法》(格兰·多培尔英译),1975年,第275页。

应用伦理学

也称“实践伦理学”,即研究怎样应用伦理原则、规则、理由去分析和处理产生于实践和社会领域里的道德问题。对于伦理学理论的这样一种实际应用始终是传统伦理学的一个方面。亚里士多德主张,所有普遍性的道德标准必须通过它们对具体情况的应用而得到调整和修正。不过,应用伦理学作为一个专门的学科,与其他的伦理学方法诸如元伦理学、规范伦理学和伦理学理论相对照,是在20世纪中期开始兴盛起来的。到目前为止,相对较完整地确立起来的应用伦理学的分支包括“学术伦理学”、“农业伦理学”、“生命伦理学”、“商业伦理学”、“环境伦理学”、“法律伦理学”、“医学伦理学”、“护士伦理学”等等。由于被运用的道德原则来自于不同的伦理体系,这些原则因而是多样性的和相互冲突的,所以应用伦理学极难得对于实践问题提供确定的回答,但应用伦理学的贡献在于使得对于实践问题的讨论尽可能地清楚而又严谨。应用伦理学的发展也导致哲学家介入到许多制定政策与决定以及评价的委员会中。

“应用伦理学已成为英语国家大学中大多数哲学系教学的一个部分,并有着和元伦理学

"Applied ethics has become part of the teaching of most philosophy departments in English-speaking universities, taking its place alongside with meta-ethics and normative ethics." - Singer (ed.), *Applied Ethics*, 1986, p. 4.

Apprehension

[from Greek: *katalepsis*, holding or grasping, also translated as cognition, an important epistemological concept for Stoicism and Epicureanism] In Stoicism, recognition has four stages: reception of visual appearance (represented by an open hand); perception or attention which results from the conjunction of visual appearance and the assent of mind (represented by a closed hand); apprehensive impression which is accurate perception (represented by a fist); and knowledge (represented by grasping the fist with the other hand). At the third stage, apprehension instantaneously grasps an impression which reveals the real object and results in apprehensive or cognitive impression (Greek: *phantasia kataleptike*). Epicurus used apprehension as the criterion of truth by guaranteeing the clarity of an image. Because of ambiguity in the extant writings, some scholars interpret this as a kind of intuition, while others explain it as concentration or attention.

"Zeno did not attach reliability to all impressions but only to those which have a peculiar power of revealing their objects. Since this impression is discerned just by itself, he called it 'apprehensive'... But once it had been received and accepted, he called it an apprehension, resembling things grasped by the hand." - Cicero, *Academic*, I. 41.

Apprehensive impression, apprehension

Appropriate act

[Greek: *kathekon*, fitting.] A key Stoic ethical term for an action which accords with nature and can be rationally justified. An appropriate act is a virtuous act and is the opposite of an inappropriate or vicious act. Other acts, for example walking, are neither inappropriate and vicious nor appropriate and virtuous, but intermediate between these two by being for natural ends which are indifferent as to virtue and vice. An intermediate act, however, can be either virtuous or vicious in some particular instance according to the disposition of the agent. The behaviour of a good man is a continuous series of appropriate selections and rejections, and such a man knows that by the performance of appropriate acts he makes virtuous progress.

"Zeno was the first to use this term 'appropriate act', the name being derived from *kata tinas hekein*, 'to have arrived in accordance with certain persons'; appropriate act is an activity appropriate to constitutions that accords with nature." - Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*,

及规范伦理学一样的位置。”——辛格编：《应用伦理学》，1986年，第4页。

领悟

[源自希腊语: *katalepsis*, 意思是“把握”或“抓住”，也译成“认知”，是斯多亚派和伊壁鸠鲁派中一个重要的认识论概念] 在斯多亚派那里，认识有四个阶段：接收可见现象（可比拟为一只张开的手）；知觉或注意，它是可见现象的连接和心灵赞同的结果（可比拟为一只闭拢的手）；领悟性印象，它是精确的知觉（可比拟为一个拳头）；最后是知识（可比拟为用另一只手握住拳头）。领悟在第三阶段，是对显现实际对象的印象的瞬间把握，结果是领悟的或认知的印象（希腊语： *phantasia kataleptike*）。伊壁鸠鲁通过对映象的清晰性的保证也把领悟用作真理的准则。由于现存著作含义的模糊，有些学者将此解释为一种直觉，另一些学者则解释为专注或留意。

“芝诺并没有把可靠性附着在所有的印象上，而是仅仅寄托于那些具有显现对象的独特力量的印象。既然这种印象恰好是由自身辨别的，他就称为‘领悟的’；……但是，一旦它被领收和接受，他便称作领悟，类似于用手把握住的东西。”——西塞罗：《学院派》，I. 41。

领悟性印象

见“领悟”条。

适当行为

[希腊词, *kathekon* (适当的)] 斯多亚派伦理学的一个主要概念，指一种合乎自然的，能得到理性说明的行为。适当行为是一种德性行为，与此相反的是不适当的或邪恶的行为。另外还有一类活动，如散步，既不是不适当的和邪恶的行为，也不是适当的和有德性的行为，而是居于两者之间，作为其自然目的与德性或邪恶无关的行为。不过，在某些情形下，它们的出现根据行为者的倾向也可以是善的或恶的。一个好人的行为乃是一串连续的适当选择和拒斥；这样的人知道，通过从事适当行为，他会取得德性上的进步。

“芝诺是第一个使用‘适当行为’这一术语的；该名词出于 *kata tinas hekein*，即‘与某些人相符而达到的’。适当行为是一种与自然构成相配的活动。”——第欧根尼·拉尔修：《名哲言行录》，7，第107页。

7, p. 107.

Appropriation

William James' technical term for the hanging together or continuity of experience. For James, experience is a continuous stream or chain, each link of which is inseparable from its predecessors and successors. Our present experience constitutes one point, but one point in a chain. It appropriates past experience, and is appropriated by future experience. This appropriating capacity of one's experience forms one's self-consciousness, representative of the entire past stream. It is hence the basis of personal identity. Other than this, there is no independent self. The relationship between appropriation and the self has been charged with circularity, for appropriation allegedly presupposes an existence of a self. But James claimed that what performs appropriation is not an ego, but only the passing experience that one's body feels.

"Its appropriations are therefore less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its present object, the body, and the central adjustments, which accompany the act of thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity." James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, p. 341.

A-proposition

In syllogisms, categorical propositions are divided into four kinds, according to their quality (affirmative or negative) and quantity (universal or particular). The medieval logicians designated them by letter names corresponding to the first four vowels of the Roman alphabet: A, E, I, O. An A-proposition is the universal affirmative (All S are P), meaning that every member of the S class is a member of the P class. An E-proposition is the universal negative (No S are P), meaning that no member of the S class is a member of the P class. An I-proposition is the particular affirmative (Some S are P), meaning that at least one member of the S class is a member of the P class. An O-proposition is the particular negative (Some S are not P), meaning that at least one member of the S class is not a member of the P class.

"The central concern of traditional logic is the investigation of the logical relations of four propositional forms: Universal affirmative (A), Universal Negative (E), Particular Affirmative (I), Particular Negative (O)." — Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 24.

Arbitrariness of grammar, another term for autonomy of language

Archaeology of knowledge

A term introduced by the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. Archaeology here is not a study of origin (*arche* in Greek), but is rather a study of what Foucault calls an "archive", that is, the deep structure or form that

占有

W. 詹姆斯的专门术语,指经验的结合或连续性。对詹姆斯而言,经验是一种连续之流或链,其中的每一环都是与其前者和后者不可分割的。我们当前的经验构成了一点,然而链上的一点。它占有过去的经验,并且为其后的经验所占有。人们经验的这种占有能力形成了人们的自我意识,即整个既往经验之流的代表,由此它成为个人同一性的基础。除此之外,则没有独立的自我。占有与自我之间的这种关系被指责为循环论证,因为占有本身已预设了自我的存在。但是詹姆斯认为从事占有的并不是自我,而不过是人们的身体所感觉到的流逝着的经验。

"因此,在头脑中,它的占有对它本身而言,要少于它当下对象中最为密切感觉到的部分,即身体,以及伴随着思维行为的中枢判断。这些是我们的个人同一性的真正核心。"——詹姆斯:《心理学原理》,1890年,第341页。

A 命题

在三段论中,范畴命题根据性质(肯定或否定)和数量(全称或单称)被分为四类。中世纪的逻辑学家根据罗马字母表的前四个元音字母来表示它们,即 A、E、I、O。A 命题是全称肯定命题(所有的 S 都是 P),即 S 类的每个成分都是 P 类的成分。E 命题是全称否定命题(所有的 S 都不是 P),即 S 类的每个成分都不是 P 类的成分。I 命题是单称肯定命题(某个 S 是 P),即至少有一个 S 类的成分是 P 类的成分。O 命题是单称否定命题(某个 S 不是 P),即至少有一个 S 类的成分不是 P 类的成分。

"传统逻辑的核心就是研究以下四种命题形式的逻辑关系,即全称肯定命题(A),全称否定命题(E),单称肯定命题(I)和单称否定命题(O)。"——米切尔:《逻辑导论》,1962年,第24页。

语法的任意性

"语言自主性"的另一说法。

知识考古学

由法国哲学家和历史学家 M. 福柯引入的一个词。考古学在这里并不是对起源(希腊文为 *arche*) 的研究,而是一种对于福柯称之为"档案"(*archive*, 或译为"案卷"、"宗卷")的东西

determines the conditions of possibility of knowledge in a particular period. An archive, which is also called the "historical a priori", is time-bound and factual. It is discovered rather than deduced. Archaeology is hence a distinct approach to the analysis of the history of thought, in contrast to the standard history of ideas. While the history of ideas is an interpretative discipline and defines the thoughts, themes and representations that are revealed in discourse, archaeology is concerned with the discourses themselves, taking them as practices obeying certain rules. While the history of ideas seeks continuity and coherence to relate discourses to their predecessors, their backgrounds and their impacts, archaeology seeks to show the specificity of discourses and the irreducibility of the sets of rules which govern the operations of particular discourses. While the history of ideas places emphasis on individual thinkers and their relations, archaeology of knowledge claims that the consciousness and statements of individual thinkers are determined by the underlying conceptual structures at a given time. Accordingly, we should aim to delineate this structure which is beyond the beliefs and intentions of individual thinkers. Finally, while the history of ideas intends to identify what has been said and bring back the distant, archaeology seeks to provide a systematic description of discourse. Archaeology has four basic methodological principles: attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative descriptions and the mapping of transformations. These principles are fully discussed in Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

"The rights of words—which is not that of the philologists—authorises, therefore, the use of the term archaeology to describe all these searches. This term does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence; of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs." —Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (tr. by Smith), 1972, p. 131.

Arche

[from Greek: *archein*, to start, hence the starting point or beginning, first principle or origin; plural: *archai*. Aristotle claimed that philosophy should investigate the fundamental *archai* and causes of generation, existence and knowledge. He described how at the very beginning of philosophy Thales sought the *arche* to account for the generation of the world. Thales believed this to be water. Anaximander is said to be the first person to use the word *arche* to name such a first entity. Aristotle called each of his four causes *arche*. He also called the basic premises for scientific deduction *archai*, discoverable by an intuitive faculty *nous*. In ethics, the end, that is the good to be pursued, is called *arche* as well.

的研究;档案是指在某个特定时期中决定知识的可能条件的深层结构或形式。这样一种被称为“先天历史的”档案受到时间的限制,并且是事实性的。它是被发现的、而不是被推导出来的,因此,考古学是一种分析思想史而非规范的概念史的独特进路。观念史是一门解释性的学科,将在言谈中开显出的思想、主题和表象加以明确;考古学所关心的却是这些言谈本身,将它们视为服从于某些规则的实践。观念史寻求连续性和一致性,为此而将言谈与它们的先导、背景和影响联系起来;考古学却意在显示言谈的独特性和那些主宰特定言谈运作的规则组合的不可还原性。观念史强调作为个人的思想者和他们之间的关系,知识的考古学声称单个思想家们的意识和陈述被某段时间中潜在的概念结构所决定;因此,我们应该致力于描述这样一个超出单个思想者们的信念和意图的结构。最后,观念史想要辨认已被说出的东西,找回不在眼前的东西;考古学却力图去系统地描述言谈。考古学有四个基本的方法论原则:辨明创新性所在、分析矛盾、比较式的描述和对于转化(变形)的标示。福柯的《知识考古学》充分讨论了这些原则。

“因此,(并非语言学意义上的)词的权利使得我们有权去使用‘考古学’这个字眼来描述所有这些探讨。这个字并不意味着探求一个开端,也不指对地质发掘物的分析。它是指这样一个普遍的描述主题,这描述对关于现存者所说的东西发出质疑,这主题还指在这描述中活动着的阐释功能、言谈中的形成和这种描述活动所属于的普遍档案系统。”——福柯:《知识考古学》(史密斯译),1972年,第131页。

本原

[源自希腊动词 *archein* (开始,领导),引申为“出发点”或“开端”,第一原理或起源,复数为 *archai*] 亚里士多德认为,哲学应研究生成、存在和知识的最根本的本原和原因。他描绘了在哲学的最开端,泰勒斯如何寻求本原来说明世界的生成。泰勒斯相信这一本原是水,虽然阿那克西曼德据称是第一个使用本原这一术语来命名这种原初实体的。亚里士多德把他的四因中的每一个都叫做本原。他也把科学推理的基本前提称作本原;这样的前提是由一种直观官能,即努斯所发现的。在伦理学中,所追求的目的(善)也叫本原。

"It is common, then, to all *archai* to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known." -- Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1013a18-9.

Archetype

[from Greek: *arche*, first — *typos*, pattern or stamp, the original model or pattern from which things are formed or from which they become copies] One of the main claims of Plato's Theory of Forms or Ideas is that Ideas are archetypes for sensible things. Locke, like Descartes, took archetypes as the referents or external causes of ideas. Real ideas conform to real beings or archetypes, and adequate ideas are those which perfectly represent their archetypes. However, complex ideas of modes and relations are not copies, but are themselves originals or archetypes. Berkeley considered archetypes to be ideas in the mind of God. In Kant, archetypes in metaphysics can only be regulative principles. Hence, he criticised Plato for hypostatizing Ideas by making them into the constitutive principles of the origin of things. On the other hand, archetypes in ethics are ideals for imitation. In the analytical psychology of Carl Jung, archetypal images and symbols are said to emerge from the collective unconscious of humankind.

"Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes." —Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2.31.2.

Architectonic

Kant's conception for the systematic relations of all human knowledge and for the art of constructing such a system. These two senses are interconnected, for he believed that human reason possesses by nature such a function of construction and that all knowledge arising from pure reason belongs to one system. Architectonic is contrasted with the technical, for while a technical investigation starts from empirical criteria, architectonic anticipates these criteria. Kant himself designed an architectonic system. He began by distinguishing first (pure) philosophy from empirical philosophy and then subdivided pure philosophy into a propaedeutic investigation of pure reason (criticism) and the system of pure reason (metaphysics). He divided metaphysics in turn into the metaphysics of morals, dealing with what ought to be, and the metaphysics of nature, dealing with what is. He further divided the metaphysics of nature into transcendental philosophy, which is concerned with the understanding and reason, and the physiology (natural science) of given objects. This rational physiology again had two branches, transcendental and immanent. Transcendental physiology includes rational cosmology and rational theology. For Kant, this framework was supported by traditional logic.

The notion of architectonic has been used to oppose at-

"一切本原的共同点是作为出发点，由此，一物得以存在、生成或被认识。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，1013a18—19。

原型

[由希腊文 *arche* (首先、第一) 和 *typos* (型式、印记) 结合而成，指事物据以形成或变成复本时所出自的原始模型或型式] 柏拉图的形式或形相理论的主要主张之一是：形相是可感事物的原型。洛克与笛卡尔相似，把原型当做观念的所指物或外在的原因。实在的观念与实在的存在或原型相一致，而恰当的观念是完全表现它们的原型的那些观念。不过，样式或关系的复杂观念不是复本，它们本身就是原初者或原型。巴克莱认为原型是上帝心中的观念。在康德那里，形而上学中的原型只能是范导性原理。因此，他批判柏拉图通过把形相变成事物之源的构成性原理而使之实在化。另一方面，在伦理学中，原型是让人们效法的理想。在 C. 荣格的分析心理学中，原型影像或符号被说成是从人类的集体无意识中浮现出来的。

"恰当的观念是完全表现它们原型的那种观念。"——洛克：《人类理智论》，第二卷，第31章，第2节。

建筑术

康德的概念，指全部人类知识的系统联系，也指构造这样一种体系的艺术。这两种意义相互联系，因为康德相信，人类理性天然具有这样一种建构功能，所有来源于纯粹理性的知识都属于一个体系。建筑术相对于“技术”而言，因为技术意味着一种从经验标准开始的研究，而建筑术则先于这些标准。康德自己设计了一个建筑术体系。他首先把第一（纯）哲学与经验哲学区分开来。然后他把纯哲学再划分为纯粹理性的预备性研究（他命之为“批判”）和纯粹理性性体系（他称之为“形而上学”）。他转而把形而上学划分为论述“应当是什么”的道德形而上学和论述“是什么”的自然形而上学。自然形而上学又进一步划分为关于知性和理性的先验哲学，以及研究现存对象的自然学（自然科学）。这种理性自然学又有两个分科：先验的和内在的。先验自然学包括理性宇宙学和理性神学。康德认为，这个框架得到传统逻辑的支持。

建筑术的观念一向用于反对把人类知识肢解为不同的互相独立的学科，虽然有些批评者主张，过分强调体系的要求会使哲学的工作遭到挫折，这是对某种特殊体系或一般哲学体系的指责，但建筑术这种观念由黑格尔加以发展，

tempts to break up human knowledge into different independent branches, although some critics claim that over emphasising the demands of system can frustrate philosophical work which is critical of a particular system or philosophical systems in general. The idea of architectonic was developed by Hegel and also by the Logical Positivists in their ideal of unified science.

"By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A832/B860.

Archive, see Archaeology of knowledge

Arctaic judgement, another name for judgement of value

Arete, Greek term for virtue or excellence

Argument

[from Latin *arguere*, to make clear] The reasoning in which a sequence of statements or propositions (the premises) are intended to support a further statement or proposition (the conclusion). The passage from the premises to the conclusion is justified through following acceptable patterns of inference and often marked by means of locutions such as "so", "hence", "it follows that" or "because". Generally, arguments are divided into two types; deductive arguments, in which the conclusion makes clear something implied in the premises, and inductive arguments, in which the conclusion goes beyond what the premises provide. While a statement is said to be true or false, an argument is said to be valid or invalid, sound or unsound. To discriminate valid from invalid forms of argument is precisely the task of logic. In another technical use especially in mathematics and logic, an argument, in contrast to a function, is a member of the domain of a function.

"The aim of argument is conviction; one tries to get someone to agree that some statement is true or false."—P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 12.

Argument *a posteriori*

An argument *a posteriori* proceeds from an effect to its cause, in contrast to an argument *a priori*, which proceeds from a cause to its effect. The pair of terms *a priori* and *a posteriori* are used here in their pre-Kantian sense. The dis-

also by logical empiricists developed as their unified scientific ideal.

"我把所谓建筑术理解为构造体系的艺术。由于系统的统一首先使一般的知识提高到科学的水准，也就是从知识的单纯堆积中构成一个体系，建筑术是我们知识中的关于科学的学说。"——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A832/B860。

档案

见“知识考古学”条。

价值判断

“价值判断 (judgement of value)”的另一名称。

德性 (或“卓越”)

“德性” (virtue) 或“卓越” (excellence) 的希腊词。

论证

[源自拉丁语 *arguere*, 弄清楚] 它是指这样的推理：一系列陈述或命题 (前提) 被用来支持另外一个陈述或命题 (结论)。从前提到结论的过渡，由于遵循了可接受的推理模式，而被证明是合理的。这种过渡以“于是”，“所以”，“由此推出……”，“因为”诸如此类的词语为标记。一般而言，论证分为两种类型：演绎论证，其结论使隐含在前提中的某种意思成为显然的；归纳论证，其结论超出了前提所提供的內容。陈述被说成是真的或假的，而论证则被说成是有效的或无效的，可靠的或不可靠的。把有效的论证形式与无效的论证形式区分开来，正是逻辑学的任务。英文词“argument”还有另一专门用法，特别是在数学和逻辑学中用得较多，它与函项相对，是函项的值域中的一个元素。[这时中文将其译作“主目”，见“函项和主目”条。]

“论证的目的是说服；一个人试图使另一个人同意某个陈述是真的或假的。”——斯特劳森：《逻辑理论导论》，1952年，第12页。

后天的证明

后天的证明是从结果到其原因的证明。它与从原因到结果的“先天的证明”相对立。这里“先天的”和“后天的”这一对词用于前康德的意义上。对这两类证明或论证的区分是由经院

distinction between these two types of arguments or demonstrations was made by the scholastic philosopher Albert, but the idea can be traced to Aristotle's view that we may either proceed from what is evident to us to what is evident in nature or proceed from what is evident in nature to what is evident to us. In the philosophy of religion, arguments which seek to prove God's existence from the current condition of the world are called proof *a posteriori* (a typical example being the argument from design), while the proofs which start from our concepts of God's nature are *a priori*.

"Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man... By this argument *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence." — Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, II.

Argument *a priori*, see argument *a posteriori*

Argument by analogy

An inference from certain similarities between two things to the conclusion that these things are also alike in other respects. Such a form of inference is not decisive, for it depends upon an implicit premise that the fact that two things are similar in some given respects entails that they are similar in other respects as well, and this premise is not obviously true. Arguments of this form can however be suggestive and are therefore widely employed. The argument from design is a version of an argument by analogy. It infers analogically from the relationship between human agents and artefacts (for example between a watch-maker and a watch) to the existence of God as the designer of the world. Indeed, analogical argument is represented in various forms of teleological arguments for God's existence. In the philosophy of mind, some philosophers adopt this form of argument to attribute a mind and mental phenomena, which are generally assumed to be private, to other individuals.

"The following is the structure of an analogical argument. Two objects A and B share several properties, say, a, b, c; A has an additional property d, therefore B has the property d also." — Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 200.

Argument from design

A traditional and popularly accepted argument for the existence of God. Natural phenomena present a complex and intricate order, like that of a machine or a work of art. This provides evidence for thinking that there must be a designer who is responsible for the structural and adaptive order of natural things and who has capacities far exceeding human

哲学家阿尔伯特作出的, 不过这个思想可以追溯到亚里士多德的观点: 即我们可以从对我们明显的东西出发, 推出本性上明显的东西, 或者从本性上明显的东西推论到对我们是明显的东西。在宗教哲学中, 从世界当前的状况出发证明上帝的存在, 被称作后天的证明(典型的例子是“设计论的证明”), 而从我们关于上帝的性质的概念开始所作的证明被称作先天的证明。

“既然由于结果彼此相似, 使得我们根据类比的一切规则推断原因也是相似的, 并且推出自然的创造者与人的心灵有几分相似……根据这个后天的证明, 而且仅仅根据这个证明, 我们的确立刻证明了神的存在, 以及他与人类心灵和理智的相似性。”——休谟:《自然宗教对话录》, 第二章。

先天的证明

见“后天的证明”条。

类比论证

这是一种推理: 由两个事物存在某些相似性而得出这两个事物也在其他方面也相似的结论。这样一种推理形式并非决定性的, 因为它依赖于这样一个未言明的前提: 两个事物在某些给定方面相似这一事实意味着它们在其他方面也相似。而这一前提并不明显为真。不过这一论证却可能是提示性的, 因此被广泛使用。设计论证是类比论证的一种形式。它用类比的方式由人类主体和人工制品的关系(例如, 钟表制造者和钟表的关系)推断上帝作为世界的设计者而存在。实际上, 类比论证体现在关于上帝存在的各种形式的目的论论证中。在心的哲学中, 有些哲学家也采用这种形式的论证来将通常被假定为是私有的心或心的现象归于他心。

“以下是类比论证的结构。两个客体 A 和 B 共有几个特性, 比如说 a、b、c; A 具有另外一个特性 d, 所以 B 也具有特性 d。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》, 1949 年, 第 200 页。

设计论证

关于上帝存在的一个传统且被广泛接受的论证。自然现象存在着错综复杂的秩序, 犹如机械或工艺品的情形。这就为这样的想法提供了证据: 必定有一位对自然事物的构造和适应秩序负责的设计者, 他具有远胜于人类才能的能力。因此, 我们可以合理地假定: 上帝作为这位

abilities. Hence, we may reasonably presume that God exists as this designer. The argument from analogy, a version of this argument, argues that since the world is like a clock, it must derive from something like a clock-maker, which is God. The argument from design can be traced to the Stoics and is the fifth of Aquinas' Five Ways of proving the existence of God. It was attacked by Hume, who introduced many other possible explanations for natural order, thus providing methodological objections to the dogmatic acceptance of the divine origin of the world, especially where experience cannot test our judgement. Kant also rejected the validity of the argument from design. The argument was further challenged when Darwin's theory of evolution explained by natural selection the adaptive features of living things that were cited to prove that the world might be designed.

"The argument from design reasons, from the fact that nature's laws are mathematical, and her parts benevolently adapted to each other, that its cause is both intellectual and benevolent." —James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1960, p. 422.

Argument from differential certainty

An argument for the existence of sense-data. Suppose I perceive something, for example a tomato, but I do not know what it is. What I *can* be certain that I am perceiving are some sense data such as red, round shape. These sense-data are the objects of my direct awareness and are infallible. But I cannot be certain that I am perceiving a real tomato, or even a material thing, for what I am perceiving may be a fake, an illusion or an hallucination. That of which I can be certain cannot be identical with that of which I cannot be certain; therefore there are sense-data whose existence is distinct from that of material things. Critics of this argument maintain that, even though it is true that there are different degrees of certainty in perceptions and statements, this does not entail that there are ontologically different kinds of things corresponding to my different levels of certainty.

"It might be true that for the speaker in our argument from differential certainty, the statement 'I see a tomato', in the conditions specified, is less certain than statements such as 'I am directly aware of something red and with a tomato-ish shape'." —Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception*, 1971, p. 22.

Argument from religious experience

An argument for the existence of God in terms of the inner, emotional experience of the presence and activity of something divine and transcendent. Some people have this kind of experience in daily life, but unless there is indeed something which is divine and transcendent, we cannot have experience of it. Hence God must exist. This kind of argument has been developed in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-

设计者而存在。“类比论证”(其推论是:既然世界犹如一台时钟,就必定有时钟的制造者,即上帝)是这种论证的一个版本。设计论证可追溯到斯多亚派和T. 阿奎那证明上帝存在“五法”中的第五种。但是,它受到了休谟和康德的攻击。休谟对自然秩序引入了其他许多可能的解释,因而对关于世界的神圣设计的盲目接受提供了方法论上的反对,尤其是在那些经验不能验证我们的判断的地方。康德也拒斥设计论证的有效性。当达尔文的进化论宣称,用以证明世界可能被设计生命之物的适应性特征都能用自然选择加以解释时,这种论证遭到了釜底抽薪似的严重打击。

“设计论证的理由,源于这样的事实:自然的规律是数学的,她的各部分仁爱地相互适应,它的原因既是智慧的又是仁爱的。”——詹姆斯:《宗教经验种种》,1960年,第422页。

不同确定性论证

对感觉材料的存在论证。假定我知觉某物,例如一个西红柿,而不知道它是什么东西。我可以确定的是,我正在知觉一些诸如红色、圆形这样的感觉材料。这些感觉材料是我直接觉知的对象并且是绝对无误的。但我不能确定我正在知觉一个真的西红柿,或者是一个物质的东西,因为我正在知觉的东西可能是一个假的东西、一个错觉或一个幻觉。我能够确定的东西不可能同一于我不能确定的东西,所以存在着不同于物质的东西的感觉材料。对于这一论证的批评认为,尽管在知觉和陈述中存在不同程度的确定性,这并不表明相应于我的不同水平的确定性在本体论上一定存在不同的东西。

“对于我们的不同确定性论证中的说话者而言,这一点可能是真的,即在特定的条件下,陈述‘我看见一个西红柿’比之‘我直接地意识到一种红色的、具有西红柿形状的东西’这样的陈述要更为不确定。”——皮切尔:《一种知觉理论》,1971年,第22页。

宗教体验说论证

根据对某种神圣而超然东西的存在及其活动的内在的、情感的体验为基础证明上帝存在的一个论证。在日常生活中,有些人有这类体验,但是,如无神圣而超然的某物确实存在,我们不能有对它的体验。因此,上帝必定存在。由于对传统的有神论论证不满意,在19世纪和20世纪,宗教哲学家们提出了这类论证。既然

turies by philosophers of religion as a result of dissatisfaction with the traditional theistic arguments. Since religious experience provides a noninferential mode of knowledge of God, analogous to sense perception of the external world, this argument is presented as the main proof of the existence of God. Critics argue that religious experience might be explained reductively through sociology, psychology or other fields and as a consequence it begs the question to ascribe independent cognitive value to it. We can have the experiences without being obliged to explain them by the existence of God. However, we often accept reductive explanation in terms of others fields where the primary belief is irrational, but the rationality or irrationality of religious belief must be determined before this objection to the argument for religious experience can be assessed. Further, it is argued that because religious experience is inherently mysterious and untestable, it cannot constitute persuasive evidence for those who do not have similar experiences.

"As a method of showing the existence of a God not otherwise known or believed to exist the Argument from Religious Experience is indeed absurd. It is not absurd if considered as a method of getting to know something about a God already known, or believed, to exist."—T. McPherson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1965, p. 123.

Argument from the relativity of perception

Under certain circumstances, the ways that things are perceived by us are not the ways that they really are. For instance, a straight oar with one end in water looks bent. When the conditions of a perceiver change, the same thing which he perceived before will be different from what he perceives now. For instance, the same food will taste differently when one is healthy and when one is sick. Hence, what is perceived to be and what really is are different. This argument has been employed by many philosophers from Plato, Descartes Locke, and Hume to Russell and Ayer, but for different purposes. Rationalism makes use of it to prove the unreliability of sense-experience and to show the ontological difference between reality and phenomena. Empiricism, on the other hand, suggests that the properties we perceive are sense-data and are not properties of physical objects themselves. This argument is similar to the argument from illusion.

"[A]rguments from the relativity of perception... start from the familiar observation that how things look to us is heavily dependent on the lighting, our angle of vision or whether we are wearing spectacles."—Smith and Jones, *The Philosophy of Mind*, 1986, p. 95.

宗教体验提供了一种不靠推理方式获得的关于上帝的知识,类似于对外部世界的感官知觉,这种论证就被断定为是关于上帝存在的主要证明。但是,批评家们指出,宗教体验可能是通过社会学、心理学或其他领域加以还原式地解释的结果,它乞求于将其赋予独立的认知价值。我们也可以有这种体验,而不一定要以上帝的存在来解释它们。我们确也接受其他领域所作的归结性解释,而那些领域中的原初信仰是非理性的,可是宗教信仰的理性与无理性,必须在估价对宗教体验说论证的反对之前而决定。人们还论辩说,宗教体验本来就是神秘莫测的、无法检验的,因此,不能成为对没有同样体验的人的有说服力的根据。

"作为一种表明上帝存在的方法(但不是靠认识或相信其存在来表明),宗教体验说论证的确是荒谬的。如果把它看做是使人逐渐了解已经认识或相信其存在的上帝的方法,就不荒谬了。"——麦克斐尔逊:《宗教哲学》,1965年,第123页。

知觉相对性论证

在某种情境下,事物被我们知觉的样式并非它们的真正样式。例如,一个直棒在水中看起来是弯的。当知觉者的情况发生改变时,他对同样一个东西的知觉会与以前有所不同,例如,当一个人健康和生病的时候,同样的食物会有不同的味道。因此,知觉的样子和真正的样子是不同的。这一论证被自柏拉图、笛卡尔、洛克、休谟至罗素和艾耶尔等许多哲学家所使用,但他们的意图有所不同。理性主义用它来证明感觉经验的不可靠以及实在与现象在本体论上的不同。而另一方面,经验主义则认为我们所知觉的特性是感觉材料,而不是物理对象本身的特性。这一论证与幻觉论证相似。

"知觉相对性论证……始于大家所熟悉的认识:事物在我们看起来的样子极大程度地依赖于光线、我们的视角或我们是否戴着眼镜。"——史密斯和琼斯:《心的哲学》,1986年,第95页。

Argumentum ad baculum

[Latin: argument to a stick, meaning appeal to force] An attempt to win assent for a conclusion by appealing to force or by issuing threats concerning the consequence that will follow if the conclusion is not accepted. This sort of argument is frequently employed in international politics and in lobbying campaigns. It is a fallacy because the conclusion is not justified on a rational basis. It is perhaps not an argument at all, but a way to get one's position accepted, in particular when rational arguments in support of the position fail.

"The *argumentum ad baculum* is the fallacy committed when one appeals to force or the threat of force to cause the acceptance of a conclusion." - Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., 1986, p. 81.

Argumentum ad hominem

[Latin: argument against or directed to the man] Rejecting a person's argument or view by attacking the person who is maintaining the view. There are various ways of making such an attack, and the standard way is to abuse the character of the opponent, for instance by claiming that he is a liar. Although in practical life the opinion of a person with a bad record regarding truthfulness is generally not respected, this argument is logically fallacious because even a person with a history of dishonesty can speak the truth. That a person is untrustworthy does not entail that his opinion is always mistaken. This fallacy is close to the genetic fallacy which focuses on the source of a view rather than on the view itself.

"This is traditionally called the *ad hominem* argument an argument, that is, directed against the man (*ad hominem*) rather than to the point (*ad rem*)." - Sullivan, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 1963, p. 242.

Argumentum ad ignorantiam

[Latin: argument to ignorance] The inference that a conclusion A is false from the fact that A is not proved to be true or known to be true, or that A is true from the fact A is not proved to be false or known to be false. This kind of argument can be used to shift the burden of proof or to reach a tentative conclusion, but the conclusion cannot have much strength. Our ignorance of A entails neither that A is false nor that A is true. Truth is one thing, and whether or not the truth is known by us is another.

"The *argumentum ad ignorantiam* is committed whenever it is argued that a proposition is true simply on the basis that it has not been proved false or it is false because it has not been proved true." - Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., 1986, p. 94.

诉诸强力的论证

[拉丁语：“诉诸棍棒的论证”，意味着“诉诸强力”] 它试图通过诉诸强力或发出威胁（如果不接受其结论，将导致某种可怕的后果），来赢得对其结论的赞同。在国际政治和游说活动中经常使用这类论证。它是一种谬误，因为它的结论不是在理性的基础上被证明为合理的。它也许根本不是论证，而是使某人的见解被接受的一条途径，特别是当支持这种见解的理性论证失败时常常使用。

“当人们凭借强力或强力的威胁去使他人接受其结论时，他就犯了诉诸强力的论证这一错误。”——柯比：《逻辑导论》，第7版，1986年，第81页。

攻击人身的论证

[拉丁语：“针对或指向那个人的论证”] 它排斥一个人的论证或观点，其办法是攻击持该观点的那个人。进行此种攻击有多种方式，标准的方式是指责对方的人品，例如，断言他是一个说谎者。尽管在现实生活中，一个人信誉不佳，其意见一般也不被尊重，但这种论证形式在逻辑上是错误的。因为即使一个有不诚实历史的人，也能够说真话。一个人不值得信赖，这并不能推出他的意见总是错的。这种谬误类似于发生学谬误，后者关注的是某种观点的来源或发生机制，而不是该观点本身。

“如果一个论证针对人 (*ad hominem*) 而不是针对他所持的观点 (*ad rem*)，这样的论证在传统上被叫做是攻击人身 (*ad hominem*) 的论证。”——沙利文：《逻辑基本知识》，1963年，第242页。

诉诸无知的论证

[拉丁语：“出于无知的论证”] 它从 A 未被证明为真或不知道 A 是真的这一事实，推出结论 A 是假的；或者它从尚未证明 A 是假的或不知道 A 是假的这一事实，就推出结论 A 是真的。这类论证能够用来推卸证明责任，或达到一尝试性结论，但它的结论不可能具有多大分量，因为我们从对 A 无知既不能推出 A 是假的，也不能推出 A 是真的。真理是一回事，我们是否知道真理是另一回事。

“当人们论证一命题是真的只是根据它未被证明为假，或者论证它是假的只是因为它未被证明为真时，他就犯了诉诸无知的论证这一错误。”——柯比：《逻辑导论》，第7版，1986年，第94页。

Argumentum ad misericordiam

[Latin: argument to pity] An argument making use of an appeal to the pity, sympathy and compassion of the audience in order to establish its conclusion. This widely employed argument is logically fallacious because it puts an emotional burden on the audience rather than concentrating on the argument itself. The fact that an argument is accepted out of pity or charity does not entail that it is logically strong. Argument is a matter of reason. Often, an argument *ad misericordiam* is offered to sway an audience in defiance of factual evidence and sound reasoning.

"The *argumentum ad misericordiam* is the fallacy committed when pity is appealed to for the sake of getting a conclusion accepted, where the conclusion is concerned with a question of fact rather than a matter of sentiment." —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., 1986, p. 95.

Argumentum ad populum

[Latin: argument to the people] An argument which seeks to get its conclusion accepted by appeal to popular opinion, mass enthusiasm, group interests or loyalties or customary ways of behaving. For example, "Since most people believe that this thing is true, it is true". This kind of argument is widely used in social life, but it is logically fallacious because it does not establish its conclusion on the basis of facts and relations between premises and the conclusion. Broadly conceived, this argument contains an *argumentum ad misericordiam* if the enthusiasm appealed to is based on pity.

"We may define the *argumentum ad populum* fallacy a little more narrowly as the attempt to win popular assent to a conclusion by arousing the emotions and enthusiasms of the multitude rather than by appeal to the relevant facts." —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., 1986, p. 96.

Argumentum ad verecundiam, the Latin term for appeal to authority

Argumentum ex consensu gentium

[Latin: argument from the consensus of the nations, an argument that supports a conclusion by appeal to common human consent] An argument that because all people consent that this is the case, so it is. The argument has been widely used in the history of philosophy to attempt to establish divine existence (the common consent argument for the existence of God) or to establish a variety of general moral principles. Sometimes it is treated as an instance of *argumentum ad populum*. It is difficult to distinguish cases in which common consent might have some weight in justifying claims or show that no justification is necessary from cases in which common consent cannot provide needed justification.

"The *argument ex consensu gentium* is that the belief in God is so widespread as to be grounded in the rational nature

诉诸怜悯的论证

[拉丁语,“诉诸怜悯的论证”] 通过利用听众的怜悯、同情和热情来确立其结论的论证。这种普遍采用的论证在逻辑上是不成立的,因为它对听众施加情绪的影响而不是关注论证本身。一个论证被接受是出于怜悯或慈悲,这一事实不能确保它在逻辑上是强有力的。论证是推理问题。通常,人们无视事实证据和有效推理,而提出了诉诸怜悯的论证。

“当人们利用怜悯来达到使他人接受其结论的目的,而该结论与事实问题有关而不是与情感问题有关时,他就犯了诉诸怜悯的论证的错误。”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,第7版,1986年,第95页。

诉诸公众的论证

[拉丁语,“诉诸众人的论证”] 即试图凭借流行的见解、公众的热情、群体的利益、忠诚或习惯的行为方式等等,来使人接受其结论的论证。例如,“既然大多数人相信这件事是真的,它就是真的。”这类论证在社会生活中被广为使用,但它在逻辑上是不成立的,因为它并不是基于事实以及前提与结论之间的关系来推出其结论。一般认为,这种论证包含着诉诸怜悯的论证,如果所诉诸的热情是基于怜悯的话。

“我们可以把诉诸公众的论证这一谬误定义得更狭窄一些,把它定义为试图通过唤起公众的情绪和热忱,而不是凭借相关的事实去赢得对其结论的普遍赞同。”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,第7版,1986年,第96页。

诉诸权威的论证

“诉诸权威”的拉丁语名称。

普遍同意说论证

[拉丁语:源于国民共识的论证,诉诸人类普遍赞同去支持结论的论证]这一论证是,因为所有人都同意情形如此,所以它就如此。在哲学史上,该论证被广泛地用于试图证明神的存在(也被称为“关于上帝存在的普遍同意论证”)或确立某些一般的道德原理。有时,它被看做是诉诸公众的论证的一个例证。很难区分普遍同意在证明理论主张中可能会起某些作用的情况,或者很难表明,在普遍同意无法提供必要的证明时,就不需要证明。

“普遍同意说论证是指,对上帝的信仰如此普及,以致于植根在人的理性本质之中,所以,应该是确实的。”——詹姆斯:《宗教经验种种》,1960年,第420页。

of man and should therefore carry authenticity with it.” — James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1960, p. 420.

Aristocracy

[from Greek: *aristos*, best + *kratia*, rule, hence rule by the best] The form of constitution which appoints the best people to the offices of government. In ancient Greek society, the best people were determined by their good birth, property, education and merit. Thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle believed that because aristocracy carries with it a high sense of honour, responsibility and duty, it is better than its rivals, that is, monarchy (rule by one) and democracy (rule by the people). The degenerate form of aristocracy is oligarchy (rule by a rich minority), which regards only the interest of the ruling class. Aristocracy has been widely rejected by modern liberal egalitarianism.

“The sovereign may confine the government to the hands of a few, so that there are more ordinary citizens than there are magistrates; this form of government is called aristocracy.” — Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, III, 3.

Aristotelian logic, see traditional logic

Aristotelian principle

A principle of motivation or a psychological thesis that everyone's central goals in life are bound up with the exercise of one's natural or acquired abilities or faculties. The greater our ability, the greater satisfaction we can expect to get from the exercise of our skill. Believing that this idea is implicit in Aristotle's ethics, Rawls has introduced this term and uses the principle to explain both why certain things are recognised as primary goods and how to rank primary goods in importance. Hence this principle is essential for Rawls' thin theory of the good and its role in his theory of justice. Basing his theory of the good upon this psychological principle strikingly distinguishes his theory from utilitarianism, which is based on psychological hedonism.

“It will be recalled that the Aristotelian principle runs as follows; other things equal, human being enjoys the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised, or the greater its complexity.” — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 426.

Aristotelianism

The tradition of translation, commentary and interpretation of Aristotle's doctrines by various groups in different historical periods. Each group or period has read into Aristotle its own preoccupations and has focused on different aspects of Aristotle's thought. Hence Aristotelianism presents

贵族统治

「源自希腊文: *aristos* (最好) 和 *kratia* (统治), 因而由精英统治」任命精英为政府官员的政体形式。在古希腊社会, 精英是由他们的良好的出身、财产、受教育程度和功绩来确定的。像柏拉图、亚里士多德这样的思想家认为, 由于贵族是以高度的荣誉感和责任心进行统治的, 它比它的对立面, 即君主政体 (由一个人统治) 和民主政体 (由人民统治) 要好。贵族统治的蜕化形式是寡头统治 (由少数富人统治), 它只注重统治阶级的利益。贵族统治一直受到现代自由平等主义的普遍反对。

“主权者可以把政府限于少数人手里, 从而使普通公民的数目多于行政官, 这种政体形式称为贵族统治。”——卢梭:《社会契约论》, II, 第3页。

亚里士多德逻辑

见“传统逻辑”条。

亚里士多德主义原则

一个关于动机形成的原则, 或者说一个心理学命题, 即认为每个人一生的核心目标都与他先天的或后天获得的能力或才能有密切关系。我们的能力越强, 我们可期望从我们的技能的运用中得到的满足就越大。罗尔斯认为这一思想包含在亚里士多德的伦理学中, 并提出了亚里士多德主义原则这一术语。他还用这一原则解释了为什么有些事情被认为是基本的善和如何从重要性上对基本的善进行排列。因此, 这一原则是罗尔斯的正义论中关于善及其作用的弱理论的本质。他的基于这一心理学原则的善的理论使他的理论与功利主义显著地区别开来, 后者是以心理学的享乐主义为基础的。

“人们可以回忆起亚里士多德主义原则是这样的: 如其他条件相同, 人们会以运用他们业已认识到的才能 (天赋的或训练后得到的能力) 为享受; 对这种才能认识得越多, 或其复杂程度越大, 这种享受也就越大。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》, 1971年, 第426页。

亚里士多德主义

用于指称不同历史时期中的不同群体对亚里士多德学说进行翻译、评注和阐释的传统。每个群体或每个时期都按自己的眼光和兴趣点来解读亚里士多德思想不同方面的含义。因此, 亚里士多德主义呈现出来的是不同甚至矛盾的图

different and even contradictory outlooks. It is sometimes also called peripateticism, after the Aristotelian *peripatikos* (Greek: walking) school whose members liked to discuss philosophical issues while walking.

The interpretation of Aristotle starts with Aristotle's disciple and successor Theophrastus. In the first century BC, Andronicos of Rhodes edited and published the first Complete Works of Aristotle containing all the esoteric works. Other exoteric works survive only in the form of fragments, which were first collected by V. Rose in the nineteenth century.

The Neo-platonists Plotinus and Proclus took Aristotle's thought as a preface to Plato's philosophy and attempted to reconcile them. Plotinus' disciple Porphyry wrote a famous commentary to Aristotle's *Categories* which set the stage for the subsequent long-standing discussion between realism and nominalism regarding the nature of universals. This tendency was further reinforced in the sixth century by Boethius's commentary to Porphyry's *Isogage*, a book that was based on Aristotle's *Organon*. Boethius also translated the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, which were the only primary Aristotelian materials that were available to Western Europeans until the twelfth century and constituted the major basis for the development of Medieval logic. Arabic Aristotelianism developed in the ninth century, largely through the work of Avicenna (ibn-Sina) and Averroes (ibn-Rushd), who translated Aristotle's works into Arabic and commented on them. They paid much attention to Aristotle's doctrine of active intellect in the *De Anima*. Their work helped Western Europeans to understand Aristotle, particularly through the study of their commentaries in the arts faculties of Paris and Oxford during the thirteenth century. Their influence led to the condemnation of Aristotle's philosophy by the Bishop of Paris in 1277 and to a short-lived prohibition of the study of Aristotle. In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Aristotle's texts in Greek reached Paris and Oxford and stimulated a renaissance of interest in Aristotle. Aristotle's works were systematically translated and studied. The major contributors to this movement included Roger Bacon, Robert Grosseteste, St. Bonaventure, and, above all, St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, the most important philosopher of the Medieval age, was preoccupied with justifying the claims of Christian teachings in terms of Aristotle's doctrines. Aristotelianism is therefore associated with scholasticism and Thomism. Aristotle was simply called the philosopher, or in Dante's words, the master of those who know.

The scientific revolution launched by Copernicus and Galileo in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attacked Aristotle's system as an obstacle to the progress of learning, although this claim is more justly levelled at the Aristotle of the scholastics rather than Aristotle himself. Nowadays Aristotle's views about the physical and animal world have

景。有时候,它也被称为“漫步主义”,因为亚里士多德学派也被称作 *peripatikos* (希腊语,“漫步”),原因在于其学派成员喜欢边散步边讨论哲学问题。

对亚里士多德的阐释开始于他的弟子和继任者泰奥弗拉斯多。在公元前1世纪,罗得岛的安德罗尼科编纂并出版了第一部亚里士多德著作全集,内容包括所有的“秘传著作”。其余“外传的著作”仅以残篇的形式存留着,在19世纪才被V.罗斯首次汇集。

新柏拉图主义者普罗提诺和普罗克洛把亚里士多德的思想视为柏拉图哲学的绪言,并试图使二者协调一致。普罗提诺的弟子波菲利(232-305)写了一篇著名的对亚里士多德《范畴》的评注,为后来唯实论和唯名论之间关于共相性质问题的长期争论提供了舞台。这种倾向在6世纪时被波埃修斯对波菲利《同规》(*Isogage*)一书(它本身以亚里士多德的《工具论》为基础)的评注进一步强化。波埃修斯也翻译过《范畴》和《解释》。这两本书成了12世纪以前西欧惟一可以利用的亚里士多德学派的第一手材料,也构成了中世纪逻辑学发展的主要基础。在9世纪后,阿拉伯的亚里士多德主义由于阿维森纳(伊本·西那)和阿维罗伊(伊本·路西德)的著作得到了很大发展,因为他们把亚里士多德的著作译成阿拉伯文并加以评注。他们特别关注亚里士多德在《论灵魂》中提出的积极理性学说。他们的著作有助于西欧人理解亚里士多德,尤其是13世纪期间,在巴黎和牛津的艺术学院中对他们评注的研究。他们的影响,导致了1277年巴黎主教宣告亚里士多德哲学有罪,以及随之而来的对亚里士多德研究的短命的禁止。但是,在12世纪末和13世纪初,亚里士多德著作的希腊原本传到了巴黎和牛津,这就刺激起人们对亚里士多德兴趣的复兴。于是,亚里士多德的著作得以系统地被翻译和研究。对这场运动作出主要贡献的人包括R.培根、R.格罗斯泰斯特、鲍拉文多拉,当然,贡献最大的是圣T.阿奎那。作为中世纪最重要的哲学家,阿奎那率先依据亚里士多德学说来证明基督教教义的主张。所以,亚里士多德主义便与经院哲学和托马斯主义联合在一起。亚里士多德本人则被简称为“哲学家”,或按但丁的话说,“认知者的老师”。

在16世纪和17世纪,由哥白尼和伽利略肇始的科学革命把亚里士多德的体系抨击为学术进步的障碍,虽然更公正地说,这种主张针对的主要是经院哲学家的亚里士多德,而不是亚里士多德本人。现在,亚里士多德关于物理世界和动物世界的观点过时了,但他覆盖广泛领域的不少著述仍能激发重要的哲学著作。

在20世纪早期,对亚里士多德的研究得益

been superseded, but much of his writing over a wide range of fields can still inspire important philosophical work.

In the early part of the twentieth century, the study of Aristotle benefited from the Oxford translation of his works edited by W. D. Ross and was influenced methodologically by W. Jaeger's genetic method. The study has developed greatly since the middle of this century, stimulated by the work of excellent scholars, such as G. E. L. Owen and John Ackrill, and many other Oxford and Cambridge philosophers have been influenced by the study of Aristotle. Recent developments in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and virtue ethics, have generated a new revival of Aristotelianism, sometimes called neo-Aristotelianism.

Philosophically, Aristotelianism is contrasted with the contrary tendency of Platonism. The distinction between them has been roughly portrayed as being that between empiricism and rationalism or naturalism and idealism, although the real relationships linking the thought of Plato and Aristotle are still a matter of scholarly debate.

" 'Aristotelianism' certainly means an emphasis on the primacy of the subject matter, the experienced world encountered." —Randall, *Aristotle*, 1960, p. 297.

Arrow of time

One of the central notions in the philosophy of time. We ordinarily believe that time is inherently directional. Time seems to be asymmetric, for we can affect the future in a way that we cannot affect the past. The past is fixed and the future is open. This is why we can talk about free will. This seems to suggest that natural processes have a natural temporal order. We talk about this directionality of time as the arrow of time. However, physics claims that time as such does not have an intrinsic orientation. It does not move towards the future as it does not move towards the past. The philosophical basis of the so-called arrow of time has been a topic of dispute.

"It has become an almost universal practice to refer to the direction of time or the arrow of time in physics, with the implicit meaning of the direction of flow or movement of the now from past to future." —Davis, *The Physics of Time Asymmetry*, 1974, p. 3.

Arrow's impossibility theorem

Also called Arrow's paradox, first formulated by the American economist Kenneth J. Arrow in *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951). Intuitively, a social choice can be obtained through the aggregation of individual preferences. Such a choice, if acceptable, must satisfy the following reasonable formal conditions: (a) a social ordering can be obtained from any set of individual orderings and preferences; (b) if at least one individual prefers A to B and nobody else objects to it, then the society should choose A (Pareto opti-

于由 W. D. 罗斯主持的对亚氏著作的牛津翻译,在方法论上,则受 W. 耶格尔发生学方法的影响。在诸如 G. E. L. 欧文和 J. 阿克里尔等杰出学者们的著作刺激下,从本世纪中叶以来,这种研究得到了很大进展,而且,许多其他牛津和剑桥的哲学家也受到了亚里士多德研究的影响。随着形而上学、心的哲学、语言哲学和德性伦理学的新近发展,亚里士多德主义的一次新的复兴(有时也称为“新亚里士多德主义”)已经出现。

从哲学上看,亚里士多德主义被看成一种与柏拉图主义相对立的倾向。二者之间的这种区别,一直被粗略地描绘为是经验主义与理性主义、自然主义与观念主义之间的区别,尽管柏拉图与亚里士多德思想的真实联系依然是学者们争论的话题。

“‘亚里士多德主义’无疑意味着是对主题,即所遭遇的经验世界的首要地位的强调。”——兰德尔:《亚里士多德》,1960年,第297页。

时间箭头

时间哲学中的一个中心概念。我们通常认为,时间是具有固有方向性的。时间看来是不对称的,因为我们可以一种方式去影响未来,但不能如此去影响过去。过去是凝固的,而未来是开放的。这就是我们能谈论“自由意志”这一问题的理由。它使人想到自然过程似乎有一种自然的时间秩序。我们称这种时间的方向性为“时间箭头”。然而,物理学认为像这样的时间并没有内在的定向。它并不指向未来,就像它并不指向过去一样。那么,所谓的“时间箭头”的哲学基础是什么?这已成为一个争辩的论题。

“在物理学中,提到时间的方向或时间箭头几乎已成为普遍的惯例,并隐含着现在从过去到未来的流动或运动的方向的意思。”——戴维斯:《时间不对称的物理学》,1974年,第3页。

阿罗不可能性定理

也称作“阿罗悖论”,由美国经济学家 K. J. 阿罗在《社会选择与个体价值》(1951)中首次系统地提出。直观地说,一个社会选择可通过个体偏好的加和而得出。这样的—个选择如果是可接受的,必须满足下列合理的形式条件:(1)一个社会排序可由任何—组个体的排序和偏好中得出;(2)如果至少有一个个体偏爱 A 而不是 B,并且没有其他人反对它,则社会应当选择 A (“帕累托最佳”);(3)社会选择不应该被独裁

mality); (c) the social choice cannot be determined dictatorially; (d) the choice with regard to A and B should be decided between them alone, independent of irrelevant alternatives. But Arrow proves that on these conditions there is no method to determine social ordering through the aggregation of individual preferences. Various attempts have been made to get out of this paradox, but none turns out to be satisfactory. The theorem indicates that the notion of general will conceived by Rousseau and prominent in social and political debate cannot easily be determined in practice. The voting paradox is an example of this theorem.

“‘Arrow’s impossibility theorem’ brings about, in a dramatic way, the tension involved in ruling out the use of interpersonal comparisons of utility, in aggregating individual preferences into consistent and complete social choice, satisfying some mild-looking conditions of reasonableness.” — Sen, *On Ethics and Economics*, 1987, p. 34.

Arrow’s paradox, another expression for Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Art

[from Latin, *ars*, *artis*, skill, human products which can arouse aesthetic experience] Starting from the eighteenth century, art replaced “beauty” to become the central notion of aesthetics. However, it has been difficult to provide a suitable definition of art to enable one to distinguish artworks from other objects and to bring all artistic activities, such as painting, sculpture, architecture, music and literature, under one heading. In an objective object-centred account, Plato defined art as *mimesis*, that is the representation or display of certain aspects of reality. However, not all arts are representational. Another traditional definition claims that art is the expression of emotions, feelings and moods. Art-expression is a specific form of self-expression. This is a subjective artist-centred notion. Other accounts include art as significant form (aesthetic formalism); art as what is recognised by an institution (institutional theory of art); art as creation; and art as play. Another major issue dividing theories of art concerns the function of art. Some theorists hold that art is functional, serving psychological, moral, social and other practical purposes, while others claim that art is autonomous and not functional. In their view art should be pursued for its sake and for pure aesthetic value.

“Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human being.” — Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 1953, p. 40.

Art for art’s sake, see aestheticism

Artificial intelligence

Often abbreviated as AI. The use of programs to enable

地决定; (4) 关于 A 和 B 的选择应当仅在它们之间作出决定, 独立于不相干的其他选择项。但是阿罗证明如果情形如此, 则无法通过个体偏好的加和来决定社会排序。为了摆脱这一悖论, 作出了种种尝试, 但是没有一种结果能令人满意。这个定理表明, 卢梭所设想的、在社会和政治争辩中著名的“普遍意志”的概念, 在实践中是难以确定的。“表决悖论”给出了这个定理的一个案例。

“‘阿罗不可能性定理’以一种引人注目的方式, 引出了在加总个体偏好为一致的和完备的社会选择中, 当满足一些看上去适度的合理性条件性时, 会出现拒绝应用个体间效用比较的紧张状况。”——森:《论伦理学和经济学》, 1987 年, 第 34 页。

阿罗悖论

“阿罗不可能性定理”的另一种表述。

艺术

[源自拉丁语 *ars*, *artis*, 意指“技艺”或“能够唤起审美体验的人类产品”] 自 18 世纪以降, 艺术取代了“美”而成为美学的中心概念。即便如此, 人们却始终很难给艺术下一个合适的定义, 以便使人能够区分艺术作品与其他对象, 或者使人能够用艺术这一名目来涵盖所有艺术活动, 譬如绘画, 雕塑, 建筑, 音乐和文学等等。在以对象为中心的客观描述中, 柏拉图把艺术界定为摹仿, 也就是再现或展示现实的某些方面。然而, 并非所有艺术都是再现性的, 另有一种传统的界说认为, 艺术是情感意趣的表现。艺术表现是自我表现的一种特殊形式。这是一种主观性的以艺术家为中心的观念。其他一些说法包括艺术即有意味的形式(审美形式主义), 艺术即直觉认识的对象(艺术直觉理论), 艺术即创造和艺术即游戏等等。另外一个分化艺术理论的主要问题涉及艺术的功能。有些理论家认为艺术是有功能的, 是服务于心理、道德、社会与其他实用目的的; 而有些理论家则认为艺术是自律的, 是无功能的。在他们看来, 艺术就是为了艺术, 就是为了纯粹的审美价值。

“艺术创造象征人类的形式。”——朗格:《情感与形式》, 1953 年, 第 40 页。

为艺术而艺术

见“唯美主义”条。

人工智能

通常略作“AI”。指使机器用程序来完成人

machines to perform tasks which human beings perform using their intelligence, and to simulate on a computer human thinking and problem-solving. Artificial intelligence aims to bypass the human brain and body and to achieve a fuller understanding of rationality. The idea can be traced to Turing's intelligent machine. In 1956, the first AI Program, called "Logical Theorist", devised by Herbert Simon and others, was capable of proving on its own, 38 of the first 52 theorems from *Principia Mathematica*. Today, AI has developed into a domain of research, application and instruction within computer science and other disciplines, focusing on issues such as new programming languages, methods of inference and problem-solving, visual recognition, and expert systems. Early AI avoided human psychological models, but this orientation has been altered due to the development of connectionism, based on theories of how the brain works. In connectionism, complex functions, including learning, involve the transmission of information along pathways formed among large arrays of simple elements. AI seeks to understand human intelligent processes in terms of symbol manipulation and raises questions about the conditions, if any, in which we would be justified in ascribing mental attributes to purely physical systems. It has also contributed to the development of cognitive science and to some controversies in the philosophy of mind. There is a distinction between the strong thesis of AI and the weak thesis of AI. The weak thesis, which proposes only that a computer program is helpful for understanding the human mind, is widely accepted. The strong thesis, that computer "minds" instantiate human psychological processes, is highly controversial. It is challenged by John Searle's argument that the syntactic manipulation of symbols by a machine is not complemented by a semantic understanding of the meaning of the symbols for the machine as it is for human beings.

"Artificial intelligence is not the study of computers, but of intelligence in thought and action. Computers are its tools, because its theories are expressed as computer programs that enable machines to do things that would require intelligence if done by people." — Boden, *Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man*, 1977, preface.

Artificial virtue, see natural virtue

Artworld

A word transformed into a technical term by the American philosopher Arthur Danto in his 1964 paper "The Artworld". For Danto, an artworld provides an atmosphere or context in which artworks are embedded. It is mainly constituted by the history and theory of art. Such a world varies according to time and place. According to Danto, this theoretical context takes an artwork up into the world of art and

类使用其智力来完成任务并用计算机来模拟人类思维和问题解决。人工智能的目的是绕过脑与身来达到对人类理智的全面理解。其思想可以追溯于图灵的智能机。1956年, H. 西蒙等人设计出了被称为“逻辑理论家”的第一个AI程序, 它能够自己证明《数学原理》中前52个定理中的38个。如今, AI已发展为计算机科学等学科中的一个研究、应用和教育的领域, 它专门研究像新的程序语言、推理与问题解决的方法、视觉识别及专家系统这样的问题。早期的AI避免人的心理模型, 但这一方针由于联结主义的发展而得到改变, 这个联结主义的发展是以大脑的工作原理为基础的。在联结主义中, 包括学习在内的复杂功能包含着沿着在大量简单元件之间所形成的通路进行的信息传递。AI试图借助于符号操作来帮助人类理解人的智力过程, 因此它提出了在什么条件下我们才有理由将心的状态归之于一个纯粹的物理系统的问题。它对于认知科学和心的哲学的发展作出了很大贡献。在“强AI论”与“弱AI论”之间有一个区分。那个弱的论点只是认为, 计算机程序有助于理解人的心的状态。这一点得到了广泛的接受。那个强的观点则声称计算机的“心”例示了人的心理过程。这一论点颇有争议。塞尔论证指出, 与人不同的是, 机器对符号的句法操作并不伴随着对符号意义的语义理解。

“人工智能不是关于计算机的研究, 而是关于思想与行为中的智力的研究。计算机是它的工具, 因为其理论被表达为使得机器做人需要智力才能做的事的计算机程序。”——博登:《人工智能与自然人》, 1977年, 前言。

人为的德

见“自然的德”条。

艺术世界

美国哲学家丹托在1964年发表的一篇题为“论艺术世界”的文章中将该词转化为一个术语。在丹托看来, 艺术世界提供一种将各种艺术作品包括在内的氛围或语境。艺术世界主要由艺术史和艺术理论构成。这一世界因时因地而异。据丹托所言, 这一理论语境可将艺术作品带进艺术世界, 使其免于沦落为现实的物体。另外

keeps it from collapsing into the real object which it is. Another American philosopher George Dickie developed the notion of an artworld from a figure of speech to something having an ontological status. He first defines it as a formal institution comprising such things as museums, galleries and art journals on the one hand and artists, art critics, organisers of exhibitions and others possessing relevant authority about art and the art market on the other. Representatives of an artworld can confer upon an artefact the status of an artwork. This account of an artworld has become essential for his "institutional theory of art". Later Dickie modified his notion into one of an art circle, an interrelated structure of relationships among artists and their audiences. Dickie's notion of an artworld is more concrete than Danto's. Nevertheless, their common idea is that art has its own environment and is the product of a type of specialised and unique institutionalised activities. Accordingly, art does not serve human life, as Plato and Aristotle claim, but is disengaged from worldly concerns. Art is a world in which one can apply one's own set of practices. The theory may explain the trans-cultural and trans-historical nature of artworks.

"To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art; an artworld." —Danto, "The Artworld", in *The Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964), p. 580.

As if

For Kant, a form of analogical argument as a maxim of regulative judgement. In theoretical philosophy, traditional metaphysical entities such as God and the soul, are beyond the limits of experience, and we cannot really know their nature. Nevertheless we may still suppose them as if they were working principles. We take them as guidance for determining the constitution and connection of empirical objects. This regulative principle can also be applied to practical philosophy and aesthetics. A moral agent should act as if he were a legislator in the kingdom of ends. A finished work of art should appear as if it were a product of nature, but without the constraint of rules.

"We declare, for instance, that the things of the world must be viewed *as if* they received their existence from a highest intelligence." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A671/B699.

Asceticism

[from Greek *askesis*] Originally meaning a course of self-discipline such as that undertaken by athletes, and later associated with rigorous self-discipline, abstinence, simplicity and the solitary and contemplative life, popular in ancient society, early Christianity and some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism. Some ascetics also follow exercises that consist in many means of tormenting themselves. Philosophically, as-

一位美国哲学家迪基发展此说,将艺术世界从修辞学地位提升到本体论地位。他率先将艺术世界界定为一种正式的机构,其中一方面包括博物馆、美术馆与艺术杂志,另一方面包括艺术家、艺术评论家、艺术展览组织者与其他同艺术和艺术市场相关的权威人士等等。艺术世界的代表人物可以授予人工制品以艺术作品的地位。这种对艺术世界的看法逐渐成为“艺术机构说”的核心观点。后来,迪基将原先的艺术世界观念修正为艺术圈子,也就是艺术家与其观众之关系的相互关联结构。迪基的艺术世界观念要比丹托的观念更为具体。但无论怎么说,他们的共识在于艺术具有自身的环境,是特殊化和独特的习俗化活动的产物。相应地,并非像柏拉图与亚里士多德所要求的那样,艺术非但不为人生服务,而是摆脱人间的关切。在艺术这个世界里,人们可以自行其事。此学说或许可以解释艺术作品的超文化与超历史本质。

“将某物视为艺术就要求某物无可挑剔——此乃艺术理论的一种氛围,是对艺术史的一种认识:一个艺术世界。”——丹托:《论艺术世界》,见《哲学杂志》第61期(1964年),第580页。

仿佛

康德把这种形式的类比论证用作规范判断的一个准则。在理论哲学中,传统形而上学的存在体,像上帝和灵魂这样的存在,超出了经验的界限,所以我们不能真正认识它们的本性。但我们仍可以假定它们,“仿佛”它们是可行的原理。我们把它们作为规定经验对象的构成和联系的指导。这个范导性原理也应用于实践哲学和美学。道德主体应当“仿佛”他是目的王国的立法者那样去行动。一个完成了的艺术作品看上去“仿佛”是自然的产品,没有受规律的约束。

“我们宣称,譬如,世界的事物必须被看做是仿佛它们从一最高理智接受其存在。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A671/B699。

禁欲主义

[源自希腊文 *askesis*] 原意为像运动员修炼的那种自律功夫,后来与严格的自律、禁欲、简朴、孤独及冥想生活相关,在古代社会、早期基督教和某些佛教和印度教流派中流行。有些禁欲主义者还从事这样的苦修,即用各种方法折磨自己。从哲学上说,禁欲主义主张人应压抑欲望。一种极端的主张要求人完全弃绝欲望,而

eticism proposes that a person should repress desires. A strong version requires one to relinquish one's desires totally, while a weaker version demands only that one denies bodily or worldly desires. There have been various grounds for advocating this unnatural style of life. Morally, asceticism is seen as the way to free one's soul from the body's pollution. Epistemologically, it is considered to be the way to gain truth or virtue. Religiously, it is claimed that the ascetic life will be rewarded by God. For every grain of pain now, we shall have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. Asceticism, in contrast to hedonism, approves of actions which tend to diminish present pleasure or to augment present pain.

"Asceticism has commonly assumed that the impulses connected with the body are base and are to be treated accordingly." —Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness*, 1961, p. 371.

Ascriptivism

A position regarding the meaning of statements about the voluntariness of acts. It claims that in saying that "This act is voluntary", we are ascribing responsibility for the act to its agent, rather than describing the act as being caused by its agent in a certain way. Thus, to call an act voluntary or intentional is not a causal statement. Such statements are not matters of fact, but are matters of practical (legal or moral) decision. They are not true or false. The idea of ascriptivism was introduced by H. L. A. Hart and belongs to a more general position of non-cognitivism. Peter Geach, who named the view, rejects ascriptivism and insists that to ascribe an act to an agent is a causal description of an act.

"Ascriptivists hold that to say an action X was voluntary on the part of an agent A is not to describe the act X as caused in a certain way, but to ascribe it to A, to hold A responsible for it." —Geach, "Ascriptivism", *Philosophical Review*, 1960, LXIX, p. 221.

Aseity

[from Latin: *aseitas*, *a*, from *se*, itself] The property of being completely and absolutely independent of anything distinct from oneself and deriving solely from oneself. As self-determination of the self as itself, it is absolute freedom. In the later medieval scholasticism, God was thought to be the only entity which has this status. God is responsible for his own existence and does not depend on anything else. Everything else, on the contrary, relies for existence on God. Based on aseity, God is ascribed various other perfections. In modern times, Schopenhauer used the term for the ontological status of Will. In existentialism, since God is dead, man comes to have aseity as absolute freedom. Nothing should be in man which is not by him. The problem of reconciling absolute freedom with the place of man in society was explored by Sartre in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.

温和的主张则只要求人否定肉体的或尘世的欲望。提倡这种不自然的生活方式的人具有各式各样的理由。从道德上说,禁欲主义被看成是使人的灵魂摆脱肉体污染的方式。就认识论而言,它被视为获得真理或德性的方法。从宗教方面看,它宣称禁欲的生活将会得到上帝的奖赏。我们现在受一份苦,在不久的将来会得到百份的享乐。禁欲主义与享乐主义相反,赞成将导致减少当前享乐或增大当前痛苦的行动。

"禁欲主义通常都认为,与肉体相关的冲动都是低贱的,并应据此而对待。"——布兰夏德:《理性和善》,1961年,第371页。

归属主义

这一学说是关于有关行为自愿性之陈述句的意义的。它认为,当我们说"这一行为是自愿的"时,我们是在把行为责任归属于其行为者,而不是在描绘这一行为是由其行为者以某种方式引起的。因此,称一个行为是自愿的或有意的,并不是一因果陈述句。对这一类陈述句而言,重要的不是事实,而是实践(法的或道德的)决定。它们无所谓真或假。归属主义的思想是由哈特提出的,属于一种更一般的非认知主义的观点。彼特·吉奇将其命名为归属主义,但反对这一立场,坚持认为把一个行为归属于一个行为者就是对该行为作因果性描述。

"归属主义者认为,说行为X对于行动者A是自愿的并不是在描绘行为X是由某种方式引起的,而是在把它归结为A,让A为它负责。"——吉奇:《归属主义》,《哲学评论》,1960年, LXIX, 第221页。

自足性

[源自拉丁语 *aseitas*, *a* (从) 和 *se* (自身)] 指完全而绝对地独立于与自身不同的任何东西,且只由自身而来的那种存在的特性。由于是自我作为自身的自我规定,所以它是绝对的自由。在后来的中世纪经院哲学中,上帝被认为是具有这种地位的惟一实体。上帝为他自己的存在负责,不依赖其他的任何东西。相反,其他每一事物都依靠上帝而存在。以这种自足性为基础,其他各种完满性也被归属于上帝。在现代,这个词也被叔本华用来指称意志的本体论地位。在存在主义那里,既然上帝死了,人就作为绝对的自由享有自足性。人的一切无不由自己支配。萨特在其《辩证理性批判》中探索了绝对自由与人在社会中的地位这二者间的协调问题。

与此相关的一个特性是"自主"(perseity,

A related property *perseity* (from Latin: *per*, by + *se*, itself, intrinsically) is a state in which a thing acts out of its own inner structure. Any substance, in contrast to its attributes, is in a state of *perseity*. However, only God can be in a perfect state of *perseity*, because through *aseity* God alone is completely independent of anything else, while other substances rely on God for their existence.

"Men have occasionally claimed that God is the cause of his own existence or of his being the kind of being which he is, although this is not a claim normally made by traditional Theologians. Etymology would suggest that this is what is meant when God is said to have 'aseity' (his existence deriving from himself, *a se*)." —Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, pp. 255—256.

A-series of time

A term introduced by McTaggart for the temporal ordering of events according to whether they are past, present or future, in contrast to the B-series of time which orders events according to whether they are before or after one another or earlier or later than one another in time. These two kinds of temporal series are different. Events in B-series of time will not change their ordering over time. Plato's time is always earlier than Hegel's time, and this relationship will never change. According to the A-series, every event will successively be future, present and past. Although McTaggart admitted that the tense-distinctions in the A-series are essential to understanding the nature of temporality, he uses the A-series to introduce his famous argument against the reality of time. Since past, present and future are contradictory attributes and since the A-series ascribes possession of these contradictory attributes to the same events, McTaggart concluded that time is not real. On this basis one is led to argue that the past and the future are not realms of true existence. Even if this time-series were not real, however, we always perceive it as though it were real. McTaggart called this perceptible time-series the C-series.

"For the sake of brevity I shall give the name of the A-series to that series of positions which runs from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present through the near future to the far future, or conversely." —McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, sect. 306.

Assertion

A term used synonymously with judgement for affirming or denying what can be true or false. Traditionally, an asserted sentence is composed of a subject-expression, a predicate-expression and a copula. On this view, the copula is essential to unite any pair of terms into an assertion, but Frege, Wittgenstein and others have offered different accounts of how a proposition or assertion has unity. An asserted sentence is contrasted to other sentences in terms of

源自拉丁语 *per* (依据) 和 *se* (自身、本然), 意指一物出于它自身的内在构造而行为的状态。与其属性不同, 任何实体都处在自主状态。但是, 只有上帝才能处于完满的自主状态, 因为只有上帝才由于自足性而完全独立于任何其他东西, 其他实体则要依靠上帝才存在。

"人们偶尔宣称, 上帝是他自身存在的原因, 或者说, 他是他存在的原因的那样一种存在, 虽然这不是传统的神学家们所持的正规说法。词源学已暗示出, 当说到上帝有 '自足性' (他的存在导源于自己, *a se*) 时, 其含义正是如此。"——斯文布勒,《有神论的融贯性》, 1977年, 第255—256页。

时间的 A 序列

一个由麦克塔加特引入的术语, 用于关于过去、现在和未来的事件的时间排序, 与时间的 B 序列形成对照, 后者把事件排列作以前或以后, 或是彼此在时间上早于或迟于。这两种时间序列是不同的。时间的 B 序列中的事件不会改变它们在时间上的定位。柏拉图时代总是早于黑格尔时代, 这种关系绝不会改变。按照 A 序列, 每个事件会依次为将来、现在和过去。尽管麦克塔加特承认, A 序列中的时态差别对于理解时间性的本性是关键, 但是, 他运用 A 序列以引入他反对时间实在性的著名论证。因为过去、现在和未来是矛盾的属性, 并且因为 A 序列把拥有这些矛盾的属性归于同一事件, 麦克塔加特得出结论, 时间不是实在的。在此基础上, 可以导致过去和未来不是真实存在的领域的论证。然而, 尽管时间序列并不真实, 我们总是感觉到它, 仿佛它是实在的一样。麦克塔加特把这种可感觉到的时间序列称作 C 序列。

"为简洁起见, 我将命名这种情形的序列为 A 序列, 它由久远的过去经由较近的过去到现在, 然后再从现在经过不远的未来去往遥远的未来, 或者反过来。"——麦克塔加特,《存在的本性》, 第306节。

断定

与判断同义, 用于肯定或否定可以为真或为假的东西。在传统上, 一个断定语句是由一个主语表达式、谓语表达式和联系动词构成的。根据这种看法, 这个联系动词对于把任何一对词项连接为一个断定至关重要。但弗雷格、维特根斯坦及其他人亦对一个命题或断定如何获得统一提出了不同的观点。断定语句由于其断定力而与其他语句形成对照。在传统逻辑中, 断定力

its assertoric force. In traditional logic assertoric force is bound up with the grammatical predicate. Assertion does not merely express a thought or hypothesis and does not issue a command or ask a question, but is committed to the truth of the sentence or puts forward a thought as being true. Wittgenstein criticised Frege's proposal of an assertion-sign to indicate whether a thought is asserted. Important questions arise about the asserted and non-asserted occurrence of sentences which are part of other sentences. If we assert "P and Q", we also assert both component sentences, but this is not the case in asserting "P or Q". In asserting "John believes that P", we do not assert "P". To reason is to infer any assertion from assertions already admitted.

"It is one thing merely to express a thought and another simultaneously to assert it. We can often tell from the external circumstances which of the two things is being done ... This is why I distinguish between thoughts and judgements, expressions of thought and assertions." — Frege, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, 1980, p. 20.

Assertion-sign

The symbol " \vdash " which Frege placed in front of a sentence to indicate that the sentence is asserted (that is affirmed or denied) or is a judgement. Frege needed this symbol to distinguish asserted propositions from unasserted ones, because while in traditional logic assertoric form is marked by the grammatical predicate, Frege's concept-script disassociated assertoric force from predication. In this symbol, " \vdash " is called the judgement-stroke and " \dashv " is called the content stroke or horizontal stroke. " \vdash " is crucial because without it, " \dashv " only expresses a content, without being committed to its truth. In modern logic this symbol has two further uses. When it is written between sets of sentences, it indicates that the sentences following it can be derived from the sentences preceding it; for example, " $[A_1 \dots A_n] \vdash B$ " means that B may be deduced from the premises $A_1 \dots A_n$. Furthermore, $\vdash B$ also means that B is a theorem in a system, that is, it may be assumed without any proof.

"The assertion-sign— what Frege called the 'judgement-stroke.'— can be attached only to the name of a truth-value, i.e. to a sentence." — M. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, p. 378.

Assertoric

A judgement or proposition by which one asserts that something is or is not the case. An affirmative assertoric judgement has the form: "X is Y", while a negative assertoric judgement has the form: "X is not Y". An assertoric is a modal form of proposition or judgement, in contrast to two other modal categorical judgements: problematic (possible) and apodeictic (necessary). Expressed adverbially, an assertoric judgement can be stated: "X is actually Y", or "X is ac-

与语法谓词有密切关系。断定并非仅仅是在表达思想或做出假设，也不是在发布命令或提出问题，而是承认句子为真或宣称一个思想为真。维特根斯坦批评弗雷格用断定记号表明思想是否被断定的做法。提出的重要问题是关于作为其他句子组成部分出现的断定语句和非断定语句。如果我们断定“P 和 Q”，我们也断定了二个分句；可这和断定“P 或 Q”不一样。在断定“约翰相信 P”时，我们没有断定“P”。推理不过是从多个已被承认的断定中推出某个断定。

“仅仅表达一个思想是一回事，而同时断定它则是另一回事。我们通常从外在环境就可以说出所做的是哪一件事。这就是我区分思想与判断、对思想的表达与断定的原因。”——弗雷格：《哲学与数学通信集》，1980年，第20页。

断定记号

即符号“ \vdash ”，是弗雷格放在句首用于标明这个句子是被断定的（即被肯定或否定）或者是一个判断。弗雷格需要用这个符号区分被断定的命题和未被断定的命题，因为，在传统逻辑中，断定形式是由语法谓词标明的，而弗雷格的概念文字则无法从谓词中分离出断定力。在这个符号中，“ \vdash ”被称作“判断号”，“ \dashv ”被称作“内容线”或“水平线”。“ \vdash ”是至关重要的，因为没有它，“ \dashv ”就只是表达了内容，而没有承认其为真。在现代逻辑中，这个符号有另外两个用法。当把它写在一些句子中间时，它就表示后一个句子可以派生于前一个句子；例如，“ $[A_1 \dots A_n] \vdash B$ ”意味着，B 可以从前提 $A_1 \dots A_n$ 中推演出来。而且， $\vdash B$ 也意味着，B 是一个体系中的公理，即无须证明就可以断定它。

“断定记号——即弗雷格所谓的‘判断号’——只能赋予真值的名称，即句子。”——M. 达米特：《弗雷格哲学解说》，第378页。

实然的

断定某件事情是或不是如此的一种判断或命题。肯定的突然判断具有“X 是 Y”的形式；否定的突然判断以“X 不是 Y”的形式表示。一个实然判断是一个命题或判断的模态形式，相对于其他两个模态直言判断：即或然的（可能的）和确然的（必然的）判断。用副词表达，一个实然判断要么是，“X 事实上是 Y”要么是“X 事实上不是 Y”。

tually not Y".

"In assertoric judgements affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true)." -- Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A75.

Assertoric force

Frege's term for the force which makes a sentence an assertion rather than a hypothetical, interrogative or imperative sentence. Assertoric force is distinguished from assertoric sense. The former is the act of asserting, and is represented using the "assertion-sign", while the latter is the thought or judgeable content contained in a sentence. In English, the indicative mood of the main verb has assertoric force, for it makes the expression of a thought into an assertion. The idea of assertoric force inspired Austin to develop his speech-act theory.

"Assertoric force can most easily be eliminated by changing the whole into a question; for one can express the same thought in a question as in an assertoric sentence, only without asserting it." -- Frege, *Collected Papers* (ed. McGuinness), 1984, p. 38.

Association of ideas

A view, especially important in Hume, explaining the patterned occurrence of ideas in our minds. The human mind can synthesise and combine various simple ideas into complex ones which are previously unknown. Exploiting the analogy of the principle of universal gravitation in the natural world, Hume believes that there are certain principles according to which the mind operates to connect all sorts of ideas. The occurrence of one idea will lead the mind to its correlative. These principles are three in number: resemblance, contiguity in time and place and causation. They were used by Hume to explain all the complicated operations of the mind which unify thought in the imagination. This constructive mechanism of the human mind became the basis for associationism, but was undermined by its own internal problems and by rival views, such as behaviourism.

"We have already observed that nature established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, resemblance, contiguity and causation." -- Hume, *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, V: II, 41.

Associationism

A position claiming that the association of elementary mental contents and representations is sufficient to account for complex mental states and processes, because the latter

"在实然判断中,肯定或否定被视为真实的(真的)。" —— 康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A75。

断定力

弗雷格的术语,是指使一个句子成为断定而不是假设句、疑问句或祈使句的力量。断定力不同于断定意义。前者是一种断定行为,是用“断定记号”表示的,而后者则是一种思想或一个句子所包含的可判断内容。在英语中,主动词的陈述语气就具有断定力,因为它使对思想的表达成为断定。断定力的观念启发了奥斯汀提出他的言语行为理论。

“通过把整体变为一个问题,断定力就可以很容易地消除了;因为人们可以在问题中表达与在断定句中相同的思想,只是没有断定它而已。”——弗雷格:《论文集》(麦奎尼斯编),1984年,第38页。

观念的联结

这一观点用于说明我们心中观念的有规则的发生。在休谟那里这个观点特别重要。人的心灵可以将各种不同的简单观念综合和结合成原先所不知的复杂观念。利用自然界中的万有引力原理类推,休谟认为存在着心灵把各种观念联结起来所依据的一些原则。一个观念的呈现将把心灵引导到该观念的相关者上。这些原则在数量上有三个:相似,时间和地点上的接近,因果关系。休谟用它们说明心灵在想像中把思想统一起来时的全部复杂活动。人类心灵的这一构造机制变成了“联想主义”的基础,但由于其自身固有的问题,以及诸如“行为主义”等对立观点的批判,它受到了削弱。

“我们已经观察到,自然在特殊的观念之间建立了联系,而且一个观念一出现在我们的思想中,它就借柔和而不可觉察的运动引进它的相关观念,并使我们注意它。我们已将这些联系或联结的原则归为三种,即相似,接近和因果关系。”——休谟:《人类理智研究和道德原理研究》,第五章,第2节,41。

联想主义

这种观点宣称,基本的心内容与表征的联想足以说明复杂的心的状态和过程,因为后者可以分解为或还原为其联想的成分。因此,任

can be broken into or reduced to the elements of their association. Hence, all postulations of external entities that are supposed to explain mental phenomena are unnecessary. The position has been favoured by British empiricism, including Berkeley, Hume and J. S. Mill. Hume believed that there are three fundamental principles of association, that is contiguity, resemblance and causation based on constant conjunction. Associationism refers also to the psychological programme, called associationistic psychology, developed by Hartley and in modern times by B. F. Skinner. Associationism is generally connected with ethical hedonism and metaphysical reductionism.

"Classical Associationists—Hume, say—held that mental representations have transportable constituents and, I suppose, a combinational semantics: the mental image of a house contains, as proper parts, mental images of proper parts of houses."—Jerry A. Fodor, in *Mind and Action* (ed. by W. G. Lycan), 1990, p. 298.

Astrology

As a theory, astrology is related to ancient cosmology and Ptolemaic astronomy, but it is mainly known as a divinatory art, to foretell one's future life according to the pattern of the heavenly bodies at birth or to predict future human events on the basis of current celestic movements. Astrology presupposes that a person's fate has been determined and written in the stars and leaves no place for human freedom. It has been a target of criticism in the Western rationalist tradition and is now presented as a prime example of a pseudoscience.

"Astrology...pretends to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior." —Bacon, *The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon*, I, 1905, p. 57.

Asymmetric relation, see symmetric relation

Atheism

[from Greek: *a*, not + *theos*, God, the absence of belief in God] The belief that God — especially a personal, omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent God — does not exist. Throughout much of Western history, atheism has been a term of abuse, and atheists have been attacked for impiety and immorality. The non-believers of a particular religion have also been called atheists by the believers of that religion. As a philosophical position, atheism is supported by several arguments. Because science proves that matter is eternal, there is no need for God to be the creator of the material universe. The existence of so many evils and defects in the world is incompatible with the existence of a God with

何用以解释心的现象的关于外部存在的假定都是不必要的。这一观点为英国经验主义者所青睐,其中包括巴克莱、休谟和密尔。休谟认为有三个基本的联想原则,即建立在不断的关联基础上的接近、相似和因果关系。联想主义又指一种心理学纲领,即联想主义心理学。它由哈特利提出,其现代的代表则是斯金纳。联想主义在广义上与伦理学的享乐主义和形而上的还原主义相联系。

“经典的联想主义者——如休谟——主张心的表征具有可移动的成分和我所猜想的联合的语义:关于一个房子的心的映象以关于房子的适当部分的心的映象作为其适当的组成部分。”——福多,见《心与活动》(里库编),1990年,第298页。

星占学

作为一个理论,星占学与古代宇宙论和托勒密天文学有关。不过,它主要被认作一种占卜术,根据一个人出生时天体的样式,来预言这个人的未来生活,或者根据当下的天体运动,来预告人类的未来之事。星占学预先假定,一个人的命运已经被确定了,并被写在星象上;它不给人类自由以任何地位。在西方理性主义传统中,星占学一直成为批判的目标,现在则被当做伪科学的一个主要例证。

“星占学……自称发现了高级的星体和低等的人之间的那种对应或联系。”——培根:《F. 培根哲学著作集》,第一卷,1905年,第57页。

反对称关系

见“对称关系”条。

无神论

[源自希腊语 *a* (不,无) 和 *theos* (神),不相信神] 相信神(尤其是人格的、全知的、全能的、仁慈的神)是不存在的。在整个西方历史的多数时候,无神论一直是一个遭贬损的词汇,无神论者被抨击为不虔诚和不道德。不信仰某种特殊宗教的人也被该宗教的信仰者称为无神论者。作为一种哲学立场,无神论有许多论证支持。因为科学证明,物质是永恒的,不需要神作为物质世界的创造者。世界上如此之多的邪恶和缺陷的存在,与传统中具有至上属性的神的存在是水火不容的。神被断言为必然存在,但要了解这个必然存在概念的意思,却是困难的。这

the traditional supreme attributes. God is claimed to exist necessarily, but it is difficult to make sense of the notion of necessary existence. These arguments contest important arguments for the existence of God. Of significant philosophers, Hoibach, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre were all atheists. Atheism should be distinguished from pantheism, which claims to identify God with the world, and from agnosticism, which claims that we do not know whether God exists.

In another sense, atheism is the position of not being a theist. God might exist, but does not govern or care for the world. This view, which is faithful to the Greek etymology of the term, is sometimes called negative atheism, in contrast to the positive atheism discussed above.

"...the controversy between atheists and non-atheists in Western society has usually been about the question of whether an all-good, all knowing, all-powerful being exists." — M. Martin, *Atheism*, p. 476.

Atom

[from Greek: *atomos*, in turn from *a*, not — *temos*, cut, hence the smallest unit, which cannot be further cut or divided] The central conception of the Greek atomists, such as Leucippus and Democritus, who claimed that atom and void are the principles from which everything else in the world is composed. Atoms are ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, homogeneous and finite. The attributes ascribed to an atom are similar to the properties that Parmenides ascribed to his "is". Atoms move in the void and differ only in size, shape and position. Thus sensible features like colour, taste and smell do not belong to external bodies but are the result of the interaction between atoms and ourselves. The conception of the atom is broadly viewed as one of the greatest achievements of ancient natural philosophy; and it has been a subject of dispute in the later development of philosophy and science, especially in the corpuscularian philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Greek philosophy, Aristotle also used the term atom for the *infirma species*.

"By convention are sweet and bitter, hot and cold, by convention is colour; in truth are atoms and the void." Democritus, in Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* 7. 135.

Atomic facts

A term introduced by Russell and also employed by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*. For Russell, atomic facts are the simplest kind of facts given in experience, but Wittgenstein is less interested in this epistemological aspect than in the role of atomism in logic and in the possibility of language. Atomic facts consist in the possession of a quality by some particular thing (i. e. "This is white") or in a relation

些论证。辩驳了支持神之存在的重要论证。在有重要影响的哲学家中,霍尔巴赫、费尔巴哈、马克思、尼采和萨特都是无神论者。应该把无神论和主张神与世界同一的泛神论以及断言我们不知道神是否存在的不可知论区别开来。

在另一种意义上,无神论指不是一位有神论者的立场。神可能存在,但并不统治或关心这个世界。这种观点忠实地传达出了该词的希腊语词源的含义,有时也被称为“否定的无神论”,与此相对应,前述的那种通常意义则叫“肯定的无神论”。

“……在西方社会中,无神论者和非无神论者之间的论争,通常是关于全善、全知、全能的神是否存在的问题。”——马丁:《无神论》,第476页。

原子

[源自希腊文 *atomos*, 由否定前缀 *a* (不) 与 *temos* (切割) 组成, 字面意义指某种不可进一步切割和划分的东西, 也即是最小的单位] 希腊原子论派(留基波和德谟克利特)的中心概念。原子论认为原子和虚空乃是这一世界上其他事物由以构成的本原。原子是不生成的, 不可毁灭的, 不可分的, 同质的, 有限的。归属于原子的属性与巴门尼德归于他的“是”(存在)的属性是相似的。原子在虚空中运动, 彼此间只是在大小、形状和位置上有所不同。因而颜色、味觉、嗅觉等感觉特征并不属于外在物, 而是我们与原子互相作用的结果。原子概念被广泛地看做是古代自然哲学的一个伟大成就, 它在以后的哲学和科学的发展中, 尤其在17和18世纪, 一直是一个争论的话题。在希腊哲学中, 亚里士多德也以这个词 (*atomos*) 表示最下层的属。

“甜与苦, 热与冷是从俗约定的; 颜色是从俗约定的; 真实的只有原子和虚空。”——德谟克利特, 见塞克斯都·恩披里柯:《反学者》, 7.135。

原子事实

这一术语由罗素发明, 并由维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中使用。对罗素而言, 原子事实是那种在经验中得到的最简单的事实, 但维特根斯坦对原子论的兴趣与其说是在这认识论的方面, 不如说是它在逻辑和语言的可能性的作用方面。原子事实的构成是: 某特定事物具有某种性质(例如: “这是白的”)或某些特定事物具

among some particulars (i. e. "A gives B to C"). The relation can be dyadic (between two things), triadic (among three things), tetradic (among four things), and so on. Russell also calls a quality a "monadic relation", allowing the integration of predication into his general account of relations. Each atomic fact contains a relation and one or more terms of the relation. Those propositions expressing atomic facts are called atomic propositions and assert that a certain thing has a certain quality or that certain things have a certain relation. Atomic facts determine the truth or falsity of atomic propositions, and there is a logical isomorphism between them. Atomic facts are the terminating points of logical analysis. A "molecular fact", that is, complex facts such as "p or q" is constituted by more than one atomic facts. Molecular facts are represented by the truth-functional compound propositions of atomic propositions, called molecular propositions.

"There you have a whole infinite hierarchy of facts—facts in which you have a thing and a quality, two things and a relation, three things and a relation, four things and a relation, and so on. That whole hierarchy constitutes what I call atomic facts, and they are the simplest sort of facts."—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, pp. 198-199.

Atomic proposition

A proposition asserting that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation, such as "This is white", or "This is between a and b". Atomic propositions can be either positive ("This is white") or negative ("This is not white"). They express atomic facts and have their truth or falsity determined by atomic facts. An atomic proposition itself cannot be further analyzed into other component propositions, but the combination of two or more atomic propositions through logical connectives forms a molecular proposition.

"We may then define an atomic proposition as one of which no part is a proposition, while a molecular proposition is one of which at least one part is a proposition."—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 106.

Atomism

[from Greek: *atom*, the indivisible] A position holding that the world is composed of a infinite number of indivisible small elements and the void. It was first proposed as a metaphysical hypothesis by the Greek philosophers Leucippus and Democritus in order to account for the phenomenon of change denied by Parmenides. This ancient atomism, which was later developed by Epicurus, claimed that there is an infinite number of imperceptible material atoms, differing in quantitative properties. The atoms meet in the void and join together to form various compounds, which may again divide into atoms. Their quantitative differences determine the qualitative differences of the compounds. All movement in

有某种关系(例如"A把B给C")。这种关系可以是二元的(在两物之间)、三元的(在三物之间)、四元的(在四物之间),等等。罗素也把性质称为"单一关系",以便把主谓关系纳入他对关系的一般说明中。每个原子事实包含一种关系以及一个或多个关系项。那些表述原子事实的命题称为原子命题。它们断定某物有某种性质,或某些事物具有某种关系。原子事实决定原子命题的真假。它们之间有逻辑上的同构性。原子事实是逻辑分析的终点。"分子事实",即诸如"p或q"这样的复杂事实,由一个以上的原子事实构成。分子事实由原子命题的真值函项复合命题表示,它们叫分子命题。

"在这里,你会得到一整个由事实构成的无穷等级系统——这些事实是这样的:你有一物及一性质,两物及一关系,三物及一关系,四物及一关系,如此等等。这个等级系统构成了我所谓的原子事实,它们是最简单的一类事实。"——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第198-199页。

原子命题

断定某物有某种性质,或某些物有某种关系的命题,如"这是白的",或"这在a与b之间"。原子命题可以是肯定的("这是白的"),也可以是否定的("这不是白的")。它们表述原子事实并且由原子事实决定它们的真假。原子命题本身不能进一步分析为其他构成性命题,但两个或多个原子命题通过逻辑联结词的结合构成分子命题。

"因此,我们可以把原子命题定义为这样的命题:它的任何部分都不是命题,而把分子命题定义为这样的命题:它至少有一个部分是命题。"——罗素:《罗素文集》,第七卷,第106页。

原子主义

[源自希腊文 *atom*, 不可分割物]该理论主张世界是由无穷数量的不可分割的细小元素和虚空所构成的,作为一个形而上学假设,它首先是由希腊哲学家留基波和德谟克利特提出的,旨在说明被巴门尼德所否认的运动变化现象。这一古代原子论后来为伊壁鸠鲁所发展,它认为有无穷数量的不可感的物质原子存在,它们在量化属性上互相区别。原子在虚空中相互碰撞而凝聚,构成了各式各样的复合体。这些复合体可以再分化回原子。它们在量上的差别决定了复合体在质上的差别。世界上的一切运动都可归结成是原子在虚空中的安排与再安排。

the world can be reduced to the arrangement and rearrangement of atoms in the void.

This metaphysical doctrine was revived in modern philosophy by Gassendi in the form of corpuscularism. Such speculation about the structure of the world was supported by the chemical investigations on John Dalton and then in physics. In this century, Russell and early Wittgenstein developed a kind of logical atomism, claiming that the world is ultimately composed of elementary or atomic facts, to which elementary propositions correspond. Semantic atomism, developed by F. Dretske and J. Fodor and others, proposes that the meaning of a concept is determined by its relation to the thing to which it applies, rather than by its relation to other concepts.

"The logic which I will advocate is atomistic... When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate things." — Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* (ed. Marsh), 1956, p. 178.

Atomistic property, another term for punctuate property

Atonement

Originally, the condition of being at-one after two parties have been estranged from one another, but later an act or payment through which harmony is restored. The Jewish Day of Atonement (Hebrew: *Yom Kippur*) is a holy day requiring abstinence and repentance from all believers. In Christianity, the primary act of atonement was the self-sacrificial death of Jesus Christ in order to redeem humankind from sin leading to the reunion of God and men. This mysterious account represents a primitive morality of paying back what one owes, but understanding the nature of this sacrifice has been a topic of debate. Interpretations include paying a ransom exacted by the devil, satisfying an outraged God, restoring God's honour insulted by sin, repaying what is our debt to God, substituting for us and giving an example of love that inspires repentance. It is difficult to render any of these theories coherent with the notion of a perfect deity. Jesus is innocent and human beings are sinful. How can the sacrifice of the former substitute for that of the latter? If God accepts that sacrifice, how can he be just? The Resurrection of Christ and the identity between the Son and the Father make atonement even more problematic.

"Atonement, following our view, is a 'sheltering' or 'covering', but a profounder form of it." —Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, 1950, p. 54.

Attitude

A mental state of approval or disapproval, favouring or disfavouring. It is associated with emotion and feeling, but is contrasted to belief. While belief is concerned with fact and

这一形而上学学说在近代哲学的伽桑狄粒子主义中得到了复兴。这种对世界结构的思辨为J. 道尔顿的化学研究以及随后的物理学思想所支持。在本世纪, 罗素与早期维特根斯坦发展了逻辑原子论, 认为世界最终是由基本命题所对应的基本或原子事实所构成。F. 德雷斯克、J. 福多及其他哲学家发展的语义原子论断定, 一个概念的意义是由它与它所应用的事物的关系所决定的, 而不是由它与其他概念的关系所决定的。

“我所倡导的逻辑是原子主义的……当我说我的逻辑是原子主义的时, 我的意思是, 我认可有许多分离的事物存在这一常识观念。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》(马什编), 1956年, 第178页。

原子特性

“精细特性”的另一个名称。

赎罪

这个词原本指两个部分被相互疏离之后的合一情形, 后来逐渐意指一种行为或偿付, 通过它, 得以恢复和谐。犹太赎罪日(希伯来词: *Yom Kippur*) 是一圣日, 要求所有信徒禁欲和忏悔。在基督教中, 赎罪的原初行为指耶稣基督为了赎回人类的原罪, 为了上帝与人的和解而自我牺牲, 慷慨赴死。这个神秘的记载, 表现了偿还所欠的原始道德的遗风, 但是, 到底怎样理解这种牺牲的本质, 却一直是个争论的论题。人们提出了多种不同的阐释, 譬如: 作为偿付恶魔, 赔偿受迫害的上帝, 恢复被罪恶侮辱的上帝的荣誉以赎身; 作为我们应对上帝的报答; 作为我们的代理人; 作为激发忏悔的爱的例证等等。但是, 要把这任何一种理论与完满的神的观念结合一致, 却是困难的。耶稣是无罪的, 而人类是有罪的。前者的牺牲怎么能够代替后者呢? 如果上帝接受那种牺牲, 他如何能够做到公正? 基督的复活, 圣子和圣父之间的同一, 使得赎罪更有问题。

“按照我们的观点, 赎罪是一种‘庇护’或‘隐忍’, 只是形式更深一些。”——奥托:《神圣观念》, 1950年, 第54页。

态度

赞成或反对、喜欢或不喜欢的一种心理状态。它与情感和感情相关, 但与信念相对立。信念是与事实相关, 是认知的, 而态度则是与评价

is cognitive, attitude is concerned with evaluation and emotional response. People having the same beliefs might have different attitudes, or have the same attitudes although they have different beliefs towards the same object. Hence the distinction between attitude and belief amounts to the distinction between value and fact. Subjectivist ethics claims that attitude is more directly related to motivation and behaviour and that ethical and other value judgements are matters of attitude rather than of cognition.

"The term 'attitude' ... designates any psychological disposition of being for and against something."—Stevenson, *Fact and Value*, 1963, p. 2.

Attribute

[from Latin: *ad*, upon · *tribure*, assign, bestow] In contrast to the notion of substance, attributes are things which can be predicated of or attributed to a substance and are represented by predicates in logic. The development of metaphysics further distinguishes between essential and accidental attributes. An essential attribute is a characteristic a thing must possess during its existence, while an accidental attribute is a characteristic which a thing may or may not possess, and the alteration of which will not affect the nature of that thing. This distinction corresponds to that between essence and accident. An attribute is generally taken to be the same thing as a property, quality or characteristic.

The basic description of attribute is from Aristotle's philosophy. Attributes are ontological complements to objects. While an object is concrete and independent, an attribute is abstract and metaphysically incomplete. Attributes are the different ways of existing that an object exhibits. The notion of attribute also plays an important role in rationalism, especially in the philosophy of Spinoza. For him, attributes were the things which constitute, express or pertain to the essence or nature of God or substance. Substance has an infinite number of attributes, each of which expresses one infinite and eternal essence. However, human intellect knows only two attributes, thought and extension. This account differed from Descartes, who claimed that thought and extension actually form two independent substances. However, Spinoza thought that there is a real distinction between thought and extension, and he developed a theory of psycho-physical parallelism to explain their interactions. Contemporary philosophy considers a state of affairs as comprising the having of an attribute by an object. Various discussions regarding the notion of attribute are based on the identification of attributes with universals. Philosophers debate questions such as the ontological status of attributes, whether there are uninstantiated attributes and how an attribute is related to an object. There is also a view which can be traced to Aristotle according to which an attribute can be a particular. The white colour of Socrates' skin might be peculiar to Socrates himself

及情感反应相关的。有着同样的信念的人们,可能会有不同的态度,或有着同样的态度虽然他们对于同一个客体有着不同的信念。因此态度与相信的区分等于价值与事实的区分。主观主义的伦理学宣称态度更直接地与动机和行为相关。并且伦理的及其他价值判断是态度问题而不是认知问题。

“‘态度’这词……表明赞成或反对某事的任何心理性情。”——斯蒂文森:《事实与价值》,1963年,第2页。

属性

[由拉丁文 *ad* (在……旁边,靠近) 和 *tribure* (分配、赋予) 结合而成] 与实体(或译本体)概念相对,指可以用来对一实体作断定,或可以归属于一实体的东西,在逻辑中它被“谓词”所代替。形而上学的发展进一步区分出“本质的”属性和“偶然的”属性。本质的属性是一事物在其存在过程中必须具有的特性,而偶然的属性是一事物可以有也可以没有的特性,而且这个特性的变化将不影响事物的性质。本质的属性和偶然的属性的区分与本质和偶性的区分相对应。属性一般被当做与性质、质量、特性一样的东西。

对属性的基本描述出自亚里士多德的哲学。属性是对对象的本体论补充。一个对象是具体的、独立的,而一个属性是抽象的、形而上学方面不完全的。属性是一个对象所表现出来的不同存在方式。属性的概念在理性主义哲学,尤其是斯宾诺莎的哲学中也起着重要作用。斯宾诺莎用属性指构成、表现或属于上帝或实体的本质或性质的东西。实体有无限多的属性,每一属性都表现了无限永恒的本质。不过,人类理智只知道两个属性,即思想和广延。这一点与笛卡尔不同,笛卡尔声称,思想和广延实际上构成了两个独立的实体。不论怎样,斯宾诺莎认为在思想和广延之间有实在的差别,他提出心物平行论来说明它们的相互作用。当代哲学家认为,一个事态包含着一个对象对一个属性的获得。关于属性概念的各种讨论都建立在属性与其相同的基础上。因此,哲学家们争论有关属性的本体论地位,是否有不用具体例证来说明的属性,以及属性怎样与对象发生关系等问题。但是也有一种观点认为属性可以是殊相,这个观点可以追溯到亚里士多德。苏格拉底的皮肤的“白色”也许是苏格拉底本人特有的,随着他的死亡就会消失。根据这个观点,普遍的属性只是特殊属性中的一种相似性。

“我将属性理解为在理智看来是构成实体的本质的东西。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第

and vanish along with his death. A universal attribute, according to this view, is merely a resemblance among particular attributes.

"By attributes I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence." Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, def. 4.

Attribute theory of mind, an alternative term for the dual-aspect theory

Attributive adjective

Peter Geach distinguishes attributive adjectives from predicative adjectives. While predicative adjectives have the same application to different nouns to which they are attached, attributive adjectives can yield various applications with regard to different nouns. If X can be both A (a singer), and B (a criminal), and if X can be a CA (an intelligent singer) and CB (an intelligent criminal), then C is a predicative adjective. If X can be both A (a singer) and B (a criminal), and X can be DA (a nice singer), but cannot be DB (a nice criminal), then D is an attributive adjective. The purpose of the distinction is to illuminate the meaning of the concept good by showing that good is an attributive rather than a predicative adjective.

"I shall say that in a phrase 'an A B' ('A' being an adjective and 'B' being a noun) 'A' is a (logically) predicative adjective if the predication 'is an A B' splits up logically into a pair of predications 'is a B' and 'is A'; otherwise I shall say that 'A' is a (logically) attributive adjective." —Geach, in Foot (ed) *Theories of Ethics*, 1967, p. 64.

Aufheben, German word for sublation

Augustinian picture of language

A view which Wittgenstein attributed to St. Augustine and criticised at the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations*. According to this view, each word has a meaning which is the object for which it stands, and so it has a meaning in virtue of its being correlated with some entity. This view is criticised as being oversimplified because it concentrates excessively on names and ignores other kinds of words which function very differently from names. Furthermore, even in the case of names the meaning relation is more complicated. From this view Wittgenstein himself proceeded to develop an alternative approach to language which emphasises the multiplicity of different kinds of words and uses of language.

"In this 'Augustinian' picture of language we find the

一部分, 定义 4。

心的属性理论

“两面理论”的别名。

归属形容词

P. 吉奇把“归属形容词”与“谓词形容词”区别开来。谓词性形容词对于它们所系的不同名词有着相同的应用, 而归属形容词对于不同的名词则产生不同的用法。区分它们的标准是, 如果 X 能够既是 A (例如一个歌唱家) 又是 B (例如一个罪犯), 并且如果 X 能是 CA (一个聪明的歌唱家), 和 CB (一个聪明的罪犯), 那么, C 就是一个谓词性形容词。如果 X 既能是 A (一个歌唱家) 也能是 B (一个药剂师), 并且 X 能是 DA (一个好的歌唱家), 但不能是 DB (一个好的罪犯), 那么 D 就是一个归属形容词。区分的目的是说明“善(好)”这一概念的意义, 表明“善”只能是一个归属性而不是一个谓词性形容词。

“我认为, 在一个短语‘一个 AB’中(‘A’是一个形容词, ‘B’是一个名词), 如果表语‘是一个 AB’在逻辑上分为一对谓项‘是一个 B’和‘是 A’, 那么‘A’是一个(逻辑上)谓词性形容词, 要不然, 我认为‘A’是一个(在逻辑上)归属形容词。”——吉奇, 见福特编:《伦理学的多种学说》, 1967 年, 第 64 页。

扬弃

德语词, 意为“扬弃”。

奥古斯丁的语言图像

维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》开篇归咎于圣奥古斯丁的并加以批判的观点。根据这种观点, 每个词都有一个意义, 它是这个词所代表的对象, 因而每个词之所以具有意义, 是由于它与某个实体相互联系。这种观点被看作是过分简单化而遭到了批评, 因为它仅仅关注的是名词, 而忽略了与名词有着完全不同作用的其他种类的词。而且, 即使在名词中, 命名关系也是极为复杂的。正是从这种观点出发, 维特根斯坦自己提出了另一种理论, 强调各种不同种类词的多样性和语言的不同用法。

“在这种[奥古斯丁的]语言图像中, 我们找到了下面观念的根源: 每个词都有一个意义。这个意义是与这个词相互联系在一起的。它就

roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands." - Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1. 1.

Augustinianism

A philosophical and theological tradition based on the thought of St. Augustine and defended by his followers. Augustine applied Plato's teaching to Christian dogmas. The main elements of Augustinianism are its doctrines of grace and predestination. Human beings have inherited the sin of Adam and Eve, and have lost the capacity that they had in the original paradisaic state to will and do good. Individuals themselves are incapable of ameliorating the situation, and only God's grace can save them. God's grace provides humanity with the knowledge of the good and the capacity to will the good and the joy in doing the good. The Scriptures constitute a special revelation which is beyond the reach of philosophy and reason. Faith in Christ alone enables man to understand the world and his own position in it on a rational basis. This later became the official doctrine of grace in the Latin Christian Church. Augustine also claimed that the chance of salvation is predestined and that man's will is impotent to attain it. The choice of God as to who would be saved and who would be condemned is hidden from us. This view of predestination gives rise to much debate in medieval philosophy. Augustinianism dominated medieval thought until the time of Aquinas. In the twelfth and thirteenth century it became the main rival of Aristotelianism and Thomism and has remained a major part of Western theology.

"The gulf between nature and God can be bridged only by grace. This is the governing principle of Augustinianism." - Leff, *Medieval Thought*, 1958, p. 185.

Authenticity

[German: *Eigentlichkeit*, from *eigen*, own, literally, my ownness, what is mine | Anxiety, the feeling arising from our sense of freedom, reveals to us that each person is uniquely himself or herself and no one else. According to Heidegger, each of us has our own potentialities to fulfil and has to face our death on our own. If as Heideggerian *Dasein*, one has a resolute attitude in facing this lonely condition and holds a responsible position towards one's uniqueness and individuality, that person is said to lead an authentic existence and to be aware of what this condition means. Authenticity holds onto both the future and the past and provides a constancy of the self. It also requires *Dasein* to accept its own death. Indeed, Heidegger claims that the real authentic self is revealed when one encounters one's own death. In authenticity, "I" always comes first, although this "I" is not a Subject. If one is led by anxiety to protect oneself through absorption into the mass and the anonymous "they", as people

是这个词所代表的对象。"——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第1部分,第1节。

奥古斯丁主义

以圣奥古斯丁的思想为基础,并被其追随者辩护的一个哲学的和神学的传统。奥古斯丁把柏拉图的学说用于基督教教义。奥古斯丁主义的主要成分是恩典说和预定说。人类继承了亚当和夏娃的罪恶,失去了在最初的乐园状态时所具有的向善及行善的能力。个人自己无力改变这种境况,只有上帝的恩典能拯救他们。上帝的恩典为人类提供善的知识、向善的能力以及行善的欢乐。《圣经》构成一种哲学和理智所不及的特别启示。只有信奉基督,才能使人在理性基础上理解这个世界以及人自己在其中的位置。后来,这成为拉丁基督教会的官方恩典学说。奥古斯丁也认为,获救的机会是预定的,人的意志无能为力。上帝关于谁会获救、谁会定罪的选择是对我们保密的。这种预定观在中世纪哲学中引发了很大的争论。奥古斯丁主义对中世纪思想的统治持续到阿奎那时代。在12和13世纪,它成为亚里士多德主义和托马斯主义的主要对手。它也依然是西方神学的一个主要部分。

"自然与上帝之间的鸿沟只有靠恩典为桥才能连通。这就是奥古斯丁主义的指导原则。"——列夫:《中世纪思想》,1958年,第185页。

真正切己状态

[德文是: *Eigentlichkeit*, 源自 *eigen* 这个词。 *eigen* 的意思是: "自己的"; 从字面上讲就是 "我自己", "属于我的东西"] "畏惧" 是来自我们的自由感的一种感觉, 它向我们透露出每个人惟一地是他本身或她本身, 而不是任何别的什么。按照海德格尔的看法, 我们中的每一个人都有一种自己的有待实现的潜能, 并不得不面对自己的死亡。作为海德格尔讲的 "缘在" (*Dasein*), 如果它 (他或她) 在面对这么一个孤独局面时采取决断的态度, 并且敢于承担自己的惟一性和个体性, 那么此人就可说是进入了真正切己的生存状态, 并意识到这个局面的含义。真正切己状态连通着未来和过去, 使自我具有连续性。它还要求缘在接受它自己的死亡。为此, 海德格尔认为, 当人与自己的死亡遭遇时, 真实的切己自我才显露出来。在真正切己状态中, "我" 总是居先的, 尽管这个 "我" 并不是

generally do, then that person leads an inauthentic existence. In inauthenticity, "they" comes first, and one's own existence is lost. This attitude is what Heidegger calls *Dasein's* "fallingness", that is, *Dasein's* turning away from itself and allowing itself to be engrossed in day-to-day preoccupations and to drift along with trends of the crowd.

"As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any *Dasein* whatsoever is characterized by mineness." —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 68.

Authoritarianism

A political view which claims that subjects should obey some authority whose excellence or legitimacy is not open to question. In practice, within an authoritarian political system the government has unlimited power and lacks proper constitutional constraint. The authority can make decisions without needing to consult or negotiate with those to whom the decisions will apply. Such a society is ruled by a person or persons rather than by law. Hobbes' *Leviathan* provides a rationale for subjects to obey an authoritarian ruler. In modern times, authoritarianism has been displayed in various forms of dictatorship. It is opposed to liberal individualism and is widely condemned for suppressing individuality and encroaching upon personal rights. Defenders of authoritarianism claim that it can provide security and order for society and that it is preferable to the limitations and corruption of a liberal democratic system. In ethics, authoritarianism is a ethical system which presupposes that the majority are ethically incompetent and need to obey ethically competent authority.

"Authoritarianism in its pure form states its basic prescription of obedience in such a way that there is no need for a higher validating principle." —Ladd, *The Structure of Moral Code*, 1957, p. 190.

Authority

The right possessed by a person, organisation or state to issue commands and have them obeyed. This right implies an obligation upon those who are subject to the authority to respect and obey the commands. Authority is a kind of power, but not every kind of power is authority. Several kinds of power are merely coercive and do not have any legitimacy. A major problem in political philosophy is to justify the grounds of state authority which provides the final appeal in settling disputes. Social contract theory is one attempt to provide a

一个主体。如果一个人被畏惧压倒,通过没人或匿名的“人们”[they, *das Man*]来保护自己,正如人们通常所做的那样,他就进入了不真正切己的 (inauthentic) 生存状态。在不真正切己的状态中,“人们”居先,人失去了自己的生存。这种态度或姿态就是海德格尔所说的缘在的“沉沦”[fallingness, *Verfallen*],即缘在避开自身,让自身浸没于日常的分心事务中,与俗世共浮沉。

“作为存在的两种方式,真正切己状态与不真正切己状态(它们是按其严格词义或词源学本义被选用的)都基于这样一个事实,即缘在从根本上被‘总是我的状态’[mineness, *Je-meinigkeit*]所决定。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第68页。

权威主义

一种政治观点,即主张国民应服从某个其优秀或合法性都无可质疑的权威。实际上,在一个权威主义的政治制度中,政府有无限的权力和缺少适当的宪法约束。权威可做出决定而无需同决定的适用者协商或谈判。这样的社会是由一个人或一些人而不是由法律统治的。霍布斯的《利维坦》为国民服从权威主义的统治者提供了理论基础。在现代,权威主义表现为各种形式的专政。它反对自由主义的个人主义,并因压制个性和侵犯人权而受到广泛的谴责。权威主义的辩护者则宣称,它可以为社会提供安全和秩序,因而比自由主义民主制度的局限和腐败更为可取。在伦理学中,权威主义是这样一种道德体系,它预先假定大多数人在道德上是不够格的,需要服从在道德上有权能的权威。

“权威主义在其纯粹形式上是这样说明它的基本服从规定的,即不需要一个更高的批准原则。”——拉德:《道德规范的结构》,1957年,第190页。

权威

个人、组织或国家所拥有的发布命令并使其得到执行的权利。这种权利对那些受权威支配、尊重和服从命令的人来讲意指一种义务。权威是一种权力,但并非每种权力都是权威。有些权力仅仅是强制的而不具任何合法性。政治哲学中的一个主要问题就是论证提供解决争端最终要求的国家权威的根据。社会契约论是提供解决办法的一种尝试。它主张人们中的合法权威只能通过约定产生。国家权威的范围和限制

solution. It claims that legitimate authority among men can come only through covenants. The scope and limits of state authority also needs explanation. Authority can hold in some areas but not in others or over some people but not over others. Max Weber distinguished three kinds of authority: rational-legal authority which is from reason and law; traditional authority which is from tradition; and charismatic authority which is from some special qualities a person has [Greek: *charisma*, divine gift]. Outside political and legal contexts, an authority is a reliable source of information.

"To have authority to do something is to have the right to do it." —Raphael. *Problems of Political Philosophy*, Second edition, 1990, p. 166.

Authority *de facto*, see authority *de jure*

Authority *de jure*

Legitimate authority that is derived from rules which people are legally or morally obliged to obey. In contrast, *de facto* authority is based on power rather than legitimacy. For authority to be stable, power and legitimacy must be combined, and in practice there is no clear way of distinguishing between *de jure* and *de facto* authority. Authority *de jure* is a normative concept which is intrinsically related to the notion of rights. In contrast, authority *de facto* is a causal concept based on tradition or power. The distinction plays a central role in contemporary discussions of authority and brings together the characteristic concerns of political philosophy with legitimacy and political science with power. The validity of the distinction is questioned by theorists who hold that one kind of authority is basic and that the other kind of authority must be reduced to it.

"So long as men believe in the authority of states, we can conclude that they possess the concept of *de jure* authority." —Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, 1970, pp. 10-11.

Automaton

A moving thing whose motion is due to the internal structure of its parts rather than to an external cause. Descartes uses automaton as a synonym of self-moving machine. For him, the whole world is an automaton, for it contains in itself the corporeal principle of the movements for which it is designed. All animated bodies (including human bodies) are automata and they are not essentially different from inanimate matter but simply exhibit greater complexity in the disposition and function of their parts. Non-human animals are automata pure and simple. All their actions and reactions can be accounted for in terms of the automatic movements of their organs which are essentially like those performed by any artificially constructed machine. Humans are distinguished from automata because some of their actions

也需加以解释。权威可以在一些领域有效,但在其他领域无效,可以对一些人有效,但对另一些人无效。M. 韦伯区分了三种类型的权威:来自理性和法律的合理—合法权威;来自传统的传统权威;来自个人具有的某些特殊品质 [希腊文: *charisma*, 神赋] 的超凡权威。在政治和法律范围之外,权威指的是可靠的信息来源。

"有权威做某事就是有权利去做它。" —拉菲尔:《政治哲学问题》,第二版,1990年,第166页。

事实上的权威

见“法律上的权威”条。

法律上的权威

法律上的权威源于人们在法律上或道德上必须服从的法规。相比之下,事实上的权威是基于权力而不是合法性。要使权威稳定,权力与合法性必须相结合。在实践上,尚不存在区分法律上的权威和事实上的权威的明确的方法。法律上的权威是一个规范性的概念,同权利概念有着内在的联系。相反,事实上的权威则是一个基于传统或权力的因果性概念。这一区分在当代有关权威的讨论中有重要的作用,并把政治哲学对合法性的特殊考虑和政治科学对权力的特殊考虑结合在一起。这一区分的有效性却受到理论家的怀疑,他们认为,只有一种权威是基本的,而另一种权威必须归并于它。

"只要人们相信政府的权威,我们就可断定他们拥有法律的权威这一概念。" —沃尔夫:《为无政府主义辩护》,1970年,第10-11页。

自动机

一个活动的东西,它的运动是由于它的各个部分的内在结构,而不是由于外部的原因。笛卡尔把它用作“自己运动的机器”(self-moving machine)的同义语。在他看来,整个世界就是一架自动机,因为它本身就包含着它被设计从事的活动的物质原理。一切有生命的物体(包括人类身体)都是自动机,它们与无生命的物质没有本质的不同,只是它们各部分的配置和功能显得更复杂。非人类的动物是纯粹而简单的自动机。它们的一切活动和反应都可以用它们器官的自动运动来说明,这种自动运动实质上与任何人造机器所做的运动相同。人类区别于自动机是因为它们的行为是自由地由意志产生的。现在,“自动机”既可以指模仿人类智能的

are initiated freely by the will. Currently "automaton" may refer either to a machine which imitates human intelligence or a machine running according to a program.

"We do not praise automata for accurately producing all the movements they were designed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily. It is the designer who is praised for constructing such carefully-made devices." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al.), 1985, I, 205.

Autonomy

[from Greek: *auto*, self + *nomos*, law, self-rule] A term traced to Machiavelli, who used it to mean both free from dependence and self-legislation. Rousseau claimed that the people of a politically autonomous society are bound only by the laws that they legislate themselves. Kant applied this notion to the moral domain and established it as a central concept in his ethical theory. A moral agent is autonomous if his will is not determined by external factors and if the agent can apply laws to itself in accordance with reason alone. Such agents respect these laws and are bound only by them. In Kant, autonomy contrasts with heteronomy (from Greek: *hetero*, other + *nomos*, law, ruled by others) in which one's will is controlled by outside factors, including one's desires. Autonomy is linked to freedom and is a necessary condition for ascribing responsibility to an agent. Respect for a person as a self-determined being is a common moral theme. However, since each of us lives in a society and is inevitably constrained by various external elements, it is possible to dispute the extent to which true individual autonomy is possible and practical. In other areas, autonomy is logical or conceptual independence.

"Autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Sect. 2.

Autonomy of grammar, another term for autonomy of language

Autonomy of language

Also called arbitrariness of grammar, or autonomy of grammar. The view that the grammar of language and its constituent linguistic rules do not mirror the essence of reality or the world, as held by linguistic foundationalism. If language is autonomous, it does not correspond to extra-linguistic reality, nor is it constrained by such a reality, and an account of reality cannot be justified by what is represented in language. Language is not a product of the rational represen-

机器,也可以指根据程序运行的机器。

"我们赞扬自动机精确做出它们被设计去做的一切动作,不是因为它做出这些动作是必然的。人们赞扬的恰恰是那个设计者,因为他造出了这样一个精心制作的装置。"——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第205页。

自主性

[源自希腊文 *auto* (自身) 和 *nomos* (法则), 字面意思为“自我管辖”] 这个术语可以追溯到马基雅维利,他用这个词既有“不依赖”也有“自我立法”的意思。卢梭也主张一个政治上自主的社会是这样一种社会,其中的人民仅受他们为自己制定的法律所约束。康德应用这一概念于道德领域,并把它确立为其伦理学理论的中心概念。一个道德行为者是自主的,如果他的意志不为外界因素所决定,并且这个行为者能仅依据理性而应用法则于自身的话。这样的行为者尊重这些法则,并为他们所约束。在康德看来,自主性(在某些地方也用作“自律”)是与“他律”(希腊文, *hetero* (其他) 和 *nomos* (法则), 字面意思为“为他人(物)所支配”)相对的,后者意味着人们的意志为外部因素,包括人们的欲望所控制。自主性与自由相联系,并且是把责任心归属于一个行为者的必要条件。把一个人看作是自我决定的存在,是一个共同的道德论题。然而,由于我们每个人都生活在社会中,不可避免地受各种外界因素所制约,因此可能引起争论的是,何种真正个体的自主性是可能的和实际的。而在其他领域,自主性则指逻辑上或概念上的独立性。

“自主性是人类本性的尊严和每一种理性本性的基础。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第2节。

语法的自主性

“语言自主性”的另一说法。

语言自主性

又叫语法的任意性,或语法的自主性,它指这样的观点:语言的语法及其构成性的语言规则并不反映实在或世界的本质,如语言学的基础主义所认为的那样。如果语言是自主的,那么它不对应语言之外的实在,它也不受这种实在的约束,对实在的说明也不能由语言所表象的东西来证实。语言不是外部实在的理性表象的产物。莱布尼茨、弗雷格和罗素持这种看法,以

tation of an external reality. This idea has led Leibniz, Frege and Russell to attempt to invent an ideal language to construct a better representation of the world than ordinary language.

Wittgenstein disagrees with the autonomy of language in his *Tractatus*, but later embraces and develops it in great detail in his account of language games. He argues that the meaning of a word is determined by grammatical rules governing its use rather than by the external metaphysical nature of the world. Language is like a game, which is determined by its rules. The aims of language are fixed by the rules of grammar. If we change the rules, a word has a different meaning. The autonomy of language does not imply that what a term means is a matter of personal choice, but indicates that language is not merely an instrument to depict what is outside language. In this sense of autonomous, Wittgenstein claims that speaking a language is part of a communal activity and is embedded in a form of life. The idea of the autonomy of language is criticized by essentialists such as Kripke and Putnam, who argue that the meaning of a word is determined by the nature of that to which it refers, and that our understanding of the meaning of a word changes in accordance with the development of scientific knowledge of that nature.

"The analogies of language with chess are useful in that they illustrate the autonomy of language. Thus in the case of chess there is no temptation to think that it is essential to point outside to some object as the meaning." - Wittgenstein, *Manuscript*, 219. 8.

Autonomy of morals

The claimed independence of morality or ethics as a discipline from other fields such as biology, psychology, sociology or religion, and even from other disciplines of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology or political philosophy. Instead, morality is claimed to have its own internal rational methods of justification and criticism. Moral terms do not refer to natural properties and hence cannot be defined by them. Moral judgements cannot be judged by any objective principles outside morality. Value judgements are not derived from statements of fact. The distinction between fact and value, between is and ought, and the alleged naturalistic fallacy are all derived from attempts to justify the autonomy of morals.

"The fundamental term of normative evaluation, the one in terms of which the others are defined, must itself be indefinable. This thesis, which many philosophers find quite plausible, may be called the doctrine of the autonomy of morals." - Feldman, *Introductory Ethics*, 1978, p. 20.

Auxiliaries

[Greek: *epikoupoi*] In the *Republic*, the class of war-

图发明一种理想语言, 来构造优于日常语言对世界的表象。

维特根斯坦在其《逻辑哲学论》中不赞成语言自主性的说法, 但在后期接受了它, 并在其对语言游戏的说明中极为详尽地对之加以发挥。他认为, 语词的意义由支配其用法的语法规则决定, 而不是由世界的外在的形而上学性质决定。语言就像游戏, 它是由规则决定的。语言的目的是由语法规则决定的。如果我们改变规则, 语词的意义就会不同。语言自主性并不是说, 词项的意谓是一种个人选择的事情, 而是表明, 语言不只是描绘语言之外事物的工具。在自主的含义上, 维特根斯坦主张, 讲语言是公共活动的一部分并深植于生活形式之中。语言自主性的想法受到像克里普克和普特南这样的本质主义者的批评。他们认为, 语词的意义是由它所指称的东西的性质决定的。我们对语词意义的理解随着对于这种性质的科学知识的发展而变化。

“把语言比拟为象棋的用处是说明了语言的自主性。象棋不会诱使人们认为必须把外在的某个对象指作意义。” 维特根斯坦:《手稿》, 第219.8节。

道德自主性

它指涉的是道德学或伦理学作为一门学科而独立于其他学科, 诸如生物学、心理学、社会学、宗教等, 甚至区别于哲学的其他学科, 诸如形而上学、认识论、政治哲学等。因而道德应该有它自己的证明和批评的内在推理方法, 道德词汇不指涉自然性质因此不能被它们所界定。道德判断不能为道德之外的任何客观原则所判定。价值判断不能从事实性陈述中引出, 事实与价值的区分、是与应当的区分以及所谓“自然主义的谬误”, 都来自于证明道德自主性的努力。

“规范评价的基本术语, 是其他词汇依据它而得到界定的术语, 它本身必须是不可定义的。这个论点——许多哲学家发现它是很有道理的——被称作道德自主性学说。” ——弗尔德曼:《伦理学导论》, 1978年, 第20页。

辅助者

[希腊文: *epikoupoi*] 在柏拉图的《国家

rriors in Plato's Ideal State or its executive branch of government. It was the second class, separated from the class of guardians, which was composed of noble young men. The function of the auxiliaries was to carry out the executive orders of the guardians for the preservation and maintenance of the city. While the guardians had knowledge, the auxiliaries only had true beliefs. Their virtue was courage, and they corresponded to the spirited element in the soul.

"Those young men whom we have called guardians hitherto we shall call auxiliaries to help the rulers in their decisions." — Plato, *Republic*, 414b.

Averageness, another expression for everydayness

Avowal

A term associated with Wittgenstein's later account of the mind and introduced into philosophy by Ryle. Along with expression and utterance, it is an English translation of the German word *Ausdruck*. An avowal is the utterance of a first person present-tense sentence to express a mental state (for example "I am in pain") rather than to describe something. For Wittgenstein, an avowal is not a cognitive claim that can be true or false, and it makes no sense to justify what I avow by reference to further grounds. Rather, an avowal is an act that characterises being in the inner state which it expresses. It is nonsense to say that "I know that I am in pain". This notion is associated with Wittgenstein's private language argument. This argument rejects the traditional Cartesian claim that an expression of mind is a description of inner mental states and raises many issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, it remains controversial whether first-person psychological sentences must be understood as something other than reports of facts about ourselves.

"Now many unstudied utterances embody explicit interest phrases, or what I have elsewhere been calling 'avowals', like 'I want', 'I hope', 'I intend', 'I dislike' ...; and their grammar makes it tempting to misconstrue all the sentence in which they occur as self-descriptions. But in its primary employment 'I want...' is not used to convey information, but to make a request or demand." — Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 175.

Awareness, *direct and indirect*, see immediate perception

Axiarchism

[from Greek; *axis*, value + *arche*, rule, rule by what is good and valued] A term invented by John Leslie for the belief that the world is largely or entirely determined by what is ethically valuable, and that things in this world have an in-

篇》中,辅助者是柏拉图理想国中的武士阶层或其政府的行政部门。它是由年轻的贵族构成的第二等级,是从统治者阶层中分离出来的。辅助者的作用是执行统治者的行政命令,防守和维护城市。虽然统治者有知识,而辅佐者有的只是忠实的信念,但他们的长处是勇气,而且他们是与灵魂中的勇敢成分相一致的。

“到目前我们称之为统治者的那些人中的年轻人,我们将称之为辅助者,他们是执行统治者命令的。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》, 414b。

平均状态

“日常性”的另一种表达。

声明

与维特根斯坦后期心的哲学有关的术语。这一术语由赖尔引入哲学,它与表达和话语一道,由德文单词 "*Ausdruck*" 译为英文。一个声明就是说出一个第一人称现在时态的句子来表达一个心的状态(例如“我感到疼痛”)而不是描述某个事物。对于维特根斯坦来说,一个声明是非认知的,亦即无所谓真与假,而使用进一步的依据来为我的声明作辩护是没有意义的。相反,声明是以处于它所表达的内在状态为特征的活动。说“我知道我感到疼痛”是毫无意义的。这一观点与他的私人语言论证相关联,意在拒斥传统的笛卡尔主义的论断:一个心的表达是对内部的心状态的一个描述。它因此而引发当代心的哲学中的许多论题。然而,是否一定要认为第一人称的心理语句不是关于我们自己的事实的报告,这依然是颇可争议的。

“许多自然的话语包含明确的兴趣短语,或者我曾在别处所说的‘声明’,像‘我想要’、‘我希望’、‘我意欲’、‘我不喜欢’……而它们的语法使得我们很容易将它们出现其中的所有语句误解为自我描述。但在其最初的使用中‘我想要……’并非用来传递信息,而是用来提出一个请求或要求。”——赖尔:《心的概念》, 1949年,第175页。

直接的和间接的知觉

见“直接知觉”条。

价值决定论

[源自希腊语 *axis* (价值) 和 *arche* (统治), 字面意思是,被善和价值的东西支配]这个术语是J. 勒斯列新造的,指这样一种信念:这个世界多半甚或完全是由伦理上有价值的东西所决

trinsic desire for the good. It is thought that this optimistic metaphysical outlook has been held by many philosophers throughout history. The belief that the universe is the product of a directly ethical requirement is extra axiarchism.

"Axiarchism is my label for theories picturing the world as ruled largely or entirely by value." —Leslie, *Value and Existence*, 1979, p. 6.

Axiological ethics, see axiology

Axiology

[from Greek *axios*, worthy + *logos*, theory or study] The general study of value and valuation, including the meaning, characteristics and classification of value, the nature of evaluation and the character of value judgements. The topics have traditionally been attached to the general study of ethics, but have developed into a special branch since the last century. Axiology is also called the theory of value and is mainly an epistemology of value. The word "axiology" was first introduced into philosophy by Urban as a translation of the German *Werttheorie*. Major contributors to axiology as a special discipline include Ehrenfels, Meinong, Brentano, Max Scheler, N. Hartmann, G. E. Moore, R. B. Perry, H. Rashdall, W. D. Ross, and C. I. Lewis. The ethics which extends the analysis of value to practical demands is called "axiological ethics".

" 'Axiology' meant the study of the ultimately worthwhile things (and of course of the ultimately counterworthwhile things) as well as the analysis of worthwhileness (or counterworthwhileness) in general." —Findlay, *Axiological Ethics*, 1970, p. 1.

Axiom

[from Greek: *axioma*, something worthy of acceptance or esteem] An initial set of propositions selected as the foundations of a systematic field of knowledge. Axioms serve as the basis for a mathematical or logical system, although they themselves cannot be proved within the system. A system in which certain propositions are inferred from axioms in accordance with a set of inferring rules is called an axiomatic system. The propositions derived from axioms are called theorems. Traditionally, a proposition is chosen as an axiom because it is basic, in that it cannot be derived from other propositions in the system, and is considered to be self-evident and intuitively true. Axioms can be divided into non-logical axioms which are propositions with non-logical contents and logical axioms which contain only logical constants and variables. A logical axiom is also called an axiom schema, which is a distinctive form of axiom that can be embodied in an infinite number of specific statements.

定,而且,世上的事物都有一种对善的内在欲望。有人认为,这种乐观的形而上学观已被历史上的许多哲学家主张过。相信世界是直接的伦理需求的产物,这种信念乃是极度的价值决定论。

"价值决定论是一张标签,用于标识把世界描绘为多半甚或完全由价值支配的理论。"——勒斯列:《价值与存在》,1979年,第6页。

价值伦理学

见“价值论”条。

价值论

[源自于希腊词 *axios* (意为“有价值的”)和 *logos* (意为“理论”或“研究”)] 对于价值或评价的一般性研究,包括对于价值的意义、特性和分类,评价和价值判断的特征等。在传统上,价值论的问题属于一般伦理学的研究,但从上个世纪以来发展成为一个专门的分支。它也被称为“价值理论”,主要是一种有关价值的认识论。“价值论”这词为厄班第一次引进哲学作为对德语 *Werttheorie* 一词的一种翻译,对于把价值论作为一个专门领域的主要贡献者有艾伦费斯、迈农、布伦塔诺、M. 舍勒、N. 哈特曼、G. E. 摩尔、R. B. 佩里、H. 拉什多、W. D. 罗斯和 C. I. 刘易斯。把价值分析扩展到实践要求的伦理学称作为“价值论伦理学”。

" '价值论' 意味着对于有终极性价值的事物的研究 (当然也是对于有终极的相反价值的事物的研究) 和一般价值 (或相反价值) 的研究。" ——芬德雷:《价值伦理学》,1970年,第1页。

公理

[源自希腊词 *axioma*, 某种值得接受或尊重的东西] 最初的一组命题被挑选为某知识的系统领域的基础。公理作为数学或逻辑体系的基础,但它们本身不能在体系中被证明。按照一组推理规则从公理推论出诸命题的某一体系被称为公理体系。从公理推导而来的命题称为定理。传统上,一命题被选为公理是因为它是基本的命题,它不能由体系的其他命题推导出来,它是自明的,直观上真实的。公理可划分为非逻辑公理和逻辑公理,前者是具有非逻辑内容的命题,后者仅含有逻辑常项和变项。逻辑公理也称为公理式,它是公理的特别形式,可具体化为无数的特定陈述。

"公理……不要求这样的演绎,正因如此才是自明的——一种主张:哲学原理无论有多么大的确定性,也不能提出此种要求。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A733。

"Axioms... require no such deduction, and for the same reason are evident— a claim which the philosophical principles can never advance, however great their certainty." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A733.

Axiom of choice

An axiom of set theory formulated by Zermelo. It states that for any infinite set, A , of non-empty subsets, no two of which having a common member, there is a set composed of choosing exactly one member from each of the subsets of the set A . Alternatively, it can be formulated that for a given class of classes, each of which has at least one number, there always exists a selector-function which selects one number from each of these classes. This axiom is independent of other axioms of the set theory and many mathematical principles turn out to be equivalent to it. The axiom implies the existence of a set which we are unable to specify and hence challenges mathematical constructivism which identifies the existence of a mathematical object with its construction by a rule. This axiom is essential for the development of set theory.

"The axiom of choice asserts that for every set S there is a function f which associates each non empty subset A of S with a unique number $f(A)$ of A ." — Moore, *Zermelo's Axiom of Choice*, 1982, p. 1.

Axiom of infinity

An axiom which is introduced by Russell to define the series of natural numbers in response to difficulties for such a definition arising from his theory of types. The axiom is a hypothesis that there is some type (the lowest type of individuals) with an infinity of instances. This axiom is widely criticized because its commitment to contentious claims about the world seem to exclude it from being a truth of logic. This in turn undermines Russell's original programme of deriving arithmetic from logic alone.

"It cannot be said to be certain that there are in fact any infinite collections in the world. The assumption that there are is what we call the 'axiom of infinity'." — Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 77.

Axiom of reducibility

Russell's ramified theory of types imposes too many restrictions upon mathematics, with the result that substantial mathematical theorems cannot be formulated and proved. To save them, Russell introduces the axiom of reducibility, which sorts propositional functions into levels and claims that for every propositional function of a higher order there exists a corresponding function of the first order which is extensionally equivalent to it. This axiom meets many difficulties, but Russell himself does not take it as a self-evident truth of logic.

选择公理

由策梅罗提出的一个集合论的公理。它表述为对于任何其中没有空(子)集、且其中的两个没有共同数的无穷集 A 来说, 存在一个正是从集合 A 的每个(子)集中选择一个数而组成的集合。换言之, 它可以表述为: 对于一个给定的类的类, 其中的每个类都至少有一个数, 总存在一个选择函数, 它从这些类中的每一个中选出一个数。这个公理独立于集合论的其他公理, 并且许多数学原理证明为等价于它。这条公理意味着存在着一个我们不能标定的集合, 因此形成对数学的“构造主义”的挑战, 后者把一个数学对象的存在, 等同于它的依据规则的构造。这一公理对于集合论的发展是必不可少的。

“选择公理断言, 对于每个集合 S , 存在一个函数 f , 它使 S 的每个非空子集 A 与 A 的一个独特的数 $f(A)$ 相联系。” —— 摩尔: 《策梅罗的选择公理》, 1982 年, 第 1 页。

无穷性公理

罗素提出的一条公理, 用来定义自然数序列, 以应付因他的类型论而产生的这一定义的困难。该公理假设, 存在某个类型(个体的最低类型)具有无穷多个事例。这条公理遭到广泛批评, 因为它承诺关于世界的种种有争议的主张, 这使它看上去不再是逻辑真理。而这反过来又损害了罗素原先仅仅从逻辑中推导出算术的计划。

“不能确定地说世界上实际存在无穷个集合。有这些集合的假定就是我们所谓的‘无穷公理’。” —— 罗素: 《数理哲学导论》, 1919 年, 第 77 页。

还原性公理

罗素的分歧类型论对数学加上了太多的限制, 其结果是一些重要的数学定理不能建立和证明。为了拯救这些定理, 罗素提出还原性公理。它把命题函项分成不同层次, 并断定对于每一高阶命题函项均存在一相应的一阶命题函项在外延上与之相等。这个公理解决许多困难, 但罗素本人并未将它当成自明的逻辑真理。

“还原性公理, ……在用到它的时候完全可以表述为假设, 而不假定它确实为真。” —— 罗素: 《数理哲学导论》, 1919 年, 第 191 页。

"The axioms of reducibility, ... could perfectly well be stated as a hypothesis whenever it is used, instead of being assumed to be actually true." —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 191.

Axiom schema, see axiom

Axiomatic method

The basic procedure of the axiomatic method is (1) the assumption of a set of propositions, axioms or fundamental truths which are logically independent of one another, and (2) the deduction of theorems (that is, propositions that are logically implied or proven by the axioms) from them in accordance with a set of rules of inference, as we infer a conclusion validly from a set of premises. Its result is to produce an axiomatic system. Axiomatic method has powerfully influenced philosophy, although each feature of the method has been criticised as inappropriate for philosophy.

"Familiar in mathematics is the axiomatic method, according to which a branch of mathematics begins with a list of undefined terms and a list of assumptions or postulates involving these terms, and theorems are to be derived from the postulates by the methods of formal logic." —Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, 1956, p. 57.

Axiomatic system

A system in which a series of propositions are derived from an initial set of propositions in accordance with a set of formation rules and transformation rules. The members of the initial set of propositions are called axioms. They are independent, that is, not derivable from within the system. The derived series of propositions are called theorems. The formulation rules specify what symbols are used and what combinations of the symbols are to count as axioms and propositions directly derived from axioms. It is thus a system in which all axioms and theorems are ordered in a hierarchical arrangement and the relations between them are necessarily deductive. All propositions conforming to formulation rules are called well-formed formulae (wff). The transformation rules determine how theorems are proved. If there is a decision procedure with respect to which all theorems of the system are provable, the system is said to be sound. If all provable formulae are theorems of that system, the system is said to be complete with respect to that decision procedure. If a system does not involve contradiction, it is said to be consistent. Soundness, completeness, and consistency are the characteristics required of an axiomatic system.

"In an axiomatic system a change anywhere ramifies into a change everywhere—the entire structure is affected when one of its supporting layers is removed." —Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, 1979, p. 45.

公理式

见“公理”条。

公理化方法

公理化方法的基本程序是：(1)假设一组逻辑上彼此独立的命题、公理或基础真句；(2)按照一组推理规则从它们中演绎出定理（这是逻辑上为公理所蕴涵或所证明的），就像我们从一组前提正确地推断出结论那样。其结果是产生一个公理化系统。公理化方法极大地影响了哲学，尽管这一方法的每一特征都被批评为不适宜于哲学。

“公理化方法在数学中是熟识的，依据它，数学中的一个分支从一系列未加定义的术语和一系列涉及这些术语的假定或公设出发，运用形式逻辑的方法从这些公设推导出定理。”——丘奇：《数理逻辑导论》，1956年，第57页。

公理系统

指这样一种系统，其中一系列的命题由一组初始命题按照一组形成规则和转换规则推导出来。这组初始命题的成员都称为“公理”。它们是独立的，亦即它们不能由这个系统中导出。推导出的系列命题称为定理。形成规则标定使用什么符号，以及这些符号什么样的结合可作为公理和由公理直接导出的命题。因此，在这样的系统中，所有这些公理和定理都被排列在一个等级序列中，它们之间的关系都必然是演绎的。所有遵从形成规则的命题称作“合式公式”（省略作 wff）。转换规则决定定理如何得证。如果存在一个相对于它、系统的全部定理都是可证明的判定程序，这个系统就被说成是健全的。如果所有可证明的定理都是这个系统的定理，这个系统就被说成是关于这一判定程序是完备的。如果一个系统不含有矛盾，它就被说成是相容的。健全性、完备性和相容性，是一个公理系统所要求的三个特性。

“在一个公理系统中，任何一处的变化都会分叉为每一处的变化——当它的一个支撑层面移动时，整个结构都受到影响。”——雷谢尔：《认识的系统化》，1979年，第45页。

Axioms of intuition

For Kant, in order for quantitative experience to be possible, we must apply the categories of quantity: unity, plurality and totality. We need rules to make these categories conform to the conditions of intuition of objects. These rules for showing the objective validity of the categories of quantity are the axioms of intuitions. The leading principle for these axioms is that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes, meaning that they have magnitudes which are spatially or temporarily extended. This principle is purported to explain the application of geometry to empirical objects and to render possible the measurement of the experiential world. Kant did not, however, specify what these axioms are. This omission raises questions about the relations between the axioms of intuition and their leading principle and about the relation between the axioms of intuition and the categories of quantity.

“Axioms of intuition. Their principle is: All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.”—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B202.

直观公理

在康德哲学中,统一性、多样性和总体性这些量的范畴的应用使量化的经验成为可能。因此,我们需要使这些范畴遵从对象的直观条件的规则。这些表明量的范畴的客观有效性的规则就是“直观公理”。这些公理的主要原理是,所有直观都是外延的量,意思是它们有空间或时间上延伸的量。这一原理意味着要应用几何学于经验世界中,使对经验世界的衡量成为可能。但康德没有详细论述这些公理是什么。因而便产生了关于直观公理和主导原理之间的关系问题,和关于直观公理和量的范畴的关系问题。

“直观公理。其原理为:一切直观皆为外延的量。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B202。

B

Backward causation

Causation is normally taken to be forward causation, in which a cause brings about an effect occurring at the same time as the cause or later. However, philosophers such as David Pears and Michael Dummett argue that backward causation is logically possible, with the ordinary temporal direction of causality reversed and the effect preceding its cause. If this is true, a current happening might bring about an earlier event and what happens in the present can affect the past.

The plausibility of backward causation depends upon our account of causation. Let us suppose that a cause is a sufficient condition for an event to take place. On this account, if an event occurring at a later time is a sufficient condition for a previous event, then the later event should be seen as a cause of the earlier event. As an example of backward causation, we can consider Aristotelian final causation, according to which an end determines something to act or move in order to realise that end. The end comes into existence later as a result of the earlier action that it determines. Backward causation can also explain many phenomena in quantum mechanics. However, such a notion does not entail that we can interfere with an earlier event, for we can only be an observer rather than an agent for this type of causation. Even so, there is still controversy whether what already exists can be caused by what does not yet exist.

"We can conceive of a world in which a notion of causality associated with the opposite direction would have been more appropriate and, so long as we consider ourselves as mere observers of such a world, there is no particular conceptual difficulty about the conception of such a backward causation."—Dummett, "Bringing about the past", in *Philosophical Review*, 73 (1964), p. 340.

Bad faith

[French: *mauvaise foi*, a kind of self-deception; for Sartre not merely a lie to oneself, but a lie about one's freedom.] A person in bad faith takes a negative attitude with respect to himself or herself. This existential phenomenon is highlighted by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* and illustrated in his literary works, although his discussion is ambiguous and is subject to much dispute in interpretation. Human reality lies in the intricate relationship between freedom and responsibility. Bad faith ignores their inner relationship, and is

逆因果

因果关系通常被看作是正向的, 其中一个原因导致与这原因同时或迟于它出现的结果。然而, 像 D. 皮尔斯和 M. 达米特这样一些哲学家争辩说, 将通常的因果性的时间方向反转而使结果在时间上居于其原因之先的逆因果是逻辑上可能的。如果这是正确的, 一个眼下的事件就可能导致一个较早的事件, 而现在所发生的事就能影响过去。

逆因果的可能性依赖于我们对因果关系的表述。让我们假设一个原因是一个事件发生的充分条件。根据这种表述, 如果一个较晚发生的事件是一个先前发生事件的充分条件, 则这个较晚的事件应被看作那个较早事件的原因。作为一个逆因果的例子, 我们可以考虑亚里士多德的目的因, 根据这种因果关系, 一个目的决定着某物的行为或运动, 以便去实现这个目的。这个目的作为它所决定的那个较早的行为的结果, 较晚才得以存在。逆因果也能解释量子力学中的许多现象。然而这么一种概念并不蕴涵着我们可以干预较早的事件, 因为就我们对这种类型的因果关系而言, 只能是观察者, 而不是行为者。即便如此, 仍然存在着是否现已存在的东西能为尚不存在的东西所引起的争论。

"我们可以设想一个世界, 在其中与相反方向相联系的因果性概念会更为适宜, 并且就我们仅仅把自己当做这样一个世界的观察者而言, 关于这种逆因果的观念, 并没有什么特别的困难。"—达米特: 《引起过去》, 《哲学评论》第 73 卷 (1964), 第 340 页。

自欺〔或译“伪劣信念”〕

[法文是 *mauvaise foi*, 意指一种自我欺骗; 对萨特而言, 它不仅意味着对自己撒谎, 而且是对自己的自由的撒谎] 一个处于自欺状态的人对于他或她自己采取一种否定的态度。萨特在《存在与虚无》之中突出了这个生存论的现象, 并在他的文学作品中表现其含义; 但他的有关讨论是含糊的, 可以导致相互抵触的解释。人类的现实处于自由与责任的复杂关系里。自欺〔的意识〕忽视它们的内在关联, 企图逃避对于

an attempt to evade responsibility for what one has freely chosen, by pretending to oneself and others that things are predetermined and could not have been otherwise. A person who falls into bad faith regards himself as merely a passive subject of outside influences. Bad faith refuses to acknowledge that human beings are self-determining and hence differ from things in the world. Bad faith is rooted in our freedom of consciousness and is possible because human consciousness brings nothingness and non-being into the world. The phenomenon reveals the discrepancy inherent in human reality between the human condition and human behaviour, between our abstract awareness of our nature and our concrete acts. According to Sartre, a person in bad faith is playing, and the instability of play makes bad faith possible in the face of the apparently paradoxical nature of self-deception. In contrast to bad faith, good faith acknowledges oneself as a self-conscious human being freely and responsibly acting within the world.

"It is best to choose and to examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 1957, p. 48.

Bad infinity

Hegel's term for an endless series advancing from one thing to another, like a straight line with no end. It is an infinite series of causes and effects and is separated from the finite. A bad infinity contrasts with true infinity, which is closely associated with the finite, for something which is infinite in one perspective can also be finite in another. True infinity is like a circle, finite but unbounded, and it is associated in Hegel's system with the negation of the negation. From the perspective of bad infinity, God is infinite and the world is finite, and hence there arises a contrast between God and the world. Hegel claims that this division is overcome in the perspective of true infinity.

"Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinity is the bad or negative infinity; it is only a negation of an infinite; but the finite rises again the same as ever, and is never got rid of and absorbed." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 93-4.

Bald man paradox, see sorites paradox

Barber paradox

There is a barber in a remote village, who claims to shave all and only those villagers who do not shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself? If he does, then he does not, because he shaves only those who do not shave

自己所自由选择的东西该负的责任。它的逃避方式是：对自己和对别人都声称，事情已被事先决定了，根本不可能是别的样子。一个堕入自欺状态的人将其自身仅视为受制于外在影响的被动主体。自欺拒绝承认人类是自我决定的存在者，并因此而有别于世间之物。自欺植根于我们意识的自由；它之所以可能，是因为人类意识将无（nothingness）和非存在（non-being）带入这世界。这个〔自欺〕现象透露出人类现实状况中根深蒂固的不谐调，即在人类所处情境和人类行为之间、对于我们本性的抽象意识和我们的具体行为之间的矛盾。按照萨特的观点，自欺之人在做一种游戏，这种游戏的不稳定性或恍惚性，使得自欺在面对“自我欺骗”这种明显的悖论性时仍然可以维持自身。与自欺相反，处于不自欺或真诚状态（good faith）的人承认自己是一个有自我意识的人类存在者，在这个世界中自由地、负责任地行动着。

“我们最好是选择并考察这样一种关键性的、深植于人类现实中的人生态度，它使得人的意识将其否定力量不是用到外部，而是用到它自身上来。在我看来，这种态度就是自欺。”——萨特：《存在与虚无》，1957年，第48页。

坏无限

黑格尔的术语，指从一物到别物进展的无穷系列，像一条没有终点的直线。它是原因和结果的无限系列，与有限相分离。坏无限〔又译为“恶无限”〕相对于真无限，后者与有限密切相联，因为某物从一个角度来看是无限的，从另一角度来看是有限的。真无限像一个圆圈，有限而无终点，它在黑格尔的体系中与否定之否定相联系。从坏无限的观点来看，上帝是无限的，而世界是有限的，因而产生了上帝和世界的对立。黑格尔主张，这种划分在真无限的观点中得到克服。

“某物成为另一物，而另一物也就是自身，因此它也同样成为另一物，如此类推，以至无穷。这种无限是坏的或否定的无限；它仅仅是有限的否定；而有限物仍然一如既往地重复发生，并没有被扬弃。”——黑格尔：《小逻辑》，93—94节。

秃顶人悖论

见“累积悖论”条。

理发师悖论

在偏远的村庄里有一位理发师，他宣称给并且只给那些不给自己刮脸的人刮脸。这位理发师给自己刮脸吗？如果他给自己刮脸，那么他不应该给自己刮脸，因为他只给那些不给自己刮

themselves; if he does not, then he does, because he shaves all those who do not shave themselves. The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself. This paradox was recounted by Russell, although he attributed it to an unknown source. It is similar in form to Russell's paradox, that is whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself, but it is different in nature. For while Russell's paradox has deep implications for logic and mathematics, we may dismiss the existence of such a barber (because there cannot be one). It is for this reason that the barber paradox, together with others of this sort, is called a pseudo paradox, in contrast to logical and semantic paradoxes.

"We respond to the barber paradox simply by saying that there is no such barber." —Sainsbury, *Paradoxes*, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 108.

Barcan formula

A principle in quantified modal logic, introduced by the American logician Ruth Barcan Marcus. It states that if possibly there exists something that is A, then there is something that is possibly A. That is, $\Diamond (\exists x) A$ strictly implies $(\exists x) \Diamond A$. This is also true for its converse: $(\exists x) \Diamond A$ strictly implies $\Diamond (\exists x) A$. The Barcan formula also includes the following thesis: If everything is necessarily A, necessarily everything is A. That is, $(\forall x) \Box A \supset \Box (\forall x) A$. The formula is rejected by Kripke and Rescher by appeal to the theory of possible worlds, for in this formula the antecedent might be true of the actual world, but its consequent might be false in certain possible worlds.

"... The Barcan Formula stipulating the implication from $\Diamond (\exists x) \Phi x$ to $(\exists x) \Diamond \Phi x$." —Rescher, *A Theory of Possibility*, 1975, p. 118.

Bare fact, another term for brute fact

Bare particular

A thing changes its properties over time while remaining the same thing. The traditional explanation is that the substance or essence of a thing remains or endures and does not involve change unless the thing itself is destroyed. An alternative account can be provided on the basis of the notion of bare particular. On this view, instead of being a continuing entity, an individual is a series of momentary objects which stand in contingent relations to other objects in the series. These relations guarantee that the thing endures. Each momentary object comprises universal properties, relations and a further element called a bare particular. The bare particular is the instantiation of the universal properties and serves as the bearer of the characteristics co-present with it. The bare particular is different from either properties or rela-

tions. The person shaving himself; if he does not, then he does, because he shaves all those who do not shave themselves. The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself. This paradox was recounted by Russell, although he attributed it to an unknown source. It is similar in form to Russell's paradox, that is whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself, but it is different in nature. For while Russell's paradox has deep implications for logic and mathematics, we may dismiss the existence of such a barber (because there cannot be one). It is for this reason that the barber paradox, together with others of this sort, is called a pseudo paradox, in contrast to logical and semantic paradoxes.

"我们对理发师悖论的回答是直截了当地说根本不存在这样一位理发师。" ——塞斯伯里:《悖论》,第2版,1995年,第108页。

巴肯公式

量化模态逻辑中的一个原则,由美国逻辑学家R. B. 马尔库斯引入。它陈述道:如果可能存在某物是A,则某物可能是A。也就是说, $\Diamond (\exists x) A$ 严格蕴涵 $(\exists x) \Diamond A$ 。这种说法对于此公式的逆也成立: $(\exists x) \Diamond A$ 严格蕴涵 $\Diamond (\exists x) A$ 。巴肯公式还包括下述论题:如果每一事物必然是A,则必然地每一事物是A,即 $(\forall x) \Box A \supset \Box (\forall x) A$ 。S. 克里普克和N. 雷谢尔凭借可能世界理论拒绝接受这一公式,因为在此公式中,前件对于现实世界可能真,而后件在某些可能世界中可能假。

"……巴肯公式规定了从 $\Diamond (\exists x) \Phi x$ 到 $(\exists x) \Diamond \Phi x$ 的蕴涵关系。" ——雷谢尔:《一种或然性理论》,1975年,第118页。

赤裸事实

“天然事实”的另一名称。

赤裸特殊

一物在时间的推移中会改变其属性但仍不失为是同一事物。对这一现象的传统解释是,除非一个事物本身被摧毁,其本体或本质会持续留存,不会变化。另一种解释则建立在赤裸特殊观念的基础上。根据这一观念,一个个体不是一连续性的事物,而是一系列即时性的对象,它们与该系列中的其他对象处于偶然性的联系中,而这些联系又保证了该事物的持续。每一即时性物体包含普遍属性、关系以及另外一个叫做赤裸特殊的成分。赤裸特殊是普遍属性的个例化,可以作为与它相并存的特性的承受者。既不同于属性也不同于关系,赤裸特殊是没有特性的(故而是赤裸的)。它甚至比时间和空间还要基本。由于一个赤裸特殊不能成为两个不同即

tions, is without characteristics (hence, bare), and is even more basic than time and space. Since a bare particular cannot be a constituent of two different momentary objects, it confers individuality upon substances by being the basis for their numerical oneness.

The difference between a bare particular and the usual notion of substance is that it is momentary rather than continuing. The theory of bare particulars is opposed to the cluster theory, according to which a substance is the sum of the characteristics we associate with them. It further opposes the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles by allowing the logical possibility of two or more substances having all of their characteristics in common. The notion of bare particulars is disputable. It is suspect epistemologically, for a thing without characteristics is neither perceivable nor knowable. Many philosophers, while finding difficulties in accepting the claim that a particular is a bundle of universals, also reject the notion that a particular can exist without properties.

"The bare particular and the pure universal are vicious abstractions from states of affairs." —Armstrong, *What is a Law of Nature*, 1983, p. 84.

Bargaining

A procedure for deciding disputes and negotiating an optimal solution for two or more parties. Bargaining is an important social fact. It is widely used in market economies and daily civil affairs, and the notion has been borrowed by political theorists as a strategy of coalition formation in politics. Bargaining is always a process during which a series of outcomes appear, each yielding some level of utility for the bargaining parties, until a final outcome is reached which is acceptable to each party. It is essential in bargaining to consider carefully what risks one can afford to take as well as the advantages that are offered.

"I shall therefore extend 'bargaining' to cover any situation where one party offers another either some advantage or the removal of the threats of some disadvantage in return for the other party's performing some specific action." —Barry, *Political Arguments*, 1965, p. 86.

Basic action

Some actions are done by performing other actions. In some sense, the latter actions cause the former actions. If I am driving a car, the action of driving a car is accomplished by such things as turning the steering wheel, depressing the accelerator or brake and checking the road and the mirror. These actions in turn are accomplished by moving my hands, feet and eyes. The chain of actions which are responsible for other actions must terminate in actions which are not accomplished by performing other actions. Danto calls these actions basic actions and calls actions performed by means of other actions non-basic actions. In many cases it is unclear

时性对象的构成成分,它成为无数本体的基础,赋予它们以特殊性。

赤裸特殊与通常的本体观念的区分在于它是即时性的,而不是持续性的。赤裸特殊论与凝聚论相对立,因凝聚论认为本体乃是与我们相关联的各种属性的总和。它也与难以觉察同一性原则相对立,因为它承认两个或更多的本体在逻辑上可能具有共同的特征。但赤裸特殊这一观念是受争议的。它在知识论上是可疑的。因为一个没有任何特性的事物是既不可感也不可知的。许多哲学家认为说“特殊是一束普遍”有不少困难,但同时也反对“特殊可以没有属性而存在”这一观点。

“赤裸特殊与纯粹普遍都是对事态的不良抽象。”——阿姆斯特朗:《什么是自然法》,1983年,第84页。

讨价还价

双方或多方为解决争端和协商一种最理想的解决办法而采取的一种做法。讨价还价是一重要的社会事实。它被广泛用于市场经济和日常民政事务,并且已为政治理论家借用作为政治生活中形成联盟的一个策略。讨价还价表现为一个过程,其间会出现一系列的结果,其中每一结果都对各方产生某种程度的效用,直到最终取得一个为各方都可接受的结果。仔细考虑一方能承担什么样的风险以及提供什么好处是讨价还价中的关键所在。

“因此,我将‘讨价还价’扩大为涵盖所有这样的情况:一方为另一方或者提供某种好处,或者排除某些不利的威胁,以换取另一方履行某种特殊的行动。”——培里:《政治上的论证》,1965年,第86页。

基本活动

某些活动由完成其他活动来完成。在某种意义上,后者导致前者。如果我在开车,开车这一活动就是由转动方向盘、踩加速器或闸以及查看道路和反光镜这些东西来完成的。这些转而又由移动我的手、脚和眼睛来完成。负责其他活动的活动链条必定中止于不由完成其他活动来完成的活动。丹托将这些活动称为“基本活动”并将通过其他活动来完成的活动称为“非基本活动”。在很多情况下,我们并不清楚应当怎样确定基本活动。有关基本活动的本质的讨论一直是活动理论的中心议题。

how to identify basic actions. Discussion concerning the nature of basic actions has been a central focus of action theory.

"B is a basic action of a if and only if (i) B is an action and (ii) whenever a performed B, there is no other action A performed by a such that B is caused by A." —A. C. Danto, "What we can do", *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (1963), p. 435.

Basic norm

A term introduced by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. As a legal positivist, Kelsen objected to the reduction of the validity of law to morality. How, then, are we to account for the source of legal validity? Kelsen claims that law is a system of norms. Each lower level norm derives its authority from norms at a higher level. This chain of validation will eventually lead to an ultimate norm, that is a basic norm (German: *Grundnorm*), which at the historical starting-point of norm-creation conferred legislative power on the fathers of the first constitution. A basic norm is a presupposition which must be assumed by anyone who seeks to explain our knowledge of positive law. As the ultimate power-conferring source, the basic norm corresponds to Austin's command of the sovereign and Hart's rule of recognition.

"Coercive acts ought to be carried out only under the conditions and in the way determined by the 'fathers' of the constitution or the organs delegated by them. This is, schematically formulated, the basic norm of the legal order of a single state." —H. Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State* (Wedberg, trans.), 1945, p. 116.

Basic particulars

Strawson's term for a distinguishable class of particulars which can be identified and re-identified without reference to particulars of other kinds. Other particulars are identifiable only through making identifying reference to basic particulars. As constituents of our conceptual framework, basic particulars bestow their characteristics upon this scheme. Because the possibility of identifying particulars lies in locating these particulars in a single unified spatio-temporal system, and because material bodies are three-dimensional objects which endure through time and are accessible to observation and experience, Strawson argues that material bodies are the best candidates for basic particulars.

"The assertion that material bodies are basic particulars in our actual conceptual scheme, then, is now to be understood as the assertion that, as things are, identifying thought about particulars other than material bodies rests in general on identifying thought about material bodies, but not vice versa." —Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 60.

"B 是 a 的一个基本活动, 当且仅当 (1) B 是一个活动, 且 (2) 每当 a 完成 B, a 并无另外的活动 A 以使得 B 由 A 引起。" ——丹托:《我们能做什么》,《哲学杂志》第 60 期 (1963 年), 第 435 页。

基本规范

奥地利法哲学家 H. 凯尔逊提出的一个术语。作为一个实证主义法学家, 凯尔逊反对把法律的效力降低为道德问题。那么, 我们如何说明法律效力的起源呢? 凯尔逊认为法律是规范的体系。每一低级规范都是从高级规范取得其权威性的。这一效力的链条最终可上溯到一个终极规范, 即基本规范 (德语: *Grundnorm*), 这一基本规范处于规范产生的历史起点, 是它授予了历史上第一部宪法的创立者们以立法权。基本规范是每一寻求说明我们有关实在法知识的人必须接受的先决条件。作为最终的权力授予的来源, "基本规范" 这一概念相当于奥斯汀的 "统治者的命令" 和哈特的 "承认规则"。

"强制行为只应在由宪法的 '创立者们' 或由他们授权的机构确定的条件和方式下来进行。提纲挈领地讲, 这就是单一国家法律秩序的基本规范。" ——凯尔逊:《法与国家的一般理论》(韦尔伯格译), 1945 年, 第 116 页。

基本特殊

斯特劳森的术语, 指一类可区分的特殊, 它们可以不指称其他类的特殊而被认同, 并且再认同。而其他类的特殊则必须通过对基本特殊作认同性的指称才能被认同。作为我们概念构架的基本成分, 基本特殊把它们的特性赋予这一构架。因为认同特殊之可能性在于把这些特殊放入一个统一的时空系统中, 因为物体是三维客体, 在时间中持续, 并易于观察和经验, 斯特劳森断定物体是基本特殊的最佳候选者。

"物体是我们现实的概念构架的基本特殊。这一断定现在可以理解作是这样一个观点, 即真实的情形是, 对关于不同于物体的其他特殊的思想的认同, 一般来说依赖于对物体思想的认同, 反之则不然。" ——斯特劳森:《个别物》, 1959 年, 第 60 页。

Basic proposition

For Logical Positivists, a proposition or statement which describes the content of one's present experience, such as "I feel a headache". Propositions of this kind are considered to be basic because of their privileged epistemological position. They are incorrigible, that is their truth cannot be denied by other evidence. Further, they can provide the test for the truth or falsity of other propositions and are the terminus of any process of empirical verification. In these respects, they are claimed to provide the foundations of all knowledge. But for there to be such incorrigible propositions would require that I have private experiences to which I can give private descriptions, a view sharply disputed in Wittgenstein's discussion of the possibility of a private language. Other logical positivists call basic propositions "protocol propositions", "experiential propositions", observational proposition or "elementary proposition".

"It is characteristic of these propositions, which I have elsewhere called 'basic propositions', that they refer solely to the content of a single experience." —Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1946, p. 10.

Basic sentence, another term for basic proposition

Bayes' theorem

A theorem of the probability calculus, named after the eighteenth century English mathematician Thomas Bayes, which compares the degree of support for a hypothesis prior to acquiring new evidence and after obtaining that evidence. As such it provides the basis for a general account of science. The theorem can be formulated as follows: $\text{Prob}(H/E) = \text{Prob}(H) \times \text{Prob}(E/H) / \text{Prob}(E)$, where H is the hypothesis whose probability is to be evaluated, and E is new evidence; $\text{Prob}(H)$ is the probability of H prior to acquiring the evidence; $\text{Prob}(E)$ is the prior probability of acquiring that evidence; $\text{Prob}(H/E)$ is the probability of H given the new evidence; and $\text{Prob}(E/H)$ is the prior probability of acquiring the evidence given the assumption that H is true.

The theory states that the conditional probability of H given E is greater than the unconditional probability of H to the extent that E is improbable in itself, but probable given H . This theorem indicates rational grounds for altering one's assessment of probability for a hypothesis in the face of new evidence. On the assumption that belief can vary by degrees, evidence which is improbable on other hypotheses but probable on this hypothesis will raise the degree of belief for this hypothesis more than evidence which is similarly probable on this and other hypotheses.

"Bayes' theorem can be used to justify the assignment of a comparatively high posterior probability to a hypothesis

基本命题

对逻辑实证主义者而言, 就是这样的命题或陈述, 它描述一个人当下经验的内容, 例如“我感到头疼”。这种命题因其特殊的认识论地位而被当做基本的。它们是不可矫正的, 即就是说其他证据不能否认它们为真。此外, 它们可以提供对其他命题真伪的检验, 它们是经验证实过程的终点。在这些方面, 它们被认为提供了一切知识的基础。但是, 若要有这种不可矫正的命题, 就会要求我要有私人经验, 我可以对之作私人描述, 维特根斯坦在讨论私人语言的可能性时对这种观点作了尖锐的批驳。其他逻辑实证主义者称基本命题为“记录命题”、“经验命题”、“观察命题”或“原始命题”。

“我在别处称为‘基本命题’的这些命题的特征是, 它们仅仅指称单一经验的内容。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》, 1946年, 第10页。

基本语句

“基本命题”的另一说法。

贝叶斯定理

一个以18世纪英国数学家T. 贝叶斯的名字命名的概率演算的定理。它比较一个假说在获得新证据之先及获得那证据之后所获得的支持的程度。这样它就为科学中的一般叙述提供了基础。它可以用下述公式表示: $\text{Prob}(H/E) = \text{Prob}(H) \times \text{Prob}(E/H) / \text{Prob}(E)$, 其中 H 是其概率有待估算的假说, 而 E 是新的证据, $\text{Prob}(H)$ 是获取证据之前的概率, $\text{Prob}(E)$ 是获取这一证据的先验概率, $\text{Prob}(H/E)$ 意指给定这一新证据下 H 的概率, 而 $\text{Prob}(E/H)$ 是给出一特殊假定 H 为真时, 获得这一证据的先验概率。

这一理论说明, 在 E 给定时 H 的条件概率。在 E 仅凭本身不可能, 而在给定 H 下则可能的范围内, 这种条件概率要大于 H 的无条件概率。这一定理表明了在面对新证据时改变一个人对一个假设的概率估价的理性根据。根据信念可随程度而有所不同的假定, 那根据其他假设不可能, 而根据这一假设则可能的证据, 相比于那根据这个假设及其他假设同样可能的证据, 更会提高对该假设的置信度。

“贝叶斯定理可用于证明一个假说的比较高的后验概率, 假如其先前的概率不是太小的话。”——帕普:《科学哲学导论》, 1963年, 第216页。

provided the latter's antecedent probability is not too small." —Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 1963, p. 216.

Bayesian epistemology, another expression for Bayesianism

Bayesianism

Also called Bayesian epistemology, a theory of epistemic justification, claiming that a belief *P* is justified if and only if the probability of *P* is reasonably high and that the probability for changing epistemic justification through the acquisition of new data can be calculated and predicated according the probability calculus, including Bayes' theorem. On a Bayesian view, the assignment of probability to belief is both subjective and rational. Different investigators can subjectively hold hypotheses with different initial degrees of belief. The operation of Bayes' theorem in rationally altering these subjective assignments in the light of new evidence will tend toward convergence in the beliefs held by the investigators. In using evidence, evidence which is unlikely in itself but likely on a given hypothesis will increase the degree of belief in that hypothesis more than evidence which is likely in itself or equally likely on this and competing hypotheses. Because of its emphasis on the role of new evidence, the theory does not deal so well retrospectively with old evidence, and the prior assignment of likelihood can also be arbitrary. Also the balance between subjectivity and rationality can be questioned, with parallel tracks of investigation rather than convergence being a possible outcome.

"Bayesianism is like probabilism in maintaining that: scientists' (and others') degrees of belief are measured by probabilities, but unlike probabilism, it sees no significance in very high or low probabilities." —Miller, *Critical Rationalism*, 1994, p. 108.

Beatific vision

A term introduced by Thomas Aquinas for the vision of God. This vision does not use the senses, concepts or any mental structures or processes. Instead it is meant to be an intimate and direct union with God. It is a kind of supernatural light by which one sees God face to face. All reasoning and deliberation is eliminated, although the certitude of judgement remains. Within it, God's essence is manifested. This is what man's ultimate beatitude consists in, as the consummation of the union of God. By nature, the vision belongs to God alone, but he grants it to human beings when he embraces them. Philosophers examine what the epistemological implications of beatific vision would be.

"In order that a person comes to the full, beatific vision, the first requisite is that he believes God, as a learner believing the master teaching him." —Aquinas, *Summa The-*

贝叶斯认识论

“贝叶斯主义”的另一名称。

贝叶斯主义

也称为“贝叶斯认识论”。它是一种认知证明理论,主张一个信念 *P* 的得以证明的条件是当且仅当这个 *P* 的概率高到合理的程度,并且这种概率由获取新论据而发生的认知证明变化,可依据概率演算包括贝叶斯定理来计算和预测。根据贝叶斯主义的观点,对信念概率的指定既是主观的,又是理性的,不同的研究者可以主观地认定具有不同起初置信度的假说。运用贝叶斯公理,根据新证据而理性地改变这些主观指定,会导向研究者们所持信念的会合。在使用证据时,那自身不可能而据一既定假说则可能的证据,相比于那自身可能或据这一及其他相竞争的假说都可能的证据,更能提高对那一假说的置信度。因为它着重于新证据的作用,这一理论在反观旧证据时则处理不好,对可能性的先在指定也可能是任意的。主观性与理性的平衡也会受到质疑,因为结果可能是平行的研究途径,而非二者的会合。

“贝叶斯主义像概率主义一样,主张科学家(和其他人)的置信度由概率来测量,但不同于概率主义的是,它认为在概率非常高或低时没有意义。”——米勒:《批判理性主义》,1994年,第108页。

至福直观

T. 阿奎那提出的术语,指对上帝的直观。这种直观不用感官,不用概念,也不用任何心灵结构或过程,而是一种与上帝亲密的、直接的结合。它是一种超自然之光,通过它,人们面对面地看上帝。所有的推论和思考都被排除,尽管还留着判断的确实性。在这种直观内,上帝的本质得到显明。这是人的至福之所在,是与上帝结合的完成。这直观本性上只属于上帝,但当他拥抱人类时,就将其赐与他们。哲学家们考察了至福直观的认识论蕴意。

“一个人若要达到完全的、至福的直观,第一个必要条件是相信上帝,一如学子相信正在教他的老师。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,2a2—2.4。

ologiae, 2a 2-2, 4.

Beauty

An object's capacity to arouse pleasant experiences for its observer. For Plato, whose dialogues *Hippias Major*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Philebus* concentrate on the notion of beauty (Greek, *kalon*), it is an objective form, a paradigm shared and imitated by all things which we call beautiful. Beauty is thus knowable and measurable. For others, beauty lies in the "eye of the beholder" and is not inherent in objects. On this view, beauty must be linked to human apprehension, and different individuals may respond differently to the same object. Accordingly, beauty is subjective. Other positions claim that beauty is produced through the relation between an object and its observer.

Philosophers also disagree whether beauty is a unifying notion. Some claim that beauty is a general notion of aesthetic value, encompassing all other aesthetic experiences. To be beautiful amounts to "to be recommendable aesthetically". Consistent with this understanding, beauty cannot be defined in terms of other qualities, and can only be intuited. Others believe that beauty is merely one species of aesthetic value, alongside such qualities as elegance, harmony or uniformity.

Until the eighteenth century, beauty was considered to be the central notion of aesthetics, as good was the central notion of ethics. The most important question for aesthetics was "What is beauty?". Then aesthetics becomes more concerned with the notion of art. While for ancient thinkers, all works of art were beautiful, this ceased to be true in modern times. Many modern artworks are thought to be ugly according to the common standard, although they might still be beautiful according to some peculiar theories of art or within some aesthetic practices. The notion of beauty is still not fully explored in contemporary aesthetics.

"For beauty includes three conditions: integrity or perfection, since these things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour." - Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*.

Becoming

[Greek: *gignesthai*, coming to be, the generation of something new] Aristotle's term for substantial change in which a new composite of form and matter is generated. In contrast, *kinesis* (Greek: motion) is reserved for non-substantial changes in quality, quantity or place. *Gignesthai* is also contrasted with *phthora* (Greek: ceasing to be), and one of Aristotle's books is entitled *Peri geneleos kai phthoras* (*On Coming to Be and Ceasing to Be*, Latin: *De Generatione et Corruptione*). However, Aristotle did not always observe the distinction between *gignesthai* and *kinesis* and sometimes uses

美

意指对象能够唤起观众之快感体验的能力。柏拉图在《大希庇阿斯篇》、《会饮篇》、《费得罗篇》与《费利布篇》等对话中，专论美（即希腊语 *kalon*）的观念。他认为美是客观的形式，是我们称之为美的一切事物所共享的和摹仿的范式。因此，美是可知可测的。但在他人看来，美存在于“观看者的眼里”，而非内在于对象之中。据此，美必然与人的悟性相关，不同的人会对同一对象做出不同的反应。如此说来，美便是主观的了。还有其他一些观点认为美是通过主客之间的关系产生的。

哲学家也不完全赞同美是一个统一的观念。有些哲学家认为美是审美价值的基本观念，涵包所有其他审美体验。所谓美的就是“在审美意义上是可取的”。与此理解相一致的是，美不能通过其他特质来加以界定，美只能凭借直觉感受。另外一些哲学家则认为美只是一种审美价值，与飘逸、和谐或整齐等审美价值并列。

到了18世纪，美就像伦理学中的中心观念善一样，被视为美学的中心观念。对美学来讲，“什么是美？”乃是至为重要的问题。于是，美学更为关注艺术观念。在古代思想家看来，所有艺术作品都是美的。但是，这一观点在现代已经行不通了。人们认为许多现代艺术作品根据通用标准是丑的，尽管按照某些特殊的艺术理论或者在某些审美实践范围内，这些作品或许依然是美的。美的观念在当代美学中依然没有得到充分的探讨。

“美包含以下三个条件：一是完整或完善，因为那些受损的东西事实上是丑的；二是合乎比例或和谐；最后是鲜亮或清晰，因为美的东西具有鲜亮的色彩。”——T. 阿奎那：《神学大全》。

变成

[希腊语: *gignesthai*, 生成, 某种新东西的产生]在这种本来意义上, 亚里士多德指实体的变化, 其中有一个形式-质料的新的合成物产生。与此相对, *kinesis* (希腊语, 意为运动) 则依然指在性质、数量和地点方面的非实体性的变化。*Gignesthai* 也对应于 *phthora* (希腊语, 意为毁灭), 亚里士多德有一部著作的书名就叫“*Peri geneleos kai phthoras*” (《论生成与毁灭》, 拉丁语为: *De Generatione et Corruptione*)。但是, 亚里士多德并不总是坚持

these terms interchangeably.

In contemporary philosophy, becoming is generally understood in the sense of Aristotelian substantial change, that is a change involving something coming into existence from the present to the future rather than a change in the attributes of some existing thing. Some philosophers such as McTaggart claim that the distinction between present and future is not real. On this view, it becomes difficult to answer the questions of what the thing is which becomes and what becoming itself is. C. D. Broad proposed that becoming is a *sui generis* type of change that defies analysis.

"Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or ever perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematography inside us." —Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 1911, p. 265.

Bedeutung, see *sense and reference*

Beetle in a box

Part of Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language. Suppose every language-user has a private box which no one else is allowed to look inside, and suppose that we refer to the contents of these boxes as beetles. Since the contents of different boxes are different, the word "beetle" plays no role in the language-game at all, for other languages-users have no idea what it means. They use the same word "beetle", but it may refer to totally different things. By analogy, if one ascribes a private definition or name to one's private sensations, it is semantically irrelevant, for it has no genuine sense and cannot be used as a name.

"Suppose everyone had a box with something in it; we call it 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.... If so it would not be used as a name of a thing." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 293.

Begging the question

Also called *petitio principii* or circular reasoning. A kind of informal logical fallacy which assumes implicitly as a premise in an argument something to be proved. That is, at least one premise needs support from the conclusion to be argued for. Sometimes the circularity can only be exposed after a series of intermediate arguments. For instance, one uses S_1 to argue for S_2 , and uses S_2 to argue for S_3 , and so on until S_n , but then one uses S_n to argue for S_1 . Since it is a general requirement that the evidence used to establish a conclusion should have prior and independent reliability, circular reasoning seriously undermines the acceptability of an argument. However, not all circularities are vicious.

"Since the aim of a proof is to bring knowledge, the con-

gignesthai and *kinesis* 之间的上述区别, 有时互换地使用这些词。

在当代哲学中, 一般是在亚里士多德实体性变化的意义上来理解变成一词, 即指某物从现在到将来的生成意义的变化, 而不是某一存在物在属性方面的变化。有些哲学家(例如麦克塔加特)断言, 现在和将来之间的区别并不实在。按这种观点, 变成的事物是什么和变成本身是什么的问题, 就变得难以回答了。C. D. 布劳德提出, 变成是不可分析的、自成一类(*sui generis*)的变化类型。

"对于变成, 我们是该思考它, 还是表述它, 甚或知觉它? 除了在我们内心放电影似地过一下之外, 我们很难再做什么。" ——柏格森:《创造的进化》, 1911年, 第265页。

指称

见“含义和指称”条。

盒子里的甲虫

维特根斯坦反对私人语言之可能性的论证的一个部分。假定每个语言使用者都有一个任何其他人都不能看到的私人盒子, 并且假定我们把这些盒子里的内容称为“甲虫”。因为不同的盒子里的内容是不同的, 所以“甲虫”一词在语言游戏中完全不起作用, 因为其他的语言使用者不知道它是什么意思。他们使用同样的词汇“甲虫”, 但可能指的是完全不同的东西。依此类推, 如果一个人将一个私人定义或名称归于其私人感觉, 那么它在语义上就是无关的, 因为它没有真正的意义, 不能被用作名称。

"假定每个人都有一个装着我们称为‘甲虫’的某种东西的箱子。谁也不能看到任何其他人的盒子的里面, 而每个人都仅仅因为看到自己的甲虫而说他知道甲虫是什么, ……如果是这样, 它就不能被用作一个东西的名称。" ——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》, 第293节。

窃取论题

亦称之为 *petitio principii* 或 circular reasoning (循环推理), 指一种非形式的逻辑谬误, 它含蓄地将有待证明的东西假定为证明的前提, 即至少有一个前提需要从要证明的结论中得到支持。有时, 这种循环只能在一系列的中间论证之后才被揭示出来。例如, 一个人用 S_1 证明 S_2 , 用 S_2 证明 S_3 , 等等, 直至 S_n , 然后又用 S_n 去证明 S_1 。既然一般的要求是, 用于确立结论的证据应当有先在和独立的可靠性, 所以循环推理就使一个论证的可接受性遭到了严重的破坏。不过, 并非一切循环都是恶的。

"既然证明的目的是带来知识, 那么, 使一个证明成为循环证明或窃取论题的条件就应使

ditions for a proof's being circular or begging the question are stated in terms of knowledge." —Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 240.

Behaviour

Broadly, all actions and reactions and the workings and performances of all kinds of material things. For the purposes of behaviourism, it is restricted to animal or specifically human actions comprising all publicly observable ordinary voluntary or involuntary acts, such as running, walking, talking or eating. Behaviour normally implies a relationship with mind or consciousness, but includes mere physical movements or passions of the body. Sometimes philosophers call the former behaviour proper and the latter physical behaviour. Behaviour is the central notion of behaviourism, which seeks to eliminate any mentalistic entity or property in the explanation of what we do or to reduce these mental things to physical entities or properties.

" 'Behaviour proper' entails 'physical behaviour', but not all 'physical behaviour' is 'behaviour proper', for the latter springs from the mind in a certain particular way." —D. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, 1968, p. 84.

Behavioural theory of meaning

Behaviourism rejects any account of the mental which requires positing inner and publicly inaccessible items and claims that overt behaviour, construed in terms of a stimulus response model, provides the basis for understanding mental life. By applying this approach to analyse the concept of meaning, some philosophers suggest that the meaning of an utterance is the response it evokes in an audience in a particular context. The forerunner of this tendency was John B. Watson. The linguist L. Bloomfield put forward a simple version of such a theory which claims that meaning can be identified with regularly evoked behavioural responses. Charles Morris, who assumed that every meaningful expression is a sign for something, elaborated a more sophisticated version of this theory, based on dispositions to respond rather than actual overt responses. According to Morris, meaning is identified with considered dispositions to response produced by utterances. A certain level of behavioural disposition is sufficient for a mental life. Charles L. Stevenson's discussion of the emotive meanings of evaluative terms also falls within this theory. However, the theory does not leave room for the relation between a sentence and the sorts of things it is used to talk about. Moreover, behaviour does not always carry with it mental states. The theory ceased to be a focus of philosophical debate with the decline of behaviourism.

"The behavioural theory of meaning also concentrates on what is involved in using language in communication, but it

用知识来阐明。"——诺齐克:《哲学解释》,1981年,第240页。

行为

广义地说,它指所有的活动和反应,各种物质的东西的活动与操作。在行为主义那里,它只限于动物,甚至更特别地局限于人类活动,指所有公开可见的普通主动或被动的活动,诸如跑、走、说、吃等等。行为通常意味着与心或意识具有某种关系,只包括纯物理的移动或身体的激情。有时哲学家称前者为“严格意义上的行为”,称后者为“物理行为”。行为是行为主义的中心观念,行为主义力图清除任何心的实体或属性在解释我们行为中的作用,或把这些心的事物还原为物理事物或属性。

“由‘严格意义上的行为’可以推定‘物理行为’,但并非所有的‘物理行为’都是‘严格意义上的行为’,因为后者以某种特定的方式发源于心。”——阿姆斯特朗:《一种唯物主义的心的理论》,1968年,第84页。

意义的行为论

行为主义拒斥各种以设置公众难以理喻的内在项目来说明心理现象的理论。它宣称,外显的行为,当根据刺激—反应模型来解释时,提供了理解心理现象的基础。有些哲学家把这种研究方式用于对意义概念的分析,提出话语的意义就是它在特定的语境中在听众那里激起的反应。这种趋向的首倡者是J. B. 华生。语言学家L. 布龙菲尔德提出了此理论的一个简单说法,它断言可以把意义与有规则地激起的反应相等同。C. 莫里斯假定每一有意义的表达式都是某物的记号。他根据反应的倾向而不是实际的外显反应,阐述了此理论的一个更为精致的说法。按莫里斯的看法,意义等同于由话语引起的经思考的反应倾向。某种层次的行为倾向就足以说明心理现象。C. L. 斯蒂文森对于评价性词语的情感意义的讨论也可归属于此理论。不过,这个理论并没有给语句与用语句来谈论的事物类别之间的关系留下余地。而且,行为也并不总是伴随有心理状态。随着行为主义的衰落,这一理论也不再是哲学论战所关注的中心。

“意义的行为论还关注在交际中使用语言时所涉及到的东西,但它与观念论的区别在于:它重点关注交际情境中可公共观察的方面。”——阿尔斯顿:《语言哲学》,1964年,第25页。

differs from the ideational theory in focusing on publicly observable aspects of the communication situation.” —Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, p. 25.

Behaviourism

Contemporary behaviourism had its origins in psychology, with the Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov and especially the American psychologist J. B. Watson. It was extended by B. F. Skinner and others, as an attempt to explain psychological functioning in terms of observed behavioural data. It stands in contrast to introspective psychology, which appeals to the notion of a mental state. Behaviourism was introduced to philosophy, particularly by G. Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*, as a new approach to dealing with the relationship between mind and body. Philosophical behaviourism is a type of reductive materialism which proposes that all our talk about mental states and processes can be explained by a set of statements about people's overt behaviour or dispositions to behave. Accordingly, there is no need to appeal to an inner life or to mental phenomena such as desires, beliefs, moods or emotions as separately existing entities. Descartes' mental substance, which is contrasted to physical substance, constitutes the myth of the ghost in the machine. The later Wittgenstein's private language argument is also said by some to be a version of behaviourism, although others deny this interpretation. Through its criticism of the dominant mind-body dualism of modern philosophy, behaviourism avoids certain intrinsic difficulties of dualism, such as the interaction between mind and body, but its total repudiation of inner mental states makes it unable to explain many phenomena. Two persons with completely similar behaviour could nevertheless differ psychologically. This and other theoretical problems led to the emergence of the identity theory of mind and functionalism as anti-dualist strategies.

“According to philosophical behaviourism, for something to ‘have a mind’ is simply for it to be a material object that behaves, or is disposed to behave, in certain complicate ways.” —Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, 1963, p. 8.

Being

A participle from the verb “to be”. Its Greek equivalence is *on*, so ontology means a theory of being. Being can be ascribed to everything that can be talked about. Whatever we say using language must involve the verb “to be” in some form, and in this sense, as Hegel says, it is the widest but also the emptiest of all notions. Merely to say that something is amounts to saying nothing about it. But when Parmenides took being as a kind of subject-matter, his speculation about the nature of being was an attempt to locate the object of knowledge and to explain that it is the simple and unchanging ultimate reality behind the changing sensible world. Starting

行为主义

当代行为主义起源于心理学，与俄国心理学家 I. 巴甫洛夫，特别是美国心理学家 J. B. 华生有关。这种主张得到 B. F. 斯金纳和其他人的扩充，以图用观察到的行为材料解释心理功能。它与诉诸于心的状态观念的内省心理学完全不同。行为主义主要是由 G. 赖尔在《心的概念》一书中引入哲学的，作为解决心身关系问题的新视角。哲学上的行为主义是一种还原论的唯物主义。它主张，我们对于心的状态和过程的一切谈论都可以用一组关于人们的可见行为或行为倾向的陈述来说明。因此，不需要诉诸于内在生活或精神现象，诸如作为现存的单独存在物的欲望、信念、情绪或情感等。笛卡尔的与物质实体完全不同的精神实体，形成了机器中的幽灵这一神话。有人也把后期维特根斯坦的私人语言论证说成是一种行为主义，虽然其他人否定这样的解释。行为主义批评近代哲学中占主流地位的心身二元论，以此来避免二元论的某些内在困难，例如心身之间的相互作用等，但它对内部心灵状态的全然否定使得它不能解释许多现象。两个人可以有完全相似的行为，但在心理上却可能迥然有别。这个问题和其他一些理论问题导致产生了心灵同一论和功能主义，以作为反二元论的理论。

“对于哲学上的行为主义而言，某物‘有心灵’不过就是说它是以某种复杂方式行动或有行动倾向的物质客体。”——舒马克：《自我知识与自我认同》，1963年，第8页。

是

系动词“是”的分词。（也译作“有”或存在。但严格地从字源上论，译作“是”最合适，虽然由于中文结构，使用“是”作为名词有些不便。）是（或存在）在希腊文中的对应词为 *on*，故是（存在）论乃是关于是（存在）的理论。“是”可归属于能够被谈论的一切事物。我们不论用语言说什么，都得涉及到系动词“是”的某种形式。在这一意义上，正如黑格尔所说，它是一切概念中最宽泛也是最空洞的概念。只是说“某物是”等于没有对它说什么。但当巴门尼德把是（存在）当做一种研究对象，并将其解释成

from Parmenides, metaphysics takes "what being is" as its central question. Different metaphysical systems can be viewed as different answers to this question.

Plato claimed that only the universal forms are beings, while sensible things are both being and not being. His distinction initiates the lasting dichotomies between reality and phenomenon and between universal and particular. He eventually identified being in the truest sense with the Good.

Aristotle thought that being is not a genus divisible into species, but rather that it has many senses. In his *Categories*, he discusses ten senses of being and argues that substance is the primary sense, while other categories such as quality, quantity, and relation are secondary senses. Thus, in seeking to determine "what is being" Aristotle focused his investigation on substance. Primary being is primary substance, which in turn is primary essence. Aristotle's ontology is the source of the dichotomy between substance and attributes and between essential and accidental properties. In some of his discussion, he ascribed primary substance, that is primary being, to God.

The medieval metaphysicians distinguished between existence (that it is) and essence (what it is) on the basis that everything is created by God. God alone is the unity of existence and essence, while all other existing things have their essence necessarily grounded in God.

Descartes claimed, "I think, therefore I am", and Berkeley's slogan was "To be is to be perceived". These theses essentially determine the development of modern philosophy. The discussions of substance and essence in modern philosophy are all discussions about being. Contemporary Existentialism is also mainly concerned with the relation between existence and essence in the search for authentic meaning in the contingency of human life. Heidegger claimed that we are still not clear about the word "being", and launches a new investigation into the meaning of Being in his *Being and Time*.

However, many other philosophers, such as Hume, Kant, Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists believe that it is a mistake to ask questions about what is being. Traditional metaphysics fails to notice that the verb "to be" has a number of different uses, as copula, as sign of identity, as a sign of existence. Being or existence, that is the existential sense of "to be", is argued by contemporary philosophical logicians not to be a first order predicate which ascribes a property to an object, but rather to be a second-order predicate which ascribes a property to a concept.

The tendency to reject the pursuit of necessary existential grounds for contingent things does not imply that the question "what being is" disappears. Quine believes that in asking about being we are asking what it is for an entity of any given kind to exist. His answer is that "to be is to be the value of a variable". What exists is anything that can be sub-

is处于变动不居的感性世界背后的单纯不变的终极实在时,他对存在的性质的思辨乃是确定知识对象的努力。从巴门尼德开始,形而上学以“什么是‘是’”作为其中心问题。不同的形而上学系统可以被看作是对这一问题的不同回答。

柏拉图认为只有普遍形式是“是”(存在),而可感事物则既是又不是。他的区分开启了实在与现象、共相与殊相等根深蒂固的对立。他最终把最真实意义上的“是”等同于善。

亚里士多德指出,是(存在)不是一个可划分成许多属的种。但它具有多种意义。在《范畴》中,亚里士多德讨论了十种意义的存在(是)并论证本体是它的首要意义,而其他诸如质量、数量和关系等范畴则是它的次要意义。因而,在确定“什么是‘是’”时,亚里士多德集中讨论本体。第一个“是”即是第一本体,而第一本体即是第一本质。亚里士多德的是(本体)论是本体与属性、本质属性与偶然属性等对立的源泉。在某些讨论中,他也把第一本体,即第一“是”,等同于神。

中世纪哲学家在万物为上帝所造这一信念的基础上区分了存在(existence, 所是)与本质(是什么)。只有上帝才是存在与本质的同一,而其他存在物的本质必定植根于上帝之中。

笛卡尔声称,“我思故我在(是)”。巴克莱的口号则是,“存在(是)就是被感知”。这些命题根本性地规定了近代哲学的发展进程。近代哲学中有关本体和本质的讨论都是关于“是”的讨论。当代存在主义在探究偶然的人类生活的真实意义时也主要关涉存在与本质的联系。海德格尔认为我们仍然不清楚“是”这个词的意思,所以在《存在与时间》中对“是”的意义展开了新的研究。

不过,其他许多哲学家,如休谟、康德、弗雷格、摩尔、维特根斯坦及逻辑实证主义者等,都认为询问什么是“是”这类问题是错误的。传统形而上学未能注意到动词“是”有许多不同的用法。它可以作为系词,也可用作等号,还可代表实存。存在或实存乃是“是”的代表实存的意义。当代哲学逻辑学家证明,它并不是那把一个属性归属于一个对象的一阶谓词,而是那把一个属性归属于一个概念的二阶谓词。

反对为偶性事物寻求必然存在根据的努力,并不意味着“什么是‘是’”这一问题就消失了。奎因相信,在讨论存在时,我们是在问,说一个特定类事物存在是什么意思。他的回答是,“‘是’乃是一个变项的值”。存在物乃是那可以取代一个可接受的量化公式中的变项的任何事物,如果那个公式能够成为一个关于世界的科学理论的部分的话。在分析哲学目前关于存在的讨论中,一个主要焦点是我们如何谈论诸如

stituted for a variable of an acceptable quantified formula if that formula could form part of a scientifically acceptable theory about the world. A major focus of current discussion of being in analytic philosophy concerns what we should say about the existence of abstract entities such as possibilities, numbers, and classes and what we should say about the existence of fictitious entities, such as characters in a novel.

Another version of the question "what being is" asks what is the distinguishing mark of an existing thing and leads on to questions of the distinguishing features of identity.

"And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz what being is, is just the question, what is substance?" — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028b3-5.

Being (Aquinas)

[Latin: *esse* or *ens*] Following Aristotle, Aquinas believed that the word "being" is used in many ways and distinguished the actually existent in its own right (*ens per se*), the actually existent coincidentally (*ens per accidens*), potential and actual existents, and existence in the sense of the true (*esse ut verum*). In addition to restating Aristotle's doctrines of being, Aquinas distinctively held that the existent in its own right is the predicate which is genuinely predicated of an individual, and is therefore a first-order predicate. In contrast, existence in the sense of true is ascribed to the predicate which indicates the nature of a kind and can therefore be applied to any subject of that kind, but does not belong to an individual. Thus existence in the sense of true is a second-order predicate that does not carry existential import. This idea was taken by Frege for his diagnosis of existence according to which existence is not a predicate. Aquinas clearly stated the distinction between existence (the fact that it is) and essence (what a being is), a contrast which originated in Avicenna's distinction between necessary and possible being. All finite things owe their existence to the creation of God and do not exist necessarily in virtue of their essence. Only in God is there a unity of existence and essence.

"We use the verb 'is' to signify both the act of existing, and the mental uniting of predicate to subject which constitutes a proposition." — Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a 48. 2.

Being (Hegel)

[German: *Das Sein*] The existence of things in general, in contrast to their inner essence and also to the antithesis of thought. More specifically, being serves as the first category in Hegel's logic. In this sense, being is pure, without any determination, although it can be thought. To say of something that it is means merely that it is and nothing more. Being is thus in contrast to *Dasein* (determinate being). Since for Hegel there is nothing to think about regarding pure be-

可能性, 数, 类等抽象实体的存在, 如何谈论诸如小说中的角色这样的虚构物的存在。

"什么是'是'?"这一问题的另一侧面是问, 什么是一个存在物的特定标志。这导向有关认同的特定标志的种种问题。

"那过去被提出, 现在被提出, 始终被提出, 并始终是困惑对象的问题, 即, 什么是'是', 也就是这样一个问题'什么是本体?'"——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1028b3-5。

存在〔或译“是”〕(阿奎那)

[拉丁语: *esse* 或 *ens*] 遵循亚里士多德, 阿奎那相信, "存在"一词可在多种意义上使用, 他将其区分为"由于自身的现实存在"(*ens per se*)、"由于巧合的现实存在"(*ens per accidens*)、"潜能的和现实的存在"和"真实意义上的存在"(*esse ut verum*)。除了重述亚里士多德的存在学说之外, 阿奎那还特别提出, 由于自身的存在就是真实陈述个体的那个述语, 所以是头等述语。与此相对, 真实意义上的存在指陈述类本质的那个述语, 所以, 能适用于该类的任何主语, 但是, 却不属于个体。这样, 真实意义上的存在就是第二等的述语, 不传达存在含义。这种观念发展成弗雷格的存在概念诊断, 根据这种诊断, 存在不是述语。阿奎那清楚地说明了存在(所是的事实)和本质(所是是什么)之间的区别, 这种对照最初出现在阿维森纳那里时, 是必然存在和可能存在之间的区别。一切有限事物, 其存在都归因于上帝的创造, 按它们的本质而言, 都不必然存在。存在与本质的统一, 只存在于上帝中。

"我们使用'是'这个动词, 既表示存在行为, 也表示述语和构成命题的主语在心里的统一。"——阿奎那:《神学大全》, 1a48. 2。

存在〔或译“是”〕(黑格尔)

[德语词: *Das Sein*] 事物一般的存在, 相对于它们的本质, 并且也相对于思想的反题。更特别的是, 存在作为黑格尔"逻辑学"中的第一个范畴。在这个意义上, 存在是纯粹的, 没有任何规定, 但它能被思维。说某物存在只是单纯地意指存在, 再无更多的东西。存在因而相对于 *Dasein* (有规定的存在)。因此, 对黑格尔来说, 关于纯存在没有什么可思考的, 它便过渡到无。

ing, it passes into nothingness. To think about being amounts to thinking about nothing and vice versa. Being and nothing are synthesised in the category of becoming, which in a sense is being and in another sense is nothing. Being, nothing and becoming form the first triad of Hegel's dialectic. Hegel associated being with Parmenides and becoming with Heraclitus. While Greek philosophy generally valued being over becoming, Hegel emphasised becoming as the development of spirit rather than being. This change of focus has exerted profound influence upon German philosophy.

"Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the predicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an 'other'; and the shape which dialectic takes in them, i.e. their further specialisation, is a passing over into another." --Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 84.

Being (Heidegger)

Like Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger particularly emphasises Being as the subject matter of philosophy. However, the meaning of being for him differs considerably from traditional conceptions. The western metaphysical tradition has been centred on the question "What is Being?". For Heidegger, the question up to his time not only lacks an answer, but is also obscure and without direction. All traditional approaches to being, Heidegger says, are concerned not with *Sein* (Being itself), but *Seiende* (beings). *Seiende* is translated as "existents", "entities", "beings" or "essents", that is as individual existents or as essential properties. Thus a concern with beings has led to a forgetfulness of Being. The distinction between Being and entities is prior to the traditional distinction between being as essence and being as existent. Thus we not only lack a proper answer to the meaning of being, but the question of being as well is not properly constructed. Traditional metaphysics or ontology since Plato and Aristotle has changed the study of being into the study of entities. Heidegger's distinction leads him to reinterpret the history of Western philosophy, in particular to destroy the history of ontology. His *Being and Time* seeks to provide a disclosure of being through unlocking what the forgetfulness of being hides from us.

For Heidegger himself, Being is the Being of entities, but it is not itself a kind of entity. Rather it determines entities as entities. He never gives an explicit answer what Being itself is, but says that this inquiry should proceed through an analysis of an entity which enjoys a privileged relationship with being in general. This entity is *Dasein*, the only entity that can question its own existing and raises the question of Being. To distinguish his own philosophy from traditional metaphysics and ontology, he calls his own metaphysics "fundamental ontology", that is philosophy which is concerned with the foundations of any other ontology. The study of *Dasein* is supposed to be preliminary to understand-

思考存在等于思考无,反之亦然。有和无被综合为变的范畴,变,在一种意义上是有,在另一种意义上是无。有、无、变形成了黑格尔辩证法的第一个三一式。黑格尔把存在联系于巴门尼德,把变联系于赫拉克利特。而古希腊哲学一般地重“存在”轻“变”,黑格尔强调变作为精神的发展,而不是强调存在。这个重心的变化对德国哲学产生了深刻的影响。

“存在只是潜在的概念,它的诸规定都具有谓词‘是’,在它们的区别中互为‘他物’,它们的进一步规定(辩证法的形式)是互相过渡到对方。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,84节。

存在〔或译“是”〕(海德格尔)

如同柏拉图和亚里士多德,海德格尔特别强调存在是哲学的主题。然而,存在的意义对于他来讲与的看法大为不同。西方传统形而上学以“什么是存在?”为中心问题。对于海德格尔,这个问题到他那时为止不仅还没有答案,而且本身就是含糊的,没有置于合适的方向上。他认为,所有关于存在的传统探讨并非与存在本身(*Sein*),而是只与存在者们(*Seiende*)相关。*Seiende*被译成“现存事物”(existents)、“实存体”(entities)、“存在者”(being)或“是者”(essents),也就是个别的现存事物或众本质属性。就这样,对于存在者们的关心导致了对于存在本身的遗忘。存在与众存在者们的区别要先于传统的对于本质存在和事物存在的区别。因此,我们不仅仅是缺少对于存在意义的合适回答,而且这个问题本身就没有得到合适的阐发。自柏拉图和亚里士多德以来,传统形而上学或存在论(ontology,又译为“本体论”)已经将对于存在的研究变成了对于存在者们的研究。海德格尔的这个区别使他去重新解释西方哲学史,特别是去摧毁存在论的历史。他的《存在与时间》试图通过开启“存在的遗忘”中所隐蔽者向我们揭示存在本身。

对于海德格尔本人而言,存在是存在者的存在,但它本身不是一种存在者。它倒是在决定存在者之所以为存在者。他从未清楚地回答存在本身是什么,而是说,这样一种调查应该通过对于这样一种存在者的分析而进行,这种存在者与存在本身具有某种特殊的关系。这种存在者就是缘在(*Dasein*),即仅有的能向自己的生存发问并暴露出存在问题的存在者。为了将自己的哲学区别于传统的形而上学和存在论,海德格尔称他自己的形而上学为“基础存在论”,即关注任何其他存在论的基础的哲学。对于缘在的研究被认为是理解存在本身的前奏。但海

ing Being in general. But Heidegger never finished his work to show how such a general understanding is reached.

"Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the world 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being." — Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 19.

Being qua being

Aristotle's term for the subject-matter of metaphysics, in which *qua* being specifies the aspect of being to be treated. Mathematicians deal with number *qua* number, namely, the numerical character of number. Philosophers are concerned with being *qua* being by investigating things with respect to the nature of their being. Since Aristotle divided being into many categories, being *qua* being deals with being in each category. Ontology, as the science of being *qua* being, considers how each of these categories can be a kind of being and how different senses of being are related to each other.

A study of being *qua* being does not involve questions of content but addresses only the nature of being itself. Therefore it is a universal science, contrasted with the special sciences which study distinct classes of being. Because according to the focal meaning pattern all senses of being are related to substance, the study of substance (ousiology) is the chief and central subject matter of the science of being *qua* being. Aristotle's description of being *qua* being is ambiguous, giving rise to several major disputes, for example concerning whether being *qua* being can be reduced to substance and concerning how the science of being *qua* being can be connected to theology—Aristotle's other account of the subject-matter of metaphysics.

"There is a science which investigates being *qua* being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a21-22.

Being-for-itself

[French: *l'être-pour-soi*] In Sartre's distinction between two regions of being, being-for-itself is human consciousness or conscious being, in contrast to being-in-itself [French: *l'être-en-soi*], a thing or non-conscious being. Here, "for-itself" means being which has presence to itself. The distinction is essentially a distinction between mind and body, consciousness and things. Sartre employs different words to avoid the impression of dualism. Being-for-itself is also being-in-itself in so far as its "is" is concerned, but it is characterised by the negative activity of consciousness, that is by the freedom of choice. A human being, as a being-for-itself, is the only being which can detach itself from the rest of the world and thereby cause "Nothingness" to emerge. In this sense, the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-

德格尔未能完成他的这本大作〔即《存在与时间》〕,向我们表明这样一种根本性的理解如何达到。

"我们用'存在'这个词真正切己地意味着什么?我们今天对于这个问题有了答案吗?完全没有。所以就有必要重新提出存在的意义这样一个问题。"——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第19页。

作为是的是(或译“作为存在的存在”)

亚里士多德的术语,指形而上学的主题。其中的“作为是”表示“是”得到讨论的那个方面。数学家研究作为数的数,即数的数学特征。哲学家们讨论作为是的是,研究事物作为是的性质。由于亚里士多德把“是”分成许多范畴,“作为是的是”乃是指每一范畴中的“是”。本体论就是关于“作为是的是”的科学,考虑每个这样的范畴如何成为一类“是”,以及不同意义的各类“是”如何互相联系。

对“作为是的是”的研究并不涉及“是”本身的内容问题,而只强调它的属性。所以,它是一门普遍科学,与只研究某一特殊类的“是”的特殊科学相对照。因为按照中心意义模式,所有意义的“是”都与本体有关,因而对本体的研究(本体论,或本是论)变成“作为是的是”的科学的主要的和中心的部分。亚里士多德对“作为是的是”的描绘是含混的,引起了不少重大争论,如“作为是的是”能否归结为本体,“作为是的是”的科学如何与神学相联系等。神学是亚里士多德对形而上学主题的另一描绘。

“有一门科学,研究‘作为是的是’以及由于它自身的本性而属于它的属性。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1003a21-22。

为自身的存在

[法文为“*l'être-pour-soi*”(又译为“自为的存在”)]在萨特对于两种存在领域的区分中,“为自身的存在”指人类的意识或有意识的存在;它与“在自身中的存在”(法文为“*l'être-en-soi*”(又译为“自在的存在”))相对;后者意味着一个东西或无意识的存在者。“为自身”在这里意指这样一种存在〔方式〕,即为自身提供〔存在的〕在场。从根本上说来,这是一个对于心与身、意识与事物的区别。〔但是〕萨特使用了不同的词来避免给人以二元论的印象。就其“存在”(is)而言,为自身的存在也是一种在自身中的存在,但它被意识的否定行为,也就是选择的自由所刻画。作为为了自身的存在,人类是仅有的能脱开世界的其余部分,并因此而引出

itself corresponds to the distinction between nothingness and being.

“... the being of the *cogito* has appeared to us as being-for-itself.” —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 104.

Being-in-itself. see Being-for-itself

Being-in-the-world

[German: *In-der-Welt sein*] A central term in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. To say that *Dasein* is Being-in-the-world does not mean that *Dasein* is spatially contained in the world. The world here does not mean the universe or the connections of real things, but is an existential-ontological concept, referring to the historical and cultural contexts in which *Dasein* exists or is formed. This world is not external, but belongs to *Dasein*'s own structure. *Dasein* as Being-there, must have a place. Being-in-the-world is the basic state or the fundamental existential constitution of *Dasein*. It is a unitary phenomenon. By this term Heidegger indicated the inseparability of human being from the world and was thus opposed to the traditional approach to a human being an isolated agency. The structure of Being-in-the-world is characterised by care, and is revealed by existential analysis.

“In the preparatory stage of the existential analytic of *Dasein*, we have for our leading theme this entity's basic state, Being-in-the-world.” —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 169.

Being-with

[German: *Mitsein*] A central feature of Heidegger's *Dasein*, according to which we are not isolated from other humans, but are so constituted that our being is available in principle to one another even prior to our experience of others. Being-with aims to reject the isolation of the individual in the social world through the constitution of *Dasein* in the way that the concept of Being-in-the-world rejects the isolation of the individual in the world. Being-with thus seeks to overcome the account of the isolated self in the Cartesian tradition and especially in the works of Husserl.

“Being-in-the world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of *Dasein* is a *with-world* [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is *being-with* Others.” — Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 155.

“虚无”的存在者。在这个意义上，为自身的存在与在自身中的存在的区别就相应于虚无与存在者的区别。

“……（笛卡尔讲的）‘我思’（*cogito*）的存在对我们显现成为自身的存在。”——萨特：《存在与虚无》（巴奈斯英译），1957年，第104页。

在自身中的存在

见“为自身的存在”条。

在此世界中存在

[德文是 *In-der-Welt-sein*（又译为“世间存在”）]海德格尔《存在与时间》中的关键词之一。说缘在是“在此世界中存在”并不意味着缘在从空间上被世界包含。这里讲的世界并不指宇宙或现实事物的结合，而是一个生存论—存在论概念，指的是缘在生存于其中、被构成于其中的历史和文化的境况（context，上下文）。这个世界不是外在的，而是属于缘在本身的结构。缘在作为在缘（Being-there）者或有缘者一定有一处所。在此世界中存在就是缘在的基本状态或基本的生存论构造。这是一个一气呵成的现象。用这个词，海德格尔表明人类存在者不可能与这个世界分离，并以此来反对传统中将人当做一孤立能动者来对待的做法。在此世界中存在的结构表现于牵挂（care）现象，由生存论的分析揭示出来。

“在对缘在的生存论分析的预备阶段，我们的主题是关于这个存在者的基本状况：在此世界中存在。”——海德格尔：《存在与时间》（马库阿里和罗宾逊英译），1962年，第169页。

共同存在

[德文为 *Mitsein*（又译为“同在”）]海德格尔讲的缘在（*Dasein*）的一个关键特点。按照它，我们与其他人并不隔绝；我们被构成的方式就决定了我们的存在甚至在我们经验到他人之前就从根本上是相互沟通的。“共同存在”的思路意在通过探讨缘在的构成而拒绝在社会层次上的孤立的个人观；它的拒绝方式与“在此世界中存在”的说法拒绝在世界层次上的孤立个人观是一样的。共同存在说就这样力图克服在笛卡尔传统中，特别是在胡塞尔的著作里表述的那样一种孤立的自我观。

“‘在此世界中存在’，这里讲的‘世界’总是我与他人共享的世界。缘在的世界是一个共同世界 [*Mitwelt*]。‘在其中存在’（Being-in）就是与他人的共同存在（*being-with*）。”——海德格尔：《存在与时间》（马库阿里和罗宾逊英译），1962年，第155页。

Belief

Since Plato defined knowledge as justified belief plus a *logos*, belief has been a central concept in epistemology. Many discussions in the theory of knowledge take belief rather than knowledge as their starting point. It is generally thought that belief is inherently relational and thus needs an object. Belief has often been represented as a state available to introspection with a certain relation to a present image or complex of images. The object of belief has been variously understood to be an actual or possible sensory state, a state of affairs or a proposition. "I believe that P" means that I have an attitude of acceptance towards P, with some (possibly inconclusive) reason. But functionalism disputes the view that belief must have an object. Traditionally, belief is considered as a state of mind serving as a causal factor in behaviour, but Ryle argued that belief is a tendency to say or to do something, rather than a state of mind. Most analyses of belief hold that beliefs are either true or false, although intuitionists hold that some beliefs are neither true nor false. In addition, probabilism or probability theory holds that belief comes in degrees. There is also an eliminativist rejection of belief as a postulated entity in out-dated folk psychology. Major philosophical issues about belief include the possibility of infallible belief as the ultimate justification of other beliefs, the relation of belief with acceptance, reason, conceptual and linguistic capacity, the relation between justified true belief and knowledge and the distinction between belief *de re* and belief *de dicto*. Moore's paradox, which arises from the absurdity of uttering "P, but I do not believe that P", and the intentionality of belief sentences raise important questions about the nature of belief.

"To believe is thus nothing but to accept something of which I am not yet logically certain. Belief, furthermore, is also a practically sufficient holding-to-be-true."—Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. Young), 1992, 116.

Belief *de dicto*

[Latin: *dicto*, proposition] Belief *de dicto*, or *de dicto* belief, is the acceptance of a proposition and has of the form "I believe that P". In contrast, belief *de re*, or *de re* belief, is belief about an individual object [Latin: *res*, thing], and has the form "I believe of A that it is X". Belief *de re* puts the believer in a particular relation to the believed object or person. The believer is ascribing something to that object. It implies that there must be an object which the belief is about. Belief *de dicto*, on the other hand, does not involve such a relation. The distinction is drawn for the purpose of determining the nature of belief attributions. Some argue that belief *de re* can be characterised as a species of belief *de dicto*, because belief *de re* can be thought to be a belief about a singular proposition, or because a belief *de re* must presup-

信念

自从柏拉图将知识定义为得到辩护的信念加上理念,信念就成为认识论的中心概念。关于知识理论的许多讨论都将信念而不是知识作为其出发点。人们普遍认为,信念具有固有的关系特性,因此需要一个对象。信念通常被表达为适合内省的状态而与当前映象或复合映象具有某种关系。信念的对象被不同地理解为实际的感觉状态或可能的感觉状态,一种事态或一个命题。“我相信P”意味着我由于某种原因(不一定是结论性)对P具有一个接受的态度。但是功能主义对信念必须有一个对象的观点提出质疑。在传统上,信念被看做是一个作为行为的因果因素的心灵状态;但赖尔论辩说信念是要说或做某事的倾向,而不是一个心的状态。对于信念的大多数分析认为,信念或者为真或者为假。尽管直观论者认为某些信念既不为真,亦不为假。此外,盖然论或盖然性理论认为信念具有不同的程度。还有一种取消论,它将信念当做过时的常识心理学假想的存在而予以否认。关于信念的主要哲学论题包括作为其他信念的最终辩护的无误信念的可能性、它与接受、推理及概念和语言能力的关系、得到辩护的真信念与知识之间的关系以及命题信念与客体信念之间的区分等。摩尔悖论指出,说“P对,但我不信P”是荒谬的。这一悖论以及信念语句的意向性对信念的本质提出了许多重要的问题。

“相信只是接受我尚不能在逻辑上确定的东西,而且,信念还是在实际上足以认为真的东西。”——康德:《逻辑学讲义》(杨编),1992年,第116节。

命题信念

[拉丁文: *dicto*, 意为“命题”] 命题信念(另作 *de dicto belief*) 是对一个命题的接受,其形式为“我相信P”。这与客体信念(另作“*de re belief*”)形成对照,后者是关于单个客体的信念[拉丁文, *res*, 意为“事物”], 其形式为“我相信A是X……”。客体信念将相信者与被相信的客体或人置于特定的关系中。相信者将某种东西归之于客体。这意味着一定有一个信念所指向的客体。相反,命题信念则不包含这样的关系。之所以要作这样的区分是为了确定信念归属的本质。有人论辩说客体信念可以被描述为命题信念的一种,因为客体信念可以被看作是关于一个单个的命题的信念,或者说,因为客体信念必须预设一个命题信念。相反,有些哲

pose a *de dicto* belief. In contrast, some philosophers argue that belief *de re* ascribes a real relation between believers and the object of their belief.

"There are two varieties of belief—*de re* beliefs, which are somehow 'directly' about their objects, and *de dicto* beliefs, which are about their objects only through the mediation of a dictum, a definite description (in a natural language, or in some 'language of thought')." —Dennett, *Kinds of Minds*, 1996, p. 107.

Belief *de re*, see **Belief *de dicto***

Belief / desire thesis

A thesis that originated with Hume and provides an answer to the question what it is for an agent to have a reason to act. The thesis states that there are two factors which motivate us to act: desire and belief. Joining these two factors gives a sufficient condition for an agent to act in a certain way. However, Hume maintained that desire is an essentially motivating state, for it is internally related to motivation, but that belief motivates in a contingent way, because it can only fulfil its motivating function with the help of desire. The desire to drink a cup of water provides the motivational push but cannot determine whether the water is drinkable. This sort of information is supplied by belief, although belief does not have motive force in itself. Desires without beliefs are blind, and beliefs without desires are inert. There have been recent attempts to give alternatives to the belief/desire thesis as an account of motivation.

"A complete motivating state—a state which is sufficient for action—must be a combination of belief and desire. This is the belief/desire thesis." —Dancy, *Moral Reasons*, 1993, p. 2.

Belief in

Traditionally, believe in is seen to be an evaluative attitude to a person, whether human or divine, while belief that is a cognitive attitude to a proposition. "Belief that" is also called propositional belief. The standard modern analysis of belief suggests that the object of belief is a proposition P and that all belief can be reduced to "belief that", for "I believe P" amounts to "I believe that P is true". In line with this programme there has been an attempt to eliminate the distinction between "belief in" and "belief that". But this turns out to be difficult. "Belief in" includes "belief that", but possesses an additional pro-attitude. That "I believe in God" not only implies that "I believe that God exists", but also involves commitment or trust towards God. "Belief in" in such cases is identical with faith. While "belief that" can be corrected or removed easily, "belief in" is often unshakeable by counter experience. Whether this approach to reducing "belief in" to

学家则论辩说, 客体信念将一种真正的关系归结于相信者和其信念的客体之间。

"有两种信念——在某种意义上‘直接’关于其客体的客体信念和仅仅通过一个宣称、一个明确描述(借助于自然语言或某种‘思维语言’)的中介才关于其客体的命题信念。"——丹奈特:《心的种类》, 1996年, 第107页。

客体信念

见“命题信念”条。

信—欲论

这个论点起源于休谟, 对于一个行为者的行动理由问题提供了一个回答。这个论点所表述的是, 有两个因素推动我们去行动, 一个是欲望, 另一个是信念。两个因素的结合是一个行为者以某种方式行动的充分条件。不过, 休谟主张, 欲望是一种本质性的动机状态, 因为它是与动机内在相关的, 另一方面, 信念以一种偶性的方式促动行为, 因为它只能通过欲望的帮助而起到它的促动作用。喝一杯水的欲望提供了动机性冲动, 但不能决定这杯水是否可以喝, 这一类信息为信念所提供, 虽然它本身没有动机的力量。欲而无信则盲, 信而无欲则怠。近来有许多努力, 力图在信—欲论之外寻求对动机的说明。

"一种完全动机态——一种要行动的充分状态——必须是信与欲的一种结合。这就是信—欲论。"——丹西:《道德理性》, 1993年, 第2页。

信以为真

按照传统理解, 人们认为“信以为真”是对于一个人的评价性态度, 不论是对普通人还是对神; 而“相信某事”则是对于一个命题的认知态度。“相信某事”也被称为命题信念。现代关于信念的标准分析表明, 信念的对象是一个命题P, 因此, 所有的信念都可以被还原为“相信某事”, 因为“我相信P”相当于“我相信P为真”。因此有人试图取消“信以为真”与“相信某事”之间的区分。但这被证明是很困难的。“信以为真”包含着“相信某事”, 但还具有另外的命题态度。“我相信上帝为真”不但意味着“我相信上帝存在”, 而且包含着对于上帝的承诺或信任。“信以为真”在这种情况下等同于信仰。“相信某事”可以被轻易地纠正或消除, “信以为真”则难以为相反的经验所动摇。“信以为真”能否以这种方式还原为“相信某事”, 在认

“belief that” can succeed is still a matter of dispute in epistemology.

“The question whether belief-in is or is not reducible to ‘belief-that’ is by no means trivial, nor is it at all an easy question to answer.” — Price, *Belief*, 1969, p. 427.

Belief that, see belief in

Beneficence

[from Latin: *bene*, well or good + *facio*, to do] Literally doing something to promote the good or interest of somebody else, due to a benevolent character. The word “benefit” comes from the same root. Beneficence is to act in a way that benefits others, and it is supplemented by non-maleficence [from Latin: *male*, bad — *facio*, to do], that is doing no harm. Beneficence has been recognised as a basic obligation or duty. To deal with possible conflicts between the principle of beneficence and other duties, such as the respect for autonomy, is a major topic in various areas of applied ethics.

“[I]t must be remembered that ‘duty of beneficence’ means an obligation to do good to others.” — Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 231.

Benevolence

Affection for others, a desire for the good of others or a disposition to act to promote their welfare. Benevolence is associated with love, compassion, charity and altruism. Benevolence is an altruistic sentiment which motivates us to act for the interests of others for their own sake. Some moral philosophies, such as Christian ethics, Hume’s ethics and especially utilitarianism ascribe benevolence fundamental importance in ethics. Nevertheless, humans generally give priority to the pursuit of their own interests, and it is a matter of dispute to explain the general presence of benevolence in human nature and the basis for our altruism.

“The term [“benevolence”] stands for a positive reaction to other people’s desire and satisfactions, which the benevolent person has only because they are the desires and satisfactions of others.” — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, pp. 81-2.

Bernoulli’s theorem

A theorem about the probability of the frequency of occurrence of events in a sequence of independent trials, first proved by the Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli (1654-1705). Suppose that we have a sequence of n trials. If there is a possible outcome, A , of each trial, and the probability P of A on each trial is the same, then as the number n of trials increases and approaches infinity the probability that the relative frequency of A s in the sequence lies within the range $P \pm x$, where x is an arbitrary small number. This is also

识论中依然颇有争议。

“信以为真能否被还原为‘相信某事’的问题并非无关紧要，这也绝不是一个容易回答的问题。”——普赖斯：《信念》，1969年，第427页。

相信某事

见“信以为真”条。

慈善

[源自拉丁词：*bene*（意为“好”或“善”）和 *facio*（意为“做”）]字面的意思是，出于一种仁善的品格，做某事来促进某人的善或利益。语词“benefit”（有益于、恩惠）出于同样的词根，慈善就是以一种有益于他人的方式行动，它为“不害人”（non-maleficence, *male* 在拉丁语中意为“恶”，即不造成伤害）所补充。慈善被看作是一种基本的义务或职责。处理这个慈善原则与其他职责诸如自主性之间可能的冲突是应用伦理学不同领域中的一个主要课题。

“必须记住，‘慈善的责任’意味着一种做对他人有益的事的义务。”——诺威尔-史密斯：《伦理学》，1954年，第231页。

仁慈

对他人的感情、对他人的善的一种欲望，或一种如此行动从而促进他人幸福的一种性情。它与“爱”、“同情”、“仁爱”或“利他主义”相联系。仁慈是一种利他主义的感情，它推动我们为了他人本身的原故而为他人的利益去行动。某些道德哲学例如基督教伦理学，休谟的伦理学，尤其是功利主义伦理学，把仁慈看作对于伦理学具有基本的意义。不过，人们一般把对自己利益的追求放在首位，为此故，如何解释在人性中普遍存在的仁慈和这种利他主义的基础，引起了许多争论。

“‘仁慈’这词代表对他人欲望和满足的一种积极反响。它为仁慈的人所拥有只是因为这些是他人的欲望和满足。”——威廉姆斯：《伦理学与哲学的限度》，1985年，第81-82页。

伯努利定理

一个有关在一连串独立试验中，事件出现频率之概率的定理，首先为瑞士数学家J. 伯努利所证明。假设我们有一连串 n 个实验。如果每一次试验有一个可能的结果 A ，并且在每次试验中 A 的概率 P 是相同的，则随着试验数目 n 的增加并趋于无穷，试验系列中 A 的相对频率的概率位于区域 $P \pm x$ 之中，其中 x 为任意小量。这也称作“弱大数定律”。

“伯努利定理在其经典形式中，用作直接推

called the weak law of large numbers.

"Bernoulli's theorem in its classical form holds as an approximation for the direct inference, if the sample is larger and the population still larger or even infinite." Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, 1950, p. 503.

Berry's paradox

A paradox formulated in *Principia Mathematica* by Russell and Whitehead and attributed by Russell to Berry, a librarian at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Names of integers consist of a finite sequence of syllables in English. Some of them can be named in one syllable (such as 2, 5), and others need at least two (such as 7, 14). All the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syllables and among these there must be a least. Now the phrase *The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables* expresses a finite integer. Although any name of this integer must contain at least nineteen syllables, the words printed above in italics amount to a name for it and they contain only eighteen syllables. This is contradictory.

"A third [semantical paradox] is Berry's, concerning the least number not specifiable in less than nineteen syllables. That number has just now been specified in eighteen syllables." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 134.

Bertrand's paradox

A paradox proposed by the French mathematician Joseph Bertrand (1822-1900). How can we find the probability that a randomly drawn chord to a given circle is longer than one side of an equilateral triangle inscribed in the same circle? It is longer if its midpoint falls at the inner half of the radius which bisects the chord. Its probability is 1/2. It is also longer if its midpoint lies in the area of the inner circle with radius bisecting the original; since this circle occupies one quarter of the area of the original, its probability is 1/4. There are further possibilities. This paradox shows that the principle of indifference cannot be simply used in choosing among alternatives in such cases.

"It is one of three problems formulated by Bertrand in his *calcul des probabilités* of 1889, pp 4-5 in order to show that it is senseless to speak of choosing at random from an infinity of alternatives... The name 'Bertrand paradox' was given to this particular problem by Poincaré." —Kneale, *Probability and Induction*, 1949, p. 84.

Best of all possible worlds

Leibniz claimed that because God is the most perfect being, the world he chose to create must be the most perfect and best among all possible worlds. To choose to create a lesser world would have been a sign of imperfection in God. Furthermore, since God, as an omnipotent and omniscient

理的近似, 如果样本较大而总数要更大或甚至于无穷的话。"——卡尔纳普:《或然性的逻辑基础》, 1950年, 第503页。

贝里悖论

罗素和怀特海在《数学原理》中表述这一悖论, 罗素把它归功于牛津大学鲍德伦图书馆的一位名叫贝里的馆员。整数的英语名称由一串有穷长的音节组成, 某些整数可以用一个音节来命名(例如2, 5), 其他整数需要至少两个音节(例如7, 14)。某些整数的所有名称必定由至少19个音节组成, 其中必定有一个整数是最小的。"*The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables*"(用少于19个音节不能命名的最小整数)表示一个有穷整数, 尽管这个整数的任何名称必定包含至少19个音节, 但用斜体印在上面的那些词语就是该整数的一个名字, 而它只含有18个音节。这是自相矛盾的。

"第三个[语义悖论]是贝里悖论, 与用少于19个音节不能刻画的最小数有关, 而此时却用18个音节刻画了这个数。"——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》, 1953年, 第134页。

伯特兰悖论

由法国数学家J. 伯特兰提出的悖论。对于任意给定圆, 随意作一条弦, 我们如何得到这条弦比同一圆的内接等边三角形边长更长的概率? 如果这条弦的中点落在二等分这条弦的半径的接近圆心的那一半之内, 则这条弦更长。所求概率为1/2。如果这条弦的中点落在以平分原半径的半径所画内圆的区域内, 则这条弦更长; 又因这个圆是原圆面积的四分之一, 故所求概率为1/4。还存在其他的可能性。这一悖论表明: 在上述各种情形之间作选择时, 不能简单地应用无差别原则。

"这是伯特兰在他的《概率演算》(1889)一书第4-5页表述的三个问题之一, 其目的在于证明: 谈论从无穷多个供选者中作随机选择是无意义的。彭加勒把这个特殊的问题命名为'伯特兰悖论'。"——涅尔:《概率与归纳》, 1949年, 第84页。

可能世界中的最佳者

莱布尼茨声称, 由于上帝是最完满的存在, 他所选择创造的世界必定是在一切可能的世界中最完满和最好的。如果上帝选择和创造了一个不那么完满的世界, 那就表明他本身还不够完满。而且, 作为全知全能的存在, 上帝不仅要

being, not only intends to create a possible world, but also knows what is the best and has the capacity to actualise it, our world must actually be the best. Accordingly, it is a logical consequence of orthodox theism that our world is the best possible world. This idea is satirised by Voltaire in *Candide* through his protagonist's claim that "everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds."

"This supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best... There would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better... So it may be said that if this were not the best of all possible worlds, God would not have created any." —Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 1. 5. 8.

Biconditional

Also called material equivalence. The combination of the conditional proposition "If p then q" and its reverse "If q then p". It is written as "p if and only if q", and is symbolised in standard predicate calculus by a triple-bar sign " $p \equiv q$ " or a double-headed arrow " $p \leftrightarrow q$ ". "If and only if" is often abbreviated as "iff". In the truth-functional treatment, "p iff q" is true when p and q are both true or both false, and is false if one of them is true while the other is false. Hence p and q are taken to be logically equivalent.

"A biconditional [$\phi \equiv \psi$] is true just in case ϕ and ψ are alike in truth value." —Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, 1951, p. 37.

Bifurcation of nature

Whitehead's term for a tendency in modern philosophy to divide reality into two parts and then assign to them different degrees of reality. One version distinguishes primary qualities from secondary qualities (such as colour), and then assigns primary qualities to the physical world and secondary qualities to subjective experience. Another version separates nature apprehended in awareness and nature which is the cause of awareness. A further version distinguishes between sensations or sense-data and things. Whitehead claimed that this practice is mechanistic and a fallacy of modern philosophy. His philosophy of process is intended to overcome these divisions by exhibiting in one system the inter-relations of all that is observed.

"What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses." —Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 1930, p. 30.

Bioethics

[From Greek; *bios*, life] A branch of applied ethics dealing with the moral issues about life and death arising from

创造一个可能的最佳世界，而且知道什么是最好的，并有能力实现它；我们的世界必定在现实上也是最佳的。因此正统一神论的一个逻辑结论就是：我们的世界是可能世界中的最佳者。这种看法受到伏尔泰的讽刺；他在《老实人》中让那个受到嘲弄的主角说：“在所有可能世界中的最佳者中，每件事情都是为了最好的目标。”

“这个最高的智慧与那不能少于无限的善相结合，就只能选择最佳者。……如果这个被选择创造出来的世界还能够更好的话，那就意味着在上帝的行为中还有可改进者。……所以，可以说，如果这不是所有可能世界中的最佳者的话，上帝就不会创造任何世界了。”——莱布尼茨：《神正论》，第一卷，第5章，第8节。

双条件句

亦称实质等值式。条件命题“如果p则q”和它的逆命题“如果q则p”的结合。它被写作“p当且仅当q”，在标准谓词演算中用三短横记号将其符号化为“ $p \equiv q$ ”，或用双箭头将其符号化为“ $p \leftrightarrow q$ ”。“当且仅当”常被缩写为“iff”。在真值函项处理中，当p和q同真或同假时，“p当且仅当q”为真；若p和q中一个为真而另一个为假，则“p当且仅当q”为假。所以p和q被看作是逻辑等值的。

“仅当 ϕ 和 ψ 在真值上相同时，双条件句 $[\phi \equiv \psi]$ 才为真。”——奎因：《数理逻辑》，1951年，第37页。

自然两分

怀特海的术语，指涉近代哲学中的一种把实在划分为两部分，然后赋予它们不同的实在程度。它有着不同的说法。一种是把第一性质与第二性质（例如颜色）相区分，然后把第一性质归属于物理世界，第二性质归属于主观经验。另一种是区别意识中所认识到的自然，和作为这种意识动因的自然。还有一种是区分感觉或感觉材料和事物，如此等等。怀特海认为这种做法是机械论的，是近代哲学中的一个谬误。他的过程哲学想要通过在一个体系中展现所有观察到的事件的内在关系，来克服这些划分。

“我从根本上反对的，是把自然分化为两个实在系统，而其实在性又有不同的意义的做法。”——怀特海：《自然的观念》，1930年，第30页。

生命伦理学

[在希腊语中，*bios*的意思是“生命”]应用伦理学的一个分支，研究从现代生物学、医学研

modern biological and medical research and health care practice. These issues include the allocation of scarce medical resources, the extent of the autonomy of the patient and the scope and limits of the authority of doctors and nurses, abortion and euthanasia, experiments with human subjects, genetic research and its applications, birth control, exogenesis, new medical techniques in human reproduction, pre-natal screening, surrogate motherhood and tissue or organ donation. Additional topics will arise as research advances. Many discussions surround such key moral notions of autonomy, equality, beneficence, justice and responsibility. Bioethics is generally regarded as a synonym of "medical ethics" or "health care ethics", although it covers many issues beyond the sphere of medically related matters. Since its central focus is health-related matters, bioethics provokes great public interest.

"It is through applying the language of bioethics that health care understands its place in a culture, and the culture comprehends the significance of health care practices and the biomedical sciences it sustains." —Engelhardt, *The Foundations of Bioethics*, p. 8.

Biography

In Russell's use of the term, all of the percepts perceived by one percipient throughout a life. This total experience and complete data of one's experience is distinguished from momentary data as part of one's experience, which Russell calls a "perspective". Wryly, Russell designates a biography not lived by anyone an "official" biography. Questions of biography also arise in relation to hermeneutics, personal identity and responsibility.

"The sum-total of all particulars that are (directly) either simultaneous with or before or after a given particular may be defined as the 'biography' to which the particular belongs." — Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 1918, p. 141.

Biological naturalism

Materialism claims that all mental states and events are determined by physical processes. Dualism claims that mental phenomena cannot be reduced to physical properties. John Searle believes that these two seemingly irreconcilable positions are not in fact inconsistent. He develops a position called biological naturalism, according to which all mental phenomena including intentionality and consciousness are higher-level characteristics of the brain. They are caused by lower-level neurobiological process in the brain, although these lower-level elements do not themselves possess the features of mental phenomena. In terms of this view, Searle claims that all difficulties arising from attempts to reconcile the natures of mind and body can be solved.

"Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the

究和保健实践中提出的有关生命的道德问题。这些问题包括：稀少医疗资源的分配，病人自主的程度，医生和护士权威的范围，堕胎和安乐死，与人为主体的实验，遗传研究和它的应用，生育控制，体外受精，关于人的再生产的新医学技术，B超，代育的母亲身份，器官捐献等。随着研究的进展，新的问题还会被提出，许多讨论围绕着诸如自主性、平等、仁慈、正义、责任等关键性的概念。生命伦理学一般被看作是“医学伦理学”和“保健伦理学”的同义词，尽管它包括的问题超过了与医学相关的问题。由于生命伦理学的问题是与健康相关的问题，它激起了巨大的公众兴趣。

“正是通过对于生命伦理学语言的运用，保健了解了它在一种文化中的位置，而文化理解了保健实践的意义和它所支撑着的生命医学科学。”——恩格尔哈特：《生命伦理学的基础》，第8页。

传记

在罗素对这个术语的用法中，它是一个知觉者终其一生知觉到的全部对象。这种个人经验的整体和完整的感材料不同于作为个人经验的记忆材料。罗素将后者称为“视野”。难于理解的是，罗素把不被任何人经历的传记叫做“正式”传记。关于传记的问题也与解释学、个人同一性和责任等问题相关。

“一切殊相——它们要么是（直接地）与一已知殊相同时发生，要么在它之前或之后——的总和可以定义为是该已知殊相所属的‘传记。’”——罗素：《神秘主义和逻辑》，1918年，第141页。

生物自然主义

唯物主义声称所有的心状态和事件都由物理过程所决定。二元论则声称心的现象不能被还原为物理特性。塞尔认为，这两个在表面上看起来不可调和的立场事实上并不矛盾。因此他提出一种称为“生物自然主义”的观点。根据这种观点，包括意向性和意识在内的所有心的现象都是大脑的高级特性，它们由大脑中的较低水平的神经生物过程所引起，尽管这些较低水平的成分本身并不具有心的现象的特征。运用这一观点，塞尔声称，对于心与身的本质所作的调和中所引起的种种困难可以得到解决。

“心的现象由大脑中的神经生理过程所引起并且它们本身就是大脑的特征。为了将这一观点与本领域的许多其他观点相区分，我称之为‘生物自然主义’。”——塞尔：《心的再发

brain. To distinguish this view from the many others in the field, I call it 'biological naturalism'." —Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, 1992, p. 1.

Biomedical ethics, see bioethics

Bipolarity

Wittgenstein's principle, meaning that every proposition, like a magnet, has two poles. It must be capable of both being true or being false. If a proposition is to be capable of truth, it must also be capable of falsehood. This is different from the principle of bivalence which states that a proposition is either true or false. While the principle of bivalence can be symbolized as " $(p) (p \vee \neg p)$ ", the principle of bipolarity can be symbolised as " $(p) (\Diamond p \wedge \Diamond \neg p)$ ". Wittgenstein puts forward this principle in order to distinguish between names and propositions. While a name has a reference, and has only a one way relationship with reality, a proposition has sense and has a two-way relationship with reality. For a proposition can have sense if it can determine a possibility which reality either satisfies or not. Even if a proposition is not true, it is still meaningful. In his later period, Wittgenstein sometimes seems to give up this principle.

"To understand a proposition p it is not enough to know that p implies 'p is true', but we must also know that $\neg p$ implies 'p is false'. This shows the bi-polarity of the proposition." —Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, p. 94.

Bivalence

A basic principle of classical or standard logic, according to which every statement or proposition must be either true or false. It is closely associated with the law of excluded middle, but its status is controversial in modern non standard logic. Many logicians and philosophers claim that some statements or propositions (for example, future contingents, mathematical claims without constructive proofs, or paradoxical, vague, or modal statements) are neither true nor false, but rather have an intermediate truth value. Modern systems of multi-valued logic, partly motivated by such claims and partly developed as important formal investigations in their own right, are truth-valueless or have from three truth values to an infinite number of truth values. Since Dummett, this principle has become the focus of the debate between realism and anti-realism. According to anti-realism, the basic position of realism is to hold that a statement must be either true or false, no matter whether we know it.

"The principle that every statement is true or false is called the principle of Bivalence." —W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 1962, p. 47.

现》，1992年，第1页。

生物医学伦理学

见“生命伦理学”条。

二极性

维特根斯坦的原则，意思是说每个命题都和磁铁一样有两极。它必定能够是真的或者是假。如果一个命题能够为真，它必定也能够为假。这不同于二价性原则，后者是说，一个命题或者为真或者为假。二价性原则可以用符号表示为 " $(p) (p \vee \neg p)$ "，而二极性原则可用符号表示为 " $(p) (\Diamond p \wedge \Diamond \neg p)$ "。维特根斯坦提出这一原则是为了区分名称和命题。名称有一个指称，只以一维方式与实在相联系，而命题有涵义，以二维方式与实在相关。因为如果一个命题能够确定实在满足或者不满足的可能性，那么它就会具有涵义。即使命题不真，它仍然是有意义的。维特根斯坦在后期有时似乎放弃了这个原则。

“要理解一个命题 p ，光知道 p 蕴含‘ p 为真’是不够的。我们还必须知道 $\neg p$ 蕴含‘ p 为假’。这就表明了命题的二极性。”——维特根斯坦：《笔记》，第94页。

二值原则

经典或标准逻辑的一个基本原则，根据这一原则，每一陈述或命题必定是或者真或者假。它与排中律密切相关，但它的地位在现代非标准逻辑中是有争议的。许多逻辑学家和哲学家宣称，某些陈述或命题（例如，未来偶然事件陈述，没有构造性证明的数学论断，悖论性陈述，模糊陈述或模态陈述）就是既不真也不假的，相反具有居间真值。现代的多值逻辑系统，部分地是由此类主张所推动，部分地是因其自身之故而作为重要的形式研究而展开的。它们全都是无真值的，或者有三个真值直至无穷多个真值。自 M. 达米特以来，二值原则已经成为实在论和反实在论争论的焦点。在反实在论看来，实在论的基本立场就是主张一个陈述必定是或者真或者假的，无论我们是否知道这一点。

“每一陈述都是真的或假的，这一原则被叫做二值原则。”——W. 涅尔和 M. 涅尔：《逻辑学的发展》，1962年，第47页。

Black box

A system or entity whose internal organisation, mechanism or structure is either unknown or viewed as insignificant. We know about it through its input-output functions rather than through its internal mechanism. In other words, we know what it does, but not how it works. In the philosophy of mind, behaviourism holds that knowing the functions of the mind exhausts our knowledge of the mind. We can leave aside questions about the nature of the internal mechanisms if we know these function. This view can be called the black box theory of mind. There is also a black box theory of science which holds that a theory should be taken as a device for predicting without any need to know the inner mechanisms of the phenomena performing the functions.

"So far we have actually been treating consciousness itself as something of a black box. We have taken its 'behaviour' (= phenomenology) as 'given' and wondered about what sort of hidden mechanism in the brain could explain it." —Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 1991, pp. 171-2.

Blindsight

Some visual cortex-damaged patients claim that although they can see nothing in a portion of their visual field, they can take in visual information from the environment and act on that information. For instance, such persons can have beliefs about how items are located in this field and move according to their beliefs. This phenomenon suggests that such people can have a visual capacity without a conscious visual experience, for they are blind with respect to those items in the blind-sighted region of their environment. This phenomenon is paradoxically called blindsight. The philosophical interest of this case is that it reveals that the relation between perception and consciousness is more complicated than we thought. It indicates that perceptual experience is not the same as the mere obtaining and processing of information.

"The person sees with the blind-sighted part of his eye, and so takes in perceptual information, and can form beliefs on the basis of the information, but has no visual experience." —Lyons, *Approaches to Intentionality*, 1995, p. 121.

Body

[Greek: *soma* and Latin: *corpus*] (1) The material composition of a human, in contrast to mind or soul. Body does not rely for its existence upon human thought. Yet traditionally, especially in religious doctrines, the body is viewed as a tomb, an obstacle to the soul's aspiration to a purely spiritual existence. Many contemporary philosophers have tried to explain the mind-body relationship in terms of identity, reduction or supervenience. (2) Body is also a synonym for "material object", and even more generally for "matter".

黑箱

一个其内部组织、机制或结构不为人所知或被认为无关紧要的系统或存在。我们通过其输入—输出功能而不是其内部机制来了解它。换言之,我们知道它做什么,但并不知道它如何做。在心的哲学中,行为主义认为,通过了解心的功能我们就可以完全了解心。如果我们知道了这些功能,我们就可以把关于内在机制的本质的种种问题抛在一边。这可以被称为“心的黑箱理论”。还有一种“关于科学的黑箱理论”,它认为一个理论应当被看作是预测的工具,而无需知道完成这些功能的现象的内部机制。

“至此我们实际上一直将意识本身当做一个黑箱一类的东西,我们将其‘行为’(现象)视为‘已知’,并且想知道大脑中什么样的隐藏机制能够解释它。”——丹奈特:《解释意识》,1991年,第171·172页。

盲视

有些视皮层损伤病人声称尽管他们看不到其某部分视野中的任何东西,但却可以接受呈现于该视野中的环境信息,并依照该信息行事。例如,这样的人可以具有关于该视野内物体如何放置的信念并根据这些信念移动身体。这一现象表明,这样的人可以具有视觉能力而不具有有意识的视觉经验,因为他看不到位于其盲视野环境中的东西。这一现象被自相矛盾地称为“盲视”。对这一事例的哲学兴趣在于,它表明知觉与意识的关系比我们所曾认为的要复杂。这意味着知觉经验并不仅仅是信息的获得与加工。

“此人可用眼睛的盲视部分来看,并接受知觉信息,而且可以在这个信息基础上形成信念,但却没有视觉经验。”——莱昂:《意向性研究》,1995年,第121页。

物体

[希腊词是 *soma*, 拉丁词是 *corpus*] 指 (1) 一个人的物质构成物, 与心灵或灵魂相对[即身体或肉体]。身体的存在不依赖于人的思想。然而, 在传统上, 尤其在宗教教义中, 身体被看作坟墓, 被看作灵魂追求纯粹精神存在的障碍。许多当代哲学家力图依据同一性、还原及伴随性来解释身心关系。(2) “物体”还是“物质对象”的同义词, 更普遍而言, 是“物质”的同义词。在笛卡尔看来, 作为物质的物体等同于

While for Descartes, body as matter is identified with extension, Hobbes believed that body is coextensive with space.

"The substance which is the immediate subject of local extension and of the accidents which presuppose extension, such as shape, position, local motion, and so on, is called body." — Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham et al), 1984, II, p. 114.

Body (Merleau-Ponty)

The Cartesian tradition views a human being as a combination of body and mind. The former was considered to be a passive object, while the latter was an active subject and the source of all knowledge. To overcome this dualism, Merleau-Ponty claimed that the human body is itself a subject in dialogue with the world and with others. Body and mind are not opposed to one another, but together form one reality which is at the same time material and spiritual. Body is certainly corporeal, but also provides us with the power of existence or transcendence, which enables us creatively to modify our corporeity. Traditional thinking only paid attention to the subjective ego, but ignored the fact that both the voluntary ego and objective things implicitly depend on an actual body living in the world. Our perception takes up a sense that is already latent in what is given because the body originally animates in its own way the spectacle of what is perceived. Our perception depends on our body's place in the world. Body is in primordial contact with Being and is the common-texture of all objects. We should live with and experience body rather than taking it as a mere object. Since everything should be embodied or incarnated in the body, purely subjective phenomena are impossible, and body has an intentionality as well as the mind. Merleau-Ponty's conception of body is the key term for his phenomenology of perception.

"I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or body in reality." — Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (tr. by Smith), 1962, p. 198.

Boo-hurrah theory

A nickname for emotivism, because emotivism claims that ethical judgements, rather than being statements of facts, are only expressions of emotion, and are neither true nor false. Moral judgements are attitudes rather than beliefs. In this way, to say something is right is to have a favourable attitude towards it and amounts to saying "Hurrah!". To say something is wrong is to have a unfavourable

广延, 而霍布斯认为“物体”与“空间”有共同的广延。

“如果一个实体是局部广延的直接主体, 是以广延为先决条件的形状、位置、局部运动等偶性的直接主体, 这个实体被称作物体,” ——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译), 1984年, 第二卷, 第114页。

身体 (梅洛-庞蒂)

笛卡尔传统把一个人看做身体与心灵的结合。前者被当做一个被动的对象, 后者则是一个活动的主体和所有知识的源头。梅洛-庞蒂不同意这种二元论, 他认为人的身体本身就是一个与世界和他人对话的主体。身与心并不相互对立, 而是一起构成了一个既是物质又是精神的现实。身体当然是有形的, 但也给我们提供了生存的力量或超越向度, 而这使我们能够创造性地修改我们的有形性或肉体性。传统思维只关注主体自我, 看不到这主动的自我和客体事物都不显眼地依据一个活在世界中的实际身体。我们的知觉从所给予者那里取得已潜藏着的感受, 因为身体以它自己的方式已经原发地激起了被知觉者的景象。我们的知觉依赖于我们的身体在这世界中的位置。身体与存在(Being)处于原本的接触之中, 是所有对象的交织之处。我们应该与身体共生活并体验它, 而不是只把它当做一个对象。由于一切东西都应体现于身体或“道成肉身于”(incarnated)身体, 纯粹主体的现象是不可能的; 并且身体本身就具有某种意向性和心灵。梅洛-庞蒂的身体概念是他的知觉现象学的关键词汇。

“我是我的身体, 至少就获得经验的意义上是这样; 同时, 我的身体可以说是一个‘自然的’主体, 一个对于我全部存在的临时草图。因此, 一个人对自己身体的体验与反思过程相反; 这样的反思过程将主体与客体相互分离, 并且只能给我关于身体的思想, 或作为一个观念的身体, 而不是对于身体的活生生体验或真实的身体。” ——梅洛-庞蒂:《知觉现象学》(史密斯英译), 1962年, 第198页。

呸 - 呜啦理论

情感主义的一个绰号, 因为情感主义宣称, 伦理判断不是对于事实的陈述, 而仅仅是对于情感的表述, 它们既不是真的也不是假的。道德判断是态度而不是信念。按这种理解, 说某种事情是正当的, 就是对于它有一种赞许的态度, 等于说“呜啦!” 而说某事是不对的, 就是一种不赞许的态度, 而这也是与说“呸!” 相等的。

attitude toward it and is equivalent to saying "Boo!".

"On that [non-cognitivist] view, to say that stealing is wrong is merely to voice one's disapproval of stealing, so the remark could be more revealingly rewritten as 'stealing-Boo'. Similarly, 'God is good' could be translated as 'Hurrah for God'. Not surprisingly, this view was dubbed the Boo-Hurrah theory of ethics." McNaughton, *Moral Vision*, 1988, p. 165.

Boolean algebra

The algebraic treatment of logic, first discussed by the Irish mathematician and logician George Boole in *The Mathematical Analysis of Logic* (1847). He translated symbols expressing logical relations into algebraic equations, and then manipulated them in accordance with a set of algebraic laws which he took as axioms governing the operations. This has become the central idea in modern mathematical logic. The characteristic axioms Boole's system contains are as follows: for every term there exists a complement; for any two terms there exists a sum; for any two terms there exists a product; for any term there exists a universal class; for any term there exists a null class; any two classes are commutative with regard to disjunction and conjunction; and any three classes are distributive with regard to disjunction and conjunction. The variables in this algebra are unquantified and can be read as schematic one-place predicate letters. Boolean algebra has been developed and applied to many areas. Any abstract structure constitutes such an algebra if its appropriate operations satisfy these axioms.

"The Boolean algebra of unions, intersections, and complements merely does in another notation what can be done in that part of the logic of quantification which uses only one-place predicate letters." — Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, 1970, p. 69.

Borderline case

A term for cases at the margin of application for expressions lacking a clear-cut extension, where there is no sharp boundary to mark the field of its application. This vagueness is not due to our ignorance or imprecise knowledge, but is intrinsic to the word itself. For instance, the concept of a person leaves it undetermined whether a foetus or a brain-damaged human being is a person. Our concept of ought leaves the boundary between prudential judgements and moral judgements uncertain. Some philosophers wish to replace our current terms with others which have sharp boundaries, but others argue that new borderline cases can always arise.

"Most words admit of what are called borderline cases. What this means is that for most words there are things which are such that we are uncertain (not as a result of lack of knowledge) whether to call them *w* or non-*w*." — Carney and Scherz, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 1974, 2nd ed., p. 77.

"就这个[非认知主义的]观点而言,说偷盗是错的,仅仅是表达了一个人的对于偷的不赞成的态度,所以这种陈述能够更表露地重写为'偷—呸'。同样,'上帝是善的'能被译成'呜啦上帝'。因而并不奇怪,这个观点能够给予呸—呜啦伦理学理论的绰号。"——麦克诺顿:《道德见解》,1988年,第165页。

布尔代数

逻辑的代数处理,首先由爱尔兰数学家和逻辑学家G.布尔在他的名著《逻辑的数学分析》(1847)中所探讨。他把符号表示的逻辑关系转化成代数方程,然后按照一组被看作支配这种运算的公理的代数规律来操作它们。这已成为现代数理逻辑的中心概念。布尔系统所包含的特征性公理如下:对每一个项都存在一个补;对任何两个项存在一个和;对任何二项存在一个积;对任意项存在一个普遍类;对任意项存在一空类;任何两个类对于析取和合取都是可交换的;任何三个类对于析取和合取是分配的。这种代数中的变量是非量化的,可被读作公式的一元谓词字母。布尔代数已经发展和应用于许多领域。任何抽象结构的适当运算如果满足这些公理,这种结构即构成这样一种代数。

"关于并、交和补的布尔代数,不过是以另一种记号法做着在仅用一元谓词字母的量化逻辑那部分所能做的。"——奎因:《逻辑哲学》,1970年,第69页。

两可情形

该词指这样一些情形,即没有明确外延的表述式的应用边际,就是说没有明显的界限以标明其应用领域。这种模糊性不是由于我们的无知或知识不精确,而是这个词本身固有的。例如,"人"的概念使我们无法确定胎儿或脑损坏的人是否是人等不确定的问题。我们的"应当"概念留下了审慎的判断与道德判断之间界限不定的问题。有些哲学家希望以具有明确界限的词来取代现行术语,而其他一些人认为两可情形总是会产生。

"大多数词语都容许有两可的情形。这意味着对于大多数词语,都有着这样的情形,我们不能确定(并非由于缺乏知识的结果)是称它们*w*,或是非*w*。"——卡雷和施尔:《逻辑基础》,1974年,第2版,第77页。

Bound variable

If a variable occurs in a quantified sentence (for example "There exist a number of Xs such that..."), it falls within the scope of its prefixed quantifier and is therefore bound. This contrasts with a free variable which is a variable occurring in an unquantified sentence (for example "X is..."). Substitution is not permissible for a bound variable. One cannot take individual expressions as values. It is possible that the same variable may be bound in a whole sentence and free in some part. Russell and Whitehead call bound variables apparent variables. For Quine, a bound variable involves ontological commitment.

"Among the contexts provided by our primitive notation, the form of context $(\alpha)\phi$ is peculiar in that the variable α lends it no indeterminacy or variability ... A variable in such a context is called bound; elsewhere, free." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 86.

Bracketing, method of

The crucial step in Husserl's phenomenological reduction. In our cognitive relationship with the world we naturally assume the existence of the external spatio-temporal world and the existence of ourselves as psycho-physical individuals. Husserl claims that we should bracket or "put between quotation" this natural attitude. This does not entail that the world is no longer thematic, but only that we should prohibit naive natural assertions and the use of any objective judgments. Husserl held that through using this method we can confine ourselves to the region of transcendently pure experiences, wherein consciousness is strictly considered as intentional agency. We are accordingly in a position to obtain eidetic or essential intuitions towards intentional structures of experiences.

"The true significance of the method of phenomenological 'bracketing' (Einklammerung) does not lie absolutely in the rejection of all transcendent knowledge and objects of knowledge, but in the rejection of all naively dogmatic knowledge in favour of the knowledge that is alone in the long run justified from the phenomenological point of view of essence." —Husserl, *Shorter Works* (eds by McCormick and Elliston, eds.), 1981, p. 72.

Brain writing, see language of thought

Brains in a vat

A thought-experiment imitating Descartes' argument from dreaming. Suppose we remove a person's brain from his body and keep it alive in a vat, and then wire the vat to a computer which provides the normal stimuli. The result would be that this brain in a vat would have a mental life that

约束变元

如果一个变元出现在一个量化语句内(例如,“存在着大量的 x 使得……”),它就处在该语句前面的量词的辖域内,因此是被约束的。这与自由变元形成对照,后者是在非量化语句(例如,“ x 是……”)中出现的变元。不允许对约束变元作代入。约束变元不能取个体表达式为值。有可能同一个变元在整个句子中是约束的,而在该句子的某些部分内是自由的。罗素和怀特海把约束变元叫做“表面变元”。对奎因来说,约束变元涉及到本体论承诺。

“在由我们的初始记法所提供的语境中,语境形式 $(\alpha)\phi$ 的特点在于:变元 α 并没有使它成为不确定的或成为可变的。……在这样一个语境中的变元被叫做约束的;否则叫做自由的。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第86页。

加括弧法

胡塞尔现象学还原中的最重要步骤。在我们与世界的认知关系中,我们自然地假定外部时空世界的存在,以及我们作为心理和身体个人的存在。胡塞尔认为我们应该将这种自然态度放到括弧里或“置入两边的引号之中”。这并非意味着这世界不再进入我们的论题里,而只意味着我们应该禁绝幼稚的自然断定态度和任何(这个意义上的)客观判断的使用。胡塞尔主张,通过运用这个方法,我们能将自己限制于先验的纯体验领域中,在那里意识被严格地当做意向性能动者,这样,我们就处在了一个获得本质直观(eidetic intuitions)的位置上,这种直观朝向体验的意向结构。

“现象学的‘加括弧’方法的真正意义不在于绝对拒绝所有超验知识和知识的对象,而在于拒绝一切幼稚的教条知识,并欢迎这样的一种独特的知识,它在长过程中从现象学的本质观点得到支持。”——胡塞尔:《短篇著作集》(麦考密克和埃利斯顿 编辑),1981年,第72页。

大脑文字

见“思维语言”条。

瓮中之脑

一个模仿笛卡尔的“梦论证”的思想实验。假定我们将一个人的脑从他的身体上拿下来并使它生存在一个瓮中,然后将瓮与计算机相联以提供正常的刺激。其结果将是,这个瓮中之脑将有一个与其过去生活完全融合的心的生活。

merges perfectly with its past life so that it is not aware what has happened. There is no basis for the brain to distinguish between its present situation and its previous situation. The conceptual possibility of this experiment leads to scepticism about the reliability of experience and empirical knowledge in our actual lives. Some philosophers, however, challenge the value of such "science fiction" examples in philosophy.

"Suppose we (and all other sentient beings) are and always were 'brains in a vat'. Then how does it come about that our word 'vat' refers to *noumenal* vats and not to vats in the image?" —Putnam, *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*, p. 127.

Brentano's thesis

A thesis ascribed to the German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano on the basis of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874). Brentano revived the medieval notion of intentionality as the fundamental feature of mental phenomena, in contrast to physical phenomena. An intentional state has contents by being directed upon an object or a state of affairs. The contents of intentional states are characterised by inexistence, that is they need not exist or be true. On this basis, Brentano claims that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. They are peculiar and cannot be reduced to physical properties or states. As a result, psychology should be autonomous from physical science. This thesis has exerted a great influence upon modern and contemporary philosophy of mind and epistemology, although it has been challenged by the identity theory of mind and its physicalist successors. Intentionality is also central to Husserl's phenomenology.

"A consequence of this [Brentano's] thesis (or another way of putting it) is that intentional concepts such as belief, which might relate to the 'inexistence', cannot be defined except in other terms of psychology, that is to say, in other intentional terms." —Nelson, *The Logic of Mind*, 1989, p. 212.

Broad content, see narrow content

Brute fact

Also called bare fact. In an absolute sense, a fact which is obtained or explained by itself rather than through other facts and which has a fundamental or underlying role in a series of explanations. We normally cannot give a full account why the fact should be what it is, but must accept it without explanation. The first principles of systems of thought generally possess such a status. Brute facts correspond to *causa sui* or necessary existence in traditional metaphysics and are ultimately inexplicable. For empiricism, what is given in sense-perception is brute fact and provides the incorrigible

以至于它意识不到发生了什么。它无以区分其当前情境与先前的情境。这一实验的概念可能性导致对我们实际生活中的经验与经验知识的可靠性的怀疑论。有些哲学家则对这类科幻的哲学价值提出质疑。

“假定我们（以及所有其他的有感知的东西）是而且一直是‘瓮中之脑’，那么我们的‘瓮’这一词汇如何可能指称实在的瓮而非想像的瓮？”——普特南：《意义与道德科学》，第127页。

布伦塔诺论纲

德国哲学家和心理学家F. 布伦塔诺根据他的《从经验立场看的心理学》(1874) 提出的论纲。布伦塔诺复活了意向性这一中世纪概念，将其视为与物理现象相对的心的现象的基本特征。一个意向状态通过指向一对象或事态而具有内容。意向状态的内容以内存在为特征，即它们不必存在或为真。在此基础上，布伦塔诺声称，所有且仅有心的现象是意向的。它们是独特的，不能被还原为物理特性或状态。因此，心理学应当独立于物理学。这一论纲对现代及当代心的哲学和认识论产生了极大的影响，尽管它受到心的同一论及其物理主义继承者的质疑。意向性亦是胡塞尔现象学的中心概念。

“这一[布伦塔诺]论纲（或其另一种表述）的一个后果是：像信念这样可能与‘内存在’相联系的意向性概念，只能用其他的心理学术语亦即其他的意向性术语来定义。”——内尔森：《心的逻辑》，1989年，第212页。

宽内容

见“窄内容”条。

天然事实

也称为“赤裸事实”。它有绝对的意义和相对的意义。它的绝对意义是指不是通过其他事实而是通过自身而获取或者得到解释的事实。这样的事实是一解释系列的根本或基础。我们通常对为什么它应该就是如此不能作出完全的说明，却必须不加解释地接受它。思想体系的第一原理一般具有这样的地位。天然事实相应于传统形而上学的“自因”或必然存在，是最终不可解释的。对于经验主义来说，在感知中所给予的东西是天然事实。它是不可纠正的，可却是一

basis of all knowledge.

In a relative sense, any fact which must be contained in a higher-level description under normal circumstances is brute relative to that higher-level description, although in another situation the fact could itself become a higher level description containing its own brute fact.

"There is something positive and ineluctable in what we sense; in its main features, at least, it is what it is irrespective of any choice of ours. We have simply to take it for what it is, accept it as 'brute fact'." —Walsh, *Reason and Experience*, 1947, p. 13.

B-series of time, see A-series of time

Bulk term, another expression for mass term

Bundle dualism, see bundle theory of mind

Bundle theory of mind

A theory associated with Hume. After contemplating the difficulties of Cartesian dualism, Hume rejected the existence of an enduring, substantial self which remains the same throughout one's life. We cannot discern any continuing spiritual principle within ourselves. All one can observe is a sequence or a bundle of experiences occurring in succession from birth to death. The mind is nothing more than a bundle of perceptions. It is a theatre in which different perceptions successively make their appearance. Since perceptions or impressions cannot endure, there cannot be an enduring self. Only because there is resemblance, contiguity and regularity in the bundle of perceptions, do we attribute a self or an identity to ourselves, but this is a customary association of ideas rather than a real connection among perceptions. The position is popular among empirical philosophers, and is also called the serial theory, because it claims that the self is a series of experience, the associationist theory or the logical construction theory. Since the mind is a succession of non-physical items distinct from the body, this theory also implies a kind of dualism which is called bundle dualism. The theory contrasts with the pure ego theory. Hume not only proposed the bundle theory, but also saw grave difficulties in it.

"I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." —Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, part 4, section 6.

切知识的基础。

它的相对意义是指,在正常情况下必定包含在更高层次描述中的任何事实,相对于那个更高层次的描述来说是天然的。尽管这个事实本身在另一种情况下也会成为一种包含它自己的天然事实的较高层次的描述。

"在我们所感觉的东西中存在着某种肯定的和不可避免的东西;在它的主要特征中,至少有一点是,它不理睬我们的任何选择的東西。我們只能把它视为就是如此的东西,接受它为'天然事实'。"——瓦尔西:《理性和经验》,1947年,第13页。

时间的B序列

见“时间的A序列”条。

堆词

“总量词”的另一种说法。

捆束二元论

见“心的捆束理论”条。

心的捆束理论

这一理论与休谟有关。在考虑了笛卡尔二元论的困难以后,休谟否认存在一个终生保持不变的持久的、实体的自我。我们在自己内部不能觉察任何持续的精神原则。所能观察到的只是一系列或一束经验由生至死一个接一个的发生。心只是“一束知觉”。它是不同的知觉次第出现的剧场。由于知觉或印象不能持久,因此不可能有一个持久的自我。只是因为在一束知觉中存在相似、邻近和规则,我们才将一个自我或一个认同归于我们自己。但这是观念的习惯联想,而不是知觉间的真正联系。这一观点在经验主义哲学家中间十分流行,又被称为“系列理论”(因为它声称自我是一系列经验)、“联想主义理论”或“逻辑建构理论”。因为心是一系列不同于身体的非物理的东西,这一理论也意味着一种二元论,这种二元论被称为“捆束二元论”。这一理论与“纯粹自我理论”相对照。休谟不仅提出了心的捆束理论,也看到了其中存在的严重困难。

“我斗胆向人类断言,它们只是不同的知觉的一个捆束或集合,以不可想像的快速承前继后,并处于一个知觉的流动和变化中。”——休谟:《人性论》,I,第四部分,第六节。

Burali-Forti's paradox

This paradox of the greatest ordinal was the first paradox discovered in modern set theory and was formulated by Cesare Burali-Forti. An ordinal number can be assigned to every well ordered set, that is a set for which every subset has at least one member. Such ordinals can be compared for size, and the set of these ordinals is a well-ordered set. The ordinal of this set must be larger than any ordinal contained within the set, but because the set is of all ordinals of well ordered sets, the ordinal of the set must be contained within it. The ordinal of this set is therefore larger than and not larger than any ordinal within the set. According to Russell, the way of solving this paradox is to deny that the set of all ordinal numbers is well-ordered.

"It is that in order to avert Burali-Forti's paradox the authors of *Principia* felt called upon to suspend typical ambiguity and introduce explicit type indices at the crucial point." —Quine, *Selected Logical Papers*, 1966, p. 123.

Burden of proof

[Latin: *onus probandi*] Originating in classical Roman law, an adversary proceeding where one party tries to establish and another to rebut some charge before a neutral adjudicative tribunal. The term has come to refer to a rule concerning the division of the labour of argumentation. Suppose A and B represent two competing views. If A has a favourable position, B will be required to produce strong arguments to defend its less favourable position. This is to say, A sets the burden of proof on B. If B cannot shift this burden, its position is defeated, even though it might be right. On the other hand, if B puts forwards arguments which show that its position is stronger than A's, then it transfers the burden of proof to A. It is a basic rule of dealing with evidence. Normally any position that argues for or against something has the burden. For instance, because common sense usually has an intuitive appeal prior to argument, any philosophical position standing against common sense bears the burden of proof.

"To say that the burden of proof rests with a certain side is to say that it is up to it to bring in the evidence to make out the case." —Rescher, *Methodological Pragmatism*, 1977, p. 202.

Buridan's ass

The fourteenth century French philosopher Jean Buridan proposed that reasons determine our choice between two alternatives and that we will choose what our reason tells us is best. To argue against this theory, a case was devised to the effect that a starving ass is placed between two haystacks which are equidistant and equally tempting. There is no more reason to go towards one stack than the other, without addi-

布拉里-福蒂悖论

最大序数悖论是在现代集合论中发现的第一个悖论,由C. 布拉里-福蒂表述出来。对每一个良序集(即每一个子集至少有一个元素的集合)可以指派一个序数。这些序数可以比较大小,它们所构成的集合也是一个良序集。这一集合的序数必定大于包含在该集合里面的任何序数,但是由于该集合是所有良序集的序数之集,该集合的序数也必定包含在它自身之内。于是,这个集合的序数既大于又不大于该集合内的任何序数。根据罗素的想法,解决这一悖论的办法就是否定所有序数之集是良序的。

“正是为了避免布拉里-福蒂悖论,《数学原理》一书的作者们感到有必要搁置典型歧义,而在关键之处引入明显的类型标记。”——奎因:《逻辑论文选》,1966年,第123页。

举证责任

[拉丁文 *onus probandi*] 源于古典罗马法,指在中立审判法庭上,一方试图确立某项指控,另一方试图反驳这项指控时的一种抗辩程序。这个词逐渐用来指有关论证分工的规则。假定A和B代表了两种对立的观点,如果A的见解是有利的,B将被要求提出有力证据捍卫自己不太有利的见解。这就是说,A将举证的责任加给B,如果B不能推掉这个责任,它的见解就被击败了,即使它可能是正确的。反之,如果B提出了论证,表明它的见解比A的见解更有力,那么,它就将举证的责任交给了A。举证责任是处理证据问题的基本规则。通常情况下,对某种观点进行证明或反驳的任何见解都具有举证责任。比如,常识一般具有比论证优越的直观力量,因此,任何与常识相反的哲学见解都承担举证责任。

“说举证责任在某一方,就是说,该由这一方来提出证据证明自己有理。”——雷谢尔:《方法论的实用主义》,1977年,第202页。

布里丹之驴

14世纪法国哲学家J. 布里丹提出,推理决定我们如何在两可之间作出选择,而我们会选择推理告诉我们的最好选择。为了反驳这一理论,有人设计了一个例证,一只饿得要死的驴被置于两个干草堆之间。这两个干草堆与它等距,并且同样地有诱惑力。如果没有其他的相关信息,就没有更多的理由选择这一堆草而不是

tional relevant information. Thus, according to Buridan's theory, the ass would starve to death. This thought experiment has been influential in the discussion of free will and determinism. It is also related to the principle of indifference. But decision theory suggests that although the ass cannot decide which stack it should choose, it surely can decide between starving to death and having either of the stacks.

"Buridan's ass, which died of hunger being unable to decide which of the two haystacks in front of it happened to be superior, could have rationally chosen either of the haystacks, since it has good reason for choosing either rather than starving to death." —Sen, *On Ethics and Economics*, 1987, p. 34.

Business ethics

Business ethics is a branch of applied ethics developed largely in the second half of the twentieth century. Business, in spite of its profit-seeking nature, is believed neither to be unethical by its very nature nor to have its own special code. Rather, it is subject to the constraints of social responsibility and should be conducted in accordance with general ethical rules. Business ethics addresses three levels of concern: business persons, business enterprises and the business community. With regard to business persons, it deals with the moral responsibilities and rights of individual employees, such as those involving honesty and integrity, job discrimination and working conditions. With regard to business enterprises, it deals with corporate governance, responsibilities concerning consumers, product safety and the environment and relations among owners, managers and employees. Since enterprises are the main business entities, this level is the primary concern of business ethics. With regard to the business community, it deals with the moral justification of economic systems. Along with the development of international business, this level involves wider consideration of cultural and social background.

"Business ethics is a specialised study of moral right and wrong. It concentrates on how moral standards apply particularly to business policies, institutions, and behaviour." —Velasquez, *Business Ethics*, p. 18.

另一堆草。因此,根据布里丹理论,这只驴将被饿死。这一思想实验在关于自由意志与决定论的讨论中很有影响。它还与“中立原则”有关。但是决策理论认为,尽管这只驴不能决定它该选择哪堆草,它无疑可以决定被饿死还是吃其中的任何一堆草。

“那个因为不能决定它面前的两堆干草哪个更优越而被饿死的布里丹之驴实际上可以理智地选择任何一堆干草,因为它有很好的理由选择其中的任何一个而不是被饿死。”——森:《论伦理学和经济学》,1987年,第34页。

商业伦理学

商业伦理学作为应用伦理学的一个分支,主要在20世纪的后半叶得到了很大的发展。一般认为,商业尽管有着追求利润的本性,但就此本性而言并不就是非道德的,也没有自己的特殊准则。相反,商业受到社会责任的约束,并且应按照社会一般伦理规则而行动。商业伦理学讨论三个层次的问题,即企业人、企业和企业共同体。就企业人而言,它处理个体雇员的道德责任和权利,诸如涉及到诚实、正直、职业歧视、工作条件等。而就企业而言,涉及到企业管理、对消费者的责任、生产安全、环境退化以及企业主、管理者和雇员的关系。既然企业是商业的主体,这个层次的问题是商业(商业)伦理的基本问题。而就企业共同体而言,它涉及到经济制度的道德合理性问题。伴随着国际商业的发展,这个层次包括对于文化和社会背景的更广泛的考虑。

“商业伦理学是对于道德的正当和错误的一种专门性的研究。它集中于如何将道德标准具体地运用于商业政策、制度和行为。”——维拉斯奎茨:《商业伦理学》,第18页。

C

Calculus

[from Latin: pebbles (plural: *calculi*)] A rule-governed formal symbolic system, which can be mechanistically applied for calculation and reasoning in mathematics and logic. The word was adopted because in ancient times calculation was done with pebbles. All axiomatic systems, together with other systems of calculation, measurement, or comparison, are calculi. As a branch of mathematical analysis, calculus was principally developed by Leibniz, Newton, Lagrange, Cauchy, Cantor and Peano. Leibniz also developed calculus as a formal system of reasoning, that is, to reduce valid argument forms or structures to a calculus by whose rules we can construct and criticise arguments. This is what he called *calculus ratiocinator* (a calculus of reasoning), or what we generally means by a logical calculus. Based on the work of Frege, modern logical calculus is generally divided into propositional calculus, which deals with the truth functions of propositions, and predicate calculus, which is concerned with items such as the quantifiers, variables and predicates of first-order languages.

"A calculus is, in fact, any system wherein we may calculate." —Langer, *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic*, 1937, p. 200.

Calculus of classes, another term for set theory

Calculus of individuals, another term for mereology

Calculus ratiocinator, see calculus

Calvinism

The theological teaching and political views developed by the French theologian and church reformer John Calvin and defended by seventeenth century Calvinist scholars. Calvin rejected Aristotelian scholasticism and advocated a kind of natural theology in which our belief in God is rooted in our innate instinct. Scripture is the norm as well as the source by which the faithful can attain certitude with regard to the content of revelation without the need of an infallible ecclesiastical interpretation. Calvin emphasised the doctrine of predesti-

演算

[源自拉丁文：卵石（复数形式：*calculi*）] 一个受规则支配的形式符号系统，可以机械地应用于数学和逻辑中的运算和推理。采用这个词的原因是，在古代计算是用卵石进行的。所有的公理系统，加上其他的诸如运算、测量或比较的系统，都是演算。作为数学分析的一支，calculus（微积分）主要是由莱布尼茨，牛顿，拉格朗日，柯西，康托尔，皮亚诺等人发展的。莱布尼茨还发展了作为形式推理系统的演算，即把有效的论证形式或结构化归于演算，根据演算的规则我们可以建构并且批评论证。这就是他所谓的理性演算（一种推理演算），或者我们通常所谓的逻辑演算。以弗雷格的工作为基础，现代逻辑演算一般分为命题演算和谓词演算，前者处理命题的真值函项，后者则研究一阶语言的量词、变元、谓词等等。

“事实上，一个演算就是我们能在其中进行运算的任何系统。”——朗格：《符号逻辑导论》，1937年，第200页。

类演算

“集合论”的别名。

个体演算

“部分论”的别名。

理性演算

见“演算”条。

加尔文主义

由法国神学家和教会改革者J. 加尔文发展起来、并由17世纪的加尔文派学者辩护的神学教育与政治观点。加尔文拒绝亚里士多德主义的经院哲学，鼓吹一种自然神论，即我们对上帝的信仰植根于我们的内在本性。《圣经》是标准，也是源头，依凭它，信徒能够获得确实可靠的启示内容，无需永远正确的教会阐释。加尔文强调预定说，断言人类自亚当堕落后就没有自由。他宣称，教会和国家各有不同的任务，应该

mination and claimed that humans have not had freedom since the Fall. He claimed that church and state have different tasks and should be constructed independently of each other. Church is not a supernatural instrument for salvation. It should be reformed and corrected by each of the faithful according to the scriptures. A resistance to the rulers rather than passive submission is also advocated. Calvin's thinking exerted great influence in the Renaissance and Reformation era throughout Western Europe.

"For Calvinists, the question of whether or not their souls were predestined to salvation was of the utmost significance."—Keat and Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, 1975, p. 147.

Cambridge change

The Cambridge philosophers Russell and McTaggart argued that the criterion of change for an entity X is that the sentence " X is F " is true at time t_1 , and false at time t_2 . Peter Geach called a change according to this criterion a Cambridge change and argued that it need not be a real change. Suppose that the sentence "Socrates is taller than Theaetetus" was true when Socrates was fifty-five and Theaetetus was fifteen, but false five years later. Because Theaetetus grew taller, there was a Cambridge change in Socrates even if his height remained the same over this period. Socrates did not undergo a real change. A Cambridge change can occur because there is a real change elsewhere. Whenever there is a mere Cambridge change there must be a real change somewhere, but the converse is not true. Geach used this notion to explain the ascription of change to an unchanging God in virtue of God's relation to a changing created world.

"An object O is said to 'change' in this sense if and only if there are two propositions about O , differing only in that one mentions an earlier and other a later time, and one is true, and the other false. I call this an account of 'Cambridge change'."—Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality*, 1979, p. 38.

Cambridge Platonists

A group of philosophers and theologians in the seventeenth-century, mainly associated with the University of Cambridge, who took Plato and Neo-platonism as their authorities. The chief representatives included B. Whichcote, J. Smith, R. Cudworth and H. More. The Cambridge Platonists characteristically emphasised the role of reason and consciousness, which they claimed to be "the candle of the Lord" (Whichcote's phrase). Metaphysically, this position is antagonistic towards mechanism and materialism, especially that of Hobbes. In anticipation of Kant, it claimed that consciousness is not secondary and derivative, but is rather the architect of reality. Ethically, the Cambridge Platonists

彼此独立建构。教会不是超自然的拯救工具。它应当被每位信徒根据圣经加以改革和修正。他也鼓吹要反抗而不是被动地顺从统治者。加尔文的思想在文艺复兴和宗教改革时期的整个西欧产生了很大影响。

"对于加尔文教徒来说,他们的灵魂是否被预定获救的问题,是至关重要的。"—基特和乌利:《作为科学的社会理论》,1975年,第147页。

剑桥变化

剑桥哲学家罗素和麦克塔加特认为,衡量一个实体 X 变化的标准是:" X 是 F " 这个句子在时间 t_1 时为真,在时间 t_2 时为假。P. 古奇把按照这个标准的变化称作"剑桥变化",并论证说,这实际上不是一种真正的变化。当苏格拉底 55 岁,泰阿泰德 15 岁时,"苏格拉底比泰阿泰德高"这个句子是真的,但是,在 5 年之后,这个句子就是假的。因为在这个时期,泰阿泰德长高了,而即使苏格拉底的高度保持不变,也仍有一个剑桥变化。苏格拉底并没发生真正的变化。剑桥变化之所以发生,是因为别处有一种真正的变化。凡有剑桥变化发生时,在某处必有实在变化,但逆推关系却不成立。古奇使用这一观念来解释,由于上帝与不断变化的创造世界的关系而把变化归属于一个不变的上帝。

"一个对象 O 被说成在这种意义上'变化':如果并且仅仅如果关于 O 有两个命题,区别只在一个述说早另一个述说晚,一个为真另一个为假。我把这称为'剑桥变化'的说明。"—古奇:《真、爱与不朽》,1979年,第38页。

剑桥柏拉图主义者

指 17 世纪的一个哲学家和神学家团体,主要是与剑桥大学相关,柏拉图和新柏拉图主义是他们的权威。主要的代表人物包括 B. 威契科特、J. 斯密、R. 库沃完斯和 H. 莫尔(1614—1687 年)。剑桥柏拉图主义者的主要特征是强调理性和意识的作用,他们把理性与意识称为"神圣的烛光"(威契科特语)。在形而上学方面,这个观点是与机械论和唯物主义相敌对的,尤其是反对霍布斯的论点,他们相信意识不是第二性的、派生的,而是实在的创造者。这个论点启发了康德。在伦理学上,这派观点强调爱、品格和动机,而不是外在的普遍性准则和道德原

stressed love, character and motivation, rather than external and universal creed and moral principle. It paved the way for the eighteenth century British moral philosophers, such as Hume and Hutcheson, for moral sense theory and the intuitionist moral tradition. In religious terms, these philosophers opposed Calvinism, sectarianism and fanaticism. They argued that people accept the existence of God due neither to some doctrine nor to the supreme will of God, but out of one's inner rational love. It proposed a rational theology and broad toleration.

"English seventeenth-century philosophy seems to us dominated by the rise of empiricism. But the Erasmian tradition was still alive and fighting, most notably in a group of thinkers loosely referred to as the 'Cambridge Platonists'." —Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 1989, p. 249.

Canon

[from Greek: *kanon*, a rule to measure or set a limit] For Epicurus, the rule for distinguishing between true and false judgements, in contrast to Aristotle's *organon* which deals with rules for attaining demonstrative knowledge and hence can extend one's knowledge. Later, both *organon* and canon became terms for logic, in contrast to dialectic. Mill's five rules of induction are also called five canons of induction. Kant's whole project of critical philosophy is based on the contrast between canon and organon. He takes an organon to be an instruction about how knowledge may be extended and how new knowledge may be acquired. Critical philosophy is not an organon, but is rather a canon in the sense of setting the limit for human understanding and reason. His transcendental analytic provides a canon for the understanding in its general discursive or analytic employment. Reason in its speculative employment does not have a canon, because it cannot be correctly applied. In its practical employment, however, reason deals with two problems: "Is there a God?" and "Is there a future life?" and has two criteria for its canon: "What ought I to do?" and "What may I hope?".

"I understand by a canon the sum-total of the a priori principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A796/B824.

Canonical notation

Quine's term for a notation which reflects the simplest kind of grammatical or logical framework which is adequate for all our propositional thinking, whatever its subject-matter. This simplest structure is supposed to reveal the broadest features of reality, and is the framework shared by all the sciences. To seek to construct such a notation is the same as the quest for ultimate categories, a project which has been the aim of many philosophers, as we can explicitly see in Aristotle, Kant, Peirce, Frege, Carnap and Quine.

则。这为 18 世纪的英国道德哲学家诸如休谟、哈奇森铺平了道路，也为道德感理论和直觉主义的道德传统准备了前提。在宗教上，这派观点反对加尔文主义、神秘主义和宗教盲从。他们论证说，人们相信上帝的存在，既不是由于某些学说，也不是由于上帝的至善，而是由于一个人内在的合乎理性的爱。它提倡理性的神学和大度宽容。

“对于我们而言英国 17 世纪的哲学似乎是为经验主义的兴起所支配，但是，爱拉斯谟斯的传统仍然还有生气，还富有战斗性，尤其是在那一群泛泛地以‘剑桥的柏拉图主义者’著称的思想家中。”——泰勒：《自我的源泉》，1989 年，第 249 页。

法规

[源自希腊语 *kanon*，意指衡量或设立界限的规则] 伊壁鸠鲁把它视为区分真实判断和错误判断的规则，相对于亚里士多德的《工具论》。后者讨论可获得证明知识的规则，具有扩大人们知识的意义。以后工具和法规成为逻辑的别名，相对于辩证法。密尔归纳法的五条规则也称为归纳法的五条法规。康德批判哲学的整个计划建立在法规与工具的对比的基础上。他把工具作为如何能扩大知识和如何能获得新知识的教导。批判哲学不是这一意义上的工具，而是为人类知性和理性设立界限这个意义上的法规。他的先验分析论为知性在它的普遍推论或分析应用中提供了法规。理性在它的思辨应用中没有法规，因为它不能被正确地应用。但是在它的实践应用中，理性要处理两个问题：“上帝存在吗？”和“是否有来世生活？”它的法规有两个标准，即：“我应该做什么？”和“我可以希望什么？”

“我把法规理解为关于知识的若干官能的正确应用的所有先天原理的总和。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A796/B824。

规范记法

奎因的术语，是指反映了最简单的语法结构或逻辑结构的记法。这种结构适用于我们所有的命题思维，无论它们讨论的是什么问题。这种最简单的结构被看作是揭示了实在的最广泛特征，是一切科学所共有的一般结构。寻求构造这种记法，就是寻求终极范畴，即我们在亚里士多德、康德、弗雷格、皮尔士、卡尔纳普和奎因那里清楚地看到的那种为许多哲学家孜孜不倦追求的目标。

"The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished from a quest for ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality." — Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 161.

Cantor's paradox

A paradox showing that we cannot treat the set of all sets as a set-theoretical entity. It was discovered by Georg Cantor through comparing the number of sets contained in the set of all sets S and the number of sets contained in PS (the power set of S), where the power set of a set is the set of all the subsets of that set. Cantor's theorem shows that for any set A , its power set PA contains more sets than A . The paradox arises because no set can contain more sets than the set of *all* sets S , yet the power set of S does contain more sets than S . Cantor's paradox and Burali-Forti's paradox together are called the paradoxes of size.

"In Cantor's paradox it is argued that there can be no greatest cardinal number and yet that the cardinal number of the class of cardinal number... must be the greatest." — Quine, *Selected Logic Papers*, 1966, p. 124.

Capital punishment

The death penalty, or the execution according to the law of murderers and in some societies others who have committed serious crimes. The killing is done by officials in the name of society and on its behalf. The morality of capital punishment has been a puzzling problem for philosophers, especially against the background of the humanism of the Enlightenment. Granted the sanctity of human life, would not the punishment of the death penalty be a violation of the murderer's right to life? The defenders of capital punishment usually follow Locke's view that although the human right to life is natural, whenever a person violates the right to life of another, he forfeits his own right and it thus need not be respected. This position faces many theoretical difficulties, for it actually denies that the human right to life has absolute value and asserts that it can be yielded in the name of social defence and retributive justice. Philosophers who oppose capital punishment argue that punishment is necessary in order to reduce crime rates, but that it is not necessary to take a person's life to achieve this end. To forfeit one's right to life is not identical with forfeiting one's life. They point to many cases in which innocent people have been executed in miscarriages of justice which cannot be corrected. Because human life has an overriding worth, we must find alternative ways of punishment, such as long-term imprisonment, which does not compromise its value. Many countries have indeed abolished capital punishment. But this position would also have difficulties if it turned out that other forms of punishment were less effective than capital punishment in crime prevention and deterrence and that they increased the economic bur-

"寻求一种简单明晰、普遍适用的规范记法模型，与寻求终极范畴即刻画实在的最普遍特征，并无二致。"——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第161页。

康托尔悖论

这一悖论表明，我们不能把所有集合之集当做一集合论实体。G. 康托尔通过比较包含在所有集合之集 S 中的集合的数目与包含在 PS (S 的幂集) 中的集合的数目，发现了这一悖论，这里一个集合的幂集是该集合的所有子集所构成的集合。康托尔定理表明：对任意集合 A 而言，它的幂集 PA 包含的集合比 A 多。由于没有任何集合能够包含比“所有”集合之集 S 更多的集合，但 S 的幂集却包含比 S 更多的集合，于是悖论就出现了。康托尔悖论和布拉里-福蒂悖论一起被叫做规模 (size) 悖论。

“在康托尔悖论中证明：不可能有最大的基数，而基数的类的基数……必定是最大的。”——奎因：《逻辑论文选》，1966年，第124页。

死刑

死亡惩罚或依据有关谋杀犯的法律执行死刑，在某些社会，执行死刑还包括严重犯罪的人。处死为官方以社会的名义和代表社会来执行。死刑惩罚的道德对于哲学家而言，是一个困惑的问题，特别是在启蒙运动的人道主义的背景下。假定人类的生命是神圣的，死刑惩罚不是对这杀人犯的生命权的侵犯吗？死刑的维护者一般追随的是洛克如下的观点：虽然人的生命权是自然权利，当一个人侵犯了他人的生命权，他就丧失了自己的权利，因此他自己的权利不需要得到尊重。这个观点面临着许多理论上的困难，因为它实际上否定了人的生命权有着绝对的价值，并断言可以在社会护卫和回报性正义的名义下让与出去。反对死刑的哲学家强调，为了减少犯罪率，惩罚是必要，但拿一个人的生命来达到这个目的是不必要的。丧失一个人的生命权与丧失一个人的生命不是等同的。他们指出在许多情况下，无辜的人们在非正义的条件下被处死而不能纠正过来。由于人类的生命有至上的价值，我们必须找到另一种惩罚方式，比如长期监禁，就没有危及这一价值。许多国家确实废除了死刑。但这个观点也有困难，因为任何其他形式的惩罚，在犯罪预防和威慑上，都不如死刑那样有效。而且它们为社会增加了经济负担。在是否采用或维持死刑问题上，衡量道德原则、经验事实及民意的重要性涉及到许多重要的争论。

“死刑有着它自身特别的残忍和恐怖，它改变了整个形势。为了公正，它必须以充分的证据

dens on society. Weighing the importance of moral principles, empirical findings and democratic preferences in deciding the question of adopting or maintaining capital punishment involves many important disputes.

"Capital punishment has its own special cruelties and horrors, which change the whole position. In order to be justified, it must be shown, with good evidence, that it has a deterrent effect not obtainable by less awful means, and one which is quite substantial rather than marginal." Glover, *Causing Death and Saving Lives*, 1977, p. 236.

Cardinal virtues

[from Latin; *cardo*, hinge] Cardinal virtues are presented as the highest ideals or forms of conduct for human life. Plato in his *Republic* listed four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom and justice. This doctrine is associated with his theory of the tripartite soul. Temperance is the virtue of appetite, courage is the virtue of emotion, and wisdom is the virtue of reason. If each of the three parts of soul realises its respective virtue, the whole soul has the virtue of justice. In medieval philosophy, Thomas Aquinas called these virtues natural or human virtues and added three other theological virtues: faith, hope and love. Together they form seven cardinal virtues. In modern time, philosophers such as Schopenhauer claimed that there are only two cardinal virtues: benevolence and justice. This diversity raises questions concerning why different cardinal virtues have been recognised in different times and circumstances and concerning the kinds of justification which are appropriate in distinguishing cardinal virtues from other virtues.

"By a set of cardinal virtues is meant a set of virtues such that (1) they cannot be derived from one another and (2) all other moral virtues can be derived from or shown to be forms of them." —Frankena, *Ethics*, 1973, p. 64.

Care

[German: *Sorge*] For Heidegger, care is the state in which *Dasein* is concerned about its Being. Since *Dasein*'s essence lies in its existence, that is in fulfilling its possibilities, its concern with the movement from any present actuality to another future condition must raise the question "What shall I do?". This is care, which lies in the capacity of *Dasein* to choose its Being. Care is viewed as the fundamental relationship between *Dasein* and the world and is the basis of *Dasein*'s significance in the world. It is the state that underlies all of *Dasein*'s experiences. Since all choice has to be made in the world, care characterises *Dasein*'s Being as Being-in-the-world. Care comprises existence (Being-ahead-of-itself), facticity (Being-already-in), falling (Being-alongside) and discourse and shows *Dasein* in its entirety. It is essentially connected with temporality, that is the time structure of human life. The Division "*Dasein* and Temporal-

显示, 它所有的威慑效果是较少威力的手段不能获得的, 并且这种威慑手段是实质性的而不是不重要的。”——格洛弗:《导致死亡与拯救生命》, 1977年, 第236页。

主德

[源自拉丁语: *cardo*, 主轴] 主德是作为人类生活的最高理想或行为方式提出来的。柏拉图在他的《国家篇》中列举了四种主德: 节制、勇敢、智慧和正义。这一主张是同他的三位一体的灵魂理论相联系的。节制是情欲的美德, 勇敢是意志的美德, 智慧是理性的美德。如果灵魂的这三部分每一部分都实现了其美德, 整个灵魂就具有了正义的美德。在中世纪哲学中, T. 阿奎那把这些美德称为自然的或人的美德, 并补充了其他三种神学上的美德: 信仰、希望和热爱。加上前面四个, 共是七个主德。在现代, 像叔本华这样的哲学家认为只有两个主德: 仁慈和公正。这一变化引出了有关为什么在不同时代和不同环境承认不同主德的问题, 以及有关适合用来区分主德和其他美德的论证类型问题。

"一组主德指的是这样一组美德: (1) 它们不能彼此派生; (2) 所有其他美德可以由它们派生或表现为它们的形式。"——法兰克纳:《伦理学》, 1973年, 第64页。

牵挂

[德文为 *Sorge*] 对于海德格尔, 牵挂是这样一种状态, 在其中缘在 (*Dasein*) 关切它本身的存在。因为缘在的本性在于它的生存, 也就是实现它的可能性, 它对于从任何当前现实朝向未来状况的变动都必会产生这样的问题: "我将做什么?" 这就是牵挂; 它植根于缘在选择它的存在的能力之中。牵挂被视为缘在与世界之间的基本关联, 并且是缘在这个世界中获得意义的基础。它是缘在所有经验的基本状态。由于所有的选择都在世界中作出, 牵挂就成为"在此世界中存在"的缘在之存在的特性。牵挂由生存 (先于自身存在)、实际性 (已经存在于……之中)、沉沦 (存在于……状态里) 和言谈组成, 并且将缘在显示于其整体之中。它与时间性, 即人类生活的时间结构息息相通。《存在与时间》中的"缘在与时间性"部分就试图将时间性揭示为

ity" in *Being and Time* attempts to reveal temporality as the basis of all the elements of care.

"We have seen that care is the basic state of *Dasein*. The ontological signification of the expression 'care' has been expressed in the 'definition': 'ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world)' as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)." —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 293.

Caring

Caring or care is a moral sentiment and concern for the well-being of others. As an emotional attitude toward other individuals as individuals, care differs from benevolence or sympathy, which concerns other individuals as human beings in accordance with abstract moral principles. Hence, caring is much deeper and more particularised than sympathy. It is certainly not merely a feeling, but also has a cognitive element, that is understanding another person's real needs, welfare and situation. Care has generally been taken as one among many important attitudes. Heidegger, however, saw care as the fundamental attitude of *Dasein* or human being. In the second half of the twentieth century, feminist thinkers have considered care to be the fundamental ethical phenomenon and have attempted to construct an entire ethical approach on its basis, that is, the ethics of care or the caring perspective.

"The caring so central here is partly emotional. It involves feelings and requires high degrees of empathy to enable us to discern what morality recommends in our caring activities." —Held, *Feminist Morality*, 1993, p. 30.

Cartesian circle

A challenge to Descartes' programme to establish a scientific system on a purely metaphysical basis. Descartes tried to prove that whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly must be true and can serve as the foundation of a science. His argument goes like this: We have a clear and distinct idea that an omnipotent and benevolent God exists; the existence of such a deity entails that we cannot be subject to deception; therefore, our clear and distinct ideas must be reliable. This argument involves a circle. On the one hand, the existence of a perfect, and non-deceiving God is the sole guarantee of the truth of what we perceive clearly and distinctly. On the other hand, Descartes claims that our intellect's power of clear and distinct perception is the sole guarantee of the truth of God's existence. Hence, what is to be proved has been taken for granted during the proof. The circle was noticed by his contemporary critics Arnauld and Gassendi. Descartes' answer to this challenge is to say that God only warrants the veracity of our memory, while clear and distinct perception is a self-sufficient guarantee of our immediate ideas. But his answer is generally considered to be unsatisfactory.

牵挂的所有要素的根基所在。

"我们看到, 牵挂是缘在的基本状态。'牵挂'的存在论意义已被表达于这样一个'定义'之中: 作为存在于(世界内所遭遇着的存在者的)状态里的、已经在(此世界)之中的先于自身。"——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年, 第293页。

关怀

关怀或关心是一种道德情感和对他人幸福的关注。不同于根据抽象的道德原则把他人当做一般人来关心的仁慈或同情, 关心是一种把其他个人当个人对待的情感态度。因此关怀是比同情更深层次和更具体的。它无疑不仅是一种感情, 也有一种认知的成分, 即理解其他人的真正需要、福利和处境。关怀被看作是许多重要态度中的一种。然而, 海德格尔则把关心看作"缘在"或人类的基本态度。在20世纪后半叶, 正兴起的女性主义认为关怀是根本的伦理现象, 力图在这个基础上建构一种完整的伦理观, 即关怀伦理学或关怀观。

"在这里如此具有中心意义的关怀, 部分地是情感性的。它涉及到感情和需要较高级程度的同情, 使我们能够觉察到, 在我们的关怀活动中, 道德所建议我们的是什么。"——赫尔德:《女性主义伦理学》, 1993年, 第30页。

笛卡尔的循环

对笛卡尔在纯形而上学基础上建立科学体系的方案的一个责难。笛卡尔企图证明, 凡是我們清楚明晰知觉到的东西必定是真的, 可以作为科学的基础。他的证明进行如下: 我们有一个关于全能而仁慈的上帝存在的清楚明晰的观念; 这样一个神的存在使我们肯定不会受骗; 所以, 我们的清楚明晰的观念必定是可靠的。这个证明陷入了循环。一方面, 一个完善的、不骗人的上帝的存在是我们清楚明晰知觉到的东西的真实性的惟一保证。另一方面, 笛卡尔声称, 我们的理智所具有的清楚明晰知觉的能力, 是上帝存在的真实性的惟一保证。于是, 要被证明的东西在证明中成为理所当然的。这个循环被笛卡尔同时代的批评家阿尔诺和伽桑狄注意到。笛卡尔回答这个责难说, 上帝只保证我们的记忆的准确性, 而清楚明晰的知觉是我们当下观念的自足保证。不过, 一般认为他的回答不能令人满意。

"既然他仅仅依靠清楚明晰的观念的有效性来证明上帝的存在, 那么, 依靠上帝来证明清

"Since it is only by relying on the validity of clear and distinct ideas that he proves the existence of God, to rely on God for the validation of clear and distinct ideas seems to be arguing in a circle. This is the famous Cartesian Circle, of which he has repeatedly been accused." —Williams, *Descartes*, 1978, p. 108.

Cartesian dualism

Descartes divided the world into extended substance, or matter, and thinking substance, or mind or soul. He claimed that the nature of the mind is completely alien to the nature of matter. Accordingly, the soul is entirely distinct from the body. Although it joins the body during life, the soul is incorporeal, not extended and can survive the death of the body. This is Descartes' most famous metaphysical doctrine and as the main form of dualism, it has greatly influenced modern European philosophy. The doctrine is a criticism of Aristotle's account of soul according to which the soul is the function or form of the body. In contrast to his own account of physical nature, Descartes held that mental phenomena cannot be mechanistically explained on the basis of physical properties. His theory also provided a metaphysical basis for the Christian doctrine of immortality. Its major problem is that since mind and matter are distinct, it is unclear how the mental and the physical are related, and how subjective cognition can attain reliable knowledge of objective reality. This becomes the famous mind-body problem which has dominated subsequent philosophy of mind.

"Cartesian dualism results from trying to put these forces in equilibrium; the subjectivity of the mental is (supposedly) accommodated by the idea of privileged access, while the object of that access is conceived, in conformity with the supposed requirement of objectivity, as there independently—there in a reality describable from no particular point of view—rather than as being constituted by the subject's special access to it." —John McDowell, in Lepore and McLaughlin (eds.), *Actions and Events*, 1985, p. 395.

Cartesianism

Cartesian is an adjective deriving from *Cartesius*, the Latin version of the name Descartes. Cartesianism is a philosophical tradition in the spirit of the philosophy of Descartes. Its main features include (1) Cartesian doubt, that is starting from an attitude of universal doubt in order to find secure foundations for the epistemic edifice; (2) the Cartesian ego, established through the argument *cogito ergo sum*. The indubitable awareness we have of our own existence which serves as the first principle of metaphysics; (3) clear and distinct ideas which God implants in us and which serve as the starting points of a solid scientific enterprise. They also provide the foundation of epistemic justification. The use of God to validate clear and distinct ideas and the use of clear and dis-

楚明晰观念的有效性似乎就是循环论证。这是著名的笛卡尔循环，笛卡尔因之屡屡受到谴责。”——威廉姆斯：《笛卡尔》，1978年，第108页。

笛卡尔的二元论

笛卡尔将世界分为“广延实体”（物）和“思维实体”（心或灵魂）。他声称心的本质与物的本质完全不同。因此，灵魂与身体完全不同。尽管灵魂在生命期间与整个的身体结合在一起，但它却是无形体的、非广延的，并在身体死后还会继续存活。这是笛卡尔最著名的形而上学主张。作为二元论的主要形式，它极大地影响了现代欧洲哲学。这一学说是亚里士多德对灵魂的描述的批判。根据亚里士多德的观点，灵魂是身体的功能或形式。相反，在笛卡尔看来，与他本人所描述的物理本质不同，心的现象不能基于物理特性作机械的解释。这一理论也为基督教的不朽学说提供了形而上学基础。其主要问题在于，由于心与物是截然不同的，很难说心的东西如何与物的东西相关联，而主观的认识又如何能够获得关于客观实在的可靠知识。这就是主导其后的心的哲学的著名的心身关系问题。

“笛卡尔的二元论是试图平衡以下力量的结果：心的主观性（被假定）用来协调优先认识的观点，而依照假定的客观性要求，那一优先认识的客体又被设想为独立的、处于一个可以不用任何特定的视角来加以描述的现实中，而不是由主体对它的特殊认识所组成。”——麦克多威尔，见拉普和麦克劳林编：《活动与事件》，1985年，第395页。

笛卡尔主义

“笛卡尔的(Cartesian)”是一个来自笛卡尔名字的拉丁形式 *Cartesius* 的形容词。笛卡尔主义是一个具有笛卡尔哲学精神的哲学传统。其主要特征包括：(1) 笛卡尔式的怀疑，亦即由普遍怀疑的态度出发来找到认识大厦的可靠基石；(2) 笛卡尔的自我，通过我思故我在这样一个论证建立起来。它是我们对于自己的存在的不容置疑的意识，这被当做形而上的第一原则；(3) 上帝灌输给我们的“清晰明确的观念”，这是可靠的科学事业的基础。它们也是认识论辩护的基础。用上帝来证实清晰明确的观念，又使用清晰明确的观念来辩护对上帝的信仰，这构成了笛卡尔的循环；(4) 笛卡尔的二元论，亦即

tinct ideas to justify belief in God constitute the Cartesian circle; (1) Cartesian dualism, according to which mind and body are two heterogeneous entities. Various important discussions in contemporary philosophy have started from the criticism of one or more aspects of Cartesianism.

" 'Cartesianism' aptly labels the radically foundationalist view that a belief is cognitively justified if and only if its object either (a) is manifest in itself to the believer in the absence of any but manifest presuppositions (amounting thus to something given), or (b) is arrived at through deductive proof from ultimate premises all of which are thus manifest." — Sosa, *Knowledge in Perspective*, 1991, p. 194.

Cash-value

William James' term. The rest of the truth of an idea or a proposition lies in its agreement with reality. This amounts to asking for its cash-value, that is the fulfilment of the sense-experience which the proposition either records or predicts. We must put each concept to work in practical contexts. If an idea or a proposition operates, its cash-value is actualised. We may ascribe truth to it, in particular on the occasions on which it works. The notion of cash-value corresponds to Peirce's pragmatic maxim which holds that the meaning of a scientific concept is its practical bearing.

"Matter is known as our sensations of colour, figure, hardness and the like. They are the cash-value of the term. The difference matter makes to us by truly being is that we then get such sensations; by not being, is that we lack them." — James, *Pragmatism*, 1943, p. 68.

Casuistry

[from Latin, *casus*, case] The study of individual moral cases to which general moral principles cannot be directly applied in order to decide whether they can be brought into the scope of general norms. Its major procedures include appeal to intuition, analogy with paradigm cases and the assessment of particular cases. Casuistry has a derogatory sense as a species of sophistry by which any conduct might be justified. Casuistry has traditionally been seen to be a part of rhetoric and was widely practised in the medieval period in the elaboration of church creed and practice. It developed into probabilism, that is the view that if a practical counsel is possibly true, then it is wise to follow it. Casuistry in this sense was attacked by Pascal. However, casuistry also has a positive meaning in ethics. Aristotle's ethics established that practical reason is crucial for adjusting universal moral norms to make them suit particular circumstances. Casuistry is the art of practical reasoning, in contrast to the mechanistic application of rigid rules of conduct. In the second half of this century, with the flourishing of applied ethics, casuistry has also been revived.

"There can be rational discussion whether a given exten-

心与身是两种异质的存在。当代哲学的各种重要讨论始于对笛卡尔主义的一个或更多方面的批评。

" '笛卡尔主义' 恰当地标志着极端的基础论观点。这种观点认为, 一个信念在认识上是可辩护的, 当且仅当这个信念的客体或者 (A) 不需要明了的先决条件 (因而相当于某种已知的东西) 以外的任何东西, 其本身对于相信者就是明了的, 或者 (B) 是由最终的前提提供演绎论证而得到的, 因而也是明了的。" — 苏萨, 《知识的展望》, 1991 年, 第 194 页。

兑现价值

W. 詹姆斯的术语。一个观念或命题的真实性的检验, 在于它与实在的相符。这等于要求它的兑现价值, 即此命题所记录或预言的感觉资料的实现。我们必须使每个概念工作于实际情境中。如果一个观念或命题奏效了, 它的兑现价值就成为现实。我们可以把真理性归属于它, 尤其是在它奏效的场合。兑现价值的概念对应于皮尔士的实用主义格言, 后者主张一个科学概念的意义在于它的实用方面。

"物质是作为我们对于颜色、形态、硬度等等的感受而被认识的。这些感觉是 '物质' 这个名词的兑现价值。物质使我们感到的差别是: 因为它真实地存在, 所以我们有这些感觉; 它不存在, 我们就没有这些感觉。" — 詹姆斯, 《实用主义》, 1943 年, 第 68 页。

决疑法

[源自拉丁词 *casus*, 意为 "例证"] 决疑法是对那种一般道德原则不能直接应用于其上的个别道德案例的一种研究, 旨在决定是否它们能被放进一般规则的范围。它的主要过程包括诉诸直觉、与典型案例类比、对于具体案例的评估。决疑法有一种贬意, 被看做一种诡辩, 因为由于它, 任何行为都有可能被证明是合理的。决疑法传统上作为修辞学的一部分, 在中世纪时期, 在对教会信条的阐发和实践中被广泛地采用。它发展成为一种 "或然论", 即这样一种观点, 如果一种实践的建议可能是正确的, 那么遵从它就是明智的。这个意义上的决疑法受到 B. 帕斯卡尔的攻击。不过, 决疑法在伦理学中也有积极意义。亚里士多德的伦理学所确立的是, 实践理性对于调整普遍性道德原则以使它们适应于特殊情况是至关重要的。决疑法是实践推理的艺术, 而与对行为僵硬规则的机械运用相对立。在 20 世纪的后半叶, 由于应用伦理学的繁荣, 决疑法也再次有了活力。

"对于一个词的某种给定外延是否恰当地负荷有该词应用于核心案例的精神和基本原

sion of the term properly bears the spirit or underlying principle of its application to the core cases. Arguments in this style are, in the Catholic tradition, known as arguments of casuistry (the unfriendly use of that term was a deserved reaction to devious use made of the technique).”——Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 96.

Categorematic, see syncategorematic

Categorical imperative

According to Kant, the fundamental absolute formal demand (or set of demands) on our choice of maxims or principles on which to act. He proposed a number of formulations of the categorical imperative which on the surface differ radically from one another, although Kant himself believed that the different formulations are equivalent. On the first version, the principle on which one acts should also be capable of becoming a universal law. As a rational agent, I must accept that a sufficient reason for me is a sufficient reason for another rational being in an exactly similar situation. The second formulation requires that one should treat humanity in oneself and others never simply as means but also as ends. One should never simply use people, for rational beings have an intrinsic worth and dignity. The third formulation requires that we treat others as autonomous and self-determining agents. To treat people as ends in themselves is to respect their autonomy and freedom. In choosing principles, one should act as though one were legislating as a member of a Kingdom of Ends. The core of Kant's deontology is to ground all duties in the categorical imperative. Unlike the categorical imperative, hypothetical imperatives have force only if we have certain desires or inclinations. Recent expositions have tried to show the unity of Kant's formulations and have defended the categorical imperative against the traditional criticism that it produces an empty formalism.

“Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want). The categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.” Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Section II.

Categorical proposition

The basic subject-predicate proposition in which a predicate is used to affirm or negate all or some of what a subject indicates. The subject and the predicate are the terms of the proposition. In traditional logic, there are four categorical propositions; (1) the universal affirmative, “All S are P”;

则,可以有一种合理的讨论。以这种方式进行的论证,在天主教的传统中,是作为决疑法的论证而著称的(决疑法这个术语不友善的用法,是对它出于一种技术而不正当地使用的一种应得的反应)。”——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第96页。

范畴词

见“助范畴词”条。

绝对命令

根据康德的观点,绝对命令乃是对我们的行为原则或公理的选择上的基本的和绝对的形式要求(或一组要求)。康德对绝对命令有许多种表述,这些表述表面上看来互不相同,可康德自己认为这些不同的表述是相等的。第一种表述是,一个人据以行动的原则也应能成为普遍法则。作为一个有理性的行为主体,我必须承认,对我来说的充分理由,对处于极相似的情形中的任何人来说也是充分理由。第二种表述是,一个人应当把自己和其他人决不仅仅作为工具,而必须也作为目的。一个人决不应该仅是利用他人,因为有理性的人具有内在价值和尊严。第三种表述是,绝对命令要求我们把他人作为自主性的和自我决定的行为者。把人看成自身即是目的,就是尊重他的自主和自由。在选择原则时,一个人的行为应当仿佛把自己看做是作为目的王国的一员而在立法。康德义务论的核心在于,把所有的责任放在绝对命令上。绝对命令是与假言命令相对的,只是在我们有着一定的欲求和偏好时,假言命令才起作用。最近的解释力图表明康德各种解释间的统一性,并且捍卫绝对命令,使其免受那种说它只是产生了空洞的形式主义的传统批评。

“所有的命令或是假言的或是绝对的。前者代表一种可能行为的实际必要性,这种行为是作为一种获得行为者想要(或可能想要)的某种东西的工具。绝对命令则是这样一种命令,它代表了一个行为,就这个行为本身而言是客观必然的,而不必参照另一个目的。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第二章。

直言命题

基本的主谓式命题,其中谓词被用来肯定或否定主词所指示的事物的全部或有些。主词和谓词都是该命题的项。在传统逻辑中,有四种直言命题:(1)全称肯定,“所有S是P”;(2)全称否定,“所有S不是P”;(3)特称肯定,

(2) the universal negative, "All S are not P"; (3) the particular affirmative, "Some S are P"; and (4) the particular negative, "Some S are not P". They are respectively abbreviated as A, E, I, O. Categorical propositions are so called in order to distinguish them from modal propositions (which express possibility or necessity), conditional propositions and other complex propositions. If both of the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism are expressed in the form of a categorical proposition, then the syllogism is called a categorical syllogism.

"In a categorical proposition, there is always something, the 'predicate', which is either affirmed or denied of something else, the 'subject'." — Prior, *Formal Logic*, 1962, 2nd ed., p. 103.

Categorical syllogism, see categorical proposition

Categoricity

Dewey's term, although the idea is much older, for a semantic property ascribed to a theory or an axiomatic system, according to which any two of its satisfying interpretations (or models) are isomorphic. That is, any two models, M and N, of a theory T have the same structure, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the domain of M and the domain of N. A theory with such a standard structure or model is categorical. Categoricity is an ideal property for the axiomatic method, but its application is very limited.

"Categoricity, as thus defined for the first-order language \mathcal{L} , is a relatively trivial notion. None of the usual axiomatically formulated mathematical theories will be categorical, because any set of sentences of \mathcal{L} with an infinite model will have models that are of differing cardinality and hence are not isomorphic." — Mates, *Elementary Logic*, 1972, p. 187.

Category

[from Greek: *kategorēin*, to accuse] The basic and general concepts of thought, language or reality. Aristotle and Kant provided the classical discussions of categories, although categories play different roles in their thought. Aristotle introduced the term in a logical-philosophical context, meaning "to assert something of something" or "to be predicated of something". Thus, his notion of category is closely connected to the subject-predicate form. Categories are, in the first instance, kinds of predicates. In the *Categories* and the *Topics* 1.9, Aristotle introduced ten kinds of categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and affection. As kinds of predicate, they reveal different ways in which a subject can be. Because there is a corresponding kind of being for each category, each kind of category can also be considered to be a kind of being.

"有些S是P", 和 (4) 特称否定, "有些S不是P". 它们分别被缩写为 A、E、I、O。之所以如此称谓直言命题,是为了把它们与模态命题(表达可能性或必然性的命题)、条件命题以及其他复合命题区别开来。如果一个三段论的前提和结论都是用直言命题形式表述的,那么该三段论叫做“直言三段论”。

“在直言命题中,总是存在着某物,即‘谓词’,它或者肯定或者否定另外的某物,即‘主词’。”——普赖尔:《形式逻辑》,1962年,第2版,第103页。

直言三段论

见“直言命题”条。

范畴性

杜威的术语,尽管这一思想可溯至久远,它是归属于一个理论或一个公理系统的语义属性,其意思是:该理论或公理系统所满足的任意两个解释(或模型)是同构的。也就是说,一理论 T 的任意两个模型 M 和 N 有同样的结构,并且在 M 的个体域和 N 的个体域之间存在一一对应。具有这种标准结构或模型的理论是范畴的。范畴性对于公理方法来说是一理想的属性,但它的应用却十分有限。

“刚才对于一阶语言 \mathcal{L} 所定义的范畴性,是一个相当不足道的概念。在通常用公理化方法表述的数学理论中,没有一个是范畴性的,因为具有无穷模型的 \mathcal{L} 的任意语句集都将有不同基数的模型,因此就不是同构的。”——梅茨:《初等逻辑》,1972年,第187页。

范畴

[源自希腊词 *kategorēin*, 字义为“指责,控告”] 今天它一般是指思想、语言或实在的基本的和一般的概念。亚里士多德和康德对范畴问题提供了经典的论述,尽管范畴在他们的思想中所起的作用很不相同。亚里士多德把这个术语引入到逻辑—哲学的语境中,意为“以某物去断言另一物”,或“述说某物(作某物的谓项)”。这样,他的范畴概念便与主—谓形式密切相关。范畴首先是各种谓词。在《范畴》和《正位篇》1.9中,亚里士多德提出了十类范畴:本体、数量、性质、关系、地点、时间、姿态、状况、活动、遭受。作为谓项的种类,它们揭示了主项得以存在的不同方式。因为每个范畴都有相应的一类存在,因此每类范畴也可以被看做是一类存在。某些范畴来源于普通的疑问句(什么,何

Some categories come from ordinary interrogatives (what, when, where, how); others are derived from grammatical structures (for instance, the active and the passive). Only in two places does Aristotle list all ten categories; in other places he gives a shorter list, often ended by "and so on". Through his classification of categories, Aristotle explained many difficulties in the philosophy of Parmenides and Plato, and greatly influenced the later development of metaphysics.

Categories for Kant are pure non-empirical concepts of the understanding by which we must structure and order the objects of experience in order for experience itself to be possible. They are the concepts under which things intuited must fall or the concepts that give unity to the synthesis of intuition. Aristotle set forth the first table of categories as our basic structure of talking about the world. Kant revived Aristotle's approach, but criticises him for identifying the categories haphazardly and took it upon himself to identify them exhaustively, systematically and with certainty. Kant believed that categories stem from the act of judgement, that is the logical function of thought in judgement. While the act of judgement holds representations in a unity, categories are precisely the pure concepts according to which we organise experience in a given intuition. Categories and acts of judgement are therefore one and the same thing in the sense that both give unity to the synthesis of intuition. For Kant there are as many categories as there are acts of judgement. Traditional logic classified four kinds of judgement, each kind containing three moments: (1) *Quantity*: Universal, Particular, Singular; (2) *Quality*: Affirmative, Negative, Infinite; (3) *Relation*: Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; and (4) *Modality*: Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic. Accordingly, Kant's table of categories has four headings, each of which has three members: (1) *Quantity*: Unity, Plurality, Totality; (2) *Quality*: Reality, Negation, Limitation; (3) *Relation*: Substance/Accidents, Cause/Effect, Reciprocity between Agent/Patient; (4) *Modality*: Possibility/Impossibility, Existence/Non-Existence, Necessity/Contingency. Within each heading, the first two members constitute a dichotomy, and the third member arises from their combination. Together these twelve categories form the grammar of thinking.

Kant's table of categories has been a subject of controversy. Some agree that categories should be derived from fundamental principles of thinking, but propose to emend it either because it is not exhaustive or because it does not reflect modern developments in logic. For other critics, philosophical reflection on judgement should be concerned not with its basic structure, but with its actual use, thus requiring non-Kantian grounds for identifying the categories. Some philosophers accept that categories are non-empirical concepts that we must use for experience or language to be possible, but seek to understand categories outside a systematic

时、何处、如何); 其他一些范畴是从语法结构引申出来的(例如, 主动和被动)。亚里士多德只在两个地方列出了十个范畴, 其他地方他列得更少些, 常以“等等”而结束。通过范畴的分类, 亚里士多德说明了巴门尼德和柏拉图哲学中的许多困难, 并且巨大地影响了形而上学的后来发展。

对于康德来说, 范畴是我们必须借以构造和整理经验对象以使经验自身成为可能的纯粹非经验的知性概念。它们是把被直观的事物统摄于其中的概念, 或对直观的综合给予统一的概念。亚里士多德列出了第一张范畴表, 作为我们谈论世界的基本结构。康德复兴了亚里士多德的方法, 但批评他对范畴的认定有些急躁。康德把穷尽地、系统地 and 确定地识别鉴定范畴作为他自己的任务。他相信, 范畴产生于判断的行为, 即判断中思维的逻辑功能。因为判断的行为就是要把诸表象带入统一, 而范畴恰恰就是我们据以组织已有直观中的经验的纯粹概念。因此, 范畴和判断的行为在这种意义上是同一回事; 即两者都对直观的综合给予统一。在康德看来, 有多少判断行为, 便有多少类范畴。传统逻辑区分了四类判断, 每一类包含三个“环节”(1) 量: 全称的, 特称的, 单称的。(2) 质: 肯定的, 否定的, 无限的。(3) 关系: 直言的, 假言的, 选言的。(4) 样式: 或然的, 实然的, 必然的。相应地, 康德的范畴表包括四类范畴, 每一类有三个成员: (1) 量: 统一性, 复多性, 总体性。(2) 质: 实在性, 否定性, 限制性。(3) 关系: 实体/偶性, 原因/结果, 主动与被动之间的相互作用。(4) 样式: 可能性/不可能性, 存在性/非存在性, 必然性/偶然性。在每个类别中, 头两个范畴构成了二分法, 第三个产生于它们的结合。这十二个范畴一起形成了思维的基本法则。

康德的范畴表一直是争论的主题。有些人赞成范畴应当来源于思维的基本原则, 但提出要对它进行修订, 或由于它没有被列举穷尽, 或由于它并不反映逻辑的现代发展。对于其他批评者, 对判断的哲学反思不仅是关心其基本结构, 而且关心到词的实际用法, 这样就要求非康德主义的确认范畴的根基。某些哲学家承认, 范畴是我们用来使经验或语言成为可能的非经验概念, 但他们力图在体系的上下联系之外来理解范畴。赖尔的范畴观看到了一组相对地无边际的范畴差别。

“本质存在的种类正好是范畴方式所表明的种类, 因为存在的意义恰恰和这些方式在数目上一样多。”——亚里士多德: 《形而上学》, 1017a23--24。

context. Ryle's notion of category sees a relatively open-ended set of categorial distinctions.

"The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figure of categories; for the senses of being are just as many as these figures." Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017a23-4.

Category mistake

Ryle's term for a kind of error typically involved in the generation of philosophical problems and in attempts to solve them. The logical type or category to which a concept belongs is constituted by the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to operate with that concept. When one ascribes a concept to one logical type or category when it is in fact of another, a category mistake is committed. For instance, to say "time is red" is to commit such a mistake, for time is not the sort of thing that could have a colour. In another example, it is a mistake to assign the Average Man to the same category as actual individual men like Smith and Jones. According to Ryle, the Cartesian dogma of the ghost in the machine commits a category mistake by describing the mind as belonging to the category of substance, when it actually belongs to the category of disposition. The way to expose a category mistake is through a *reductio ad absurdum* argument showing the conceptually unacceptable consequences of treating an item as belonging to an inappropriate category.

"It is, namely, a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another." — Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 17.

Catharsis

[Greek: cleansing or purging] Aristotle defined the function of tragedy as the catharsis of such emotions as pity and fear. In contrast, Plato's claimed that tragedy encourages the emotions. Aristotle did not give an exact explanation of what he meant by catharsis. In Greek, the word can mean either religious purification from guilt or pollution or medical purgation of various bodily evils. Accordingly, there developed two dominant interpretations of this term. One view tends to translate it as "purification" and takes Aristotle to mean that tragedy has a moral effect of achieving psychological moderation and refinement. It can relieve tensions and quiet destructive impulses. The other view tends to translate it as "purgation" and believes that Aristotle proposed that tragedy arouses relaxation and amusement rather than having moral significance. The debate between these two accounts has persisted over the whole history of philosophy. But it is generally agreed that tragedy has the function of catharsis because of its inherent value or worth. In this century, this term has become more complicated through association with

范畴错误

赖尔的术语, 指在提出和尝试解决哲学问题中所犯的一种典型错误。一个概念所属的逻辑类型或范畴由它在逻辑上合理地操作于那一概念的一系列方式所组成。当一个人将事实上属于另一类型或范畴的概念归于一种类型或范畴时, 他就犯了范畴错误。例如, 说“时间是红的”就犯了这样一个错误, 因为时间不可能是那种可能有颜色的东西。又比如说, 将平均的人与像史密斯和琼斯这样真正的人归于同一范畴中也是错误的。在赖尔看来, “机器中的幽灵”这一笛卡尔的教条就犯了一个范畴错误, 因为它将心描述为一个实体范畴, 而实际上心属于倾向性范畴。揭露一个范畴错误的方法就是通过归谬论证, 来表明把一概念归于一个不合适的范畴会导致不可接受的后果。

“亦即, 它是一个范畴错误, 它将关于心的生活的事实描述得好像它们属于一种逻辑类型或范畴(或类型或范畴的范围), 而实际上它们属于另一个逻辑类型或范畴。”——赖尔:《心的概念》, 1949年, 第17页。

净化

[希腊语, 意指“净化”或“清除”] 亚里士多德将悲剧的功能界定为对怜悯与恐惧这类情感的净化。相反, 柏拉图认为悲剧激发这类情感。亚里士多德对其使用净化一说的用意未做具体的解释。在希腊语里, 该词或指对罪恶或亵渎意念的宗教式清除, 或指祛除各种身体疾病的医疗性泄药。因此, 对这一术语有两种主要解释。一种观点倾向于将其译为“清除”, 认为亚里士多德的用意是说悲剧具有一种取得心理矫正和纯化的道德效应。这种效应可以解除紧张感, 可以平息破坏性的冲动。另一种观点倾向于将其译为“宣泄”, 认为亚里士多德建议悲剧与其说具有道德意味, 还不如说能够唤起松弛感与娱乐感。在整个哲学史上, 这两种不同观点一直争论不休。但是, 一般看来, 悲剧之所以具有净化作用, 是因为其内在价值的缘故。在本世纪, 净化这一术语由于同弗洛伊德的心理分析发生联系而变得更加复杂了。

“紧随审美体验之后往往有一种非常特殊

Freudian psychoanalysis.

"There is often a very special refreshing feelings that comes after aesthetic experience, a sense of being unusually free from inner disturbance or unbalance. And this may testify to the purgative or cathartic, or perhaps sublimative, effect." Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 1981, p. 560.

Causa sui

[Latin: self-cause, cause of itself] Spinoza introduces *causa sui* as one of the major characteristics of substance or God. God is caused not by anything else, but by itself. Here "cause" is not used in its ordinary sense as the agency which brings something into being. Thomas Aquinas has pointed out that to say that God is self-caused in the ordinary sense of "cause" is self-contradictory. For the idea of such a causal power implies the separation between the cause itself and its effect. But the meaning of Spinoza's "*causa sui*" is that the reason for God's existence lies in his nature or essence. God or substance does not owe its existence to anything else, but is rather the source of its own existence. This is in a sense an abbreviation of the ontological argument for God's existence.

"By *causa sui* I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, def. 1.

Causal analysis of mental concepts

The initial step in D. Armstrong's central-state materialism. A token behaviour must have a cause within the person, and the cause is that person's mental states. Unlike a behaviourist analysis, mind is not behaviour but is the cause of behaviour. According to Armstrong, the concept of a mental state is primarily "the concept of a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour". On the basis of his causal analysis, Armstrong moves to the second step of his theory which is to identify mental states with states in the brain. The central task of his book *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* is to work out this analysis of mental concepts. The major challenge to this theory is the claim that it is inadequate as an explanation of consciousness.

"Indeed, it is startling to observe that Wittgenstein's dictum, 'An "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria', might be the slogan of a Causal analysis of the mental concepts." —Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, 1968, p. 92.

Causal determinism

The view that the world is governed by the principle of causality, that is, for anything that happens, there must be a cause. Nothing can exist and cease to exist without a cause. Causality is the objective and necessary connection which exists and functions universally. To understand a phenomenon

的新鲜感受, 一种罕见的从内心动荡不安中解脱出来的自由感。这或许能够证明宣泄或净化或者升华的效用。” 比尔斯利,《美学》,1981年,第560页。

自因

[拉丁文, 自因, 自身的原因] 斯宾诺莎引入这个词作为他的实体(或译本体)或上帝的主要特点之一。上帝非由任何其他东西引起, 而是由他自身引起的。此处的“原因”一词不是用于通常的意义上, 即产生某物的动因。T. 阿奎那指出, 在“原因”一词的通常意义上说上帝是自己引起的, 乃是自相矛盾。因为这样的因果力概念意味着原因本身和它的结果的分离。而斯宾诺莎的“*causa sui*”一语的含义是: 上帝存在的理由存在于他的性质或本质中。上帝或实体不将其存在归于任何其他东西, 相反, 它是它自己存在的根源。这个观点在某种意义上是上帝存在的本体论证明的缩写。

“我把 *causa sui* 理解为这样的东西, 它的本质包含存在, 或者它的本性只能被设想为存在的。”——斯宾诺莎,《伦理学》,第一部分,定义1。

心的概念的因果分析

这是阿姆斯特朗中心状态唯物主义的的第一步。一个单例行为必须在此人的内部有一个原因, 而这个原因就是该人的心的状态。与行为主义的分析不同, 这一观点认为, 心不是行为, 而是行为的原因。根据阿姆斯特朗的观点, 一个心的状态的概念主要地是“关于一个人倾向于产生某种特定行为的状态的概念”。基于他的因果分析, 阿姆斯特朗进入其理论的第二步, 即将心的状态等同于大脑状态。他的《唯物主义的心的理论》一书的中心任务就是得出关于心的概念的这种分析。对于这一理论的主要质疑是声称它作为对意识的解释是不充分的。

“实际上, 我们吃惊地看到, 维特根斯坦的格言‘一个“内部过程”需要一个外部的标准’可能成为关于心的概念的因果分析的口号。”——阿姆斯特朗,《唯物主义的心的理论》,1968年,第92页。

因果决定论

那种主张世界是由因果性原理支配的观点, 即对所发生的任何事情, 都必然有一个原因的观点。任何事都不能没有原因而存在和不再存在。因果性是客观的和必然的联系, 它普遍地存在着和起着作用。认识一个现象就是要认识

is to understand its causal relations. The view is also called **causalism**.

"While the causal principle states the form of the causal bond (causation), causal determinism asserts that everything happens according to the causal law." —Bunge, *Causality*, 1959, p. 1.

Causal deviance, another term for wayward causal chain

Causal dualism, see dualism

Causal explanation

The explanation of an event or state of affairs as an effect of another preceding or concurrent event or state of affairs, which is the cause. On most accounts, the cause and effect must be linked by a causal law that holds universally between items of their types in a specified range of initial conditions. Some philosophers require causal accounts to explain why an effect must take place, while others reject causal necessity and see the universality of causal explanation merely as a limiting condition of statistical explanation. Causal explanation can be given materially in terms of events or states of affairs and initial conditions or formally in terms of the truth of relevant propositions. Causal explanation is the most important type of deductive-nomological or covering law explanation. Historically, the theory of deductive-nomological explanation was developed out of the theory of causal explanation. To provide a causal explanation is to specify the cause in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the effect. Causal explanations can be complex, with the choice over what is a cause and what is a background condition determined in part by the interests of the investigator. Necessary and sufficient conditions can be nested within one another, as in Mackie's account of a cause as an insufficient but necessary element of an unnecessary but sufficient condition of the effect. Establishing a causal law determined an invariable sequential order of dependence between kinds of events or states of affairs in certain initial conditions, but there is controversy whether there could be causal laws of backward causation.

"To give a causal explanation of a certain event means to derive deductively a statement (it will be called a prognosis) which describes that event, using as premises of the deduction some universal laws together with certain singular or specific sentences which we may call initial conditions." —Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemy*, Vol. II, 1952, p. 262.

Causal theory of action

A theory of action which proposes that the distinguish-

它的因果关系。这种观点也称为“因果论”。

“因果原理表达了因果联接(因果关系)的形式,而因果决定论断言任何事情都是依据因果律发生的。”——邦格:《因果性》,1959年,第4页。

因果异常

“无常因果链”的别名。

因果二元论

见“二元论”条。

因果解释

把一个事件或事态解释成是另一种先在的或同时发生的事件或事态的结果,而那先在的或同时发生的事件或事态则是原因。根据大多数人的见解,原因与结果必须是由一因果律联系的,而那因果律普遍适用于在一定范围内的原始条件之中的任何同类事物之间。有些哲学家要求因果关系论解释为什么结果必定发生,而另一些则拒斥因果必然性,而把因果解释的普遍性只看作是统计解释的限定条件。因果解释或是根据事件或事态或起始条件而内容性地给出,或是依据相关命题的真值而形式性地给出。因果解释是演绎—规律解释(或涵盖法则解释)中最为重要的一种类型。从历史上看,演绎—规律解释理论是由因果解释理论发展而来的。提供因果解释,就是依照结果的必然而充分的条件,说明所议事件的原因。因果解释可能很复杂,因为对什么是原因,什么是背景条件的选择部分地是由研究者的兴趣所决定的。必然的与充分的条件能是相互交织的,如根据麦基的叙述,一个原因可作为一个结果的不必然可却充分的条件的不充分但却必然的因素。建立因果律确定了在某类起始条件中各类事件与事态间的恒常连续的依赖次序。可是人们一直在争论是否有一种后溯因果关系的因果律。

“对某一事件给出因果解释,指的是,把与我们可以叫做初始条件的某些单独或特有的句子连在一起的一些普遍规律用作演绎的前提,演绎性地推出描述该事件的一个陈述(它将被称为预测)。”——波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》,第二卷,1952年,第262页。

活动的因果理论

这一关于活动的理论提出,自由活动的显

ing feature of free action is that it is caused by appropriate antecedent mental events and episodes such as desires, beliefs, rememberings, and so on. It is a necessary condition for behaviour to be an intentional action that it be caused by a mental event. Hence to explain action is to specify the prior mental events which are the proximate cause of the action. This is to reject the view, held by the later Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Hampshire that explanations of actions by reasons are not causal explanations. The classic discussion of the causal theory of action can be found in Davidson's paper "Actions, Reasons and Causes" (1963). Davidson claims that there is a primary reason which explains an action by rationalising it. Primary reason has two components: a pro-attitude towards so acting and a belief that acting in this way is to promote what the pro-attitude is directed upon. This is the agent's reason for performing the action and the cause of that action. Finding the reason for so acting is a species of causal explanation, and freedom can be explained in terms of causal power. The causal theory of action is now the most influential account of action. Other proponents include Goldman, Scarle and Castaneda. The major problem it faces arises from the possibility of a wayward or deviant causal chain, in which a non-standard causal chain between a mental event and an action calls into question the intentionality of the action.

"According to causal theories of intentional action, if one has appropriate reasons for doing something and if these reasons cause one to do that, what is done is an intentional action." — Moya, *The Philosophy of Action*, 1990, p. 6.

Causal theory of knowledge

An attempt to modify the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief in the light of challenges such as "Gettier's problem". The theory suggests that the justification condition should be conceived as a causal condition between the believer and the fact that he believes. Hence knowledge is true belief which bears a proper relationship with the believed fact. This is an externalist position, for the subject need not necessarily be aware that this causal condition is fulfilled. The theory has different formulations depending on how one conceives of the causal criterion. The theory also intends to reject Platonist abstract entities and substitute causal connection. The classical position is expressed by Alvin Goldman in his paper "A causal theory of knowing". Different versions by other philosophers such as Armstrong and Dretske are developed as a rejection of Goldman's position. The areas of debate regarding this theory include issues involving the sort of causal relationship which can be sufficient for knowledge, how to account for knowledge of future events, and whether it is possible to have knowledge without causation.

"The spirit of any account worthy of the name [of causal

著特征在于,它是由像欲求、信念、记忆等等这样适当的先前的心事件和情节所引起的。行为成为意向活动的必要条件是,它由一个心的事件所引起。因此,解释活动就是确定那个作为活动的最近原因的先前的心事件。这就否认了由后期维特根斯坦、安斯康和亨普舍尔等人所主张的观点,这种观点认为,用理由来解释活动并非是因果解释。对于活动的因果理论的经典讨论见于戴维森的论文《活动、理由和原因》(1963年)。戴维森声称,存在一个通过理性化来解释活动的第一理由。第一理由有两个组成部分:一个对于如此行事的赞成态度以及一个认为如此行事能够引起那个赞成态度所指向的东西的信念。这就是主体完成这一活动的理由,也是这一活动的原因。找到如此行事的理由就是一种因果解释。而自由也可以用因果力来解释。活动的因果理论现在是对于活动的最有影响的说明。其他的支持者包括哥尔德曼、塞尔、卡斯坦尼达等等。其面临的主要问题来自“无常或异常因果链”的可能性,其中,一个心的事件与一行为间的非正常的因果链导致对行为的意向性的质疑。

“根据意向活动的因果理论,如果一个人有适当的理由做某事,并且如果这些理由导致此人做此事,那么此人所做的这件事就是一个意向活动。”——摩雅:《活动哲学》,1990年,第6页。

知识因果论

试图用诸如“盖梯尔问题”的挑战来修正传统的知识定义即已辩明的真信念。这种理论认为,辩明条件应该看作是相信者与他相信这个事实之间的因果条件。因而,知识就是真的信念,它与所相信的事实之间有一种专门的关系。这是一种外在论的立场,因为这个主体并不必然地意识到这个因果条件得到了满足。根据人们所认为的不同的因果标准,这个理论有着不同的表现形式。这个理论也倾向于反对柏拉图主义的抽象实体,而代之以因果联系。最典型的立场是由A.哥尔德曼在他的《知道的因果论》一文中表达的。而其他哲学家诸如阿姆斯特朗和德雷斯克等人则提出了不同的看法,反对哥尔德曼的立场。关于这个理论的争论包括了这样一些问题,即可以成为知识的充分条件的一种因果关系问题、如何说明未来事件的知识以及是否可能拥有没有因果关系的知识。

“值得用[知识因果论]这个名称的任何说明,其精神实质在于这样一种观念,即要想得知某物,人们就必须拥有某种与已知事物之间的因果联系。”——布朗:《心灵实验室》,1991年。

theory of knowledge] will include the idea that to know about something one must have some sort of causal connection with the thing known.” —Brown, *The Laboratory of the Mind*, 1991, p. 67.

Causal theory of meaning, another term for the causal theory of reference

Causal theory of perception, an alternative term for representationism

Causal theory of reference

Also called the causal theory of meaning. Most traditional theories of reference depend on the distinction of intension (a list of properties) and extension (reference) and then claim that intension is the ground for describing the meaning of a term, while extension or reference is decided by the description of meaning. The causal theory of reference, developed recently in the United States by Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam, and more influentially Saul Kripke, is a rebellion against such a tradition. Although each of these philosophers presents a different version of theory, the common attribute of the theory is that referential expressions are neither connotative appellations nor disguised or abbreviated descriptions. Proper names and natural kind terms (such as “gold” or “water”) have no intension as understood by these theorists, and accordingly do not have their reference fixed by the concepts or descriptions associated with them. They acquire meaning through the causal linguistic or non-linguistic circumstances of their initial use and maintain it through a historical chain of communication. Although we may fix the reference of a term by giving descriptions, this is not the same as giving the meaning of that term. A speaker uses a name correctly if his usage is causally linked in an appropriate way to the chain of communication. Hence what we need is a definite theory of reference that would capture this causal relation. This theory is, to some extent, an updated version of Mill’s view that proper names have denotations but no connotations. It introduces social and contextual considerations into semantic theory which traditionally focuses on the semantic relations that hold between certain linguistic expressions and the objects for which they stand.

* [There] is the idea that certain real (usually causal) relations between our words and the world may make an essential contribution to the content of utterance without in any way figuring in the knowledge of those who utter them. Causal theories of the references of singular terms and essentialist theories of the extension of natural-kind words both advance such a claim.” —von Wright, *Realism, Meaning and Truth*, 1992, p. 34.

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意义的因果理论

“指称的因果理论”的另一个名称。

知觉的因果理论

“表征主义”的别名。

指称的因果理论

亦称“意义的因果理论”。大多数传统的指称理论都依赖于内涵（一组性质）和外延（指称）之间的区分，并随后宣称内涵是描述一词项的意义的基礎，而外延或指称则是由关于意义的描述所决定的。新近在美国由 K. 唐纳兰，D. 卡普兰，H. 普特南，更有影响的是由 S. 克里普克等人所发展的因果指称论，是对这样一种传统观点的又一次反叛。尽管这些哲学家中的每一位都提出了不同的理论观点，但他们对这一理论的共同之处在于：指称表达式既不是具有内涵的名称，也不是伪装的或缩略的摹状词。专名和自然种类词（如“金”和“水”）没有如传统理论家所理解的那种内涵，相应地也并不凭借与这些词紧密相联的概念或摹状词来确定其指称。它们通过其最初用法的语言或非语言的因果情景来获得意义，并通过交际的历史链条继续保持这种意义。尽管我们可以通过给出摹状词来确定一个词语的指称，但这与给出该词语的意义并不是一回事。说话者正确地使用了一名称，如果他的用法是以一种适当的方式因果地与该交际链条连在一起的话。所以，我们所需要的是能把握这种因果关系的确定的指称理论。在某种程度上说，这一理论是密尔下述观点的现代版：专名有所指但没有内涵。它把社会和语境的考虑引入语义理论中，后者传统上只关注在某些语言表达式和它们所代表的对象之间成立的语义关系。

“有一种观点认为，在我们的词语和这个世界之间的某种真实的（通常是因果的）关系可以对话语的内容作出实质性贡献，而不以任何方式进入说这些话语的那些人的知识之中。关于单称词项的指称的因果理论和关于自然种类词的外延的本质主义理论都提出了这样一种主张。” —冯·赖特：《实在论，意义和真理》，1992 年，第 34 页。

Causalism, another expression for causal determinism

Causality, see causation

Causality, principle of

A common and deeply held belief that every event or state of affairs has a cause and that every proposition about the world can be derived from other propositions about the world in virtue of causal relations among the items given in the propositions. If we knew enough relevant facts, we could infer any other fact about the world. The principle is also called the principle of determinism. The justification of this principle is a matter of dispute. For physicalism, it is based on the uniformity of nature. For Hume, it is based subjectively on the habit of associating like events. In Kant's version of the principle, every event follows upon a preceding event in accordance with a rule. But his characterisation is regarded as too narrow, since not all causality involves succession.

"The principle of causality... asserts, to put it in a simple, unsophisticated way, that every event has a cause." -- Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 224.

Causation

One of the fundamental topics in metaphysics, also called causality. Causation is the firm and constant relation between events such that if an event of the first kind occurs, an event of the second kind will or must occur. The occurrence of the first event, the cause, explains the occurrence of the second event, the effect. Some philosophers believe that items other than events, such as objects, states of affairs and facts can also enter into causal relations. The traditional view before Hume claimed that causation is an actual trait, which involves objective interdependence among real events. Hence, causation was seen as an ontological category, for necessary connection is a relation objectively holding between objects or happenings which are said to be causally related. But according to the British Empiricists, causation is only an epistemological category. Locke took it to be a connection between sensation and the sensed object, while for Hume it was purely a relation of ideas, and was just a matter of our imposing our mental habits upon the world. Hume argued that the traditional conception of causation is mistaken. Because nothing but experience can teach us of the orderliness of nature and because we do not experience instances of necessary connection, the phrase "necessary connection" is meaningless. We can verify spatial contiguity and temporal priority in our impressions, but not necessary connection. The real basis for our idea of causation is observed regularity. Events of type a have always been followed by events of

因果论

“因果决定论”的另一种表述。

因果性

见“因果关系”条。

因果性原理

人们所持的一种广泛而深刻的信念,认为每一事件或事态都有一个原因,关于世界的每一个命题都可借助于其他命题中已知项之间的因果关系而从它们那里推导出来。如果我们知道足够多的相关事实,我们可以推论出任何其他关于世界的事实。此原理也叫做“决定论原理”。关于这一原理的辩明问题是一件引起争议的事情。对物理主义而言,它是基于“自然的齐一性”。对休谟而言,它在主观上基于像事件一样的联想的习惯。在康德对此原理的表述中,每个事件根据规则紧接着先前的事件。但人们认为他的描述太狭窄了,因为并不是所有的因果性都涉及到前后相继。

“因果性原理……用简单明了的话来说,就是主张,每个事件都有一个原因。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第224页。

因果关系

形而上学的主要论题之一,亦称作“因果性”。“因果关系”表示如下情况下两个事件之间的牢固而永久的关系:当第一类事件中的一个事件发生,第二类事件中的一个事件也将发生或必定发生。第一个事件即原因的发生说明了第二个事件即结果的发生。有些哲学家认为,诸如对象、事态和事实这样的非事件项目,也可以归入因果关系。休谟之前的传统观点认为,因果关系是一个实际的特性,这个特性涉及到实在事件的客观相互依赖性;由于必然联系是在据说有因果关系的对象或事件之间客观保持着的一种关系,因而因果关系是一个本体论范畴。不过,根据英国经验论者的观点,因果关系只是一个认识论的范畴。洛克把它当做感觉和被感觉的对象之间的一种联系,而休谟认为它纯粹是观念的关系,它只不过是我们将我们的心理习惯强加给世界而已。休谟论证说传统的因果关系概念是错误的。既然只有经验能告诉我们自然的条理性,而我们并未经验到必然联系的事例,所以,“必然联系”这个用语是没有意义的。我们可以证实我们的印象在空间上的接近性和时间上的在先性,但是不能证实必然联系。我们的因果关系观念的真实基础是观察到的规律性。a 类型的事件总是被 b 类型的事件所跟随,于是,当一个新的 a 类型事件出现,我们就由于习惯预断一个 b 类型事件将跟随。这不是逻辑

type b, and so when a new a-type event occurs we predict by custom that a b-type event will follow. This is not a logical, demonstrable or self-evident connection, but concerns our habitual attitudes and what happens in our minds. Hence Hume claimed that predictions of causation can have only an inductive basis, not a necessary or certain one. Hume's theory was established on the basis of his principle of the association of ideas and it has been the focus of much debate. Kant's attempt to establish causation as a category, or as a condition for the possibility of experience, provides a major rival to the Humean account. What, then, is the distinctive feature of cause and effect? Various approaches have been presented. Among them, the most influential include the regularity theory, which claims that causal relations are instances of a kind of regularity; the counterfactual theory, which claims that a cause is a cause because without its occurrence the effect would not have occurred; and the manipulation analysis, which proposes that a cause is a cause because by manipulating it we can produce something else. Other problems widely discussed include: the possibility of backward causation, where an effect precedes cause; the relations between causation and explanation, between causation and determinism and between causation and necessity; the role of causation in natural laws; causal deviance; and the eliminativist possibility of science getting rid of the notion of causation.

"The term causation... signifies causingness and causedness taken together." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, xxxi, p. 198.

Cause

In modern usage, a cause normally involves an agent or event which exerts power and effects a change. A cause produces or brings about an effect. If X occurs and Y invariably follows, then X is the cause and Y is its effect, and the relationship between them is called causation or causality. A cause is often regarded as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of its effect, but there are complex arguments over the role of sufficient and necessary conditions in an adequate account of causes and effects. The existence of causal chains is a necessary condition for the possibility of science. A cause is generally taken to precede its effect, but some argue that there could be backward causation (where a cause follows its effect), and concurrent causation (where a cause is simultaneous with its effect). According to Davidson, the reason for an action is a mental act that is causally linked to the action and that explaining an action by giving a reason is a sort of causal explanation. Cause is also employed to translate the Greek term *aitia*. Hence, Aristotle's theory of four *aitia* is translated as "four causes". However, *aitia* as cause means more broadly explanatory feature. Of Aristotle's four causes, only efficient cause bears some resemblance to the modern notion of cause, while all of the other three (material,

的、可证的或自明的联系,而是与我们的习惯态度和我们心中所发生的事情相关的。因此,休谟声称,因果关系的预测只能以归纳为根据,而没有必然的或确实的根据。休谟的理论是建立在他的观念联结原则基础上的,并已经成为许多争论的焦点。康德试图把因果关系确定为一个范畴,或确定为经验可能性的一个条件,从而提出了一个能与休谟的解释相匹敌的主要观点。那么,原因和结果的独具特点是什么呢?对此人们已作了各种各样的探讨。在这些探讨中,最有影响的包括“规则性理论”、“反事实理论”和“操作分析”理论。“规则性理论”主张,因果关系是一种规则性的事例;“反事实理论”主张,原因之为原因,是因为没有它的出现,结果就不会出现;“操作分析”理论提出,原因之为原因,是因为通过对原因的操作,我们可以造出其他某种东西。其他被广泛讨论的问题包括:结果在原因之前的“逆因果关系”的可能性问题,因果关系和说明、因果关系和决定论、因果关系和必然性的关系问题;自然规律中因果关系的作用问题;因果异常性问题;摆脱了因果关系概念的取消主义的科学可能性问题。

“因果关系这个术语……意味着把引起和被引起放在一起。” — *J. S. 密尔著作集*,第三十一卷,第198页。

原因

在近代的用法中,原因通常意味着一个发挥能力并影响变化的动因或事件。原因产生或造成结果。如果X发生,Y总是跟随,那么,X是原因,Y是其结果。它们之间的关系被称作“因果关系”或“因果性”。原因常常被认作是使其结果得以发生的充足条件。但是,在对原因和结果的恰当说明中,对于充足和必要条件的作用问题仍有一些复杂的论证。因果链的存在对于科学的可能性是必要条件。原因一般被看作先于其结果,不过,人们也论证说可能有“逆因果关系”(原因在结果之后)和“并发因果关系”(原因与其结果同时发生)存在。根据戴维森的观点,一个行为的理由是一个心智活动,它与这个行为有因果联系。而且通过给出理由来说明一个行为,就是一种因果说明。我们还用“原因”一词翻译希腊词 *aitia*。因此,亚里士多德的“四 *aitia*”理论被翻译成“四因”论。不过,作为原因的 *aitia* 一词意指更广泛的“说明性特征”。就亚里士多德的四因而言,只有“动力因”符合“原因”一词的近代用法,其他三个原因(质料因、形式因和终极因)全都是不活动的,不可能成为动因。

formal, and final causes) are inactive and cannot be agents.

"Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes, and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II. 22. 11.

Cause in fact. see *sine qua non*

Causes, four

[Greek: *aition*, cause or explanatory factor, from the adjective *aitos*, responsible] Aristotle held that we know by means of causes, of which there are four sorts: material causes (out of which things come to be), formal causes (what things essentially are), efficient causes (sources of movement and rest) and final causes (purposes or ends). He claimed that all his predecessors sought after these causes, but only vaguely and incompletely. In modern use, a cause is an agent or event exerting power and effecting a change, and a cause must do something to bring about an effect. Of Aristotle's four causes, only efficient cause resembles this modern notion, and even here there are differences. What Aristotle was distinguishing are different sorts of answers that can be given to the questions "Why?" or "Because of what?". Aristotelian causes are four types of explanatory factors or conditions necessary to account for the existence of a thing. Aristotle sometimes said that formal and final causes are identical, especially in his natural teleology, and sometimes went further to say that formal, final and efficient causes are identical.

"Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know each thing only when we think we recognise its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four senses." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983a24-6.

Cave, simile of the

A fundamental image of human knowledge and reality described by Plato in the *Republic* 514-21. Imagine prisoners in an underground cave who have been there since their childhood. They are chained in such a way that they cannot turn their heads but can only see the shadows on the cave wall in front of them. The shadows are cast by a fire behind them and by the artefacts which men carry and pass along a track across the Cave and which stand above a low wall built along the track, like the screen at a puppet show. The prisoners naturally believe that the shadows are the only real things. If one of them happens to be released and turns round to the fire and to see the objects themselves, he will initially become bewildered, his eyes will be in pain, and he will also

“由于能力是一切活动得以进行的源泉,所以,当这些能力所寓居的实体将这个能力发动起来,这些实体就被称作原因,而随即被产生出来的实体,或者由于那个能力的发挥而被引入任何主体中的简单观念,就被称作结果。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第22章,第11节。

事实中的原因

见“绝对必要”条。

四因

[源自希腊词, *aition* (原因或解释因素), 该词出自形容词 *aitos* (对……负责)] 亚里士多德认为,我们知道一物是通过知道其原因。原因有四类: 质料因 (事物自此构成), 形式因 (事物的本质之是), 动力因 (运动和静止的源泉) 及终极因 (目的或终端)。他认为, 所有他的先驱们都在寻求这些原因, 但只是含混的, 不完整的。在近代意义上, “原因”意为某种行使力量造成某种变化的动因或事件; 它必须与引起结果的事相关。在亚里士多德的四因中, 只有动力因与现代原因概念相近。但即使在这一点上, 也不是没有差别的。亚里士多德所区分的乃是对“为什么”或“由于什么”这一问题能给出的各种不同类答案。亚里士多德的原因乃是四种说明事物存在所必需的解释因素或条件。亚里士多德有时说形式因等同于终极因, 这在他的自然目的论中尤其明显。他有时还进一步认为形式因、终极因和动力因都是等同的。

“显然, 我们必须获得对根本原因的知识 (因为只有当我们认为已认识到一物的第一因时, 我们才说我们知道了该物), 而原因可在四种意义上来谈论。”——亚里士多德: 《形而上学》, 983a24-26。

洞穴之喻

这是柏拉图在《国家篇》514—521 中描述的对人类知识的基本想像。设想在一个地穴中有一批囚徒; 他们自小呆在那里, 被锁链束缚, 不能转头, 只能看面前洞壁上的影子。在他们后上方有一堆火, 有一条横贯洞穴的小道; 沿小道筑有一堵矮墙, 如同木偶戏的屏风。人们扛着各种器具走过墙后的小道, 而火光则把透出墙的器具投影到囚徒面前的洞壁上。囚徒自然地认为影子是惟一真实的事物。如果他们中的一个碰巧获释, 转过头来看到了火光与物体, 他最初会感到困惑; 他的眼睛会感到痛苦; 他甚至会认为影子比它们的原物更真实。

如果有人进一步拉他走出洞穴, 到阳光下

think that the shadows are more real than their originals.

If he is further dragged upward through the entrance of the cave and to the sunlight, he will be even more dazzled and angry. At first, he will only be able to see the reflections of the real things in the water, and then the things themselves in the light of the sun, and finally even the sun itself. At that time he will be in a condition of real liberation and will pity his fellow-prisoners and his old beliefs and life. If he goes back to save his fellow-prisoners, it will take time for him to get used to the darkness in the cave, and he will find it hard to persuade the prisoners to follow him upward.

This simile is connected with the simile of the Sun and the simile of the Line, with the world inside the cave corresponding to the perceptible world and the world outside the Cave corresponding to the intelligible world, but the text has been subjected to a variety of divergent interpretations.

Plato explicitly stated that the prisoners are like us and serve as a representation of the human condition, and the prisoner being dragged out of cave is analogous to a process of enlightenment by education. We can interpret the upward journey and the contemplation of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm. The Cave simile exerted great influence on later political and educational theories.

"Socrates is meant to tell us in the [simile of the] cave that the general condition of mankind is one of seeing things indirectly through their images." —Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, 1962, 1, p. 117.

Cement of the universe

Hume's term for what he took to be the most basic principles of the association of ideas, that is resemblance, contiguity in time or in place, and causation. These are the links that connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves. For Hume, the human mind operates according to these principles to construct various complex ideas and consequently to build up our picture of the universe. These principles are themselves associated, and the presence of one will introduce the other two to the mind. The contemporary philosopher John Mackie took "The Cement of the Universe" to be the title for his influential book about causation (1974).

"As it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they [the principles of association] are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them." —Hume, *An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature*.

Censorship

The inspection and restriction of the contents of publications, films and performances by a religious or government

的世界,他会更加眩目,甚至会发火;起初他只能看事物在水中的倒影,然后才能看阳光中的事物,最后甚至能看太阳自身。到那时他才处于真正的解放状态,会开始怜悯他的囚徒同伴、他的原来的信仰和生活。如果他返回去拯救他的囚徒同伴,他得有一段时间去适应洞中的黑暗,并且会发现很难说服他们跟他走出洞穴。

这一比喻与太阳之喻和线段之喻相联系。洞穴之中的世界相应于可感世界,而洞穴外面的世界则比作理智世界。可是原文可作许多不同的解释。

柏拉图明确声称囚徒与我们相像,即是说他们代表人类的状态;而囚徒被拉出洞穴的过程则类似于通过教育而获得启蒙的过程。我们可以把上升之途和对上面事物的观照解释成是灵魂上升到理智世界的过程。洞穴之喻对于后来的政治和教育理论影响甚巨。

"苏格拉底的洞穴之喻是要告诉我们,人类在一般情形下是通过事物的影子来间接地看事物。"——克隆比,《柏拉图学说考察》,1962年,1,第117页。

宇宙的粘合剂

休谟的用语,指他所认为的观念联结的最基本原则,即相似,时间或地点的接近,因果关系。这些是把我们同我们自身之外的任何人或对象联结起来的环节。在休谟看来,人类心灵根据这三个原则运作,构造出各种各样的复杂观念,并随之建立起我们的宇宙图画。这些原则本身是联系着的,它们中的一个出现,将把其他两个引入心中。当代哲学家J. 麦基将"宇宙的粘合剂"一词用作他的关于因果关系的很有影响的著作(1974)的标题。

"既然任何事情只有借思想才对我们的感情发生影响,而这些联想原则是我们的思想的惟一纽带,那么,它们对我们来说实际上就是宇宙的粘合剂,心灵的一切活动必定在很大程度上依赖于它们。"——休谟:《〈人性论〉概要》。

审查制度

宗教、政府机构或其他组织对于出版物、电影、演出等内容的审查与限制。有两种审查制

office or some other body. There are generally two kinds of censorship. The first examines works for illegitimate or immoral contents, such as hard-core pornography; the other concerns political and ideological content and seeks to prohibit or alter what is offensive to the government or other censoring body. Liberalism especially condemns political censorship on the grounds that such as practice violates the basic right of free speech. This gives rise to the problem of how and to what extent free speech must be protected. The prior restraint of publication or performance is considered more difficult to justify than providing penalties afterwards, but there is also the possibility that fear of penalties afterwards will contribute to self-censorship. In some circumstances, such as wartime, there is a greater tolerance of censorship than in ordinary times.

"If we recognise the general value of free expression, therefore, we should accept a presumption against censorship or prohibition of any activity when that activity even arguably expresses a conviction about how people should live or feel, or opposes established or popular convictions." Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, pp. 337-8.

Central-state materialism

Also called the central-state theory of mind and synonymous with the identity theory, a materialist or physicalist theory of mind which holds that mental states, such as visual perceptions, pains and beliefs are inner states which cause behaviour. These inner mental states, however, are identified with states or processes occurring in the brain and central nervous system. Mind is in brain. That is not to say that it is a substance, but that it is possessed by a substance. This theory can be traced to Thomas Hobbes, and in contemporary philosophy has been developed by Place and especially by the Australian philosophers J. J. C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong. In the standard version, the identity between mental states and physical states is contingent, not necessary. The theory, which occupies the middle ground between dualism and Ryle's behaviourism, emerged as an attempt to overcome one of the major difficulties faced by the latter, that is the denial of the existence of inner mental states. But the theory itself has trouble in analysing the intentionality of mental states, how they can have content and be about something. Some critics also object that it has difficulty in accounting for the logical possibility of disembodied existence.

"For the most part these who profess physicalism (or materialism) are advocating a physicalism of substance combined with something like a dual aspect theory of events. They assert that mental events are identical with physical events within an organism's central nervous system or brain. The theory is sometimes called central state materialism." — Hodgson, *The Mind Matters*, 1991, pp. 65-6.

度,一是检查是否有非法的或不道德的内容,诸如赤裸裸的黄色读物,二是政治和意识形态方面的内容,要求禁止或修正冒犯了政府或其他审查机构的东西。自由主义强烈谴责政治审查,认为这种行为违反了言论自由的基本权利。这产生了如何以及在什么程度上言论自由必须受到保护的问题。一般认为,对出版物或表演的预先限制比出版或表演后加以惩罚更加不合理,可是对事后惩罚的担心亦有可能导致自我审查。在某些特殊情形下,如战争时代,人们较比和平时代更能容忍审查。

"如果我们承认自由表达的普遍价值,那么,我们应该接受反对审查制度或对任何活动的禁止的假定——即使是这种活动有争议地表达了人们应当怎样生活和感觉的信念,或是反对已确立的或流行的信念。"——德沃金:《原则问题》,1986年,第337—338页。

中心状态唯物论

又称“心的中心状态理论”,与“同一论”同义,是一种关于心的唯物主义或物理主义理论,认为像视知觉、疼痛、信念等这样的心的状态是导致行为的内部状态。这些内部状态同一于发生于大脑和中枢神经系统的状态或过程。心在脑中,这并不是说它是一个实体,而是说,它为一个实体所具有。这一理论可以追溯于T. 霍布斯,在当代哲学中则由普雷斯、特别是澳大利亚哲学家 J. J. C. 斯马特和 D. 阿姆斯特朗所发展。按照其标准的看法,心的状态与物理状态之间的同一是偶然的,而非必然的。这一理论居于二元论和赖尔的行为主义之间,其产生乃是由于试图克服后者所面临的主要困难之一,亦即否认内部心的状态的存在。但这一理论本身难以分析心的状态的意向性,难以解释这些状态何以具有内容以及何以能够论及某物。有的批评者还反驳说它难以说明无壳存在的逻辑可能性。

“这些信奉物理主义(或唯物主义)的人多半是在主张一种关于实体的物理主义,并将之与某种类似于事件的双面理论的东面相结合。他们断言心的事件同一于一个机体的中枢神经系统或大脑中的物理事件。这一理论有时被称为中心状态唯物论。”——霍奇逊:《心的作用》,1991年,第65—66页。

Central-state theory of mind, another term for central-state materialism

Certainty

[from Latin: *certus*, sure] Either a state of mind (psychological certainty), such as acceptance, trust, taking as reliable and not disputing or questioning, or a property of a proposition of being incapable of being doubted and being undeniable (propositional certainty). Psychological certainty is opposed to doubt and scepticism, and propositional certainty contrasts to probability. Psychological certainty regarding truth is insufficient to establish propositional certainty without further justification. What is known to be certain is a kind of true knowledge, but certainty is different from truth because “certainly true” is stronger than “true” and because we can also judge that a proposition is “certainly false”. The distinction between certainty and probability can be compared to the distinction between necessity and contingency. Certainty admits varying degree according to the nature and extent of the testimony.

Modern philosophy has sought to ground knowledge on certainty, which was understood by Descartes in terms of the impossibility of doubt. Some have located certainty in thoughts or experiences which could not be denied and which could provide the basis for the acceptance of riskier items. Others, like Peirce, proposed a general fallibilism, according to which knowledge was possible without the requirement of certainty. In response to Moore's discussion of certainty in terms of common sense, Wittgenstein's account in *On Certainty* distinguishes between certainty and knowledge. What is certain provides a partially changing array of ‘hinge’ propositions, on which our whole system of belief in ordinary propositions depends.

“Certain, possible, impossible; here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability.” --Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.464.

Ceteris paribus

[Latin: other things being equal] The generalisation of a scientific law or regularity is reached on the assumption that normal conditions obtain, and its application also generally assumes normal circumstances or conditions. All abnormal and exceptional conditions are ruled out. Hence all generalisations imply an unstated *ceteris paribus* clause, which may be stated “other things being equal”, or “if conditions are normal, then...”. The existence of *ceteris paribus* clauses suggests the limitation of the validity and the scope of general explanations. The development of science reduces the scope of *ceteris paribus* clauses by including some previously excluded circumstances within more complex and comprehensive theories. Some philosophers hold that science will always deal with simplified models of reality and that *ceteris*

心的中心状态理论

“中心状态唯物论”的别名。

确定性

[源自拉丁文 *certus* (确实)] 要么指心灵的状态 (心理的确定性), 诸如认可、信任、视为靠得住和没有争议或疑问的, 要么指命题不能被怀疑或不可否定的性质 (命题的确定性)。心理学上的确定性与疑惑和怀疑态度相反, 而命题的确定性与或然性相对。与真实性相关的心理学上的确定性, 如果没有进一步的理由, 就不足以确立命题的确实性。已知为确实的东西是一种真知识, 但确实性不同于真实性, 因为“确实为真”强于“真”, 也因为我们同样可以判断一个命题“确实为假”。确定性和或然性的区别可以比作必然性和偶然性的区别。确定性有不同的程度, 根据证据的性质和范围而定。

近代哲学一直寻求将知识奠基于确定性之上。笛卡尔将确定性理解为怀疑的不可能性。有些人在思想或经验中寻求确定性, 它们是不可否认的, 并可以提供一个基础来接受不那么确实的东西。其他人, 例如皮尔士, 主张一种普遍的可错论。据此, 知识不要求确定性也是可能的。在回应摩尔用常识来讨论确定性时, 维特根斯坦在《论确定性》一书中区分了确定性和知识。确实的东西提供了一系列部分可变化的“关键”命题。我们对于日常命题的整个信念系统要依靠这些命题。

“确定的、可能的、不可能的: 这里就有了我们在概率论中所需要的最重要的分度标志。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》, 4.464。

如果其他情况相同

[拉丁文: 其他情况相同] 科学规律或规则的概括的获得是基于正常条件存在这样一种假定, 这种概括的应用一般也假定是在正常的环境或条件下。所有反常和例外的条件都是被排除的。因此, 所有的概括都含有一个未加明确说明的“如果其他情况相同”的条款, 这一条款可表述为“其他情况相同”或“如果条件正常, 那么……”。“如果其他情况相同”条款的存在暗示着普遍性解释在效力和范围上的局限性。科学的发展通过把某些以前排斥掉的情况包括在更复杂更全面的理论中而缩小了“如果其他情况相同”这一条款的范围。一些哲学家认为, 科学总是要处理被简化了的现实的模型, “如果其他情况相同”的条款是永远不会根除的。

“在社会科学实际的因果关系争论中, 常常

paribus clauses will never be fully eliminated.

"In actual causal arguments in the social sciences, it will often emerge that the claim that C is sufficient for E rests up on an unstated *ceteris paribus* clause; *c* is sufficient for *e* under normal circumstances." —Little, *Varieties of Social Explanation*, 1991, p. 25.

Chance

[Greek: *tuche*, from *tuchanein*, to happen; also translated as fortune, luck] In a broad sense, *tuche* is used as a synonym of *automaton* (spontaneous). Sometimes Aristotle distinguished the two terms, but the distinction was neither important nor always observed. Something happening by chance does not happen for any reason. Its cause cannot be accounted for, and it is an exception to the general rule. Chance can be either good or bad, that is either good luck or bad luck, fortunate or unfortunate. In ethics, matters of chance or luck are uncontrolled events which are beneficial or harmful to somebody. In modern philosophy, chance contrasts with determinism and is discussed without ethical aspects in statistics and probability theory.

"Thus to say that chance is a thing contrary to rule is correct." —Aristotle, *Physics*, 197a17.

Change

[Greek: *metapole*, *alloisis*, *gignesthai* or *kinesis*, which are also translated by other terms, such as alteration, generation, becoming, motion and movement] Any transition to something. Aristotle analysed three elements in a change: a pair of opposites; the lack of a character prior to the change (privation) and the character after the change (form); and the subject or substratum which underlies the opposites. He held that all change is from the potential to the actual. He also distinguished two types of change on the basis of his theory of categories. First, a non-substantial change occurs if a definite thing changes its attributes and comes to be such-and-such a thing, with the substratum of change being an individual. For example, there is a non-substantial change if a man changes from being unmusical to being musical. Non-substantial change includes change of place, qualitative change and quantitative change. Secondly, substantial change occurs if the subject itself, rather than its attributes, changes, with the substratum of change being matter. Substantial change is coming-into-being, the generation of a new composite of form and matter. Sometimes Aristotle distinguished among *kinesis* (non-substantial change); *gignesthai* (substantial change) in contrast with *phthora* (ceasing to be); and *metabole* (the whole change), but did not always observe these distinctions. His theory of change is a criticism of Parmenides, who claimed that change is impossible because being cannot be generation from not-being. According to Aristotle, not being is an absence which changes through

出现这样的情况: 认为 C 对 E 来说是充分的这一说法, 是基于一个未加明确说明的“如果其他情况相同”的条款, 即 *c* 在正常情况下对 *e* 是充分的。”——利特尔:《社会解释的多样性》, 1991 年, 第 25 页。

机遇

[希腊语: *tuche*, 源自 *tuchanein* (发生), 也被译为“命运”或“运气”] 在广义上, *tuche* 和 *automaton* (自发) 作为同义语使用。亚里士多德有时把两个词区分出来, 但这种区分既不重要也没一贯遵循。由于机遇而发生的某事, 不是因为某种理由发生的。它的原因不能加以说明, 是一般规律的某种例外。机遇有好坏之分, 即好运或坏运, 幸运或不幸。在伦理学上, 机遇或运气指不受控制的事件, 它们对某人有益或有害。在现代哲学中, 机遇与决定论相对立, 而在统计学和概率论中没有伦理色彩的讨论。

“因此, 机遇是反乎常规的说法是正确的。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》, 197^{a17}。

变化

[在希腊语中, *metapole*、*alloisis*、*gignesthai* 或 *kinesis*, 都能译作“变化”, 虽然也可以用其他译名, 譬如更改、生成、变成、移动和运动] 指向某物的某种转变。亚里士多德分析了变化中的三要素: 对立的双方; 变化之先特征的缺乏即缺失, 变化之后的特征即形式; 处于对立双方下面的主体或载体。他主张, 一切变化均是从潜能到现实。以他的范畴理论为基础, 他也区分了两种类型的变化。首先, 非实体性变化, 即一个确定的事物改变其属性, 并成为如此这般的一个事物, 其变化的载体是一种个体。例如, 如果一个人从不文雅的变成文雅的, 就是一种非实体性变化。非实体性变化包括地点的改变、性质的变化和数量的变化。其次, 实体性变化, 即主体本身而不只是其属性发生了变化, 变化的载体是质料。实体性变化是形式—质料的一个新的合成物的生成或产生。有时, 亚里士多德也对 *kinesis* (非实体性变化) 与 *phthora* (毁灭) 对应的 *gignesthai* (实体性变化) 和 *metabole* (整体变化) 作出区分, 不过, 他并没一贯遵守这种区分。他的变化理论是对巴门尼德的批判, 因为巴氏断言, 存在不能从非存在生成, 所以变化是不可能的。按亚里士多德的观点, 非存在是一种不在, 它通过由肯定特性替代的存在而变化。

当代哲学家一般把变化理解成一事物 T 在时间 t_1 和时间 t_2 之间的差异; 理解成一物 T 在时间 t 中被另一物 T' 替代; 或理解成一个事

being replaced by a positive characteristic.

Contemporary philosophers understand change as the difference between a thing *T* at time *t*₁ and at time *t*₂; as the replacement of one thing *T* by another thing *T'* at time *t*; or as the occurrence of an event at time *t*. Cambridge change, which need not involve a real change in a thing, occurs if some predicate is true of *T* at *t*₁ but false of *T* at *t*₂. This has provoked much debate, for in such cases *T* can undergo a Cambridge change without really altering. Since change involves time, philosophers who deny the reality of time deny the existence of change as well. There is also a tradition, starting from Heraclitus and represented in this century by Whitehead, which reduces physical objects to changes or processes.

"If change proceeds... from the contrary, there must be something underlying changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not change." ~ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1069b6-7.

Character

[Greek: *ethos*, character or disposition] A state of desiring and feeling resulting from early habituation. The notion is closely connected with habit and custom. From *ethos* we derive the name of the philosophical discipline "ethics", literally meaning "concerned with the character". The character of a person makes that person the sort of person he is. The cultivation of character requires the education of the non-rational parts or aspects of the soul. Aristotle divides virtue (excellence) into virtues of intelligence and virtues of character. A large part of his ethics concerns the formation of virtues of character.

"Virtue of character result from habit; hence its name ethics, slightly varies from *ethos*." ~ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a16-7.

Characterising term, Strawson's term for mass noun

Charity

[from Latin, *caritas*, generally translated as love] The benevolent love for God and one's neighbours (others). Charity, along with faith and hope, is one of the three cardinal Christian theological virtues. Among them, faith is first in order of origin, while charity is the highest in order of perfection. Charity is the fundamental and underlying spiritual orientation for Christian life, and determines all other moral and intellectual virtues. For Christians, this is because we come from God and will go back to God. Charity is not instrumental but is unconditional and is pursued beyond the present life. Currently, charity is the voluntary provision for the poor and suffering and the pursuit of other good causes. It is taken to mean the same as philanthropy.

件在时间 *t* 中发生。如果某谓词在 *t*₁ 时能真实地适于 *T* 但在 *t*₂ 时却不能, 那么, 不涉及事物中实在变化的所谓剑桥变化就发生了。这种观点引起了很大争论, 因为在这样的情形中, *T* 能够无实在更改地发生剑桥变化。既然变化涉及时间, 否认时间实在性的哲学家也就否认变化的存在。也存在着一种把物理对象都化解成变化或过程的传统, 该传统始于赫拉克利特, 在本世纪的代表人物是怀特海。

“如果变化……来自相反, 就必然有某种东西潜藏在下面, 变成相反状态; 因为相反双方并不变化。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1069b6-7。

品格

[希腊词 *ethos*, 指性情或气质] 品格是来自于早期习惯化的感情和欲望的状态。这个概念与习惯和风俗密切相关, 从 *ethos*, 我们得到了哲学学科 "*ethics*" (伦理学) 的名称, 其字面的意思是 "与品格相关的"。一个人的品格使他成为他所是的那种人。品格的培育需要对于灵魂的非理性部分或方面的教育。亚里士多德把德性 (卓越) 分为两种: 一些德性是理智的德性, 另一些则是品格的德性。他的伦理学的大部分是关于品格德性的构成的。

“品格的德性来自于习惯, 因此, 它的名称是 '伦理的', 与 *ethos* 只是稍有不同。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1103a16-17。

描述词

斯特劳森称 "总量名词" 的名称。

慈爱

[拉丁词 *caritas*, 一般被译为 "爱" (love)] 指涉的是对上帝和对人们的邻人 (他人) 的仁慈的爱。慈爱, 与 "信仰" 和 "希望" 一道, 是一个主要的基督教的 "神学德性"。这三者中, "信仰" 在起始秩序中, 排在第一位, 而慈爱则是在完善的秩序中排在最高位置上。慈爱对于基督教徒的生活来说, 是基本的和根本性的精神倾向, 决定着其他道德的和理智的德性。对基督教徒来说, 这是因为我们来自于上帝和将回到上帝。慈爱不是工具性的而是无条件的, 对它的追求超越尘世生活。现在, 慈爱一般指涉的是对于穷苦人的自愿帮助及从事其他善举, 被看做是与 "博爱" (philanthropy, 又译为 "慈善") 同义。

"Charity is the mother and root of all the virtues in as much as it is the form of them all."—Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia Iae, 65, 3.

Chinese room argument

A thought experiment devised by John Searle in his 1980 paper "Minds, Brains and Programs". It is designed to demonstrate that software can not make a computer conscious or give it a mind which is anything like a human mind. Suppose an English speaker, who cannot speak Chinese, is locked in a room with two windows and an instruction book in English. Pieces of paper with questions in Chinese written on them are put into the room through one window. The person matches these pieces of paper with other pieces of paper with Chinese symbols according to the instructions in the book and then passes these other pieces of paper through the other window. Searle believes that this is basically what the set-up inside a computer is like and that the non-Chinese-speaking person is like the computer. He processes everything received from the input according to a program, and his output might as a matter of fact take the form of answers to the Chinese questions he received. Hence he passes the Turing Test, but still does not gain an understanding of Chinese. Similarly, a computer only operates according to designed formal rules, and cannot be aware of the contents of the symbols it manipulates. Searle then concludes that a program is not a mind, for the former is formal or syntactical, while the latter has semantic content. Semantics is not intrinsic to syntax, and syntax is not sufficient for semantics. The Chinese room argument is a powerful criticism of the position of strong artificial intelligence which claims that a mind is nothing more than a computer program. The logic and implications of this Chinese room argument have been hotly debated over the past decade.

"I believe the best-known argument against strong AI was my Chinese room argument that showed a system could instantiate a program so as to give a perfect simulation of some human cognitive capacity, such as the capacity to understand Chinese, even though that system had no understanding of Chinese whatever."—Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, 1992, p. 45.

Choice, see decision

Chronological logic, another name for tensed logic

Church's theorem, see Church's thesis

"慈爱是所有德性之母和德性之根源,因为它是一切德性的形式。"——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia Iae, 65.3。

中国屋论证

由J. 塞尔1980年在其论文《心、大脑与程序》中提出的思想实验。它用以表明软件不能使得一个计算机具有意识或具有人那样的心。假定一个不会说中文的说英语的人,被锁在一个有两个窗口和一部英文说明书的屋子里。从一个窗口递入用中文写着问题的纸条。屋子里的人根据说明书来将这些纸条与其他写有中文符号的纸条相匹配,并将那些其他的纸条通过另一窗口递出。塞尔相信计算机内部的设置基本上就是这样。而这个不会说中文的人就像是那个计算机。他根据一个程序来加工所接受到的所有东西,而他的输出事实上就像他对中文问题所作的回答。因此他通过了“图灵测验”,但仍然没有获得对中文的理解。同样地,一个计算机只是根据所设计的形式规则进行操行,而不能意识到它所操纵的符号的内容。塞尔因此结论说,程序不是心,因为前者是形式的或句法的,而后者则具有语义内容。语义学并不内在于句法学,而句法学对于语义学也是不充分的。中国屋论证对于强人工智能立场是一个有力的批评,后者声称心只是计算机的程序。中国屋论证的逻辑和涵义在过去10年间引起热烈的争论。

“我相信对强人工智能最著名的反驳就是我的中国屋论证。这一论证表明,一个系统可以例示一个程序以模拟人的某种认知能力,诸如理解中文的能力,尽管这一系统并不理解中文。”——塞尔:《心的再发现》,1992年,第45页。

选择

见“决定”条。

时序逻辑

“时态逻辑”的另一个名称。

丘奇定理

见“丘奇论题”条。

Church's thesis

"That the notion of an effectively calculable function of positive integers should be identified with that of a recursive function..." This thesis was proposed by the American mathematical logician Alonzo Church in 1935. It combines Gödel's notion of recursiveness with the notion of computability. A function is computable if and only if it is recursive and Turing computable. Since this thesis is closely related to the concept of Turing-computability, it is sometimes called the Church-Turing thesis. The notion of effective computability in Church's thesis is an intuitive rather than proven notion. For this reason, Church's thesis is a thesis rather than a theorem. There is, however, Church's theorem, proved by Church in 1936, which states that there is no decision procedure for determining whether an arbitrary formula of predicate calculus is a theorem of the calculus. It is a negative solution to the decision problem. Church's thesis serves as one of the premises of Church's theorem.

"Church's thesis, if true, guarantees that a Turing machine can compute any 'effective' procedure." —Baker, *Saving Belief*, 1987, p. 45.

Circular definition

A definition is circular if its *definiens* has to be explained by appeal to its *definiendum*, or if its *definiendum* appears in its *definiens*. This is in violation of the rule in formal logic that the *definiens* should not contain any part of the *definiendum*. A more common form of circularity occurs in a set of definitions, if a term A is defined by B, and B by C, and then C by A.

"If a definition contains the *definiendum* in the *definiens*, the definition is said to be circular." —Adams, *General Logic*, 1954, p. 164.

Circular reasoning, another term for begging the question

Citizenship

The legal status of being a member of a nation or state. In contemporary political philosophy, citizenship is both a duty-related and rights-related concept. As a citizen, one has a duty to promote and defend the interest of the state, even, if necessary, at the expense of one's own life. Citizens are also obliged to sacrifice some of their private life to engage in public activity. Citizens, however, are recognised as having a right to participate in public life, rights to vote and to stand for public office, rights to education and other welfare and rights to legal protection. Other rights, such as those involving free speech, free association and access to a free press, also derive from the notion of citizenship. Citizenship has been described as a democratic ideal which distinguishes free individuals from mere subjects who live under various forms

丘奇论题

“正整数的能行可计算函数的概念,应当等同于正整数的递归函数……”这个论题是由美国数理逻辑学家 A. 丘奇于 1935 年提出来的。它把哥德尔的递归性概念与可计算性概念结合起来。一个函数是可算的,当且仅当它是递归的和图灵可计算的。由于这个论题与图灵可计算性概念密切相关,有时也称作“丘奇-图灵论题”。丘奇论题中的能行可计算性的概念是一个直观的而非已证明的概念。因此,丘奇论题就只是一个论题,而非定理。不过,存在一个由丘奇于 1936 年证明了的“丘奇定理”,它表述为:不存在一个判定程序来确定谓词演算中的任意公式是否为演算的一个定理。这是对判定问题的一个否定解。丘奇论题用作丘奇定理的前提之一。

“‘丘奇论题’如果是正确的,就保证了图灵机能计算任何‘能行’程序。”——贝克尔:《拯救信念》,1987 年,第 45 页。

循环定义

在一定义中,如果定义项本身必须诉诸于被定义项来说明,或如果被定义项本身出现在定义项中,这个定义是循环定义。这个定义违背了定义项不应包含被定义项的任何部分这一形式逻辑规则。循环定义的比较常见的形式出现在一组定义中,这时,A 项用 B 项来定义,B 项用 C 项来定义,然后 C 项用 A 项来定义。

“如果一个定义将被定义项包含在定义项中,就说该定义是循环定义。”——亚当斯:《一般逻辑》,1954 年,第 164 页。

循环推理

“窃取论题”的别称。

公民身分

指的是作为一个国家的成员的法律地位。在当代政治哲学中,公民身分既是一个与义务相关的概念,也是一个与权利相关的概念。作为公民,一个人有义务促进和保卫国家的利益,甚至在必要的时候献出自己的生命。公民还要牺牲一些他们的私人生活去从事公共活动。但公民被承认有权参加社会生活,有权投票和参加政府公职人员的竞选,有权享受教育和其他福利,有权受到法律保护。其他权利,如那些包括言论自由、结社自由和出版自由的权利,也是从公民身分概念派生出来的。公民身分已被说成是一种把自由的个人与不过是生活在各种非民主政权下的国民区别开来的民主理想。民主的公民身分的公平问题是政治学有关公平问题讨

of undemocratic regimes. The equality of democratic citizenship is a central topic in the political discussion of equality.

"Democratic citizenship is a status radically disconnected from every kind of hierarchy." Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 1983, p. 277.

Civil disobedience

Activity engaged in openly but deliberately against the law in order to express some conscientious and deeply held convictions in the hope of changing perceived injustices in the law and government policies. The laws broken need not be the laws against which protest is raised. Civil disobedience must be distinguished from militant actions and organised forcible resistance. As a mode of address or protest for a vital social purpose, civil disobedience generally occurs in a well-ordered, democratic society and against a constitutional regime. The activity itself is in violation of law, but it is performed by people who accept the basic principles of a democratic society. Problems arise regarding questions such as the grounds on which these acts can be justified and how the legal systems might legitimately respond to them. The discussion of civil disobedience is closely related to the question of political obligation.

"I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 364.

Civil duty, see civil rights

Civil liberties, see civil rights

Civil rights

Civil matters pertain to the dealings of the state with its citizens as citizens. Civil rights are the rights granted to the citizens by the constitution and laws of a state and must be protected by the constitution and laws. These rights, or civil liberties, generally include freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religious belief and freedom of political participation. In this sense, they cover the rights stated in articles 1-21 of the *Universal Declaration Of Human Rights* (1948). The right to due process in the law and other legal protections are also included. It is a matter of dispute whether fundamental economic and social rights, such as the rights to education, work, shelter and health care, should also be regarded as civil rights. Questions arise concerning the relations among civil rights. Are they all on a par, or are some more fundamental than others? What should be done if the rights conflict? Can each stand on

论的中心话题。

"民主的公民身分是一种与各种等级制度根本无关的地位。"——沃尔泽：《正义的领域》，1983年，第277页。

非暴力反抗

公开而又审慎地进行的反对某一法律的活动，以表达某些良心上深信不疑的改变法律和政府政策中已被察觉出的不公正的愿望。反抗活动所违反的法律不必是它们所反对的那些法律。非暴力反抗必须同好战的行为和有组织的暴力反抗区别开来。作为一种为了极其重要的社会目的而采取的表达或反抗的方式，非暴力反抗一般发生在秩序良好的民主社会，其所反对的是一个符合宪法的政权。这一行为本身是违法的，但它是由那些接受民主社会的基本原则的人们进行的。于是出现了诸如为这些行为辩护的根据是什么及法律制度如何才能对它们做出合法的反应这类问题。对非暴力反抗的讨论与政治责任的问题密切相关。

"我首先把非暴力反抗定义为一种公开的、非暴力的、既是凭良心做的又是政治性的对抗法律的行为，其目的通常是为了使政府的法律或政策发生一种改变。"——罗尔斯：《正义论》，1971年，第364页。

公民责任

见“公民权利”条。

公民自由

见“公民权利”条。

公民权利

公民事务关涉一个国家如何把它的公民当做公民来看待。公民权利是一个国家的宪法和法律授予它的公民的权利，必须受到国家的制度和法律的保护。这些权利或“公民自由”通常包括言论、集会、出版、宗教信仰和政治活动等方面的自由。在这个意义上，它们涵盖了《世界人权宣言》(1948年)从第1条款至第21条款所陈述的权利。法律中所赋予的过程和其他法律保护也包括在其中。引起争议的是，诸如受教育的权利、工作、住房、健康保护工作等基本的经济和社会权利，是否也应该看作是公民权利。其他所提出的问题包括这些民权间的关系。它们是平等的吗或某些权利比其他的更为根本？抑或某一些权利彼此冲突怎么办？它们每一个是独立的，还是相互依赖的？公民权利是与“公民责任”相关连的。如果A有对X的权利，那

its own or are they interdependent? Civil rights are correlated with civil duties. If A has a right to X, then other citizens and the state have an obligation not to interfere with A's right. The United States enacted a Civil Rights Act in 1964, which addressed in particular the problem of racial equality. Here "civil rights" means the equal rights of black people to education, employment and the vote.

"The liberal, therefore, needs a scheme of civil rights whose effect will be to determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to reflect strong external preferences and to remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions altogether." ---Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 197.

Civil society

[German *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*] A major term in Hegel's political philosophy for an economical organisation of independent persons. Civil society is distinguished from an autonomous and sovereign political state. It includes a system of needs, that is the institutions and practice involved in the economic activities that meet a variety of needs, the administration of justice, public authority and corporations. A political state makes one a citizen, while a civil society makes one a bourgeois. In a civil society, the individual pursues his own private good and has equal civil rights. However, there is also a determinate system that guarantees both the freedom of the individual and the harmony of individual needs and the collective needs of the community. Hence civil society characterises modern ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Hegel's original distinction between civil society and the political state helps to understand the central role of the economical market in modern society.

"Civil society—an association of members as self subsistent individuals in a universality which because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal systems—the means to security of person and property—and by an external organisation for attaining their particular and common interests." ---Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, III, p. 157.

Civitas, see commonwealth

Class

A collection of entities satisfying a condition for membership in the class, that is, having certain common properties. The notion of a class or set is fundamental to set theory. A class is said to be open if it has infinite members and closed if its members are numerable. According to the axiom of extensionality, if two classes are exactly alike with respect to their members, they are identical. If a class has no members, it is called the null class or empty class. Class is usual-

么其他公民和国家就有义务不干涉 A 的权利。美国在 1964 年通过的《公民权利法案》，尤其强调种族平等问题。这里，“公民权利”意为黑人在受教育、就业和选举方面的平等权利。

“因此，自由主义者需要一个公民权利的方案，这个方案的作用将决定那先前很可能是反映强烈的外在偏爱的政治决定，以及从大多数人的政治制度中完全除掉这些决定。”——德沃金：《原则问题》，1986 年版，第 197 页。

市民社会

[德语词：*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*] 黑格尔政治哲学的重要概念，指独立个人间的经济组织。市民社会不同于自治的和君主的政治国家。它包括需要的体系，即在那满足各种需求的经济活动、司法、公共权威和公司的管理中所涉及的组织和实践。政治国家使人们成为公民，而市民社会使人们成为有产阶级。在市民社会中，个人追求他自己的私人利益，并具有平等的公民权利。然而也存在着确定的制度以保证个人的自由，协调个人需要和共同体的集体需要。因此，市民社会描述了现代伦理生活的特征。黑格尔的市民社会和政治国家的独创性区分有助于理解经济市场在现代社会中的中心作用。

“市民社会——这是各个成员作为独立的个人的联合，惟因他们的独立性，因而是抽象的普遍性的联合。他们的联合是通过他们的需要，通过保障人身和财产的法律制度——和通过维护他们的特殊利益和公共利益的外部组织而建立起来的。”——黑格尔：《法哲学》，Ⅱ，第 157 页。

全体国民

见“共同国家”条。

类

一个满足其成员条件，即具有某种相同性质的实体的集合体。类概念或集合概念是集合论的基础。一个类如果有无穷成员，称为“开放的”；如果其成员是可数的，称为“封闭的”。根据外延性公理，如果两个类就其成员而言完全相同，则它们是同一的。如果一个类没有成员，就称作“零类”或“空类”。“类”通常可与“集合”互换使用。但有些人认为“集合”仅包含那

ly used interchangeably with set, but some suggest that while set covers only those classes which are members of other classes, class covers collections which are not members of any other classes. The distinction is thought to be significant for solving Russell's paradox, which is also called the class paradox.

"By 'class' I mean things that have members." David Lewis, *Parts of Classes*, 1991, p. 4.

Classical Aristotelian conception of truth

Tarski asserted that his task was to enunciate the conception of truth in Aristotle's formula: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true". Aristotle's conception is the standard version of the correspondence theory of truth: "The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with reality". This formula is equivalent to the semantic notion of truth: "A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs". This is in turn the same as Tarski's (T) schema: " 'p' is true iff p".

"We should like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth." — Tarski, "The semantic conception of truth", in Feigl and Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, 1949, p. 53.

Class-inclusion

A transitive relationship such that if an individual S (or a class A) is included in a class B, and B is in turn included in a higher class C, then if S (or class A) belongs to class B, S (or class A) also belongs to class C. For instance, if Socrates is a human being, and human beings are animals, then Socrates is an animal. In contrast class-membership is an intransitive relationship. If A is a member of B, and B is a member of C, it does not follow that A is a member of C. For instance, Smith is a member of Oxford University, and Oxford University is a member of the National Union of Universities. But Smith is not a member of the National Union of Universities.

"The relation of class-inclusion is to be distinguished from the relation of class-membership, most importantly because class-membership is non-transitive." — Alexander, *A Preface to the Logic of Science*, 1963, p. 43.

Class-membership, see class inclusion

Clear and distinct

Descartes' general criterion of the certainty of knowledge or truth. It is based on methodological doubt and attached to the intellectual perception of ideas. Clarity is in contrast to obscurity. A perception or idea is clear if it con-

些作为其他类的成员的类,而“类”此外还包括那些不是任何其他类的成员的集合体。这一区别被认为对于解决“罗素悖论”(也称为“类悖论”)是重要的。

“我用‘类’意指那些有着成员的事物。”——刘易斯:《类的部分》,1991年,第4页。

亚里士多德的经典真理概念

塔斯基宣称他的任务是要阐明亚里士多德的以下真理概念公式:“把不存在的说成是存在的,把存在的说成是不存在的,就是谬误;而把存在的就说是存在的,不存在的就说是存在的,就是真实的。”亚里士多德的概念是真理符合论的典型说法:“一语句的真在于它与实在一致。”这个公式等同于真理的语义学概念:“一语句如指明一事件的存在状态则为真。”这同样等同于塔斯基的(T)等式:“‘P’为真当且仅当P”。

“我们喜欢我们的适当对待直觉的定义,这种直觉信奉亚里士多德的古典真理概念。”——塔斯基:《真理的语义学概念》,见费格尔和塞拉斯:《哲学分析读物》,1949年,第53页。

类包括

类包括是这样一种传递关系,如果一个个体S(或类A)为一个类B所包括,而B又依次为一更高的类C所包括,这样,如果S(或类A)属于B,则S(或类A)也属于类C。例如,如果苏格拉底是一个人,而人是动物,那么苏格拉底是一个动物。与之相比,类成员关系是一种非传递关系。如果A是B的成员,而B是C的成员,并不能得出A是C的成员。例如,史密斯是牛津大学的成员,牛津大学是全国大学联盟的成员,但史密斯不是全国大学联盟的成员。

“类包括关系之区别于类成员关系,最重要的是因为类成员是非传递的。”——亚历山大:《科学逻辑序论》,1963年,第43页。

类成员

见“类包括”条。

清晰明晰的

笛卡尔关于知识或真理的确实性的一般标准,这个概念以方法论上的怀疑方法为基础,而且附属于对观念的理智知觉,清楚与模糊相对。一个知觉或观念如果不包含随后可能引起我们

tains no implications which might subsequently causes us to doubt them. This requires the attentiveness of the mind. An idea is distinct if it is separated from everything else and contains absolutely nothing else but clear ideas. Distinctness is contrasted to confusion and is a stricter notion than clarity. An idea may be clear without being distinct, but a distinct idea is always clear. Descartes claimed that sorting out what is clear and distinct from what is obscure and confused is a laborious task. However, since this criterion relies on the intellect's power, it is usually criticised as failing to provide a genuine solution to the problem of the validation of human knowledge, for it simply declares that truth is self-manifesting to the human mind.

"I call a perception 'clear' when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind... I call a perception 'distinct' if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear." — Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al), 1985, vol. I, p. 208.

Closed sentence, see open sentence

Closed society, see open society

Cogito ergo sum

[Latin: I think, therefore I am.] The first principle or first truth of Descartes' metaphysical system. I can doubt everything, including whether I have a body. But as long as I am engaged in the process of thinking, I exist. Even if I doubt my existence, there must exist an "I" who can doubt. It would be a contradiction to deny the existence of something which is thinking. Thus this proposition is certain and indubitable. It is the first limitation to the agnostic doubt, and the starting-point of strict knowledge. It implies, of course, some prior knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved and their logical implications, but it is the first matter of existence of which one can be sure. The proposition might be construed syllogistically as presupposing a major premise that everything that thinks exists. But Descartes emphasised that the certainty of my existence is not a logical inference; rather it is an individual and immediate act of thinking.

"Observing that this truth 'I am thinking, therefore I exist' [*Ego Cogito Ergo Sum*] was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy of I was seeking." — Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, IV.

对它的怀疑的任何含义,那么它是清楚的,这要求心灵有充分的注意。如果一个观念与其他一切东西分开,绝对只包含清楚观念,那么它是明晰的。明晰与混乱相对,是比清楚更严格的概念。一个观念可以是清楚的而不明晰,但一个明晰的观念永远是清楚的。笛卡尔声称,把清楚明晰的观念从模糊混乱的观念中区分开来是一件费力的工作。不论怎样,由于这个标准依赖于理智能力,于是人们往往批评它未能真正解决人类知识的有效性问题的,因为它只是简单地宣布真理对于人类心灵是自明的。

"当一个知觉出现和到达于注意的心灵,我称这个知觉是'清楚的'……如果一个知觉不但是清楚的,而且与其他一切知觉截然分开,以至它自身中只包含清楚的东西,我称这个观念是明晰的。"——笛卡尔,《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第208页。

闭语句

见“开语句”条。

封闭社会

见“开放社会”条。

我思故我在

[拉丁语,我思想,所以我存在]笛卡尔的形而上学体系的第一原理或第一真理。我可以怀疑一切事情,包括我是否有一个身体。但是只要我在思维的过程中,我就存在,即使我怀疑我的存在,也必定有一个能怀疑的“我”存在着。否认正在思想的东西的存在是一个矛盾。因此,这个命题是确实的、不容置疑的。它是对不可知论的怀疑的第一个限制,是严格知识的起点。当然,它指的是关于相关词项的意义的某种先天知识和它们的逻辑蕴涵,但它是一个人关于存在所能肯定的第一件事。这个命题可以构成一个三段论,它预先假定了一个大前提:每一个思想的东西都存在。但笛卡尔强调,我的存在的确实性不是一个逻辑推断,毋宁说是单一而直接的思维活动。

"由于看到'我思想,所以我存在'这条真理是那样可靠和确实,以致怀疑论者的一切最狂妄的假定都不能使它动摇,于是我断定,我可以毫不迟疑地接受它,把它当做我所寻求的哲学的第一原理。"——笛卡尔,《方法谈》,IV。

Cognition

[from Latin: *cognitio*, awareness, or the formation of the ideas of something] *Cognitio* is usually translated as “knowledge”; but this is not precise. While “knowledge” is also used to translate “*scientia*”, Descartes distinguished cognition from knowledge (*scientia*), for much of our cognition is confused and inadequate. Spinoza distinguished among three grades of cognition. The first grade is composed of mere second-hand opinion, imagination and cognition derived from shifting experience. This kind of cognition admits of falsity. The second grade is reason (*ratio*) which seeks the underlying reason or cause of phenomena, and to find necessary truths. The third and highest grade is intuitive knowledge (*scientia intuitiva*) which advances from adequate ideas of the essence of attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. The distinction between intuitive knowledge and reason roughly corresponds to Aristotle’s distinction between *nous* which grasps the first principles and *apodeixis* (demonstration) which involves deduction from the established first principles.

In general philosophical usage, cognition comprises those states and processes leading to knowledge and is distinguished from sensation, feeling and volition. In contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive sciences, cognition is viewed as the representational states and processes of the mind, including not only thinking, but also language-using, symbol-manipulating and behaviour-controlling.

“Cognition of the first kind alone is the cause of falsity; cognition of the second and third orders is necessarily true.” —Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, proposition 41.

Cognitive science

An interdisciplinary investigation of human cognition and cognitive processes such as thinking, reasoning, memory, attention, learning, mental representation, perception and problem solving. It emerged in the 1970s, and psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, computer science, and artificial intelligence all contribute to this enterprise. While artificial intelligence attempts to get computing machines to approximate a human mind, the basic idea of cognitive science is to view the human mind as a computer-like information processing system. It is hence an attempt to understand the human cognition system in terms of the developments of computer science and artificial intelligence. Initially cognitive science viewed computation as the manipulation of symbols, but its recent development has taken the form of connectionism or neural network modelling.

“The basic inspiration of cognitive science went something like this: human beings do information processing.” —Searle, in Rynn and Tsui-James (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 13.

认知

[源自拉丁文 *cognitio*, 知道 (awareness), 或形成某物的观念] 通常被译为“认识”, 然而这是不准确的。“认识”也用作 *scientia* 的翻译, 笛卡尔把认知同认识 (*scientia*) 区分开来, 因为我们的许多认知是混乱的、不恰当的。斯宾诺莎划分了认知的三个等级。第一等的认知完全由第二手的意见、想像和从变幻不定的经验中得来的认知组成。这种认知承认虚假。第二等的认知是理性 (*ratio*), 它寻找现象的根本理由或原因, 发现必然的真理。第三等即最高等的认知是直觉认识 (*scientia intuitiva*), 它从有关属性本质的恰当观念发展而来, 达到对事物本质的恰当认识。直觉认识和理性的区分大致相当于亚里士多德的努斯和 *apodeixis* (证明) 的区分, 努斯把握第一原理, *apodeixis* 包括从既定的第一原理出发进行的演绎。

按照一般的哲学用法, “认知”包括通往知识的那些状态与过程, 与感觉、感情和意志相区别。在当代认知心理学和认知科学中, 认知被看作心灵的表征状态和过程, 它不但包括思维, 而且包括语言运用、符号操作和行为控制。

“只有第一种认知是虚假的原因, 第二种和第三种认知是必然为真的。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, 第二部分, 命题 41。

认知科学

对于像思维、推理、记忆、注意、学习、心的表征、知觉和问题解决等这样的人类认知和认知过程的跨学科研究。它出现于 70 年代, 汇集了心理学、语言学、哲学、神经科学、计算机科学和人工智能的研究成果。人工智能试图使计算机接近人的心, 而认知科学的基本思想则是将人的心视为像计算机那样的信息加工系统。因此, 它试图用计算机科学和人工智能的发展来理解人的认知系统。最初的认知科学是将计算视为信号的操纵, 其新近的发展则采取“联结主义”即“神经网络模型”的形式。

“认知科学的基本精神就是: 人类进行信息加工。”——塞尔, 见布宁和崔-詹姆斯编:《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》, 1996 年, 第 13 页。

Cognitive value

A term Frege introduced to contrast with truth-value. The truth-value of a sentence is its truth or falsity and does not vary if we substitute for one of its components another term having the same reference. However, the substitution might result in a different understanding of the sentence. For the substitute term might have the same reference (that is, what it designates) but different senses (that is, what it means). Hence, the substantial information the sentence conveys will be changed. This sense is the cognitive value of a sentence, which we understand when we understand the sentence. Cognitive value is also called epistemic value.

" $a = a$ and $a = b$ are obviously statements of differing cognitive value." —Frege, *Collected Papers*, 1984, p. 157.

Cognitivism

Ethical theories which hold that there is knowledge of moral facts and that normative ethical judgements can be said to be true or false. Cognitivism includes the majority of traditional ethical theories. In contrast, noncognitivism, represented by emotivism and prescriptivism, holds that moral statements do not possess truth-values and cannot be known. Outside of ethics, cognitivism is a psychological theory which explains behaviour by appeal to the information-processing states of the physical brain.

"Roughly, cognitivists hold that there is ethical knowledge; non-cognitivists deny it." —Hancock, *Twentieth Century Ethics*, 1974, p. 12.

Coherence theory of truth

A theory taking truth to consist in coherent relations among the members of a set of beliefs and propositions, rather than in relations between a proposition and a corresponding fact. This theory arises due to the failure of the correspondence theory of truth to provide a satisfactory explanation of the nature of correspondence. The coherence of a proposition with other propositions is the ultimate criterion of truth. Truth is defined in terms of the coherence of propositions. Coherence usually means consistency and interdependence. Generally speaking, the proponents of this theory have their philosophical outlook shaped by an admiration for mathematics. For many rationalists, this theory of truth is an essential ingredient in their epistemology. In the twentieth century this theory was proposed by the idealist Bradley and the logical positivist Neurath, and was most recently defended by Rescher. Its major problem is that it generally goes beyond one's power to put a proposition into a holistic system of beliefs. Furthermore, a proposition might be coherent with others in its system, but the system as a whole might be incompatible with another system of beliefs. Accordingly, coherence and truth do not seem to be the same.

"A coherence theory of truth may be seen, in an essen-

认识值

弗雷格引入的与“真值”相对的词。句子的真值就是它的真假，即使我们用另一个具有相同指称的成分替换句子的组成部分，这个真值也不会改变。然而，这种替换可能会带来对句子的不同理解。因为这个替换词可能有相同的指称（即它所指明的东西），但却有不同的意义（即它所意味的东西）。因而这就会改变这个句子所传递的替换内容。这种意义就是句子的认识值，即当我们理解了一个句子时所理解的东西。认识值也被称作认知值。

" $a = a$ 和 $a = b$ 显然是有着不同认识值的陈述。”——弗雷格：《论文集》，1984年，第157页。

认知主义

指这样一些伦理理论，它们认为，存在关于道德事实的知识，并且规范的伦理判断可以说是或真或假的。认知主义包括了大多数传统的伦理学理论。相反，以“情感主义”和“规定主义”为代表的非认知主义认为，道德陈述不具有真值，不能认知。在伦理学之外，认知主义也指称那种诉诸大脑的信息处理状态解释行为的心理学理论。

“大致地说，认知主义认为有伦理知识，非认知主义则否定之。”——汉考克：《20世纪伦理学》，1974年，第12页。

真理融贯论

这一理论认为，真理在于一套信念和命题各部分之间的融贯关系，而不在于一命题与它所对应的事实之间的关系。这种理论之所以出现，是因为真理符合论对符合的性质不能提供令人满意的说明。一命题与其他命题的融贯是真理的最终标准。真理根据命题之间的融贯关系来定义。融贯性通常意味着相容性和相互依赖性。一般而言，这一理论的倡导者们出于对数学的羡慕而形成了他们的哲学观点。对许多唯理论者来说，这种真理论是其认识论中的本质性构成要素。在20世纪，这一理论为唯心论者布拉德雷和逻辑实证主义者纽拉特所提倡，新近又由雷谢尔极力加以捍卫。它的主要问题是：把一命题纳入一整体性的信念系统通常超出了一个人的能力范围。更有甚者，一命题可能与它所在的系统内的其他命题相融贯，但该系统作为一个整体却可能与另一个信念系统不相容。由此看来，融贯和真理似乎不是一回事。

“可以看出，真理融贯论实质上发挥着某种调节作用，它支配着有关把经验命题分类为真命题的那些考虑，并没有宣称要展示真理本身的构成性本质。”——雷谢尔：《真理融贯论》，

tially regulative role governing the considerations relating to the classification of empirical propositions as true, rather than claiming to present the constitutive essence of truth as such.”—Rescher, *The Coherence Theory of Truth*, 1973, p. 39.

Coherentism

[from Latin: *cohaerere*, to adhere together, stick together] Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification, in opposition to foundationalism. It denies the view that there is a set of self-warranting perceptual beliefs which serve as the ultimate justification for all other beliefs. Instead it suggests that all beliefs form a network within which each has equal epistemic status. A cognitive system is a family of interrelated theses that are linked to one another by an interlacing network of connections. These connections are inferential in nature but not necessarily deductive. Justification is a matter of coherence. A belief is justified if and only if it coheres with the background system of beliefs. There are various ways of understanding the nature of coherence; and different views of what coherence is form different versions of coherentism. Since coherence is essentially an internal relation among beliefs, there is a major difficulty for coherentism to deal with, i. e. how to fill the gap between justified belief and external reality. It is also difficult to accommodate this theory with perceptual knowledge. In another usage, coherentism means the view that a complete inductive logic is restricted to a principle of credal coherence.

“Coherentism... views the network-interrelatedness of factual theses as the criterial standard of their acceptability.”—Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, 1979, p. 66.

Collective predicate, Goodman's term for mass noun

Collective responsibility

Modern ethics has been traditionally individualistic in the sense that only the individual can be the focus of ethical consideration and that an action of a group can be morally meaningful only when it can be reduced to the actions of individuals. But there is a tendency to believe that in certain circumstance we can have a notion of group or collective responsibility which cannot be reduced to individual responsibility. For example, some seek to ascribe responsibility or blame collectively to white South Africans under apartheid and to Germans as a whole under the Nazi regime. The problem is how to talk about this group responsibility. It does not seem correct to model it on the discourse of individual responsibility. What is important is to define what the group is. It is generally thought that the group in question should not be a random collection of individuals, but must be one which has a group cohesion and identity. All its members should have

1973 年, 第 39 页。

融合主义

[源自拉丁文 *cohaerere*, 是指连在一起, 钉在一起]“融合主义”通常是指一种认识的辨明理论, 与之对立的是“基础主义”。它否认存在一套自明的知觉信念作为其他一切信念的最终辨明。相反, 它认为一切信念构成了一个框架, 其中的每个信念都具有相同的认识地位。一个认识体系就是一个相互关联的论题家族, 这些论题通过交错的关联网络联在一起。这些关联在本质上是推论性的, 但并非必然是演绎性的。辨明就是一种融合。一个信念得到辨明, 当且仅当它符合作为其背景的信念体系。对融合的性质有各种理解; 而对融合究竟是什么的不同看法, 就构成了不同形式的融合主义。由于融合基本上是信念之间的内在关系, 因而融合主义就面临着这样一个主要困难, 即如何去填补已辨明的信念与外在实在之间的鸿沟。而要使这个理论能够适应知觉的知识, 也很困难。在另一种用法中, 融合主义是指这样一种观点, 即认为一个完整的归纳逻辑只能限于可信融合的原则。

“融合主义……把事实论题的交错网络看作是可以接受它们的评判标准。”——雷谢尔:《认识的系统化》, 1979 年, 第 66 页。

集合谓词

古德曼称“总量名词”的名称。

集体责任

现代伦理学在传统上是个人主义的, 因为惟有个人是伦理考虑的关注点; 而一个团体的行为, 只有当它能归结到个人的行为时才有道德意义。但有一种倾向相信, 在一定的环境下我们会有不能归结为个人责任的团体责任或集体责任。例如, 当南非实行它的种族隔离法, 我们可以把责任或指责集体性地归之于作为一个群体的南非白人, 我们也可以把责任或指责归于纳粹时代的全体德国人。问题是如何说明这种集体责任。以个人责任讨论的模式似乎不能正确地说明它。重要的是先界定团体(群体)是什么。一般认为, 所讨论的团体不是个人的任意的集合, 而必须是一个具有团体凝聚力和认同的集体, 它所有的成员有着共同利益, 有着对于团体的自豪或羞愧感。我们把指责或责任归诸于这类团体, 不光是因为它的所有成员都做了错

common interests and a sense of pride and shame in the group. Blame or responsibility should be ascribed to this kind of group not only when all of its members do something wrong, but also when some of its members commit significant blameworthy actions in virtue of their membership. The issue, along with similar questions regarding group interest, group rights and group justice, remains open and is unlikely to be settled until we have a better understanding of the metaphysical nature of social entities and the relationship between groups and their members.

"My account makes it a necessary condition for the ascription of collective responsibility to unorganised groups that each member of a group engage in acts or omissions which contribute to the harmful consequences for which the group is held collectively responsible." —May, *The Morality of Groups*, 1987, p. 75.

Collectivism

In contrast to individualism, which gives priority to individual interests over collective interests, the view that the common interests of a group or society are more important than the interests of its individual members. The significance of an individual cannot be considered apart from the group or state to which he belongs, and an individual can flourish or develop freedom only within the necessary background conditions provided by some collectivity. When the interests of an individual and society clash, the individual should concede in order to allow the society to meet its goals. Like individualism, collectivism has ethical, metaphysical, explanatory and methodological versions, which need not all be accepted. One can accept the claim that there are collective entities like families or states which have some kind of metaphysical priority over their individual members without accepting a moral priority for the goals of the collective over the aims of the individuals.

Often collectivism is equated with socialism on the basis of Marx's explanation of social and historical phenomena in terms of class conflict based on the forces and relations of production and of his understanding of individualism as a product of the capitalist mode of production. Socialism proposes the use of the apparatus of state and government power to control, command and regulate the economy and various other sectors of civil society for the good of the proletariat and ultimately other social classes until class-based society is superseded by communism. This sophisticated theory and its criticism raise many fundamental questions about the claims of collectivism.

"I use the term 'collectivism' only for a doctrine which emphasises the significance of some collective or group, for instance, the state (or a certain state; or a nation; or a class) as against that of the individual." —Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 1945, I, p. 203.

事,而且也因为它的某些成员凭借他们的团体成员资格犯下了极可谴责的恶行。这一问题,连同相联的有关团体利益、团体权利和团体正义等相似的问题,仍处于争论之中,而且不太可能盖棺定论,除非我们对社会存在物的形而上学性质以及团体与个人的联系有更好的理解。

"就我的论点而言,把集体责任归属于一个非组织的团体的必要条件是,一个团体中的每一个成员,他们所从事的活动或忽略做的事情促成了有害的后果,而对于这个后果,团体被认为集体地负有责任。"——梅:《团体道德》,1987年,第75页。

集体主义

与把个人利益置于集体利益之上的个人主义不同,集体主义认为,一个团体或一个社会的共同利益比其单个成员的利益更重要。个人的重要性不能脱离他从属的团体或国家来考虑,个人只有在由某一集体提供的必要背景条件下才能发扬或发展自由。当个人利益和社会利益发生冲突时,为了使社会实现其目标,个人利益应当让步。与个人主义一样,集体主义也有伦理的、形而上学的、解释性的和方法论的不同形式,它们无需都被接受。我们可以接受这样的说法,即存在着像家庭或国家这样的集体实体,它们对其单个成员具有某种形而上学的优先性,而不必接受集体目的高于个人目的道德优先性。

根据马克思以基于生产力和生产关系的阶级斗争对社会和历史现象的说明,以及他把个人主义理解为资本主义生产方式的产物,集体主义常常被等同于社会主义。社会主义提出为了无产阶级的和其他阶级的最终利益,要运用国家机器和政府权力去控制、指挥和规范经济及公民社会的其他各种部分,直至阶级社会为共产主义社会所取代。这一复杂的理论及其批评对集体主义的说法提出了很多根本性的问题。

"我使用'集体主义'这个词只是用以表示一种学说,这一学说强调某些集体或团体的重要性,如'国家'(某一国家、民族、阶级),以反对个人的重要性。"——波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》,1945年,第一卷,第203页。

Command

As a central concept in Kant's moral philosophy, a law that must be obeyed and followed even in opposition to inclination. A command is formulated through an imperative and is expressed as an ought. It is the subjection or conformity of the inclinations of the will to objective moral law. Categorical imperatives are commands in the absolute sense, while hypothetical imperatives are commands that are subject to certain conditions regarding the aims of those to whom they are addressed. In contemporary philosophy of language, a command is a kind of speech act which, when addressed to other people, expresses a mandate and involves a prescription. The logic of commands or imperatives has been part of a more general development of contemporary logic.

"The representation of an objective principle insofar as it necessitates the will is called a command (of reason)." — Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 413.

Command theory of law

A theory that can be traced to Jeremy Bentham, but which became widely known through the work of his disciple John Austin, who elaborated the theory in *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (1832). Austin rejected the claim of natural law theory that positive law is derived from natural law. Instead, he defined law as a species of command issued by a sovereign person or body that has purpose or power to inflict punishment. Law is a coercive method of social control, and we do not have an option to avoid following legal requirements. In his understanding, a command has two aspects: (a) it signifies a desire or wish conceived by a rational being; (b) it can inflict evil or harm on those who fail to satisfy this desire. Accordingly, his definition of law excludes customary law, constitutional law and international law, because they are not commands in his sense. If the sovereign has stipulated a sanction, one is under a legal duty. Austin's command theory of law is generally criticised as being too narrow, for law does more than merely command. In recent times, his definition of law is examined by H. L. A. Hart in *The Concept of Law*.

"Austin's particular theory is often called 'the command theory of law' because he makes the concept of command central in his account of law and maintains that all laws are commands, even when they do not take a form that appears imperative in nature." — Murphy and Coleman, *The Philosophy of Law*, 1984, p. 23.

Commensurability, see incommensurability

Common consent argument, another term for *consensus gentium argument*

律令

康德道德哲学的中心概念，指必须服从和遵守的法则，即使该法则与自己的倾向相冲突。律令通过命令式来表述，即表达为“应该”。这就是使意志的倾向从属于或遵守客观的道德法则。绝对命令是绝对意义的律令，而假言命令是从属于某种条件的律令，这种条件涉及那些对他们提出律令的人们的目的。在当代语言哲学中，律令成为一种言语行为。它指向其他人，表达一个训令，还包含一个指示。律令或命令的逻辑一向是当代逻辑普遍发展的部分。

“客观原则的表现，就其对意志具有强制性来说，称为（理性的）律令。”——康德：《道德形而上学基础》，第413页。

法的命令理论

这一理论可追溯到J. 边沁，但使其成为众所周知的理论却是由于他的信徒J. 奥斯汀的著作，后者在他的《法理学的既定范围》（1832）一书中对这一理论做了详尽的阐述。奥斯汀拒绝自然法理论所主张的实在法起源于自然法的主张，并把法律定义为一种由最高主权者，或由有意或有权进行惩罚的机构发布的命令。法律是一种社会控制的强制方法，我们没有可以避免遵守法律要求的选择。按照他的理解，“命令”这个词有两层含义：（a）它意指由一个理性的人提出的要求或希望；（b）它可使违背这一要求的人遭受不幸或伤害。因此，他将习惯法、宪法和国际法都排除在他的法律定义之外，因为它们都不是他所讲的那种命令。一旦统治者制定了法令，人们就负有法律责任。奥斯汀的法的命令理论通常被指责为过于狭窄，因为法律绝不仅仅是命令。在近代，H. L. A. 哈特在《法的概念》一书中对奥斯汀的法律定义进行了考察。

“奥斯汀的独特理论常常被称为‘法的命令理论’，因为他将命令这一概念置于其法律解释的中心，并坚持认为所有的法律都是命令，即使在它们实际上没有采取强制形式时也是如此。”——墨菲和科耳曼：《法哲学》，1984年，第23页。

可通约性

见“不可通约性”条。

常识论证

“常识论证 (*consensus gentium argument*)”

Common good

The public and shared interests of a community, such as peace, order and security, the enjoyment of which by some community members does not prevent enjoyment of it by others. The common good is contrasted to individual or private goods, the enjoyment of which precludes the rights of others to them. The common good is essential for human happiness and every member of the community is obliged to pursue it. In the traditional theory of natural law, protecting and promoting the common good is the sufficient and necessary condition for the authenticity of the law. The existence of the common good demands that the individual should be subordinate to the community and that in certain circumstances individual interests should be sacrificed to secure the common good. A major issue in contemporary ethical and political theory is to justify the rationality and scope of this subordination and sacrifice.

"Government is assumed to aim at the common good, that is, at maintaining conditions and achieving objectives that are similarly to everyone's advantage."—Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 233.

Common notion

[Greek: *koine ennoia*] A Stoic term for notions which refer to the most basic features of a conceived object and which arise naturally in the minds of all sensible men. These notions are thought to be self-validating, self-evident and are the starting point of all reasoning and investigation. In Euclid's geometry, common notions are axioms or first principles. In modern philosophy, some philosophers such as Thomas Reid consider them as intuitively known and unquestionable beliefs which are generally accepted and arise out of natural instinct. Descartes used the conception of common notion for fundamental logical truths or axioms, such as "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time". The truth of a common notion is completely assured. According to Descartes, we do not arrive at these notions out of natural instinct. They are rather acquired by the natural light of reason, though some people whose natural light is obstructed would not perceive them properly. Common notions form a part of the content of the mind and are a condition of knowledge.

"Common notions... are, as it were, links which connect other simple natures together and whose self-evidence is the basis for all the rational inferences we make."—Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al), 1985, I, p. 45.

Common sense

The natural and ordinary beliefs which are taken for

的英文表述。

共同善

一个共同体公共的和共享的利益,即和平、秩序、安全等。对于共同善的享有并不排斥其他人享有它。因此,它是与个人的或“私人的善”相对的,对私人善的享有排斥了其他人对它的享有。共同善对于人类幸福是至关重要的,要求共同体的每一个成员都有义务追求它。在自然法理论的传统中,保护和促进共同的善是法的权威性的充分而又必要的条件。共同善的存在要求个人应该服从共同体,在一定的条件下,为了保卫共同善,个人利益应该作出牺牲。当代伦理学和政治学理论的一个主要问题是,论证这种服从和牺牲的范围和合理性。

“政府的目标在于共同善,即维护和获得对于每一个人的利益都有同样意义的条件和目标。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第233页。

共同概念

[希腊词是 *koine ennoia*] 这个词为斯多亚派用来指这样一些概念,这些概念指称被构想的对象的最基本特征,并且是从一切明智的人心中自然而然产生出来的。这些概念被认为是自身有效和自明的,是一切推理和研究的起点。在欧几里得几何中,共同概念指公理或第一原理。在近代哲学中,有些哲学家,像T. 里德,认为共同概念是一些由直觉所知、毫无疑问的信念,这些信念被普遍接受,而且出自天生的本能。笛卡尔用共同概念这个概念指根本的逻辑真理或公理,像“同一事物不可能既存在同时又不存在”。一个共同概念的真理性是完全确定的。根据他的观点,我们从天生的本能达不到这些概念。毋宁说它们是靠“自然的理性之光”而获得的,尽管有些人的自然的理性之光被堵塞了,他们不能恰当地察觉这些概念。共同概念构成了心灵的内容的一部分,是知识的一个条件。

“共同概念……可以说是将其他简单性质联系在一起的一环,它们的自明性是我们作出的一切合理推断的基础。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第45页。

常识

一些自然的、日常的信念,它们被未受哲学

granted by people independent of philosophical training. While rationalistic philosophy often starts by challenging and rejecting common sense, there is a kind of philosophy which argues that the general consent which exists regarding the views of common sense offers justification for accepting them in preference to sceptical or revisionary doctrines. Historically, Thomas Reid, the main figure in the Scottish school of common sense, argued with great subtlety against Hume's scepticism and his associated theory of ideas. G. E. Moore, the leading defender of common sense in this century, claims in his famous paper "A Defense of Common Sense" that a philosopher's common sense convictions are more certain than any of the arguments purporting to establish scepticism.

Another meaning of common sense, initiated by Aristotle (Greek, *koine aisthesis*), refers to a faculty which integrates the data from the five specialised senses. This meaning is accepted by the scholastics and also elaborated in the philosophy of Descartes. Kant adapted the Aristotelian notion to form an account of common sense as reflective, public and critical in contrast to what he saw as Reid's vulgar account of common sense.

"Both common sense and physics supplement precepts by the assumption that things do not cease to exist when unperceived." —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 340.

Common sense morality

Pre-theoretical moral convictions, held by ordinary people. Its value in ethics has been a subject of dispute. While some philosophers, such as Plato and Aquinas, believe that ordinary morality must be subject to theoretical examination and guidance, others, such as Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, those in the British moral sense tradition, moral intuitionists, Rawls and applied ethical theorists, believe that an adequate ethics must lie primarily in systematising our common sense moral judgements. If the conclusions derived from a moral theory deeply conflict with common sense, the theory itself must be defective. Common sense morality denies that we need moral experts to guide our daily life, but it must combat moral relativism and can face a demand to provide a criterion to test the adequacy of common sense moral beliefs.

"I submit that analogous to this internal common sense of law there is an internal common sense of morality which every rational morality ought to respect." —Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 202.

Common sense psychology, another term for folk psychology

Commonwealth

In a broad sense, a commonwealth contrasts with the state of nature and is identical with a civil state or *civitas*. In a narrow sense, it is government, in particular democratic

训练的人当成是不言而喻的。理性主义哲学的出发点常常是挑战和拒斥常识，存在着这种哲学主张，它提供理由证明应该接受而不是怀疑或修正人们在常识方面达成的共识。从历史上看，苏格兰常识学派的主角 T. 里德极其细致地批驳了休谟的怀疑论及其相关的观念论。本世纪捍卫常识的领头人物 G. E. 摩尔在其著名的文章“捍卫常识”中说，哲学家对常识的坚信比旨在建立怀疑论的任何论证都更为确定。

常识还有另一层含义，最先由亚里士多德提出（希腊文为 *koine aisthesis*），指把由五种特殊感官得到的材料加以整合的能力。这一层含义被经院哲学家接受，并在笛卡尔的哲学中得到发挥。康德采纳了亚里士多德的概念，把常识说成是反思的、公共的、批判的，以区别于他视为里德对于常识的庸俗说明。

“常识和物理学都以下列假定对格言作了补充：事物在不被感知时就不再存在。”——罗素：《人类的知识》，1948年，第340页。

常识道德

为普通人所持有的前理论的道德信念。在伦理学中，它的价值一直是一个争议的问题。某些哲学家例如柏拉图和阿奎那相信，常识道德必须受到理论的审察和导引，而其他一些哲学家，诸如亚里士多德、康德、黑格尔，英国道德感传统中的那些人，道德直觉主义者，罗尔斯和应用伦理学家，相信一种适当的伦理学必定主要在于系统阐发我们常识性的道德判断。如果来自于一种道德理论的结论是与常识深刻冲突的，这个理论本身必定是有问题的。常识道德否定我们需要道德专家来指导我们的日常生活，但它必须与道德相对主义相争执，并且面对着提供一个标准来检验常识道德信念的适当性的要求。

“我认为，相类似于这种法的内在常识的是，有一种道德的内在常识，每一种理性道德都应该尊重这种常识。”——库珀：《道德思考的多样性》，1981年，第202页。

常识心理学

“常识心理学”的另一表述。

共同国家

在广义上，共同国家相对于自然状态而言，等同于市民国家或全体国民（*civitas*）。在狭义上，它指政府，特别指民主政府。霍布斯和洛克

government. Both Hobbes and Locke endorsed the broad sense. A commonwealth as a civil state is formed when people in a state of nature consent to give up some of their rights and power in exchange for the protection of other rights and powers. It is generally believed that in a commonwealth people can live in a peaceful and orderly manner. A commonwealth must have some form of government, that is, some system of subjection and obedience. In this regard it is different from a community in which there is no system of subjection. Both Hobbes and Locke held that a commonwealth should be one coherent living body. Among the various forms of government a commonwealth might have, Hobbes preferred monarchy, while Locke proposed democracy.

"By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a Democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community which the *Latines* signified by the word *civitas*, to which the word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a Society of Man, which Communities or city in English does not, for there may be subordinate Communities in a Government." —Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, 2, Sect. 133.

Communicative action

For Habermas, a distinct and crucially important type of social interaction that is oriented toward reaching mutual understanding through a process of argumentation. Within such action, participants harmonise their respective plans on the basis of having a common understanding of the situation and make claims that all concerned can accept as valid. Communicative action seeks public agreement rather than private advantage; agents do not seek to influence others to act in ways solely favouring their own interests and plans. Communicative action is opposed to strategic action, in which individual participants are oriented toward achieving their own goals by manipulating their opponents. Strategic action is instrumental and egoistic, with individual agents seeking to achieve their ends by any effective means. Communicative action is a matter of dialogue and is characterised by reciprocity. There are implicit canons of normative validity in communicative action, and each side acts out of unforced obligations based upon mutual understanding. Discourse is the idealisation of communicative action. Philosophy should reveal the universal conditions determining the possibility of communicative action. It should show how communicative actions of different types are embedded in historical situations and how they change in historical time. The theory of communicative action is inspired by speech act theory.

"The concept of communicative action presupposes languages as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted

都认同广义的共同国家概念。当自然状态的人同意放弃他们的某些权利和权力,以换取对其他权利和权力的保护,这时,作为市民国家的共同国家就形成了。一般认为,在共同国家中,人民可以和平而有秩序地生活。一个共同国家必须有某种政府形式,即某种服从和顺从的制度。就此而言,它与共同体是不同的,共同体中没有服从的制度。霍布斯和洛克都认为共同国家应当是一个连贯的、活动的机构。在共同国家可能具有的各种政府形式中,霍布斯偏爱君主制,而洛克提倡民主制。

"人们必须理解,我用共同国家一词始终指的不是民主国或任何政府形式,而是拉丁文 *civitas* 一词所指的任何独立的社会,在我们的语言中,与 *civitas* 最相符的词是 commonwealth,而且它最恰当地表示了这样一个人类社会,英语中的社区或城市两词都不能表示,因为在政府中可以有下属的社区。"——洛克:《政府论两篇》,第二篇,第133节。

交往行为

对哈贝马斯来说,交往行为是一种独特的和极为重要的社会互动类型,这种互动试图通过论辩过程来达到相互理解。在这种交往行为中,参与者在对所处情形具有一个共同理解的基础上协调他们各自的计划,并要求所有相关者都认可这种协调。交往行为追求共通一致而非私人优势;参与者并不单单以有利于自己利益和计划的方式来影响他人行事。交往行为与“策略行为”相对立,在后者之中,个体参与者为了达到自己的目的而操纵其对手。策略行为是工具主义的和以自我为中心的,其特点是个体行事者们力求通过一切有效手段而达到各自的目的。交往行为则是一种对话,以互动互惠为特点。在这种行为中有隐含着的规范有效性的规范,每一方的行为都出自在相互理解基础上的非强迫义务。对谈是交往行为的理想化。哲学则应揭示决定交往行为可能性的普遍条件。它应该显示不同类型的交往行为如何植根于历史情形之中,它们如何在历史性时刻发生变化。交往行为理论从“言语行为”理论获得灵感。

"交往行为的概念预设语言为达到某种理解的中介。在这理解过程中,通过与一个世界相关联,参与者互动互惠地提出可被接受或争议的有效性要求。"——哈贝马斯:《交往行为理论》,第一卷,1984年,第99页。

or contested.” —Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, I, 1984, p. 99.

Communicative ethics, another name for discourse ethics

Communicative rationalisation, see communicative rationality

Communicative rationality

Habermas's term for the rationality that is implicitly contained in the structure of human speech and shared by all competent speakers. Standard accounts of rationality represent it as involving one dimensional logical relations between propositions and as centred in the thought and action of individual subjects. In contrast, communicative rationality is two dimensional and involves a dialogical relationship between different speakers. The traditional conception of rationality is represented in the paradigm of our knowledge of objects, while communicative rationality is expressed in the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects who are capable of speech and action and in an understanding of the world which is decentred away from the individual subject. It is the life-world rationality, dealing with the intersubjectivity of valid claims. Its sphere of validity corresponds to the sphere of human speech. For Habermas, the notion of communicative rationality is the basis for communicative action. He calls the process by which communicative action replaces strategic action communicative rationalisation.

“This communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a rationally motivated agreement” —Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (tr. Lawrence), 1987, p. 315.

Communitarianism

A family of positions which stand in contrast to liberal individualism. While liberal individualism, which developed from utilitarian and Kantian thought to Rawls and Nozick, focuses on the individual as the bearer of rights and as the centre of moral and political analysis, communitarianism shifts this focus to the community. It insists that the individual is embedded into a concrete moral, social, historical and political context which is constitutive of individual identity. Hence communitarianism replaces the atomistic conception of the person with a contextualist view of human identity and agency. It emphasises the social nature of life and the relationships constituting the person and society rather than freedom of choice. It claims that communal good is prior to individual rights and that there is no single distributive principle

交往伦理学

“言谈伦理学”的别名。

交往理性化

见“交往理性”条。

交往理性

哈贝马斯用这个词来表达那隐含在人类言语结构中并由所有能言谈者共享的理性。在传统的标准理性观看来,理性只有一个维度,它涉及命题之间的逻辑关系,并成为思想和单个主体行为的中心。与此不同,交往理性是双维度的,涉及不同言谈者之间的对话关系。传统理性观通过我们关于对象的知识范式表现出来,而交往理性则在主体间相互理解的范式中被表达;这些主体能够说话和行动,处于对一个非自我中心化的世界的理解之中。它是生活世界(life-world)的理性,关注可靠主张的主体间性。它的有效性领域相应于人类言语的领域。在哈贝马斯看来,交往理性观是交往行为的基础。他称交往行为代替策略行为的过程为“交往理性化”。

“这种交往理性使更早的逻各斯(logos)观念复活。之所以会这样,乃是因为这种理性具有一种非强迫地统一化和促成共识的言谈力量,在其中参与者们克服他们一开始带有的主观偏见视角,从而朝向一种由理性推动着的谐调一致。”——哈贝马斯:《现代性的哲学话语》(劳伦斯 英译),1987年,第315页。

共同体主义

与“自由个人主义”相对的一组立场。从功利主义和康德发展到罗尔斯和诺齐克的自由个人主义,关注的焦点在于把个人作为权利的承担者和道德分析与政治分析的中心,而共同体主义则把这个焦点转移到共同体。它坚持认为个人是被嵌于一种具体的道德、社会、历史和政治背景中,这种背景对于个人的同一性起着建构作用。因此,共同体主义以人格同一性和行为者的背景论观点取代原子式的人的概念。它强调生活的社会性和人与社会的关系而不是选择自由。它主张共同的善先于个人权利,没有任何单一的分配原则可运用于任何社会的善。对于正义的理解与证明必须与传统及大家认可的善的观念相连。我们不可能站在特定社会的传统

that is applicable to all social goods. The intelligibility and justification of justice must be connected to tradition and the shared conception of the good. We cannot stand outside the discourse and traditions of particular societies. The major proponents of communitarianism include A. MacIntyre, M. Sandel, C. Taylor and R. Rorty, but the position has not yet been systematised and does not have a common manifesto. The major charge facing at least some communitarian positions is that they have conservative social and political implications and that they make cross-cultural criticism difficult.

"As the name suggests, communitarianism is concerned with community, and more particularly its absence from the liberal account." —Archard, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds), *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1995, p. 269.

Community

In ethics, community is not an institution which is organised for any special purpose in accordance with rules. Instead it is the social context in which members are united by mutual co-operation and reciprocity. Community in this sense has been seen as a virtue in traditional conceptions of the good or ideal society. Liberal individualism places priority on the individual in contrast to community by isolating individuals from their historical and social context and treating individuals as abstract bearers of rights. Contemporary communitarianism argues that community rather than the individual should be the basis of ethics and political theory. The community is constitutive of the individual's identity. It is a formative context and an organic whole rather than an aggregate of atoms. This idea can be traced to Aristotle's emphasis on the role of the *polis* in the cultivation of virtues and Hegel's doctrine of *Sittlichkeit*. Since in a contemporary society, national identity and historical, ethical or religious identities do not coincide, the boundaries of political communities have become unclear.

"Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right relation." —Dworkin, *Law's Empire*, 1986, p. 219.

Compatibilism

Also called soft determinism, a position which holds that determinism and free will are compatible. Hence human actions can be caused, but still be free. Free actions are not uncaused actions, but are actions that are closely linked with an agent's inner causation through one's own beliefs and desires. On this view, I did X freely means that if I had wanted to I could have done otherwise and that I did X as a result of my own desire and deliberation rather than as a result of being compelled and coerced. Accordingly the study of human

和叙述之外。共同体主义的主要提倡者包括 A. 麦金泰尔、M. 桑德尔、R. 泰勒和 R. 罗蒂，但他们的观点还没有系统化，还没有一个共同的宣言。它所面对的主要指控是，它具有保守主义的社会意义和政治意义以及它使跨文化批评变得困难。

“正如它的名称所意味着的，共同体主义所关心的是共同体，尤其是共同体在自由主义理论中无地位的状况。”——阿查德，见布宁和崔·詹姆斯合编：《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》，1995年，第269页。

共同体

在伦理学中，共同体不是那种为了某个特殊目的而按照规则组织起来的团体，相反，它乃是其成员们通过相互合作和互惠互利而联合起来的社会背景。这种意义上的共同体在好的或理想社会的传统概念中被认作是一种德性。自由个人主义通过把个人与他的历史和社会背景隔绝的方法把个人放在与共同体对立的优先位置上，把个人看做是权利的抽象承担者。当代共同体主义相信，正是共同体而不是个人，应该是伦理学和政治理论的基础。共同体是个人同一性的建构者。它是一种构成环境，一个有机整体而不是原子的聚合。这个观念可以追溯到亚里士多德在论述德性培育中对于城邦作用的强调，以及黑格尔有关国家伦理的学说。由于在一个当代社会，民族认同和历史、伦理或宗教认同不是重合的，因而政治共同体的边界变得不清楚了。

“整合性要求尽可能把共同体的公共标准订立及表现成为表达一种在适当关系中的正义和公平的单一的、一致的方案。”——德沃金：《法的帝国》，1986年，第219页。

相容论

也称为“弱决定论”，一种认为决定论与自由意志是相容的见解。因此人类的行为可以是有原因的，但仍然是自由的。自由的行为并不是无原因的，而是通过人们自身的信念和愿望与行为者内部的因果关系密切相关的。按这种见解，我自由地做X，就意味着：如果我要想的话，我也可以干别的，而且X之被做是作为我的愿望和考虑的结果，而不是出于受迫和强制。相应地，对人的研究尽管不可能是完全精确的，仍然

beings can yield some predictability within the terms of an inexact science, although complete accuracy is not possible. The truth of determinism carries no threat to moral responsibility. For freedom is in contrast with coercion or constraint, rather than with having a cause. That my action is causally determined does not entail that I am constrained to do it and does not entail that I am not free. The proponents of this view include Hume and Mill. In contrast, incompatibilism, also called hard determinism, holds that determinism and free will are not compatible and that the truth of determinism will destroy the grounds of moral responsibility.

"Compatibilist philosophers ascribe to us a single conception of the initiation of action, and a kind of belief as to the sufficiency of this initiation in so far as moral approval and disapproval are concerned. The conception is that of a voluntary action, and here a determinism is taken to affect moral responsibility not at all." —Honderich, *The Consequence of Determinism*, 1988, p. 170.

Competence and performance

A distinction drawn by Chomsky. Competence is a person's acquaintance with a set of grammatical rules which are abstracted to a considerable degree from actual linguistic activities. It is the person's underlying linguistic ability. Performance applies this competence in actual circumstances to produce grammatical sentences. According to Chomsky, a linguist should be concerned with linguistic competence rather than the non-regularities of actual performance. A suitable grammar should be a description of an ideal speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence. The distinction between competence and performance is related to Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*. It is also said to be close to Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that, but this claim is controversial.

"We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, p. 4.

Complete notion

For Leibniz, a concept of an object which contains all the predicates truly attributable to that object. The objects of such a concept can only be the individuals which are the real subjects of categorical judgements. Correspondingly, an entity is an individual substance if and only if its concept is complete. An individual is nothing but the object of a complete concept. In comparison, an accident is a being whose notion does not include everything that can be attributed to the subject to which the notion is attributed. Since an individual contains all the predicates in itself, and is a complete world, many other propositions in Leibniz's metaphysics are

可以提出一种不那么精确的可预测性内容。决定论的真实性并不带有对道德责任的威胁。因为自由是与逼迫或强制相对立、而不是与有一个原因相对立的。从我的行为是因果决定的这一事实,并不必然地衍推出我被强迫这么做,也衍推不出我不是自由的。这种观点的支持者包括休谟和密尔。与相容论对立的是“不相容论”,也叫作“强的决定论”,它主张决定论和自由意志是不相容的,决定论的真实性将会破坏道德责任的根据。

“相容论哲学家划归给我们以单一的行为起始观念,以及一种关于当涉及道德许可和不许可时这种起始的充足性的信念。这种观点就是一种自愿的行为以及这里的一种决定论,根本不应看作会影响道德责任。”——洪德里奇:《决定论的后果》,1988年,第170页。

能力和运用

乔姆斯基做出的区分。能力意味着一个人熟知一套语法规则,而这套规则在相当大的程度上是从实际的语言活动中抽象出来的。这是个人内在的语言能力。运用是在把这种能力用于实际环境中,产生符合语法的句子。根据乔姆斯基的观点,语言学家应当关心语言能力,而不是毫无规律的实际运用。一种恰当的语法应该是对理想的听者与说者内在能力的描述。能力和运用的区分与索绪尔的语言和话语的区分有关。这也被说成是接近于赖尔对知道如何和知道什么的区分,但这尚有争议。

“我们由此就在能力(说者与听者的语言知识)和运用(语言在具体场景中的实际使用)之间做出了基本的区分。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,第4页。

完满性观念

莱布尼茨的术语,指一个对象概念,它包含可真实地归属于那个对象的一切属性。这样一种概念的对象只能是作为直言判断的真实主项的个体。相应地,一个物体当且仅当它的概念是完满的,乃是一单一本体。一个个体无非就是完满性概念的对象。比较之下,偶性是这样一种存在,它的概念并不包含一切可归属于这一概念所归属的主体的东西。由于一个个体包含一切自身具有的属性,是一个完满的世界,因而莱布尼茨形而上学中的许多其他命题便直接由他关于完满性观念的论述中引申出来;诸如不可分辨

derived directly from his account of a complete notion, such as the thesis of the identity of indiscernibles, the thesis that individuals are ungenerable and indestructible, the thesis that individuals are incapable of real interaction and the thesis that each substance is quasi-omniscient and quasi-omnipotent since each is a micro-cosmos.

"We can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed." — Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, p. 8.

Completeness

A property ascribed to a system of formal logic, an axiomatic system or a theory, generally meaning that all truths of the system or the theory can be derived or proved within the system or theory. A logical system is semantically complete if and only if all of its semantically valid formulae are theorems of the system. It is syntactically complete if an addition of a non-theorem will lead to inconsistency. Syntactical completeness is the stronger sense of completeness. A theory is complete or negation-complete if any of its statements or the negation of that statement is provable within the theory. However, according to Gödel's theorem, none of the systems of ordinary arithmetic is complete for it must either be inconsistent or contain at least one truth which is not provable within the system itself. This thesis of incompleteness effectively undermines Hilbert's programme of providing mathematical proofs of its own consistency.

"The notion of completeness of a logical system has a semantical motivation, consisting roughly in the intention that the system shall have all possible theorems not in conflict with the interpretation." — Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, 1956, p. 109.

Complex ideas

Locke distinguished between simple and complex ideas. While simple ideas come directly from sensation or reflection, complex ideas are compounded by the mind from simple ideas and can also be decomposed into them. Complex ideas are the results of mental operation on simple ideas, and their existence indicates that we are not entirely passive in experience. In the first edition of his *Essay*, Locke divided complex ideas into modes, substances (ideas) and relations. Modes, such as triangle or gratitude, are said not to contain the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are dependent on substances. Substances, ideas such as man or sheep, are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves. Relations consist in the consideration and comparison of one idea with another. However, in the fourth edition of the *Essay*, relations became products of the mind's power of comparing both simple and complex ideas with one another.

物的同一性命题,个体不可创造和不可毁灭的命题,它们不能真正互动的命题,和由于每个本体都是一微观宇宙,因而每个本体都是准全知和准全能的这一命题。

"我们能够说,单个本体或完满性存在的本性具有一个如此完满的概念,以致于它充分地包含其概念所归属的主体的一切属性,并允许我们从它之中将它们都推演出来。"——莱布尼茨:《形而上学论》,第8页。

完全性

归属于一形式逻辑系统、公理系统或一理论的一种属性,通常是指:该系统或该理论的所有真命题在该系统或该理论内都可以推导出来或被证明。一逻辑系统是语义完全的,当且仅当它的所有语义有效公式都是该系统的定理。它是语法完全的,如果加入一个非定理就会导致不一致。语法完全性是更强意义上的完全性。一理论是完全的或"否定一完全的",如果它的任意陈述或该陈述的否定在该理论内可证。不过,根据哥德尔定理,没有一个普通算术系统是完全的,因为它必定或者是不一致的,或者至少包含一个真命题在该命题本身之内不可证。这一不完全性论题实际上削弱了给数学自身的相容性提供数学证明这一希尔伯特纲领的基石。

"〔提出〕一逻辑系统的完全性概念有语义的动机,大致说来在于这一意图:该系统应该囊括不与其解释相冲突的所有可能的定理。"——丘奇:《数理逻辑导论》,1956年,第109页。

复杂观念

洛克区分了简单观念和复杂观念。简单观念直接来自感觉或反省,复杂观念是心灵用简单观念复合而成的观念,复杂观念也可以分解为简单观念。复杂观念是作用于简单观念上的精神活动的结果,它们的存在表明我们在经验中不完全是被动的。在《人类理智论》的第一版中,洛克将复杂观念区分为样式、实体(观念)和关系。他说像"三角形"、"感恩"那样的样式不包含对独自存在的假定,它们依赖于实体。实体,即"人"或"羊"那样的观念,被认为代表了独自存在的各个特殊的事物。关系存在于对一个观念和另一个观念的思考和比较之中。不过,在《人类理智论》的第四版中,关系变成了心灵不但对简单观念而且对复杂观念进行相互比较的能力的产物。在该版中,洛克增加了一个新的范畴,即普遍观念或一般概念(universals),

In that edition Locke added a new category, that is general ideas or universals, which are the results of abstraction in which the mind separates ideas from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence.

"When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II. 2. 2.

Compositionality

A language is compositional if its syntactically complex expressions, for example sentences, derive their meanings from their syntactic structures and the meanings of their lexical constituents. For instance, the meaning of the sentence "Snow is white" is a function of the meaning of "snow", the meaning of "white" and the places that these expressions occupy in the subject-predicate structure of the sentence. The semantic feature of compositionality has a wide application in the philosophy of language. It also forms the basis for the truth-conditional theory of meaning. A satisfactory semantic theory should explain how the meanings of small expressions contribute to the meanings of larger ones that contain them. It has become the principle that the meaning of an expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the syntactic structure of these parts. This principle is generally ascribed to Frege and is also called the Fregean Principle.

"The principle of compositionality: The meaning of an expression is a monotonic function of the meaning of its parts and the way they are put together." — Cann, *Formal Semantics*, 1993, p. 4.

Compound thought

Analogous to a compound sentence, which consists of two or more sentences, Frege introduced the notion of compound thought, which is a whole combined out of two or more thoughts by something that is not a thought. As a compound sentence is itself a sentence, a compound thought is itself a thought, and it can also be compounded into other thoughts. Frege distinguishes six different types of compound thought. With A and B representing different single thoughts, they are (1) A and B; (2) (not A) and (not B); (3) (not A) and B; (4) not (A and B); (5) not (not A) and (not B), and (6) not ((not A) and B). Frege believed that in a mathematical compound thought, if one component is replaced by another thought having the same truth-value, the new compound thought has the same true-value as the original. The idea is central to propositional logic.

"By 'compound thought' I shall understand a thought consisting of thoughts, but none of thoughts alone." — Frege, *Collected Papers*, p. 391.

它们是抽象活动的结果,在抽象活动中,心灵将一些观念同它们实际存在时与它们相伴随的其他一切观念区分开来。

"理智一旦储备了这些简单观念,它就有能力对它们进行重复、比较和结合,甚至达到几乎无限的多样性,并因而能随意造出新的复杂观念。"——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第二章,第2节。

构成性

如果一个语言在句法上复杂的表达(例如句子)的意义由其句法结构和词汇组成的意义派生而来,那么这个语言就是构成性的。例如,语句"雪是白的"的意义是"雪"的意义和"白"的意义以及这些词在句子的主谓结构中所占位置的一个功能。构成性的语义特征在语言哲学中具有广泛的应用。它也构成了意义的真值条件理论的基础。一个令人满意的语义理论应当解释小的表达式的意义如何对包含它们的较大表达式的意义起作用。它成为这样一种原则:一个表达式的意义是其部分的意义及这些部分的句法结构的功能。这一原则通常被归于弗雷格,并被称为"弗雷格原则"。

"构成性原则:一个表达式的意义是其部分的意义及这些部分的句法结构的单一功能。"——凯恩:《形式语义学》,1993年,第4页。

复合思想

类似于由两个或更多的句子组成的复合句子,弗雷格引入了"复合思想"概念,它是由两个或更多的思想,通过并非思想的某个东西结合而成的整体。正如复合句子本身是一个句子,复合思想本身也是一个思想,它同样可以用于构成其他的思想。弗雷格区分了六种不同的复合思想。用A和B代表不同的单个思想,这六种复合思想就是:(1)"A和B";(2)"(非A)和(非B)";(3)"(非A)和B";(4)"非(A和B)";(5)"非(非A)和(非B)";(6)"非((非A)和B)"。弗雷格相信,在数学的复合思想中,如果用另一个具有相同真值的思想替换这个复合思想的某个成分,这个新的复合思想就有与最初相同的真值。这是命题逻辑的核心观念。

"我用'复合思想'可以理解为由思想构成的思想,而不是单独的思想。"——弗雷格:《论文集》,第391页。

Compromise

The agreement reached through joint negotiations by contending parties after each party makes some concessions from its initial demands. Compromise is based on the premise that for each party co-operation in dealing with the issues in question is better than the breakdown of the relationship. Surrender of some goals is seen by each as helping to secure other and perhaps more important goals. When compromise in this sense applies to conflicts arising from rationally irreconcilable ethical commitments, it is called moral compromise. Moral compromise is necessary for people within a society where conflicting moral principles and interests prevail. Otherwise a peaceful and non-coercive agreement on a single course of action by proponents of opposing principles cannot be achieved. However, because moral compromise involves sacrificing basic principles and can damage the integrity of the moral agents, it normally carries a derogatory sense. Compromise always involves a tension between uniting with people with different moral convictions and maintaining loyalty to one's principles and oneself. This tension leads to discussion of how we should understand the role of moral principles and integrity.

"Compromise is both something 'reached' and a 'way of reaching'. As something reached, a compromise is a certain type of outcome of a conflict or disagreement; as a way of reaching, it is a process for resolving conflict or disagreement." —Benjamin, *Splitting the Differences*, 1990, p. 4.

Computational model of mind

While artificial intelligence attempts to get computing machines to approximate the abilities of minds, cognitive science is based on the assumption that mind is a machine, with the implication for the philosophy of mind that the mind is viewed as a computational information-processing system. Philosophers who accept this analogy attempt to solve problems regarding the mind/body relationship in terms of this analogy. They try to reveal facts about human functional and representational organisation by modelling them on the basis of a computer's internal set-up. This is the project of assimilating mind to computer. Advocates of different understandings of computation develop different models. But various aspects of the whole project have been criticised. One of the most influential objections is presented in Searle's Chinese Room argument which seeks to show that the mind is not merely a kind of software or program.

"That causal relations reconstruct inferential relations is a foundational assumption of computational theories of mental processes." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 179.

Computer functionalism, another term for the strong thesis of AI

妥协

妥协指的是, 冲突各方经过联合谈判在对自己的起初要求作了某些让步之后所达到的同意。它是基于这样的一种前提: 就争议的问题而言, 各方考虑到合作比关系破裂更好, 放弃某些目标可能更有利于确保其他的、可能更重要的目标。当妥协的这种意义运用到产生于合理的可又不相容的伦理责任的冲突时, 被称作为“道德妥协”。在普遍存在冲突性的道德原则和利益的社会中, 道德妥协是必要的。否则, 在相互对立的原则的倡导者之间对如何采取某一行动就不可能获得和平的、非强制性的协议。不过, 因为道德妥协涉及到基本原则的牺牲, 会损害道德行为者的完整性, 因而它通常有一种贬义。道德妥协总是涉及到具有不同道德信念的人们的联合和人们使自己不让自己异化掉这两者之间的张力。这种张力导致人们讨论我们应该怎样考虑道德原则和完整性的作用。

“妥协既是‘达成’某事, 也是‘达成的一种方式’。就其作为达成的某事而言, 一种妥协是一种冲突或分歧的结果; 就达成的一种方式而言, 它是解决冲突或分歧的一个过程。”——本杰明:《分析差异》, 1990年, 第4页。

心的计算模型

“人工智能”试图使计算机接近于心的能力, 而认知科学则建立在这样的假设基础之上: 心是机器。这一思想对于心的哲学的意义在于, 心被看作是一个计算的信息加工系统。接受这一类比的哲学家试图用这一类比来解决与身心关系有关的问题。他们试图以计算机的内部设置为模型来揭示关于人类的功能和表征组织的事实。这是把心看作计算机的方案。对于计算的不同理解产生了不同的模型。但这整个方案的不同方面受到了批评。最有影响的反驳之一是塞尔的中国屋论证, 这一论证表明心不只是一个软件或程序。

“关于心的过程的计算理论的一个基本假设是: 因果关系再造推理关系。”——福多和拉普:《整体论》, 1992年, 第179页。

计算机功能主义

“人工智能的强主题”的另一个术语。

Concept

A general notion or idea that may apply to a multiplicity of things and that is expressed by general words. It is the simplest content of our thinking. Concepts are contrasted to proper names, which refer only to one individual thing. Individuals fall under concepts, and we talk about individuals in terms of concepts. Concepts themselves admit degree of generality. A genus concept is wider in extension than a species concept. A concept is a component of propositions. It mediates between the mind and physical reality, and is a psychological entity with a non-psychological content. Hence it belongs to what Frege called the third realm. A central concern for analytical philosophy is to classify our most fundamental concepts by analysing their contents and their logical relations with other concepts. Philosophy is concerned with analysing concepts such as truth, meaning, person, mind, body, justice, goodness, object, cause, matter, motion, space, time, beauty and their logical relations. Such concepts have wide applications and are crucial in expressing and understanding. Often, their analysis takes place within the context of sophisticated theories using many basic concepts rather than in isolation. Concepts themselves do not admit of truth or falsity, but the propositions of which concepts are components are the bearers of truth value. Frege distinguished concepts from objects, suggesting that the former are expressed by predicates, while the latter by subjects or names.

"A representation through reason is a concept... Universal representations are concepts, and concepts are universal representations." —Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 201.

Concept and object

A distinction based by Frege on an analogy between functional expressions in mathematics and subject-predicate propositions, according to which such propositions can be analysed in terms of argument and function. Concepts are given through the functional aspect or the predicate part of a proposition. Predicate expressions are concept words. The argument of the function or the subject part of a proposition stands for an individual object. In the subject-predicate formula, predicates are taken formally, referring not to an individual, but to a form or essence. In mathematics, each function is incomplete and contains an empty space to be filled by the argument. Similarly, in propositions a concept is unsaturated, and can be completed by various objects picked out by subject terms. For Frege, this combination of predicate and subject terms to introduce concepts and to pick out objects to complete them is the way that language works.

Frege also distinguished between first order concepts (under which objects fall) and second order concepts (under which concepts fall) and derived a corresponding distinction

概念

可应用于大量的事物并用一般的词汇表达的一般的想法或思想。它是我们思想的最简单的内容。概念与专有名称不同,后者仅指一个个别事物。个别归入概念之下,我们用概念来谈论个别。概念本身在概括程度上有差异。种概念比属概念在外延上更宽泛。概念是命题的组成部分。它是精神和物质现实的中介,是一个具有非心理内容的心理的存在体。因此,它属于弗雷格所说的第三领域。分析哲学关注的中心问题,是通过分析我们使用的最基本概念的内涵及它们与其他概念的逻辑关系进而将它们分类。哲学涉及对诸如真理、意义、人、精神、物体、正义、德行、对象、原因、物质、运动、空间、时间、美这类概念及其逻辑关系的分析。这类概念有广泛的适用性,对表达和理解至关重要。对它们的分析常常是在使用很多基本概念的理论间进行的,而不是孤立进行的。概念本身不存在真与假的问题,但由概念构成的命题却是真值的载体。弗雷格将概念与对象区分开来,认为前者由谓词表达,而后者由主词或名词表达。

“通过理性形成的表象是概念,……一般的表象是概念,概念是一般的表象。”——康德:《逻辑学讲义》(杨编),1992年,第201页。

概念和对象

由弗雷格提出的一种区分,其基础是把数学中的函项表达式与主谓式命题加以类比。根据这种类比,主谓式命题也可以用主目和函项来分析。概念由命题的函项部分或谓词部分给出。谓词表达式是概念词。函项的主目或一命题的主词部分代表个别的对象。在主谓式公式中,从形式上看,谓词所指称的不是个别的对象,而是形式或本质。在数学中,每一个函项都是不完全的,含有一个要由主目来填充的空位。类似地,在命题中一概念是“不饱和的”,要由主词所挑出的各种不同对象来使其完全。在弗雷格看来,把谓词和主词如此结合以引入概念、并挑选出对象使概念完全,正是语言发挥作用的途径。

弗雷格还区分了一阶概念和二阶概念,前者的空位由对象填充,后者的空位由概念填充;并引出了一阶谓词和二阶谓词的相应区分。弗雷格认为,关于上帝存在的本体论证明的主要错误在于,它把存在当做一个一阶概念,而实际

between first order and second order predicates. Frege claimed that the major fault in the ontological proof for the existence of God is that it treats existence as a first order concept, while it is actually a second order concept.

The distinction between concepts and objects suggests that predicates correspond to concepts rather than to objects and that the abstract objects expressed by the concept are parasitic upon concrete objects. This position can claim to correct Aristotle's view that predicates correspond to objects. Aristotle's ten categories (ten forms of predication) can be regarded as ten kinds of concepts under which concrete objects fall. The notions of concept and object reflect more precisely the roles performed in language by predicates and subjects. But they also create a paradox that "the concept *horse*" is not a concept, but an object for it is a definite entity which is not incomplete and which can be referred to. This paradox leads Wittgenstein to distinguish formal concepts from ordinary concepts.

"The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate." — Frege, "On Concept and Object", in Geach and Black (eds), *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, 1966, p. 43.

Concepts of reflection, see transcendental reflection

Concepts of the understanding, pure, another Kantian term for categories

Conceptual analysis

The activity of attempting to clarify the meanings of concepts or ideas by employing logical devices. It tries to discover what elements a concept is composed of and how these elements are related. It also states the relations between certain concepts and the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of given concepts. Conceptual analysis is the basis for propositional analysis. Only when we understand the meaning of a word, can we employ it in formulating precise questions and thus provide correct solutions. For analytical philosophy this activity of reaching the understanding of a given concept is vital. In its early period, conceptual analysis was taken as a synonym of philosophy.

"So his [i. e., the analytical philosopher's] self-awarded title of 'analytical philosopher' suggests 'conceptual analysis' as the favoured description of his favoured activity." — P. Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics*, 1992, p. 2.

Conceptual content, see judgeable content

上存在是一个二阶概念。

概念和对象的区分表明，谓词对应于概念而不是对象，由概念表示的抽象对象是寄生在具体对象上的。可以说这一见解纠正了亚里士多德关于谓词对应于对象的观点。亚里士多德的十范畴（十种谓述形式）可以看作是十种类型的概念，具体对象则从属于这些概念。概念和对象的观念更精确地反映了主词和谓词在语言中所起的作用。但是它们也造成了悖论，即“马这个概念”不是一个概念，而是一个对象，因为它是一个确定的实体，并不是不完全的，能够成为指称的对象。这一悖论导致维特根斯坦把形式概念与普通概念区分开来。

“概念（就我的理解而言）是谓词性的。反之，一个对象的名称，一个专名，是绝不能用作语法谓词的。”——弗雷格：《论概念和对象》，见吉奇和布莱克编：《G. 弗雷格哲学文集》，1966年，第43页。

反思概念

见“先验的反思”条。

纯粹知性概念

康德的“范畴”的另一名称。

概念分析

运用逻辑方法以图澄清概念或观念的意义的活动。它力图发现组成一个概念的要素和这些要素是怎样相互联系的。它也陈述某些概念之间的关系，以及某些给定概念之运用的充分必要的条件。概念分析是命题分析的基础。只有当我们理解了一个词的意义，我们才能运用它来勾勒明确的问题，并因而可以提供正确的答案。对于分析哲学而言，理解一个给定的概念这种活动是至关重要的。在分析哲学的早期，概念分析被看作是分析哲学的同义语。

“所以，他的[即分析哲学家的]自许的称号‘分析哲学家’，意味着‘概念分析’是对他所喜欢的活动的最好描述。”——斯特劳森：《分析与形而上学》，1992年，第2页。

概念内容

见“可判断内容”条。

Conceptual polarity, another expression for polar-related concept pair

Conceptual relativism

The claim that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Different people can and sometimes do adopt and use different specific notions of being true, being moral and being right. Each of these different notions has its own rationality, and there is no common measurement among them. The position does not entail that the fact that one believes something automatically makes it true, but it advocates a pluralist attitude.

"Conceptualism relativism... apparently implies that conceptual variability admits of no rational assessment." — Moser, *Philosophy after Objectivity*, 1993, p. 99.

Conceptual role theory

A semantic theory which claims that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by its role in a language or theory. What a person means by an utterance depends on the network of associated beliefs that the person has. There are various ways of understanding the notion of conceptual role, and hence there are a number of versions of the theory. It is called variously the cognitive role theory, the causal role theory, the functional role theory and the network theory of meaning. The general idea concerns the way an expression associates with other expressions in a language. The theory originated with Wilfrid Sellars and has been developed by Ned Block, Paul Churchland, Devitt, Harman, and Lycan. It criticises the traditional view that the meaning of an expression involves a word-world relation and argues that the same word can mean a number of different things because it has a number of linguistic roles although it has the same reference. The theory contributes to the understanding of the meaning of some expressions such as logical constants. Applied to mental representations, it suggests that something is a representation and has the content it does in virtue of its cognitive role. Hence one can locate a mental representation in a cognitive network by considering the possible cognitive consequences of occurrences of that mental representation in the system. Its main problem, according to Fodor, is that the conceptual role theory cannot account for truth and reference conditions. Furthermore, an expression that belongs to different languages will be different in meaning and this leads to linguistic relativism.

"The meaning of an expression for an individual is a function of the role that expression plays in his internal representational economy—that is, of how it is related to sensory input and behavioural output and of its inferential/computational role within the internal economy. Sparing the niceties, this is the network theory of meaning, otherwise

概念的两极性

“极性相关的概念对”的另一种表述。

概念相对论

它认为,真理相对于概念图式,而不同的文化和传统中存在着不同的概念图式。不同的人能够而且有时确实接受和使用各种不同的真、道德和正确等专门概念。所有这些不同的概念都有自身的合理性,它们之间并不存在共同的尺度标准。这个立场并不意味着承认,某人相信某事就自动地使这个事为真,它只是提倡一种多元论的态度。

“概念论的相对论……明显地意味着,概念的可变性不承认任何理性的评价。”——莫泽,《客观性之后的哲学》,1993年,第99页。

概念作用理论

一种语义理论,它声称语言表达的意义由它在语言或理论中的作用所决定。一个人所说的一句话意味着什么取决于他所具有的相关信念的网络。对于概念作用的定义有各种不同的理解,因此这一理论有许多形式,并获得各种不同的称呼:认知作用理论、因果作用理论、功能作用理论或“意义的网络理论”。它主要是关于在一个语言中一个表达与其他表达之关联方式的。这一理论最初由 W. 塞拉斯提出,并由 N. 布洛克、P. 丘奇兰德、戴维特、哈曼和里库等人所发展。它所批评的是这样一种传统观点:一个表达的意义包含着一个语词—世界关系。它认为,同样的语词可能意味着许多不同的东西,因为它具有许多语言作用,尽管它具有同样的指称。这一理论对于理解某些像逻辑常项这样的表达的意义有一定的作用。应用于心的表象,它提出某个东西因其认知作用而成为一个表象并具有它所具有的内容。因此,一个人可以通过考虑系统中呈现那种心的表象所可能带来的认知结果来将这个心的表象置于一个认知网络。在福多看来,其主要问题在于,概念作用理论不能说明真和指称条件。而且,一个属于不同语言的表达会具有不同的意义,而这则会导致语言相对主义。

“对于个体而言,一个表达的意义是那个表达在其内部的表象系统中所起作用的功能。即,是说,它如何相联于感觉输入和行为输出,以及它在内部系统中的推理的或计算的功能。忽略细节,这就是关于意义的网络理论,又被称为整体论或概念作用理论。”——丘奇兰德,《神经哲学》,1988年,第344页。

known as the holistic theory or the conceptual-role theory." Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, 1988, p. 344.

Conceptual scheme

A scheme itself has a structure. It contains some basic concepts which can explain anything else, but which are not explained by others. A conceptual scheme, also called a "conceptual framework", is a network of concepts and propositions by which we organise, describe and explain our experience. Each discipline has its own conceptual scheme, and it changes along with the development of the science. A conceptual scheme is the backbone of a language. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant and Strawson believe that reality is represented in our conceptual scheme, and to understand what there is we must understand our conceptual scheme. Strawson therefore characterises descriptive metaphysics as a study of conceptual schemes, believing that it is an instrument of conceptual change and a means of furthering new directions or styles of thought. However, each of these three philosophers believes that at the deepest level human beings all share one common conceptual scheme. Belief in the existence of a global conceptual scheme is in contrast to "conceptual relativism", which claims that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Davidson claims that although there appear to be many conceptual schemes, if we are to understand an alternative conceptual scheme, we must translate it, at least partially, into our present conceptual scheme. The availability of such a translation suggests that the translated scheme might not be a genuine alternative.

"Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene," -- Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, p. 183.

Conceptualism

A theory of universals which claims that universals exist as thoughts or concepts formed by the knowing mind. It is one of the three positions about the nature of universals mentioned in Porphyry's *Introduction to Aristotle's Categories*. The other two are nominalism, which claims that universals are merely common names, and realism, which claims that universals exist in some mind-independent fashion. Conceptualism holds a position midway between realism and nominalism and argues that universals neither exist merely as names nor exist in their own right. A universal is a predicate, but predicates can be truly or falsely predicated of things only because they stand for concepts. As a product of

概念图式

一个图式本身就有—个结构。它包括了某些可以解释其他东西的基本概念,而这些概念本身却是不能用其他概念解释的。概念图式,也称作“概念框架”,是概念和命题的网络,我们用它组织、描述和解释我们的经验。每个学科都有自己的概念图式,它随着科学的发展而变化。一种概念图式就是一种语言的支柱。像亚里士多德、康德和斯特劳森等哲学家相信,我们的概念图式表现了实在,而且要理解存在之物,我们就必须理解我们的概念图式。因而斯特劳森把描述的形而上学刻画为对概念图式的研究,相信这种形而上学是概念变化的手段和推进新的思想方向或风格的方式。然而,这三位哲学家都相信,整个人类在最深层次上都具有一种共同的概念图式。相信存在着一种包罗万象的概念图式,这与“概念的相对论”截然对立,后者认为真是相对于概念图式的,不同的文化和传统中存在着不同的概念图式。戴维森认为,虽然存在着许多概念图式,但一旦我们想要理解另一种概念图式,我们就必须(至少部分地)把它翻译为我们目前的概念图式。可以做出这种翻译就意味着,被翻译的图式可能并不是完全不同的图式。

“我们得知,概念图式是组织经验的方式;它们是为感觉材料提供形式的范畴体系;它们是个入、文化或时代在消逝的场景中得以保留下来的一些观点。”——戴维森:《真理与解释的探究》,1984年,第183页。

概念论

一种关于共相的理论。它认为共相作为由理智心灵构成的思想或概念而存在。它是波菲利在其《亚里士多德〈范畴篇〉导论》中提及的关于共相性质的三种理论之一。其他两种是指认为共相只是共同名称的唯名论以及认为共相独立于心灵而存在的唯实论。概念论的立场处于唯实论和唯名论之间。它认为,共相既不是名称也不独立存在。共相是谓词,而谓词能够或真或假地述说于事物乃是因为它们代表概念。作为心灵的产物,共相能够同时个例化于许多殊相之中。它们是精神表象或观念,是对它们能应用于其上的特殊事物进行概念化而产生的。它

mind, universals can be instantiated by many particulars at the same time. They are mental representations or ideas, conceptualised out of the particular things to which they apply. Their main function is to serve as principles of classification.

"Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 14.

Concreta, see *abstracta*

Concrete / abstract, see *abstract / concrete*

Concrete concept, another expression for concrete universal

Concrete essence

Merleau-Ponty's term for the meaning or sense of a thing or its non-sensory presence. According to his account of our existential hold on things, a thing is given or acquired through contact. As a consequence, essence can be grasped only through its actualisation within the world. Hence essence must be concrete, and pure essence is impossible. This account stands in opposition to Husserl's notion of essence (*eidos*).

"The concrete essence of the triangle... is not an essence of objective 'properties', but the formula of an attitude, a certain modality of my hold on the world, a structure." —Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, 1945, p. 442.

Concrete other

In the self-other relationship, a standpoint from which to understand others as concrete, historical and emotional individuals, with their own needs, capacities, and life plans. Such a view pays attention to the private sphere of life and emphasises complementary reciprocity in one's relations with others. In contrast, we treat individuals from the standpoint of the generalised other by dealing with them as abstract and rational entities with a set of rights and duties. According to feminist critics, the standpoint of the generalised other has dominated the history of Western moral and political theory, with the consequence of focusing ethics on the public sphere of justice and ignoring the private sphere of care. Hence, the experience of women has been excluded from the consideration of moral theory. According to these critics, the remedy for this prejudice is to establish a new type of ethics which recognises the concrete as well as the generalised other.

"The standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individu-

们的主要功能是作为分类原则。

"概念论认为共相存在,但它们是心灵制造的。"——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第14页。

具体物

见“抽象物”条。

具体/抽象

见“抽象/具体”条。

具体概念

“具体共相”的另一种表述。

具体本质

梅洛-庞蒂用来表述一个事物的意义、含义或者它的非感觉在场的词。按照他关于我们如何在生存中通达事物的看法,一个事物是通过接触而被给予或获得的。因此,本质只能通过它在世界中的现实化而被把握。这样,本质就必须是具体的,纯本质根本不可能。这种见解与胡塞尔的本质(*eidos*)观相对立。

“这个三角形的具体本质……不是一个客观‘属性’那样的本质,而是一种姿态的样式,我通达世界的方式或一个结构。”——梅洛-庞蒂:《知觉现象学》,1945年,第442页。

具体的他人

关于自己与他人关系的一种观点,该观点把他人理解为具体的、历史的和有感情的个人,这些人有他们自己的需要、能力和生活计划。这种观点重视私人生活的领域,强调一个人与他人关系的互补互惠。它与一般化的他人的观点形成对照,后者把他人视为拥有一组权利和义务的、抽象和理性的实体。在女性主义批评家看来,一般化的他人的观点在西方道德和政治理论史上一直占统治地位,其结果是使伦理学将注意力集中在公共的正义领域,而不关心私人的领域。因此,妇女的经验一直被排除在道德理论的考虑之外。按照这些批评家的意见,对这种偏见的纠正是创建一种既承认具体的他人也承认一般化的他人的新伦理学。

“相比之下,具体的他人的观点要求我们把每一理性的人视为有具体的历史、个性和感情素质的个人。”——本哈比:《妇女和道德理论》(基泰和迈耶斯编辑),1987年,第165页。

al with a concrete history, identity, and affective emotional constitution.” — Benhabib, in Kittay and Meyers (eds.), *Women and Moral Theory*, 1987, p. 165.

Concrete universal

A term introduced by Hegel to correct the traditional view that a universal is abstract through referring to the common nature of a kind of entity by abstraction. Hegel held that a universal is concrete rather than an abstract form. A true universal is not a mere sum of features common to several things, but is self-particularising or self-specifying. A universal is not isolated from particulars, nor does it transcend them. Rather it inheres in particulars as their essential determination. Hegel even claimed that particulars are nothing but dialectical relations among universal concepts. Further, a universal concept is not isolated from other universals, but can be derived from them and, hence, is one item in a system. In Hegel's logic, each category contains its contrary and develops into that contrary. Together, the category and its contrary are synthesized into a third category, which becomes a member of a new triad. The absolute idea is the culmination of this development as the largest concrete universal.

“End... is the concrete universal, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself.” — Hegel, *Science of Logic*, II, ii, 5.

Concretism, another term for realism

Concupiscence

[from Latin; *con*, with — *cupere*, desire] Sexual and other bodily desires or the human faculty which generates these desires which are traditionally seen as not being derived from reason. For Augustine, concupiscence is the incentive to sin which baptism cannot take away. Unlike its opposite, love or charity, it is something with which we must always struggle. Concupiscence is the first step in the chain of evil, but it will diminish as charity grows. Aquinas used concupiscence as equivalent to *epithumia* (Greek; *epi*, upon — *thumos*, desire). He held that these desires are in the part of the soul which we share with other kinds of animals and that this part should be morally subjected to regulation by the rational part of the soul. Because of concupiscence, the incontinent man will act contrary to a decision he had reached through reason about a course of action.

“Concupiscence is a general cause of sin.” — Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia 2æ, 73, 6.

Concurrence of God

[Latin; *concursum dei*] A thesis in medieval theolo-

具体共相

由黑格尔所引入的术语,用以纠正传统的观点:共相是抽象的,是通过抽象指称一种实体的共同本性。黑格尔坚持认为,共相是具体的而非抽象的形式。真实的共相并非多个事物共同特征的总和,而是自我殊相化或自我具体化的。共相不是与殊相相隔绝的,也非超越于殊相之上。勿宁说它内在地存在于殊相之中作为它们的本质规定。黑格尔甚至主张,殊相物无非就是诸普遍概念间的辩证联系。进一步说,普遍概念并非与其他共相相隔绝,而是可由它们推导出来的,因此,它存在于体系之中。在黑格尔的逻辑学中,每个范畴都包含它的对立面并发展为那个对立范畴。范畴和它的对立面一起综合为第三个范畴,它成为新的三一式的一员。绝对概念是这种发展的最高点,成为最大的具体共相。

“终点……是具体共相,它在自身中具有特殊性和外在性的环节,因而是活动的,并推动着自身排斥自身。” — 黑格尔:《逻辑学》,II,ii,5。

具相论

“实有论”的另一个词。

情欲

[源自拉丁语 *con* (有) 和 *cupere* (欲望)] 指性欲和其他的肉体欲望,或指人类产生这些在传统上被视为不是源于理智的欲望的官能。在奥古斯丁看来,情欲是罪恶的诱因,洗礼也不能消除。与它的对立面情爱或博爱不同,它是我们必须永远与之斗争的东西。情欲是邪恶链条中的第一环,但随着博爱的增大,它会减小。阿奎那把情欲用作希腊语词 *epithumia* (*epi* (依照) 和 *thumos* (欲望)) 的同义语。他认为,这些欲望是我们和其他种类的动物共同分有的那部分灵魂,在道德上,这个部分应服从灵魂中理性部分的节制。由于情欲,不能自制的人会违背他通过理智已经决定的行为方向,背道而驰。

“情欲是罪恶的一般原因。” — 阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia 2æ, 73, 6。

上帝的同意

[拉丁文 *concursum dei*] 中世纪神学的一个

gy which proposes that God has the power to preserve the existence of things and activate them once he created them, a power which is essentially identical with his divine act of creation. All created substances are active and have causal powers, but the exercise of their causal powers must have the concurrence of God. If God withdrew his concurrence, created substances would collapse into nothing. A human action is the effect of one's own deliberation and choice and God's causal endorsement. Descartes sometimes used the phrase "regular concurrence" to account for the conservation of motion in the world whose quantity was imparted to matter when it was created. He also used the phrase "divine concurrence" to express the view that things are allowed by God to act under their own systems as they were created.

"Created substances... are things which need only the concurrence of God to exist."—Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, 1, 52.

Concursus dei. Latin term for concurrence of God

Conditio sine qua non. see *sine qua non*

Conditional

A conditional, or a conditional statement, is a complex sentence of the form: "if p then q ". Both p and q are statements, with p the antecedent and q the consequent. The logical relation between the antecedent and consequent is called implication. The converse of the conditional, that is "if not q then not p ", is called the contrapositive. Conditionals are also called hypotheticals. In propositional logic, a conditional is generally symbolised as " $p \rightarrow q$ " or " $p \supset q$ ". The major problem associated with conditionals is determining their truth conditions. Most commonly a conditional is treated as a truth-function such that "if p then q " is false if and only if p is true and q is false. This is called the material conditional or material implication. But there are paradoxes associated with the material conditional which have lead to a revision called the strict conditional which claims that a conditional is true if and only if when p is true, q is necessarily true. There are, however, also problems associated with strict conditionals. A much debated issue concerns the truth conditions of the counterfactuals in which the antecedent is false. For example, "If Kennedy had not been killed, he would have won the next election". The problem of counterfactuals is also closely associated with the discussion of possible worlds.

"A sentence of the form 'If ... then ...', where the blanks are to be filled with other sentences, is called a conditional." — Mates, *Elementary Logic*, 1972, p. 7.

论点, 认为上帝一旦创造事物就有保持事物的存在, 并使它们活动起来的能力, 这是与他的神圣创造活动本质上相同的能力。一切被造的实体都是能动的, 具有引起结果的能力, 但是它们对这个能力的使用必须经过上帝的同意。如果上帝收回了他的同意, 被造的实体就瓦解为虚无。一个人的活动就是这个人自己的思考、选择和上帝起原因作用的结果。笛卡尔有时用“有规律的同意”这个短语来说明世界的运动守恒。运动的量是物质被造出来时就给予物质的。他还用“神圣的同意”这个短语来表达这样的观点: 上帝创造事物后就允许各种事物在它们自己的系统下活动。

“被造的实体……是只需要上帝的同意而存在的东西。”——笛卡尔:《哲学原理》, 第一部, 第 52 页。

上帝的同意

“上帝的同意 (concurrency of God)”的拉丁文

必要条件

见“绝对必需”条。

条件句

条件句或条件陈述是“如果 p 则 q ”这种形式的复合句。其中 p 和 q 都是陈述, p 是前件, q 是后件。前件和后件之间的逻辑关系叫做“蕴涵”。条件句的逆否命题, 即“如果非 q 则非 p ”, 叫做它的“换质位命题”。条件句也叫做“假言命题”。在命题逻辑中, 它通常用符号表示为 " $p \rightarrow q$ " 或 " $p \supset q$ ". 与条件句相关的主要是如何确定它们的真值条件。最常见的是把条件句处理成真值函项, 使得“如果 p 则 q ”为假当且仅当 p 真而 q 假。这叫做“实质条件句”或“实质条件句”。但是, 存在着与实质条件句密切相关的悖论, 悖论引出了叫做“严格条件句”的修正方案, 后者断言: 一条件句为真当且仅当若 p 真时 q 必真。不过, 也存在不少与严格条件句密切相关的问题。最有争论的问题是有关其前件为假的“反事实条件句”的真值条件。例如, “如果肯尼迪未被杀害, 则他将赢得下一次总统选举”。反事实条件句问题还与关于可能世界的讨论密切相关。

“一个形式为‘如果……则……’, 并且其空位将由其他的语句来填充的语句, 叫做条件句。”——梅茨:《初等逻辑》, 1972 年, 第 7 页。

Conditional duty, see *Prima facie* duties

Conditional probability

The probability of an event e' occurring after the occurrence of another event e . The value of this probability is determined by the effect of the probability of e on the probability of e' before e occurred.

A related notion is conditional proof. If B is deduced from a set of premises that includes A_n , then in a deductive system we can infer from the remaining premises the conditional if A_n then B . This rule of conditional proof is presented as the following: If $A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B$, then $A_1, \dots, A_{n-1} \supset A_n \supset B$. This rule is also called the rule of \supset introduction.

"Crudeley, the expected frequency of a kind of outcome, B , given that a kind of outcome, A , has occurred, is the probability of B conditional on A or the conditional probability of B given A ." ——Sklar, *Philosophy of Physics*, 1992, p. 93.

Confirmation

In ordinary language, to confirm is to verify. As a logical term, confirmation is the measurement of the extent to which evidence raises the probability of a hypothesis. Hence, it is closely related to probability and to the problem of induction. A confirmation proposition assesses the probability of a hypothesis. Carnap in his *Logical Foundations of Probability* claims that a confirmation proposition can be classificatory (e [evidence] confirms h [hypothesis]), comparative (e confirms h more than e_1 confirms h_1) or quantitative (the confirmation of h given e is c). Confirmation theory examines how different evidence renders different hypotheses probable and how much the evidence affects the probability.

Confirmation (or affirmation) is a translation of *Konstatierung* (German), a term used by Schlick to denote what he takes to be the peculiar characteristic of observation statements, namely that one may be absolutely certain of their truth. Unlike many other Logical Positivists, he denies that observations are fundamental in the edifice of knowledge, since they are always of the form "here now so and so". Instead, their place in the system comes at the end rather than at the beginning of knowledge. Other statements are hypotheses, which in a sense depend upon the fleeting confirmations but not in the sense of being built up from them.

"Many writers use the term 'confirms' or some technical term for describing the extent to which evidence renders hypotheses probable." ——Swinburne, *An Introduction to Confirmation Theory*, 1973, p. 3.

Conjecture

For Karl Popper, science does not start with observations, but with practical problems and an existing problemat-

有条件职责

见“当下职责”条。

条件概率

一个事件 e' 在另一个事件 e 发生后发生的概率, 这一概率的值是由在 e 发生前, e 的概率对 e' 的概率的影响所决定的。

一个相关的观念是条件证明。如果 B 从一组包括 A_n 的前提中演绎出, 则我们在演绎系统中就能从其余前提中推断出条件式“如果 A_n 则 B ”。这个条件证明的规则列出如下: 如果 A_1, \dots, A_n 推断出 B , 则由 A_1, \dots, A_{n-1} 推断出 $A_n \supset B$ 。这一规则也称作“蕴涵引入规则”。

“粗略地讲, 假定一种结果 A 已经出现, 一种结果 B 的预期频率, 是以 A 为条件的 B 的概率, 或是给定 A 下的 B 的条件概率。”——斯克莱:《物理学哲学》, 1992 年, 第 93 页。

确认

在日常语言中, 确认就是证实。作为逻辑术语, 确认是对于证据提出的假设的或然性大小的量度。因此, 它与或然性和归纳问题密切相关。确认命题估量假设的或然性。卡尔纳普在其《或然性的逻辑基础》中认为, 确认命题可以是分类性的 (e [证据] 确认 h [假设]), 比较性的 (e 对 h 的确认高于 e_1 对 h_1 的确认), 或者是量值性的 (e 对 h 的确认为 c)。确认理论考察不同的证据如何使不同的假设成为或然的, 证据在多大程度上影响或然性。

确认 (或断定) 是德文词 *Konstatierung* 的翻译, 石里克用这个术语来指他认为的观察陈述的专门特征, 即是说, 人们可以绝对肯定它们的真实性。他与许多其他逻辑实证主义者不一样, 不承认观察在知识大厦中有根本作用, 因为它们总是具有“这里现在如此这般”的形式。相反, 它们在系统中处于知识的结尾而非开端的位置。其他陈述都是假设, 这是在它们依赖变幻不定的确认这层含义上, 而不是在从这些确认上建构起来的含义上而言的。

“许多作者使用‘确认’这个术语或某个技术性术语来描述证据使得假设成为或然的范围。”——斯文布勒:《确认理论导论》, 1973 年, 第 3 页。

猜想

对 K. 波普而言, 科学并非始自观察, 而是始自实际的问题和一个现存的有问题的理论。

ic theory. We attempt to offer tentative solutions to the problems. These tentative solutions are conjectures or hypotheses which can be subjected to severe testing or trial, whose object is to refute them. If a conjecture is refuted in testing, it must be rejected. Because Popper denied that induction can lead to conclusive verification, he rejected a central role for induction in science. He held, however, that conclusive refutation is possible through falsification and that a hypothesis is corroborated by withstanding serious attempts to refute it. Popper views science as a dynamic enterprise which grows from old problems to new problems by means of conjectures and refutations. This is the main point of his falsificationism.

"The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially, our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures." — Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1972, preface.

Conjunction

A complex proposition of the form "p and q". Both p and q are propositions and are called conjuncts. In propositional calculus, a conjunction is symbolised either as " $p \cdot q$ ", " $p \wedge q$ " or " $p \& q$ ". Taking it as truth-functional, "p and q" is true if and only if each of p and q is true. If either conjunct is false, or both are false, then the conjunction is false. We may infer from the premise p and the premise q to the conclusion p and q. This is called the rule of conjunction or conjunction introduction. We may also infer from the premise "p and q" to the conclusion p or to the conclusion q. This is called conjunction elimination. Conjunction can also be used to join together more than two statements in the process of asserting them all.

"A conjunction of statements all of which are true is true; and a conjunction of statements not all of which are true is false." — Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1962, p. 2.

Conjunction elimination, see conjunction

Conjunction introduction, see conjunction

Connectionism

A program in artificial intelligence and cognitive science which is designed to help us understand how the brain operates in terms of computer models of brain functioning. The theory considers the brain as a network of neural units which interact until they reach a stable state in response to external inputs. The information-process is parallel and distributed, that is to say that a lot of information is processed simultaneously and each connection contributes to many contents.

我们试图对这些问题提出试探性的解答。这些试探性解答是猜想或假说，它们接着要经受严格的检验或试验，其目标是反驳它们。如果一个猜想在检验中被驳倒，则必须被抛弃。因为波普否认归纳能导致结论性的证实，他排斥了归纳在科学中的中心地位。不过，他认为结论性的反驳是通过试错而可能的，一个假说通过经受住拒斥它的尝试而进一步得到确认。波普把科学看作为动态的事业，它依靠猜想和反驳，从旧的问题成长到新的问题。这就是他的“否证主义”的要点。

“知识，特别是我们的科学知识，是通过未经证明的（和不可证明的）预言，通过猜测，通过对我们的问题的试探性解答，通过猜想而进步的。”——波普：《猜想与反驳》，1972年，序言。

合取式

形式为“p 并且 q”的复合命题，其中 p 和 q 都是命题并且叫做合取支。在命题演算中，合取式被符号化为“ $p \cdot q$ ”，“ $p \wedge q$ ”或者“ $p \& q$ ”。若把它当做真值函项，“p 并且 q”为真当且仅当 p 和 q 中每一个都真；如果有一个合取支为假，或两个合取支都假，则该合取式为假。我们可以从前提 p 和前提 q 推出结论“p 并且 q”，这叫做“合取规则”或“合取引入”。我们也可以从前提“p 并且 q”推出结论 p 或者推出结论 q，这叫做“合取消除”。合取式还可以把多于两个的陈述组合在一起，如果能够断定所有这些陈述的话。

“多个陈述的合取式为真，如果其中所有的陈述都真；多个陈述的合取式为假，如果并非其中所有的陈述都真。”——奎因：《逻辑方法》，1962年，第2页。

合取消除

见“合取式”条。

合取引入

见“合取式”条。

联结主义

是人工智能和认知科学中的一个课题，用大脑功能的计算机模型帮助我们理解大脑是如何操作的。这一理论将大脑看做一个神经单元的网络。这些单元相互作用直至达到一个对外部输入作出反应的稳定状态。这一信息加工是并行的和分布的，也就是说许多信息被同时加工，并且每一联结都对许多内容起作用。联结主义因此又被称为“并行分布加工”（简写作

Connectionism is also called parallel distributed processing (PDP) or neural network modelling. This approach, pioneered by F. Rosenblatt and O. Selfridge, contrasts with the traditional approach in cognitive science which treats the brain as a rule governed linear manipulator. The central philosophical implication of connectionism is that human intelligence can be understood to arise out of the whole structure of neural systems in the brain. Such a philosophical approach is sometimes called neuro-philosophy.

"Connectionism (or PDP, for parallel distributed processing) is a fairly recent development in AI that promises to move cognitive modelling closer to neural modelling, since the elements that are its bricks are nodes in parallel networks that are connected up in ways that look rather like neural networks in the brain." - Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 1991, p. 268.

Connotation

J. S. Mill distinguishes connotation from denotation. A connotation is the signification or conception of a term, which indicates those attributes we really mean to predicate of the object. Denotation, in contrast, is the scope for which a term is truly predicated. The term "red", for instance, denotes all red things, but connotes the attribute of redness. Mill claims that we must distinguish connotative terms from non-connotative terms. The former denote a subject and imply an attribute; and therefore have a meaning. A proper name has denotation, but has no connotation; hence it is not a connotative term. This idea is fully developed in Russell's theory of definite description. Other logicians use intension to name what Mill calls connotation, and extension to name denotation.

"Whenever the names given to objects convey any information — that is, where they have properly any meaning — the meaning resides not in what they denote but in what they connote." — Mill, *Collected Works*, VII, p. 34.

Conscience

[from Latin: *con*, with — *scire*, know.] The immediate and intuitive human moral consciousness, the inborn restraining or directing force by which an individual judges what he ought to do or what is morally permissible. Conscience has been held to be one of the main sources of morality. Different philosophers describe it as a human faculty of moral sense, as the voice of God, as a personal demon or as the voice of reason. The British philosopher Joseph Butler claimed that conscience is a sentiment of the understanding and treated it as the basis for his whole moral system. But others, especially Christian moralists, believe in the existence of erring or bad conscience, for moral agents may have mistaken ideas about what they ought to do, and they are liable to be deceived. Hence we need to distinguish between

PDP) 或“神经网络模型”。这一由 F. 罗森伯拉特和 O. 赛尔福雷奇发起的研究方法与认知科学的传统方法不同, 后者将大脑看做是由规则支配的线性操作器。联结主义的哲学涵义在于认为, 人类智力可以被理解为产生于大脑神经系统的整体结构。这样一个哲学方法有时被称为“神经哲学”。

“联结主义 (或并行分布加工的简写 PDP) 是人工智能一个颇为新近的发展, 有望使认知模型更接近神经模型, 因为作为其基石的因素就是并行网络中的节, 它们被联结的方式与大脑中的神经网络颇为相似。”——丹奈特:《解释意识》, 1991 年, 第 268 页。

内涵

J. S. 密尔区分了内涵与外延。内涵是语词的意义或所表示的概念, 它表明我们在描述对象时实际上指的那些属性。外延则与之不同, 它是语词实际上所描述东西的范围。例如, “红色”这个词指示一切红色的东西, 但意指红这种属性。密尔主张, 我们必须区分内涵性语词与非内涵性语词。前者指示了一个主体并蕴含一种属性, 因此具有意义。专名有外延而无内涵, 因此不是内涵词。这种看法在罗素的确定摹状词理论中得到了充分发展。其他逻辑学家用“intension”来称呼密尔所说的“内涵”, 用“extension”来称呼“外延”。

“每当给予对象的名称传达信息时, ——即是说, 当它们本身具有意义时 ——意义不在于它们指示了什么东西, 而在于它们包涵了什么东西。”——密尔:《著作集》, 第七卷, 第 34 页。

良知

[源自拉丁文 *con* (有) 和 *scire* (知)] 直接和直觉的道德意识, 一个人借以判断该做什么或什么是在道德上允许的天生的控制或指导力量。良知曾被认为是主要的道德源泉之一。不同的哲学家分别把它描述为一种人类的道德感官能、上帝的声音、个人的守护神或理性的声音。英国哲学家 J. 巴特勒声称良知是一种理解情感并因此将其作为其整个道德系统的基础。但其他人, 特别是基督教道德学家, 相信错误或罪恶良知的存在, 因为道德主体可能对于应该做什么具有错误的观念, 并容易被欺骗。因此我们需要区分应当谴责的主动的罪恶良知和应当饶恕的被动的罪恶良知。进一步的问题是一个主体是否可能违背其良知而行事, 这与意志软弱的

voluntary bad conscience which is blameworthy and involuntary bad conscience which should be forgiven. In a question related to the problem of the weakness of will, we may ask whether an agent may act against his conscience.

"If obeying and disobeying a mistaken conscience are both bad, it seems that men with mistaken consciences are caught in a trap, and cannot avoid sin." — Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 2ae, Q19, art. 6.

Consciousness

Various forms of subjective experience such as sensation, mood, emotion, retrospection, memory, thought and self-consciousness. There are grave difficulties in all attempts to develop a philosophical account of what consciousness is or how it might be explained. If we concentrate on what it is like to be a conscious human being, we have no explanation; if we try to explain consciousness in terms of what goes on in our brains, the sheer feel of consciousness itself is left aside. Descartes believed that consciousness is the essence of mind or the general property of mental states, implying that all mental states are conscious. On a Cartesian view, consciousness is irreducibly subjective in the sense that the individual with that consciousness appears to have privileged access to it in a way that no one else can achieve. Various versions of behaviourism, functionalism and naturalism challenge these Cartesian points and try to explain consciousness in physical, functional or neurological terms. But the problem of how we can understand consciousness on a physical or neural basis, the so-called explanatory gap, still remains. Major contemporary issues concerning consciousness include: Does consciousness have a causal role? If so, what is it? Are all mental states conscious? What is the relation between consciousness and intentionality? What is the philosophical importance of the raw feel of conscious states? Do persons have privileged access to their conscious states?

"Consciousness; a person is said to be conscious of a circumstance when he uses words, or images of words, to others or to himself, to assert the circumstance." Russell, *Collected Papers Of Bertrand Russell*, IX, p. 15.

Consensus gentium argument

Also known as the common consent argument for the existence of God, this argument is based on the premise that belief in God is virtually, if not strictly, universal. According to the version of the Stoic philosopher Seneca, the near universality of this belief suggests that it is innate and instinctive and that it must therefore be true. This biological version of the argument was severely attacked by Locke in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, iv, 9. Locke rejected the claim that the belief is universal and also argued that universality would not entail that the idea of God is in-

问题相关联。

“如果服从和违背一个错误的良知都是罪恶的，那么具有错误的良知的人便落入陷阱而不能逃避罪恶。”——阿奎那：《神学大全》，1a, 2ae, Q19, art. 6。

意识

像感觉、心境、情绪、反思、记忆、思维和自我意识这样的各种形式的主观经验。在各种力图对意识是什么及如何可能对之进行解释的哲学说明中，都存在着重大困难。如果我们专注于作为一个有意识的人是什么样子的这样的问题，那我们就没有一个解释；如果我们试图用大脑中所发生的一切来解释意识，意识本身的那个纯粹的感觉就被漏掉了。笛卡尔认为意识是心的本质或心的状态的普遍特性。这意味着所有的心状态都是意识的。根据笛卡尔主义的观点，意识在某种意义上具有不可还原的主观性：具有那个意识的个体能够以任何其他人都不具有的方式优先获知这个状态。各种形式的行为主义、功能主义和自然主义都对这些笛卡尔的观点提出质疑并试图用物理的、功能的或神经的方式来解释意识。但仍然存在着如何能够以物理的或神经的基础来理解意识的问题，这就是所谓的“解释沟”。与意识有关的主要当代问题有：意识具有因果作用吗？如果有的话，其因果作用是什么？所有的心状态都是意识的吗？意识与意向性的关系是什么？意识状态的原初感觉的哲学重要性是什么？人们能够优先获知他们自己的意识状态吗？

“意识：当一个人用语词或语词的映象对他人或自己肯定一个情境的时候，我们就说他意识到了这一情境。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第九卷，第15页。

普遍同意论证

也被通称为关于上帝存在的普遍同意论证。这个论证以下面的前提为基础：如果不严格区分，对上帝的信仰实质上是普遍的。根据斯多亚派哲学家塞涅卡的说法，这种信仰儿近普遍化就表明，它是天赋的和本能的，所以必然是真的。该论证的这种生物学说法，受到了洛克在《人类理智论》第四卷第九章中的猛烈抨击。洛克否认信仰是普遍的这种说法，也论证了普遍化并不意味着上帝观念是天赋的。密尔向相信上帝存在的天赋性和真实性之间的联系发起了

nate. Mill challenged the link between the innateness of the belief that God exists and its truth.

Another version was formulated by the British philosopher G. H. Joyce. The universality of a belief suggests that human reason assures us that it is true. If human reason is trustworthy, which is obviously the case, then the belief that God exists must be true. Setting aside the dubious premise of the universality of this belief, this version has been criticised on the grounds that most believers come to their belief in God by traditional indoctrination. The *consensus gentium* argument appears to lack logical force. It was once universally believed that the earth is flat, but the universality of this belief does not show that it was true. Nevertheless, this argument raises questions of whether some of our universal beliefs do not need external justification and whether religious beliefs could be among these.

"The argument for *consensus gentium* is a fallacy, which means only that we can't be sure that a belief is true just because it may be true that everyone, or nearly everyone holds it. But we certainly can't be sure that it is false either." Penelhum, *Problems of Religious Knowledge*, 1971, p. 10.

Consent

Epistemologically identical with assent, that is believing or accepting some propositions. Locke described how consent is involved in the formation of beliefs, and he attacked the universal consent argument for God's existence. Consent is more often used in a political context where it is contrasted with coercion or exploitation and is offered as grounds for the legitimation of social and political practice. In the state of nature there is no consent regarding the standard of right and wrong. To gain security, people consent to form a social contract and create a single body politic in which each individual agrees to give some of his liberty to the government and to obey the laws, and in return enjoys the rights of being protected. The consent of individuals is what constitutes the community; but for a society to act as a living body, it must be run according to the consent of the majority. This is because the aim of the social contract, which is based on consent, is to preserve the lives, freedom and property of all, and not merely of a minority of rulers. However, there are many occasions on which we do not give our express consent to the decisions of a government. To cope with this problem, Locke put forward a notion of tacit consent, that is consent without any verbal or behavioural expression. There has been debate about what constitutes tacit consent. In contemporary political philosophy, express and tacit consent are also called actual and potential consent. Potential consent is ascribed to a person if a normal subject would rationally consent to something in a given situation.

"The beginning of political society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one soci-

挑战。

另一个说法被英国哲学家 G. H. 乔依斯表述得最为清楚。信仰的普遍性暗含着, 人类理智向我们保证它是真实的。如果人类的理智值得信赖 (而这是显而易见的), 那么, 关于上帝存在的信仰就必然真实。撇开信仰的普遍性这个可疑的前提不谈, 仅以大多数信仰者是通过传统教养而信仰上帝为根据, 这个说法也受到批判。普遍同意论证显得缺乏逻辑力量。人们曾经普遍地相信地球是扁平的, 但这个信仰的普遍性并不表明它就是真的。然而, 这个论证提出了我们的有些普遍信仰是否不需要外在的客观证明以及宗教信仰是否应在这之列的问题。

"普遍同意论证是谬误, 这仅仅意指, 我们不能确信, 一个信念为真恰好因为每个人或近乎每个人都持有该信念, 所以它可能真。但是, 我们肯定也不能确信它是假的。" ——培纳休姆:《宗教知识疑难》, 1971 年, 第 10 页

同意

在认识论上其用法与赞成相同, 即相信或接受某些命题。洛克描述了同意怎样与信念形成的过程相关。他抨击关于上帝存在的普遍同意论证。这个词较常用于政治语境中, 与强制、剥削等词相对, 而且是主张社会政治实践合法性的根据。在自然状态下, 对于正确和错误的标准没有任何同意。为了获得安全, 人们同意建立社会契约, 创建一个单一的政治机构。在这个机构中, 每一个人都同意将他们的某种自由交给政府, 同意服从法律, 并反过来享有被保护的權利。个人的同意使社区建立起来, 但是, 要使社会像一个有生命的物体那样行动, 它必须根据大多数人的同意来运行。这是因为, 建立在同意之上的社会契约, 其目的是保护全体人的而不仅仅是少数统治者的生命、自由和财产。不过, 有很多时候我们并未对政府的决定表示同意。为了处理这个问题, 洛克提出了默许的概念, 即不用任何言语或行为表示的同意。对于何者被算作默许, 存在着争论。在当代政治哲学中, 明确同意和默许又分别被称为实际同意和潜在同意。如果在一定的情况下, 一个正常人会合理地同意某件事情, 那么这个人就会被说成是潜在的同意。

"政治社会的开端取决于各个个人同意加入和建立一个社会。" ——洛克:《政府论两篇》, 第 136 节。

ety.” — Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, Sect. 106.

Consequential characteristics, see supervenience

Consequentialism

The term may be traced to G. E. M. Anscombe's 1958 paper "Modern moral philosophy". It is now a general practice to divide moral theory into consequentialism and non-consequentialism, also called teleological and non-teleological ethics. Consequentialism or teleological ethics holds that the value of an action is determined entirely by its consequences and thus proposes that ethical life should be forward-looking, that is concerned with maximising the good and minimising the bad consequences of actions. Utilitarianism and pragmatism are important representatives of consequentialism. Sometimes consequentialism is divided into restricted or rule-consequentialism, according to which an action is right if it accords with rules which lead to better consequences than alternative rules, and extreme or act-consequentialism, according to which an action is right if it produces better consequences than alternative actions open to the agent. Another form of consequentialism is motive-consequentialism, which holds that a motive is good if it intends to bring about the best consequences.

Consequentialism has been subjected to criticism in contemporary ethics. Its major demerits are claimed to be the following. First, it is agent-neutral in that it ignores the interests, projects and personal relationships of the moral agents themselves and can require the unlimited sacrifice of any one of them. It is thus an impersonal and disinterested standpoint. This feature is condemned by common sense morality, intuitionism, and, in particular, agent-centred virtue ethics. Secondly, consequentialism overemphasises the importance of good consequences and hence implies the possibility that any act, no matter how immoral it is, can be justified as long as it can bring about the best consequences. The claim that consequence are prior to morality strongly violates moral common sense. In its defence, proponents of consequentialism have formulated various notions of consequence in an attempt to answer some of the criticism.

"Any form of consequentialism locates ethical value ultimately in states of affairs." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 76.

Conservatism

A political position which accords primacy in politics to upholding traditional, inherited and established values and practices. Conservatism opposes large and sudden social and cultural change, especially violent revolution, because it holds that any large-scale radical reform will bring unforeseen and unintended adverse consequences. Conservatism

结果特性

见“伴随性”条。

效果论

这个术语可追溯至 G. E. M. 安斯康 1958 年的一篇题为《现代道德哲学》的论文，现在人们惯例上把道德理论划分为效果论和非效果论，两者也分别被称为“目的论的伦理学”和“非目的论的伦理学”。效果论或目的论伦理学认为，一个行为的价值完全由它的后果所决定，因而提出伦理生活应当是前瞻性的，即关心把行为后果的善加至最大和把坏的后果减至最小。功利主义和实用主义是效果论的重要代表。有时效果论也被划分为严格的或规则效果论和极端的或行为效果论。前者认为，如果一个行为符合能导致比其他规则更好后果的规则，那么这个行为就是正当的。后者认为，一个行为对于行为者的可选行为而言，如果它能带来较好后果，就是正当的。效果论的另一种形式被称为“动机—上效果论”，它主张，一个动机如果打算带来最好的后果，它就是（好的）善的。

效果论在当代伦理学中始终受到批评。它的主要不足被认为有如下几点：第一，它是行为者中立的，因为它忽略了道德行为者本身的利益、规划、个人关系，要求他或她作无限制的牺牲。因此这是非个人的和无利害关系观点。这一点受到“常识道德”、“直觉主义”、尤其是“行为者中心德性伦理学”的指责。第二，效果论过分强调了善的后果的重要性，因此隐含着这样的可能，即任何行为，不论怎样不道德，只要能带来最好的后果，就可证明其合理性。而这就是主张，后果是先于道德的，因而严重地违背了道德常识。出于对效果论的辩护，支持者们已经提出了种种不同的后果概念，力图回答某些批评。

“效果论的任何形式都把伦理价值最终置于事务之中。”——威廉姆斯：《伦理学与哲学的限度》，1985 年，第 76 页。

保守主义

一种在政治生活中把坚持传统的、固有的和已确立的价值和实践放在首位的政治主张。保守主义反对大规模的、突发的社会和文化变革，特别是反对暴力革命，因为它认为任何大范围的激进革新都会带来预料不到和非所要求的有害的后果。保守主义并不绝对地拒绝变革，但

does not absolutely reject change, but requires that change must be continuous, gradual and tested against experience. In Britain, conservatism was first systematically developed by Edmund Burke in his response to the violence of the French Revolution.

Conservatism generally distrusts any abstract theory which seeks to establish universal and objective political principles on the basis of an allegedly universal human nature. In contrast, it holds that the nature of human beings is correlated with the societies and circumstances in which humans find themselves. A society has its distinct history and cultural setting. Political theory should articulate the knowledge and rules which are presupposed in political practice. This approach to political philosophy, mainly represented in this century by Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton, has some common features with communitarian thought. A major objection facing conservatism is that existing values and institutions might have arisen historically from violent revolution or radical reform. In addition, even flexible and imaginative conservatives sometimes must deal with a radically defective historical inheritance.

"By 'conservatism' I intend here to refer to any view to the effect that all attempts to transform societies in accordance with principles (whether they be want-regarding or ideal-regarding principles) are pernicious, dangerous and self-defeating at once." — Brian Barry, *Political Argument*, 1965, p. 54.

Consilience of inductions

[from Latin: *con*, together + *salire*, to jump] A term introduced by the British philosopher of science William Whewell to describe a feature of the best kind of induction. In the process of induction, seemingly diverse and apparently unrelated phenomena may provide evidence which may leap in the same direction to support an unforeseen and uncontented scientific hypothesis. According to Whewell, a theory formed on the basis of the consilience of induction might not only explain different phenomena but also uncover their underlying cause. It is hence more general and credible than induction without consilience and has deductive force. One example is Newton's theory of gravitation which applies not only to the motions of the heavenly bodies but also to the motions of the tides.

"Accordingly the cases in which inductions from classes of facts altogether different have thus jumped together, belong only to the best established theories which the history of science contains. . . I will take the liberty of describing it by a particular phrase; and will term it the 'consilience of inductions'." — Whewell, *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. 1, ch. v, sect. III.

它要求变革必须是持续的、渐进的，并且必须接受经验的检验。在英国，保守主义是由 E. 博克在对法国大革命的暴力做出的反应中首次系统地提出的。

保守主义一般不相信任何试图在所谓普遍人性的基础上建立普遍的、客观的政治原则的抽象理论。相反地，它认为人性是与人们本身所处的社会和环境相关联的。每个社会都有它独特的历史和文化背景。政治理论应把这方面的知识与在政治实践中被预先设定的规则联系起来。政治哲学的这一方法，在本世纪主要是由 M. 奥克肖特和 R. 斯克拉顿提出的，它与共同体主义的思想有某些共同的特征。保守主义面临的一个主要反对意见是，现有的价值观和制度在历史上也许是通过暴力革命或激烈的改革而产生的。此外，即使是灵活的、富于想像力的保守主义者有时也必须应付极有缺陷的历史遗产。

“这里我用‘保守主义’是想要提及这样的观点，其大意是所有根据原则（无论这些原则是关于需要的原则或关于理想的原则）改变社会的企图都是有害的；危险的同时也是使自己的目标无法实现的。”——培里：《政治上的论证》，1965 年，第 54 页。

归纳的一致

源自拉丁文 *con*（共同）和 *salire*（跳跃）[英国科学哲学家 W. 惠威尔用来描述最好的归纳之特征的术语。在归纳过程中，看起来不同和表面上不相干的现象可以提供这样的证据，它们可以向同一方向跳跃以支持一个没有预见到的、未经深思熟虑的科学假说。在惠威尔看来，根据归纳的一致所形成的理论可能不仅解释了不同的现象，而且还揭示了这些现象的深层原因。所以它是比无一致的归纳更普遍和更值得信赖的，并且具有演绎的力量。例证之一就是牛顿的引力理论，它不仅适用于天体运动，而且还适用于潮汐的涨落。

“相应地，同时从完全不同类的事实出发作归纳跳跃，这种情形只属于科学史所包含的得到最好确证的那些理论……我将冒昧地用一特殊的短语描述这一现象，将其称为‘归纳的一致’。”——惠威尔：《归纳科学的哲学》，第 1 卷，第 5 章，第 3 节。

Consistency

Propositions are consistent if they can all be true. A system of propositions can be shown to be inconsistent if it contains a contradiction (a proposition and its negation). No proposition is consistent with its own denial. If two propositions are true, then they must be consistent. However, it does not follow from the fact that two propositions are consistent that both are true. The relation of consistency is symmetrical. Consistency and completeness are two key concerns of modern logic.

“When we speak of two propositions as ‘consistent’, we mean that it is not possible, with either one of them as premise, to deduce the falsity of the other.” — Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, 1932, p. 153.

Constant

As a technical logical term, any operator with a fixed meaning. In predicate logic, the quantifiers some (symbolised as \exists) and all (symbolised as \forall) are constants. In modal logic, the operators necessarily (\Box) and possibly (\Diamond) are constants. In propositional logic, the truth-functional operators, that is the connectives which indicate the logical form of a proposition, such as not (\sim), and (\wedge), or (\vee), if...then (\supset) and if and only if (\leftrightarrow) are constants. More generally, constants contrast with variables which range over a domain, with constants (a, b, c) distinguished from the variables (x, y, z) that they instantiate. It is difficult to determine a principle distinguishing logical constants from non-logical constants, although philosophers agree on their enumeration.

“The expressions which occur in formulae, but are not variables, are constants.” — P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 47.

Constant conjunction

Hume’s term for the relation that exists when the occurrence of an event of one kind A is invariably attended by the occurrence of an event of another kind B. Fire is generally followed by heat; hence there is a constant conjunction between fire and heat. The experience of constant conjunction between two or more kinds of event conveys to our mind the idea of a necessity connection between these events, and leads us to label the precedent events as causes of the attendant events as effects. On the basis of such an experience, when we observe A, we infer the existence of B. Thus Hume claimed that our idea of causation is derived from constant conjunction.

“... the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation” — Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, iii, 15.

一致

如果诸命题都是真的话, 它们就是一致的。一个命题系统可被证明是不一致的, 如果它包括一个矛盾 (一个命题和它的反题)。任何命题与它自己的否定面都不是一致的。如果两个命题是真的, 它们必定是一致的。不过, 我们不能从两个命题是一致的这一事实得出二者都是真的。一致的关系是对称的。一致与完整是现代逻辑的两个关键问题。

“当我们谈到两个命题是‘一致的’, 我们的意思是以两者之一作为前提, 不可能推论另一个是虚假的。” — 刘易斯和兰根福特: 《符号逻辑》, 1932年, 第153页。

常项

作为一个逻辑专门术语, 它指具有固定含义的任何算子。在谓词逻辑中, 它指量词“有的” (符号化为 \exists) 和“所有的” (\forall)。在模态逻辑中, 它指算子“必然” (\Box) 和“可能” (\Diamond)。在命题逻辑中, 它指真值函项算子, 也就是表示一命题的逻辑形式的联结词, 例如像“并非” (\sim), “并且” (\wedge), “或者” (\vee), “如果……则” (\supset) 和“当且仅当” (\leftrightarrow)。更一般地说, 常项是与变元相对而言的, 后者的值域是个体域, 如常项 (a, b, c) 不同于它们作为其实例的变元 (x, y, z)。尽管哲学家们在枚举常项时是一致的, 但确定一个原则以把逻辑常项和非逻辑常项区别开来, 却是一件困难的事情。

“常项是在公式中出现但又不是变元的那些表达式。” — 斯特劳森: 《逻辑理论导论》, 1952年, 第47页。

恒常会合

休谟的用语, 指 A 类的一个事件发生, 就确定无疑会伴有 B 类的一个事件发生时所存在的关系。火一般由热相跟随, 因此, 火和热之间有恒常会合。两个或更多种类事件之间恒常会合的经验, 把这些事件必然联系的观念传达给我们的心灵, 并使我们称前一个事件为原因, 称伴随的事件为结果。在这样一个经验的基础上, 当我们看到 A, 就推断 B 的存在。于是休谟声称, 我们的因果关系的观念来自于恒常会合。

“……对象的恒常会合决定它们的因果关系。” — 休谟: 《人性论》, 第一卷, 第三章, 第15节。

Constative

J. L. Austin's term for utterances such as "John is running", which state, report or describe facts in the world. The utterance "John is running", depends for its truth or falsity on whether it is the case that John is running. Here the act or fact and the utterance are distinct and the former decides the truth of the latter. Most language clearly belongs to this kind of utterance. Constative utterances are contrasted with performative utterances which have a similar linguistic structure but do not issue true or false statements about the world. However, Austin was not satisfied with this distinction, and he later replaces it with his theory of illocution.

"Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word 'Constative'." — Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, p. 3.

Constitutive principles

Kant's term for the principles which objectively state what is present in the object itself, that is what is the constitution of appearance. Constitutive principles are principles of pure understanding which are laid down by us as standard and necessary constituents of the world of appearance. Constitutive principles are contrasted with regulative principles, which are rules to show how experience may be organised or regulated without reference to the constitution of the object. Regulative principles, such as transcendental ideas, play no part in determining the objective character of the world of appearance. They are maxims, neither provable nor disprovable, and are not to be understood as true or false. They serve to guide our inquiry within experience and can lead us to transgress the limits of reason from the conditioned to the unconditioned. For Kant we must observe the distinction between these two kinds of principles. If we use regulative principles as constitutive, dialectical illusions or errors arise. Kant's transcendental dialectic is a presentation of what these errors are.

"The principles of pure understanding, whether constitutive a priori, like the mathematical principles, or merely regulative, like the dynamical, contain nothing but what may be called the pure schema of possible experience." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A236/B296.

Constructionism

An idealist view of history, developed by L. J. Goldstein and J. W. Meiland. They claim that there is no real past consisting of events which exist independent of our knowledge of them. The task of historians, therefore, is not to discover what happened in the past but to construct a past or a narrative of the past on the basis of present evidence and in accordance with certain methodological rules. Consequently, if historians come to possess new evidence or change their methodology, their historical account could be greatly al-

记述式

奥斯汀的用语,是指诸如“约翰正在奔跑”这样的话。这种话语陈述、报道或描述了世界中的事实,“约翰正在奔跑”这句话的真假取决于是否存在约翰正在奔跑这个事实。在这里,行为或事实与说出的话语是不同的,前者决定了后者的真。大多数语言显然都属于这种话语。记述式话语是与完成式话语相对而言的,后者具有相似的语言结构,但并不解决关于世界的陈述真假问题。不过,奥斯汀对这种区分并不满意,后来他把它替换为关于以言行事的理论。

“并非所有的真假陈述都是描述的,因此我更愿意用‘记述式’这个词。”——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》,1962年,第3页。

构成性原理

康德的术语,指这类原理客观地阐明在客体自身中所呈现的东西,即构成了现象的东西。构成性原理是纯粹知性的原理;它们是被我们制定出来作为现象世界的标准、必然的构成成分的。构成性原理相对于“规范性原理”,后者是表明如何组织或整理经验的规则,而不顾及客体的构成。规范性原理,如“先验理念”,在规范现象世界的客观特性中毫无作用。它们是一些准则,既不能证实也不可证伪,不必对它们作真和假的判断。它们用来指导我们的经验研究,会引导我们使理性的限度从有条件的领域超越到无条件的领域。对康德来说,我们必须遵守这两类原理的区别。一旦我们把规范性原理用作构成性原理,就会产生辩证的幻象或谬误。康德的先验辩证论就是展示这些谬误的。

“纯粹知性原理,不论是先天构成性的,如数学的原理,或者只是规范性的,如力学的原理,仅包含可名之为可能经验的纯粹图型。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A236/B296。

构建主义

由L. J. 哥德斯坦和J. W. 梅兰德提出的一种历史唯心主义观点。他们认为,不存在由独立于我们对其的认识而存在的事件构成的真实的过去。因此,历史学家的任务不是发现过去发生了什么,而是以现在的证据为基础按照一定的方法论规则去构建一个过去或叙述过去。所以,一旦历史学家获得了新的证据或改变了他们的方法论,他们对历史的描述就会发生很大的改变。构建主义以否认历史陈述指的是实际

tered. Constructionism contests the objectivity of historical statements by denying that these statements refer to an actual past.

"Constructionism is just the thesis that whatever historians do is to be conceived not as discovering but as constructing the past." - R. F. Atkinson, *Knowledge and Explanation in History*, 1978, p. 41.

Constructivism

The view that mathematics should confine itself only to the entities which it can construct, that is which it can prove systematically in virtue of things we already accept. Thus, constructivism opposes mathematical Platonism, which treats mathematical objects as entities independent of cognitive operations and treats the facts concerning mathematical objects as not depending on the possibilities of verification. Constructivism is a term covering many different doctrines; finitism rejects abstract notions such as set and operation; predicativism claims definitions of mathematical objects should be predicative; and Bishop's constructive mathematics takes it that the statements of mathematics should have numerical meaning; Markov's constructive recursive mathematics and the mathematical intuitionism of Brouwer and Heyting belong to the centre of constructivist thought.

"Constructivism in the broad sense is by no means homogeneous, and even the views expressed by different representatives of one school, or by a single mathematician at different times are not always homogeneous." - Troelstra and Dalen, *Constructivism in Mathematics*, I, p. 1.

Contemporaneity

According to Kirkegaard, there are two kinds of history: one is secular and the other sacred. Secular history consists of past events and a process of temporal becoming. Sacred history, for Kirkegaard Christian history, also has temporal becoming, but, paradoxically, it is also always present in virtue of its eternity. Eternity knows neither past nor future, but is the everlasting now. Christ is not merely an historical person. By accepting his existence, a believer is always contemporary with him. In relation to him, there is only one situation of contemporaneity, and to believe in him is to become contemporary with him. This conception attempts to answer a question arising from the incarnation: if Christ lived in human form at a particular time, what bond is there to sustain his relationship to later generations of believers?

"The person who actually became a Christian on the presupposition of the contemporaneity of the transitional situation with Christianity's coming into the world indeed knew what Christianity is." - Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (trans. by Hong and Hong), I, 1992, p. 348.

的过去为由, 反对历史陈述的客观性。

"构建主义就是这样一种论点: 历史学家所做的一切都被视为不是发现过去, 而是构建过去。" —— 阿特金森: 《历史中的知识和解释》, 1978年, 第41页。

构造论

它是指这样一种观点, 数学应该局限于仅处理它可以构造的那些东西, 即是说, 那些它可以根据我们已经接受的事物来系统地证明的东西。因此, 构造论反对数学中的柏拉图主义。后者把数学对象当成独立于认识功能的东西, 认为有关数学对象的事实不依赖于证实的可能性。构造论是个包括了许多不同学说的术语; 有穷论反对集合和运算这样的抽象概念; 断定论主张数学对象的定义应该是可断定的; 毕肖伯的构造论数学认为, 数学陈述应该有数值意义; 马尔柯夫的构造论递归数学以及布劳维尔和海丁的数学直觉论处于构造论思想的中心地位。

"构造论在宽泛的意义上决不是同质性的, 甚至同一学派的不同代表表述的观点, 或同一数学家在不同时间表述的观点, 也并不总是一样的。" —— 特洛斯特拉和达兰: 《数学中的构造论》, 第一卷, 第1页。

当代性

对克尔凯郭尔来说, 有两种历史: 一种是世俗的、另一种是神圣的。世俗历史由过去的事件和一个时间变化过程组成。神圣历史对于克尔凯郭尔而言是基督教史, 其中也有时间变化; 但貌似矛盾地, 它却凭借其永恒性也总是现在的。永恒性既不知过去, 亦不知未来, 而是永久的现在。基督不只是一位历史人物。凭借接受他的存在, 一位信仰者就总与他是同代人。在与他的关系中, 只有当代性这一种情形, 相信他就是去成为他的当代人。这个概念试图回答这样一个从道成肉身中产生的问题: 如果基督在某个特定时间以人形生活, 那么, 他与后来一代代信仰者的关系是靠什么保证的呢?

"以基督教的出现所导致的突变形势的当代性为前提, 一个人在实际意义上成为了基督徒; 这样, 他才真明白了基督教是什么。" —— 克尔凯郭尔: 《关于〈哲学片断〉的非科学的最后附言》, 第一部分, 1992年, 第348页。

Content

[from Latin: *continere*, contain] That which a mental or propositional attitude is about or means, and hence also called mental content or propositional content. The content of a belief, intention, hope and other attitude is typically expressed in language by a *that*-clause, for example, "I believe *that it will rain tomorrow*" or "I fear *that you will be late*". The logical structure of such sentences is puzzling. For most attitudes the sentences are not extensional, and it is difficult to understand their structure and why they have it. Content seems to be abstract and language-dependent and to have truth-conditions, but it is also generally considered to be a distinctive feature of thought.

We can distinguish between the narrow content and the broad or wide content of what we say or think. Narrow content is about the same objects and properties, whatever the circumstances, whilst broad or wide content incorporates certain aspects of one's embedding situation or environment and can vary in what it is about according to these circumstances. Suppose two liquids seem exactly similar in surface properties, but have different internal constitutions. According to narrow content, we should use different terms for the two liquids, but according to broad content, the situation in which they both could be used alike could allow us to use the same term for them.

Some philosophers believe that content can be understood as a set of possible worlds in which certain objects and properties are realised, while others believe that content should be understood in terms of a structured composite of substance and attributes. There is also debate about what makes a token mental state a belief and about the relation between the acceptability conditions and the truth conditions of a content.

"Content is typically attributed in English by '*that*' clauses and this feature permits an ontologically and theoretically neutral way to distinguish one belief from another (or one desire from another, and so on)." - Baker, *Saving Belief*, 1987, p. 16.

Content holism

A type of semantic holism which claims that an expression can have a content only as a part of a whole language. It cannot have a content unless many other expressions have contents. If I believe a proposition *p*, then I would have to believe various propositions which are in the context of *p*. Content holism contrasts with linguistic atomism which believes that an expression can have a meaning by itself through its relation to an extra linguistic entity.

"What we will call content holism is the claim that properties like having content are holistic in the sense that no expression in a language can have them unless many other (nonsynonymous) expressions in that language have them

内容

「源自拉丁文 *continere*, 包容」心理态度或命题态度所涉及或意指的东西, 因此也称作“心理内容”或“命题内容”。我们用带 *that* 从句的语言来典型地表述信念、意向、希望和其他态度的内容, 例如 “I believe *that it will rain tomorrow*” (我相信明天会下雨) 或 “I fear *that you will be late*” (我担心你要迟到)。这种句子的逻辑结构是费解的。大多数表达态度的句子都不是外延的, 而且很难了解它们的结构以及它们为什么有此结构。内容似乎是抽象的、依赖于语言的, 似乎具有真值条件, 不过, 人们一般也认为它是思想的独具特征。

我们可以将我们所说所想的内容分为狭隘内容和广泛内容。狭隘内容是不论情形如何关于同样对象和性质的内容; 而广泛内容将内容所内设的处境或环境的某些方面结合进来, 可以根据这些情形在它所涉及的范围变化。假设两种液体的表面性质似乎完全相似, 但有不同的内部构造。根据狭隘内容, 我们对这两种液体用不同的术语, 而根据广泛内容, 鉴于两种液体可以相似用于一种情况下, 我们就可以被允许对两种液体使用同一个术语。

有些哲学家认为, 可以将内容理解为一组可能的世界, 在这些世界中, 某些对象和性质被实现了, 而另一些哲学家认为, 内容应当按照实体和属性的有结构的合成物来理解。还有一个争论是关于何者使一单例心理状态成为一个信念, 以及关于一个内容的可接受条件和真值条件之间的关系。

“在英语中, 内容典型地由 '*that*' 从句给出, 这个特征允许我们用一种本体上、理论上中立的方式将一个信念同另一个信念 (或一个欲望同另一个欲望, 等等) 区分开来。” - 贝克尔: 《拯救信念》, 1987 年, 第 16 页。

内容整体论

一种语义学整体论, 它认为, 一个表达式只有作为整个语言的部分时才能够有内容。它能够有内容, 是由于许多其他的表达式都有内容。如果我相信命题 *p*, 那么, 我就得相信与 *p* 处于语境关系中的各种命题。内容整体论是与语言原子论相对而言的, 这种原子论相信, 表达式可以通过自身与语言之外实体的关系而具有意义。

“我们所说的内容整体论是认为, 具有内容这种属性是整体性的, 在这种意义上, 只有当语言中的许多其他 (不同义的) 表达式具有内容时, 某个表达式才能够具有内容。” - 福多和

too.” Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 5.

Content stroke. see assertion-sign

Context principle

Introduced by Frege in *The Foundation of Arithmetic* as a fundamental methodological principle, it asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Frege's original intention was to solve the problem of how numbers are given to us. By this principle he transferred the question from an epistemological approach to a linguistic investigation into how we are able to fix the senses of sentences containing numeric terms. According to Dummett, the context principle is significant in the linguistic turn of philosophy and is essential to the whole movement of analytic philosophy. On the basis of this principle, Dummett himself derived the dependence thesis. If it is impossible to grasp the sense of a word independent of the sentence in which it occurs, then it is also impossible to grasp a constituent of a thought without apprehending the whole thought of which it is a constituent.

“The context principle... is... the thesis that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning.” — Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, 1993, p. 5.

Contextual definition

A definition conveying the sense of a term by defining the sentence or the text in which it occurs. Excellent examples are provided by Russell's analyses of definite descriptions, which amount to definitions of the sentences in which the definite descriptions occur. According to Russell, all incomplete symbols have their meanings by contextual definitions, for incomplete symbols are not denoting expressions which stand for something, and they have meaning only in a context of a sentence or a formula. In employing contextual definitions, Russell had a device for eliminating unwanted entities. Ayer claimed that philosophical analysis in its entirety is a matter of contextual definition. But this is generally regarded as an inadequate account of philosophical analysis, for contextual definition only reveals the logical structure of language and is applied only to linguistic complexes. Philosophical analysis, on the other hand, is applied also to mental and other complexes. Contextual definition is also called definition in use, and Bentham called it paraphrasis.

“Contextual definition of a term showed how to translate sentences containing the term into equivalent sentences lacking the term.” — Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 77.

Contextual implications

Nowell-Smith's term for a distinctive use of ethical language. The proper use of ethical language in a given context

拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第5页。

内容线

见“断定记号”条。

语境原则

弗雷格在《算术的基础》中引入的基本方法论原则,它断定,一个词只有在一个句子的语境中才有意义。弗雷格的最初想法是要解决关于我们如何得到数字这个问题。他用这个原则把这个问题从认识论探索转向了语言研究,即我们如何能够确定那些包含数词的句子的意义。根据达米特的观点,这种语境原则在哲学的语言转向中很有意义,它对整个分析哲学运动都至关重要。在这种原则基础之上,达米特本人则提出了一个“从属论题”:如果独立于一个词所出现的句子就不能掌握这个词的意义,那么没有领会整个思想也就不能掌握构成这个思想的组成部分。

“语境原则,……是……这样一个论题,即一个词只有在句子的语境中才有意义。”——达米特:《分析哲学的起源》,1993年,第5页。

语境定义

通过定义一词项所出现的语句或文本来传达该词项含义的定义。罗素关于限定摹状词的分析是语境定义的最好例证,它相当于对该限定摹状词所出现的那个语句的定义。在罗素看来,所有不完全符号都通过语境定义获得其意义,因为不完全符号并不是代表某物的指称表达式,它们只在语句或公式的语境中才有意义。在使用语境定义时,罗素获得了去掉不想要的实体的手段。艾耶尔宣称,哲学分析整个就是语境定义问题。但人们一般认为这一说法是对哲学分析的不充分说明,因为语境定义只能揭示语言的逻辑结构,并且只适用于语言复合物。另一方面,哲学分析还适用于心智复合物和其他复合物。语境定义也叫做“用法定义”。边沁则把它命名为“释义”(paraphrasis)。

“一个词项的语境定义表明了如何把含该词项的语句翻译为不含该词项的等价语句。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性及其他论文》,1969年,第77页。

语境蕴含〔或译“背景蕴含”〕

诺威尔-史密斯的术语,是对伦理语言的一种特定用法。在一给定的语境中,伦理语言的适

authorises certain inferences which the original ethical sentences cannot be said to assert or state, but which their use implies in that context. Any logical implication can be said to be a sub-class of contextual implication, but not vice versa. The denial of contextual implications is logically odd. The proper use of ethical language itself implies that the speaker believes his statement is true and conforms with the relevant recognised moral rules or his own moral principles. It also implies that what the speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience and that he would make the same statement in similar situations.

"I shall say that a statement P contextually implies a statement Q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language would be entitled to infer Q from P in the context in which they occur." Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 80.

Contextual relativism, an alternative term for contextualism

Contextualism

Also called contextual relativism, a position in both ethics and the philosophy of language which claims that various sorts of contexts should be taken into account when we consider a moral position or the meaning of a term. Both ethical contextualism and linguistic contextualism are directed against formalism, which claims that we can establish a set of abstract moral principles which have universal application without regard to particular situations (ethical formalism) or that we may determine the meaning of a statement through the study of its logical structure (linguistic formalism).

Ethical contextualism holds that we cannot deal with ethical problems in detachment from the particular practical situations in which the problems arise. Instead, ethics should be concerned with ethical problems in given contexts. Historically, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Hegel are considered to be contextualists to some degree. In this century, influenced by pragmatism and logical positivism, contextualism has been used specifically for the view that in any given context there are always some ethical premises which are themselves unquestioned, although they may be questioned in another context. These premises, conjoined with the result of common experience or science, can lead to a suitable resolution of the problems that arise in that context. On this view, abstract ahistorical principles are dispensable. Dewey, Austin and Wittgenstein are claimed as representatives of this kind of position. Ethical feminism also endorses this position, but it claims, controversially, that universal principles are masculine illusions, while women's moral consideration is contextual and concrete.

In the philosophy of language, contextualism proposes that the meaning of a word is determined by its use or occur-

当使用确立了某些推论, 这些推论不能说是原来的伦理语句所断言或陈述的, 可却是它们的用法在那种语境中所蕴含的。任何逻辑蕴含都可说是语境蕴含的子类型, 反之则不是。对于语境蕴含的否定会造成逻辑上的混乱。伦理语言的适当使用本身隐含着说者相信他的陈述是真的, 是与公认的有关道德规则或他自己的道德原则一致的。这也隐含着说者所说的可被认为是与听者的兴趣相关的, 而且听者在同样的情形下会给出同样的陈述。

“如果掌握了语言的惯常用法的任何人, 有理由从 P 所出现的语境中推出 Q, 那我将说, 一个陈述 P, 在语境意义上蕴含了陈述 Q。”——诺威尔-史密斯:《伦理学》, 1954 年版, 第 80 页。

语境相对主义 (或译“情景相对主义”)

“语境主义”的另一种表述。

语境主义 (或译“情景主义”)

也被称为“语境相对主义”, 伦理学和语言哲学中的一种主张, 认为当我们考虑一种道德观点或一个术语的含义时, 各种不同的语境都应予以重视。伦理学的情景主义和语言学的语境主义都反对形式主义, 后者认为, 我们可以建立一套能被普遍应用而无须考虑特殊情况的抽象的道德原则 (伦理形式主义), 或者, 我们可以通过研究一个陈述的逻辑结构来确定它的含义 (语言形式主义)。

伦理情景主义认为, 离开伦理问题出现于其中的特殊实际情况, 我们就无法论述这些问题。因而, 伦理学应关注在既定情景中的伦理问题。从历史上看, 亚里士多德、阿奎那、休谟和黑格尔在某种程度上都被认为是情景主义者。在这个世纪, 受实用主义和逻辑实证主义的影响, 情景主义尤其被用于这样一种观点, 即在既定的情景中, 总存在某些本身无异议的伦理学前提, 虽然它们在另一情景中也许会受到质疑。这些前提与公众经验的结果或科学的结果结合起来, 就能导致对出现于那种情景中的问题的适当解决。根据这种观点, 抽象的非历史的原则不是必不可少的。杜威、奥斯汀和维特根斯坦都可以说是这种观点的代表。伦理女性主义也赞成这种观点, 但它争论说, 那些普遍的原则是男性的幻觉, 而妇女的道德考虑则是与情景相联系的和具体的。

在语言哲学中, 语境主义提出, 一个词的意思是通过它在一个句子中的用法或出现来确定的, 也就是说, 通过它对句子内容的作用来确定的。因此, 句子或命题在对意思的解释上比词或概念更重要。理解一个词就是理解它如何能被

rence in a sentence, that is by its contribution to the content of the sentence. Accordingly, sentences or propositions are prior to words or concepts in the explanation of meaning. To understand a word is to understand how it can be employed in a sentence. Contextual definition, which means explaining a word by appeal to the sentence in which it occurs, is based on contextualism. By analogy with contextualism, Quine and Davidson developed what is called semantic holism, that is the view that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its use in a whole language. Contextualism is also used for the claim that the meaning of a theory varies according to its placement in different non-logical contexts. Meaning must be qualified by certain historical, semantic, social and political perspectives.

"The contextualists ... felt that there was much more to theory than its being a logical calculus which merely enabled the scientists to make predictions." —Aronson, *A Realist Philosophy of Sciences*, 1984, p. 5.

Contiguity

If two objects are next to or succeed each other, they are contiguous. For Hume, contiguity is one of the three basic principles of the association of ideas (the other two are resemblance and causation). If we experience the constant conjunction of two contiguous objects, this experience will lead the mind to infer the existence of one of them from the presence of the other. This is a necessary condition for us to establish that there is a relation of cause and effect between these two objects. Hence for Hume contiguity is essential for our notion of causation. For Leibniz, the principle of contiguity is a natural law that each natural change is continuous rather than abrupt. It can be summarised by the slogan *natura non facit saltum* (Nature makes no leaps).

"This likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie *contiguous* to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects." —Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, I, iv.

Contingent identity

A crucial notion for central-state materialism or the identity theory. This theory in the philosophy of mind claims that mental states or processes are nothing other than processes in the brain. But linguistic philosophers argued that the logic of statements about brain states and the logic of statements about mental states are different and that brains and minds cannot therefore be identical. To deal with this objection, physicalism introduced the notion of contingent identity to say that the identity between mental states and brain states is not logical or necessary identity. Expressions

用在一个句子中。语境定义是以语境主义为基础的,它指的是解释一个词要求助于它出现于其中的句子。根据对语境主义的类比,奎因和戴维森创立了人们所说的语义学整体论,这一观点认为,一个句子的意思是由它在整个语言中的用法确定的。语境主义也被用于这样一种主张,即一个原理的意思是随着其所处的不同的非逻辑语境而改变的。意义必定受特定的历史、语义学、社会和政治的观点的限制。

"语境主义者……认为,理论绝不只是仅能使科学家做出预言的逻辑演算。"——阿隆森:《一种实在论的科学哲学》,1984年,第5页。

接近性

如果两个对象彼此相邻或接续,它们是接近的。在休谟看来,接近性是观念联结的三个基本原则之一(其他两个原则是相似和因果关系)。如果我们经验到两个相近对象的恒常会合,这个经验将引导心灵从两者之一的出现,推断另一个的存在。这是我们确定这两个对象之间有因果关系的必要条件。因此,在休谟看来,接近性对于我们的因果关系概念是必不可少的。在莱布尼茨看来,接近性原则是一个自然规律:每一个自然变化都是连续的,而不是突发的。它可以被概括成一个口号:"自然从不飞跃"(*natura non facit saltum*)。

"同样明显的是,由于感官在变更它们的对象时必须作有规律的变更,把它们当做是互相接近的,所以想像也必然因长期的习惯而获得同样的思想方法,并在构想它的对象时依次经过空间和时间的各个部分。"——休谟:《人性论》,第一卷,第一章,第4节。

偶然同一性

"中心状态唯物论"或"同一论"的关键术语。心的哲学的这一理论声称心的状态或过程仅仅是大脑中的过程,但是语言哲学家指出,关于大脑状态的陈述的逻辑与关于心的状态的陈述的逻辑是不同的,因此,心与脑不可能是同一的。针对这一反驳,物理主义者引进了偶然同一性这一概念来说明心的状态与大脑状态之间的同一不是逻辑的或必然的。关于这些状态的表达在意义上是不同一的,而只是偶然或碰巧地挑选出相同的项目,这个同一性只是一个偶然

for the states are not identical in meaning, but pick out the same items contingently or accidentally, and the identity holds as a matter of contingent fact. The identity is not a conceptual truth. The world could have been otherwise, but it happens to be the case that mental states are brain states. The notion of contingent identity has been attacked by Kripke, who claims that contingent statements involving descriptions do not reflect any genuine identity. Identity statements must be made using names rather than descriptions, but then following Leibniz's law, if an identity statement is true, it must be necessarily true.

"Everyone agrees that descriptions can be used to make contingent statements... Certainly when you make an identity statement using description—when you say 'the x such that ϕx and the x such that ψx are one and the same'—that can be a contingent fact." —Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 1972, p. 98.

Contingent / necessary

A basic philosophical distinction. Contingent propositions happen to be true or happen to be false, but could be otherwise. According to a possible world account, a proposition is contingent if and only if it is true in at least one possible world and false in at least one other possible world. Necessary propositions are true whatever the circumstances. Necessary propositions are true in all possible worlds. Philosophers disagree whether there are any necessary propositions. Some restrict necessary propositions to propositions which are analytic or true because of their logical form, including logical and mathematical propositions. Others argue that some propositions can be metaphysically, transcendently or naturally necessary. A contingent event is one that does not necessarily take place. If there are necessary events, natural rather than logical necessity is involved. The provision of a semantics for modal terms (such as necessary and possible) and the revival of essentialism has led to renewed interest in the distinction between what is necessary *de dicto* (of a statement) and necessary *de re* (of a thing).

"Classical metaphysics depreciated the contingent... As late as Hegel, 'necessary' is a word for laudation, and 'contingent' of denigration." —Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method*, 1970, p. 47.

Contingentism, see necessitarianism

Continuum, see continuum hypothesis

Continuum hypothesis

A continuum is a collection of points, such that between any two points there are distinct points. Classical examples

的事实,它并不在概念上为真。世界或许可能会是另外一种样子;但它碰巧是:心的状态就是大脑状态。偶然同一性概念遭到克里普克的攻击,他声称偶然陈述所包含的描述不反映任何真正的同一性。同一性陈述必须使用名称而不是描述,而根据莱布尼茨定律,如果一个同一性陈述为真,它一定是必然为真。

"每个人都同意描述可以用来作偶然陈述……当然当你用描述来作一个同一性陈述时——当你说" ϕx 中的 x 与 Ψx 中的 x 是同一个时——那就可能是一个偶然事实。"——克里普克:《命名与必然性》,1972年,第98页。

偶然/必然

一个基本的哲学对立。偶然命题是碰巧为真或碰巧为假,但也可以说是其他的情况。根据可能世界的说明,一个命题是偶然的,当且仅当它至少在一个可能世界真且至少在另一个可能世界为假。必然命题是在无论任何环境条件下都为真。必然命题是在所有的可能世界中都为真。可哲学家们对是否存在某些必然命题持不同意见。有些把必然命题限制为分析命题,或因为其逻辑形式为真的命题,包括逻辑的和数学的命题。另一些论争说,有些命题能是形而上学的、超验的或自然必然的。一个偶然事件是那不必然发生的事件,如果有必然事件,所涉及到的会是自然的而不是逻辑的必然性。模态术语(如必然、可能)的语义学的提出以及本质主义的复兴,导致了关于陈述的必然性与关于事物的必然性这一区分的兴趣的复兴。

"古典形而上学贬低偶然……晚至黑格尔,'必然'都是受赞之词,'偶然'则遭否定。"——哈特肖恩:《创造性综合与哲学的方法》,1970年,第47页。

偶然论

见"必然论"条。

连续统

见"连续统假设"条。

连续统假设

连续统是点的汇集,使得在任意两点之间存在明晰的点。经典的连续统范例为线、面和空

of continua are lines, planes and spaces. This notion can be traced to Aristotle's definition of continuity in *Physics* V, which states that "things are called continuous when the touching limits of each become one and the same and are, as the word implies, contained in each other". In his theory of infinite cardinal numbers (the numbers measuring the size of infinite sets), Cantor postulates the continuum hypothesis that the cardinality of any power set of an infinite set (the set of all of its subsets) is the second highest cardinality after that of the set itself. Gödel proved in 1938 that this hypothesis is compatible with the most popular system of the set theory (the Zermelo-Fraenkel-Skolem system). However, Paul Cohen proved in 1963 that its negation is also compatible with that system. Hence this hypothesis is independent of the accepted axioms of set theory. The question of the truth or falsity of this hypothesis constitutes the so-called continuum problem.

"It is now known that the truth or falsity of the continuum hypothesis and other related conjectures cannot be determined by set theory as we know it today." —Paul Cohen, *Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis*, 1966, p. 1.

Contractarianism

An approach to ethics on the basis of social contract theory. It has two forms; Hobbesian contractarianism and Kantian contractarianism. Hobbesian contractarianism starts from the assumption that people have a natural equality of physical power and proceeds to infer that to prevent harm to one another it is mutually advantageous to reach an agreement which protects each person's interests. Accordingly there is no inherent right or wrong, and morality flows from the constraints necessary for mutually beneficial co-operation. This position is criticised because it does not take morality as a value in itself, and, furthermore, the pursuit of mutual advantage itself requires some prior moral claims. Kantian contractarianism, which is also called contractualism, argues that people have a natural equality of moral status. John Rawls is the most influential contemporary proponent of this position. According to Rawls, if a contract is negotiated from an original position of equality, it can give equal consideration to each of its contractors. Thus, moral thinking is about what agreements people could make in such circumstances. An action is wrong if its performance is disallowed by a system of rules which is set by informed, unforced and general agreement and which no one could reasonably reject in those circumstances. Some critics argue that this position offers an intellectual account of morality, but fails to uncover any real motivation for acting morally. They claim that it does not give any reason for persons possessing greater power to avoid using it to harm others in the pursuit of their own interest and that it does not give any reason to give moral consideration to the interests of future genera-

tion. 这个概念可以追溯到亚里士多德在《物理学》第五章中的连续性定义,它表述为“当事物赖以相互接触的外限变为同一个,或者说(正如这个词本身所表明)互相包容时,就被称作连续的”。康托尔在他的无穷基数(用以度量无穷集大小的数)理论中提出了连续统假设,即一个无穷集的任何幂集(即其所有子集的集)的基数,是在集自身基数之后的第二个最高基数。哥德尔于1938年证明了这一假设是与集合论中最流行的系统(策梅罗—弗兰克尔—司寇伦系统)相一致的。然而,P.柯亨于1963年证明其否定也是与这系统相一致的。因此这一假设独立于公认的集合论公理。这样,这一假设的真假问题构成了所谓的“连续统问题”。

“现在已认识到,连续统假设的真实或虚假以及其他相关的猜想不能为我们如今所知道的集合论所确定。”——柯亨:《集合论与连续统假设》,1966年,第1页。

契约主义

以社会契约理论为基础的一种对伦理学的探索。它有两种形式:霍布斯式的契约主义和康德式的契约主义。霍布斯式的契约主义以人有身体力量的自然平等的假设开始,推理的过程是,为了防止相互伤害,相互有利的是达成某种协定以保护各自的利益。因此,对与错都不是内在的。道德来自于为了相互有益的合作的必要约束。这个观点受到批评,因为它并不把道德看成是自身有价值的。而且,相互有利的追求本身需要某种先行的道德主张。康德式的契约主义,也称为“契约论”,强调人的道德地位是天然平等的,J.罗尔斯是这种观点最有影响的当代提倡者。据罗尔斯看来,如果一种契约是从一种原始的平等观点订立的,它就能够给予每一个订约人以平等的考虑。因此,道德的思考就是关于人们在这种环境中能够订立什么协议。如果一种行为不为行为的规则系统所允许,那这种行为是错误的,而这种规则系统是由公认的、非强制的和普遍的协议所确立的,是任何人在那种环境条件下都无法合理地拒绝的。批评者说,这种观点对于道德提供了一种理智的解说,但没有揭示道德行为的真正动机。他们认为这种观点没有提供任何理由说明强者在追求他们自己的利益时应避免使用强权去伤害他人,也没有说明我们为什么要对后代的利益予以道德考虑。

“契约主义的一个使人困扰的特征是它把人们的道德主张系于他们讨价还价的力量的方式上。”——格洛弗:《应该有什么样的人》,1977

tions.

"A disturbing feature of Contractarianism is the way it ties people's moral claims to their bargaining power." — Glover, *What Sort of People Should There Be*, 1977, p. 145.

Contractualism, another name for contractarianism

Contradiction

[from Latin: *contra* against — *dicere* speak] A contradiction conjoins a statement and its negation ("p and not p"), ascribes and denies the ascription of the same feature to an individual ("a is f and not f") or, more broadly, is false on logical grounds alone. According to the law of non-contradiction, "p" and "not p" cannot both be true. They are logically exclusive and logically exhaustive and cannot be true or false together. These two inconsistent statements are called contradictories. Contradictories are distinguished from contraries because while contradictories can neither be both true nor both false, contraries cannot both be true but can both be false. In the square of oppositions, the universal affirmative judgement (A) "All S are P" and the particular negative judgement (O) "Some S are not P" are contradictories, and so are the universal negative (E) "All S are not P" and the particular affirmative (I) "Some S are P".

Traditionally, finding a contradiction has been a way of showing that a system must be rejected. Accepting contradictions has been considered intellectually ruinous because every proposition follows from a contradiction. But there have been recent explorations of logical systems which seem able to tolerate some contradictions. Hegel and Marx understood contradictions to be conflicts necessary to the dialectical development of spirit or history. Their accounts should not be confused with other discussions of contradiction.

"A contradiction cancels itself and leaves nothing." — P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 3.

Contradictories, see contradiction

Contrafactuals

Also called counterfactuals or contrary-to-fact conditionals. Propositions expressed in the form: "if P had been the case, then Q would have been the case." The antecedent is presupposed or known to be false and hence describes a contrary to fact or contrafactual state of affairs. The consequent claims how things would have been were the antecedent state of affairs to be realised. For example, "If I had been the president of the United States at that time, I would not have got the U. S. involved in the Vietnam War". All contrafactuals are subjunctive, but not all subjunctive conditionals are

年, 第 145 页。

契约论

“契约主义”的另一名称。

矛盾

[来自拉丁文 *contra* (相反) 和 *dicere* (说)] 矛盾把一陈述和它的否定组合在一起 ("P 且非 P"), 把同一特征及其否定归属于同一对象 ("a 是 f 并且是非 f"), 或者更一般地说, 矛盾仅依据逻辑就是假的。根据不矛盾律, "P" 和 "非 P" 不能同真。它们在逻辑上是相互排斥的, 并且在逻辑上是穷竭的, 不能同真或同假。这两个不相容的陈述叫做矛盾命题。矛盾命题区别于反对命题, 因为矛盾命题既不能同真也不能同假, 而反对命题虽不能同真却可以同假。在对当方阵中, 全称肯定判断 (A) "所有 S 是 P" 与特称否定判断 (O) "有些 S 不是 P" 是矛盾命题, 并且全称否定判断 (E) "所有 S 不是 P" 和特称肯定判断 (I) "有些 S 是 P" 也是如此。

从传统上讲, 找出一个矛盾一直是证明某个系统必须被拒斥的途径。容纳矛盾一直被认为在理智上是自毁的, 因为每一个命题都可以从矛盾推出来。但是, 近来已经有人在探索、研究似乎能够容忍某些矛盾的逻辑系统。黑格尔和马克思把矛盾理解为精神或历史的辩证发展的必要的冲突。他们的阐述不应与关于矛盾的其他讨论相混淆。

"矛盾取消它自身并留下虚无。" — 斯特劳森: 《逻辑理论导论》, 1952 年, 第 3 页。

矛盾命题

见“矛盾”条。

反事实语句

亦称反事实条件句, 是用下述形式表述的命题: "假如 P 已经发生, 则 Q 也会已经发生。" 这里前件被预先假定或已被知道是假的, 所以它描述了一种“与事实相反”或“反事实的”事态; 后件断言假如前面的事态被实现了的话事情将会是怎样的。例如, "假如我当时是美国总统, 我将不会使美国卷入越南战争。" 所有反事实语句都是虚拟的, 但并非所有虚拟条件句都是反事实语句。

反事实语句的特殊性在于, 它们是非真值

counterfactual.

The peculiarity of counterfactuals is that they are not truth-functional. Their truth-value cannot be determined by the truth values of their components. They involve neither material implication nor strict implication. Thus there arises a problem about how to determine the truth conditions of counterfactuals. Currently there are three main positions. One, held by Chisholm, Goodman and Rescher, suggests that a counterfactual is true if its antecedent *P*, when conjoined with lawlike generalisations and statements of background conditions, will logically entail the consequent *Q*. The second, held by D. Lewis and Stalnaker, has been developed on the basis of possible world theory and claims that a counterfactual is true if its consequent *Q* is true in the nearest possible world in which the antecedent *P* is true. The third argues that a counterfactual should be treated as an argument and should be judged as valid or invalid, but not as true or false. Each solution has some difficulties and the problem of counterfactual conditionals is still a subject of lively debate.

"Any adequate analysis of the contrafactual conditional must go beyond mere truth values and consider causal connections, or kindred relationships, between matters spoken of in the antecedent of the conditional and matters spoken of in the consequent." —Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1952, p. 14.

Contraposition

In traditional logic, an immediate inference formed by negating both the subject term and the predicate term of a proposition and exchanging their positions. The result is called the contrapositive, in which the predicate of the original proposition becomes the subject. Thus, contraposition is the operation of converting the obverse of a proposition or of obverting its converse. Of the four basic categorical propositions in traditional logic, the contrapositive of SAP ("All *S* are *P*") is "all not *P* are not *S*"; that of SEP ("All *S* are not *P*") is "all not *P* are not not *S*"; that of SIP ("Some *S* are *P*") is "Some not *P* are not *S*", and that of SOP ("Some *S* are not *P*") is "some not not *P* are not *S*". The contrapositions of SAP and SIP are valid, while that of SEP and SOP are invalid.

In modern logic, contraposition is an inference consisting in negating both the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional, and exchanging their positions. For instance, from the premise "If *p* then *q*", contraposition yields "if not *q* then not *p*". This is a valid inference.

"Contraposition may be defined as a process of immediate inference in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred having for its subject the contradictory of the original predicate." —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 134.

函项性的。它们的真值不能由其支命题的真值决定。它们既不涉及实质蕴涵也不涉及严格蕴涵。于是这里就提出了一个问题：如何去确定反事实语句的真值条件。目前有三种主要见解。一种由齐硕姆、古德曼、雷谢尔等人所主张，它提出，一反事实语句为真，如果把它的前件 *P* 与似规律的概括和背景条件的陈述结合在一起之后，能够逻辑地推出它的后件 *Q*。第二种由 D. 刘易斯、斯托奈克等人所主张，已经在可能世界理论的基础上加以展开。它断言，一反事实语句为真，如果它的后件 *Q* 在使前件 *P* 为真的那个最近的可能世界中也为真。第三种观点认为，反事实语句应该看成是一个论证，它能够被判定为有效或者无效，而不能被判定为真的或者假的。每一种解决方案都有某些困难，因此反事实条件句问题仍然是一个热门的论战话题。

“关于反事实条件句的任何适当的分析，都必定超出单纯的真值，而考虑到在该条件句的前件中说到的事情与后件中说到的事情之间的因果联系或同源关系。”——奎因：《逻辑方法》，1952 年，第 14 页。

换位法

在传统逻辑里，一种直接的推论在于同时否定一个命题的主词和谓词，并交换它们的位置，其结果被称作换位，在这里，原来命题的谓词成了主词。因此，换位法就是反转一个命题的相对面或倒转它的相反面。在传统逻辑的四个基本直言判断中，SAP（“所有的 *S* 是 *P*”）的换位是“所有的不是 *P* 的不是 *S*”，SEP（“所有的 *S* 不是 *P*”）的换位是“所有的不是 *P* 的不是非 *S*”，SIP（某些 *S* 是 *P*）的换位是“某些不是 *P* 的不是 *S*”，SOP（某些 *S* 不是 *P*）的换位是“某些非非 *P* 不是 *S*”。SAP 和 SIP 的换位是有效的，而 SEP 和 SOP 的换位则是无效的。

在现代逻辑中，换位法是一种推论，在于同时否定一个条件句的前件和后件，并交换它们的位置。例如，从前提“如果 *p* 那么 *q*”，我们通过换位法得到“如果不是 *q*，那么不是 *p*”，这是有效的推论。

“换位法可以界定为直接推论的过程，在这个过程中，从一个给定的命题，可以推出另一个命题，这个被推论出的命题的主词是原命题谓词的矛盾。”——凯恩斯：《形式逻辑》，1928 年，第 134 页。

Contraries

Two statements which cannot both be true but may both be false. For example, "this cat is black" and "this cat is white", are contrary statements or contraries because a cat cannot be both completely black and completely white. It might, however, be neither black nor white, but, say, tan. Contraries differ from contradictions because in a pair of contrary statements, the negation of one does not entail the other. In traditional logic, the universal affirmative judgement "all S are P" and the universal negative judgement "all S are not P" are contraries.

"To say of two statements that they are contraries is to say that they are inconsistent with each other, while leaving open the possibility that there is some statement inconsistent with both." —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 16.

Contrary, see contraries

Contrary-to-fact conditionals, see contrafactual

Contributor's dilemma

Should I contribute to public goods? If I help, I will add to the sum of benefits. But only a very small portion of the benefit I add will come back to me. Since my share of what I add will be very small, it may not repay my contribution. It may thus be better for me if I do not contribute. This can be true whatever others do. But it will be worse for everyone if fewer people contribute. This is the contributor's dilemma, and it raises the question of what difference a single altruistic choice would make in cases that involve many people and whether it is rational to contribute in such cases. In rational choice theory this dilemma is related to the problem of the free rider.

"It is often claimed that, in those contributor's dilemmas that involve very many people, what each person does would make no difference." —Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 1984, p. 66.

Convention

[from Latin: *conveniens*, suitable, proper; related to Greek: *nomos*, laws, social customs, in contrast to *physis*: nature] Conventions are acceptable regularities or patterns in a community or population group, with examples including such things as moral rules, laws and traffic rules. Conventions arise either unconsciously or from specific agreement. They are inherited, imitated, and taught explicitly within a community. Philosophy of language holds that many words gain their meaning by convention, rather than being deter-

反对命题

指两个不能同真但可以同假的陈述。例如，“这只猫是黑的”和“这只猫是白的”就是反对的陈述或反对命题，因为一只猫不能同时是完全黑和完全白的。不过，它可能既不黑也不白，而是比如说棕褐色的。所以，反对命题区别于矛盾命题之处在于：在一对反对命题中，否定一个并不衍推另一个。在传统逻辑中，全称肯定判断“所有 S 是 P”和全称否定判断“所有 S 不是 P”是反对命题。

“说两个陈述是反对命题，就是说它们互不相容，但留下了这样一种可能性：存在某个陈述与它们两者都不相容。”——斯特劳森：《逻辑理论导论》，1952 年，第 16 页。

反对的

见“反对命题”条。

反事实条件句

见“反事实语句”条。

贡献者的两难困境

我应该对公共善作出贡献吗？如果我乐意，我可以增加利益的总量。但是，我所加上的利益只有很小的份额将返回给我。既然我所加上的只有很小的份额是我能享有的，那就没有回报我的贡献。因此如果我不作贡献，也许对我更有利。不论其他人是否贡献，这总是对的。但如果几乎没有什么人作贡献，则对于每个人都不利。这是贡献者的两难困境，它的问题是，单个人的利他主义的选择，在涉及到许多人的情况下，能造成多少差别。或在这种情况下一个人的贡献是否是合理的。在理性选择理论中，这也与逃票乘客的问题相关。

“人们常常说，在那些涉及到许多人的贡献者的两难困境中，每一个人所做的没有什么区别。”——帕菲特：《理性与人》，1984 年，第 66 页。

约定

[源自拉丁文 *conveniens*，适当的、专门的；在希腊文中，它是 *nomos*（法则、社会习俗等），与 *physis*（自然）相对照]它是指在团体或人群中公认的规则或模式，例如道德法则、法律、交通规则等。约定或者是无意识地产生的，或者是来自专门的协定。它们是人类固有的、模仿的和在团体中明确习得的。语言哲学认为，许多语词是通过约定而得到意义的，而不是由它们所指称的对象性质决定的。所谓句子 S 意味着 X，可

mined by the nature of the objects they refer to. What it is for a sentence S to mean X is explained in terms of the existence of a convention in a population of speakers that S should be used to mean X. There is a convention relation between sentences in general and the propositions they express. According to Logical Positivism, a language framework is also determined by convention. There are various discussions about the precise mechanism that gives rise to a convention and the way it is maintained.

"Conventions are to be explained in terms of the patterns of beliefs and intentions of the members of the population." —Stalnaker, *Inquiry*, 1984, p. 32.

Conventional implicature, see conversational implicature

Conventionalism

The view that human conventions rather than independent realities or necessities shape our basic concepts of the world, scientific theories, ethical principles, and the like. On this view, scientific laws and theories are conventions or postulates, rather than absolute and independent. They depend on our choices from among alternative ways of organising and explaining experience. Human arrangements are the measure and final source of their authority. We choose a given theory on the basis of its convenience or simplicity, but it is not any more true than the rival theories. This position developed out of Kant's claims that the laws we find in the natural world are dependent on the character of our rational human minds and on our conceptual structure, although Kant argued that the basic concepts and principles so originating were unique and not open to successful challenge. The major proponent of conventionalism was H. Poincaré, who held that mathematical theorems are relative to our framework of knowledge, are subject to revision and may even be totally abandoned. The difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry is not factual but conventional. The only necessary limitation on our choice of theorems and laws is the avoidance of contradiction. Other proponents include E. Mach, P. Duhem, and, in some respects, the later Wittgenstein. Conventionalism is close to instrumentalism and pragmatism, but is opposed to realism. Its difficulty is that it must admit that alternatives to our accepted principles are also workable conventions and that the choice between rival principles is arbitrary. Among its critics are M. Schlick, K. Popper and E. Nagel. In moral philosophy, conventionalism is the view that moral rules are due to social conventions.

"Conventionalism ... tries to show that most of the epistemological questions contain no questions of truth-character, but are to be settled by arbitrary decisions." —Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction*, 1938, p. 11.

解释为一群说话者约定 S 应该用于指 X。在一般的句子与它们所表达的命题之间存在着一种约定关系。根据逻辑实证主义的观点,语言框架也是由约定确定的。对引起约定的精确机制和它所维持的方式,还存在着各种讨论。

"约定只能用信念模式和人类成员的意向加以解释。"——斯托奈克:《研究》,1984年,第32页。

约定含义

见“对话含有关系”条。

约定论

这个论点是,人类的约定而不是独立的实在或必然性,塑造了我们关于这个世界、科学理论、伦理原则以及其类似东西的基本概念。按照这种观点,科学法则和理论是约定或假定,而不是绝对的独立的。它们取决于我们对整理和解释经验的可选择的方法的选择。人们的安排是它们的权威尺度和最终根源。我们依据其方便程度或简易性选择了一种特定的理论,但这并不必然意味着它比其他理论更正确。这个观点是从康德的如下主张发展而来的:我们在自然界所发现的法则实际上依赖于人类理智的特性和我们的概念结构。不过,康德还认为,如此创造的基本概念和原则是独一无二的并且不可能受到成功的诘难。这一观点的主要提倡者是 H. 彭加勒,他相信数学定理是相对于我们的知识结构的,是可以修正的,甚至可能会完全被抛弃的。欧几里德几何学与非欧几里德几何学的不同不是事实性的而是约定性的。我们在选择公理和法则时,惟一必要的限制是避免矛盾。其他的提倡者包括 E. 马赫、P. 杜恒,或许还可包括后期维特根斯坦。约定论与“工具主义”和“实用主义”密切相关而与实在论相对立。它所面对的难题是,它必须承认不同于我们所接受的原则的其他可选择的方法必然也是起作用的约定,并且在各种相竞争的原则间的选择是任意的。它的批评者还包括有: M. 石里克、K. 波普和 E. 内格尔。在道德哲学中,约定论是这样的观念:道德规则起因于社会的约定。

"约定论……力图证明多数认识论问题不是具有真理特性的问题,而是为任意的决定所确定的。"——赖兴巴赫:《经验与预言》,1938年,第14页。

Conventionality of language forms, see principle of tolerance

Conversational implicature

Grice's term for a structure of implications based on features governing conversation and its context which supplements and at times overrides implications licensed by logic and the conventional meaning of terms. This notion is central to Grice's influential theory of language.

A person by saying a statement S implicates another statement T if he is aware that T is required to complete what he is saying and is also aware that his co-operative hearer can normally work out the implied T from the spoken S according to certain principles governing a conversation. In this case, the conversation has an implicature, and T is the *implicature*. One of the most important principles of conversational implicature is the co-operative principle, which states that you should "make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged". Conversational implicature is contrasted to conventional implicature, which is derived from the conventional meanings of the lexical terms occurring in the sentence and the sentential structure.

"I wish to present a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call conversational implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain features of discourse." —Grice, *Studies in the Ways of Words*, 1989, p. 26.

Conversion

In traditional logic, an operation which obtains a proposition by interchanging the subject term and predicate term of another proposition. The resultant proposition is called the converse of the original proposition. For instance, the converse of SAP ("All s are p") is "All p are s". Of the four basic categorical propositions in traditional logic, the converse of SEP and that of SIP are valid, for they do not involve a change of quantity. Hence, they are also called simple conversions. The converse of SAP and of SOP are invalid, for they involve a change of quantity. They are also called conversion *per accidens*.

In modern logic, conversion refers to an operation which infers a conclusion by interchanging the positions of the antecedent clause and the consequent clause, that is from "If p then q" to "If q then p". This is invalid.

"We convert a proposition when we transpose the terms of the original proposition." —Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 34.

Copernican revolution

In opposition to the traditional geocentric, Ptolemaic

语言形式的约定性

见“宽容原则”条。

对话含有关系

格莱斯的术语,指基于支配对话及其语境的特征的涵义结构。这一结构补充由逻辑和语词的约定意义所许可的涵义,有时则使之无效。这是格莱斯的颇有影响的语言理论的中心概念。

如果一个人意识到陈述 T 对于他说出陈述 S 是必要的且意识到他的合作听者通常能够根据某些支配谈话的原则由说出的 S 得出所意味着的 T, 那么这个人就通过说陈述 S 而含有陈述 T 的意思。在这种情况下, 这个对话就具有一个含有关系, 而 T 则是被含有者。对话含有关系的最重要的原则之一就是“合作原则”, 亦即你应当“使得你的谈话在其发生的阶段合乎你所参与的谈话交流所接受的目的或方向的要求”。对话含有关系与约定含义关系相对照, 后者派生于出现在语句及其结构中的词汇的约定意义。

“我希望介绍非约定含有关系的某个子集, 我将称之为对话含有关系, 与对话的某些特征具有必然的关联。”——格莱斯:《词法研究》, 1989 年, 第 26 页。

换位

在传统逻辑中, 通过交换一个命题的主词和谓词而获得另一个命题的一种程序。结果命题被称为原始命题的反题。例如, SAP (所有的 S 是 P) 的换位是“所有 P 是 S”。在传统逻辑的四个基本直言判断中, SEP 的换位和 SIP 的换位是有效的, 因为它们不涉及到量的改变。因此, 它们也称为简单换位。SAP 和 SOP 的换位是无效的, 因为它们涉及到量的改变。因此它们也称为偶性换位。

在现代逻辑中, 换位指涉的是通过交换前件从句和后件从句的位置而推演出一个结论的一种程序, 即从“如果 p, 那么 q”换位为“如果 q, 那么 p”。这是无效的。

“当我们改变原始命题的词的位置, 我们转换了一个命题。”——米切尔:《逻辑导论》, 1962 年, 第 34 页。

哥白尼革命

在对行星运动现象的解释上, 相对于传统

framework for explaining the appearance of planetary motion, Nicolaus Copernicus established a new mode of thought which claims that the earth is in motion and that the sun is immovable at the centre of the planetary system. This hypothesis was confirmed by Kepler and Newton, and represents a fundamental transformation in the development of modern science.

In opposition to the traditional metaphysical claim that knowledge must conform to the objects, Kant in his critical philosophy sought to establish that objects must conform to our knowledge and that understanding is the lawgiver of nature. He drew a famous analogy in the preface to the second edition of the first *Critique*, comparing his new mode of thought in philosophy to what Copernicus did in astronomy. In proposing that objects must conform to our knowledge, he claimed to proceed "precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis". Apparent features of our experience can be ascribed to ourselves rather than to the objects of our experience. Commentators accordingly take Kant's philosophy to be a Copernican revolution in metaphysics. Moreover, while Copernicus' thesis is only a hypothesis, Kant claimed that he has demonstrated his thesis apodeictically by examining the nature of the forms of intuition and categories.

"This indeed is the essence of the 'Copernican Revolution' which Kant proudly announced as the key to a reformed and scientific metaphysics. It is only because objects of experience must conform to the constitution of our minds that we can have the sort of a priori knowledge of the nature of experience which is demonstrated, in outline, in the *Critique* itself." — P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 1966, p. 23.

Copula

The function of the verb "to be" when it joins the subject expression and predicate expression in an assertion to show that there is affirmation or denial. Sometimes the copula is also viewed as a part of the predicate itself. "To be" also serves as an identity sign between expressions, but that is a different function from that of the copula. While the expressions are reversible when "to be" serves as an identity sign, the subject and predicate cannot exchange positions when "to be" serves as a copula. As a copula it may be eliminated without affecting the meaning of a statement, but as an identity-sign it may not. In the philosophy of logic, there is discussion as to whether the copula divides every elementary proposition into "S-P" form, and whether the copula involves a commitment to the existence of various sorts of entities and structures.

"A copula is the link of connexion between the subject and the predicate, and indicates whether the latter is affirmed or denied of the former." — Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 93.

的托勒密的地心说的理论框架,N. 哥白尼建立了新的思维模式,主张地球在运动,而太阳是不动的,并处于宇宙的中心。这个假说得到了开普勒和牛顿的证实,成为近代科学发展的里程碑。

在解释知识的本性时,相对于传统形而上学关于“认识必须符合对象”的立场,康德的批判哲学努力建立这种观点:对象必须符合我们的认识,知性是自然的立法者。因而康德在《纯粹理性批判》第二版的序言中作出了一个著名的类比,把他在哲学中提出的新的思维模式与哥白尼在天文学中所提出的新学说相类比。他认为,在提出客体必须符合我们的认识这一立场时,他正在“沿着哥白尼基本假设同样的路线而前进”。可以把我们的经验的明显特征归属于我们自己,而不是我们的经验对象,评论家们因而把康德哲学作为形而上学中的哥白尼革命。此外,哥白尼的命题只是一个假说,康德则宣称,他通过考察直观形式和范畴的本性已经无可置疑地论证了他的命题。

“康德自豪地宣称:‘哥白尼革命’是通往一种革新的和科学的形而上学的钥匙。这确实是这一革命的本质。只是因经验对象必须符合我们心灵的构造,我们才能具有这种经验本性的先天知识,这些知识在《批判》本身中大体上得到了证明。”——斯特劳森,《感知的界限》,1966年,第23页。

系动词

动词“to be”的作用,即在一个断定中联结主语表达式和谓语表达式,表明有一个肯定句或否定句。有时系动词也被看做是谓词本身的一部分。“to be”也可以作为表达式之间的等号,但这与系动词的作用是不同的。当“to be”用作等号时,这些表达式是可逆的,而当用作系动词时,主语和谓语就无法交换位置。当作为一个系动词时,它可以被取消而不影响陈述的意义,但作为一个等号时,就不可能这样了。逻辑哲学中存在着这样的讨论,系动词是否可以把每个基本命题都划分为“S-P”的形式,系动词是否对形形色色的实体和结构的存在都做出了承诺。

“系动词是主语和谓语的联结,标明后者是否是对前者的肯定或否定。”——凯恩斯,《形式逻辑》,1928年,第93页。

Corporatism

A system in which interests are represented and policies are determined through the activities of organised groups in society acting as legitimate intermediaries between their members and the state. Corporate groups seek to limit or modify the activity and effect of market forces and the state and to bargain for the interests of their members in terms of class compromise. Many theorists believe that corporatist interference with the market offers short-term comfort at the expense of long-term inefficiency and stagnation. Corporatism has a long history, and its different forms correspond to different stages of economic development and different ideological motivations. Corporatism that is imposed by a centralised state, as in the case of fascism, can become a part of an authoritarian system, but corporatism can also be a relatively autonomous product of pressures from the working class.

Corporatism resembles the syndicalism of the anarchist tradition, which seeks to free workers from all capitalist and states controls and to establish a society with a decentralised system of worker-owned and worker-managed economic organisations.

"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberation representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports." — P. C. Schmitter in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds) *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*, 1979, p. 13.

Corpuscularianism

A metaphysical view of the world in the spirit of the Greek atomism of Democritus. It holds that everything is composed of indivisible corpuscles or atoms, which are the units at the last stage of the analysis of material things into their components. This theory accepts the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and claims that corpuscles differ intrinsically in their primary qualities such as size, shape, mutual arrangement and motion. With these differences they form various kinds of materials and things. Every change can be reduced to mechanical action, with geometry and mechanics as the paradigms of science. Modern corpuscularianism was developed by the Irish scientist Robert Boyle in the middle of seventeenth century as an attempt to replace the Aristotelian world view of hylomorphism, but it is also associated with Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Newton, and chemical atomism. The dominance of the theory declined

社团主义

社团主义是这样一种制度,在这种制度中,利益的阐述和政策的确定都要通过作为其成员和国家之间合法中介而行事的、社会中有组织的团体的活动。社团试图限制或更改市场力量和国家的活动与影响,并根据阶级妥协为其成员的利益而讨价还价。很多理论家相信,社团主义对市场的干预提供的只是短期的安慰,而这是以长期的低效率和停滞为代价的。社团主义已有很长的历史,它的不同形式是与经济发展的不同阶段和不同的思想运动相一致的。由集权制国家强加的社团主义,像在法西斯主义的情况下,可以成为权威主义制度的一个组成部分,但社团主义也可以是来自工人阶级压力的相对自治的产物。

社团主义类似无政府主义传统的工团主义,后者试图把工人从一切资本家和国家控制下解放出来,建立一个由工人所有和工人管理的经济组织构成的实行分权制度的社会。

“社团主义可以定义为一种利益代理制度,在这种制度下,子单位被组建成有一定数量限制的单一的、强制的、非竞争的、等级制的和功能不同的部门,这些部门得到国家的承认或准许(虽然不是封授的),并享有在它们各自的部门内审议代理人的垄断权,代价是遵守某些对他们选择领导人、表达要求和支持的控制。”——施密特:《走向社团主义调解》,施密特和莱姆布鲁克(编),1979年,第13页。

微粒论

一种体现了希腊的德谟克利特原子论精神的形而上学世界观。它主张每一事物都由不可分的微粒或原子组成,微粒是当我们把物质分解成其成分至最后阶段的单位。这一理论承认第一性质和第二性质的区分,并认为微粒在其诸如大小、形状、相互排列和运动等第一性质上有着固有的差异。正是由于这些差异,它们形成了不同的物质和事物。以几何学和力学为科学的范式,每个变化都可以还原为机械活动。近代微粒论于17世纪中叶由爱尔兰科学家R. 波义耳所发展,它试图取代亚里士多德的泛神论世界观,并与伽利略、笛卡尔、洛克、牛顿和化学原子论等相关联。随着19世纪中叶场论的出现,这一理论的支配地位开始衰减,但仍然对当代科学哲学产生着重大的影响。

“微粒论者尽管在特殊细节上有着很大分

with the emergence of the field theory in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it still exerts great influence on contemporary philosophy of science.

"Corpuscularians, although disagreeing quite substantially about specific details, held that the things we experience are in fact made up of small material particles and the way we experience them is a product of the action of these small particles on our sense organs." —Tiles and Tiles, *An Introduction to Historical Epistemology*, 1993, p. 46.

Corrective justice, an alternative expression for rectificatory justice

Correspondence rules

In the double language model developed by Carnap and Ernest Nagel, the language of science is divided into theoretical language and observation language. Correspondence rules serve to relate these two languages. These rules are statements containing both theoretical terms and observational terms. By means of these rules, a theoretical term can be partially and indirectly explained empirically. These rules are also called by different authors "mixed sentences", "operational definitions", or "correlative definitions".

"[C]orrespondence rules, as I call them, ... connect the theoretical terms with the empirical ones." —Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, 1966, p. 235.

Correspondence theory of truth

The most widely held theory of truth, taking truth to consist in a relation of correspondence between propositions and the way things are in reality. A proposition is true if it states what is the case, and false otherwise. It is a kind of replica or map of reality. This theory can be traced to Aristotle's dictum in the *Metaphysics* that "to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". Locke provided an empirical foundation for it, because if sense-experience is the main source of our knowledge, truth must consist in a kind of correspondence. Russell and Wittgenstein, during their logical atomism periods, offered versions of the theory, according to which truth is correspondence and correspondence is a relation of structural isomorphism between propositions and facts. A true proposition is one where the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. The correspondence theory has been attacked because it presupposes a controversial metaphysics of things and facts. Moreover, the notion of correspondence is ambiguous. Various words have been employed to convey the meaning of correspond, such as accord with, fit in with, agree with and tally with, yet the sort of relation alleged to exist between a sentence and fact is still unclear. To avoid this criticism Austin developed a version which explains correspondence in terms of two kinds of correlation in-

歧, 却都主张我们所经验的事物实际上由很小的物质粒子组成, 我们所经验它们的方式, 是这些微小粒子作用在我们感官上的行为的产物。"——泰尔斯和泰尔斯:《历史认识论引论》, 1993年, 第46页。

纠正的正义

“矫正的正义”的另一表述。

对应规则

在由卡尔纳普和E. 内格尔提出的“双语模型”中, 科学语言被分为理论语言和观察语言。对应规则的作用就是连接这两种语言。这些规则是包含了理论术语和观察术语的陈述。通过这些规则, 一个理论术语就可以部分地和间接地在经验上得到解释。这些规则也被不同的作者称作“混合句子”、“操作定义”或“关联定义”。

“我所称作的对应规则……把理论术语与经验术语连接起来。”——卡尔纳普:《物理学的哲学基础》, 1966年, 第235页。

真理符合论

流传最广的真理论, 认为真理就在于命题与事物在现实中的存在方式之间的符合关系。一命题为真, 如果它陈述了确实存在的情况; 否则, 该命题为假。命题是实在的一种复制品或地图。这一理论可以追溯到亚里士多德《形而上学》中的一句名言: “说是者为是, 非者为非, 是真的。”洛克给这一理论提供了经验基础, 因为一旦感觉经验是我们知识的主要源泉, 那么真理必定在于一种符合关系。罗素和维特根斯坦在其逻辑原子论时期, 提出了这种理论的不同形式。在他们看来, 真理就是符合, 而符合则是命题与事实之间结构上的同构关系。真命题就是这样的命题: 其命题记号的要素与思想的对象相对应。符合论已经受到了攻击, 因为它预设了关于事物和事实的有争议的形而上学。此外, 符合是一个模糊概念, 各种各样的词语已被用来传达“符合”的意义, 例如“与……一致”(accord with), “与……相适合”(fit in with), “与……相符”(agree with), “与……相吻合”(ally with)等, 但这种所谓存在于语句和事实之间的关系仍然是不清楚的。为了避开这种批评, 奥斯汀根据词语与世界之间的两类关联(“描述性约定”和“指示性约定”)去解释符合, 从而提出了符合论的另一种形式。他的理论也

volving descriptive conventions and demonstrative conventions between words and world. His theory is also controversial. Tarski's semantic theory of truth is also an attempt to reconstruct the essence of the traditional notion of correspondence.

"The property of being a mother is explained by the relation between a woman and her child; similarly, the suggestion runs, the property of being true is to be explained by a relation between a statement and something else ... I shall take the licence of calling any view of this kind a correspondence theory of truth." - Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, p. 37.

Corroboration

Popper's term for the support obtained by a hypothesis or conjecture which survives serious testing and is not superseded by another hypothesis or conjecture. Popper preferred to call the testable degree of a hypothesis its degree of corroboration rather than its probability. Corroboration is introduced to distinguish Popperian testing from confirmation and to show that the probabilistic theory of induction is wrong. Corroboration is a measurement or report of the past performance of a theory and does not make a theory universal or more reliable. Hence, the degree of corroboration of a theory has nothing to do with prediction or future decision-making. For Popper, a theory can never be established beyond doubt. The aim of science is not to verify, but to falsify.

"The term 'confirmation' has lately been so much used and misused that I have decided to surrender it to the verificationists and to use for my own purposes 'corroboration' only." - Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1972, p. 57.

Cosmogony

The theory of the genesis and growth of the cosmos, the main theoretical form of Pre-Socratic philosophy. There were many pre philosophical mythical and religious cosmogonies among the ancient Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonians, but the Pre-Socratics differed fundamentally from all of them by seeking the origin of the world on a rational basis, rather than by appealing to a supernatural force. Nevertheless, their cosmogony was deeply influenced by Hesiod's theogony or genealogical account of the divine kingdom. All of the Pre-Socratics held that the cosmos has a beginning. Some set up one or more elements as fundamental principles, claiming that the primary opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, evolved from these principles and that the other parts of the cosmos evolved from these opposites. Other philosophers claimed that there was an original mixture from which evolved first the four basic elements and then natural substances and the organic world. Although views differed about the process, the whole picture was evolutionary rather than creative and involved no design. Compared with scientific

是很有争议的。塔斯基的语义学真理论也是重构传统符合观念之本质的一种尝试。

“‘是一位母亲’这一性质由一位妇女和她的孩子之间的关系来解释。类似地，正如该建议所表明的，是真的这一性质应由一陈述和某种另外的东西之间的关系来加以解释。……我将允许把任何这种观点称之为真理符合论。”——戴维森：《真理与解释的探究》，1984年，第37页。

确认

波普的术语，用于指当一个假说或猜想经受了认真的检验，并且没有为另一个假说或猜想所取代时所获得的支持。波普更喜欢称一个假说的可检验程度为它的“确认度”，而不是它的“概率”。这个概念的引入是为了使波普式的检验与确证相区别，并且表明归纳的概率理论是错误的。确认是对一个理论的既往表现的测量或报告，它并不使一个理论成为普遍的或更为可靠的。因此，一个理论的确认度与预言或制定对未来的决策无关。对波普来说，一个理论绝不会确定得不容置疑。科学的目的是去证实，而是去证伪。

“‘确证’一词近来已用得太多太滥，我决定把它让给证实主义者，而我为自己的目的则只用‘确认’一词。”——波普：《猜想与反驳》，1972年，第57页。

宇宙生成论

关于宇宙的生成和发展的理论，是前苏格拉底哲学的主要理论形式。在古希腊、埃及和巴比伦有许多前哲学的神话的和宗教的宇宙生成论。但前苏格拉底哲学与这些理论的根本差异在于，它在理性的基础上寻求世界的起源，而不是诉诸于一种超自然的力量，尽管他们的宇宙生成论也深受赫西俄德的神谱（即他对神圣王国的生成叙述）的影响。他们都相信宇宙有一个开端。有些哲学家确立了一种或多种原素作为根本原则，认为从这样的原则中，首先演化出最初的对立，即热与冷、湿与干，然后从它们中转而生成宇宙的其他部分。其他哲学家认为，有一个原初的混合，从中演化出四种基本原素，然后再进而从中产生自然本体和有机世界。尽管每个哲学家对这种过程有不同见解，但总的图景是进化的而不是创造的，设计在这里没有地位。尽管与科学的宇宙生成论相比较，前苏格拉底哲学家们的理论大都是思辨性的，但它们也提出了产生许多深刻洞见的理性思想。

cosmogony, the theories of the Pre-Socratics were largely speculative, but they nevertheless demonstrated rational intelligence which yielded many profound insights.

"Practically all that we know about the philosophy of the Milesians concerns their cosmology, their account of how the world came into being."—Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, 1947, p. 3.

Cosmological argument

A family of arguments advanced to prove the existence of God. These arguments are based not on the analysis of God's essential nature, but on the nature of the cosmos or universe. Different versions argue respectively from the empirical facts that the universe is in motion, causally organised, contingent or ordered to the conclusions that there must be an unmoved mover, an uncaused cause, a necessary being or an orderer. God is then identified with the being that is shown to be necessary in order to explain the selected features of the world. In the history of philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz and Locke are among the defenders of one or more versions of the cosmological argument, while Hume, Kant, Mill and Russell are among the critics. A major difficulty facing all versions of the argument lies in the ambiguous nature of their key notions, such as necessity or causality. Even if the argument succeeds, it shows the existence of a divine object, whereas religion requires God to be known primarily as a person.

"In the widest sense of the term, any theistic argument that proceeds from the world to God can be described as cosmological." J. E. Hick, *Arguments for the Existence of God*, p. 37.

Cosmology

[From Greek: *kosmos*, the world or universe—*logos*, theory or study] A study of the universe as a whole, especially its constitution and structure. Philosophical cosmology is a rational inquiry which combines some scientific evidence and substantial speculation. It is also called rational cosmology, in contrast to mythic cosmology and to modern cosmology, which is a branch of astronomy. Wolff took rational cosmology to be one of three branches of specific metaphysics, with the others being rational theology, and rational psychology. The most general issues discussed in philosophical cosmology include space, time, causality, necessity, contingency, change, eternity and infinity.

Cosmology was the dominant concern of the Pre-Socratics. It also played a significant role in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and in medieval philosophy. Most claims of traditional cosmology were undermined by Renaissance science, but it was revived by Leibniz and Newton. Kant applied his critical philosophy to cosmology, claiming that cosmological problems can never be solved because we cannot apply cate-

"事实上,我们所知的米利都派的哲学都是关于宇宙论的,即他们对世界是如何生成的论述。"——阿姆斯特朗:《古代哲学导论》,1947年,第3页。

宇宙论论证

证明上帝存在的一族论证。这些论证不以分析上帝的本质属性为依据,而以宇宙或世界的本性为基础。宇宙论论证虽有不同的说法,但各自都从经验事实出发进行论证,即宇宙是运动的、因果组织成的、偶然的或有秩序的,于是得出结论,必然存在着一个不动的动者、无原因的原因、必然的存在或安排秩序者。然后,上帝与这种显示为必然的存在同一,以便解释世界的这些精选特征。在哲学史上,柏拉图、亚里士多德、阿奎那、笛卡尔、莱布尼茨和洛克都是宇宙论论证的一种或几种说法的辩护者,而休谟、康德、密尔和罗素则在批判者之列。这类论证的所有说法所面对的一个主要困难,是它们的关键性概念具有歧义性,譬如必然性或因果性。即使该论证成功,它表明的是神圣对象的存在,而宗教需要的则是上帝首先被认作一个人。

"在该词最广的意义上,从世界演进到上帝的任何有神论论证都可描述为宇宙论的。"——希克:《上帝存在诸论证》,第37页。

宇宙论

[源自希腊词 *kosmos* (世界或宇宙) 和 *logos* (理论或研究)] 对宇宙整体,特别是对它的构成和结构的研究。哲学宇宙论是一种理性的研究,是若干科学根据和深刻思辨的结合。它也称为理性宇宙论,区别于神话宇宙论,也区别于作为天文学分支的现代宇宙论。沃尔夫把理性宇宙论作为专门形而上学的三个分支之一(其余两个是理性神学和理性心理学)。哲学宇宙论讨论的最一般的问题包括空间、时间、因果性、必然性、偶然性、变化、永恒性、无限性。

宇宙论是前苏格拉底哲学主要关心的领域,它在柏拉图、亚里士多德哲学和中世纪哲学中也起着重要作用。传统宇宙论的大多数论断受到文艺复兴时期科学的根本性打击,但它在莱布尼茨和牛顿那里得到了复兴。康德把他的批判哲学应用于宇宙论,断定宇宙论问题是不可能得到解决的,因为我们不能把范畴用于时空界限之外。企图解决这样的问题只能导致二律背反。在康德看来,宇宙论产生于人类理性追

gories beyond their spatio temporal limits. Attempts to resolve such problems result in antinomies. According to Kant, cosmology arises from a natural inclination of human reason to seek absolute knowledge of the world, and he claimed that a positive critical cosmology is needed to set the limit of reason in this regard. Later, Schelling and Hegel turned rational cosmology into the philosophy of nature.

Contemporary cosmology is grounded in empirical natural sciences, particularly modern physics. Since few observations are available in this area, metaphysical theories still play an important role. The main problems of contemporary cosmology include the origin, size and development of the universe, the possibility of other universes, the nature of space, time, matter and energy, and the kinds of logic needed for cosmological theory.

"Cosmology seeks to understand the nature of brute matter, considered as the cause of phenomena and as the foundation of physical laws." — Duhem, *Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science*, 1996, p. 31.

Cost-benefit analysis

A type of practical reasoning that analyses or evaluates an issue by calculating how much cost we need to put in and how much interest or benefit the outcome is going to produce. We then choose the alternative which, measured by some common scale, costs least but gains most. It is a standard utility calculus and is widely employed in economic affairs and social policy. In order to apply this sort of reasoning, the goals of an action must be well defined. Furthermore, it must be possible to compare costs of alternative policies in terms of some definite unit and to quantify benefits in a way that renders them commensurable with one another. This approach is therefore limited regarding those moral and social issues which resist quantitative analysis. Not all significant costs and benefits can be measured in terms of money or can be brought into a system of commensurability.

"Cost-benefit analyses are not popular now in some quarters; and they have indeed been misused, by failing to include very important costs and benefits (often because they are not measurable in terms of money)." — Hare, *Essays on Political Morality*, 1989, p. 40.

Count noun

A noun used for a kind of countable thing such as "table", "river" or "body". A count noun has grammatical plural forms and can be modified by an indefinite article. The question "how many Cs are there?" has an answer if C is a count noun. A count noun can replace a variable in predicate logic. A count noun corresponds to a sortal, but contrasts with a mass noun, which refers to an uncountable thing or substance such as wood, water, or flesh. Mass nouns do not have plural forms and are not modified by an indefinite arti-

求世界的绝对知识之自然倾向,因此他主张,我们需要一个实证的、批判的宇宙论在这方面为理性设立界限。后来,谢林和黑格尔把理性宇宙学转变为自然哲学。

当代宇宙论植根于经验自然科学,特别与当代物理学相联系。但由于在这个领域几乎得不到观察材料,因而形而上学理论仍起着重要的作用。当代宇宙论讨论的主要问题包括宇宙的起源、大小和演化,其他宇宙的可能性,时间、空间、物质和能量的本性,以及宇宙论所需要的各种逻辑。

"宇宙论致力于理解原始物质的本性,把其作为现象的原因和物理法则的基础。" —— 杜恒:《科学史与科学哲学论集》,1996年,第31页。

本利分析

在分析或评估一个问题时,通过计算我们需要投入多少成本和结果将会产生多少利益或效益而采用的一种实用的推理方法。通过某一通行的换算法的计算,我们选择成本最小但获利最大的方案。这是一种标准的实用计算,被广泛应用于经济事务和社会政策中。为了应用这种推理,一个行动的目的必须很好地确定。此外,必须有可能以某一确定的单位对所选择的政策的成本进行比较,以相互通约的方式使收益量化。因而这一方法对于道德问题和某些社会问题而言是有局限的,因为这些问题是难以进行定量分析的。不是所有重要的投入和效益都能用货币来计算,或能被置于一个可通约的体系中。

"本利分析现在在一些领域已不流行;由于没有包括一些非常重要的成本与效益(这常常是因为它们是无法用货币来计量的),它们实际上已被滥用。" —— 黑尔:《政治道德论文集》,1989年,第40页。

可数名词

一种指用于“桌子”、“河流”、“身体”这类可数事物的名词。可数名词在语法上有复数形式,并可由一不定冠词来修饰。如果C是一可数名词,那么“有多少(how many)个Cs”这一问题就有答案。在谓词逻辑中可数名词可以替换变项。可数名词相当于一个类,与指称像木头、水、肉这样的不可数事物或实体的物质名词恰成对照。物质名词没有复数形式,并且不被不定冠词所修饰。它们被用于回答“有多少(how

cle. They are used to answer the question "how much M is there?"

"Count nouns have plurals; in the singular they admit of the indefinite article, and it is appropriate where c is a count-noun to ask the question 'How many Cs are there?'" — Williams, *Being, Identity and Truth*, 1992, p. 193.

Counterexample

A counterexample to a generalisation is a case which is an instance of the kind to which the generalisation applies but which does not have the property that generalisation asserts that things of that kind possess. For instance, "All swans are white" is a generalisation. But if there is one swan which is not white, that non-white swan becomes a counterexample. A counterexample to an argument is a case in which all premises are true but the conclusion is false. The discovery of a counterexample to an argument indicates that the argument is not logically valid, or at least that its conclusion cannot be universally applied. Hence the absence of a counterexample becomes a mark of the validity of an argument. A valid inference is one which has no counterexample. Otherwise it is invalid.

"To find an interpretation which shows that an argument is logically invalid is the same thing as finding a counterexample to the argument." — Suppes, *Introduction to Logic*, 1957, p. 69.

Counterfactuals, see contrafactuals

Counterfactuals of freedom, another expression for middle knowledge

Counterpart theory

A theory which can be traced to Leibniz, but has recently been developed by D. Lewis to cope with the problem of trans-world identity. For Lewis, an individual can exist only in one of the plurality of possible worlds, because a thing can only be in one place at a time. There is nothing that inhabits more than one world. Hence, individuals are worldbound, and there are no identical individuals in different worlds. How, then, are we to analyse what is possible or impossible for a worldbound individual? Lewis claims that individuals have counterparts in other worlds. Even though they are not identical with their actual-world counterparts, they resemble them more closely than do other things in their worlds. They are such that for anything X in the actual world W, its counterpart X-in- W_w is just as X-in-W would have been, had things been different in the way things are different between W and W_w . Trans world resemblance is the counterpart relation, and is a substitute for trans-world identity.

much) M" 这样的问题。

"可数名词有复数;用于单称形式时它们允许不定冠词,并且倘若c是一个可数名词,那么问'有多少个Cs'这样的问题是适当的。"——威廉姆斯,《是,同一和真理》,1992年,第193页。

反例

一个概括的一个反例就是这样一种情形,它是这个概括所适用的种类的一例,但却不具有那个概括宣称这种事物所具有的特性。例如,"所有的天鹅都是白的"是一个概括。但是如果有一只天鹅不是白的,那个不白的天鹅就是一个反例。一个论证的反例则是这样一种情形:这一论证的所有前提都为真,但其结论却为假。发现一个论证的一个反例就意味着这一论证在逻辑上是无效的,或至少可以说,其结论不是普遍适用的。因此,没有反例便成为论证有效性的标志。一个有效的推理就是一个没有反例的推理。否则,它就是无效的。

"找到表明一个论证在逻辑上是无效的解釋就是找到这个论证的一个反例。"——苏佩斯:《逻辑引论》,1957年,第69页。

反事实语句

见"反事实语句"条。

反事实自由

"中间知识"的另一表述。

对应体理论

一种可以追溯到莱布尼茨的理论,但新近由D. 刘易斯发展出来对付跨世界的同一性问题。在刘易斯看来,一个体只能存在于众多可能世界的一个中,因为一事物在一个时间内只能存在于一个地方。没有任何东西能够居住于一个以上的世界中。所以个体是有世界制约的,在不同的世界中根本没有同一的个体。那么,对一个有世界制约的个体,我们如何去分析可能的或不可能的东西呢?刘易斯主张,个体在其他世界中有对应体,虽然不等同于它们在现实世界中的对应体,但它们比所在世界中的其他事物更类似于这些对应体。它们使得对现实世界W中的任何事物X,它在 W_w 中的对应体X恰像在W中的X所是的样子,假如事物的不同正像W和 W_w 之间事物的不同的话。跨世界的相似正是对应体关系,因而是跨世界的同一性的替代物。

"In general, something has for counterparts at a given world those things existing there that resemble it closely enough in important respects of intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations, and that resemble it no less closely than do other things existing there." —D. Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, 1973, p. 39.

Courage

[Greek: *andreia*, related to *aner*, an adult man; hence manliness or bravery, corresponding to Latin: *virtus*] One of the prominent virtues in ancient Greece. In the ancient world, a good man had to be courageous or brave in battle and in the face of other dangers. Socrates argued that courage as a virtue must involve knowledge of what is and what is not truly to be feared. Moreover, courage is not only fortitude in the face of physical danger, but also involves enduring in one's convictions against all adversity and temptation. Courage is the subject of Plato's dialogue *Laches* and is further discussed in the *Republic*. It corresponds to the spirited element in the tripartite account of the soul, and is the virtue of the auxiliaries. Aristotle considered courage to be a mean between feelings of fear and confidence.

"Hence whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is a courageous person." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115b17-8.

Covering law model

A term for an account of scientific explanation, according to which an event is explained through deduction from a general law and certain initial conditions. In an explanation, the event is subsumed or covered by the general law. This is called the deductive nomological model of explanation (D-N model). The model can also apply to the covering law itself, that is the law can be explained by deducing it from a higher order covering law or body of laws. Such a theory of explanation was elaborated by Hempel. In an extended sense the covering law model can employ statistical laws to explain an event by showing that it is highly probable. This model of explanation, which is usually inductive, is called the inductive-probabilistic model. The term "covering law model" was used by Dray for the first model in *Law and Explanation in History* (1957). Hempel extended the term to the second model as well. Many disputes have arisen concerning each model. For the deductive-nomological model, some critics claim that in some cases a law is not needed to provide an explanation, while at least some accounts satisfying the model do not have explanatory force. On one diagnosis, these problems arise because the formal approach of the model does not leave room for contextual elements in explanation. There is also debate about the nature of the statistical model and

"一般而言,某物在一给定世界中的对应体是这样一些事物:它们在该世界中存在,并且在内在性质和外在关系方面足够密切地类似于它,并且其类似程度不低于也在该世界中存在的任何其他的事物。"——刘易斯:《反事实句》,1973年,第39页。

勇敢

[希腊词为 *andreia*, 在词源学上与 *aner* (一个成年男子) 相关,是如此有男子气的和有勇气的,与拉丁词 *virtus* 相应] 古代希腊的主要德性之一。在古代世界,一个好〔善〕人必定是在战斗中或面对其他危险时无所畏惧的。苏格拉底认为,勇敢作为一种德性必然涉及到什么是真正可怕和不可怕的知识。而且,勇敢不仅是面对身体危险时的坚忍(刚毅),而且意味着在面对所有不利情形和诱惑时的对自己信念的维持。勇敢是柏拉图的对话《拉凯斯篇》的主题,并在《国家篇》中进一步得到讨论。它相应于灵魂三分中激情的部分,是三个等级中战士的德性。亚里士多德把勇敢看成是怯懦与自负(鲁莽)之间的中道。

"那在恰当的时候,为了恰当的目的,采用恰当的方式,坚持他所应坚持的,怕他所应怕的,并具有相应的自信,就是一个勇敢的人。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1115b17-18。

覆盖律模型

一个用于表述科学说明的术语,意为一个事件通过从一个一般规律和某些初始条件中演绎出而被说明。说明就是把事件纳入一个一般规律,或者说用一般规律来“覆盖”它。这称为说明的演绎—规律模型(简写作:D-N模型)。这个模型也可应用于覆盖律自身,即这一定律可由从更高阶的覆盖律或规律本身中演绎出而得以说明。这种说明理论是由亨佩尔所详尽阐释的。在一种拓展的意义上,覆盖律模型能利用统计规律,通过表明一个事件是高度或然的以说明它。这—通常是归纳的说明模型被称为归纳—概率模型。“覆盖律模型”一词由德莱在他的《历史中的规律与解释》(1957)一书中首先用于指第一种模型。亨佩尔把它的使用拓展到第二种模型。围绕着每一种模型都展开了许多争论。对于演绎—规律模型,有些批评者认为,在某些情形中,提供说明无须规律,而至少有些满足这—模型的表述又缺乏说明力。根据某种解释,出现这些问题,是因为这种模型的形式化方法没有注意到说明中的情境因素。对于第二种,争论关涉统计模型的本性和一个纯统计规律能否用于说明。覆盖律模型也称作“说明的归类模型”。

whether a purely statistical law can explain. The covering law model is also called the subsumption theory of explanation.

"The Hempelian theory of explanation has become known as the Covering Law model (or theory)." — von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, 1971, p. 11.

Craig's theorem

A theorem in mathematical logic put forward and proved by the American logician William Craig in his paper "On axiomatizability within a system" (*Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 1953). The theorem states that if we separate the vocabulary of a formal system into the T (theoretical) terms and the O (observational) terms, there is a formalised system T' such that (a) the axioms of T' contain only the observational terms, and (b) T and T' imply the same O-sentences. This theorem shows that theoretical terms are in principle eliminable from empirical theories. It is thus a method by which we may formulate all connections between observables without having to make use of theoretical terms. To apply this method, one needs first to distinguish the essential expressions of the system from the auxiliary expressions, and to take the content of the system to be identical with the class of essential expressions and then to construct a new axiomatized system which contains all the essential expressions and none of the auxiliary expressions. This system has the same observational consequences as the original one. Craig himself does not think that this method really dissolves the problem of analysing the empirical meaning of theoretical terms and holds that this method applies only to completed deductive systems. Nevertheless, his theorem has greatly influenced discussion in the philosophy of science of the relationship between theoretical terms and observational terms. The method is close in spirit to the notion of the Ramsey sentence.

"What Craig's theorem provides is a general method of eliminating a selected group of terms from a formalised system without changing the content of the system." — Brown, *Perception, Theory and Commitment*, 1977, p. 44.

Creation ex nihilo

Creation out of nothing, in contrast to the claim that *ex nihilo nihil fit* (nothing comes out of nothing). Christian theists held the doctrine that God created the world out of nothing, contrary to the view of the relation between God and the world expressed by Plato and Neo-platonism. The doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* maintains that matter is not eternal and that no matter existed prior to a divine creative act at the initial moment of the cosmic process. Whilst the pre-existence of matter would restrict God to the role of a formal cause or an agent which orders or arranges pre-existing stuff, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* holds that matter

"亨佩尔的说明理论已被称作为覆盖律模型(或理论)。"——冯·赖特:《解释与理解》, 1971年,第11页。

克雷格定理

数理逻辑中的一个定理,由美国逻辑学家 W. 克雷格在一篇题为《论一个系统中的可公理化性》(《符号逻辑杂志》,1953年)的论文中提出和证明的。这个定理说,如果我们把一个形式系统的词汇区分为 T (理论的) 术语和 O (观察的) 术语,存在一个形式化系统 T' 满足 (1) T' 的公理仅包含观察术语,并且 (2) T 和 T' 蕴涵相同的观察句。这个定理表明,理论术语是原则上可从经验理论中删除的。因此,它是一种我们可用以构成所有可观察物间的关系,而无须运用理论术语的方法。要运用这种方法,人们需要首先把系统的基本表达式与其辅助性表达式区分开来,并使系统的内容等同于其基本表达式的类,然后构造一个新的公理化系统,它包含所有的基本表达式而没有辅助性表达式。这个系统与原初那个有相同的可观察结果。克雷格本人并不认为这种方法真正消解了分析理论术语的经验意义的问题,并认为这个方法只适用于已完备的演绎系统。但是,他的定理对于科学哲学中关于理论术语和观察术语之间关系的讨论,产生了很大影响。这一方法在精神上与“拉姆塞命题”的概念相近。

"克雷格定理所提供的,是一种从一个形式化系统中删除掉一组选出的术语而不改变其内容的方法。"——布朗:《知觉、理论和承诺》, 1977年,第44页。

无中创造

即出于无的创造,与此对应的说法是 *ex nihilo nihil fit* (无物出于无)。基督教有神论者坚持上帝从无中创造世界的学说,与柏拉图和新柏拉图主义阐述的上帝和世界之间关系的观点相反。无中创造学说主张,物质不是永恒的,在宇宙过程的最初那一瞬,在神圣的创造活动之先,没有任何物质存在,物质的先在把上帝限于形式因或动力因的角色范围,它规划或安排了先在的材料,相反,无中创造学说却坚持,物质也是由上帝从无中,即在绝对非存在的严格含义上即刻创造出来的。按这种观点,创造是绝

was created instantaneously by God out of nothing, in the strict sense of absolute non-being. On this view, creation is absolutely without determination. For example, God did not create the world because he needed this action to complete his nature. God is held to be necessary and is not confronted with any alien and rival necessity which might determine or constrain his acts.

"According to classical theism God created the world 'out of nothing' (*ex nihilo*). " —H. D. Owen, *Concepts of Deity*, p. 8.

Creativity

Generally, to create is to make something new, including both material objects and ideas. Creativity has a wide application in human activities, but is of particular significance in the production of art. In Greek thought, a poet is called "maker" (Greek, *poietes*). Aristotle's masterpiece on aesthetics, what is usually translated as "*poetics*", is in its Greek original "*poietikos*" ("concerned with making"). Art has long been seen as a creative activity, but there have been disagreements regarding what it means to say that an activity is a creative artistic activity. Creativity implies novelty and involves producing something different from what has been produced before, but also extends beyond mere novelty. In creation, an artist seeks to assimilate within a design recalcitrant features of a subject and to keep and enhance the subject's initiative and freedom. There is disagreement whether the process of artistic creation is explicable. For Plato, artists themselves lack knowledge and are under the influence of divine inspiration. Hence artistic creativity is associated with madness. For others, although artistic creation derives from inspiration, it is also subject to rational analysis.

"Creative activity in art, that is to say, is not a paradigm of purposive activity, that is, of activity engaged in and consciously-controlled so as to produce a desired result." —Tomas (ed), *Creativity in the Arts*, 1964, p. 98.

Credo quia absurdum est, see fideism

Credo ut intelligam

[Latin; I believe in order that I may understand] An avowal from St. Anselm's *Prologion* in which the ontological argument was first expressed. Anselm claimed that it is impossible to understand Christian doctrines without faith or belief. Reason itself cannot discover anything intelligible about God. The view has inspired other explorations of non-intellectual or non-rational conditions of understanding. Outside theology, it is popular to affirm that one must use the practical means of living in a culture in order to understand

对无限定的。例如，上帝以前没创造世界是因为他需要这个行为来完成他的本性。上帝被认为是必然的，且不冲突于任何相异的、敌对的、会限制其行为的必然性。

“按照古典有神论，上帝‘从无中’(*ex nihilo*)创造世界。”——欧文：《神的概念》，第8页。

创造性

概而论之，创造就是创新，包括新的物体与新的思想。创造性在人类活动中应用广泛，但在艺术生产中则具有特殊的意味。在希腊思想中，诗人被称为“制作者”（希腊语 *poietes*）。亚里士多德的美学杰作通常被译为《诗学》，其希腊原文则是 *poietikos*（意思是“与制作有关”）。艺术向来被看成是一项创造活动，但对于什么活动是创造性的艺术活动的说法一直存在不同意见。创造性意味着新奇性，包括生产某种不同于现成的东西，因此也超过单纯的新奇性。在创造过程中，艺术家竭力想在一种设计中同化主体身上桀骜不驯的特征，同时保持和提高主体的主动性与自由性。人们对于艺术创作过程是否可以解释说明的问题持有不同看法。在柏拉图看来，艺术家自身缺乏知识，并且受到神性灵感的影响。所以，艺术创造性与迷狂状态相关。但在其他人看来，艺术创造虽然源自灵感，但也属于理性的分析。

“也就是说，艺术中的创造性活动并非是目的性活动的范式，即这种活动不是像产生某种期望的结果那样孜孜不倦，是一种有意识的支配活动。”——托马斯编：《艺术中的创造性》，1964年，第98页。

荒谬，故我信

见“信仰主义”条。

为知，故我信

[拉丁语，意为“我相信，为了我可以理解”]这句断言出自安瑟尔谟的《宣讲》，正是在此书中，他第一次表述了本体论论证。安瑟尔谟断言，如无信念或信仰，不可能理解基督教学说。理智本身不能发现有关上帝的任何睿智的东西。这种观点激发了对于理解的非智力或非理性条件的其他探究。在神学之外，流行的主张是，为了理解文化，人必须使用在文化中生活的实践手段，孤立地地理性理解文化是不可能的。

that culture and that detached rational understanding of a culture is impossible.

"I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand (*credo ut intelligam*). For this I also believe; that if I did not believe, I could not understand." — Anselm, *Prologion*, II, 1.

Criterion, problem of the

A criterion is a test or standard by which truth, existence, identity or meaning can be determined. There is an influential question concerning the relation between criteria and that for which they are criteria, called the problem of the criterion. The problem was originally formulated by Sextus Empiricus in the *Outline Of Pyrrhonism*, II, 4. To know the truth, one needs a proof that what one knows is the truth. How, then, can a proof be true? It seems that any proof requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion needs a proof to demonstrate its truth. That involves a circular process of reasoning. This paradox has historically had various formulations and has been a subject of wide discussion. Chisholm presents the problem in this way: We have two general questions in epistemology. (A) "What do we know?" and (B) "How do we know anything?". Question A concerns the extent of our knowledge, and B the criterion for knowledge. However, if we try to answer A, we must answer B first. To know whether things are really as they seem to be, we need to have a procedure for distinguishing appearance from reality. On the other hand, if we want to answer question B, we must answer question A first. For to know whether a procedure is good or proper, we must first know the distinction between appearance and reality. To get out of this circle, we must show that we can justify our criteria of knowledge without appealing to what these criteria countenance as knowledge. This involves the distinction of different levels of knowledge and different levels of justification. Fulfilling this task has become one of the major problems of epistemology and of philosophy in general.

"The problem of the criterion seems to me to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. I am tempted to say that one has not begun to philosophise until one has faced this problem and has recognised how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is." — Chisholm, *The Foundations of Knowing*, 1982, p. 61.

Criterion of verifiability

A test proposed by logical positivists to distinguish genuine propositions from pseudo-propositions. By virtue of demonstrating that metaphysics is composed of pseudo-propositions, they attempted to show that philosophy, as a genuine branch of knowledge, must be distinguished from metaphysics. What purports to be a factual proposition has

"我决不是为了信仰才理解,而是为了理解才信仰(*credo ut intelligam*)。因此我也相信;假如我不信仰,我就不能理解。"——安瑟尔谟;《宣讲》, II, 1.

标准问题

标准是能用来确定真理、存在、同一性或意义的一个验证或准则。对于标准和它们作为标准所衡量的东西之间的关系,有一个很有影响的问题,被称作“标准问题”。这个问题最初由 S. 恩披里柯在《皮浪主义纲要》第二章,第 4 节中提出的。一个人要认识真理,需要一个证据来说明他所知道的东西是真理。那么,一个证据如何才能是真的?似乎任何证据都要求一个对证据加以确证的标准,而这个标准又需要一个证明其真理性的证据。这里陷入了循环推理过程。这个难题在历史上有各种各样的系统表述,并已成为广泛讨论的题目。齐硕姆以下面的方式提出这个问题:我们有两个基本的认识论问题。(A)“我们知道什么?”(B)“我们是怎样知道任何事情的?”问题(A)关系到我们的知识的范围,问题(B)关系到知识的标准。无论如何,如果我们试图回答(A),我们必须首先回答(B)。要知道事情是否实际如此,我们需要有一个将表象同实在区分开来的程序。另一方面,如果我们想回答问题(B),我们必须首先回答问题(A)。因为要知道一个程序是否良好或恰当,我们必须首先知道表象和实在之间的区别。要跳出这个循环,我们必须表明,我们可以不求助被这些标准当做知识的东西,来说明我们的知识标准是正当的。这里涉及到知识的不同层次和辩明的不同层次的区分。如何完成这个任务已经变成了认识论和一般哲学的主要问题之一。

"对我来说,标准问题是所有哲学问题中最重要也是最困难的问题之一。我要冒昧地说,一个人直到面对这个问题,并认识到对这个问题的每一可能的解决最终是多么乏味,他才开始走进哲学。"——齐硕姆:《认知的基础》,1982年,第61页。

可证实性标准

由逻辑实证主义者提出来以区分真正的命题和伪命题的检验。通过论证形而上学是由伪命题构成的,他们试图证明,哲学作为真正的知识分支,必须与形而上学区分开来。所谓的事实命题具有认知意义,当且仅当它是经验上可证实的,如果它不能被证明是真或是假的,它实际

cognitive sense if and only if it is empirically verifiable. If it cannot be shown to be true or false, it is factually insignificant, although it can perhaps have emotive meaning for those who utter it. We can distinguish between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Many propositions could, with sufficient effort, be verified in practice. For others, such as "there are planets or stars in other galaxies", we can conceive of an observation allowing us to decide its truth or falsity, but lack the means which would enable us actually to make such an observation. Because we know that being in a position to make the observation would allow verification, this kind of proposition is verifiable in principle.

There is a further distinction between a strong and a weak sense of verifiable. According to the strong sense, held by Schlick, a proposition is verifiable if and only if its truth is conclusively or practically established in experience; according to the weak sense, developed by Ayer, a proposition is verifiable if it is possible for experience to render it probable.

"The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability." —A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1946, p. 35.

Critical cognitivism

A term introduced by Roderick Chisholm for an approach to the problem of how to formulate the criterion that determines disputed knowledge claims, such as knowledge of ethical facts, religious knowledge, knowledge of other minds, or knowledge of the past and future. The difficulty with this kind of knowledge is to show how we can infer from what is directly evident to what is indirectly evident. We may reasonably assume that we have just four sources that yield knowledge, that is external perception, inner consciousness, memory, and reason. None of them can individually and directly provide us with knowledge of the disputed type. We have also induction and deduction, but they do not help either. Chisholm then attempts to establish the existence of principles of evidence other than the principles of induction and of deduction and called this approach critical cognitivism. It tells us under what conditions cognitive states will confer evidence or reasonableness upon propositions about external things. It takes the knowledge produced by other approaches as sign or evidence for more dubious knowledge and reaches the latter from the former facts of experience.

"The other type of answer might be called critical cognitivism. If we take this approach, we will not say that there are empirical sentences that might serve as translations of the sentences expressing our ethical knowledge; but we will say that there are empirical truths which enable us to know certain truth of ethics." —Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 1966, p. 60.

上就是无意义的, 尽管对于说出它的那些人来说它也许具有情感意义。我们可以区分实际的可证实性和原则上的可证实性。经过充分努力之后, 许多命题能够实际上被证实。对于其他命题例如“在其他星系存在行星或恒星”来说, 我们能够设想某次观察, 它允许我们去确定该命题的真或假, 但我们缺乏能使我们实际地进行此类观察的手段。因为我们知道, 假如能够进行该类观察, 将允许对该命题的证实, 所以此类命题在原则上是可证实的。

“可证实的”一词可进一步区分出强的意义和弱的意义。根据石里克所主张的强的意义, 一命题是可证实的, 当且仅当它的真是结论性地或实际地在经验中确立的; 根据艾耶尔所发展的该词的弱的意义, 一命题是可证实的, 当且仅当经验有可能判定它是或然的。

“我们用来检验表面的事实陈述是不是真正的事实陈述的标准, 就是可证实性标准。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》, 1946年, 第35页。

批判认知主义

R. 齐硕姆发明的词, 是指解决如何构成确定有争议的知识主张的标准这个问题的方法。这些有争议的知识主张包括伦理事实的知识、宗教知识、关于他人心灵的知识、关于过去与未来的知识等等。这种知识的困难在于表明, 我们是如何从直接明显的东西推出只是间接明显的东西。我们可以有理由断定, 我们具有四种派生知识的源泉, 即外在的知觉、内在的意识、记忆和推理。但它们中的任何一种都无法单个地和直接地为我们提供这种有争议的知识。我们可以使用归纳和演绎, 但它们都无济于事。于是, 齐硕姆试图确立不同于归纳和演绎原则的证据原则, 并把这种方法称作“批判的认知主义”。它告诉我们在什么条件下认识状态会使关于外在事物的命题提供证据或合理性。它把由其他方法产生的知识看作是对更为可疑的知识的记号或证明, 从前者的经验事实而达到后者。

“另一类回答可以称作批判的认知主义。如果我们采用了这种方法, 我们就不会说, 存在经验句子, 它们可以作为表达我们伦理知识的句子的翻译; 但我们可以说, 存在经验真理, 它们能够使我们知道某种伦理学真理。”——齐硕姆:《知识理论》, 1966年, 第60页。

Critical ethics, another name for meta-ethics

Critical idealism, another term for idealism, transcendental

Critical realism

An American epistemological movement that flourished in the early twentieth century. Its representatives include George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars and Arthur O. Lovejoy. The movement took its name from Sellars' book *Critical Realism* (1916). A volume *Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge* (1920) became the manifesto of the school. By claiming that there is an objective and independent physical world which is the object of knowledge, critical realism opposed idealism. It also opposed the naive version of direct realism proposed by the new realists, specifically their claim that we directly perceive the objective things themselves. Critical realism is called "critical" because it claims that what is present directly in consciousness are mental states and not the physical things as such. They held that the mind knows the external world via the mediation of the mental. Critical realists tried to account for the relationship between the mediating elements and what they represent. They believed their accounts to be the most reasonable way to explain phenomena such as error, illusion and perceptual variation. However, critical realists had many disagreements over the nature of the mediating elements and the roles they filled. Candidates for the mediating elements ranged over essences, ideas and sense-data. Because of these differences, critical realism did not survive as a school.

"Critical realism accepts physical realism. Like common sense, it holds to the belief that there are physical things; and, like enlightened common sense, its idea of the physical world is moulded by the conclusions of science. It is a criticism of naive realism, and an attempt to free it from its pre-supposition that knowledge is, or can be, an intuition of the physical thing itself."—Roy Wood Sellars, in *Essays in Critical Realism*, 1920, p. 189.

Critical theory

A type of social theory that originated with western Marxist thinkers attached to the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. Leading critical theorists included Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. The Institute moved to Geneva and during the Second World War to the United States, but it returned to Germany in 1950. The original proponents of critical theory are also called the Frankfurt school.

The project of critical theory was inspired by Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach", in which Marx said, "Philosophers have given different interpretations of the world; the point is

批判伦理学

“元伦理学”的另一个名称。

批判唯心主义

〔康德〕对“先验唯心论”的另一种提法。

批判的实在论

20 世纪前期流传于美国的认识论运动。它的代表人物包括：桑塔亚那、塞拉斯和洛夫乔伊。这个运动的名称来自塞拉斯的书《批判的实在论》(1916 年)。一卷题为《批判的实在论文集：关于知识问题的合作研究》(1920 年)成为这一学派的宣言。批判的实在论主张存在一个客观的和独立的物理世界作为知识对象，由此反对唯心主义。它也反对由新实在论者们提出的直接实在论的朴素表达，特别是认为我们直接知觉到客观事物本身的想法。批判的实在论被称为“批判的”，因为它声称那直接呈现于意识之中的是心灵状态，不是物理事物本身。他们主张，心灵通过心智的中介而知道外部世界，批判的实在论者试图说明这些中介因素与它们所表象者的关系。他们相信自己的说明最合理地解释了诸如错误、幻觉和知觉变化等现象。然而，批判的实在论者对于中介因素的本性和它们所起的作用多有分歧意见。可充当中介元素的待选者包括本质、观念和感觉材料。由于这些歧见，批判的实在论作为一个学派已不复存在。

“批判的实在论接受物理的实在论。类似于常识的看法，它坚信有物理的事物；又相似于开明的常识观，它依据科学的结论来塑造自己关于物理世界的观念。它是对朴素实在论的批判，并且力图使其摆脱这样一个前提，即知识就是或能是对于物理事物本身的直观。”——塞拉斯，载《批判的实在论文集》，1920 年，第 189 页。

批判理论

一种社会理论，来源于与法兰克福大学社会研究所有关的西方马克思主义思想家。主要的批判理论家有 M. 霍克海默、T. W. 阿多尔诺和 H. 马尔库塞。这个研究所曾迁到日内瓦，在第二次世界大战期间又迁到美国，1950 年又迁回德国。因此，最初的批判理论的倡导者也被称为“法兰克福学派”。

批判理论的方案受到马克思的《费尔巴哈提纲》的激励，在“提纲”中马克思写道：“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界，问题在于改造世界。”批判理论拒绝逻辑实证主义在人文

to change it". Critical theory rejected the attempt of logical positivism to find universal laws in the human sciences. It held that modern science and technology have been totally reduced to an administrative system governed by a purely technological rationality. To counteract this, critical theory focused on the superstructure rather than the economic base of societies and emphasised moral, political and religious values. It claimed that knowledge is relative to human interest and introduced a wide range of cultural criticism into Marxist social theory. It sought to reveal the false embodiment of the ideals of reason in the social and political conditions of capitalist societies. Critical theory sought to identify the possibility of social change and to promote a self-reflective, domination-free society.

Critical theory developed into a new phase with the work of Jurgen Habermas, who was based at the same Institute. Habermas' ambition was to replace the technological rationality predominant in modern societies with communicative rationality, which reaches conclusions through discussion and dialogue. He tries to achieve this goal by shifting philosophical emphasis from the subject-object relation to the process of intersubjective communication. He believes that the act of communication anticipates the goal of critical theory and also establishes a universalistic discourse ethics as the evaluative foundation of social critique.

"The expression 'critical theory' has been applied to a wide range of different theoretical standpoints. In its narrowest sense, it refers to the views advocated by members of the Frankfurt school, especially in the early writings of Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse." - Keat and Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, 1975, p. 147.

Critical thinking, another term for informal logic

Critique of Judgement

The third and last critique in Kant's critical philosophy. First published in 1790, the *Critique of Judgement* is an examination of the power or faculty of judgement, that is the possibility of making judgements. This issue is related to the schematism of the first critique. Kant divides judgement into two kinds; a determinant judgement applies a rule or concept to particular instances, and a reflective judgement (or judgement of reflection) discovers the rule or concept under which a given particular instance falls. The thinking in determinant judgement is from the universal to the particular, but in reflective judgement, the thinking is from the particular to the universal. The *Critique of Judgement* concerns reflective judgement, especially its two most problematic forms: aesthetic judgement and teleological judgement. The book is divided into two parts; the critique of aesthetic judgement of taste, and the critique of teleological judgement. Each has its

科学中寻求普遍规律的尝试。它认为,现代科学技术已完全变为由纯粹技术理性统治的管理系统。为了抵制这一变化,批判理论将注意力集中于社会的上层建筑而不是经济基础,强调道德、政治和宗教的价值。它主张知识是与人的利益相关的,并将大范围的文化批判引入马克思主义的社会理论。它试图揭示资本主义社会的社会和政治条件是理性理想的虚假体现。批判理论试图发现社会变革的可能性,并提倡一个自省的、自由居主导地位的社会。

随着在同一研究所工作的J. 哈贝马斯的著作的出版,批判理论发展到一个新阶段。哈贝马斯的志向是以通过讨论和对话达成结论的交往理性取代在现代社会中居支配地位的技术理性。他试图通过从主-客体关系向主体间的交往过程这一哲学重心的转换来达到这一目的。他认为交流行为先于批判理论的目标,并且还创立了一种普遍言谈伦理学作为社会批判的评价基础。

" '批判理论' 这一用语已被应用于范围广泛的不同的理论观点。从狭义上讲,它指的是法兰克福学派成员倡导的观点,特别是M. 霍克海默和H. 马尔库塞早期作品中的观点。" ——基特和乌利:《作为科学的社会理论》,1975年,第147页。

批判性思维

“非形式逻辑”的另一个名称。

《判断力批判》

这是康德批判哲学中第三个也是最后一个批判的标题。该书第一次于1790年出版,是对判断官能或能力,即作判断的可能性的考察。其问题与第一批判中的图型学说相关。康德把判断力分为两种:规定的,即把规则或概念应用于特殊情况;反思的,即要发现那些使特殊情况统摄于其下的规律或概念。在规定的判断力中的思维是从普遍到特殊,反思判断力中的思维是从特殊到普遍。在《判断力批判》这个题目中的“判断力”是指反思的判断力,特别是它的两种最困难的形式:审美判断和合目的性判断。该书相应地分为两个部分:鉴赏的审美判断力批判和合目的性判断力批判。每个部分都有它自己的分析论和辩证论。

对这个批判一般存在两种研究方法。一种强调它在整个批判计划中的作用。第一批判讨

own analytic and dialectic.

There are generally two approaches to the third *Critique*. One approach emphasises its role in the whole critical enterprise. The first critique discussed the realm of nature, the second the realm of freedom, and the third is viewed as a bridge which combines these two realms and completes the critical philosophy. The other approach focuses on the critique of aesthetic judgement of taste. The analytic of this part includes an analytic of the beautiful and an analytic of the sublime, which are viewed as the origin of modern aesthetics. On this approach, these questions of aesthetics are considered independently.

"A Critique of pure reason, i. e. of our faculty of judging on a priori principles, would be incomplete if the critical examination of judgement, which is a faculty of knowledge, and as such, lays a claim to independent principles, were not dealt with separately." Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, p. 168.

Critique of Practical Reason

The second critique of Kant's critical philosophy, first published in 1788. The book was divided into two parts: the doctrine of the elements of pure practical reason and the methodology of pure practical reason. The former part was further divided into the Analytic and the Dialectic. The Analytic sought to determine synthetic *a priori* principles about what we ought to do and to demonstrate the legitimacy of these principles. The Dialectic dealt with an antinomy concerning the definition of the highest good, with the conflicting theses represented by Epicurus and the Stoics. While the first critique rejected the traditional metaphysical notions of God, freedom and immortality as objects of knowledge, the *Critique of Practical Reason* justified them for morality as postulated objects of faith. The book elaborated and developed the central ideas about morality which Kant established in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785).

"... reason, which contains constitutive a priori principles solely in respect of the faculty of desire, gets its holding assigned to it by the *Critique of Practical Reason*." Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, p. 168.

Critique of Pure Reason

Kant's greatest masterpiece, one of the most important books in the history of Western philosophy. It fundamentally shaped the development of modern philosophy. For Kant, a critique was a critical examination, and pure reason was contrasted with empirical reason, with pure reason seeking to provide knowledge independent of experience. Kant saw a critique of pure reason as a critical examination of these claims of pure reason conducted by pure reason itself. While the logical use of reason unifies knowledge already gained through other faculties, pure reason tries to add to our

论自然王国,第二批判讨论自由王国,而第三批判被作为是一种把这两个王国接连起来的桥梁,因此是批判哲学的完成。另一种研究方法注重于鉴赏的审美判断力批判。这一部分的分析论包括美的分析和崇高的分析,它被视为现代美学之起源。按照这种研究方式,这些美学问题可独立考察。

"对纯粹理性,即我们按照先天原理来判断的能力的批判是不完整的,如果对判断力的批判考察不作专门处理的话。判断力作为一种认识能力,其自身也要求一种独立的原理。"——康德:《判断力批判》,第168页。

《实践理性批判》

康德批判哲学第二个批判的标题。该书第一次于1788年出版。它分为两个部分:“纯粹实践理性的原理论”和“纯粹实践理性的方法论”。前一部分又进一步分为分析论和辩证论。分析论试图建立关于我们应该做什么的先天综合原理,并且论证这些原理的合法性。辩证论论及至善定义的二律背反,分别以伊壁鸠鲁和斯多亚为冲突对方的代表。第一批判反对传统形而上学把上帝、自由和灵魂不朽设定为知识对象的主张,而《实践理性批判》则证明它们对道德而言是假设的信仰对象。该书精心阐述和发展了康德在1785年出版的《道德形而上学基础》中就已经提出的主要道德观。

“那包含着在欲求官能领域内先天构成性原理的理性,通过《实践理性批判》确立了赋予它的地位。”——康德:《判断力批判》,第168页。

《纯粹理性批判》

康德最伟大的杰作,是西方哲学史最重要的著作之一。该书从根本上决定了现代哲学发展的进程。按照康德的观点,“批判”意为“批判地考察”;纯粹理性与经验理性形成对照,它致力于提供独立于经验的知识。康德把纯粹理性批判视为对纯粹理性自身所指导的各种纯粹理性的主张作批判的考察。理性的逻辑用法把已经通过其他官能而获得的知识统一起来,而纯粹理性则力图通过它自己的劳动来增加我们的知识,因而成为辩证谬误的源泉。纯粹理性也

knowledge through its own labours, and thus becomes the source of dialectical error. Pure reason is also the name that followers of Wolff gave to their philosophy, which was dominant in Kant's time. Kant's criticism of pure reason has both of these aspects in mind.

The first *Critique* is an examination of the limits and conditions of human theoretical reason. It was first published in 1781, but very extensively revised for its second edition in 1787. The first edition is designated A and the second edition B. In modern editions and translations, the page numbers of both editions are normally marked in the margin. The book is divided into two parts: the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental Doctrine of Methods. The former occupies five-sixths of the book, and the Doctrine of Methods is merely a systematic presentation of the basic elements of knowledge discovered in the previous part. The Doctrine of the Elements is divided into the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, which is further divided into the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic.

The first *Critique* purported to carry out a Copernican revolution in philosophy by proposing that objects must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledge to objects. This position is related to the complex and controversial claims of Kant's transcendental idealism, which he sought to combine with empirical realism. The Transcendental Aesthetic deals with sensibility. Kant sought to demonstrate that sensibility has *a priori* forms, space and time, that are subjective forms of intuition. He also offered influential claims about the nature of mathematics. The Transcendental Analytic deals with understanding. Kant proposed his table of categories as pure concepts of the understanding and a schematism for the application of the categories to sensible objects. The claim that judgement and perception involves both sensibility and understanding is a major theme of the first *Critique*. The crucially important transcendental deduction of the categories attempted to justify our use of the categories as conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant also provided important examinations of individual categories and of ourselves as subjects of experience. These two parts attempt to answer Kant's central question of how synthetic *a priori* judgement are possible. Kant tried to provide a metaphysical foundation for Newtonian physics. The pure concepts of understanding can only be applied to a spatio-temporal phenomenal world. Once human reason attempts to make use of them beyond our experience to things-in-themselves, illusions, errors or antinomies are generated. According to Kant, this is the source of the errors of traditional metaphysics. The task of the transcendental dialectic, which is concerned with reason, is to expose these errors.

"I do not mean by this [the critique of pure reason] a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in

是沃尔夫的追随者们给予他们哲学的名称。这种哲学在康德时代是占主导地位的观点。这两种含义都包含在康德对纯粹理性的批判中。

该书是对人类理论理性的条件和界限所作的考察。它于1781年第一次出版,1787年出第二版时做了很大程度的修订。第一版被称为“A”,第二版称为“B”。该书的现代版和译本中,规范的方式是把两个版本的页码标在页边上。该书分为两个部分:“先验原理论”和“先验方法论”。前者占整本书的六分之五,而“方法论”仅仅是对“原理论”已揭示的知识的基本要素作一个系统的排列和叙述。原理论进一步划分为“先验感性论”和“先验逻辑”;先验逻辑本身又一分为二,即“先验分析论”和“先验辩证论”。

第一批判旨在实行哲学中的哥白尼革命,提出对象必须符合我们的知识,而非我们的知识符合对象。这种立场与康德的先验唯心主义的复杂而有争议的主张相关,他力图把他的先验唯心论与经验实在论结合起来。先验感性论讨论感性能力。康德力图证明感性有它的先天形式,即空间和时间,这些形式是主观的直观形式。他提出的关于数学本性的主张也颇有影响。先验分析论讨论知性。康德提出了他的作为纯粹知性概念的范畴表和作为范畴对感性对象的应用的图型学说。判断和知觉既涉及感性又涉及知性的主张是第一批判的重大主题。具有决定性重要意义的范畴先验演绎企图证明我们对范畴的使用是经验可能性的条件。康德对个体范畴和我们自身作为经验主体也进行了重要的考察。这两个部分力图回答康德的中心问题:“先天综合判断如何可能?”康德试图为牛顿的物理学提供形而上学的基础。知性的纯粹概念只能应用于空间-时间的现象世界。一旦人类理性试图超出我们的经验而使用它们,即把它们应用于“物自体”中,幻象、谬误或二律背反就会产生。康德认为这就是传统形而上学的错误根源。研究理性的先验辩证的任务是要揭示这些错误。

“我之所谓批判[纯粹理性批判]并非是指对书籍和体系的批判,而是一般性地针对理性能力,针对它力图独立于一切经验而追求一切知识这方面的批判。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A, xii。

general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience.” —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A, xii.

Crucial experiment

[Latin: *experimentum crucis*] A term introduced by Francis Bacon in *Novum Organon*. At a certain stage of scientific development, two rival hypotheses appear to have equal explanatory power. When this occurs, it is of great importance that scientists should devise an experiment which can play a decisive role in determining which one of rival scientific theories should be refuted or accepted. Eddington's measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a solar eclipse was crucial in the debate between Einstein's general relativity and Newtonian mechanics. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the notion of a crucial experiment has become an important topic in the discussion of scientific methodology. Some, like Duhem, argue that a crucial verifying experiment is impossible. Others, like Popper, believe that a crucial experiment functions decisively in falsifying one of the rival theories. Still others, like Lakatos, suggest that a crucial experiment cannot be final in overthrowing a theory, although it may be an indication of the progress or demise of a research programme.

“In most cases we have, before falsifying a hypothesis, another one up our sleeves; for the falsifying experiment is usually a crucial experiment designed to decide between the two. That is to say, it is suggested by the fact that the two hypotheses differ in some respect; and it makes use of this difference to refute (at least) one of them.” —Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 1968, p. 87.

Cruelty

[from Latin: *cruor*, spilled blood] Cruelty is traditionally conceived as an activity of inflicting pain upon other persons. In addition to physical pain which is related to spilling blood, it also covers mental or psychological pain. It is opposed to care and beneficence, and is regarded as a paradigmatic evil. Cruelty can be committed by individual persons or by institutions (for example, by the slave system or by Nazi Germany), although in many cases they are difficult to separate. Institutional cruelty involves a relationship between strength of the institution and the weakness of its victims. There are issues concerning the complicity of the individual agents or members of the institution and the extent to which they are responsible for such cruelty. In some cases, questions of assessment arise because persons believe themselves to be caring, but those affected by their actions consider them to be cruel. There is dispute whether and to what extent cruelty to evil-doers can be justified. One important case concerns whether capital punishment is cruel. In contemporary environmental ethics, cruelty as an evil extends from the

判决性实验

[拉丁文是 *experimentum crucis*] 该术语由 F. 培根在其《新工具》一书中采用。在科学发展的某一阶段, 两个相争的假设似乎有同等说明力, 当这种情况出现时, 极为重要的是, 科学家应当设计一个实验, 这个实验可以在确定相争的科学理论中的哪一个应当被放弃或接受时起决定作用。埃丁顿对光线在日食期间的引力弯曲的测量, 对于爱因斯坦的广义相对论和牛顿力学的争论是判决性的。在 19 世纪和 20 世纪, 判决性实验的概念在关于科学方法论的讨论中成为一个重要题目。像杜恒那样的一些人论证说, 证实性判决实验是不可能的。像波普那样的另一些人则相信, 在对相争理论之一的证伪中, 判决性实验起着决定的作用。还有像拉卡托斯那样的一些人提出, 虽然判决性实验可能指示出一个研究纲领的进展或倒退, 但是, 它对于推翻一个理论不可能是终极性的。

“在大多数场合, 我们在证伪一个假设之前已经有了另一个假设; 因为证伪实验通常是一个判决性实验, 它被设计来在两个假设之间做出决定。也就是说, 它之被提出是由于如下事实, 这两个假设在某些方面是不同的, 判决性实验利用这一不同 (至少) 否决其中的一个假设。” ——波普: 《科学发现的逻辑》, 1968 年, 第 87 页。

残忍

[源自拉丁词 *cruor*, 意为“溅血”] 残忍一般看作是一种把痛苦施加于他人的一种活动。除了有与溅血相关的身体性痛苦外, 它也包括精神或心理上的痛苦。它是与关怀和仁慈相对的, 被看作是典型的恶。残忍的主体既有社会机构 (例如奴隶制度, 纳粹德国对犹太人的虐待), 也有个人, 虽然在许多情形下这两者是难于分开的。社会机构性残忍涉及到机构的强大与其受害者的软弱之间的关系, 也涉及到单个主体或机构成员的同谋的问题, 以及他们需对这类残忍负责的程度。在某些情况下, 评价问题之所以产生是因为, 行动的一方相信他是在关心, 而被动的一方则认为行动者的行动是残忍的。所争论的问题还包括是否和在什么程度上对于罪犯的残忍是公正合理的, 一个重要的情形关涉到死刑是否残忍? 在当代的“环境伦理学”中, 残忍作为一种恶从人类共同体扩展到人与动物的关系。动物解放运动要求我们停止对非人类的动物的残忍。

human community to human relationships with animals. The animal liberation movement demands that we stop cruelty to non human animals.

"Cruelty or savageness is the desire whereby any one is incited to work evil to one whom we love or whom we pity." - Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, Prop. 38.

C-series of time, see a-series of time

Cultural relativism

A theory which holds that each culture is a unique and arbitrary system of thought and behaviour. What is considered to be a reasonable claim in one society is not necessarily thought to be so in another culture, and consequently it is impossible to compare and rank different cultures. Any behaviour has to be explained in terms of the society and context in which it occurs. Any attempt to compare different cultures would inevitably have to appeal to some assumptions universally found in human cultures, but cultural relativism denies that there are such significant cultural universals. Cultural relativism was the dominant conviction in anthropology in the 1930s and 1940s and is still employed in many studies of the social sciences, including studies of ethics. Many philosophers reject cultural relativism as incoherent on the grounds that it undermines our concepts of truth, objectivity and meaning.

"The reason cultural relativism is so crucial is that it challenges the orthodoxies of our civilisation. To the confirmed relativist, the ideas of our society (whether moral or existential) are a matter of convention and are not rooted in absolute principles that transcend time and place." - Hatch, *Culture and Morality*, 1983, p. 3.

Culture

In its most central sense, culture refers to the forms of life and the tools, symbols, customs and beliefs which are characteristic of a distinct historical group of people. This sense of culture, associated with the notion of society, provides much of the subject-matter of sociology and anthropology. The variety of cultures has led some thinkers to endorse "cultural relativism", the claim that the culture of any society must be judged in its own terms and not by standards provided by the culture of another society. Others have accepted the importance of culture while rejecting cultural relativism. Culture may also refer to the system of value and ways of thinking peculiar to a society. This amounts to "the consciousness of a society". In its widest sense, culture refers to the totality of human thoughts, behaviours and the products of human activities. Culture in this sense, which stands in contrast to biological nature and has been used to distinguish humans from animals, belongs to the subject of

"残忍或野蛮是那种激起人们对我们所爱和所同情的人作恶的欲望。" - 斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第三部分,命题 38。

时间的 C 序列

见“时间的 A 序列”条。

文化相对主义

这种理论认为,每种文化都是独特的、任意的思想与行为体系。在一种社会中被认为是合理的看法,在另一种文化中就不必然被认为是如此。所以,比较和排列不同的文化是不可能的。任何行为都只能用它所出现的社会和语境来加以解释。任何试图比较不同文化的企图,最终都将不得不求助于关于人类文化中普遍存在的某些假设,但文化相对主义否定存在这种具有重要意义的普遍文化。文化相对主义是 20 世纪 30 年代和 40 年代人类学中占主导地位的信念,至今仍然应用于许多社会科学研究,包括伦理学研究。许多哲学家认为文化相对论是不一致的理论而加以摒弃,因为它否认了我们的真理、客观性与意义等概念。

"文化相对主义至关重要的原因在于,它向我们的正统文明提出了挑战。根深蒂固的相对主义认为,我们的社会观念(无论是道德上的还是存在上的)只是一种约定而已,并非根植于超越时空的绝对原则。" - 哈奇:《文化与道德》,1983 年,第 3 页。

文化

文化的中心意思是表征不同历史的人类群体的生活方式、工具、符号、习俗和信仰等等。与社会观念相关的这一文化含义,为社会学和人类学提供了许多研究题材。文化的多样性使一些思想家赞同“文化相对论”,认为任何社会的文化务必依据自身的情况而非别的社会文化所提供的准则予以评判。另外一些思想家则接受文化的重要意义,但同时又拒绝文化相对主义。文化也会涉及到某一社会特有的价值体系与思维方式。这便等于“对某一社会的认识”。在广义上,文化是指人类思想、行为与人类活动产品的总和。在此意义上,文化与生物本性截然不同,并且一直用来区别人类与动物,因此属于哲学人类学研究的主题。在狭义上,文化包括艺术、体育、娱乐与其他休闲活动。高雅文化包括最意味和最上乘的视觉艺术作品、音乐、舞蹈与文学,从而与通俗文化形成对照,尽管在某些

philosophical anthropology. More selectively, culture comprises art, sports, entertainment and other leisure activities. High culture, containing the most significant and accomplished works of visual art, music, dance and literature has often been contrasted with popular culture, although the two in some circumstances influence one another. Culture also means personal cultivation through education and training. The science of culture seeks to understand that which is defined by the creation of values.

"A culture is an interrelated network of customs, traditions, ideals and values." —Marcus Singer (ed), *American Philosophy*, 1985, p. 18.

Cunning of reason

According to Hegel, the absolute idea or spirit accomplishes its end through the interactions and competitions of particular things, although reason itself cunningly avoids being dragged into the struggle. It remains in the background to control the whole process without being the object of explicit awareness. Reason does not work directly on the subject or lower itself to becoming a particular thing, but nevertheless achieves its goal. Particular things are merely means used for the end of reason, but are themselves parts of a necessary process. The play of contingency serves to realise the necessary plan or the inner teleology of the world. In the area of history, everyone pursues his own purpose and falls into battle with others, but eventually history develops its own pattern out of particular and selfish human actions.

"It is not the universal idea which places itself in opposition and struggle, or puts itself in danger; it holds itself safe from attack and uninjured in the background and sends the particular of passion into the struggle to be worn down. We can call it the cunning of reason that the Idea makes passions work for it, in such a way that whereby it posits itself in existence it loses thereby and suffers injury."—Hegel, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte* (ed. Hoffmeister), 1955, p. 105.

Curve-fitting problem

A problem first proposed by Legendre (1753-1833) and Gauss (1777-1855). Curve fitting to the data on a graph is a method of inferring from observed data. If a scientist tries to connect two variables on the grounds of a set of n data points, he will join them with a curve. There might be a family of curves that fit these n points to any desirable degree. How, then, can the scientist locate the best-fitting curve? Intuitively, and also based on common-sense, a smooth curve will be chosen. But why is this one the best fitting? Philosophically, there is a problem of simplicity, that is how we determine the simplest curve from all those curves that pass through every one of a set of data points on a graph and justify choosing it. This problem is relevant not only to the definition of simplicity but also to the problem of induc-

情况下两者相互影响。文化也指通过教育和培训而获得的个人修养。文化学旨在搞清价值创造所界定的东西。

“一种文化是由习俗、传统、理想与价值观念组成的相关网络。”——M. 辛格尔编：《美国哲学》，1985年，第18页。

理性的机巧（或译“理性的狡计”）

按照格尔的观点，绝对理念或绝对精神通过特殊事物的相互作用和冲突而实现它的目的，但理性自身机巧地避开被拖入到斗争中。它留在幕后控制着整个过程，并且不成为明确意识的对象。理性并不直接对主体起作用，或屈尊为特殊事物，但依然获取了它的目标。特殊事物仅是用作理性目的的手段，但本身是必然过程的部分。偶然事件的登场用来实现必然的计划或世界的内在目的性。在历史领域，每个人追求着他自己的目的，并陷入与他人的争斗之中，但历史从特殊的和自私的人类行动中最终发展它自己的型式。

“普遍理念不是让自身置身于对立、斗争或危险之中，它让自己留在幕后保持安全，免受冲击和不受损害，而把特殊的热情投入到斗争中而被磨损。我们把它称为理性的机巧，理念以这样的方式使热情为它而工作，它借助于热情在损失和遭到伤害的存在中设定自身。”——黑格尔：《历史中的理性》（荷夫马依斯特编），1955年，第105页。

曲线求律问题

一个首先为勒让德（1753—1833）和高斯（1777—1855）提出的问题。在一个图上对数据作曲线求律，是一种由观察数据推理的方法。如果一个科学家尝试在一组 n 个数据点的基础上联系两个变量，他将用一条曲线来结合它们。可能会有一族曲线以任意想要的程度适合于这 n 个点，那么科学家如何能找出最适合的曲线呢？直观上，同时也基于常识，会选择一条平滑的曲线。但为什么这条曲线最合适呢？从哲学上讲，这引起了一个简单性问题，即我们如何从所有这些通过图形上这组数据点中的每一点的曲线中，确定一条最简单的曲线并为这种选择作出辩护？这不仅与简单性的定义相关，也与归纳问题相关。

tion.

"The curve-fitting problem: two different curves are defined at all points and pass exactly through each data point, why should we think that the smooth curve is more probably true?" - Sober, *Simplicity*, 1975, p. 166.

Cybernetics

[from Greek: *kybernetes*, pilot, helmsman, governor] A term introduced by Norbert Wiener in 1947 for the study of communication and the manipulation of information in self-regulating systems and control systems, both in machines and living organisms. Its central notion is control. Cybernetic theory is closely related to communication theory and biology and in the popular understanding is the simulation of human data-processing and regulative functions in a digital computer. The philosophical interest in this field concerns computers that are developed by combining simple components through complex and goal-directed cybernetic processes.

"In the present content, the term [cybernetics] is used to designate the study of communication and central function of living organisms, in particular human beings, in view of their possible simulation in mechanical terms." - K. Sayre, *Cybernetics and Philosophy of Mind*, 1976, p. 18.

Cynics

[from Greek: *kunikos*, dog-like, in turn from *kuon*, dog] A Greek school founded by Socrates' disciple Antisthenes, and represented by Diogenes of Sinope. The school got its name because it was opposed to the existing civil life and against any cultural constraints (*norm*), requiring instead that we conform to nature (*physis*), and live like dogs, that is live shamelessly from the point of view of civil life. They not only advocated an ascetic lifestyle, but actually practised it.

Nevertheless, the Cynics were not moral nihilists. They believed that virtue is sufficient for a happy life, which lies in the freedom to do what reason requires, self-mastery of desires and feelings and indifference to external disturbances such as wealth, social status, pleasure and pain. They held that virtue is independent of fate and fortune and that a virtuous life is intrinsically better than a non-virtuous life. This position seeks to isolate human nature from social and historical contexts. Animal behaviour is taken as a criterion of naturalness. It deeply influenced the Hellenistic ideal of sagacity and, in particular, Stoic ethics.

"One omnipresent figure since the mid-fourth century had been that of the itinerant Cynic, whose main tenets would be the absolute self-sufficiency of virtue and the total inconsequentiality of all social norms, physical comforts, and gifts of fortune." - Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, I, 1987, p. 3.

"曲线求律问题:两条不同的曲线被限定于所有的点并且严格地通过每个数据点,为什么我们应认为平滑的曲线更可能为真呢?"——索伯:《简单性》,1975年,第166页。

控制论

[源自希腊文 *kybernetes*, 意为领航员、舵手和统治者] 由 N. 维纳于 1947 年所发明的术语,指对自我控制系统和控制系统(包括机器和生物体)中的信息交流和操纵所作的研究。其中心概念是“控制”。这一理论与交流理论和生物学密切相关。根据流行的理解,它是在数字计算机中模拟人的材料加工和规则功能。这一领域的哲学兴趣在于通过复杂的和目标定向的控制过程由简单成分的组合而产生计算机。

"在当前的内容中,这一术语「控制论」用以指关于生物体特别是人的交流与中心功能的研究,以期可能用机械方法来模拟它们。”——K. 塞厄:《控制论与心的哲学》,1976年,第18页。

犬儒

[源自希腊词 *kunikos*, 它是从 *kuon* (意为“狗”)转折而来,意为“类似于狗的”] 指的是为苏格拉底的弟子安提斯泰尼所创建,以西诺班的第欧根尼为代表的希腊学派。这个学派的得名是因为它反对当时的文明生活,并且反对任何文化约束(规范),而要求我们与自然(*physis*)一致,像狗一样生活,即从文明生活的观点看,无羞无耻地生活。他们不仅提倡这种苦行主义的生活方式,而且还实际实行它。不过,犬儒主义不是道德虚无主义。他们相信德性对于幸福生活是充足的,在于自由地做理性所要求的事情、对欲望和感情的自我主宰,以及对诸如财富、社会地位、愉快和痛苦等外界纷扰的淡漠。他们认为,“德性”独立于命运和运气,一种有德性的生活内在地好于无德的生活。这个观点所寻求的是把人性从社会和历史的背景中独立出来。动物行为被看作是自然的标准。它深刻地影响了希腊化时期的圣者的理想,尤其是斯多亚主义的伦理学。

"自从公元前4世纪中叶以来,一个无所不在的人物就是游走性的犬儒,其主要信条是德性的绝对自足,所有的社会规范、身体安适和命运的馈赠都是微不足道的。”——朗格和塞德利:《希腊化时期的哲学家》, I, 1987年,第3页。

Cyrenaics

A Greek philosophical school, noted for its radical hedonism. Its origin can be traced to Socrates' disciple Aristippus, and the name is derived from his native city, the North African Greek colony of Cyrene. The founder of this school was his grandson, referred to as Aristippus junior (about 340 BC), and other major exponents included Anniceris, Hegesias and Theodorus, all of whom were contemporaries of Epicurus. Cyrenaics claimed that because the past is gone and the future is not certain, the present enjoyment of sensual pleasure, that is what they called "the smooth motion of the flesh", is the supreme good in life. Their view thus contrasted with the hedonism of Epicurus, which emphasised recollection and anticipation. The epistemological basis of the Cyrenaic position was their claim that momentary perception and feeling are the only authentic source of guidance. Its metaphysical ground is that all living creatures pursue pleasure and avoid pain by nature. The school has been criticised for ignoring those deep long-term needs which go beyond sensory gratification.

"Aristippus, a native of Cyrene (whence the name of his followers, Cyrenaics) was said to have been brought to Athens by the fame of Socrates." —Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, 1969, p. 490.

居勒尼学派

一个希腊哲学学派，以它的激进的快乐主义而著称。它的起源可追溯至苏格拉底的弟子亚里斯提卜，它的名称来源于他出生的城市，即北非的希腊殖民地居勒尼。可这个学派的真正创立者为他的孙子，称为小亚里斯提卜（约公元前340年），其他的主要代表人物包括安尼克里斯、赫格萨斯和泰奥多，他们都是伊壁鸠鲁的当代人。居勒尼派主张，过去的已经过去，将来还没有到来，因此，对于感性快乐的现在的享受，即他们称之为“肉体的柔和运动”，是生活的至善。它是与伊壁鸠鲁的快乐主义相对的，后者强调回忆和期望。居勒尼学派的认识论基础是认为瞬间的感觉和感受是惟一的权威性向导。它的形而上学的基础是，所有的生物的本性都追求快乐和避免痛苦。这个学派一直受到批评，因为它忽视感性满足之外的深刻的和长期的需要。

“亚里斯提卜，一个居勒尼的当地人（因此，他的追随者因而名为居勒尼学派），据说因苏格拉底的名声而来到雅典。”——格思里：《希腊哲学史》，Ⅲ，1969年，第490页。

D

Daimon

[Greek: spirit, divinity] In Greek philosophy, sometimes a god and sometimes an immortal spirit, that is the divine soul which is incarnated in a mortal body but which may return to its god-like state. In another use, a *daimon* is a guardian angel which looks after an individual both in life and after death. Happiness in Greek is *eudaimonia*, having a good *daimon*. Socrates claimed that he had a *daimon* which ordered him to do what he did, although his *daimon* was his reason.

"When anyone dies, his own daimon, which was given charge over him in his life, tries to bring him to a certain place where all must assemble." --Plato, *Phaedo*, 107d.

Darwinism

A scientific doctrine based on the work of the British naturalist, Charles Darwin, and in particular on his book *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859). It claims that the organic world, including the human species, came into being through a natural and gradual process of evolution and its major mechanism of natural selection. Nature selects those species and those members of the same species which are best adapted to the environment in which they live. When we notice that members of the species *S'* have feature *F* for the sake of advantage *G*, we should understand this to be a result of evolution. For some members of a preceding species *S* had *F* and other members of *S* did not have *F*, but members of *S* which had *F* thereby had advantage *G*, and members of *S* without *F* did not have advantage *G*. In the long run, only members of *S* with *F* survived, so now all members of the successor species *S'* have *F*.

Because it can explain functional adaptation and the variety of species in natural terms, Darwinism rejects the argument from design for the existence of God and the theory of genesis. It also rejects teleology since the development of an organism is determined by the environment and environment changes, hence there is no final goal for each organism other than adaptation to its environment. It also suggests that distinctions between species or natural kinds are not absolute and challenges traditional essentialism. Darwinism deprives humankind of its alleged superiority over other species by locating the species in terms of natural evolution. All the central features of Darwin's theory have provoked long-lasting debates and have dramatically changed our view of the

神灵

[源自希腊词, 精灵, 神灵] 在希腊哲学中, 它有时用作神的同义词, 有时则指不朽的精神, 即神圣的灵魂。灵魂不幸地现身于一个总有一死的肉体中, 但有可能回到它本来的似神状态。该词的另一种用法是指守护天使, 它照顾某个个体的生前死后。“幸福”的希腊词是 *eudaimonia*, 字面意义是“有一个好的神灵”。苏格拉底也声称他有一个神灵, 命令他做他所做的事。不过, 他的神灵实际上是指他的理性。

“当一个人死后, 那统治了他一生的他自己的神灵力图把他带到某个大家都必须去集合的地方。”——柏拉图:《斐多篇》, 107d.

达尔文主义

一种建立在英国博物学家 C. 达尔文的工作、尤其是其名著《通过自然选择的物种起源》(1859) [通译《物种起源》] 基础之上的科学学说。它认为包括人类在内的有机界经由自然的和逐渐的演化过程而来, 而这一过程的主要机制是“自然选择”。自然选择那些能最好地适应其生存环境的物种和同一物种中的成员。当我们注意到同一物种 *S'* 的成员由于优势 *G* 的缘故而有特征 *F*, 我们应当把它理解为进化的结果, 因为一种较早的物种 *S* 的成员中有些有 *F*, 有些没有 *F*, 而 *S* 的成员中有 *F* 的具有优势 *G*, 没有 *F* 的则没有优势 *G*。只有那些具有 *F* 的 *S* 成员才存活下来, 所以现在所有的 *S'* 的后代物种其成员都有 *F*。

由于它能以自然原因解释功能适应和物种多样性, 达尔文主义反对关于上帝存在的设计论证和创世说。它也反对目的论, 因为有机体的演化是由环境和环境变化决定的, 所以对于每个有机体来说, 除了对其环境的适应之外, 并不存在最终的目的。它还认为物种或自然类之间的区别不是绝对的, 从而对传统的本质主义提出挑战。达尔文主义通过按照自然演化链来确定物种的地位, 剥夺了人类据说的对其他物种的优越性。达尔文理论的这些主要特征, 引发了许多旷日持久的争论, 并且极大地改变了我们的世界观。通过社会达尔文主义, 把适者生存的概念引来说明人类社会的成问题的尝试, 也产生了种种伦理和社会的争论。达尔文本人并没有关于遗传本性及其变化的适当理论, 这个空

world. The questionable attempt to introduce the notion of the survival of the fittest into an account of human society through Social Darwinism has generated various ethical and social controversies. Darwin himself did not have an adequate theory about the nature of heredity and genetic change, and this gap has been filled by the modern science of genetics. Contemporary evolutionary theory is a Neo-Darwinian synthesis of the theory of natural selection and genetic theory.

"The one criterion for Darwinism is the abstract success or prevalence of whatever happens to prevail, without any regard for its character." —Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, 1914, p. 323.

Dasein

[German: being-there] A crucial term for Heidegger, but it is generally left untranslated. In traditional German philosophy, *Dasein* is broadly every kind of being or existence and narrowly the kind of being that belongs to persons. Heidegger uses the term solely for the modes of human being. Human being must have a place *there* in the world and must be considered as Being-in-the-world. This Being is a human structure rather than the being of this or that particular man (*der Mensch*). Heidegger claimed that the meaning of Being is the subject-matter of philosophy. *Dasein* is the only kind of Being that can raise the question about Being and wonder about itself as existing. By making the understanding of Being possible, it is ontologically distinctive. Rather than being an object of some sort, *Dasein* is defined as Being-in-the-world. By being viewed as a life-story unfolding between birth and death, it is associated with the conception of "historicity" or "temporality". For Heidegger, any inquiry about Being must start with the investigation of *Dasein*. The analysis of *Dasein* is the inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of understanding Being in general. Instead of being an epistemological study that is concerned with our way of knowing Being, the study is an ontological investigation into what Being is. The study of *Dasein*, which is the theme of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, constitutes a necessary preliminary to the question of Being in general. The book begins with an examination of the static or formal structure of *Dasein*, and then discusses its temporal structures. To describe ourselves as *Dasein* is sharply distinct from the Cartesian view of human beings as an external combination of mind as an isolated subject and body.

"This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term '*Dasein*.' " —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 27.

Data

[plural of Latin *datum*, given] The materials or information from which any inquiry or inference begins. Data are

白是由现代遗传学填补的。当代的进化理论是自然选择观点和遗传理论的综合,称作“新达尔文主义”。

“达尔文主义的一个标准是抽象的成功,或无论什么偶然盛行的东西的流行,而毫不顾及其特征。”——布拉德雷:《真理和实在论文集》,1914年,第323页。

缘在〔或译“此在”〕

[德文,意为 being-there] 海德格尔使用的一个关键词,但通常存而不译。在传统的德国哲学中, *Dasein* 从广义上讲是每一种存在 (being or existence), 从狭义上讲则是属于人的那样一种存在。海德格尔只用这个词来表示人类的〔存在〕方式。人类必在这个世界中有它的处所: 缘 (*there*); 并且必被视为“在此世界中存在” (Being-in-the-world)。这样一种存在 (Being) 是一个人类的〔生存〕结构, 而不是这个或那个特殊个人 (*der Mensch*) 的现成存在 (being)。海德格尔认为存在的意义是哲学的主题。缘在 (*Dasein*) 是能够对存在发问, 并对生存着的自身感到惊异的惟一存在。它从存在论或本体论角度讲是特异的, 因为它使得对于存在的理解成为可能。缘在不是任何意义上的对象, 而是被定义为在此世界中存在。由于被视为生死之间展开的生命历程或故事, 它与“时间性”和“历史性”紧密相关。对于海德格尔, 任何对于存在的探讨都必须以研究缘在开始。对缘在的分析就是探讨理解存在本身的可能性的条件。它不是有关我们认知存在方式的认识论研究, 而是对于存在意义所做的存在论调查。对于缘在的研究是海德格尔《存在与时间》的主题, 是解决存在本身问题的必要准备。此书以对缘在的形式结构的研究开始, 然后讨论它的时间结构。视人为缘在的看法与笛卡尔对于人的看法完全不同, 后者将人视为孤立主体之心灵和身体的外在结合。

“这样一种我们自身总是〔它〕的存在者, 这样一种在其他〔的存在可能性〕之外具有发问的存在可能性的存在者, 我们就用‘缘在’ (*Dasein*) 这个术语来表达。”——海德格尔: 《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年, 第27页。

予料

[拉丁文 *datum* 的复数, 意为“所予”] 任何研究或推断由之开始的材料或信息。予料是

the beliefs which need no further reason and which are the indispensable minimum of premises for our knowledge of world. The data have different degrees of certainty and can be further divided into hard data and soft data. The former are the beliefs which are certain, self-evident and are believed on their own account, and the latter are the beliefs which are found upon examination not to have this status but which are inferred from other beliefs. Russell always uses "data" and "hard data" as synonymous. This distinction also corresponds to another of Russell's distinctions between primitive knowledge and derivative knowledge.

"I give the name 'data' or rather 'hard-data' to all that survives the most severe critical scrutiny of which I am capable, excluding what, after the scrutiny, is only arrived at by argument and inference." — Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 79.

De dicto

[Latin: about a proposition.] The distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* (about a thing) propositions gained currency with St. Thomas Aquinas. *De dicto* propositions predicate certain terms of a subject-predicate proposition as a whole, thus forming a second-order statement. *De re* propositions predicate certain terms of a subject. This distinction has a wide application, but is particularly important in the analysis of modal propositions, that is propositions concerning necessity and possibility. *De dicto* modality concerns the ascription of "necessary" or "possible" to a proposition, for example "it is possible that Socrates is running". *De re* modality concerns the ascription of these modal terms to a subject or object, such as "Socrates is possibly running". A *de dicto* interpretation and a *de re* interpretation will result in different truth values for a proposition. Controversy over the distinction has revived with the renewal of interest in modal logic and essentialism.

"These terms are often explained by saying that in a modality *de dicto* necessity (or possibility) is attributed to a proposition (or *dictum*), but that in a modality *de re* it is attributed to the possession of a property by a thing (*res*). " — Hughes and Cresswell, *An Introduction to Modal Logic*, 1968, p. 183.

De dicto belief, another term for belief *de dicto*

De Morgan rule

A valid rule of inference for conjunction and disjunction which shows how we can move negation signs inside and outside of parentheses. It states that we can proceed from the negation of a conjunctive proposition to the disjunction of the negations of its parts, and conversely that we can proceed from the negation of a disjunctive proposition to the conjunc-

这样的信念,它们不需要进一步的理由,它们是我们关于世界的知识必不可少、最低限度的前提。予料的确实程度不同,可以进一步分为“硬予料”和“软予料”。前者是确实的、自明的信念,靠它们自身就为人们相信,后者是这样的信念,经过考察后发现它们不具有上述性质,而是从其他信念中推导出来的。罗素一直把“予料”和“硬予料”作为同义词使用。这一区别也对应于罗素在“基本知识”和“派生知识”之间作出的另一区别。

“我所谓的‘予料’,或是‘硬予料’,是指一切这样的东西,它们经受住了我所能进行的最严格的批判性考察,而不包括在考察之后凭借论证和推理才得到的东西。”——罗素:《我们关于外部世界的知识》,1926年,第70页。

从言的

[拉丁语:关于命题的]“从言”命题和“从物”(de re,拉丁语,关于事物的)命题的区分,由于T.阿奎那的工作而获得流行。从言命题用某些词项对作为一个整体的主谓式命题作出断言,从而形成一个二阶陈述。从物命题则用某些词项对主词作出断言。这一区分有广泛的应用,但在关于模态命题(有关必然性和可能性的命题)的分析中特别重要。从言模态与把“必然地”或“可能的”归属于一命题有关,例如“苏格拉底在跑是可能的”。从物模态与把这些模态术语归属于一主词或对象有关,例如“苏格拉底可能在跑”。从言解释和从物解释对于同一命题将导致不同的真值。随着对模态逻辑和本质主义兴趣的复苏,有关这一区分的争论也再次流行起来。

“这些术语经常被这样解释:在从言模态中,必然性(或可能性)被归属于一命题(或 *dictum*),但在从物模态中,它被归属于一事物(*res*)所具有的性质。”——休斯和克雷斯威尔:《模态逻辑引论》,1968年,第183页。

关于命题的信念

“命题信念”的另一表达。

德摩根规则

对合取命题和析取命题的一种有效的推理规则,它表明我们如何能够从圆括弧内外移动否定记号。它规定,我们可以从一个合取命题的否定形式推进到否定其各部分的析取命题,相反,我们也可以从一个析取命题的否定形式推进到否定其各部分的合取命题,反之亦然。用符

tion of the negations of its parts, and conversely. To symbolise, $\sim (P \wedge Q)$ (not both P and Q) $= \sim P \vee \sim Q$ (either not P or not Q); and $\sim (P \vee Q)$ (not either P or Q) $= \sim P \wedge \sim Q$ (not P and not Q). We must notice that “not both” is not equivalent to “both... not”, and that “not either” is not equivalent to “either... not”. The rule is named after the nineteenth century logician Augustus De Morgan, but it occurred earlier in Ockham's work.

“De Morgan rule... may be summarised as follows: when moving a negation sign inside or outside a set of parentheses, ‘and’ switches to ‘or’, and conversely.” Hurley, *Logic*, 1982, p. 268.

De re, see de dicto

De re belief, another expression for belief *de re*

De se belief

[from Latin: *de*, of | *se*, self] First-person belief involving a form of self-attribution in which we recognise properties as belonging to ourselves independent of the grounds on which we ascribe properties to external things or persons, such as under descriptions or through perception. The existence of this kind of belief has raised philosophical questions about the analysis of what is believed and about our knowledge of what is ascribed to ourselves in this way. It contrasts with *de re* belief, which is about external particulars and about myself when seen as an external object.

“Perceptual beliefs of a certain sort—what philosophers call *de se* belief (e. g. that is moving)—are often silent about what it is they represent, about what topic it is on which they comment, about their reference.” —Dretske, *Explaining Behaviour*, 1988, p. 73.

Death

Death is the final cessation of life. Murder, suicide, euthanasia and capital punishment and war all raise complicated moral questions about death. Questions in medical ethics arise because different criteria of death can come into conflict. In addition, there are moral questions concerning the death of animals. The unnatural and unwilled death of an innocent person is regarded as a harm because it deprives that person of future experiences. But it is difficult to determine whether some other deaths are straightforward harms, harms outweighed by additional concerns or not harms at all. One can consider, for example, self-chosen death, natural death or death legally imposed as punishment for certain major crimes, such as murder.

It is possible to ask when the harm of death takes place. Before death, the person is not yet dead, although he is ca-

号来表示, 即 $\sim (P \wedge Q)$ (非 P 和 Q) $= \sim P \vee \sim Q$ (非 P 或非 Q); $\sim (P \vee Q)$ (非或 P 或 Q) $= \sim P \wedge \sim Q$ (非 P 和非 Q)。我们必须注意的是, “非两者” 并不等同于 “两者皆非”, 而 “非其中一者” 也并不等同于 “其中一者非”。这个规则是以 19 世纪的逻辑学家 A. 德摩根的名字命名的, 但它最早出现在奥康的著作中。

“德摩根规则..... 可以概括如下: 当把否定记号移到一套圆括弧之内或之外时, ‘和’ 就变为 ‘或’, 反之亦然。” —— 赫尔利: 《逻辑》, 1982 年, 第 268 页。

从物的

见 “从言的” 条。

客体信念

“客体信念 (belief *de re*)” 的另一表达。

关于自我的信念

[源自拉丁文 *de* (关于) 及 *se* (自我)] 涉及一种自我归属形式的第一人称信念。在这种信念中, 我们将某些特性看作是自己的特性, 这不依赖于我们将特性归结于外部事物或人时所依据的任何基础, 诸如依据描述或通过知觉。这种信念的存在对所相信的东西的分析, 以及关于我们对以这种方式归属于我们自己的知识提出了许多哲学问题。它与客体信念形成对照, 后者是关于外部的东西和被视作外部客体的自我的。

“某种知觉信念——哲学家称之为关于自我的信念 (例如, 这在移动)——通常完全没有表明它们所表征的是什么、它们所评论的是什么话题以及它们所指称的是什么。” ——德雷斯克: 《解释行为》, 1988 年, 第 73 页。

死亡

死亡是生命的最终停止。谋杀、自杀、安乐死、死刑和战争都引出关于死亡的复杂的伦理问题。医学伦理学的问题也由于死亡标准的不同和相互冲突而出现。还有关于动物死亡的伦理问题。一个无罪之人的非自然的和非自愿的死亡被看作是一种损害, 因为它剥夺了那个人的未来经验。但是, 要决定其他的死亡是真正的损害、可被另外的考虑抵消掉的损害, 还是根本无损害, 就是困难的了。请考虑以下这些例子: 自己选择的死亡、自然死亡或法律上作为对于重罪 (比如谋杀) 的惩罚而造成的死亡。

可以问这样一个问题: 死亡的损害从何时开始? 在死亡之前, 这人还未死, 但他能够从对死亡的预期中感受痛苦。在死亡之后, 此人已死了, 也就不能感受痛苦了。仅限于死亡瞬间的损

pable of suffering from the anticipation of death. After death, the person is already dead and cannot suffer. Harm restricted to the moment of death would lack the weight that we normally ascribe to the harm of death.

The experience of death has been a chief concern for existentialism. In Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*, death reveals the terrible temporality of our existence. In this revelation, he claimed, we find the ground of our authentic existence. Everyone dies his or her own death. As an experience entirely of one's own, death cannot be shared. This experience makes one focus on one's finitude, on one's uniqueness and on one's determinate self. The analysis of death is not only the ground of authenticity and freedom, but also the ground for the totality of *Dasein*. A total perspective of *Dasein* can only be reached when one is dead. This complete account is not possible until my death actually takes place. But we may provide an account of the required sort from the first-person standpoint by being aware that "I am going to die". Death is hence characterised as Being-towards-the-end. This Being is the way one comports oneself in pondering when and how this possibility of death may be actualised. It has been widely proposed that the finitude imposed by death is part of what gives life meaning and that an immortal life is morally meaningless.

"Death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped." -Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 294.

Death instinct

The biological basis of Freud's psychoanalysis postulates that in mental life there are two classes of instinct which correspond to the contrary processes of dissolution and construction in the organism. These two classes of instinct are the death instinct and the life instinct. He also expresses this contrast as the contrast between *thanatos* (Greek: death) and *eros* (Greek: love), a pair of notions that can be traced to the cosmology of Empedocles. The life instinct, or *eros*, establishes order and prolongs one's life. The death instinct, which is also called the destructive impulse, ego-instinct or even the aggressive instinct, is an impulse to destroy order and to return to a pre-organic state. According to Freud, these two kinds of instinct are present in living beings in regular mixtures, and life consists in the manifestation of the conflict or interaction between them. For the individual, reproduction represents the victory of the life instinct, while death is the victory of the death instinct. Their conflict and interaction also dynamically promote the development of culture. The idea of the death instinct is influenced by Schopenhauer's idea that the goal of life is death. There are problems with both life and death instincts. Although the life instinct could be explained in Darwinian terms, it is more dif-

害缺少我们平日归为死亡损害的那种分量。

死亡体验一直是存在主义的一个主要关注点。在海德格尔对于缘在 (*Dasein*) 的分析中, 死亡透露出我们生存中可畏惧的时间性。他认为在此透露里边, 我们发现了我们真正切己的生存基础。每个人死于他或她自己的死。作为一种完全属于自己的体验, 死亡是不能分享的。这种体验使人集中于自己的有限性、惟一性和限定自我。对死亡的分析不仅是真正切己性和自由的基础, 而且是缘在的整体性的基础。对于缘在的完整视野, 只有当此人死亡时才能达到。除非我的死亡实际发生了, 这样一个(现成意义上的)完全说明是不可能的。但我们通过“我正在走向死亡”的意识从第一人称的立场来给出所需要的那种说明。因此, 死亡被视为“朝向终端的存在”。这种存在乃是一个人去思索这种死亡的方式, 即思索死亡的可能性何时以及如何被实现的方式。这里被经常提出的一个要点是: 死亡造成的有限性是生活意义源泉的一部分, 一个永恒的生活或生命从伦理学上讲是无意义的。

“死亡将自己揭示为一个最切己的可能性。这种可能性是非关系的和不会被超过的。”——海德格尔,《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年, 第294页。

死亡本能

弗洛伊德心理分析的生物学基础包含这样的设定: 在心灵生活中有两类本能, 相应于有机体中的消解和建构这样两个对立的过程。这两类本能是死亡本能和生命本能。他也将这种对立表达为 *thanatos* (希腊文, 意为死亡) 和 *eros* (希腊文, 意为“爱”(又音译为“厄罗斯”)) 之间的对立; 这对观念可以一直追溯到恩培多克勒的宇宙论。生命本能或厄罗斯建造起秩序并延续人的生命。死亡本能又被称为毁坏冲动、自我本能 (ego-instinct) 或侵犯本能; 这是一种要摧毁秩序、回到前生命状态的冲动。按照弗洛伊德的主张, 这两种本能在生命体中有规则地混合存在着; 生命或生活就在于表现出它们的争斗和互动。对个体而言, 生殖就代表着生命本能的胜利, 而死亡则是死亡本能的凯旋。它们的争斗和互动也驱动着文化的发展。这死亡本能的观念受到叔本华“生命目标在于死”这一思想的影响。(弗洛伊德) 对这两种本能的看法都有问题。虽然生命本能能够以达尔文的术语来解释, 但如何以进化过程中的自然选择来解释死亡本能就要困难得多了。

“有这样一组本能, 它们沉默地运作着, 目

ficult to see how the death instinct could be explained by natural selection within the process of evolution.

"The one set of instincts, which work essentially in silence, would be those which follow the aim of leading the living creature to death and therefore deserve to be called the 'death instincts'; those would be directed outwards as the result of the combinations of numbers of unicellular elementary organisms, and would manifest themselves as destructive or aggressive impulses." —Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 258.

Death of art

Also called end of art. On the basis of Hegel's theory, the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto believes that art has an ultimate goal of self-realisation through self-comprehension. He argues that because twentieth century art has fulfilled this goal and has realised its destiny, the history of art has come to an end. In art, there is no longer a distinction between subject and object. Knowledge becomes its own object. Rather than seeking to understand the external world directly, art depends more and more on theory for its existence. Things which are hardly works of art can now become artworks by means of an atmosphere of theory in an artworld. The quest for itself transforms the character of the object. Questions about what art is and what art means seem to have been answered. The traditional boundaries between art forms are no longer stable. In this situation, art is alienated more and more from the public and becomes philosophy. Artistic activities lose direction. Certainly, we continue to produce artworks, but they now miss the historical importance that art once possessed. We make works of art only by habit. Danto calls contemporary art "post-historical art". Danto has been criticised for basing the alleged death of art on a very narrow notion of art. Critics argue that because art meets the demands of human nature, so long as human nature does not come to the end, art will continue its history.

"It supposes that its own philosophy is what art aims at, so that art fulfils its destiny by becoming philosophy at last. Of course art does a great deal more or less than this, which makes the death of art an overstatement. That ours is a post-historical art, however, is a recognition deepened with each succeeding season." —Danto, *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, 1986, p. 81.

Death penalty, an alternative name for capital punishment

Decidability

A theory (system or set) is decidable if there is an algorithm for determining whether an arbitrary well-formed for-

的在于引导生命体到达死亡,因此应被称作‘死亡本能’。作为许多单细胞的原生生物体的结合的结果,那些死亡本能被导向外部,作为毁坏冲动或侵犯冲动而表现自身于世界之中。”——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第18卷,第258页。

艺术的消亡

亦称“艺术的终结”。基于黑格尔的学说,美国哲学家丹托认为艺术是通过自我理解而达到自我实现的终极目标。他论证说,由于20世纪的艺术已经实现了这一目标并且走到了尽头,因此艺术史已告终结。在艺术里,主客体之分已经不复存在。知识成为自身的对象。与其说艺术想要直接理解外在的世界,还不如说艺术越来越多地取决于有关艺术自身存在的学说。凭借“艺术世界”中的理论氛围,几乎算不上是艺术作品的东西,现在反倒可以成为艺术品。探索本身使得对象的特征发生了转化。关于何为艺术与艺术有何意义的问题似乎已经得到了回答。艺术形式之间的传统界限不再是一成不变的了。在此情况下,艺术与公众日益疏离,结果成为哲学。艺术活动失去了方向。当然,人们依旧生产艺术作品,但是现在这些作品缺乏艺术曾经具有的那种历史意义。人们只是根据习惯在制作艺术品。丹托称当代艺术为“后历史艺术”。由于丹托把艺术消亡的说法建立在非常狭义的艺术观念之上,因此一直遭到批评。批评家们争辩说,由于艺术要满足人性的需要,因此,只要人性没有终结,那么艺术将会继续不断地沿革。

“假定艺术旨在形成自己的哲学,那么,艺术最终就会以哲学而终结。不消说,艺术的作为或多或少地不同于此,这便使得艺术消亡的说法成了一种夸大之词。尽管如此,我们当前的艺术是一种后历史艺术,这一认识会随着时间的推移而不断得到深化。”——丹托:《哲学对艺术的剥夺》,1986年,第81页。

死刑

“死刑 (capital punishment)” 的另一种名称。

可判定性

一个理论(系统或集合)是可判定的,如果存在一种算法,能确定任意一个合式公式是否

mula is or is not a theorem of the theory. If the solution is positive, there is a decision procedure which enables one to determine this mechanically by following a rule within a finite number of steps. The truth-table is a decision procedure for propositional calculus. Gödel's theorem proved that in any axiomatic system there are well-formed formulae which are not decidable within the system itself.

"A set of sentences G is decidable just in case there is a decision procedure—an effective finitary method—for determining any sentence in the language whether or not it is in G ." —Chellas, *Modal Logic*, 1980, p. 32.

Decision

[Greek: *prohairesis*, decision, from *pro*, before in the sense of temporal and preferential priority + *hairesis*, choosing] In Aristotle's ethics, the origin of action. His theory of decision is viewed as a predecessor of the modern theory of will. Choice may be based on emotion and appetite, while *prohairesis* is rational choice. Decision is a mental act which combines both thinking and desiring and comprises both a rational desire for some good as an end in itself and deliberation about how to achieve the end. It is an impulse following upon a judgement reached by deliberation. Action or decision can be the outcome of practical reason in deliberation.

"For it is our decision to do what is good and bad, not our beliefs that make the characters we have." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1112a3-4.

Decision procedure

A mechanistic procedure for determining whether an arbitrary well formed formula is a theorem of a given formal system or theory by following a rule within a finite number of steps or a procedure to determine its semantic validity. A decision procedure determines whether a well-formed formula is true under any interpretation. A decision procedure is an algorithm. For instance, the truth-table is a decision procedure for propositional calculus. A proof that such a procedure exists for a theory provides a positive solution to the decision problem for that theory. Otherwise, there is a negative solution. A decision procedure is also a way of finding whether a concept can be applied in any given case. A concept connected with such a procedure is called definite and is regarded as meaningful.

"A procedure of decision for a class of sentences is an effective procedure either, in semantics, for determining for any sentence of that class whether it is true or not ... or, in syntax, for determining for any sentence of that class whether it is provable in a given calculus." —Carnap, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, 1950, p. 503.

为这个理论的一条定理的话。如果解答是肯定的,则存在一个“判定程序”,它使人们能按一个规则在有限数目步骤内机械地确定这点。“真值表”就是“命题演算”的判定程序。“哥德尔定理”表明,在任何公理化系统中,有一些公式是在系统自身内无法判定的。

“一组命题 G 是可判定的,仅当存在一个判定程序——一个能行有限方法——以确定这语言中的任何命题是否在 G 之中。”——切勒斯:《模态逻辑》,1980年,第32页。

决定

[源自希腊词, *prohairesis* (决定), 该词出自 *pro* (时间上和意愿上的在先性) 和 *hairesis* (选择)] 在亚里士多德伦理学中,它指行为的起源。他的决定理论被看作是现代意志理论的先驱。选择可能是基于情感和欲望的,而 *prohairesis* 则是理性的选择。决定作为一种心智行为结合了思维及欲求两者;它既包括把某种善作为目的自身的理性愿望,也包括关于如何达到这种目的的考虑。它是由通过考虑而达到的判断所产生的冲动。行为或决定可以是实践理性深思熟虑的结果。

“形成我们品格的是我们作好事还是作坏事的决定,而不是我们的信念。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1112a3—4。

判定程序

一种通过在有限数目步骤内,按一种规则以确定任意合式公式是否为—给定形式系统或理论的定理的机械程序,或是一种确定其语义正确性的程序。—判定程度确定—合式公式是否在任何解释下为真。判定程序是一种算法。例如“真值表”是用于“命题演算”的判定程序。对一个理论如果已证明存在这种程序,则提供了这理论的判定问题的肯定解。否则,则存在否定解。判定程序也是一种决定一个概念是否能应用于任何给定情形的方式。与这种程序相联系的概念称为确定的,并被看作是有意义的。

“判定程序对于一类语句而言是一种能行程序,或者在语义上确定此类中任意句子是否为真……或者在句法上确定此类中任意句子在给定演算中是否可证。”——卡尔纳普:《概率的逻辑基础》,1950年,第503页。

Decision theory

The mathematically-oriented theory of rational choice or decision-making which aims to make clear what is the best thing to do in a given situation. There are many situations in which an agent is faced with a set of alternatives which have various degrees of risk and various probabilities of possible outcomes being realised. Sometimes the agent has only limited knowledge of the consequences of possible actions. Decision theory helps an agent confronted with such a situation to decide the most rational way to act given the relevant available information. The common approaches include assigning probability to the outcomes of each possible action and then either to choose the action with the maximum expected utility or to choose the action which is least bad compared with other alternatives. Decision theory is philosophically interesting, because it is closely associated with notions such as preference, choice and deliberation and is hence widely applicable in moral and political theory. Game theory is one part of decision theory, for while decision theory must take into account all factors involved, including natural and blind chance, game theory only involves interactions with the choices of other rational agents.

"Decision theory as an empirical theory holds that there is some specification of alternative actions, outcomes, and beliefs about these and their probabilities, and preferences among these, such that the person acts so as (for example) to maximise expected utility."—Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 653.

Deconstruction

A term introduced by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida and characteristic of his thought. He believes that preceding Western metaphysical systems were established on the basis of fundamental conceptual oppositions, such as speech/writing, soul/body, transcendent/empirical, nature/culture and good/evil. For each conceptual pair, one term was allegedly superior to the other. Deconstruction is a philosophical practice that aims to remove our thinking from the domination of these opposites by asking how they are possible. It is an analysis or critique of the meaning of linguistic expressions by attending to their use or to the role that they play in human activities. Derrida begins by demonstrating that the supposedly inferior concept within each pair has the same defining characteristics as the allegedly superior one and that there are no grounds for giving priority to one over the other. He then displaces the opposition by introducing an overarching concept which avoids having the fixity or determinateness that a concept normally possesses. To a limited extent, deconstruction is similar to Hegel's procedure of following the dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, although Derrida repeatedly emphasises that deconstruction is not a scientific procedure. The term can be traced to

决策理论

合理性选择或制定决策的具有数学特性的理论,这种选择或决策的目的在于弄清在既定的情形下做什么样的事是最好的事。在许多情形中,行为者面临一组选择,它们有着不同程度的危险和可能出现各种结果的概率。有时,行为者对于可能行为的后果只有有限的知识。决策论帮助行为者去处理这样的局势,根据所获得的有关信息,去决定最合理的行动方式。一般方法包括确定每一可能行为的后果,然后或是选择有着最大预期功利的行为,或是选择与其他可选择行为相比的最不坏的行为。决策论有着哲学的意义,因为它与诸如偏好、选择、审慎等概念密切相关,因此可广泛运用于道德和政治理论。游戏理论是决策论的一部分,因为决策论必须说明所包括的一切因素,包括自然的和育目的的机会,而游戏理论仅仅涉及到与其他理性行为者的选择的相互作用。

“决策理论作为一种经验理论认为,对于可选择的行为、结果和对这些以及它们可能的信念和诸因素中行为者的偏好,可以作出某种阐明,(例如)为了最大化可期望的功利,人们应如此行动。”——诺齐克:《哲学解释》,1981年,第653页。

解构

由法国哲学家J. 德里达引入的一个术语,并以此而表现出他的思想特点。他相信以前的西方各种形而上学系统建基于这样一些根本对立的概念上,比如,说话/书写、灵魂/身体、超验/经验、自然/文化以及善/恶。在每一对概念里,总有一个术语被认定高于另一个术语。解构就是这样一种哲学实践,其目的在于通过追问这些对立如何可能,从而解除它们对我们思想的主宰。这是一种通过关注语言表达式的使用或在人类行为中扮演的角色,来对语言表达式的意义所做的分析或检讨。德里达一开始就要表明,在每对概念中被认为是低级的概念与那所谓高级者相比,具有同样决定性的特征,厚彼薄此毫无道理。于是他引入了一个两边拱合的概念来代替这种对立,这种概念避免了一个概念通常具有的那种固定性或确定性。在有限的程度上,解构类似于黑格尔讲的正、反、合的辩证程序,尽管德里达一再强调解构不是一个科学程序。这个词可以溯源到胡塞尔的“消减”(Abbau) [英文,拆除] 和海德格尔讲的对于存在论历史的“摧毁”(destruction, 除去其现成结构)。有些评论家将这解构相比于康德对理性

Husserl's *Abbau* [English: dismantling] and Heidegger's deconstruction of the history of ontology. Some commentators compare deconstruction to Kant's critique of reason. Both Kant and Derrida are concerned with the possibility of metaphysics and the possibility of objectivity discoverable by reason. Deconstruction is not purely negative, but seeks to attain the ultimate foundation of concepts. In addition to its influence in philosophy, deconstruction has had a great impact on literary criticism.

"All sentences of the type 'deconstruction is x' or 'deconstruction is not x', a priori, miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts 'deconstruction', is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the third-person present indicative, 'S is P'." — Derrida, in Wood, ed., *Derrida and Difference*, p. 3.

Deduction

[from Latin: *de*, away, from — *ducere*, lead, draw)] An inference which proceeds from a more general to the less general, or from the necessary to the contingent. It contrasts with induction, which is an inference proceeding from the particular or less general to the more general. A conclusion derived deductively is the logical consequence of the premises; hence deduction is also a process of making explicit the logical implications of general statements. A deduction is valid if it is impossible that all the premises are true while the conclusion is false. Deductive logic reveals the inferential relationship of entailment existing between premises and conclusions and codifies the rules of deduction. A deductive system which has been viewed as the paradigm of scientific knowledge is one in which all other rules can be deduced from a small set of axioms or theorems. In jurisprudence deduction means the establishing of a legal rather than factual ground for an action. It is this meaning that Kant borrows in his transcendental deduction.

"In deduction, a proposition is proved to hold concerning every member of a class, and may then be asserted of a particular member" — Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 1937, p. 522.

Deduction (Kant)

Deduction is normally used in a logical or geometrical sense for the derivation of a conclusion from premises, but Kant adopted a different use from the practice of jurists. The law distinguishes between the question of right (*quid juris*) and the question of fact (*quid facti*). Both these questions need to be proved. While questions of fact are proved through experience, the proof of questions of right is called deduction. In this sense, a deduction is a proof of the legitimacy of something. In his critical philosophy, Kant set out various *a priori* intuitions and concepts, but argued that he

的批判。康德和德里达都关心形而上学的可能性和由理性发现的客观性的可能性。解构不是纯否定,它的目的是找出概念的最终基础。除了它在哲学中引起的关注,解构对于文学批评已发挥了极大影响。

“所有类似‘解构是x’或‘解构不是x’的句子先天地就不得要领,也就是说这些句子起码是不对的。正如你们所知,我文章中称为‘解构’者的要点之一就正是对于存在论的解限,特别是对于第三人称直陈现在时‘S是P’的解限。”——德里达,载伍德(编辑):《德里达与区别》,第3页。

演绎

[源自拉丁文:*de*(远离,从……出发)和*ducere*(导至,引出)]从较为一般命题推到较不一般命题,或从必然命题推到偶然命题的推理。它与归纳形成对照,后者是从特殊的或较不一般的命题推到较为一般命题的推理。演绎得出的结论是前提的逻辑后承,所以演绎也是一个明确揭示一般陈述的逻辑蕴涵的过程。一演绎是有效的,如果其前提真而结论假这种情况是不可能的。演绎逻辑揭示了存在于前提和结论之间的衍推型推理关系,并编制出演绎规则。演绎系统已被看做是科学知识的典范,在它里面从一小组公理或定理能够演绎出所有其他的规则。在司法审判中,演绎意味着确立一个行为的法律根据而不是事实根据。康德在他的先验演绎中,正是借用了演绎的此种意义。

“在演绎中,一个命题被证明对于一个类的每一成员都成立,于是可以断定它对于该类的一特殊成员也成立。”——罗素:《数学原则》,1937年,第522页。

演绎(康德)

“演绎”一词一般在逻辑或几何学的意义上使用,意为从前提推出结论。康德采用了来自法学家们的实践的不同用法。法学家们把权利问题(*quid juris*)和事实问题(*quid facti*)区分开来。这两个问题都需要被证明。对事实问题的证明是经验,而对权利问题的证明则称为演绎,意为对某种事情的合法性的证明。康德在其批判哲学中提出了各种先天直观和概念,但认为他需要证明它们的合法性和解释它们如何可有效地应用于对象。这个步骤他称为演绎。他进一

needed to provide justification and explanation of how they can be validly applied to objects. This procedure is what he called deduction. He further distinguished three types of deduction: metaphysical deduction, which is the argument that derives the categories from the twelve forms of judgement; empirical deduction, which shows the legitimacy of applying an empirical concept in terms of our experience of empirical objects; and transcendental deduction, which is carried out by a transcendental argument. The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

"Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A85.

Deductive logic

Deductive logic analyses the logical concepts related to deduction and classifies propositions in terms of their logical forms. It seeks to formulate logic explicitly by analysing the logical forms of arguments and the relationship of valid entailment in deductive argument in order to reveal the forms of argument in which the conclusion is necessarily inferred from the premises. A proposition which implies a false conclusion cannot be true. An argument is valid if premises and the negation of the conclusion involve a self-contradiction.

"The task of deductive logic is often defined as the explicit formulation of the implicitly recognised rules of deductive inference." — Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 188.

Deductive-nomological model

A theory of explanation developed by Hempel. On this model, an event is explained by logically deducing the sentence describing it from a law-like generalisation and a statement of certain initial conditions. The law-like generalisations are called nomological generalisations or covering laws. This model of explanation, abbreviated as the D-N model, can also apply to the covering laws themselves. A covering law can be explained by deducing it from a higher order covering law or body of laws. The D-N model is a sub-model of the covering law model, with the inductive-statistical model considered to be another sub-model. Because it is the variant of greatest importance and most frequent employment, the deductive-nomological model is often taken as synonymous with the covering law model.

"The general conception of explanation by deductive subsumption under general laws or theoretical principles... will be called the deductive nomological model, or the D-N model of explanation." — Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, 1965, p. 345.

步区分了三类演绎：形而上学演绎，即把范畴从判断的十二种形式推导出来的论证；经验演绎，它表明了依据我们对经验对象的经验来应用一个经验概念的合法性；先验演绎，它通过先验论证来进行。先验演绎是《纯粹理性批判》的中心论证。

“在构成高度复杂的人类知识之网的杂多概念中，有一些概念被选作纯先天的使用，完全独立于一切经验；它们如此应用的权利总是需要演绎。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A85。

演绎逻辑

演绎逻辑分析那些与演绎相关的逻辑概念，并根据命题的逻辑形式来给命题分类。它试图通过分析论证的逻辑形式和演绎论证中的有效衍推关系明确地用公式构造逻辑，从而揭示从前提必然推出结论的论证形式。一个蕴涵假结论的命题不可能是真的。一个论证是有效的，如果它的前提和结论的否定包含自相矛盾。

“演绎逻辑的任务经常被定义为明确表述演绎推理那只被隐含地认可的规则。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949年，第188页。

演绎—规律模型

一种由亨佩尔所发展的说明理论。按此模型，一个事件通过从一似定律的概括和关于某些初始条件的陈述中逻辑演绎出描述这事件的语句而得以说明。似定律概括称为规律概括或“覆盖律”。这个说明模型经常被缩写为“D-N模型”。它也适用于覆盖律本身。一个覆盖律可通过由更高阶的一个或一组覆盖律中演绎出而得以说明。说明的D-N模型是“覆盖律模型”的子模型，而归纳—统计模型是另一个子模型。但由于它是最重要的和最常用的模型，演绎—规律模型常被用作覆盖律模型的同义词。

“通常的通过一般定律或理论原理来演绎归类的说明概念，将被称作演绎—规律模型，或说明的D-N模型。”——亨佩尔：《科学解释的若干方面》，1965年，第345页。

Deep structure

The distinction between deep structure and surface structure is one of most influential and significant features of Chomsky's theory of language. Deep structure is actually the abstract features of grammatical structure. It has some affinity with the logical structure of sentences and is closely associated with meaning. For Chomsky, deep and surface structure do not distinguish between profound and superficial linguistic features, but between what is abstract and what is concrete in language. Surface structure is present in the sensory or observational characterisation of an utterance and is closely associated with the phonetic structure of the spoken language. This structure, according to Chomsky, cannot reveal the ambiguity of a sentence. In some cases two sentences may mean the same but differ in their surface structures; in other cases two sentences may have the same surface structure but differ in their syntax. Since surface structure is a poor guide to the meaning of a sentence, we need to postulate the existence of deep structure, that is the underlying abstract structure that determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence. Deep structure does not cause surface structure. They are generally distinct, but in some cases they may coincide. However, Chomsky does not say how we can detect or identify deep structure. There has been much debate about this notion amongst linguists. Historically this distinction can be traced to von Humboldt's notions of inner form and outer form, and Wittgenstein's distinction of surface grammar and deep grammar in his *Philosophical Investigations*, although the latter distinction is only concerned with the use of a word.

"The syntactic component of a grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic interpretation. The first of these is interpreted by the semantic component; the second by the phonological component." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 136.

Defeasibility

A term for the liability of certain legal or moral principles and rules to be overridden in appropriate circumstances. In the face of the Gettier problem, which challenges the traditional definition that knowledge as justified true belief, a defeasibility theory of knowledge has also developed. This theory maintains that for a belief to count as knowledge, it is necessary, but not sufficient for it to be true and justified. Because a currently justified belief might be defeated in the face of new evidence, the belief is defeasible, and its justification is merely *prima facie* justification. New evidence which overcomes justified belief can be called a defeater. It renders doubtful the connection between the belief and the

深层结构

深层结构与表层结构的区分,是乔姆斯基语言理论中最有影响和最重要的观点之一。深层结构实际上是语法结构的抽象特征。它与句子的逻辑结构有某些相似之处,并与意义有着密切联系。在乔姆斯基那里,深层与表层结构并没有区分“深刻的”与“肤浅的”语言特征,而是区分语言中的抽象之物与具体之物。表层结构是话语展现出来的可感觉的或可观察的特征,它与口语的语音结构有着密切的关系。根据乔姆斯基的观点,这种结构无法揭示句子的模糊性。在某些情形中,两个句子可以意义相同,但表层结构不同;在其他情形中,两个句子可以有相同的表层结构,但却有着不同的句法。由于表层结构难以导向句子的意义,因而我们必需假设存在深层结构,即作为基础的抽象结构,它决定了对句子的语义解释。深层结构并不带来表层结构。一般来说,它们是不同的,但在某些情形中,它们也可以是一致的。然而,乔姆斯基并没有说过我们如何能够察觉或确认这种深层结构。语言学家们对这个概念始终存在着许多争论。从历史上看,这种区分可以追溯到冯·洪堡的内在形式和外在形式概念,以及维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中提出的表层语法和深层语法之间的区分,尽管这后一种区分只是涉及词的用法。

“对每个句子来说,语法的句法成分必须区分为决定其语义解释的深层结构和决定其语音解释的表层结构。第一种可以用语义学成分加以解释;而第二种则可以用音位学成分加以解释。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第136页。

可废弃性

一个意指保证一些法律或道德原理和准则在适当境况中是可以放弃的术语。面对着对传统的知识定义,即知识是得到辩护的真信念提出挑战的“盖梯尔问题”,一种知识的可废弃性理论也得到了发展。这种理论强调,尽管如果要把一个信念当做知识,其必要条件是它必须为真且得到辩护,但这并不是充分条件。因为一个当前得到辩护的信念在新的证据面前可能会被挫败,这个信念是可废弃的,其辩明仅仅是最初辩明。那个战胜了已经辩明的信念的新证据,可以称作挫败者。它对信念与原初辩明间的关系提出了疑问。认识论者论证说我们是否应当定

original justification. Epistemologists argue whether we should define knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. A defeasible knowledge claim can be made confidently, but should recognise the possibility in principle that further evidence could give reason to withdraw the claim. A concept can also be defeasible. The standard criteria for the correct application of a defeasible concept allow for that application to be retracted in the light of further evidence. Verification of claims using defeasible concepts is never conclusive and is always open to the possibility of revision.

"The notion of defeasibility was first introduced in moral philosophy where it was applied to concepts such as duty, obligation, and responsibility. Such concepts were said to be defeasible in that their applicability could be negated or overridden by one or other of a set of circumstances." O'Connor and Carr, *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, 1982, p. 82.

Definiendum, see definition

Definiens, see definition

Definist fallacy

Frankena's term for the mistake of defining one predicate by means of another predicate which cannot properly define it. This is the fallacy of identifying two distinct properties. He regards Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" — the practice which attempts to define general ethical terms such as "good" in terms of some supposedly identical natural property — as a species of definist fallacy. In logic, "definist fallacy" refers more generally to a tactic in argument which defines a term in a way favourable to one's position, and then insists that the debate should continue on that basis. For example, an anti-abortion activist insists on defining a foetus as a person, and turns the debate about the morality of abortion into a debate about the morality of killing a person. Sometimes "definist fallacy" also refers to an attitude which requires that a term must be defined before it can be employed.

"The definist fallacy is the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by another, or of substituting one property for another." — Frankena, "Naturalist Fallacy", *Mind* (XLVIII), 1939, p. 471.

Definite description

An expression that picks out something as the sole individual having a certain set of properties and has the form "the so-and so". In contrast, an indefinite or ambiguous description is an expression that may apply to many different objects and has the form "a so-and so". A definite description is not a name, but a complex symbol such as "The author of Wa-

义知识为不可废弃的、得到辩护的真信念。一种可废弃的知识主张是这样一种主张，它是很有信心地提出的，但又认识到原则上有可能进一步的证据会给出撤销这一主张的理由。一个概念也可以是可废弃的。可废弃概念的正确使用的规范标准，允许按照进一步的证据而取消这种使用。运用了可废弃概念的主张，其证实绝不是最终的，而总是有着修正的可能性。

“可废弃性概念首先在道德哲学中被引入，它在那儿被应用于诸如义务、职责和责任等概念。这些概念被说成是可废弃的，当它们的适用性为一组境况中的这个或那个所否定或废弃时。”——奥康纳和卡尔：《知识论导论》，1982年，第82页。

被定义项

见“定义”条。

定义项

见“定义”条。

定义错误

法兰克纳用这个词是指这样一种错误，它用另一个谓词定义某个谓词，而前一个谓词是无法适当地定义后一个谓词的。这是把两个不同特性相等同的错误。他认为，摩尔的“自然主义错误”，即试图用所谓相同的自然特性去定义诸如“善”这样的一般伦理术语的努力，就是一种定义错误。在逻辑中，“定义错误”更一般地是指一种论证战术，即以有利于某人立场的方法去定义术语，然后认为这个争论应该沿着这个方向继续。例如，反对堕胎的人坚持把胎儿看作是一个人，因而就把关于堕胎道德的争论变成了关于杀人道德的争论。有时，“定义错误”也指一种态度，它要求一个术语必须在能够应用之前得到定义。

“定义错误是混淆了两种特性或把它们等同起来的一种过程，即用一种特性定义另一种特性，或者用一种特性取代另一种特性。”——法兰克纳：《自然主义错误》，《心灵》（第68期），1939年，第471页。

限定的摹状词

即确认某物为具有某些属性的惟一个体的表达式，其形式为“如此这般”。相反，非限定的或模糊的摹状词是可以用于许多不同对象的表达式，其形式为“一般这样”。限定的摹状词不是名称，而是一个诸如“《威弗利》的作者”这样的复合符号。罗素的限定摹状词理论对限

verley". Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions provides a classic analysis of definite descriptions. A proposition containing definite descriptions can be analysed into three parts: an existence condition, a uniqueness condition and a predication. A proposition "the F is G" can be presented as "there is one and only F and it is G". In such a case a definite description is analysed through a contextual definition. Russell held that his theory can solve a number of semantic problems about the apparent reference to non-existents, as with the expression "the present King of France". It removes the burden of finding objects to which these expressions seem to refer and was seen as the central paradigm of analytic philosophy. But Russell's analysis was criticised by Peter Strawson for failing to distinguish between sentences and the statements made by the speaker in uttering the sentences.

"I want you to realize that the question whether a phrase is a definite description turns only upon its form, not upon the question whether there is a definite individual so described." —Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 244.

Definition

[from Latin; *definire*: limit; equivalent to Greek; *horismos* or *horos*, boundary or setting a boundary] The use of an expression (Latin; *definiens*, the part of the definition which does the defining) to clarify the meaning of some other expression (Latin; *definiendum*, the word or expression which is to be defined). In Greek philosophy the canonical form of definition gives the essence or species of something by stating its *genus* and the *differentia* of the *genus*, thus marking off the defined species from other species of same genus. To define "man", for example, we say that it is a rational (*differentia*) animal (*genus*).

Definition increases information and prevents ambiguity and is essential for various kinds of intellectual investigation, but its nature and status are themselves a topic of philosophical debate. While essentialists like Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Husserl hold that essential or real definitions reveal the essence of what is defined, nominalists or prescriptivists like Hobbes, Russell, Quine and Carnap reject the notions of essence and real definition and hold that nominal or verbal definitions are only a matter of symbolic convention and that the *definiendum* is just a word and not a concept as understood by realists.

Further common types of definitions are (1) lexical or reportive definitions, which clarify the meaning of an already existing term; (2) stipulative definitions, which show how an author intends to use a term; (3) functional definitions, which define something by showing what functions it performs; (4) extensional or denotative definitions, which provide a list of members to which the *definiens* can be correctly applied; and (5) intensional or connotative definitions, which reveal the common property shared by all things to

定的摹状词给出了经典的分析。根据这种分析,一个包含限定摹状词的命题可以分解为三个部分,即一个存在条件,一个惟一性条件和一个论断。命题“这个F是G”可以表述为“存在一个并且只有一个F,而且它就是G”。在这种情况下,限定的摹状词是通过语境定义加以分析的。罗素相信,他的理论能够解决许多关于表面指称非存在物的语义学问题,诸如“当今的法国国王”。它卸掉了必须寻找这些表达式似乎指称的对象这种负担,因而被看作是分析哲学的核心范式。但罗素的分析遭到了P. 斯特劳森的批评,因为它没有区分句子与说话者在说出这个句子时所做出的陈述。

“我想让你们意识到,一个短语是否是一个限定的摹状词这个问题,仅仅取决于它的形式,而不是取决于是否存在它所描述的确个体这个问题。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第244页。

定义

[源自拉丁语 *definire* (界限); 其希腊文同义语是 *horismos* 或 *horos*, 意指界域或界域的确立] 用一种表述(拉丁词 *definiens*, 意指界定的定义部分)阐明另外某个表述(拉丁词 *definiendum*, 意指将被界定的那个词或表述)的意义。在希腊哲学中,正规的定义形式是通过说明某物的属和属的种差给出该物的本质或种,这样,就把被定义的种与同属的其他种区分出来。例如,要界定“人”,我们就说是理性的(种差)动物(属)。

定义增加了信息,防止了歧义,对于各种认知研究是不可缺少的,但是,它的本性和地位本身却是哲学论争的论题。本质主义者如柏拉图、亚里士多德、康德和胡塞尔认为,本质的或实在的定义揭示被定义项的本质,唯名论者或规范论者如霍布斯、罗素、奎因和卡尔纳普则反驳本质和实在定义的见解,认为名词或动词定义只是个符号约定问题,*definiendum* 甚至仅仅是个语词,而不是实在论者们理解的概念。

定义的常见种类还有:(1)辞典定义或报告定义,阐明已经存在的术语的含义;(2)约定定义,表明作者意欲如何使用一个术语;(3)功能定义,通过揭示术语实现的功能来界定某物;(4)范围或外延定义,提出能正确地适用于 *definiens* 的成员名单;(5)内包或内涵定义,揭示能适用于 *definiens* 的所有事物分有的共同特性,尽管许多术语缺乏共同特性,但却有着连接它们能够适用的条目的相似模样。此外,还有哲学上用得着的其他类型的定义,譬如语境定义、递归定义、归纳定义、实指定义和说服定义。

“定义是揭示事物本质的短语。”——亚里

which the *definiens* can be applied, although many terms lack a common property and instead have patterns of likeness which link the items to which they can be applied. In addition, there are other types of definitions which are philosophically useful, such as contextual definitions, recursive definitions, inductive definitions, ostensive definitions and persuasive definitions.

"A definition is a phrase signifying a thing's essence." — Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b36.

Definition by genus and difference

[from Latin; *genus et differentia*] The most generally applicable form of intensional definition, which conveys the meaning of a term by picking out the genus or larger class to which it belongs and the difference or attribute which distinguishes it from the other members of its genus. Hence what is achieved is a genus qualified by a specific difference. For instance, "man" is defined by "the rational" (the difference) and "animal" (the genus).

"A definition by genus and difference assigns a meaning to a term: by identifying a genus term and one or more difference words that, when combined, convey the meaning of the term being defined." — Hurley, *Logic*, 1982, p. 6.

Definition in use, another term for contextual definition

Deflationary theory of truth, see truth

Degree of belief

The central notion of an account holding that belief comes in degrees rather than being a simple matter of "yes" or "no". That we have different degrees of subjective confidence in our beliefs is a basic tenet of Bayesianism, which argues that the subjective probability or degree of belief of propositions can be altered by new evidence according to a procedure recommended by Bayes' Theorem. Beliefs can be compared in the sense that the degree of belief or subjective probability of one belief is greater than another. Degrees of belief can be analysed in terms of the degree of belief with which a belief is actually held or of the degree of belief with which it should rationally be held. Bayesian theory allows purely subjective initial assignments of degrees of belief, but applies rational discipline to the alteration of beliefs in light of new evidence, with the expectation that there will be convergence in the degrees of belief assigned to beliefs by different investigators. For personalists such as Ramsey and de Finetti the consistent degrees of beliefs must conform to the rules of probability calculus. This notion implies a perspective from which we may quantify beliefs and suggests a possible approach to a rigorous science of behaviour.

士多德：《正位篇》，101b36。

种加属差定义

[源自拉丁文 *genus et differentia*] 通常是指内涵定义的最普遍适用的形式，它传达一个词的意义是通过确认属类或它所属的更大的类，通过差异或把它与其属类中其他成员区分开来的属性。由此得到的是由种差所确认的属类。譬如，“人”被定义为“有理性的”（种差）和“动物”（属类）。

“种加属差定义赋予一个词以意义，是通过确认一个属名以及一个或者更多的种名，这些种名在被涉及时传达着被定义词的意义。”——赫尔利：《逻辑》，1982年，第6页。

使用定义

“语境定义”的另一表述。

真理紧缩论

见“真理”条。

置信度

这样一种观点的主要概念，即认为信念并非简单的“是”或“非”的问题，而是以程度形式出现的。我们对我们的信念有不同程度的主观信心，这是“贝叶斯主义”的基本信条，它论证说，对命题的置信度或主观概率可以在有新证据时，根据贝叶斯公理所推荐的程序而得到修正。说信念是可以比较的，乃是指一个信念的置信度或主观概率大于另一个。对置信度的分析可以按照一个信念被实际拥有的置信度，或是按照一个信念应当理性地被持有的置信度来进行。贝叶斯主义允许对置信度做最初的纯主观指定，但将理性训练应用于根据新证据而对信念的改变，以期不同研究者指定给信念的置信度会有 一种趋同。对于人格主义者，如拉姆塞和德·费莱蒂来说，一致的置信度必须符合概率演算规则。这一概念意味着一种视界，我们可以由此使信念量化，并提出一种严格的行为科学的可能进路。

“一个人S对句子P所具有的置信度，是S对P的真实性的信心的数值量度，并且在S于打赌、活动等等中所作出的选择中表现出

"The degree of belief that a person S has in the sentence P is a numerical measure of S's confidence in the truth of P, and is manifested in the choices S makes among bets, actions, etc." —Garber, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. x, 1983, p. 101.

Degree of confirmation

A term introduced by Carnap. If one knows what observations would be relevant to the truth or falsity of a statement, the statement is said to be confirmable. How much evidence, then, is required for one to say that the statement is actually confirmed? The degree of confirmation is the measure by which generalised statements may be ranked in order of acceptability. It is a quantitative concept of confirmation and of probability. If we take h to be a statement, e to be evidence, q to be a real number between 0 and 1, and c to be a symbol for degree of confirmation, then $c(h, e) = q$ or the degree of confirmation of h with respect to e is q .

"Given certain observations e and a hypothesis h (in the form, say, of a prediction or even of a set of laws), then I believe it is in many cases possible to determine, by mechanical procedures, the logical probability, or degree of confirmation, of h on the basis of e ." —Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, 1966, p. 34.

Deism

[from Latin: *deus*, god] A doctrine of natural, as distinct from revealed, religion claiming that reason assures us that God exists, but that the mode of divine existence is absolute and transcendent. This account denies all of God's mystical relations to the world and human affairs. Divine revelations, dogma and religious superstitions should also be excluded as fictions. Once God set the universe in motion, he intervened no more and left it to its own laws, just as a watch-maker leaves a watch which has been set in motion. Although both theism and deism are associated with belief in the existence of God, deism is less orthodox than theism. The idea of deism can be traced to Aristotle's notion of a prime mover, but in Christianity the term was first used by the Calvinists during the latter part of the sixteenth century and developed over the following two centuries. Deism was a reaction against the attempt of medieval theology to subordinate philosophy to theology and represented an attempt to place religion within the framework of reason. Voltaire, Locke and Kant all took a deistic position. In modern times, deism has led to anti-authoritarian political and social positions and has promoted a growth of the spirit of tolerance.

"Deism... uses the word 'God'... to refer to the great force who initially caused the universe to function but who has since that time withdrawn from any active participation or 'interference' with his artefact." —Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 122.

来。”——盖伯：见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》1983年第10期，第101页。

确证度

由卡尔纳普引入的术语。如果人们知道哪些观察与一个陈述的真或假相关，这个陈述就称作可确证的。那么，人们需要多少证据才能说这个句子实际上被证实了呢？确证度就是这么一种量度，通过它，一般化陈述按可接受性加以排列。它是一种量化的确证概念和概率概念。如果我们取 h 为一个陈述， e 为证据， q 为位于 0 和 1 之间的实数， c 为表示确证度的符号，则： $c(h, e) = q$ 意味着“ h 关于 e 的确证度为 q ”。

“给定某些观察 e 和一个假设 h （例如以一个预言甚或一组定律的形式），则我相信在许多情形中，有可能通过机械的程序，确定 h 在 e 的基础上的逻辑概率或确证度。”——卡尔纳普：《物理学的哲学基础》，1966年，第34页。

自然神论

[源自拉丁语 *deus*（神）] 一种区别于启示宗教的自然宗教学说，认为理智使我们确信，上帝存在，但存在的方式却是绝对的、超验的。这种解释否定了上帝与世界及其人类事务的一切神秘关系。天启、教义和宗教迷信也应作为虚构而被排除。上帝一旦使宇宙运动起来，就离开了，不干预它自己的规律，犹如一位钟表制造者在拨动钟表后就离开一样。虽然一神论和自然神论在对上帝存在的信仰上是一致的，但自然神论和一神论相比，较少正统色彩。自然神论的观念可以追溯到亚里士多德的第一推动者说法，但在基督教中，这个术语却是 16 世纪下半叶由加尔文主义者首先使用的，在随后的两个世纪中，这种观点又得以发展。自然神论是对哲学附属于神学的中世纪神学企图的反动，表现了把宗教纳入理性框架之内的企图。伏尔泰、洛克和康德都持一种自然神论立场。在近代时期，自然神论导致了反独裁主义的政治和社会立场，培育了宽容精神的生长。

“自然神论……使用的‘上帝’一词……意指这样一种伟大力量：他最初引发宇宙机能，但从那一刻起，他就不再对他的作品有任何主动的参与或‘干涉’。”——费勒：《现代宗教哲学基础》，1968年，第122页。

Deliberation

[Greek: *Bouleusis*, a prerequisite of *prohairesis*, decision.] Aristotle discussed deliberation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 3, Ch. 3. The objects of deliberation are the things which can be calculated with probability and can be brought about by our efforts. Starting from an assumed end, that is an accepted object of desire or wish, deliberation analyses the ways and means by which the end can be achieved and terminates in a rational choice and appropriate action. In Greek “means to the end” are things related to a goal, and the term is broader than the modern conception of instrumental means to an end. Deliberation, which enables a person to know what he must do if he is to achieve his objective, is a major feature in Aristotle's ethics and in contemporary virtue ethics.

“We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends.” —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1112b12.

Demarcation, criterion of

Popper maintained that the demarcation problem, that is the problem of distinguishing genuine scientific theories from pseudo-scientific theories, is one of the most fundamental problems for the philosophy of science. To deal with this problem, it is crucial to establish a criterion of demarcation. Popper proposed falsifiability as the criterion. Unless scientists state the conditions under which their theories can be refuted, their theories belong to pseudo-science. For Popper, the problem of demarcation is precisely the problem of scientific rationality and his criterion of demarcation determines the logic of scientific discovery and the definition of science. Critics argue that some pseudo-scientific claims satisfy the criterion and are indeed falsified, but that their proponents ignore their refutation. On this view, the demarcation becomes a matter of scientific integrity rather than a formal test of falsifiability. Lakatos argued that all theories from their inception are surrounded by falsifying instances. For this reason, demarcation cannot be sharply drawn in terms of falsification, and scientific rationality involves pursuing potentially fruitful theories. Others argue that scientific theories have histories and that only at some stages is the question of falsifiability appropriate. On this view, the question of demarcation is dealt with historically.

“... I tentatively introduced the idea of the falsifiability (or testability or refutability) of a theory as a criterion of demarcation.” —Popper, in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (ed. Shilpp), 1974, p. 32.

Demiurge

In Plato's *Timaeus*, the divine craftsman, who made the lower gods, the soul of the universe and the immortal part of the human soul. The lower gods in turn made all physical

考虑

[源自希腊词 *bouleusis*, 它是决定的一个先决条件]亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》第三卷第三章对这一概念作了集中讨论。考虑的对象是可以计算其或然性并且通过我们的能力可以实现的事物。首先设定一个目的,即一个可接受的欲望或愿望对象,考虑然后去分析可以达到这一目的的各种途径或方法,并最后取得一个理性的选择和适当的行为。在希腊文中,“达到目的的各种途径”是与目的相关的各种事物,其意义广于现代意义的“达到目的的各种工具性途径”。考虑使一个人明白,如果他要达到他的目的的话,他必须做什么。这是亚里士多德伦理学和当代德性伦理学的一个重要概念。

“我们考虑的不是目的,而是促进目的的东西。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1112b12。

分界标准

波普主张分界问题,即区分真假科学理论的问题是科学哲学最基本的问题之一。讨论这一问题的关键是确立分界标准。波普提出可否证性作为这种标准。除非科学家说明他们的理论在什么条件下可以被反驳,否则他们的理论就属于伪科学。在波普看来,分界问题也正是科学的合理性问题,其分界标准决定了科学发现的逻辑和科学的定义。批评者认为,有些伪科学声称满足该标准,而且确实被证伪了,可它们的倡导者忽略了它们的反驳。据这一观点,分界成了科学的诚实问题,而非可证伪性的形式测验。拉卡托斯论证说,一切理论从一开始即为许多证伪的例证所包围。由于这一原因,分界不能依照证伪而明确划线,而科学的合理性则涉及到对潜在的实有成果的理论的追求。另一些人论证说,科学理论有历史,只有在某些阶段上可证伪性问题才合适。据这一观点,分界问题应历史地处理。

“‘……我尝试性地引入理论的可否证性(或可检验性、可反驳性)概念作为分界标准。’——波普:《K. 波普的哲学》(希耳普主编), 1974年,第32页。

造物主

柏拉图著作《蒂迈欧篇》中的神圣工匠(有时也直译为:“提摩革”),这一工匠制作了低级的众神、宇宙的灵魂及人类灵魂的不朽部分。而

things. In creating, the Demiurge uses the Forms or Ideas as his model, works on given existing or material elements, and must persuade necessity to co-operate in order to finish the job ideally well. Although the idea of the Demiurge had great influence on Christianity, the Demiurge is thus not identical with the biblical Creator. For Plato, it is a literary device to symbolise the rational element in the world order.

"The work of the Demiurge, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect." —Plato, *Timaeus*, 28a.

Democracy

[from Greek: *demos*, people | *kratia*, mighty, powerful, literally, rule by the people] A form of government, traditionally contrasted to aristocracy (rule by the best), oligarchy (rule by the few) and monarchy (ruled by the one). Ideally, democracy requires all citizens to join in making governmental decisions, but such pure democracy, excluding women and slaves, was only practised for a short period in ancient Athens. The standard democratic form is representative democracy, that is rule by a group of representatives who are elected for limited periods directly or indirectly by the people. A representative democracy governs through discussion and persuasion rather than by force. Decisions are generally made by majority vote in order that policies will reflect at least to some degree the will or interests of the people. In order to prevent the over-concentration of power, the main legislative, executive and judicial functions of government are separated. The values and principles underlying this form of government are liberty and equality, sometimes called the democratic ideals. According to the principle of liberty, individuals should make decisions for themselves, rather than allowing decisions to be made on their behalf and imposed on them. The principle of equality requires all citizens to have an equal right to select those holding governmental office and to stand for office themselves. The active role of citizens in a democracy underlies the recognition of certain rights and liberties which shape their personality outside political life and ground the rule of law. Among these rights are the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and protection against arbitrary arrest. It is widely believed, especially by members of Western societies and by contemporary political theorists, that representative democracy can secure a maximum of freedom and rights for citizens and a minimum of the abuse of political power. Nonetheless, there are difficulties in maintaining an authentic democratic system in the face of the overwhelming influence of wealth and power, indifference, ideological fixations, mutual hatred and corruption. Rousseau's democratic theory has clearly totalitarian aspects.

低级的众神转而制造了一切物理事物。当造物主创造时,它观照形式或形相为其模型,并且在已存在或给予的物质元素的基础上工作。它还必须说服必然性与它合作才能理想地完成它的工作。所以,虽然造物主的思想无疑对基督教影响甚巨,造物主并不等同于《创世记》中的创造者。对于柏拉图来说,这是一种用来象征世界秩序中的理性因素的文学手法。

“当造物主观照不变的形式,并按照这永恒的模式来设置其工作的形式和性质时,它的工作必定是美丽的、完美的。”——柏拉图:《蒂迈欧篇》, 28a。

民主政体

[源自希腊文: *demos* (人民) 和 *kratia* (力量、权力), 从字义上讲是由人民统治] 一种传统上与贵族政体(由精英分子统治)、寡头政体(由少数人统治)和君主政体(由一个人统治)相对立的政体形式。理想的民主政体要求所有的公民都参加制定政府的决策,但这种纯粹的民主政体只在古代雅典实行了很短一段时期,而且妇女和奴隶是被排除在外的。标准的民主政体形式是代议制的民主政体,它是由一批被人民直接或间接地在一定时期选出的代表控制的。代议制民主政体的管理是通过辩论和说服而不是通过武力。决策一般是根据大多数的赞同票做出的,以使政策至少在一定程度上反应人民的意愿或利益。为了防止权力的过分集中,政府主要的立法、行政和司法职责是分开的。构成这种政体基础的价值观和原则是自由和平等,它们有时也被称为民主的理想。根据自由的原则,个人应代表他们自己做出决定,而不允许别人代表他们做出决定并将决定强加于他们。平等的原则要求所有的公民拥有平等地选举掌管政府的官员和自身参加官员竞选的权利。在一个民主政体中,公民的积极作用构成了承认某些权利和自由的基础,这些权利和自由塑造他们政治生活之外的个性,并使法律规范有根据。这些权利包括言论自由、出版自由、结社自由、集会自由和防止任意逮捕的保护。很多人,特别是西方社会的成员和当代政治理论家相信,代议制民主政体可以保障公民的最大限度的自由和权利并将政治权利的滥用降至最低限度。然而,面对财富和权力的势不可挡的影响、对政治的冷淡、思想上的固步自封、相互间的敌意和腐败,维系一个真正的民主体制是有困难的。卢梭的民主理论明显带有极权主义的色彩, J. S. 密尔则承认民主政体中少数人的权利可以为多数人的权利所侵犯。民主理论的部分内容涉及从较少民主的政体向较多民主的政体的转变问题,以及确定使民主政体稳定而有效地发挥作用的公共机构的关系问题。

and J. S. Mill recognised that the rights of a minority in a democracy could be violated by the majority. Part of the theory of democracy deals with the transition from lesser to greater democracy and with determining the institutional contexts in which democracy can function with stability and effectiveness.

"The sovereign may put the government in the hands of the whole people, or of the greater part of the people, so that there are more citizens-magistrates than there are ordinary private citizens. This form of government is known as democracy." —Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, II, 3.

Demonstration

[from Latin: *de*, away, from + *monstrare*, show; its Greek counterpart is *apo*, away + *deixis*, show] For Aristotle, demonstration was the inference of new knowledge from certain previously established knowledge or axioms, in contrast to intuition which directly apprehends first principles. All syllogism is demonstration, although not all demonstration is syllogism. For Descartes and Locke, demonstration was the discovery of the connections of ideas and the comparison of ideas by reason alone. It amounts to rational justification and contrasts with immediate knowledge. Hume proposes that demonstrative knowledge is indubitable knowledge, in contrast to contingent knowledge about matters of fact. In contemporary philosophy, demonstration amounts to proof, that is, the deduction of a conclusion from one or more accepted premises by means of a set of valid rules of inference.

"In the nature of the case the essential elements of demonstration are three: the subject, the attributes, and the basic premises." —Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 76b22.

Denominatio extrinseca

A scholastic term used in contrast to *denominatio intrinseca*. *Denominatio intrinseca* (intrinsic denomination) means a reference to a thing's intrinsic property or its inherent properties, while *denominatio extrinseca* (extrinsic denomination) is a reference to a thing's accidental properties. More narrowly, an extrinsic denomination is an experiential determination directed at a thing. For instance, being seen or being talked about is an extrinsic denomination of a thing when someone sees or talks about that thing. Thomas Aquinas proposes that of Aristotle's ten categories, the first four, substance, quality, quantity, and relation, are intrinsic denominations, and all others are extrinsic denominations. But the distinction is controversial, especially with regard to the status of relation. An accepted notion in contemporary philosophy is that if a relation is internal, it is an intrinsic denomination, if it is external, it is an extrinsic denomination.

"Extrinsic denominations; denominations which have absolutely no function in the very thing denominated." —Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (Ariew and Garber, eds and

"主权者可以将政府交到全体人民或大多数人民手中,从而使作行政官的公民多于普通平民,这种政府形式,被认为是民主政体。"——卢梭:《社会契约论》,Ⅱ,3。

证明

[源自拉丁文, *de* (离开, 从……出发) 和 *monstrare* (显示); 它在希腊语中相应的词是 *apo* (离开) 和 *deixis* (显示)] 在亚里士多德看来,证明与直接理解第一原则的直观相反,意指从某些先已确立的知识或公理得出新知识的推理。所有的三段论都是证明,虽然并非所有证明都是三段论。在笛卡尔和洛克那里,证明意指只凭借理性去发现观念的联系和进行观念的比较。它相当于理性的辩护,与直接知识构成对照。休谟指出,证明的知识是无可争辩的知识,不同于有关事实问题的偶然知识。在当代哲学中,证明 (demonstration) 等同于“证明” (proof),也就是指从一个或多个公认前提出发,凭借一组有效推理规则演绎出结论的过程。

“就其自身本性来说,证明包括三个本质性要素:主体、属性和基本前提。”——亚里士多德:《后分析》,76b22。

外在指称

与 *denominatio intrinseca* 相对,它们一起构成了一对经院哲学术语。*denominatio intrinseca* (内在指称) 意味着指向事物的内在特性或其固有的特性,而 *denominatio extrinseca* (外在指称) 则是指向了事物的偶然特性。更严格地说,外在指称是指向事物的经验确认。例如,“被看到”或“被谈到”就是当某人“看”或“谈论”某物时对这个事物的外在指称。T. 阿奎那提出,亚里士多德十范畴中的前四个范畴,即实体、质量、数量和关系就是内在指称,而其他的所有范畴都是外在指称。但这个区分引起了很大的争议,特别是在关系的地位方面。当代哲学中一种公认的看法认为,如果关系是内在的,那么它就是内在指称,如果它是外在的,那么它就是外在指称。

“外在指称:在真正被指称的事物中完全没有作用的指称。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第32页。

trans), 1989, p. 32.

Denominatio intrinseca, see *denominatio extrinseca*

Denotation

The distinction between denotation and connotation was introduced by J. S. Mill, and corresponds to what other logicians call the distinction between extension and intension, or that between reference and meaning. Denotation is the object designated by a singular term or the class of objects referred to by a general term. Connotation is the attribute of an object which permits the term to apply correctly to the object. Words with different connotations can have the same denotation. For instance, "the capital of the United Kingdom" and "the largest city in the United Kingdom" denote the same object, although they connote different attributes. A name, such as a proper name, may have a denotation but no connotation. The idea that some terms denote but do not connote and therefore do not have meaning is crucial for Russell's theory of definite description.

"If we know that the proposition 'a is the so-and-so' is true, i.e. that a is so-and-so and nothing else is, we call a the denotation of the phrase 'the so-and-so'." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VI, p. 160.

Denoting phrases

A term introduced and analyzed in Russell's important article "On Denoting". It refers to definite and indefinite descriptions, including those which may denote one definite object, e.g. "the present King of England", those which may be denoting phrases but do not denote anything, e.g. "the present King of France", and those which may denote ambiguously, e.g. "a man", "some men". According to Russell, denoting phrases do not have meaning in themselves, but contribute to the meaning of the whole proposition in which they occur. Thus these phrases are also called incomplete symbols.

"A denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own account." — Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 51.

Denying mode, another term for *modus tollens*

Denying the antecedent

A logical fallacy of the form "if p then q, not p, therefore not q". The categorical premise denies the antecedent of the conditional premises, while the conclusion denies its consequent. For instance, "If he is sick, he does not come to work"; "he is not sick"; therefore, "he comes to work".

内在指称

见“外在指称”条。

外延

外延和内涵的区别由 J. S. 密尔提出, 对应于其他逻辑学家所说的 extension 和 intension 之间的区别, 或指称和意义的区别。外延是单称词指称的对象, 或全称词所指的一类对象。内涵是这样一个对象的属性, 它使得语词可以正确地应用于该对象。具有不同内涵的语词可以有相同的外延。例如“英国的首都”和“英国最大的城市”都指同一个对象, 虽然它们包涵着不同的属性。诸如专名这样的名称, 可以有外延而无内涵。有些词有外延而无内涵因而没有意义, 这一观点对于罗素的确定摹状词理论至关重要。

“如果我们知道命题‘a 是如此这般’为真, 即 a 是如此这般并且无其他东西如此这般, 我们就称 a 为‘如此这般’这个短语的外延。”

罗素:《罗素文集》, 第六卷, 第 160 页。

指示短语

这一术语是在罗素的重要文章《论指示》中提出和加以分析的。它指确定摹状词和不定摹状词, 包括可以指示一个确定对象的摹状词, 例如“当今英国国王”, 也包括可以指示短语, 但不指示任何东西的摹状词, 例如“当今法国国王”, 还包括这样的摹状词, 它们可能有含混的指称, 例如“有个人”, “有些人”。据罗素的主张, 指示短语本身没有意义, 但使得它们所属的整个命题有意义, 因此, 这些短语也称为不完全符号。

“指示短语实质上是句子的部分, 而不像大多数单个词一样仅凭自身就有意义。” — 罗素:《逻辑和知识》, 1956 年, 第 51 页。

否定式

“否定后件式”的另一个名称。

否定前件式

形式为“如果 p 则 q, 非 p, 所以非 q”的逻辑谬误。直言前提否定条件前提的前件, 而结论否定它的后件。举例来说, “如果他生病了, 则他不来上班”; “他没有生病”; 所以, “他来上班”。这一推理是无效的, 因为“生病”是“不

The inference is not valid because being sick is a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for not coming to work. Hence it is not sound to deny the consequent on the basis of a denial of the antecedent. The correct form should be from the denial of the consequent of the conditional to the denial of its antecedent; that is, "if p then q; not q; therefore not p". This is called by the medieval logicians, *modus tollens*, and is also called the *denying mode*.

"The truth of the premises does not require the truth of the conclusion. This means that denying the antecedent is an invalid form of the simple conditional argument." — Adams, *General Logic*, 1954, p. 164.

Deontic concept, another term for deontic modality

Deontic judgement, another name for judgement of obligation

Deontic logic

A kind of formal logic, also called the logic of obligation, which concerns the logical relations between propositions containing deontic modalities or concepts such as obliged, permitted or forbidden. It was motivated by the development of modal logic in this century, and the observation by logicians that the words obligatory and permissible parallel the roles of necessary and possible in arguments. Deontic logic can be traced to the medieval logicians, and to Leibniz, Bentham and Ernst Mally, but in contemporary logic it started with G. H. von Wright's seminal paper "Deontic Logic" [*Mind*, 60 (1951)]. The most systematic treatment of this logic so far is in the works of von Wright. In a sense, deontic logic is the application of formal logic to ethical notions and tends to codify the rules of practical reasoning. Although the discovery of paradoxes in formal deontic systems has led to proposals for their radical reformulation, many logicians still endorse this part of logic, anticipating the contribution of deontic logic to the development of both ethical and logical theory.

"There are several families of concepts, the members of which exhibit in their mutual relations the same formal pattern as the modalities. An example are the deontic or normative notions: obligation, permission, and others. The formal theory of these has become known as deontic logic." — von Wright, *Philosophical Logic*, 1983, p. 117.

Deontic modality

[from Greek; *deontos*, fitting, proper or as it should be] Deontic modalities, also called deontic concepts, are the concepts implying obligation (ought to), permission (may), and forbidding (ought not to). Sentences in which these concepts occur are called deontic sentences. This term was introduced

来上班”的充分条件而不是必要条件。所以，因否定前件而否定后件是不正确的。正确的形式应该是从否定条件句的后件推出否定它的前件，即“如果 p 则 q；非 q；所以非 p。”这被中世纪逻辑学家叫做 *modus tollens*（否定后件式），也叫做“否定式”。

“前提真并不要求结论真。这意味着：否定前件式是简单条件句论证的一种无效形式。”——亚当斯：《一般逻辑》，1954年，第164页。

道义概念

“道义模态”的另一个称谓。

道义判断

“义务判断”的另一个名称。

道义逻辑

一类形式逻辑，亦称义务逻辑，它关注含有“义务”、“允许”、“禁止”等道义模态词或概念的命题之间的逻辑关系。它应归功于模态逻辑在本世纪的发展；也由于逻辑学家注意到以下事实，即“义务的”、“允许的”两词类似于“必然的”、“可能的”在论证中的作用。它的起源可以追溯到中世纪逻辑学家，以及莱布尼茨、边沁、E. 马里，而在当代逻辑中起源于冯·赖特的开创性论文《道义逻辑》[《心灵》，60 (1951)]。在冯·赖特的著作中可以找到对这一逻辑迄今为止最系统的处理。在某种意义上，道义逻辑是把形式逻辑应用于伦理学概念，并试图编制出实践推理的规则。虽然在形式的道义系统中发现悖论，以至有人提议对它们作根本性修改，但许多逻辑学家仍致力于研究逻辑的这一部分，并预言道义逻辑将对伦理学和逻辑理论的发展作出贡献。

“存在几组概念，其成员在相互关系上显示出与模态词相同的形式模式。例子之一就是道义或规范概念：义务，允许以及其他。关于这些概念的形式理论已经作为道义逻辑而广为人知。”——冯·赖特：《哲学逻辑》，1983年，第117页。

道义模态

[源自希腊文 *deontos*，指“得体的”、“恰当的”或“应该如此”] 道义模态也被称作“道义概念”，包含了义务（应当）、允许（可以）和禁止（不应当）的概念。出现有这种概念的句子被称作“道义句子”。这个词是由 G. H. 冯·赖特

by G. H. von Wright, and he contrasts them with normative concepts such as "right" or "wrong", and axiological concepts such as "good" or "bad". The logic that is concerned with the logical relations between propositions containing deontic modalities is deontic logic or the logic of obligation.

"The deontic modalities are about the mode or way in which we are permitted or not to perform an act." von Wright, *An Essay in Modal Logic*, 1951, p. 37.

Deontology

[from Greek; *to deon*, what is proper, what ought to be or duty.] An ethics based on acting according to duty. It concentrates on moral motives and takes obligation or duty as its central notion. Deontology holds that there are certain things which are right or wrong intrinsically. We should do them or not do them simply because of the sorts of things they are, regardless of the consequences of doing them. Hence, deontology is contrasted to teleological or consequentialist ethics (represented by utilitarianism), which claims that the rightness of an action depends on whether it brings about good consequences. To lie is wrong simply because it is a lie, no matter how much happiness it can produce. There are a set of moral principles and rules which a moral agent must observe absolutely. Deontology maintains that consequentialism is wrong because the goodness of the consequences of an action does not guarantee the rightness of an action. But it is difficult for deontology to explain why certain sorts of things are wrong in themselves. Generally deontology attempts to answer this question by appeal to common sense moral intuition or to human rationality, but a satisfactory account of what makes an act wrong is still required.

Kant is the most important deontological theorist. Other major deontologists include Samuel Clarke, W. D. Ross, Prichard, Butler and in contemporary philosophy Alan Donagan, C. Fried and Thomas Nagel. Some theorists have tried to distinguish rule-deontology and act-deontology. The former determines what is right in accordance with a set of universally applied moral rules, while the latter maintains that given changing circumstances we should act in accord with particular moral judgements regarding particular situations. This distinction is not presently in fashion. Deontology and Utilitarianism have been the two major trends in modern Western ethics.

The term was introduced by Bentham in a manuscript entitled "Deontology" to refer to the ethics which "for its object the learning and showing for the information of each individual, by what means the net amount of his happiness may be made as large as possible". Bentham's deontology is equivalent to utilitarianism, but this usage is largely ignored.

"... Deontological ethics ... is any system which does not appeal to the consequences of our actions, but which appeals to conformity with certain rules of duty." — Smart and

提出的, 他把它与诸如“对”或“错”等这种规范概念和诸如“好”或“坏”等这种价值概念对立起来。关心包含有道义模态的命题之间的逻辑关系的逻辑, 就被称作“道义逻辑”或“义务逻辑”。

“道义模态关心的是我们被禁止或被允许完成某种行为的模式或方式。”——冯·赖特:《论模态逻辑》, 1951年, 第37页。

道义论

[源自希腊词 *deon*, 意为“那适当的”, “那应当的”或“职责”] 道义论是一种以根据责任而行动为基础的伦理学。它集中注意于道德动机, 把义务或职责看作是中心概念。它认为, 有些事情内在地是对的或错的。我们应当做或不应当做这些事只是因为这类事情本身使然, 而与做这些事情的后果无关。因此, 道义论是与目的论的或效果论的伦理学(以功利主义为代表)相对立的, 后者主张, 一个行为的正当性取决于它是否能带来好的后果。撒谎是错的仅仅因为它是撒谎, 而不管它能带来多少幸福。有一类道德原则和规则是行为者必须绝对遵循的。道义论主张, 效果论是错的, 因为一个行为的好的结果不能确保一个行为的正当性。但它本身在解释为什么某些事情就它们本身而言就是错的也有困难。一般而言, 道义论企图以诉诸于常识的道德直觉, 或者是人类理性来回答这个问题, 但对于什么使得一个行为成为错误的, 仍然需要一种使人满意的说明。

康德是最重要的道义论理论家。其他主要的道义论者包括塞缪尔·克拉克、W. D. 罗斯、普里查德、巴特勒, 在当代哲学中, 有 A. 唐那根、C. 弗里德、T. 内格尔等。某些理论家力图区分规则道义论和行为道义论, 前者依据普遍可应用的道德规则决定什么是正当的, 而后者坚持认为, 环境总在变化, 我们应当做什么要依据考虑到特殊环境的具体的道德判断。但这种区分并不流行。道义论和功利主义一直是现代西方伦理学的两个主要潮流。

这个术语为边沁在题为“道义论”的手稿中采用。它在那里被用来指这种伦理学: “就它的目标而言, 研究和指出每个人的情况, 以什么方法可以有最大的可能来创造他的幸福的总量。”“道义论”的这种用法是“功利主义”的同义词, 但这种使用在很大程度上被忽略了。

“……道义论的伦理学……是不诉诸于我们行为后果的任何体系, 但它所诉诸的是遵守一定的职责规则。”——斯马特和威廉姆斯:《功利主义: 赞成与反对》, 1973年, 第5页。

Williams, *Utilitarianism For and Against*, 1973, p. 5.

Dependence thesis, see context principle

Derivative belief, see primitive knowledge

Derivative knowledge, see primitive knowledge

Description, attributive use of, see description, referential use of

Description, referential use of

Donnellan distinguishes between the attributive and the referential use of descriptions. In the attributive use, a speaker makes an assertion about whatever or whoever fits the description, without necessarily having any idea about what that thing or person is. In the referential use, a speaker has a definite individual in mind and uses the description to refer to it, thus enabling his audience to pick out or identify what he is talking about. In the referential use, the description is merely a tool for achieving reference, and the reference can succeed even if the thing referred to does not fit the description. This distinction shows that our use of descriptions is complex and that descriptions do not always refer to whatever happens to fit them. Donnellan uses his distinction to criticise the analyses of descriptions offered by Russell and Strawson. Russell ignores the referential use, while Strawson seems to ignore the attributive.

"I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing." — Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Description", in Schwarz (ed.), *Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, 1977, p. 46.

Descriptions, theory of

Russell divided descriptions into two kinds, indefinite descriptions, that is, phrases of the form "a so-and-so", and definite descriptions, that is, phrases of the form "the so-and-so". He claimed that descriptions are not referring expressions, and they do not need to denote anything in order to be meaningful. A description is an incomplete symbol and is meaningful only in a sentence which contains it ("contextual definition"). Both kinds of description can be analysed away, and can be replaced by quantifiers and variables. We

从属论题

见“语境原则”条。

派生信念

见“基本知识”条。

派生知识

见“基本知识”条。

摹状词的归属性用法

见“摹状词的指称性用法”条。

摹状词的指称性用法

唐纳兰区分了摹状词的归属性用法和指称性用法。在归属性用法中,说话者作出一个关于何物或何人适合于该摹状词的断定,而不必对该物或该人是什么样子有任何观念。在指称性用法中,说话者头脑中有一个确定的个体,他使用该摹状词去指称它,这使得他的听众能挑选或识别出他正在谈论的那个个体。在指称性用法中,摹状词纯粹是达到指称的一个工具,即使所指称的事物不适合该摹状词,指称也能成功。这一区别表明,我们对摹状词的使用是复杂的,摹状词并不总是指称碰巧适合它们的某物。唐纳兰用他的区分去批评罗素和斯特劳森所提出的摹状词分析。罗素忽视了指称性用法,而斯特劳森忽视了归属性用法。

“我将把我所想到的限定摹状词的这两种用法,叫做归属性用法和指称性用法。在一断定中归属性地使用限定摹状词的说话者,陈述了关于何人或何物是如此这般的某种东西。另一方面,在一断定中指称性地使用限定摹状词的说话者,使用该摹状词以使得他的听众能识别出他正在谈论何人或何物,并陈述了有关该人或该物的某种东西。”——唐纳兰:《指称和限定的摹状词》,载施瓦茨编:《命名,必然性和自然种类》,1977年,第46页。

摹状词理论

罗素把摹状词分为两类:非限定的摹状词,即“一个如此这般的东西”这种形式的短语,和限定的摹状词,即“这个如此这般的东西”这种形式的短语。他认为,摹状词并不是指称表达式,它们并不需要指称什么东西以便有意义。摹状词是“不完全符号”,它只有在包含它的句子中才有意义(“语境定义”)。这两类摹状词都可以被分析瓦解,被替换为量词和变项。我们可以用存在量词替换非限定的摹状词(“有一个东西

can replace an indefinite description with an existential quantifier ("There is one thing that is..."), and we can replace a definite description with a uniqueness quantifier ("There is exactly one thing such that..."). Russell's theory of definite descriptions has greatly influenced contemporary epistemology and logic, and has been cited as a model of philosophical analysis. The theory, however, is challenged by Peter Strawson who argues that descriptions are, at least sometimes, referring expressions that can single out something. Keith Donnellan further argues that both Russell and Strawson are one-sided, for they fail to notice that description can be used either attributively or referentially.

"Russell appears to claim for the Theory of Description that it gives an exact account of the working of one class of definite singular terms, viz. singular descriptions, and I am bound to deny this." —Strawson, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), *Words and Objections*, 1969, p. 107.

Descriptive ethics

The description of the moral views and moral principles held by people at a particular time in a particular community. Descriptive ethics also examines resemblances and differences among these moral views, but does not commit itself to preferring one view to another. It seeks to explain ethical discourse and statements as well. While meta-ethics specifies the proper use of ethical terms and lays down certain rules of ethical discourse, descriptive ethics does not move beyond an account of ethical discourse by placing it within a general cultural background. Descriptive ethics is more properly a branch of anthropology rather than a branch of ethics, and some philosophers believe that one cannot gain insight in descriptive ethics without testing the ethical views and principles philosophically.

"I shall call the investigation of the moral code and accompanying ethical conceptions of a person or group descriptive ethics." —Ladd, *The Structure of a Moral Code*, 1957, p. 1.

Descriptive fallacy

J. L. Austin's term for the practice in the traditional theory of statements of taking all statements to be descriptive and claiming that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to understand its truth-conditions. However, Austin argued that there are many sentences, such as those used in performative utterances, whose meanings are not determined by their truth conditions. They are not subjects of truth and falsity, for they do not specify or report features of reality, but are used to do something. To say "I swear..." is not to report that one swears, but is the act of swearing itself. This point is well developed by noncognitivism, whose major theme is to distinguish factual statements from ethical statements.

就是……"), 我们也可以用单一量词替换限定的摹状词("正是有这个东西使得……")。罗素的限定摹状词理论对当代认识论和逻辑学产生了巨大影响, 一直被作为哲学分析的典范。然而, 这个理论也受到了P. 斯特劳森的挑战, 他认为, 摹状词至少有时就是指出某物的指称表达式。K. 唐纳兰进一步认为, 罗素和斯特劳森都是片面的, 因为他们都没有注意到, 摹状词既可以归属性地使用, 也可以指称性地使用。

"罗素的摹状词理论似乎认为, 它严格地描述了一种限定的单个术语, 即单个的摹状词是如何作用的, 而我则倾向于否定这一点。" ——斯特劳森, 载戴维森和辛提卡(编):《词与异议》, 1969年, 第107页。

描述的伦理学

描述的伦理学认为, 对道德观点的描述是人们在特定时间和特定的共同体内所持的道德原则。描述的伦理学还考察这些道德观点之间的相似与不同, 但不使本身偏爱这种或那种观点。它也试图解释道德论说和陈述。虽然元伦理学详细说明了伦理学术语的恰当使用, 并制定了一些道德论说的规则, 描述的伦理学还是没有超出一种通过把道德论说置于一个一般的文化背景中对它加以的说明。严格说来, 描述的伦理学更是人类学的一个分支而不是伦理学的一个分支, 一些哲学家认为, 不对那些道德观点和原则做哲学上的检验是无法在描述的伦理学中获得灼见的。

"我把对道德规范和相伴随的一个人或一群人的道德观念的调查称作描述的伦理学。" ——拉德:《道德规范的结构》, 1957年, 第1页。

描述谬误

J. 奥斯汀的术语, 指的是在传统的陈述理论中的实践。传统的陈述理论把所有的陈述都看成是描述性的, 并主张, 理解句子的意义就是理解它的真值条件。不过, 奥斯汀争论道, 有许多句子, 诸如完成式话语, 其意义就不为它们的真值条件所决定。它们不是真假的主体, 因为它们并不说明或报告实在的特征, 只是用来做某事。说"我发誓……"不是在报告某人发誓, 而是指发誓这一行为本身。其主要论点为区分事实陈述和伦理陈述的非认知主义所发展。

"以一种曾很普遍的方式忽视了这些可能性, 这被称为'描述谬误'。" ——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》, 1962年, 第3页。

"To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the 'descriptive fallacy.'" —Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, p. 3.

Descriptive meaning

Some philosophers suggest that we distinguish between two kinds of meaning of expressions. Descriptive meaning contributes to a bare presentation of facts, as in the claim "This strawberry is sweet". Evaluative meaning functions in a different way by offering an assessment, as in the claim "This strawberry is good". The descriptive meaning of a statement can be determined by its truth-conditions, while the evaluative meaning cannot. This is because the descriptive meaning is constant while the evaluative meaning varies with the reactions of those using the expression. For instance, "war" has a fixed and translatable descriptive meaning, but its emotive associations can give it different evaluative meanings. For some "war" evokes a feeling of terror, and for others it evokes a feeling of heroic courage. The distinction between these two kinds of meaning is crucial for the distinction between ethical descriptivism (cognitivism) and non-descriptivism (noncognitivism). Non-descriptivism, such as emotivism and prescriptivism, holds that ethical judgements have an element of descriptive meaning, but chiefly have evaluative meaning. In contrast, descriptivism holds that the entire meaning of moral judgements is descriptive. Descriptive meaning is also called semantic meaning.

"As the descriptive meaning of 'good' in 'good apple' is different from its meaning in 'good cactus'; but the evaluative meaning is the same in both cases we are commending." —Hare, *The Language of Morals*, 1952, p. 140.

Descriptive metaphysics

A term introduced by P. F. Strawson in *Individuals*, in contrast to revisionary metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics aims to describe the most general features of our conceptual scheme, that is to describe reality as it manifests itself to the human understanding. Conceptual analysis is its main method. Revisionary metaphysics, on the other hand, attempts to revise our ordinary way of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. Hence, revisionary metaphysicians generally like to establish a well-organised system beyond the world of experience. Strawson claims that the history of metaphysics can be broadly divided into these two kinds of metaphysics. Aristotle and Kant are considered to be the forerunners of descriptive metaphysics, and Strawson's own *Individuals* is also subtitled *An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, while Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley are representatives of revisionary metaphysics. This distinction may not cover all metaphysical systems, but it has been greatly influential in reviving work in metaphysics.

描述意义

有些哲学家主张我们应区分两类表达式的意义。描述意义是对事实的赤裸裸的展现,例如,当我们说:"这个草莓是甜的。"评价意义是以不同的方式提供一种评价,例如,"这个草莓是好的"。一个陈述的描述意义可由其真值条件所决定,而评价意义则不能。这是因为描述意义是不变的,而评价意义则随着该表述的使用者的反应而变化。例如,"战争"这个述词有着一种确定的可解释的描述意义,但它有不同的情感关联,可产生不同的评价意义。对于某些人而言,这个词唤起了一种恐怖的情感,但对于另一些人而言,则唤起了一种英雄般勇敢的情感。这两种意义的区分对于区分伦理描述主义(认知主义)和非描述主义(非认知主义)是至关重要的。非描述主义,诸如情感主义和规定主义,认为伦理判断有描述意义的成分,但它们主要是有评价意义。与此相对照,描述主义认为,道德判断的整个意义都是描述的,描述意义也被称为"语义学意义"。

"'好苹果'中的'好'的描述意义不同于它在'好仙人掌'中的意义,但评价意义是相同的。在两种情形中我们都是作推荐。"——黑尔:《道德语言》,1952年,第140页。

描述形而上学

P. 斯特劳森在《个别物》中引入的专名,相对于修正形而上学而言。描述形而上学旨在描绘我们概念构架的最一般特征,就是要按照实在展现其自身于人类理智的样子来描绘它。概念分析是这种形而上学的主要方法。另一方面,修正形而上学则力图修改我们日常思维方式和日常概念构架,旨在提供一幅在理智上及道德上都更为可取的世界图画。因此,修正形而上学一般喜欢建立一个超越经验世界的有序系统。斯特劳森认为,历史上的形而上学大致上可划分成这两种类型。亚里士多德与康德被看作是描述形而上学的代表,斯特劳森自己的《个别物》也有一个副标题:《论描述形而上学》。另一方面,笛卡尔、莱布尼茨和巴克莱则是修正形而上学的代表。这一区分或许并不能包括历史上所有的形而上学体系,但它对复兴形而上学具有重大影响。

"描述形而上学满足于描绘我们关于世界的思想的现实结构,而修正形而上学则关注于

"Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure." — Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 9.

Descriptive psychology

The name that the German philosopher Franz Brentano gave to his psychology, in which he sought to give a pure description of the constituents of human consciousness and their modes of combination in order to present a general notion of the entirety of human consciousness. According to Brentano, such a psychology enables us to know directly the human mind as it actually is. It is distinguished from genetic psychology because it is not concerned with the physiological genesis of psychological phenomena. However, Brentano considered it to be the basis for genetic psychology. Brentano's descriptive psychology had great impact on Husserl's phenomenology and Meinong's philosophy. It has also played a significant role in the philosophy of mind.

"Descriptive psychology, we said, sets itself the task of an analysing description of our phenomena, i. e., of our immediate experiential facts, or, what is the same, of the objects which we apprehend in our perception." — Brentano, *Descriptive Psychology* (ed. Muller), 1982, p. 139.

Descriptivism

Hare calls the division between descriptive and non-descriptive ethical theories a division between cognitive and noncognitive ethical theories. Descriptivism or cognitivism holds that ethical statements are obtained in the same way as factual statements and accordingly that we understand the meaning of ethical judgements by determining their truth-conditions. Both naturalism and intuitionism belong to descriptivism. Non-descriptivism or noncognitivism, on the other hand, argues that ethical judgements are not the same as factual statements and that they generally are neither true nor false. Their meaning contains a descriptive element which may be decided by their truth-conditions, but they are chiefly emotive or prescriptive. Emotivism and prescriptivism are both varieties of non-descriptivism.

"[T]hat moral judgements are a kind of descriptive judgements, i. e. that their descriptive meaning exhausts their meaning. This is descriptivism." — Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 1963, p. 17.

Desert

What a person ought to get or what he deserves to get according to some facts about him., such as his actions, character or state. Virtuous persons should be rewarded by happiness in proportion to their virtue, and evil persons should be punished in proportion to the degree of evil in their actions. The idea of desert is associated with fairness and

产生一个更好的结构。”——斯特劳森：《个别物》，1959年，第9页。

描述心理学

德国哲学家F. 布伦塔诺对其心理学的命名。在其中他力图对人类意识的组成成分以及它们的组合形式作出纯粹的描述，以提出关于人类意识的全部的整体概念。根据布伦塔诺的观点，这样的心理学使得我们直接了解人心的本来面目。它与发生心理学的区别在于，它不关心心理现象的生理起源。然而，布伦塔诺却认为它是发生心理学的基础。布伦塔诺的描述心理学对于胡塞尔的现象学和迈农的哲学有重大的影响。它在心的哲学中亦起十分重要的作用。

“我们说，描述心理学给自己确立这样的任务：对我们的现象，亦即我们的直接经验事实进行分析描述，或同样地，对我们在知觉中所领悟的对象进行描述。”——布伦塔诺：《描述心理学》（穆勒编），1982年，第139页。

描述主义

黑尔把伦理学理论中描述主义和非描述主义的区分称作认知的与非认知的伦理理论的区分。描述主义或认知主义认为我们获得伦理陈述的方式与我们获得事实陈述的方式是同样的，因此，我们通过决定伦理判断的真值条件来理解它们的意义。自然主义和直觉主义属于描述主义。而非描述主义或非认知主义则认为，伦理判断与事实判断不同。一般而言，它们既不真也不假。它们的意义包含着为真值条件所决定的描述成分，但主要是情感的或规定的。非描述主义包括情感主义和规定主义。

“道德判断是一种描述判断，即它们的描述意义穷尽了它们的意义。这就是描述主义。”——黑尔：《自由与理性》，1963年，第17页。

赏罚

赏罚是一个人根据他的某些实际情况，如他的行为、性格或状态应当得到或值得得到的东西。有德之人因其德行应得到相应的幸福，邪恶之人因其行为的邪恶程度而应受到相应的惩罚。赏罚的思想是与公平和正义相联的，但与平等主义和功利主义的原则相抵触。对赏罚的合

justice, but conflicts with egalitarian and utilitarian principles. Legitimate claims to desert do not always entail that others must guarantee that the claimants get their desert. However, by accepting the idea of desert, one is likely to hold that desert is essential for morality. One is also likely to hold that a just political system should promote the provision of just deserts by distributing benefits and harms according to desert. On this basis, desert is an important element in determining how we should treat persons, especially where no explicit moral principles or rules give us guidance. In contemporary political philosophy, merititarianism is the view that advocates the importance of considering deserts.

"To ascribe desert to a person is to say that it would be a good thing if he were to receive something (advantageous or disadvantageous) in virtue of some action or effort of his or some result brought about by him."—Barry, *Political Argument*, 1965, p. 106.

Desire

[Greek: *orexis*] Aristotle distinguished three forms of desire: (1) *boulesis*: a wish or rational desire for objects conceived as good; (2) *thumos*: an emotional or non-rational desire for objects that appear good. Because Aristotle frequently associated it with self-assertive feelings involving pride and anger, *thumos* can also be translated as "spirit" or "temper"; (3) *epithumia*: an appetite or irrational desire for an object believed to be pleasant. These desires are associated especially with basic biological needs, such as desires for food or sex. Aristotle's classification is apparently based on Plato's tripartite division of the soul, ascribing different desires to different parts of the soul. Desire, in each form, is a motive force leading to movement.

In contemporary philosophy, desire includes all kinds of wants and interests which lead one to act in order to satisfy them, in particular the wants related to bodily pleasure or certain dispositions. As a source of motion, desire is a prominent but complicated concept in moral philosophy and theory of action. Desire can be divided into intrinsic desire (a desire of something for its own sake as an end) and extrinsic desire (a desire of something as a means to further ends). This roughly corresponds to the distinction between basic and derivative desires. Desire is a basic psychological state, which is distinguished from belief because a desire never purports to represent the way the world is and because believing something to be true or good need not rationally affect our desires. This raises a matter of dispute, whether a desire is simply a fact which cannot be assessed in terms of truth and falsehood and which is not subject to rational criticism. Desire is usually ascribed to the appetitive part of the soul, but Plato believed that even reason itself has a desire for the Good. Hume argued that desire is neither true nor false, neither rational nor irrational. Another long-standing debate

理要求并不总是需要其他人必须保证提出要求者得到对他们的赏罚。不过,通过接受赏罚的思想,一个人可能会认为赏罚是道德的本质。一个人还可能会认为,一个公正的政治制度应当借助按照赏罚予以奖惩来倡导公正赏罚的规定。以此为基础,赏罚是我们决定应如何待人的一个重要的因素,特别是在那些没有明确的道德原则或规范指导我们的地方。在当代政治哲学中,赏罚主义是一种倡导重视赏罚的重要性的观点。

“将赏罚归于一个人就是说,如果他由于他的某一行为或努力、或由他导致的某一结果而得到某种东西(有利的或不利的),那都是一件好事。”——培里:《政治上的论证》,1965年,第106页。

欲望

[希腊词 *orexis*] 亚里士多德区分了三种形式的欲望。(1) *boulesis*: 一种被理解为对善的目标的希望或理性欲望;(2) *thumos*: 对于那看来好像是善的目标的一种情感的或非理性的欲望。亚里士多德常把这些欲望与包括自负和愤懑的那些自我认定的感情相联(因此 *thumos* 也被译为“精神”或“脾气”); (3) *epithumia*: 对于被认为是愉快的目标的情欲的或非理性的欲望。这些欲望与基本的生理需求相联,诸如对于食物和性的欲求。亚里士多德分类显然是依据柏拉图的灵魂三分说,把不同的欲望归为灵魂的不同部分。每一种形式的欲望,都是导致活动的动机。

在当代哲学中,欲望指涉的是各种需要和兴趣,尤其是与身体的愉快或某种性情需要相关的欲望,它们导致人们去行动以满足它们。作为一种活动之源,欲望在道德哲学和行为理论中是一个重要而又复杂的概念。欲望被划分为内在欲求(对某事的欲望是因它本身的原故,即作为目的)和外在的欲求(对某事的欲求是作为以后目的的手段)。这大致与基本欲望与派生欲望的划分相符。欲望是一种基本的心理状态,它基于如下理由而与信念相区分: 欲念并不旨在反映这个世界的方式,而相信某事是真或假对于我们的欲望没有合理性的影响。这引起了争议,即欲望是不是不可依据真假来评价和不可受到理性批评的事实? 欲望一般被归为灵魂的情欲部分,但柏拉图相信,即使理性本身也有对善的欲望。休谟则认为,欲望既不真也不假,既不是理性也不是非理性。另一个长期的争论是,关于在行为的发动上欲望与理性的关系,亚里士多德相信两者都相关。休谟则认为,理性在动机意义上是惰性的,因此伦理学必须以欲望为

concerns the relationship between desire and reason in the initiation of action. Aristotle believed that both of them are involved. Hume held that reason is motivationally inert and that ethics must be based on desire. Kant argued that reason can itself lead one to act and that moral laws should be independent of contingent desires.

"Desire: an animal engaged in pursuing a purpose is said to desire the condition in which it will be in relative equilibrium." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, IX, p. 11.

Despair

In ordinary language, despair is the feeling based on the belief that one cannot get what one desires. Kierkegaard took despair as the starting point of his positive philosophy of existence or his anthropological contemplation. Despair is the sense of emptiness one feels in finding that one can neither ignore nor face up to a spiritual goal. As doubt is a despair of thought, despair is a doubt of personality. It is typically presented in one's defiance of God. A person feels that he is right against God, but also that he cannot be right against God. In despair, one feels a contradictory or paradoxical existence, involving an interplay of finitude and infinitude, of the divine and the human and of freedom and necessity. It presents a contradiction between certainty that death is the end and belief that life transcends death. The opposite of despair is faith. For Kierkegaard, a person destroyed by despair is superficial. An authentic feeling of despair initiates a process by which one cultivates one's real self. Despair about one's life and its foundation is necessary if one is to move from a sensuous life to a higher form of existence. Kierkegaard's discussion of despair is a direct source of later existentialism.

"If there is to be any question of a sickness unto death in the strictest sense, it must be a sickness of which the end is death and death is the end. This is precisely what despair is." — Kierkegaard, *Sickness unto Death* (tr. by Hong and Hong), Part One, A, c.

Determinables and determinates

A pair of terms introduced in this century by the British philosopher and logician W. E. Johnson and further specified by A. N. Prior and J. Searle. The relation between determinates and determinables is one between the special and the general. For instance, "red" is a determinate of the determinable "colour", and Plato is a determinate of the determinable "man". However, the relation is significantly different from the relation between genus and species. While a species is defined by adding an independent property (differentia) to a genus, a determinate cannot be specified by conjoining a differentia with the determinable. A determinate has a distinctively positive content. If it is correct to predi-

基础。康德则认为,理性本身能导致一个人行动,道德法则独立于偶性的欲望的。

“欲望:一个投入于对一个目的的追求的动物,据说是在欲求一种它在其中处于相对平衡的条件。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第四卷,第11页。

绝望

在日常语言中,绝望是一种感情,它出自当事人确信自己得不到所愿望者的情境。克尔凯郭尔以绝望作为他关于生存的实际哲学或他的人类学思索的出发点,绝望是这样一种虚无感,它来自人发现自己既不能忽略又不能直接面对一个精神目标时的感受。正如怀疑是一种思想上的绝望,绝望乃是一种对个性的怀疑,它典型地存在于人对上帝的冒犯之中。一个人感到他反对上帝是对的,但又感到他反对上帝不可能是对的。在绝望中,人感受到一种矛盾的或两难的生存,即一种交织回荡于有限与无限、神与人、自由与必然之间的生存。它表现出这样一种矛盾,即确信死亡为终结与相信生命超越死亡之间的矛盾。绝望的反面是信仰。对于克尔凯郭尔来说,被绝望毁灭的人是肤浅的。对于绝望的真切感受本应引发出一个开发人的真实自我的过程。如果一个人要从感觉式的生活上升到更高的生存形态,此人必须对自己的生活及其基础感到绝望。克尔凯郭尔对于绝望的讨论是后来的生存主义或存在主义的一个直接来源。

“如果对于最严格意义上的致死疾病有任何问题的话,回答只能是:它必然是这样一种疾病,其终结为死亡,死亡乃其终结。这就正是绝望的意义。”——克尔凯郭尔:《致死的疾病》(洪夫妇英译),第一部分, A, c。

可确定物和确定物

英国哲学家和逻辑学家 W. E. 约翰逊在本世纪提出的一对术语,并由 A. N. 普赖尔和 J. 塞尔进一步阐明。确定物和可确定物的关系是特殊和一般的关系。例如,“红色”是可确定物“颜色”的确定物,柏拉图是可确定物“人”的确定物。但是,这关系与种和属的关系有着重要的区分。属是由把独立的性质(属差)加之于种,而确定物则不能靠把属差与可确定物连接而得到说明。确定物具有明确的肯定性内容。如果谓述一确定物为一对象是正确的,则该对象必定要列入相应的可确定物的项目中。例如,只有当一物可以着色时,我们才能谓述它为红色。

rate a determinate of an object, the object must fall under the corresponding determinable term. Only if a thing can be coloured, for example, may we predicate red of it. Thus, the determinable is a necessary and sufficient condition of predicability of the determinate. Determinates emanate from determinables as members of mutually exclusive groups, so that all determinates under the same determinable are incompatible.

"I propose to call such terms as colour and shape determinables in relation to such terms as red or circular which will be called determinates."—W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, 1921, vol. 1, p. 174.

Determinant judgement, see *Critique of Judgement*

Determinates, see determinables and determinates

Determination

A term for a property or characteristic, such that what is determinate can be clearly and precisely specified, whilst an indeterminate thing can be specified only vaguely and without precision.

Determination also refers to relations between objects, including material things, events, ideas and states of affairs, such that the existence, occurrence or character of the items that are determined is fixed by the items which determine them. Accordingly, we may infer from knowledge of certain items in such relations to knowledge of certain other items related to them. Some philosophers claim that determination in this sense is identical with causation, for "A causes B" amounts to "A determines B". Others claim that determination is a relation between mathematically idealised states, while causation involves relations between observable changes of state. Still others argue that causation is only one form of determination. The relationship between determination and causation depends largely on how one understands the notion of "causation". Some philosophers also propose that there can be a relation of determination between a thing and itself, that is "self-determination".

"As for 'determination', I do not mean final discovery of truth, but only enough examination to reach a decision as to whether a given statement or its negative is to be admitted as evidence for the hypothesis in question." Goodman, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, 1973, p. 65.

Determinism

The theory that every event has a cause, and that all things in the universe, including human beings, are governed by causal laws and operate in accordance with them. Given such and such conditions, some specified thing must happen.

因此,可确定物是确定物的可谓述性的必要而充分的条件。确定物作为互斥群成员来源于可确定物,以至于属于同一可确定物的所有确定物是不可兼容的。

“相对于把红色的或圆形的称为确定物,我主张把颜色和形状这样的东西称为可确定物。”——约翰逊:《逻辑学》,1921年,第一卷,第174页。

规定的判断力

见《判断力批判》条。

确定物

见“可确定物和确定物”条。

限定性

该术语表示一种特性或特征,因此,举凡限定的东西就能得到清晰而精确的说明,而未限定的东西只能得到含糊而粗略的描述。

限定性也指对象之间的关系,其中包括物质性的东西、事件、思想与事态等等;因此,这些限定事项的存在、发生与特征取决于限定它们的那些事项。相应地,我们可以从这些关系中的某些事项的知识里,推论出与其相关的某些别的事项的知识。有些哲学家宣称,限定性在此意义上等于因果律,因为“甲引起乙”等于说“甲限定乙”。另外一些哲学家则宣称,限定性是数学意义上的理想化状态之间的一种关系,而因果关系则包含着可见的状态变化之间的关系。还有一些哲学家认为,因果关系只不过是一种限定形式罢了。限定性与因果律之间的关系在很大程度上取决于人们如何理解“因果关系”的观念。一些哲学家还建议说,在一件事物与其自身之间可能存在一种限定关系,这便是“自我限定”。

“就‘限定’而言,我并非是指最终的真理发现,而仅仅是指有充分证据做出决定,决定已知的陈述或其否定说法是否可以作为相关假设的证据。”——古德曼:《事实、虚构与预测》,1973年,第65页。

决定论

这种理论认为,每个事件都有原因,宇宙中的所有事物,包括人类,都受因果律的支配,并根据因果律而运行。给定如此这般的条件,某个特定事物必定出现。除了因果决定论之外,决定

There are many versions of determinism in addition to causal determinism. Ethical determinism, which can be found in Plato, Aquinas and Leibniz claims that human voluntary actions are determined by the true end or good. Logical determinism claims that a given future event must either occur or not occur. The prediction before the event that whatever happens would happen will turn out to have been correct; as can be shown purely by logical considerations of future contingents. Theological determinism, which can be found in Augustine, Spinoza and Leibniz, infers from God's will that the existing world is the only possible world, so we have to accept it and find our own places in it. It also infers from God's omniscience and omnipotence that everything that happens is inevitable. There are also varieties of causal determinism. Physical determinism, advocated by the Epicureans and especially by Hobbes, holds that all things, including human actions are determined by eternal and inviolable laws of nature. Psychological determinism, which is elaborated by Hume and others, considers that human behaviour is caused by psychological events within the mind of the agent. Each version of determinism has its opponents. The discussion of determinism is as old as philosophy itself and has produced a vast literature. The principal problem concerns the relation between determinism and free will or human choice. If determinism is true, how can we account for freedom and moral responsibility? Soft determinism claims that free action is still possible in a deterministic world, whilst hard determinism regards free will as illusory.

"... if there is a coherent thesis of determinism, then there must be a sense of 'determined' such that, if that thesis is true, then all behaviour whatever is determined in that sense." —P. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment*, 1974, p. 10.

Determinism, hard, see determinism, soft and hard

Determinism, principle of, see causality, principle of

Determinism, soft and hard

A distinction between soft determinism and hard determinism is drawn by William James. By soft determinism he means all those theories, like Hobbes, Hume and Mill, which affirm that determinism is true, but deny that determinism has the implication that people are not morally responsible. These theories, then, seek somehow to reconcile determinism with morals. By hard determinism, on the other hand, he means those theories holding that people are completely governed by natural laws and are therefore not responsible for what they are or for what they do. On this view, freedom is only an illusion. Representatives of hard

论还有许多说法。柏拉图、阿奎那和莱布尼茨所持有的道德决定论认为,人类的自愿行为由真实的目的或善所决定。逻辑决定论主张,一已知未来事件必定要么发生,要么不发生。事件之前预言说任何发生的事件都会发生将证明是必定正确的;就像可以纯粹从逻辑上考虑未来的偶然事件所表明的那样。可以从奥古斯丁、斯宾诺莎和莱布尼茨那里看到的神学决定论从上帝的意志推断出现存的世界是惟一可能的世界,所以我们只能接受它,并找到我们自己在其中的位置。从上帝的全知全能中还可以推出,任何发生的事都是不可避免的。因果决定论也有若干种。由伊壁鸠鲁,特别是由霍布斯倡导的物理决定论主张,一切事物,包括人类的行动,都是由自然的内在的、不可变更的定律决定的。休谟和其他人阐发的生理学决定论认为人的行为由行为者脑中的生理事件所引发。决定论的每一种表述都有其对立面。关于决定论的讨论和哲学本身一样古老,并产生了相关的文献。主要问题涉及到决定论和自由意志或人的抉择的关系。如果决定论为真,我们何以能够说明自由和道德责任?温和的决定论认为,在决定论世界上,自由行动仍然是可能的,而强硬的决定论认为自由意志是幻想。

“……如果有一种自我一致的决定论观点的话,那么就必然有一种‘被决定’的含义,使得如果该观点为真,那么在此含义下所有一切行为都是被决定的。”——斯特劳森:《自由与怨恨》,1974年,第10页。

强硬的决定论

见“温和的和强硬的决定论”条。

决定论原理

见“因果性原理”条。

温和的和强硬的决定论

温和的决定论和强硬的决定论的区分是由W. 詹姆斯作出的。他所说的温和决定论指像霍布斯、休谟和密尔所有这些人的理论,肯定决定论为真,但否定决定论意味着人们在道德上是没有责任的。所以,这些理论企图找到某种办法来调和决定论和道德。另一方面,他所说的强硬决定论指这样的理论,主张人们完全受自然定律支配,因此对于他们是什么或干什么不负责任。按这种观点,自由只是幻想。强硬决定论的代表是诸如霍尔巴赫、叔本华和霍斯培斯这样一些哲学家。总而言之,强硬决定论认为决定

determinism are philosophers such as Baron D'Holbach, Schopenhauer and Hospers. In short, while hard determinism contrasts determinism with freewill, soft determinism thinks that they are compatible. Hard determinism belongs to incompatibilism, and soft determinism to compatibilism. Currently most defenders of determinism argue for soft determinism.

"Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. . . . Nowadays we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom." —William James, *Essays in Pragmatism*, p. 40.

Deterrence

The threat or warning that retaliation will follow if another party commits a transgression. Its purpose is to prevent harmful and unjust offence. The morality of deterrence is a heatedly debated topic due to its connection with capital punishment and especially with nuclear strategy. The arguments which seek to justify the necessity of capital punishment are chiefly based on its function as a deterrent, that is on the expected reduction of murders and other violent crimes in a society in which murderers are executed. The major ground for the justification of the possession of nuclear weapons is also its function as a deterrent, that is the expected consequence of preventing war. However, deterrence itself involves many paradoxes. Should deterrence be sincere, so that retaliation will be carried out if the threat fails, or insincere, so that retaliation will not be carried out if the threat fails? If it is insincere, is it morally ruled out as a form of lying? If it is sincere, would retaliation carry the risk of violating any conception of a just war by punishing innocent people and punishing the offence disproportionately? Should we only threaten what we may morally do? If this is the case, the function of deterrence in maintaining the real goods of peace and stability will be undermined. But if we must threaten to do what is morally wrong, then how can deterrence itself be permissible? Different and conflicting moral principles will lead to different and conflicting answers to these questions about deterrence.

"It is doubtful whether threats of punishment have as much deterrent value as it is often supposed." Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 504.

Deus sive natura

[Latin; God or nature] Spinoza claimed that there is only one substance in which all attributes and modes inhere, but that this substance has two names, God or nature. This is the first principle of Spinoza's metaphysical system and the chief characteristic of his pantheism. God might be conceived to be the creator of the world, and nature might be conceived to be that which God created, but God is nature, and nature

论和自由意志不同,而温和决定论认为它们可以并存。强硬决定论属于不兼容主义,而温和决定论属于可兼容主义。目前,大多数捍卫决定论的人主张温和决定论。

“老式的决定论是我们所谓的强硬决定论……现在我们有一种温和决定论,它厌恶僵硬严厉的话语,拒斥宿命论、必然性,甚至先定论,说自己的真名实姓是自由。”——詹姆斯:《实用主义文集》,第40页。

威慑

一种如果对方侵犯法律,报复将随之而来的威胁或警告。它的目的在于阻止有害的和公正的冒犯。威慑的道德是一个热门话题,因为它与“死刑”,尤其是与核武器的战略问题相关。寻求证明死刑的必要性的论证主要是基于它的威慑作用,即希望减少犯罪率和在处死犯人的社会中的其他暴力犯罪。而为拥有核武器作辩护的主要理由也是基于核武器威慑的作用,即希望有防止战争的效果。不过,威慑本身涉及到许多悖论。威慑应该是真诚的(即如果威胁失败,报复将被执行)或是不真诚的(如果威胁失败,报复仍不执行)?如果它是不真诚的,那么,这是一种谎言,这在道德上是不允许吗?如果它是真诚的,执行报复就会导致惩罚无辜者或不适当地惩罚冒犯者,因而具有违反正义战争看法的危险吗?或者我们只能对我们在道德上能做的事进行威胁吗?如果这样,则威慑在维持和平与稳定这些真正好的方面的功能就会削弱。但如果我们威胁做道德上的错事,那么,威慑本身怎能允许?不同的相冲突的道德原则对威慑的这些问题将得出不同的甚至相冲突的答案。

“惩罚威胁是否有通常所认定的那样大的威慑价值,是很可疑的。”——布朗特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第504页。

神或自然

[拉丁语,神或自然]斯宾诺莎宣称,只存在一个实体,一切属性和样式都为它固有,但这个实体有两个名称,即神或自然。这是斯宾诺莎形而上学体系的第一原理,也是他泛神论思想的主要特征。神可被想像为世界的创造者,自然亦可被想像为神的创造物,但神就是自然,自然就是神。没有形式上的区别。这样,斯宾诺莎就

is God. There is no formal distinction. Spinoza thus denied the contrast between God and the world, a thesis essential for Christianity. Philosophers have discussed the consequences of his position as well as the methodological basis of his metaphysical arguments.

"There can only be one substance, and this Spinoza called 'God or Nature' (Deus sive Natura)." - Ninian Smart, *Historical Selections in the Philosophy of Religion*, 1962, p. 124.

Developmentalism

Also called the genetic method, Werner Jaeger's method for dealing with Aristotle's thought elaborated in *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (1923). Aristotle's thought is traditionally interpreted as a unified organic system. Jaeger, however, claimed that there was an intellectual development in Aristotle from his early Platonism to the empiricism of his later period. He believed that it was impossible to explain the peculiar state of Aristotle's extant writings without the supposition that they belonged to different stages in his evolution of thought. His interpretation has greatly influenced Aristotelian scholarship in this century and still offers a major approach to reading Aristotle. Nevertheless, Jaeger's own developmental picture has been widely criticised, especially by G. E. L. Owen, who argued that Aristotle started by attacking Platonism and later developed a position closer to Platonism.

"Despite the number of developmental studies that have been carried out the complex task of reassessing Aristotle has still only just begun. So far other scholars have hardly been much more successful than Jaeger was in gaining acceptance for their interpretations of the way Aristotle's thought developed." - G. E. R. Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 1968, p. 24.

Deviant causal chain, another name for wayward causal chain

Deviant logic

A term for a non-classical or non-standard logic. These logic systems establish different sets of theorems or valid inferences from those established by classical or standard logic and are proposed as rivals to the latter. Some deviant logics, for example, reject the principle of bivalence in classical logic. Deviant logics include many-valued logic, intuitionist logic, quantum logic and free logic. They contrast with extended logics which introduce new vocabulary and new theorems to classical logic and hence are extensions rather than rivals to it. Examples of extended logics are modal logic, tensed logic, deontic logic and epistemic logic.

"A 'deviant logic' is a system which is a deviation of classical logic." - Haack, *Philosophy of Logics*, 1978, p. 204.

否定了神与世界之间的对立，而这正是基督教的本质命题。哲学家们讨论了他的立场的蕴含，以及他的形而上学论证的方法论基础。

"只能有一个实体存在，斯宾诺莎将此称为‘神或自然’。"——斯马特：《宗教哲学史籍选》，1962年，第124页。

发生论

也叫“发生法”，是W. 耶格尔在其《亚里士多德：发展史基础》（1923年）中论述亚里士多德思想的方法。传统上亚里士多德的思想被解释成是一个统一的或有机的系统。但耶格尔主张亚里士多德经历了一个理智发展过程，从早期的柏拉图主义到晚期的经验主义。他深信，如果我们不把现存的亚里士多德著作看作是属于他思想发展的不同阶段，要解释其种种奇怪之处是不可能的。这一解释极大地影响了本世纪的亚里士多德研究，至今依然是阅读亚里士多德的一种重要方法。尽管如此，耶格尔自己的发展图式受到了广泛的批评，尤其为另一位著名的亚里士多德学者G. E. L. 欧文所批评。他认为，亚里士多德是从批评柏拉图主义开始，然后发展到一种与柏拉图主义相近的立场。

"虽然应用发生论来从事重新估价亚里士多德这一复杂工作才刚刚开始，迄今为止，在有关亚里士多德的思想是如何发展的种种解释中，耶格尔的论点与其他学者的相比更易为人接受。"——罗伊德：《亚里士多德》，1968年，第24页。

变异因果链

“无常因果链”的别名。

变异逻辑

表示非经典或非标准逻辑的术语。这些逻辑系统所确立的定理集或有效推理，与经典或标准逻辑所确立的不同，它们是作为后者的竞争者提出来的。例如，某些变异逻辑拒斥经典逻辑中的二值原则，这包括多值逻辑、直觉主义逻辑、量子逻辑和自由逻辑。变异逻辑与扩充逻辑形成对照，后者把新词汇和新定理引入经典逻辑，所以是经典逻辑的扩充而不是它的竞争者。扩充逻辑包括例如模态逻辑、时态逻辑、道义逻辑、认知逻辑。

"‘变异逻辑’是经典逻辑的变异系统。"——哈克：《逻辑哲学》，1978年，第204页。

Dialectic (Hegel)

Hegel's conception of dialectic was influenced by Kant's antinomies and Fichte's triadic process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hegel claimed that contradictions are universally present and account for all change and movement in both thought and the world. Through dialectic, thought as understanding first holds a category as a concept which is finite and independent of other concepts; secondly, thought as negative reason recognises that the initial concept depends for its meaning on being contrasted with its negation; and thirdly, thought as positive reason reaches a higher category which embraces both earlier contradictory categories in a unity of opposites, but also contains a contradiction in itself. This tripartite structures of opposition and subsequent reconciliation keeps repeating until the complete system of concepts is reached. Hegel claimed that dialectic is not merely a process of thinking, but is a development conducted by concepts themselves and by the absolute idea. More important, dialectic also constitutes the autonomous self-development of the world. He claimed that a thing develops by changing into its opposite and then resolves the contradiction into a synthesis. The process continues until it arrives at complete perfection. This tripartite structure is also the architectonic structure of Hegel's philosophy. Some philosophers seek to retain Hegel's attempt to understand change and development in thought and the world, but reject the rigidity of his dialectical structure.

"It is customary to treat Dialectic as an adventitious art, which for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance of contradiction into definite notions. . . But by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 81.

Dialectic (Kant), see canon, transcendental dialectic

Dialectical materialism

The general name for Marxist philosophy, although it is sometimes distinguished from historical materialism in virtue of its focus on ontology and epistemology. Dialectical materialism provides the fundamental principles of Marxism, with historical materialism showing how these principles are worked out in society and history. Influenced by Hegel's dialectic and Ludwig Feuerbach's materialism, it seeks to provide an organic combination of dialectic and materialism. In opposition to idealism, it holds that matter is the primary being and that mind is subordinate. Matter can exist without mind, but mind cannot exist without matter. Sense-experience reveals the existence of an external and objective world.

辩证法 (黑格尔)

黑格尔的辩证法概念受到康德的二律背反和费希特的正题、反题和合题的三一式过程的影响。黑格尔主张,矛盾是普遍存在的,它说明了思想和世界的一切变化和运动。按照辩证法,思想作为知性,首先把范畴看作是有限和独立于其他概念的概念;其次,思想作为否定的理性认识到,原初的概念其意义依赖于与它的否定者的对比;第三,思想作为肯定的理性达到了更高的范畴,它把先前的矛盾范畴包含于对立统一之中,但自身中也包含着矛盾。这种对立和随后的调解的三一式结构不断重复直至达到概念的完整体系。黑格尔主张,辩证法不单纯是思维过程,而且是概念本身和绝对理念所进行的发展。更重要的是,辩证法也构成了世界的自发的自我发展。他认为,事物通过变为它的对立面,然后解决矛盾而发展为综合。这个过程不断进行一直达到完善。这个三一式结构也是黑格尔哲学的建筑结构。某些哲学家努力保留黑格尔的思想和世界运动变化的思想,但反对他的辩证结构的僵硬性。

"辩证法通常被看成一种外在的技艺,它由于主观的任性而给确定的概念带来混乱和矛盾的单纯假象……但所谓辩证法是一种内在的超越,通过这种超越,知性概念的局限性和片面性便昭然若揭,并表明是对知性自身的否定。" —黑格尔:《小逻辑》,81节。

辩证论 (康德)

见“法规”、“先验辩证论”条。

辩证唯物主义

马克思主义哲学的通用名称,由于它着重于本体论和认识论,有时又区别于历史唯物主义。辩证唯物主义提出了马克思主义的基本原理,而历史唯物主义表明这些原理如何在社会和历史中得到彻底贯彻。它受到黑格尔的辩证法和L. 费尔巴哈的唯物主义的影响,从而极力把辩证法和唯物主义有机地结合起来。与唯心主义相对立,它坚持认为物质是第一性的存在,而精神是派生的。物质可以没有精神而存在,而精神没有物质则不能存在。感觉经验揭示出外部客观世界的存在。与机械唯物主义相对比,它坚持认为,物质世界不是静止不动的。事

In contrast to mechanistic materialism, it holds that the material world is not static. Things are full of contradictions or opposites which drive them into a continuous process of development. This development is progressive through recognising and reconciling the inherent contradictions. The basic principles of development include the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, the law of the inter-penetration of opposites and the law of negation of the negation. Dialectic materialism is the basis of Marxist theories of social change and revolution and has formed an essential part of communist ideology. The theory was founded by Marx and expounded in detail by Engels in *Anti Daring* (1879) and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (1888). It was further developed by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio criticism* (1909). Neither Marx nor Engels used the term "dialectical materialism" to refer to their materialism. Plekhanov first adopted the term to refer to the metaphysical framework of Marxism.

"The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements—have remarkably confirmed Marx's dialectical materialism." —Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism". 1.

Dianoia

[Greek: intelligence, mind, thinking, reasoning, from the verb *dianoesthai* | A term used in different related ways. First, *dianoia* is mind or thinking in general, in contrast to body (*soma*). Secondly, it is thought or intelligence, divided by Aristotle according to whether it is concerned with study (*theoria*), with production (*technē*) and with action (*phronesis*). Thirdly, it is rational understanding or discursive thinking, in contrast to intuitive thinking (*nous* or *noesis*). Fourthly, in Plato's simile of the Line, it is the state of mind which is concerned with mathematical entities, that reasons from hypotheses and that reaches conclusions with the aid of sensible objects rather than reasoning from unhypothetical first principles.

"When *dianoia* is concerned with study, not with action or production, its good or bad state consists in being true or false." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a28-9.

Dichotomy, paradox of

Also called the stadium or racetrack paradox, one of Zeno's arguments to show that motion is impossible. If somebody wants to move from A to B, he must first reach the halfway point between A and B; but before reaching the halfway point, he must reach the halfway point between A and that halfway point, and so *ad infinitum*. Thus to move any distance at all, one must cover an infinite number of halfway points, which is impossible in any finite time. Therefore, it is logically impossible for someone to move from A to B. Aristotle's first diagnosis of this paradox was

物充满矛盾和对立，这些矛盾驱使事物产生发展的连续过程。这种发展是通过认识和调解内在矛盾的前进过程。发展的基本原理包括量变到质变的规律、对立面相互渗透的规律、否定之否定的规律。辩证唯物主义是马克思主义关于社会变化和社会革命理论的基础，并已成为其共产主义意识形态的本质部分。这个理论是由马克思所创立，由恩格斯在《反杜林论》(1879)和《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》(1888)中加以详尽的阐发。它由列宁在《唯物主义和经验批判主义》(1909)中加以进一步发展。马克思和恩格斯都没有用“辩证唯物主义。”这个词来命名他们的唯物主义。普列汉诺夫首先采用这个术语来指明马克思主义的形而上学的框架。

“自然科学的最新发现，如镭、电子、元素转化等——已经辉煌地证实了马克思的辩证唯物主义。”——列宁：《马克思主义的三个来源和三个组成部分》，1。

理智

[希腊词，理智，心灵，思维，推理，出自动词 *dianoesthai*] 这一词有相关的不同用法。(1) 指一般的心灵或思维，与肉体 (*soma*) 相对；(2) 思想或职能，亚里士多德将之划分成关于研究的（称作“思辨”），关于制作的（称作“技艺”）和关于行为的（称作“慎思”）；(3) 理性理解或论证性思维，与直观性思维（努斯或理解）相对；(4) 在柏拉图的线段之喻中，是指关涉于数学实体的心智状态，它从假设开始推理，在可感事物的帮助下达到结论，而不是从不是假设的第一原则出发所做的推理。

“当理智关注研究，而不是行为或制作时，它的好坏状态在于其是真的或是假的。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1139a28—29。

二分法悖论

也叫“运动场”或“竞技场”悖论，是芝诺用以表明运动不可能的论证之一。如果有人要从 A 走到 B，他必须先达到 A 和 B 的中间点；但在到达中间点前，他必须先到达 A 和那个中间点之间的中间点，以此类推，以至无穷。这样，要越过任何一段距离，这人必须越过无穷个中间点，而这在任何有限的时间内是不可能的。因而，在逻辑上这人不可能从 A 移至 B。亚里士多德对这一悖论最初的诊断是，有限的时间也是可以无限划分的，故一个人有可能经过一段

that a finite time is also infinitely divisible and that will be sufficient for someone to move an infinitely divisible distance. He later decided that the response was not adequate, and claimed instead that the infinite number of halves is only a potential, rather than an actual, infinity. Contemporary philosophers and mathematicians are still inquiring whether it is really impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks; if it is impossible, whether the impossibility is a logical one or merely a physical one and what the impossibility really consists in. Many answers have been proposed, but none is generally accepted.

"For we have many arguments contrary to accepted opinion, such as Zeno's that motion is impossible and that you cannot traverse the stadium." —Aristotle, *Topics*, 160b7-8.

Dictum de omni et nullo

[Latin; said of all and none] A principle which some medieval logicians believed to be the principle of the first figure of syllogism, and which others even thought to be a principle underlying all valid syllogistic reasoning. Among its various formulations, one version is that "whatever is affirmed or denied universally of something is also affirmed or denied of anything of which that thing is predicated of". This is alleged to be derived from Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 24b26. A related version is "what qualifies an attribute qualifies a thing possessing it". This is claimed to be based on Aristotle's *Categories* 1b10. But modern logicians believe that Aristotle never intended such a principle for his syllogism, even for its first figure. Indeed it is impossible that this principle covers all valid moods of syllogism.

"The *dictum de omni* [*et nullo*] defines the relation of subject and predicate, so that 'Any A is B' is to be understood as meaning 'To whatever A is applicable, B is applicable.'" —Peirce, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 366.

Differance

[French; *différance*] A term introduced by Derrida from the French verb "*différer*", meaning both "to differ" (to be other, not to be identical) and "to defer" (to temporize, to take recourse in the temporal mediation of a detour that suspends the fulfilment of desire). Differing, corresponding to the Greek *diapherein*, is related to spatiality and is the root of all conceptual oppositions. Deferring, on the other hand, is related to temporality and involves the perceptual change in the relationship of determining meaning between the linguistic chain and the extralinguistic world. With this neologism, Derrida tries to suggest that while traditional metaphysics is concentrated on "presence", the meaning of language is always deferred because linguistic meaning is associated with the use of language and cannot be present in language as structure. In a productive movement, differance

可无限分割的距离。但后来他认定这一回答是不合适的,所以提供了另一答案说,无穷数量的一半只是潜在的,而不是现实的。当代哲学家和数学家们仍在研究,是否完成一无穷系列的任务确实是不可能的;如果是的话,那么这种不可能性是逻辑的还是只是物理的;到底是什么构成了不可能性。人们已经提供了许多答案,但尚无一个得到普遍认可。

"我们有许多与我们的认可的观念相反的论证,如芝诺认为运动不可能,所以你不可能越过运动场。"——亚里士多德:《正位篇》, 160b7—8。

遍有遍无公理

[拉丁文,指遍有遍无]中世纪的逻辑学家相信这条原则是三段论第一式的原则,而其他人则把它看作是一切可靠的三段论推理背后的原则。在对它的各种表述中,有一种是,"凡是对某物的整体肯定或否定的东西,也是对这个事物所构成的部分肯定或否定的东西。"这被看作是来自亚里士多德的《前分析》, 24b26。另一种相关的说法是,"凡是修饰特性的东西,也修饰具有这个特性的事物"。这被看作是基于亚里士多德的《范畴》, 1b10。但现代逻辑学家相信,亚里士多德决不可能为他的三段论,即使是第一式,提出这种原则。而这个原则实际上也不可能涵盖三段论所有可靠的式。

"遍有遍无公理定义了主词与谓词的关系,因而,'任何A都是B'就可以理解为意味着'可以用于A的东西,也可以用于B'。"——皮尔士:《文集》,第二卷,第336页。

趋别

[法文为 *différance*]德里达引入的一个词,来自法文中的一个动词 "*différer*"; 这个词有两个意义:"区别"(differ, 与之不同、不一样)和"拖延"(defer, 延宕、通过暂时的曲折调停而推迟欲望的满足)。区别相应于希腊词 *diapherein*, 与空间性相关;并且是所有概念对立的根源。与此不同,拖延关系到时间性,涉及这样一种知觉的改变,它发生于确定语言链条和超语言世界的意义关系中。用这样一个新造词,德里达试图表明,传统的形而上学的关注焦点是"在场",而语言的意义却总是被拖延着(而无法定于一尊)的,因为语言的意义与语言的使用相联系,不能作为结构而呈现于语言之中。在创造性的运动中,趋别(differance)〔注意此词的书写,它将法文的 "différence (区

is an oscillation between differing and deferring. It is the condition for the possibility of all objects and the condition for the opening of Heidegger's ontological difference between Being and beings. It is the irreducible difference of all differences. For Derrida, différance indicates the impossibility of achieving a theoretical account of a thing's inner structure and serves as the condition for the deconstruction of metaphysics.

"In a conceptuality adhering to classical strictures, 'différance' would be said to designate a constitutive, productive, and originary causality, the process of scission and division which would produce or constitute different things or differences. But because it brings us close to the infinitive and active kernel of *différer*, *différance* (with an *a*) neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active." — Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy* (trans. A. Bass), 1982, pp. 8-9.

Difference principle

Rawls' second principle of justice includes two parts, the first requiring fair equality of opportunity and the second, called the difference principle, constraining the distribution of social and economic inequalities so that the position of the least advantaged members of society will be as good as it can be. Inequalities in income, wealth and office can be tolerated so long as they involve a continuous mutual improvement. The operation of this principle does not aim to reduce the advantage of more favoured individuals, but rather to improve the situation of less-favoured ones. The principle involves a basic contrast with the utilitarian pursuit of social arrangements which promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number and sharply conflicts with the Social Darwinist suggestion that the unfit should be eliminated for the advantage of society. Commentators have raised problems concerning the relations between the difference principle and the other principles of justice advanced by Rawls. The principle has been vigorously debated by those who seek a more egalitarian principle and by those who argue that it is unjust to enforce Rawlsian constraints on the distribution of goods. In particular, Robert Nozick argues that individuals are entitled to goods which they have legally acquired whatever the pattern of distribution turns out to be.

"Then the difference principle is a strongly egalitarian conception in the sense that unless there is a distribution that makes both persons better off (limiting ourselves to the two-person case for simplicity), an equal distribution is to be preferred." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 76.

Differentia. see genus, definition

别)中第二个“e”改写成了“a”,但两词发音无区别。中译保持了这种音同形不同的特点。)是处于区别和拖延之间的摆动。它是使所有对象可能的条件,并且是揭示海德格尔的存在本身与存在者之间的存在论区别的条件。它是所有区别的不可还原的区别。对于德里达而言,趋别表明要获得对事物的内在结构的理论说明是不可能的,并因此是对形而上学进行解构的前提。

“在习惯于经典苛评的概念框架中,‘趋别’会被说成指称着一种构造的、产生性的和原发的因果关系,即产生和构成不同事物或区别的切分过程。但是,由于它使我们接近了‘区别与拖延’(différer)的不定式的和主动语态的核心,趋别或différance(含有一个‘a’)将不定式所指示者中性化为单纯的主动语态。”——德里达:《哲学的边缘》(巴斯英译),1982年,第8—9页。

差别原则

罗尔斯关于正义的第二个原则,包括两个部分,第一是要求机会的公正平等,第二叫做差别原则,即强行限制社会和经济的不平等的分配,以使最少获利的社会成员的境况尽可能地改善。只要收入、财富和当官这些方面的不平等包含着持续的、共同的改善,它们就是可以被容忍的。这一原则的实行不是为了减少得到较多优惠的人的利益,而是要改善得到较少优惠的人的境况。这一原则与功利主义者追求的促进绝大多数人的最大利益的社会安排有着基本的不同,与社会达尔文主义者提出的为了社会的利益不适合者应被消灭的主张也有尖锐的冲突。评论家们已对差别原则和罗尔斯提出的正义的其他原则之间的关系提出疑问。那些追求一个更为平等的原则的人,和那些论证实施罗尔斯的对利益分配的强制是不公正的人,对差别原则展开了激烈的争论。特别是R. 诺齐克,他论证说,无论分配模式的结果如何,个人都有权得到他们合法获得的利益。

“那么差别原则在下面的意义上就是一种强烈的平等主义观念:除非有一种使两个人的状况都得到改善的分配(为简化起见,我们限于两个人的情况),否则,一种平等的分配就更可取。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第76页。

属差

见“种”、“定义”条。

Dignity

A prominent attribute of human beings, an object of respect which is independent of such factors as race, gender, talent, wealth or social rank and is purely rooted in human reason and autonomy. The notion of human dignity was emphasised in the Renaissance, and is fully elaborated in Kant's ethics. Any agent who is morally authentic has personal dignity. Since human beings have dignity, they must be treated as ends in themselves, rather than merely as a means to other ends. Traditionally, human dignity have been considered to be the basis of moral worth, and human beings have been held to be the only objects of moral consideration. In contemporary ethics, the notion of human dignity is challenged. According to behaviourists and Freud, the noble account of humanity is false, because the majority of human actions are determined by desires and dispositions rather than being guided by reason. Proponents of animal ethics accuse this notion of being the product of speciesism. Utilitarians also believe that human dignity is not supreme and can be overridden to obtain the best consequences. In spite of these challenges, human dignity is widely upheld, in part because it provides intelligible grounds for human rights and self-respect.

"That which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i. e. value, but has an intrinsic worth, that is dignity." — Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, preface, Sect. I.

Dilemma

In ordinary language, a dilemma is a situation in which one has to make a choice between two or more conflicting but equally important alternatives. Ryle used the term for theoretical situations in which a thinker is strongly inclined to support different positions and embracing one of these positions would seemingly oblige him to repudiate the others. In logic, a dilemma is a form of argument consisting of two conditionals and one disjunction. They are divided into constructive dilemmas and destructive dilemmas. Each is sub-divided into one complex form and one simple form. The simple constructive form is: if p then q; if r then q; p or r; therefore q. The complex constructive form is: if p then q; if r then s; p or r; therefore q or s. The simple destructive form is: if p then q; if p then s; not q or not s; therefore not-p. The complex destructive form is: if p then q; if r then s; not q or not s; therefore not-p or not-r.

"A dilemma is a formal argument containing a premise in which two or more hypotheticals are conjunctly affirmed, and a second premise in which the antecedents of these hypotheticals are alternatively affirmed or their consequences alternatively denied." — Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1906, p. 363.

尊严

人类的一个显著属性,一个与种族、性别、才能、财富、社会地位等不相关的可尊重对象,尊严纯粹根植于理性与自主性。人类尊严的概念在文艺复兴中得到强调,而为康德的伦理学所充分阐发。如果一个行为者在道德上是真诚的,他或她就有着人格上的尊严。由于人类有尊严,他们必须自身被当做目的来对待,而不是作为为其他目的的一个工具。在传统意义上,人类的尊严被认为是道德价值的基础,因此人类被看作是道德考虑的惟一客体。在当代伦理学中,人类尊严的概念受到挑战。根据行为主义者和弗洛伊德的主张,人类尊贵的说法不是真实的,因为大多数人类行为是出于欲望和性情,而不是受到理性的导引。动物伦理学谴责这个观念是物种主义的产物。功利主义也相信人类尊严不是至上的,它能够被侵犯,如果对它的侵犯可导致最好的后果。不过,人类尊严仍是一个被广泛持有的观念,部分是因为它为人权和自重提供了理智根据。

“那种构成事物作为自在目的而存在的条件的东西,就不仅具有相对价值,而且具有内在价值,这就是尊严。”——康德:《实践理性批判》,序言, I。

二难困境

在日常语言中,二难困境是指人们不得不在两个或多个相互冲突但同等重要的候选者中作出选择的情形。赖尔使用这个词指称下述理论处境:一位思想家强烈地倾向于支持几种不同的见解,假如他坚持这些见解中的某一种,看起来将迫使他摒弃其他的见解。在逻辑中,它是指由两个条件句和一个析取式构成的论证形式。它分为构成式二难推理和破斥式二难推理。每一种再分为复杂式和简单式。简单构成式是:如果 p 则 q; 如果 r 则 q; p 或者 r; 所以 q。复杂构成式是:如果 p 则 q; 如果 r 则 s; p 或者 r; 所以 q 或者 s。简单破斥式是:如果 p 则 q; 如果 p 则 s; 非 q 或非 s; 所以非 p。复杂破斥式是:如果 p 则 q; 如果 r 则 s; 非 q 或非 s; 所以非 p 或非 r。

“二难推理是一种形式论证,其一个前提合取地断定了两个或多个假言命题,第二个前提则析取地断定了假言命题的前件,或者析取地否定了假言命题的后件。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1906年,第363页。

Dilemma of attention

A problem for the notion of a sense-datum. A sense-datum is generally conceived as being what is directly present in perception and as being incorrigible. However, it is a fact that what is present in perception will be different according to whether one perceives inattentively or carefully. For instance, when we look at a speckled hen, at first glance it is perceived vaguely as being speckled, but a close look will show the colour and shape of the speckles and we may also come to know their size and number. The sense-datum theory faces a dilemma in explaining this phenomenon: it is forced either to admit that the sense data changes with the change of attention, or to say that the accuracy of sense-data varies. If it admits the former, we have difficulty in understanding how the change in attention, which is merely a change in the mode of awareness, can affect a change in the object. If it says the latter, then sense-data cannot be incorrigible. While Ayer insists on the incorrigibility of sense-data, and hence admits that sense-data are different in different situations, Price maintains that sense-data are consistent at the expense of their incorrigibility. Since the example of the speckled hen is widely employed to illustrate the problem, this dilemma is also called the problem of the speckled hen.

"Apart from the weakness of those arguments [for the existence of sense-data] the final conception of sense-data involves serious difficulties. The first is the dilemma of attention." Hirst, *The Problem of Perception*, 1959, p. 52.

Diminished responsibility

Some defendants who satisfy the *mens rea* criterion can still provide evidence to prove that they committed a crime when their mentality was abnormal. Such mental conditions do not constitute insanity, but substantially impair the defendant's powers of control, judgement and reasoning. Hence, the defendant is not fully accountable for his action. If such an excuse is acceptable, the defendant's responsibility for the crime is also diminished and this can reduce a conviction to a less severe crime, although it does not justify total acquittal. The idea of diminished responsibility was introduced in England by statute in 1957. This partial defence applies mainly in murder cases. If a plea of diminished responsibility is successful, a person accused of murder might be found guilty only of manslaughter.

"[T]he doctrine of diminished responsibility... provides that a person who kills should not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind as 'substantially impaired his mental responsibility', but only of manslaughter carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life." — Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, 1968, p. 57.

注意两难

作为感觉材料概念的一个问题而提出。一个感觉材料被普遍设想为直接呈现于知觉的、不可纠正的东西。然而,事实上,在一个人不注意地进行知觉或认真仔细地进行知觉时,呈现于知觉中的东西是不一样的。例如,当我们看一只只有斑点的母鸡时,在第一眼,它只是模糊地被看作是有斑点的,但仔细一看,就会看出斑点的颜色和形状,甚至还可以知道它们的大小和数目。感觉材料理论在解释这一现象时面临一个两难:它或者被迫承认感觉材料随着注意的变化而发生变化,或者不得不说感觉材料的精确性会发生变化。如果它承认前者,我们就难以理解,注意的变化仅仅作为一种知觉形式的变化,如何能够导致对象的变化。如果采用后一种说法,那么感觉材料就不可能是不可纠正的。艾耶尔坚持感觉材料的不可纠正,因此承认感觉材料在不同的情境下会有所不同,而普赖斯则牺牲不可纠正性而坚持感觉材料的一致性。由于花斑母鸡的例子被广泛使用来说明这一问题,这一两难又被称为“花斑母鸡问题”。

“除了[对于感觉材料之存在的]论证的无力以外,对于感觉材料的最后一个概念包含着严重的困难。首先是注意两难问题。”——赫斯特:《知觉问题》,1959年,第52页。

部分责任

某些被告符合犯罪精神状态的规定,但能提供文件证明他们是在精神状态不正常情况下犯罪的。这种精神状态不构成精神病,但在很大程度上损伤了被告的控制、判断和推理的能力。因此,被告不对他的行为负完全的责任。如果这一理由被接受,被告对其犯罪的责任也就被减轻了,虽然这不能提供宣判完全无罪的法律根据,但能使不太严重的犯罪得以减刑。部分责任这一见解是在1957年以法规的形式传入英格兰的。这一部分的辩护主要应用于谋杀案中。对被告而言,一旦部分责任的抗辩得以成立,被控告犯有谋杀罪的人也许只被判为误杀罪。

“部分责任这一理论……提出,一个人虽杀了人,但如果他正处在‘其心理责任在很大程度上受到损害’这样一种精神不正常的情况下,他就不能被定为谋杀罪,而只能定为最多处以无期徒刑的误杀罪。”——哈特:《惩罚与责任》,1968年,第57页。

Ding-an-sich, The German term for thing-in-itself

Dionysian / Apollonian

In the *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche characterised the Dionysian and Apollonian as two natural artistic powers. The Apollonian is associated with dreams and illusions and is the impulse to create harmony and measure and to establish proportionate form amid the flux of change. The Dionysian, in contrast, is associated with intoxication and is the impulse to disrupt and to change established orders and norms. This duality developed in Nietzsche from the basic impulses operative in art into the basic tendencies discernible in human life and in nature. He viewed the two tendencies as different expressions of a single fundamental impulse: the will to power. In his later usage, the Dionysian is no longer opposed to the Apollonian, but becomes a synthesis of both gods. The world itself is described as a Dionysian one which is eternally self-creating, and eternally self-destroying, that is a world characterised by the process of eternal recurrence.

"Much will have been gained for esthetic once we have succeeded in apprehending directly—rather than merely ascertaining—that art owes its continuous evolution to the Apollonian-Dionysiac duality, even as the propagation of the species depends on the duality of the sexes, their constant conflicts and periodic acts of reconciliation." —Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, I.

Direct intention

Bentham distinguished between direct intention and oblique intention. Direct intention is what is directly or strictly aimed at, including both the ends and the means to achieve the ends. These are the agent's deliberate and voluntary choices for which he claims direct responsibility. Oblique intention, on the other hand, is the foreseen consequences of the agent's voluntary actions which lie outside the range of what is strictly pursued. This distinction is closely related to the problem of double effect, which contrasts the deliberate effects produced by an action and its foreseen but undesired effects.

"A consequence, when it is intentional, may either be directly so, or only obliquely. It may be said to be directly or linearly intentional, when the prospect of producing it constituted one of these links in the chain of causes by which the person was determined to do that act." —Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, III, 1970, p. 84.

Direct realism

A type of perceptual realism which claims that the physical world is independent of perceivers and that what we perceive directly is the nature of the physical objects them-

物自体

“物自体 (thing-in-itself)” 的德语词。

狄俄尼索斯的/阿波罗的

在《悲剧的诞生》中,尼采将狄俄尼索斯状态和阿波罗状态说成是两种自然的艺术力量。阿波罗状态与梦想和幻觉相连,是一种要创造和谐与尺度,并在变化之流中建立合适形式的冲动。与此相反,狄俄尼索斯状态与沉醉相关,是去破坏、去改变现有秩序和规范的冲动。在尼采的著作中,这种二元化从活跃在艺术中的基本冲动发展成为在人类生活和本性中可知觉到的基本倾向。他视这两种倾向为一个单独的基本冲动,即对力量的意愿 [the will to power, 一般译作“权力意志”] 的不同表现。在他后期的用法中,狄俄尼索斯状态不再与阿波罗状态相对,而是成为两位神的综合。这世界本身被描述为一个永远在自我创造和自我毁灭的狄俄尼索斯的世界,也就是一个具有永恒轮回过程的世界。

“对于美学大有益处的一件事就在于我们能够直接领会到,而不仅仅是断言,艺术之所以能够持续发展,要归因于阿波罗和狄俄尼索斯状态的二元性 [甚至物种的繁衍也靠性的二元], 即它们之间持续的争斗和定期的协调行为。” ——尼采:《悲剧的诞生》,第1部分。

直接意图

边沁在直接意图和间接意图之间做了区分。直接意图是直接的或严格的用意所在,它既包括目的,也包括达到目的的手段。这些目的和手段是当事人有意的和自愿的选择,对此他自称负有直接的责任。而间接意图指的则是当事人自愿行为预见到的后果,这些后果是在其严格意义上追求的东西的范围之外的。这一区分与双重结果问题密切相关,它使一个行为产生的有意的结果与其预见到的但非所希求的结果形成对照。

“一个结果,当它是有意造成的时,它可以是直接有意造成的,或只是间接有意造成的。当产生它的期望构成原因链条中的一个环节,而那个人正是据此决心做出这一行动时,就可以说它是直接地或线状地有意造成的结果。” ——边沁:《道德与立法原则导论》,II,1970年,第84页。

直接实在论

一种感性实在论,相信物质世界是独立于感觉者之外的,我们直接感觉到的是物质对象本身的性质。一方面,这个观点是与反实在论的

selves. This position contrasts with anti-realist positions such as phenomenalism, which claims that there is no real physical world outside of experience. It also contrasts with another type of perceptual realism—indirect realism—which argues that the physical world is only perceived indirectly and that sense-data are what we immediately experience. There are two main versions of direct realism. Naïve realism believes that all perceptual properties are in the physical objects, while scientific direct realism suggests on the basis of Locke's distinction between ideas of primary and secondary properties that our ideas of secondary properties are relative to the existence and sensory capacities of a perceiver.

"Direct realism holds that in sense-perception we are directly aware of the existence and nature of the surrounding physical world." —Dancy, *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, 1985, p. 147.

Dirty hands

A term which was derived from the title of Sartre's 1948 play *Dirty Hands* (*Les Mains Sales*) and which is widely used by contemporary moral and political philosophers concerning political activities which violate the common demands of morality. It is not clear whether dirty hands can be avoided in politics and whether immoral acts considered necessary to govern can be excused. According to ideas developed by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Max Weber, it is necessary for political rule to be violent, deceitful and immoral, and a politician would be naïve to act on the assumption that others will comply with morality. Furthermore, it is necessary sometimes for a politician to do evil in order to achieve a greater good for the community. Because political reasons must sometimes override moral considerations, the demands of politics are incompatible with private virtue. Aristotle, on the other hand, held that political activity is necessary to achieve the full development of virtue and consequently politics cannot stand outside of ethics.

"It is cases where the politician does something morally disagreeable, that I am concerned with; the problem that has been called that of dirty hands. The central question is: how are we to think about the involvement of politicians in such actions, and about the dispositions that such involvement requires?" —Williams, in Hampshire (ed.), *Public and Private Morality*, 1978, p. 55.

Disappearance theory of mind, another name for eliminative materialism

Discourse

Generally, discourse is a linguistic sequence longer than a single sentence, and containing sentences or statements as its minimal unit. Conversation, dialogue, narrative and argument are all considered forms of discourse. The study of dis-

观点相对立的,后者如现象主义宣称,在经验以外没有真正的物质世界;另一方面,直接实在论也与另一种感性实在论——间接实在论——相对立。间接实在论认为,物质世界仅是可以间接感觉到的,我们所直接感受的只是感觉材料。有两种主要的直接实在论,素朴的直接实在论相信所有的感知特性都在物质对象之中,而科学直接实在论根据洛克对第一特性和第二特性的区分,认为第二特性是相对一个感觉者的存在和感知能力的。

"直接存在论认为,在感官感觉之中,我们直接意识到了周围物质世界的存在和性质。"——丹西:《当代认识论导论》,1985年,第147页。

肮脏的手

这一术语出自萨特1948年的剧本《肮脏的手》的剧名,并被当代道德和政治哲学家在论及违背通常道德标准的政治活动时广泛引用。肮脏的手在政治生活中能否避免,以及对于统治是必要的不道德行为能否得到原谅,这些都不清楚。根据马基雅维利、霍布斯和M. 韦伯提出的思想,篡改、欺骗和不道德对政治统治而言都是必要的,一个政治家若以其他人都会遵循道德这一假设去行事那将是幼稚的。进而言之,一个政治家有时为了某一共同体的更大的利益去做坏事也是必要的。由于政治上的理由有时必须压倒道德上的考虑,因而政治上的要求与个人的美德是不相容的。但另一方面,亚里士多德又认为,政治活动必须达到德性的全面发展的目的,因此政治学不能与伦理学相脱离。

"在政治家做了某一不道德的事情的情况下,我所关注的是被称为肮脏的手的问题。这里核心的问题是:我们如何考虑政治家卷入这样的行为和这种卷入所要求的倾向?"——威廉姆斯,载于汉普舍(编辑):《公共道德和个人道德》,1978年,第55页。

心的消失理论

"取消唯物论"的别名。

言谈

一般说来,言谈是指比单个句子更长的一个语言序列,以一些句子或陈述作为它的最小单位。交谈、对话、讲述和论证都被视为言谈的形式。对于言谈的研究要考虑参加言谈的谈话

course takes account of speakers and hearers involved in the discourse and the temporal and spatial placement of the discourse. In contemporary continental philosophy, discourse is viewed as the basis on which to defend the legitimacy of social and political practices, in contrast to traditional accounts of such legitimacy based on reason or a theory of human nature. On some views, the aim of discourse is to achieve consensus about those interests which are generalisable. Through showing how sentences are related through various types of relations, discourse analysis seeks to uncover the norms governing our language and institutions. An ethics based on discourse tends to offer a set of norms and practices that are fully acceptable to those subject to them. Discourse ethics aims at a community based not on imposition, but on the agreement of free and equal persons.

"The word 'discourse' will be used to refer to a string of statements regardless of what type these statements may be. An argument is an example of discourse." - Ladd, *The Structure of a Moral Code*, 1957, p. 23.

Discourse ethics

The ethical theory that Habermas attempts to establish in *The Theory of Communicative Action*. According to the theory, the search for fundamental ethical principles should focus on the structure of practical discourse or on the fundamental norms of rational argumentative speech. Moral practice is fundamentally structured around the imperatives of a species that is dependent upon linguistically co-ordinated action. Communication has its own rationality and normative content which will inevitably involve the reciprocal recognition of validity claims. Any claims about what is right can be justified when challenged only through argumentative discourse leading to rationally motivated consensus. This argumentation is understood as a procedure for the exchange and assessment of information and reasons. Discourse is the medium in which the ethical aspects of our idealising suppositions are most transparent and most easily reflected upon. This character of discourse allows us to transcend strategic action and to act according to obligations based upon mutual understanding. The approach of discourse ethics is deontological, cognitive and universalistic, and is hence opposed to communitarian moral theory. To some extent, discourse ethics is regarded as a reconstruction of Kantian ethics by shifting the basis from our reflecting moral consciousness to a community of subjects in dialogue. It is also called communicative ethics.

"Whereas the communitarians appropriate Hegel's legacy in the form of an Aristotelian ethics of the good and abandon the universalism of rational nature law, discourse ethics takes its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition but without incurring the cost of a historical dissolution of

者和聆听者,以及言谈发生的时空所在。在当代欧陆哲学中,言谈被看作是维护社会与政治实践的合法性的基础,与传统的认为这种合法性基于理性或某个人性理论的观点相对立。在某些讨论言谈问题的人看来,言谈的目的是在那些可普遍化的利益之间取得一致。通过表明不同句子如何依据不同的关系类型而发生关联,言谈分析试图去揭示主宰着我们语言和制度的规范。基于言谈的伦理学要提供的就是这样一组规范和实践,它们对于服从它们的人来说是完全可以接受的。言谈伦理学旨在建立和维持这样一种共同体,它不建立在强制之上,而是建立在自由和平等的人们之间的同意之上。

"'言谈'这个词将被用来指谓一串陈述,而不考虑这些陈述可能是什么类型的。一个论证是言谈的一个例子。"——拉德:《道德规范的结构》,1957年,第23页。

言谈伦理学(或译“商谈伦理学”)

这是哈贝马斯试图在《交往行为理论》中建立的伦理理论。按照这个理论,对于基本的伦理原则的寻求应该集中在实践言谈的结构上或在理性论证言谈的基本规范上。道德实践围绕着这样一种律令来获得基本结构,这种律令是依靠语言的合作行为而形成的物种(即人类)所必须遵守的。交往有自己的合理性和规范内容;这内容不可避免地涉及有效要求的相互承认。任何一个关于什么是对的主张在下述情况下就能被认可,即它只在论证式的言谈中受到挑战,而且这言谈导向了合理产生的共识。这种论证被理解为交换、估价信息和推理的程序。言谈是这样一种介质,在其中我们理想化前提的伦理方面是最透明的和最容易得到反思的。言谈的这个特点使我们能够超越策略行为,并且按照基于相互理解的责任义务而行动。言谈伦理学的方法是义务论的、认知的和普遍论的,因而与公共社团的(communitarian)伦理理论相对立。在某种程度上,言谈伦理学被认为是对康德伦理学的重构;它将伦理学的基础从我们反思的道德意识变到对话中由主体组成的共同体。它也被称之为交往伦理学。

"公共社团主义者以亚里士多德的关于善的伦理学的方式来占有黑格尔的遗产,并且放弃了理性自然法则的普遍性;与此相对,言谈伦理学的方向是从黑格尔的认识理论中获得对于绝对命令(categorical imperative)的主体间的解释,但又不让伦理生活中的道德性在历史性中消融掉。"——哈贝马斯:《辩明与应用》,1990年,第1页。

morality in ethical life.” —Habermas, *Justification and Application*, 1990, p. 1.

Discrimination

[from Latin: *discrimen*, that which separates] To discriminate may simply be to make a distinction. In ethics, it involves distinguishing a group of people from others for unfair and harmful treatment on some unjustified grounds, often on the basis of bias or prejudice. Discrimination conflicts with the principles of justice and equality. Discrimination against woman on the grounds of gender is called sexism. Discrimination against black people and other minorities on the ground of race is called racism. Some groups, like women and minorities, have long been unfairly treated and remain disadvantaged even after beginning to receive equal treatment. In recent years in Western countries there has been a movement to correct entrenched injustice based on past discrimination and to establish equality of opportunity by deliberately making policies to treat these groups preferentially in such areas as employment and education. However, this approach, sometimes called reverse discrimination, has been subject to bitter dispute and legal challenge. Opponents argue that it violates the principle of equal competition and that the injustices of earlier generations cannot be put right by unjustly punishing members of the present generation. Animal ethics attempts to extend the scope of the ethical community and calls discrimination against animals on the grounds that they are not rational, speciesism.

“Impartiality is undoubtedly a requirement of justice, and ... it is a form of equality as contrasted with the discrimination of equity.” —Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy*, 1976, 2nd ed., p. 121.

Disembodiment

The existence of a person after bodily death and disintegration. It is one account that has been proposed for the afterlife or life after death. It presupposes that life need not terminate on the death of the body. The conditions for disembodied personal existence include the maintenance of a person's identity with that of one's pre-mortem state and the maintenance of psychological awareness, especially memory, of one's experience before death. The mental life of a disembodied individual might be extremely austere if embodiment is needed to have new experiences. Re-embodiment occurs if a disembodied soul becomes united with another body. Resurrection is the return to life of a body which has been reunited with its original soul. Some Christian doctrine supports the actuality of disembodied existence, but other Christian accounts require a renewed embodiment with one's earthly body or with another special body for survival to be possible. Philosophically, the arguments in favour of disembodiment are drawn from Cartesian dualism, which claims that mind

歧视

[源自拉丁语 *discrimen*, 意为“分隔”] 这个术语的简单定义是指制造区别。在伦理学中,它意味着出于某种不公正的理由或常常是出于偏见,把一群人与其他人区别开来加以不公平的伤害性的对待。歧视是与正义和平等原则相对立的。出于性别的原因而对妇女的歧视被称为“性别歧视”。出于种族的原因对黑人和其他少数民族的歧视被称作“种族歧视”。某些团体,如妇女和少数民族,长期以来被不公正地对待,即使开始受到公平的对待,也仍处在不利的地位。在最近几年,西方国家有一种政治纠正运动,即有意地制定在就业、教育等方面优先对待他们的政策,以纠正以往的歧视所造成的已根深蒂固的不公正,恢复机会的平等性。不过,这也是一个有争议的问题并受到法律的挑战,有时被称为“逆反性歧视”。反对者认为它与平等竞争原则并不一致。而且前代人的不公正不应通过不公平地惩罚这一代人的方式来纠正。“动物伦理学”扩展了伦理共同体的范围,把基于动物是非理性的这种理由而对动物的歧视称为“物种歧视”。

“不偏不倚无疑是一个正义的要求,并且,它是一种平等的形式,与对平等的歧视相对立。”——拉斐尔:《政治哲学问题》,1976年,第二版,第121页。

无壳

一个人在其身体死亡和解体以后的存在。它是对“来世”或死后的生活的一种解释。它预设生命并不因身体的死亡而终结。无壳人存在的条件包括:与其死前的状态保持同一及保持对其死前经验的心理知觉尤其是记忆。如果具有新经验必须要有躯壳的话,无壳个体的心的生活就会是极其有限的。如果一个无壳的灵魂获得与另一个身体的联合,则被称为“再入壳”。如果一个躯体与其原来的灵魂重新结合而重获生命,则称为复活。有的基督教学说支持无壳灵魂的存在。而另外的基督教解释则要求灵魂与其现世的躯体或另外一个特殊的躯体重新结合以使得存活成为可能。在哲学上,支持灵魂无壳的论证是由笛卡尔的二元论得出的,笛卡尔的二元论宣称心与身是彼此独立的存在。某些哲学家还关心脱离身体经验的临界死亡的含义。但许多接受死后无壳生命之逻辑可能性的哲学家否认其物理可能性。不过有些哲学家还是声

and body are independent entities. Some philosophers are also interested in the implications of apparent near death out of body experiences. But many philosophers who accept the logical possibility of disembodied life after death reject it as physically impossible. Nevertheless, some philosophers claim that any suitable theory of mind should allow disembodied existence to be a logical possibility.

"It is a criticism of any theory of mind if it is unable to allow the logical possibility of disembodied existence."
Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, 1967, p. 19.

Disguised description theory

A theory about the meaning of egocentric facts, such as "I am having such and such an experience". It is based on Russell's theory of description and holds that the word "I" is an abbreviation for a definite description denoting a particular that is known by description rather than by acquaintance. So the word "I" in each of its occurrences can be replaced by a descriptive phrase of the form "the self having such and such properties". For instance, the statement "I see an image" is taken to state that a self having the appropriate description sees an image.

"According to disguised description theory, the person who knows an ego-centric fact is not pretending any particular as a self and is not using the word 'I' as a proper name in the logical sense." —Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, 1938, vol. 1, p. 174.

Disinterest , see aesthetical attitude

Disjunction

Also called an alternation. A complex proposition of the form "p or q", where p and q are component propositions and are called disjuncts. The connective "or" has an inclusive sense and an exclusive sense. In its inclusive sense, sometimes called inclusive disjunction, "p or q" means "p or q or both". In propositional calculus, such a disjunction is symbolised as " $p \vee q$ ". It is true if p is true, if q is true or if both disjuncts are true; it is false if and only if both disjuncts are false. From the premise p or q and the premise not p, we may infer the conclusion q, and this is called a disjunctive syllogism. In its exclusive sense, sometimes called exclusive disjunction, "p or q" means "either p or q but not both". In propositional calculus, it is symbolised as " $\perp (p \vee q) \wedge \sim (p \wedge q)$ ". It is true if p and q have opposite truth values and is false if they have the same truth-values.

"We may take next disjunction, 'p or q'. This is a function whose truth-value is truth when p is true and also when q is true, but is falsehood when both p and q are false." —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 147.

称,任何适宜的心的理论都应容许无壳存在的逻辑可能性。

“如果一种心的理论不能容许无壳存在的逻辑可能性,这种理论必定遭到批评。”——阿姆斯特朗:《一种唯物主义心的理论》,1967年,第19页。

伪装的摹状词理论

关于像“我正具有如此这般的……一个经验”这样的“自我中心事实”的意义的理论。它建立在罗素的摹状词理论的基础上,认为语词“我”是一个限定摹状词的缩略语,指示了由摹状而不是熟知所了解的东西。所以在出现了“我”这个词的每一句子中,这个词都可以替换为一个像“具有如此这般特性的自我”这样的摹状词短语。例如,“我看见一个映象”这样的陈述就被认为是陈述一个具有适当摹状词的我看见一个映象。

“根据伪装的摹状词理论,知道一个自我中心事实的人并不是把任何东西当作一个自我,不是将‘我’这个词用作一个逻辑意义上的专名。”——布劳德:《麦克塔加特哲学考察》,1938年,第一卷,第174页。

无利害

见“审美态度”条。

析取式

亦称“择取式”。形式为“p 或者 q”的复合命题,其中 p 和 q 是支命题,叫做析取支。联结词“或者”有相容意义和相斥意义。就其相容意义(有时叫做“相容析取”)而言,“p 或者 q”意味着“或者 p 或者 q 或者两者”。在命题演算中,这样一种析取被符号化为“ $p \vee q$ ”,“ $p \vee q$ ”为真,如果 p 真, q 真或者两者都真;“ $p \vee q$ ”为假当且仅当两个析取支都假。从前提“p 或者 q”和前提非 p 我们可以推出结论 q,这叫做“析取三段论”。就其相斥意义(有时叫做“相斥析取”)而言,“p 或者 q”意味着“或者 p 或者 q 但并非两者”。在命题演算中,它被符号化为“ $\perp (p \vee q) \wedge \sim (p \wedge q)$ ”。如果 p 和 q 有相反的真值则它为真,如果 p 和 q 有同样的真值则它为假。

“我们可以考虑下一种析取,‘p 或者 q’。这是一个函项,当 p 真时它的真值是真,当 q 真时它的真值也是真;但当 p 和 q 都假时它的真值是假。”——罗素:《数理哲学导论》,1919年,第147页。

Dispositional property

Properties of material things have, since Locke, been traditionally divided into primary and secondary qualities. Recent philosophers further divide primary qualities into substantial and dispositional properties. A dispositional property is the capacity of an object to affect or to be affected by other things. An active capacity of a thing to affect others is also called a power. For instance, falling down is a dispositional property of a thing that has weight, and being poisonous is a dispositional property of arsenic. Dispositional properties are analysable into nothing but dispositions, and hence they can be distinguished from substantial properties which are independent particulars. Substantial properties might provide a basis for dispositional properties, but some philosophers hold that all properties are dispositional.

"It is a dispositional property of paper that it will burn." — Joske, *Material Objects*, 1967, p. 39.

Dispositions

[from Latin: *dis*, away — *ponere*, place] The tendency, habit, ability or proneness to act or react in a certain way in certain circumstances. It is not an entity, a state of affairs or an instance of behaviour, but a behavioural pattern. One will display this pattern through a number of instances of behaviour. To attribute a disposition to X is to say that X is prone to do Y in circumstance C. Sentences embodying dispositional claims are always hypothetical in form: "If circumstance C occurs, then X will do Y". The term "disposition" is prominent in Ryle's philosophy of mind, for his strategy is to replace the Cartesian mental substance and its activities with behavioural dispositions. He claims that the Cartesian concept of mind commits a category mistake, for it takes the mind to be one sort of ontological category, substance, when in fact the mental belongs to the category of disposition. He analyses the majority of mental states in terms of dispositions. Since Descartes does not think of the mind as a disposition, any dispositional account of the mind is incompatible with Cartesian dualism. However, there are various views about dispositions. For Ryle, a disposition does not involve any hidden internal cause and is simply manifested in the circumstances specified. Armstrong, on the other hand, argues that dispositions are derivative and that their existence requires the prior existence of an underlying state of affairs. He attempts to identify dispositions with their bases. Others think that dispositions have categorical bases, but are not identical with them.

"To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realised. The same is true about specifically human dispositions such

倾向性特征

自洛克以来,物质特性在传统上就一直被分为第一性质和第二性质。新近的哲学家们又把第一性质分为实在性特征和倾向性特征。倾向性特征是对对象作用于其他事物或被其他事物所影响的能力。事物作用于他者的积极能力同时也被称作“强力”。譬如,下落是事物具有重量的倾向性特征,而有毒则是砒霜的倾向性特征。倾向性特征只能分析为倾向,并由此能与作为独立个体的实在性特征区分开来。实在性特征可能提供了倾向性特征的基础。不过也有哲学家认为,所有的特征都是倾向性的。

“一张纸的倾向性特征是,它会燃烧。”——乔斯克:《物质对象》,1967年,第39页。

倾向

[源自拉丁文 *dis* (离开) 和 *ponere* (地方)] 在某些情境下以某种方式行事或反应的意向、习惯、能力或倾向性。它不是一个存在,不是一个事态,也不是一例行为,而是一个行为模式。一个人将通过许多例行为来展现这一模式。说 X 具有一个倾向是说 X 在情境 C 中倾向于做某事 Y。包含倾向性主张的句子总是采取假设的形式:“如果发生情境 C,那么 X 就会做 Y。”“倾向”这一术语在赖尔的心的哲学中十分重要,因为他的策略就是用行为倾向取代笛卡尔的心的实体及其活动。他声称笛卡尔的心的概念犯了一个范畴错误,因为它误认为心属于一种本体论的范畴——实体,而实际上心属于倾向性范畴。他用倾向性来分析大部分心的状态。由于笛卡尔并不把心看作是一个倾向,因此对心的任何倾向性描述都与笛卡尔的二元论不相容。不过,关于倾向性存在各种不同的观点。对于赖尔而言,倾向性并不包含任何隐藏的内部原因,而只是简单地由特定情境所显现。而阿姆斯特朗则认为倾向性是派生的,其存在要求其基础事态的先前存在。他试图将倾向性同一于它们的基础。其他人认为,尽管倾向性具有一个范畴基础,但并不同一于这个基础。

“具有一个倾向性特性并非处于一个特别的状态或发生一个特别的变化;它是当某一特定条件得以实现时,必定或易于处于一个特定状态或发生某一特定变化。像性格这样的人类特有的倾向性也是如此。”——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949年,第43页。

as qualities of character.” —Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 43.

Disquotational theory of truth

The claim that truth is nothing more than a simplifying linguistic device, with the truth-predicate understood as having a distinctive role according to the principle of disquotation. According to this principle, for any appropriate sentence p , “ p ” is true if and only if p . The sentences “ p ” and “‘ p ’ is true” are in some sense equivalent in meaning, and “so and so is true” amounts to “so and so” and no more. The truth-predicate produces a sentence which can be used to say the very same thing and to perform the very same propositional acts as the original sentence. Accordingly, truth is a matter of the linguistic role of an expression rather than an external relation of correspondence with the world or a property. The major problem confronting the disquotational theory is to explain the fact that not all utterances are treated as truth-valued.

“Disquotational theory of truth: on this theory, we understand the word ‘true’ not by associating that word with a property, or a correspondence, but by learning such facts as the obvious fact that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only snow is white.” —Putnam, *Realism and Reason*, 1983, xiv.

Distinct, see clear and distinct

Distributed

A way of characterising how a term occurs in categorical propositions. A term is distributed if it refers to all members of the class to which it is referring and is explicitly or implicitly prefixed by a universal quantifier. For instance, in “Every man is mortal”, “man” is distributed, for it covers every man. “All” and “none” are called distributive signs. In traditional logic, all subject terms of universal categorical propositions and all predicate terms of negative propositions are said to be distributed. But the predicate terms of affirmative propositions and the subject terms of particular propositions are not distributed. The distribution of terms is important in syllogistic inference. A valid syllogism requires that (a) if a term is distributed in the conclusion, it must be distributed in a premise, and (b) the middle term must be distributed in at least one premise.

“A term is said to be distributed, when it is used in reference to its whole extension, or to all that it can denote; undistributed, when not so used.” —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 216.

Distributive law

Two principles of modern logic concerning the interchange of the connectives “and” and “or”: (1) $p \wedge (q \vee r)$

真理的消除引号论

主张真理仅是简化的言语手段, 认为真值谓词按照消除引号的原则而具有特别的作用。按照这种原则, 对于任何合适句子 p 来说, “ p ” 是真的当且仅当 p 。句子 “ p ” 和 “‘ p ’ 是真的” 在某种意义上是涵义相等的, “如此这般是真的” 等于 “如此这般”, 仅此而已。真值谓词产生了一个句子, 这个句子可用来述说的事情和原句所说的一样, 起着同样的命题作用。因此, 真理是有关表达的言语作用的事情, 而不是那符合世界或性质的外在关系。消除引号论所面对的主要问题是解释这一事实: 并非所有表述都被看做具有真值。

“真理的消除引号论: 按照这种理论, 我们理解“真的”这个词, 不是通过把这个词与某性质相联系, 或相符合, 而是通过把这样的事实了解为明显的事实: ‘雪是白的’ 是真的当且仅当雪是白的。” —普特南: 《实在论与理性》1983年, 第xiv页。

明晰的

见“清楚明晰的”条。

周延的

用来刻画一词项在直言命题中的出现方式的概念。一词项是周延的, 如果它指称它正在指称的那个类的所有元素, 并且它的前面或明显或隐含地冠有全称量词。例如, 在“每一个人都是有死的”中, “人”是周延的, 因为它包括每一个人。“所有”和“无一”叫做周延记号。在传统逻辑中, 所有全称命题的主词和所有否定命题的谓词被说成是周延的。但肯定命题的谓词和特称命题的主词是不周延的。词项的周延性在三段论推理中很重要。一有效的三段论要求: (a) 如果一词项在结论中周延, 则它必须在前提中周延, 并且 (b) 中项至少在一个前提中周延。

“当一个词项用于指称它的整个外延时, 或者用于指称它能够指谓的所有事物时, 就说该词项是周延的; 当不被如此使用时, 就说它是不周延的。” —约瑟福: 《逻辑导论》, 1916年, 第216页。

分配律

现代逻辑中有关联结词“并且”和“或者”交换的两个原则: (1) $p \wedge (q \vee r) \leftrightarrow (p \wedge q)$

$\leftrightarrow (p \wedge q) \vee (p \wedge r); (2) p \vee (q \wedge r) \leftrightarrow (p \vee q) \wedge (p \vee r)$. In (1) the operator "and" distributes over the operator "or" and expresses the distributivity of conjunction into disjunction or alternation. In (2) "or" distributes over "and" and expresses the distributivity of disjunction into conjunction. The spirit of these laws is similar to mathematical algebra's $p(q + r) = pq + pr$. In opposition to distributive laws are associative laws: (1) $p \wedge q \wedge r \leftrightarrow (p \wedge q) \wedge r \leftrightarrow p \wedge (q \wedge r); (2) p \vee q \vee r \leftrightarrow (p \vee q) \vee r \leftrightarrow p \vee (q \vee r)$. These laws plus the commutative law ($p \vee q = q \vee p$, and $p \wedge q = q \wedge p$) are called the usual formal laws.

"By the usual formal laws, we mean the following, ... (iii) the distributive law: $\alpha(\beta \rightarrow \gamma) \rightarrow \alpha\beta \rightarrow \alpha\gamma$." —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 5.

Divided reference. Quine's term for a sortal

Divine attributes

Properties attributed to God which are believed to be essential for God as the creator of the universe and the supreme being and which distinguish him from other kinds of being. These properties include omnipotence (God has maximal power), omniscience (God has unlimited knowledge), eternity (God is not bounded by time), absolute goodness (God is wholly benevolent), infinity (God is free from any limitation), unity (God cannot be divided), simplicity (God is not composite but absolutely simple), incorporeality (God is not material), immutability (God is not subject to change) and impassability (God is not affected). Contemporary discussions of these attributes reveal that many of them imply paradoxes. Some of these have been included in this dictionary as separate entries, such as the paradox of omnipotence, paradox of omniscience and the problem of evil. Other problems arise from ascribing versions of human attributes, such as reason, intelligence or perceptual knowledge, to a being which is not embodied and does not exist temporally.

"The main problem in connection with the divine attributes is how to reconcile their multiplicity with the simplicity of God." —Mascall, *He Who Is*, 1943, p. 117.

Divine command theory

Also called theological voluntarism, a position which claims that God's *command* is the ultimate source of moral obligation or that God's will is the basis of moral laws. An action is said to be good because it conforms to divine commands. An action is said to be bad or evil because it is performed even though the agent knows that such an act breaches God's commands. This position was held by the medieval theologians and philosophers Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. It was endorsed by Locke and Berkeley, and in the modern age it has been especially elabo-

$\vee (p \wedge r); (2) p \vee (q \wedge r) \leftrightarrow (p \vee q) \wedge (p \vee r)$ 。在(1)中, 算子“并且”对算子“或者”分配, 表达了合取对析取或择取的分配性。在(2)中, “或者”对“并且”分配, 表达了析取对合取的分配性。这些规律的精神与数学代数式 $p(q+r) = pq+pr$ 是类似的。与分配律相对的是结合律: (1) $p \wedge q \wedge r \leftrightarrow (p \wedge q) \wedge r \leftrightarrow p \wedge (q \wedge r); (2) p \vee q \vee r \leftrightarrow (p \vee q) \vee r \leftrightarrow p \vee (q \vee r)$ 。这两组规律加上“交换律”($p \vee q = q \vee p$, $p \wedge q = q \wedge p$), 叫做“平常的形式规律”。

“所谓平常的形式规律, 我们是指下列各种: …… (iii) 分配律: $\alpha(\beta \rightarrow \gamma) = \alpha\beta \rightarrow \alpha\gamma$ 。”

罗素:《数理哲学导论》, 1919年, 第5页。

分类指称

奎因用于指“类”的名称。

神性

属于上帝的特性, 被相信为是作为宇宙创造者和至上存在的上帝的本质, 使和其他种类的存在相区别。这些特性包括全能(上帝有最大力量)、全知(上帝有无限知识)、永恒(上帝不受时间限制)、绝对善(上帝完全仁爱)、无限(上帝无任何限定)、单一(上帝不能被分开)、单纯(上帝不是合成的, 而是绝对单纯)、无形体(上帝是非物质的)、不变(上帝不受变化影响)、不动心(上帝不受影响)等等。当代对这些属性的讨论表明, 它们中的许多都包含着悖论。其中的一些作为单独的词条已包括在本辞典中, 如“全能悖论”、“全知悖论”、“邪恶问题”。把人类属性的表现形式, 如理智, 理性或知觉知识, 归属于一个没有形体的不在时间中存在的实在, 也引起了其他问题。

“与神性有关的主要问题是, 如何使上帝的单纯性与其属性的复多性一致起来。”——马斯科:《他谁》, 1943年, 第117页。

神命论

也被称为神学意志论, 是指这样一种主张: 上帝的命令是道德义务的最终来源, 或上帝的意志是道德法则的基础。一种行为被说成善, 是因为它遵从神的命令。一种行为被说成坏或恶, 是因为行为者即使知道这样行为有违上帝命令, 仍然实施。持这种见解的中世纪神学家和哲学家有安瑟尔谟、阿布拉、D. 司各脱和奥康的威廉。它也得到了洛克和巴克莱的赞同。在现代, 对此作出精心论证的尤推克尔凯郭尔和巴特。这种见解受到了阿奎那的批判, 他更强调上

rated by Kierkegaard and Barth. It was criticised by Aquinas, who emphasised God's intellect rather than his will. The theory faces two major problems: How can we gain access to God's commands? If God is dead, are there any constraints on how we should behave? The theory is also challenged by Plato's Euthyphro problem: Does God command that a thing is good because it is good, or is a thing good because God command it? If it is the former, God is not the authority and we should be able to determine our morality without reference to God; if it is the latter, we have a tautology: a thing is what God commands because it is what God commands. In neither case do we seem to have explained the nature of goodness. This theory has difficulty in explaining how God's commands can have moral force. If a moral law is justified in terms of God's will, it is not clear how we can determine that God's will is good. If we have other grounds for finding out what is morally good, we might determine that God's will is good, but we do not need his commands to know our moral obligations.

"According to a divine command theory of morality, obligations are to be explained in terms of what God wills or commands; we have such obligations because God wills or commands the content of the obligation." —Kvanvig, *The Problem of Hell*, 1993, p. 66.

Divine illumination

Augustine, deeply influenced by Plato, believed that the universality, immutability and necessity of eternal truths cannot be grasped by reference to sense experience. How then can our mortal and fallible minds know them? Plato answered this question in terms of his theory of reminiscence, which Augustine replaced with his theory of divine illumination. According to this theory, the glimpses that human minds have of eternal truth are illuminated by the divine mind. The notion of illumination comes from Plato's analogy of the Sun in the *Republic*. Plato held that by analogy to the Sun as the author of the light illuminating the sensibility of the world, the idea of the Good is the source of intelligibility of the idea of the world. For Augustine, illumination is direct intuition whereby the mind comes to know the truth, analogous to the act by which the eye sees a body. As objects must be made visible by natural light before they can be perceived, so truths must be made intelligible before they can be known. Augustine claimed that God is the source of this spiritual light. Hence, the theory of divine illumination constitutes a proof of God's existence as well as an explanation of human knowledge. The notion of divine illumination is not only epistemological, but also indicates the dependence of human rationality upon God. However, Augustine did not offer a clear account of the precise nature and operation of divine illumination, and that has given rise to much dispute among commentators.

帝的智慧,而不是意志。神命论面临两个主要困难:我们如何能够获得上帝的命令?如果上帝死了,对我们应做的行为会有什么限制吗?这个理论也受到柏拉图的尤息弗罗问题的挑战:上帝要求事物是善的是因为它善的,还是事物为善,是因为上帝的要求?如果是前者,上帝就不是权威的,我们应当无需提到上帝就能够决定我们的道德;如果是后者,我们就陷入了同语反复:事物是上帝所命令的。是因为它是上帝命令的。我们在这两种情况中似乎都没有解释神的性质。这个理论的困难在于解释上帝的命令如何能够具有道德力量。如果一条道德法则依据上帝的意志得以证明,那么,我们怎么能够确定上帝的意志善良,是不清楚的。如果我们有其他根据发现什么是道德上善的,我们可以确定上帝的意志是善的,但这样我们就不再需要他的命令来知道我们的道德义务了。

“按照道德神命论的观点,义务将依据上帝意愿或命令的东西加以解释:我们之所以有如此义务,是因为上帝意愿或命令该义务的内容。”——克万威格:《地狱问题》,1993年,第66页。

神之光照

由于深受柏拉图的影响,奥古斯丁坚信,永恒真理的普遍性、不变性和必然性不能靠与感觉经验相关的东西来把握。那么,我们有死的且易错的心智怎样能够认识它们呢?柏拉图用他的回忆说回答了这个问题,奥古斯丁则是用他的神之光照说替代回忆说而作答的。根据这个学说,人类心智之有永恒真理的瞥见,是神力光照的结果。“光照”一词源于柏拉图在《国家篇》中的日喻。柏拉图认为,通过太阳是照耀感觉世界的光源这个日喻的类比,善的理念是理念世界的可理解之源。在奥古斯丁看来,光照是心智赖以认识真理的直接直觉,类似于眼睛依凭活动而看见肉体。既然物体在能被知觉到之前必须靠自然之光使其可见,真理在能被认识之前也必须使其可知。奥古斯丁断言,上帝是这种精神之光的来源。因此,神之光照学说成为上帝存在的一个证明,也成为人类知识的一种解释。神之光照说不仅是认识论的,而且也表明了人类理智对上帝的依赖。然而,奥古斯丁并未对神之光照的确切本性和运作情况作出清楚的说明,这就在评注者间引起了很大争论。

“他们[柏拉图主义者]宣称,在可被知晓的万物中,照耀人们智力的光是这位自同的上帝,万物都由他造成。”——奥古斯丁:《上帝之城》,Ⅷ, vii.

"They [Platonists] have declared that the light which illumines the intellects of men in all things that may be learned is this selfsame God by whom all things were made." ---Augustine, *City of God*, VIII, vii.

Division

[Greek: *diairesis*]. Also called dialectic, a method of definition employed by Plato, especially in his later dialogues. It consists of a complete and exact division of a genus into a series of subgenera or species. The classification corresponds to a Form in nature and was compared to dissection according to the joints. Plato used it in an attempt to find an answer to the problem of the one and the many. As an exploration of the relation between genus and species, the method contributed to the formation of Aristotle's logic.

"Unless one is capable of dividing things into their kinds and embrace each individual thing under a single form, he will never become skilled in discussion as is within the limit of human capacity." ---Plato, *Phaedrus*, 273d.

Division of linguistic labour

A hypothesis introduced by Putnam in his article "The Meaning of 'Meaning'". Language is used in a community, and a community is divided into many subsets. A word in a language may have different meanings and extensions, depending on its different references and the occasions on which it is used. The expert speakers may know all facets of the word and be aware of its various distinctions, but this will not be the case for average speakers. Not all of them can know all the distinctions or the exact extension. They use the word in the way which is accepted by the subset of the community to which they belong. By virtue of this principle, Putnam tries to indicate that not every term is a description, and that the extension of each term is at least partly determined socially rather than in the mind of the individual speaker.

"Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of division of linguistic labour just described, that is, possesses at least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured co-operation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets." --- Putnam, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. vii, 1975, p. 146.

Division principle, see agglomeration principle

Dogma

[from Greek: *dogma*, that which seems to be, later meaning public decree or ordinance] Originally, any peculiar doctrine, but subsequently used as a term of abuse. Histori-

划分

[希腊语是 *diairesis*] 也叫辩证法, 是被柏拉图使用的一种定义方法, 尤其在他的晚期对话中。一个完全的、严格的划分就是把属分成若干从属的属或种。分类对应于本性上的理念, 犹如依据关节的解剖。柏拉图也试图运用划分, 找到一种解决一和多问题的答案。这种方法作为属种之间关系的一种探索, 有助于亚里士多德逻辑学的形成。

"除非一个人能将事物分成它们的不同类型, 并把每一个体事物统摄在单一的理念之下, 否则, 他不可能熟练地参与人类能力范围之内的讨论。" --- 柏拉图: 《费得罗篇》, 273d。

语言分工

普特南在他的论文《“意义”的意义》一文中引入的假设。语言在共同体中使用, 而一个共同体又划分为许多子集。语言中的一个词可能有不同的涵义和外延, 取决于其不同的指称以及使用场合。专家言说者可能懂得这个词的所有涵义, 并且知道其不同的差别, 但一般的言说者却不可能这样。他们并非都知道所有这些区别或是其确切的外延。他们以那种为他们所属的共同体子集所接受的方式, 来使用这一词语。借助于这一原则, 普特南试图表明并非每一术语都是描述, 一个术语的外延至少部分是由社会决定的, 而不是仅仅是在个体言说者心目中由他自己决定的。

"每个语言共同体都有刚才描述的这种语言分工的例证, 即都至少拥有若干术语, 它们所相关的‘准则’仅为那些习得这些术语的言说者子集所知晓, 它们为其他言说者的使用取决于他们与相关子集中言说者之间的有结构的合作。" --- 普特南, 见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》, 1975年, 第七卷, 第146页。

分解原则

见“聚合原则”条。

教条

[源自希腊文 *dogma*, 字面意思是“看起来所是的东西”, 后来指“公共法令”或“条令”] 原来指任何特殊的学说, 后来成为一个贬义词。

cally, a dogma is a religious doctrine proclaimed by scripture or the Church, which requires popular acceptance without rational justification. For its supporters, a dogma is indisputable and unchallengeable. According to sceptical critics, any metaphysical proposition is a dogma because, although there may be a rational argument for it, this argument itself relies on some unproved first principles and is therefore unreliable. Hence, any metaphysical doctrine is allegedly open to the charge of dogmatism.

"The concept of 'dogma', through historical and especially canonical development, has taken on a heteronomous character. Dogma is the central object of attack for autonomous culture." —Tillich, *What is Religion*, 1969, p. 105.

Dogmatism

[from Greek: *dogma*, belief, public decree] Ancient scepticism charged all non-sceptical philosophies with dogmatism, meaning that they were committed to some doctrines which they believed to be indubitably true. This does not entail that all knowledge is false or scepticism would turn out to be a negative form of dogmatism. For ancient scepticism, we should suspend our judgement because knowledge is neither possible nor impossible. For classical German philosophy, dogmatism is the position that knowledge arises from the effect of independent reality on the mind and contrasts with Kantian transcendental idealism. In modern times, dogmatism is the uncritical, partial and possibly irrational persistence of some opinion.

"Those who are properly called dogmatists ... think that they have discovered the truth" —Sextus Empiricus, *Outline Of Pyrrhonism*, 1. 1.

Domain, see range

Dominion thesis

The position that human beings should dominate over animals as decided by God in the *Bible*. After the Creation, God told human beings that they "have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth". This was repeated after the flood. These passages have been understood to indicate that God grants the right of humans to take animal life, and that animals exist to serve the needs or interests of human beings. The thesis, although subjected to various interpretations, has been widely taken to support traditional anthropocentrism or human chauvinism, and is opposed by environmental ethics.

"Dominion thesis, the view that the earth and all its nonhuman contents exist and are available for man's benefit and serve his interests and, hence, that man is entitled to

在历史上,它是指由经文或教会所宣布的宗教学说,它要求被普遍接受而不要求理性恰当性的证明。对于教条的支持者来说,一个教条是无可争辩、不容指摘的。根据怀疑论批评家所说,任何形而上学的命题都是教条,因为尽管对它可能有理性的证明,但是该证明本身依赖于某些未经证明的第一原理,因而是不可靠的。所以,一个形而上学学说总容易被指责为“教条主义”。

“‘教条’这个概念经过历史的,尤其是教规方面的发展,已经有了他律的特征。对于自律文化,教条是主要的攻击对象。”——蒂利希:《宗教是什么》,1969年,第105页。

独断论

[源自希腊语 *dogma*, 意指“信念”、“公告”]古代怀疑论把一切非怀疑论哲学统统谴责为独断论,意思就是说,这些哲学设定了他们相信为无疑真实的某些学说。这并不是说所有知识都虚假,或者,怀疑论的结果是独断论的否定形式。对古代怀疑论来说,我们应当悬置我们的判断,因为知识既非可能,也非不可能。在德国古典哲学中,独断论指知识起因于独立实在对心智的影响这样一种见解,这种见解与康德的先验唯心论相对照。在现代,独断论是指非批判的、偏爱的甚至非理性的坚持某种意见。

“那些认为他们发现了真理的人,……被恰当地称为独断论者。”——塞克斯都·恩披里柯:《皮浪主义纲要》,1. 1。

域

见“值域”条。

主宰论

这个论点主张,人类应该支配动物,这是上帝在《圣经》中决定的。上帝创世后告诉人们,他们“对海中的鱼、空中的鸟和所有地上行走的生物有着支配权”。这在大洪水之后得到重复。这些段落被引用来证明,上帝授权给人类处置动物的生命,以及动物的存在是为人类服务的,这个论点,虽然有着不同的解释,但被广泛地看作是支持传统的人类中心主义或“人类沙文主义”,因而为环境伦理学所反对。

“主宰论是指这种观点,地球和所有它的非人类的内容,是有利于人的利益和服务于人的利益而存在的,因此,人类有权随心所欲地,即根据他的利益管理这个世界和它的系统。”——R. 和 V. 罗特勒:《反对人类沙文主义的必然性》,见古德帕斯特/莎耶尔合编:《21世纪的伦

manipulate the world and its systems as he wants, that is, in his interest.”——R. and V. Routley, “Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism”, in Goodpaster and Sayre (eds), *Ethical Problems of the 21st Century*, 1979, p. 56.

Double aspect theory, see dual-aspect theory

Double contingency, see social action

Double effect, doctrine of

In some cases an action will inevitably bring about double effects; the intended good results and the foreseen undesirable effects. Can such an action be permitted? Starting with Thomas Aquinas and developed by Catholic theologians, the principle of double effect was formulated. Under the circumstances of such double effect, an action is permissible if the evil result is not directly intended, the good result is not achieved through the evil result, and the good result outweighs the bad one. But these conditions can themselves come into conflict. Some contemporary moral philosophers have tried to revise the formulation, and others deny this principle on the grounds that it is difficult to distinguish between the intentional and the foreseen and between the directly and indirectly intended consequences. Nevertheless, this principle is widely used to justify responses to many difficult cases in ethics, such as killing in self-defence, killing a foetus in order to save the life of its mother and inflicting civilian casualties during a military action.

“By ‘the doctrine of the double affect’ I mean the thesis that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.”——Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 1971, p. 20.

Double language model

A model developed by Carnap and Nagel, among others, to suggest that the language of science can be divided into theoretical and observational languages. They are semi-autonomous. Observational language is directly related to sense impressions, while theoretical language cannot be analysed in the standard empirical way. Theoretical terms used by theoretical languages neither are nor should be definable in the observation language. The experiential content of theoretical terms is obtained through correspondence rules which connect the two languages by sentences containing both theoretical terms and observational terms. This model gives rise to much debate regarding, for example, how an observational term can fix its meaning independent of its relation with theoretical terms, and how to assess the truth of a theoretical sentence.

“[The] well-known double language model [consists] of

理问题》，1979年，第56页。

双面理论

见“两面理论”条。

双重偶然性

见“社会行为”条。

双重效果论

在某些情况下，一些行为不可避免地将带来双重效果：意愿中的好的结果和可预见到的不想要的效果。这样一种行为是可允许的吗？双重效果的准则为T. 阿奎那开始构建并为天主教的神学家所发展。在有双重效果的环境下，如果坏的结果不是所直接想要的，好的结果不是通过坏的结果取得的，而且好结果的分量超过了坏的结果，这样的行为是可允许的。但是这些条件本身就是冲突的。某些当代道德哲学家力图修正这个原则，而另一些人则否定这个原则，其理由是，难于区分所打算的和可预见性的，难于区分直接的和间接的所图谋的后果。尽管如此，这个原则被广泛地用于论证对伦理学中许多难题的回答，诸如自卫杀人，杀死胎儿以拯救其母亲的生命，军事行动期间平民遭受损失的原因问题等等。

“所谓‘双重效果论’，我是指这样的论点，有时可允许由不直接的意愿引起的不是我们直接力图达到的结果。”——福特：《德性与邪恶》，1971年，第20页。

双语模型

由卡尔纳普和内格尔等人提出的模型，认为科学语言可以分为理论语言与观察语言。它们是半自主的，观察语言直接与感觉印象相连，而理论语言则不能用标准的经验方法加以分析。理论语言使用的理论术语既不能也不应当用观察语言加以定义。理论术语的经验内容是通过“对应规则”得到的，这些规则用包含了理论术语和观察术语的句子把这两种语言连接起来。这个模型产生了许多争议，例如，观察术语如何能够不依赖于它与理论术语的关系而确定其自身的意义，如何评价理论句子的真。

“[‘这个’著名的双语模型是‘由’观察语言L₀和理论语言L₁构成的]，后者包含了一套假说T。这些语言是由对应规则互相联系的，即用包含了观察术语和理论术语的句子。”——费耶阿本德，载《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》，1962

an observational language, L_o , and a theoretical language, L_t , the latter containing a postulate system, T . The languages are connected to each other by correspondence rules, i. e. by sentences containing observational terms and theoretical terms" — Feyerabend, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. iii, 1962, p. 41.

Double negation, see negation of a negation

Double truth theory

A position ascribed to the medieval philosopher Siger of Brabant and the Averroists, according to which the truth of faith and the truth of philosophy belong to two different domains. While a proposition is true from the philosophical point of view and can be demonstrated by reason, an incompatible proposition, which is therefore false philosophically, can be true by revelation in religion. This theory was an attempt to retain Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines when they contradicted Christian teaching, but was condemned as heretical in the thirteenth century by the Bishop of Paris.

"A double-truth theory, namely that a proposition could at the same time be true in theology and false in philosophy." — Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, 1972, p. 7.

Doubt

Doubt in its ordinary sense is an uncertain state of mind. It contributes substantially to scepticism, whose purpose is the questioning of knowledge claims and the suspension of belief. Descartes' method of doubt differs from this sense and also from traditional scepticism. It is a procedure by which he attempted to demolish all prejudices and preconceived opinions for the purpose of establishing a firm and stable metaphysical basis for his system. In other words, Descartes established the method of doubt in order to eliminate doubt and find something indubitable. Doubt is employed in order to lead the mind away from the senses and towards rational truth. It is only a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The method of doubt plays a central role in Descartes' first philosophy. It comprised a succession of arguments, from the unreliability of the senses, the possibility that one is dreaming, the possible error of mathematical reasoning, and finally to the malicious demon.

"Because in this case I wish to give myself entirely to the search after truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain." — Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, IV.

年, 第三卷, 第 41 页。

双重否定

见“否定之否定”条。

二重真理论

被认为是中世纪哲学家布兰班特的西格尔和阿维罗伊主义者所持的一种见解。根据这种见解, 信仰真理和哲学真理属于两个不同的领域。当一个命题从哲学的观点看为真并能被理性证明时, 另一个哲学上为假的不相容命题也能被宗教启示为真。这种理论是一种在亚里士多德的形而上学学说与基督教教义抵触时坚持前者的企图, 但在 13 世纪时, 被巴黎主教判为异端。

“二重真理论, 即一个命题能同时在神学中为真而在哲学中为假。”——柯普莱斯顿:《中世纪哲学史》, 1972 年, 第 7 页。

怀疑

在通常的意义上, 怀疑指心灵的不确定状态。对于怀疑主义来说, 怀疑起着实质性的作用。怀疑主义的目的就是对知识的各种主张提出质疑, 并搁置信念。笛卡尔的怀疑方法不同于这种通常意义上的怀疑, 也不同于传统的怀疑主义。它是一个程序, 凭借这个程序, 笛卡尔试图推翻一切偏见和先入之见, 以便为他的体系建立一个牢固可靠的形而上学基础。换句话说, 笛卡尔为了消灭怀疑和找到不容置疑的东西, 制定了怀疑的方法。运用怀疑是为了使心灵离开感觉, 趋向理性的真理。怀疑归根结底只是达到目的的一个方法, 它本身不是目的。怀疑的方法在笛卡尔的第一哲学中起核心作用。它由一些连续的证明组成, 从对感官的不可靠性的证明, 人做梦的可能性的证明, 数学推理的可能错误的证明, 最后直到对恶意的神灵的证明。

“因为现在我希望完全从事于追求真理, 所以我想我有必要采取显然相反的做法, 把我稍能想出怀疑根据的一切事情都当做绝对虚假的加以排斥, 以便看看此后在我的信念中是否有任何完全确实的东西保存下来。”——笛卡尔:《方法谈》, IV。

Doxa

[Greek: usually translated as belief or opinion, from the verb *dokein* or *doxazein*, to appear, to believe or to seem] A term used in connection with seeming, the immediate awareness of or direct acquaintance with objects in contrast with *episteme* (knowledge). For Plato, *doxa* is not only opinion, but also the faculty or capacity to produce opinion. It is the state of mind of the non-philosopher (the lover of opinion, *philo-doxos*), and its object is the perceptible world of becoming, which is both to be and not to be, and things that are copies of the Forms. In contrast, *episteme* is not only knowledge as a consequence of cognition, but also the faculty to produce knowledge. It is a state of mind of the philosopher (the lover of wisdom, *philo-sophos*), and its object is the world of the Forms itself, which really is. The distinction is discussed in detail in the *Republic* Book V, and is essential for Plato's separation of the world of the Forms from the sensible world. It has had a lasting influence on Western metaphysics and epistemology.

"We clearly agree that *doxa* is different from knowledge." — Plato, *Republic*, 478a.

Doxastic theory

[from Greek: *doxa*: opinion or belief] A doxastic state refers to one's belief. Doxastic theory claims that epistemic justification is only a function of such a state. We can determine what to believe on the basis of the overall beliefs we possess, without needing to take into account anything else, including perceptual states. Both foundationalism and coherentism are doxastic theories. This theory is thus opposed to non-doxastic theory, which claims that in order to justify one's beliefs it is not enough to examine the beliefs themselves. Rather we must refer to the cognitive process of belief-forming and belief-preserving. Non-doxastic theory is divided into internalism which suggests that justification is a function of one's internal states, and externalism which argues that justification must involve factors which are external to one's consciousness.

"Doxastic theories take the justifiability of a belief to be a function exclusively of what else one believes." — J. Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, p. 93.

Doxastic virtue, see epistemic virtue

Dread, see anxiety

Dreaming. argument from

One of the principal arguments against the certainty of perception in Descartes. Dreaming is taken by Descartes to be a kind of experience we have when we sleep, with a con-

意见

[希腊词, 通常译作意见或信仰, 出自动词 *dokein* 或 *doxazein*, “显现”, “相信”或“看起来”] *doxa* 常与“似乎”联用, 是对对象的当下意识或直接相识, 与 *episteme* (知识) 相对。对于柏拉图来说, *doxa* 不仅是“意见”, 而且是指产生意见的官能或能力。它是非哲学家(或爱观念者, *philo-doxos*) 的心智状态, 它的对象是变化的可感世界, 既是(存在)又不是(不存在), 是形相世界的摹本。相反, *episteme* 不仅是作为认知结果的知识, 而且是产生知识的官能。它乃是哲学家(爱智慧者, *philo-sophos*) 的心智状态, 以真实存在的形相世界自身为对象。这一区分在《国家篇》第五卷中得到了详细讨论。它对于柏拉图分离可感世界与形相世界起了关键的作用, 并对西方形而上学和知识论的发展具有持续性的影响。

“我们欣然同意意见与知识是不同的。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》, 478a。

信念论

[源自希腊文 *doxa*, 是指“意见”或“信念”] 信念状态就是指人们的信念。信念论认为, 认识上的辨明就是这样一种状态的功能。我们可以基于我们所拥有的全部信念, 决定要相信什么, 而无须说明其他的东西, 包括知觉状态。基础主义和融合主义都是信念论。这种理论是与非信念论对立的, 后者认为, 要想证明某人的信念, 仅仅考察这些信念本身是不够的。相反, 我们必须涉及构成信念和保持信念的认知过程。非信念论又分为内在论和外论: 内在论提出, 辨明是人们内在状态的一种功能; 而外论则认为, 辨明必须涉及外在于人们意识的因素。

“信念论把信念的可辨明性完全看作是人们所相信的其他东西的功能。”——波洛克:《当代知识论》, 第93页。

信念德性

见“认知德性”条。

恐惧

见“畏惧”条。

梦的证明

笛卡尔反对知觉的确实性的主要证明之一。他把梦当做我们睡觉时具有的一种经验, 它的内容主要由意象组成。当我实际上赤裸地躺

tent consisting mainly of imagery. In a dream, while I am actually lying undressed in bed, I can think that I am dressed and seated near the fireplace. Now I think that I am awake, and am reading this book with a pen in my hand. But since I have been deceived by similar illusions whilst asleep, I can not know with certainty that these apparent perceptions do not belong to a dream. There seems to be no logical criterion to distinguish waking experience from dream experience. I have reason to doubt any of my perceptions on the grounds that it could be an illusion from my dreams. We cannot distinguish between deception and non-deceptive perception. Thus my perceptions on any given occasion might not be veridical, and could be merely illusory. Any perceptual beliefs I form on their basis could be false. This argument raises the problem of the external world and has played a great role in modern Western philosophy.

"In the dream argument Descartes recognises that conflicts may occur among perceptions of any sort—even among those that bear the sensory marks of perception under the most ideal conditions." — Frankfurt, *Demons, Dreamers and Madman*, 1970, p. 46.

Dual-aspect theory

As an alternative to Cartesian dualism of mind and body, this theory holds that mind and body are not two independent things, but two attributes of the same underlying substance; hence they cannot be actually separate, but can only be abstracted from one another in thought. Spinoza's philosophy of mind, which is often called parallelism, is sometimes said to be more adequately called a dual aspect or double aspect theory, for he claims that mind and body are attributes of one and the same substance, and sometimes even says that a mode of thought and a mode of extension are one and the same thing, only being expressed in two ways. The problem for this theory is that it replaces the problems of substance dualism with those of property dualism, for the interaction between these two attributes remains unclear. The best example of dual aspect theory in modern philosophy of mind is functionalism, as held by Strawson, Hampshire and Davidson.

"The double aspect theory 'explains' psycho-physical correlations by saying that one and the same event, which in itself is neither mental or physical, may be apprehended introspectively or perceptively; in so far as it is apprehended in the former way it is mental, in so far as it is apprehended in the latter way, it is physical." — Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 278.

Dualism

Any metaphysical theory which, in contrast to monism, holds that reality is composed of two kinds of fundamental entities, neither of which can be reduced to the other.

在床上,在梦中我却可以想像我穿着衣服坐在炉火旁。现在我想我是醒着的,而且正在读这本书,手里拿着笔。但是,由于我已经被熟睡时的相似幻象所欺骗,所以我无法确切知道这些明显的知觉不是梦境。这里似乎没有任何逻辑标准可以用来将醒时的经验同梦中的经验区分开来。我有理由怀疑我的任何知觉,其根据是,它可能是我的梦幻。我们无法区分欺骗和非欺骗的知觉。因而,在任何给定情况下,我的知觉也许不是不真实的,也可能完全是虚幻的。我在它们的基础上形成的任何知觉信念都可能是虚假的。这个证明引出了关于外部世界的问题,在近代西方哲学中发挥了重要作用。

"在梦的证明中笛卡尔认识到,在任何种类的知觉中……甚至在最理想条件下带有感觉印记的知觉中……都可能发生冲突。"——法兰克福:《神灵、梦与狂人》,1970年,第46页。

两面理论

一个用于取代笛卡尔的心身二元论的理论。两面理论认为,心灵和身体不是两个独立的事物,而是同一个基础实体的两个属性;因此它们不可能实际分开,只能在思想中互相抽象分开。斯宾诺莎的心灵哲学常常被称作平行论,有时人们认为把它称作两面理论或双面论更合适,因为他主张心灵和身体是同一个实体的属性,有时甚至说,一个思想样式和一个广延样式是同一个东西,只不过是两种方式表现出来的。这个理论的问题在于它将实体二元论问题替换成了性质二元论,因为这两个属性之间的相互作用仍然是不清楚的。两面理论在现代心的哲学中的最佳例子是功能主义,而且为斯特劳森、亨普舍尔、戴维森所采纳。

"双面论以如下说法'说明'心-物的相互关系:对于本身既非心理亦非物理的同一个事件,可以作内省的理解或知觉的理解,就前一种方式的理解而言,它是心理的。就后一种方式的理解而言,它是物理的。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第278页。

二元论

指任何这样的形而上学理论,它与一元论相对,主张实在由两种基本实体组成,其中任何一种都不能还原为另一种。笛卡尔把世界划分

Descartes divided the world into extended substance (matter) and thinking substance (mind), and these two have mutually incompatible properties. Accordingly, the soul is entirely distinct from the body. This standard mental-physical dualism is called Cartesian dualism. Aside from the above "substance dualism", there is also "property dualism", called dual aspect theory, which suggests that the mental and the physical are two mutually irreducible types of properties of one and the same thing. Russell holds a kind of "causal dualism", according to which the dualism is not between two entities or properties, but rather between two fundamental kinds of law: physical causal laws and psychological causal laws.

Traditional dualism, implying that the mind or soul is independent of body, has difficulty in accounting for interaction between body and mind and has become the focus of many disputes in contemporary philosophy of mind. Ryle accuses dualism of making the mind a ghost in the machine. Various theories about the relationship between mind and body have been proposed to avoid the problems of dualism.

In its wider sense, dualism refers to philosophical systems which are established on some sharp fundamental distinction, such as Plato's distinction between the sensible world and the ideal world or Kant's distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world.

"Dualism: this theory holds that there are both mental and physical particulars. It is the Cartesian view, the view of educated common sense, and the view of Christian theology." Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, X, p. 283.

Duck-rabbit

The psychologist J. Jastrow draws an ambiguous picture in his *Fact and Fable in Psychology* which can be viewed either as the head of a duck, or as the head of rabbit, although one cannot perceive the picture as both at the same time. Wittgenstein appeals this picture in his *Philosophical Investigations* to illustrate the point that if the same object can be seen as two different things, it shows that perception is not purely sensory and that we must attend to aspects in our account of perception. A report of perception is concept-laden, a combination of experience and thought.

"I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit from the first."—Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, II, xi.

Duhem Quine thesis

Also called the Quine-Duhem thesis. The view that any single hypothesis or theoretical sentence is not conclusively refuted when predictions derived from it turn out to be false, that is, when it is apparently incompatible with observation. Predictions may also rest upon other hypotheses which serve

为有广延的实体(物质)和能思维的实体(心灵),这两种实体的性质是互不相容的。因此,灵魂与身体是完全不同的。这种标准的心身二元论称为笛卡尔二元论。除了上述“实体二元论”,还有“性质二元论”,称为两面理论,它主张心与物是同一物的两类相互不可还原的性质。罗素主张一种“因果二元论”,根据这种理论,二元论不是关于两种实体或性质,而是关于两种基本定律:物理的因果律和心理的因果律。

传统的二元论含有心的或灵魂独立于身体之意,但在说明身心之间相互作用时遇到了困难。这一问题一直是当代心的哲学中许多争论的焦点。赖尔指责二元论把心灵当做机器中的幽灵。人们提出了各式各样的关于心身关系的理论,以避免二元论问题。

在更为宽泛的意义上,二元论是指各种建立于尖锐的根本性对立之上的哲学体系,诸如柏拉图对感觉世界和理念世界的区分,或康德对现象世界和本体世界的区分。

“二元论:这种理论认为既有精神的殊相,也有物理的殊相。这是笛卡尔的观点,这是受过教育的常识观点,是基督教神学的观点。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第九卷,第283页。

鸭兔

心理学家J. 贾斯特罗在他的《心理学中的事实与虚构》中画出的一个模糊的图形,它既可以看作是一只鸭子的头,也可以看作是一只兔子的头,虽然人们无法同时看出这两者。维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中借助这个图形来阐明这样的观点:如果同一个对象可以被看成是两个不同的东西,那么这就表明知觉并不是纯粹的感觉。我们必须在叙述知觉中注意若干方面。对知觉的报道承受着概念,是对经验与思想的结合。

“我可以从一开始把鸭兔简单地看作一只兔子的图形。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第二部分,第xi节。

杜恒—奎因论题

也称作“奎因—杜恒论题”,它认为,对任何单个假设或理论句子来说,当由此派生的预测被证明是假的,就是说与观察明显不一致时,这个假设或句子并没有被最终驳倒。预测也可能基于作为背景知识的其他假设。我们往往能

as background knowledge. We can always revise this background knowledge to save the hypothesis in question. Empirical tests can only be applied to the whole system of hypotheses, not to single theoretical sentences. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. The confirmation conditions of a single sentence are determined by the sentence's role in the language or in the theory in which it occurs. This thesis was defended by the French philosopher of science, P. Duhem and by Quine. This thesis is also called epistemological holism, and is related to Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.

"The Quine/Duhem thesis says that confirmation is holistic; that is, that every statement in a theory partially determines the level of confirmation of every other statement in the theory." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 41.

Duration

A notion of time, generally meaning the temporal distance between the beginning of an event and its end. Bergson contrasts duration to physical time and places it as a central conception of his philosophy. Physical time (*le temps*) is our ordinary idea of time, which is conceived as being an unbounded line composed of units or moments. Physical time is spatialised and intellectualised, and it can be measured by some measuring device or tool. This spatialised or mathematical idea of time enables us to fix the occurrence of events, but is itself empty and homogeneous. In contrast, duration (*durée*) or pure duration is the time of inner experience, a non-spatial stream of consciousness in which before and after interpenetrate one another. Duration is constituted by deep-seated conscious states, applies only to persons and not to external things, and leads to free will. We can only be aware of duration by intuition. It is a series of qualitative changing with no quantitative differentiation. It is heterogeneous and not homogenous. If we take the concept of the self as a succession of states, it is the superficial self as seen from physical time. Duration expresses the nature of the life of the deeper self. Only acts starting from duration are free. The distinction between physical time and duration, according to Bergson, can avoid determinism. His account of duration and physical time influenced the existentialist distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence.

"Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states." —Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, p. 100.

Dutch book

A combination of bets on which a person will suffer a collective loss no matter what happens. Suppose you are betting on a coin toss and accept odds of 3 : 2 that the coin lands heads and 3 : 2 that the coin will land tails. On this basis,

够修正这个背景知识,以保留相关的假设。经验检验只能用于整个假设体系,而不能用于单个的理论句子。经验意义的单位是整个科学,单个句子的确证条件是由这个句子在其所出现的理论或语言中的作用决定的。这个论题得到了法国的科学哲学家P. 杜恒和奎因的捍卫。这个论题也被称作“认识论的整体论”,它与奎因否定分析命题与综合命题的区分有关。

“奎因—杜恒论题是说,确证是整体性的;就是说,一个理论的每个陈述都部分地确定了这个理论中其他所有陈述的确证水平。”——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第41页。

绵延

一个时间概念,通常是指事件始末之间的时间距离。柏格森将绵延与物理时间相对,将其作为他的哲学的中心概念。物理时间(*le temps*)是指我们的普通时间观念,它没有界限,由单位时间或瞬间组成。物理时间被空间化和理性化了,因此可凭借测量仪器或测量工具予以测量。这种空间化或数学化的时间观念能使人们固定事件的发生时间,但其本身则是空洞的和同源的。相形之下,绵延(*durée*)或纯粹绵延是指内在体验的时间,是指一种前后相互渗透的无空间的意识流。绵延由深层的意识状态构成,只适用于个人而非外在事物,其结果会引致自由意志。我们只能通过直觉而意识到绵延。这是一系列没有量性差异的质性变化。绵延是异质的而非同源的。倘若把自我的概念当做一连串心理状态的话,那么,表层的自我可从物理时间中见出。绵延则表现深层自我的生命本质。惟有源于绵延的行为才是自由的。在柏格森看来,物理时间与绵延之间的区别可以避免决定论。柏格森对绵延与物理时间的描述影响到存在主义对真假存在之间所作的区别。

“当我们的自我想要活动起来的时候,当我们的自我不愿将其目前状态与以往状态分别开来的时候,我们的一连串意识状态就会假定存在纯粹绵延这一形式。”——柏格森:《时间与自由意志》,第100页。

荷兰赌〔或译“大弃赌”〕

“荷兰赌”是这样一种赌的组合,在其中一个人无论如何都会蒙受总体上的输钱。设想你正就掷硬币打赌,并且将接受以3 : 2的赔率既赌硬币头像朝上也赌底部朝上,则你将绝不会

you will never win and will always lose. Whatever the outcome of the coin toss, your bets will total of 4 and you will gain only 3. The notion of the Dutch book was introduced into epistemology by Ramsey and de Finetti to show that it is irrational to put oneself in a no win situation by accepting beliefs which have an incoherent combination of degrees of belief. Hence, rational degrees of belief must conform to the probability calculus. The validity of this argument is controversial, for what it proves is more a prudential rationality rather than an epistemic rationality.

"The Dutch Book argument ... entails that if your degrees of belief ... do not satisfy the probability calculus, then there are positive and negative stakes ... which you would accept in bets at the odds determined by your degree of belief and which, once accepted, would cause you to lose money come what may." —Howson and Urbach, *Scientific Reasoning*, 1989, p. 71.

Duty

[German: *die Pflicht*] What is owed or due to others or to oneself. In an ordinary sense, duty comprises the requirements, obligations or assignments ascribed to any occupant of a social position, such as the position of parent, citizen or jobholder, for which the person occupying that position is responsible. Duty as an ethical conception can be traced to the Stoics, but came to prominence in Kant's ethics as the central concept of morals. Kant's ethics is therefore a deontological theory (from Greek: *deon*: duty).

For Kant, duty is what ought to be done and thus constrains action. It is distinctive of conscientious conduct and is a concept that must be apprehended *a priori*. A good will is the basis of morality, and to have a good will is always to act from a sense of duty. Only an action performed out of a sense of duty can have moral worth. Duty is what we are obliged to do out of respect for the universal law. Kant distinguished duties chiefly into duties of justice (juridical duties) and duties of virtue (ethical duty). A duty of justice is external in the sense that it applies to action that we can be compelled to do by an appropriate legal authority, while a duty of virtue is internal in the sense that its constraint or compulsion regarding action originates from our awareness of the moral law. This distinction roughly corresponds to his earlier distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting from duty. He also distinguished between positive duty (what one ought to do) and negative duty (what one ought not to do); between perfect duty (which must be fulfilled under any circumstance and which specifies a particular action) and imperfect duty (which may be overridden and for which we have a significant degree of freedom in deciding how to comply).

"Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of*

赢并且注定要输。不管掷币的结果为何,你的赌注为4,可你仅得3。拉姆塞和德·费莱蒂把荷兰赌的概念引入认识论,以表明接受一组置信度不一贯的信念,从而置自己于一种从不赢的境地是非理性的。因此,合理的置信度必须符合概率演算。这一论证的有效性是很有争议的,因为它所证明的更多地是一种审慎的合理性,而不是一种认识的合理性。

"荷兰赌论证……蕴涵的是:如果你的置信度不满足概率演算,则存在你在赌博中将接受的正向和反向的赌注,其赔率由你的置信度所决定;而一旦你接受了这种赌注,你就无论如何都将输钱。"——豪森和厄伯奇:《科学推理》,1989年,第71页。

职责

[德语为: *die Pflicht*] 字义上指,应归属他人或自己的东西。普通的意义指归属于任何社会位置的拥有人(如父母,公民或在职人员)的要求、义务或分派的任务,对此,那些位置占有者负有责任。职责作为伦理概念可追溯到斯多亚派,而在康德的伦理学中地位卓著成为道德的中心概念。因此康德的伦理学是一种“义务论”理论(关于 *deon* 的学说, *deon* 在希腊语中意为“职责”)。

对于康德来说,职责意为“应该做的事”,即对行为的强制。它是显明的良心的行为。这个概念应该被先天地领会。善良意志是道德的基础,具有善良意志就是总是出于职责感来行动。只有出于职责感的行为才有道德价值。职责是我们出于对普遍法则的尊重而不得不做的行为。康德把职责主要区分为公正的职责(法律的职责)和德性的职责(伦理的职责)。前者是“外在的”,意思是说它被应用于那些我们可由适当的法律权威强制而作的行动;后者是“内在的”,意思是说,对行为的强制或强迫来源于我们对道德法则的意识。这种区别大略相应于他早期作出的“按照职责”和“出于职责”的区别。他也区分肯定职责(人们应当作出的行为)和否定职责(人们不应作出的行为);区分了完全职责(它在任何情况下都必须实行,并常常说明特殊的行动)和不完全职责(它能够变为无效,我们有很程度的自由来决定如何遵守它)。

“职责就是由于尊重规律而产生的行为必然性。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第400页。

Morals, p. 409.

Dyadic

[from Greek; *dyas*, two, a pair] A *dyad* is a group consisting of two parts. In logic, a dyadic relational predicate, such as "is higher than" or "is better than", requires two terms to make a complete sentence. A dyadic predicate expresses a relation between two items and is symbolised as Rxy . The order of the letters after the predicate matters, and Rxy cannot in general be equated with Ryx . A dyadic or two-place predicate expresses a two-term relation. In contrast, monadic or one-term predicates do not express relations, and polyadic or many-term predicates, such as triadic or three-term predicates and tetradic or four-term predicates, express relations among more than two terms.

"Predicative expressions used to form sentences exemplifying simple predicative formulae with more than one individual variable are sometimes called relational predicates, and are distinguished into dyadic ('two-place'), triadic ('three-place'), &c. predicates, according to the number of individual expressions they commonly require to form a sentence."—P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, pp. 141-2.

二元的

[源自希腊语 *dyas*, 其意思是“二”或“一对”] *dyad* 是由两个部分组成的一组。在逻辑中, 二元关系谓词, 像“比……高”, “比……好”, 需要两个词项才能构成一完整的句子。一个二元谓词表达两个词项的关系, 并被符号化为 Rxy 。谓词之后字母的次序是至关重要的, 因为一般来说 Rxy 并不能等同于 Ryx 。二元或二位谓词表达一个二项关系。相比之下, 一元或一项谓词并不表达关系, 而多元或多项谓词, 如三元或三项谓词以及四元或四项谓词, 却表达不止二项之间的关系。

“谓词表达式和不止一个个体变元用来形成语句, 后者如简单的直谓公式。有时也把它们称作关系谓词, 并且根据形成语句时它们通常所需要的个体表达式的数目, 还将其区分为二元(‘二位’)谓词, 三元(‘三位’)谓词, 等等。”——斯特劳森, 《逻辑理论导论》, 1952年, 第141—142页。

E

Écart

[French: splitting off or separation from itself] For Merleau-Ponty, the primordial action or movement of Being. Being, which is dynamic, possesses itself to some degree and gains some hold, but then is removed from itself (*écart*) due to its finitude and its insufficiency for ever-renewed attempts to overcome separation. The result of this movement is temporality. *Écart* implies that Being is at the same time one and many. It is thus consistent with the lapse, flux or *ekstase* of Being. *Écart*, which characterises Merleau-Ponty's understanding of Being, is the character of Being that we experience with necessary indeterminacy in all situations.

"Look in a completely different direction: the for itself itself as an incontestable, but derived, characteristic: it is the culmination of separation (*écart*) in differentiation... the perceptual separation (*écart*) as making up the 'view' such as it is implicated in the reflex, for example--and enclosing being for itself by means of language as differentiation." -- Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (tr. by Lingis), 1968, p. 191.

Ecocentrism

An approach to environmental ethics, proposing that its central concern should be the ecological system or biotic community and its sub-systems, rather than the individual members it contains. Ecocentrism is based on the claim that ecology has revealed human beings and the rest of nature to be related both diachronically (through time) and synchronically (at one time) and are part of the web of life. Proponents argue that we should therefore consider the whole ecosystem rather than its individual members in isolation from the matrix in which the individuals are embedded. Unlike the major modern moral traditions, which focus on the interests or rights of the individual, ecocentrism is an holistic, or even totalitarian, approach. It judges the moral worth of human behaviour in terms of its impact on the environment. Hence, while other approaches try to extend traditional Western moral norms to issues concerning animals and the environment, ecocentrism attempts to establish a new ethical paradigm. Land ethics and deep ecology are the most important representative forms of this trend. A fundamental problem facing ecocentrists is how to provide an appropriate place for human individuals within their account of the welfare of

自离

[法文, 意指“分裂”或“与自己分开”] 对于梅洛-庞蒂说来, 这个词意味着存在 (Being) 的原发行为或动作。动态的存在在一定程度上拥有自身并有所把持, 但由于它的有限性和不能充分实现那不断更新的去克服分离的企图, 这存在就从自身脱离 (*écart*)。这种 (自离的) 动作的结果就是时间性。自离意味着存在同时是一和多。因此它与偏离、流逝或存在的逸出 (*ekstase*) 都不矛盾。自离给予梅洛-庞蒂对存在的理解以自己的特点: 它是在所有形势中以必然的非决定性的方式所体验到的存在特性。

“从一个完全不同的方向来看, 这自为自身乃是一个无可争议的但却是衍生的特点。它是在分异中的自离的顶点。……这知觉的自离被认为造成了这样一种‘视野’或‘观点’, 正如它被隐含在反射之中一样, 而且通过起到分异作用的语言而自为地包含着存在者。”——梅洛-庞蒂: 《可见的与不可见的》(林吉斯英译), 1968年, 第191页。

生态中心主义

环境伦理学的一种研究视角。它提出环境伦理学的中心问题应该是生态系统或生物共同体本身或它的亚系统, 而不是它所包括的个体成员。生态中心论的根据是, 生态学揭示了人类和自然的其他成员既有历时性(时间过程)也有共时性(同一时间)的关系, 他们共同是生命系统的一部分。因此, 我们应该考虑整个生态系统, 而不是把个体于其中的母体与个体分隔开。多数现代的道德理论, 把注意力集中于个体的权利或利益, 与此不同, 生态中心主义是一种整体论的或总体主义的方法。它依据对环境的影响判断人类行为的道德价值。因此, 当其他方法力图把传统的西方道德规范扩展至关于动物和环境问题时, 生态中心主义力图建立一种新的伦理模式。“土地伦理学”和“深层生态学”是这种倾向的最重要的代表。生态中心主义者所面临的主要问题是怎样把环境的利益与人类个体的权利与利益相协调。

“人们把包括我在内的这些哲学家, 称为‘生态中心主义’, 因为我们提倡把内在价值基点从个体(不论是个人还是个别较高级的‘低等

the environment.

"Those philosophers, among whom I count myself, have been called 'ecocentrists' since we have advocated a shift in the locus of intrinsic value from individuals (whether individual human beings or individual higher 'lower animals') to terrestrial nature—the ecosystem—as a whole." —Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, 1989, p. 3.

Economic base, see relations of production

Economic determinism

The basic thesis of Marx's historical materialism that the modes of production determine the legal/political superstructure and ideological superstructure of a society. Although some scholars use the term as a neutral description, many critics employ it pejoratively to accuse the theory of claiming that non-economic phenomena are mechanically determined by the economic structure in a way that is incompatible with the existence of human freedom and moral responsibility. But Marx never claimed that there is a monocausal relation between the economical structure and superstructure. Instead, he emphasised in his later life that superstructure, although fundamentally determined by the economical structure, is not ineffectual, but plays an active role in maintaining the economic base. Engels shared this view. Some commentators are uncertain how well the distinction between base and superstructure survives a more robust role for the superstructure, even if in the last analysis the base is allocated explanatory priority.

"It used to be said more often than it is now that Marx was an 'economic determinist'. Some critics held this against him, while others reckoned it a point in his favour." —Plamenatz, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man*, 1975, p. 8.

Economic structure, see relations of production

Ecstasy, see temporality

Effective historical consciousness, see effective history

Effective history

[German; *Wirkungsgeschichte*] Gadamer claims that history or tradition is not simply the past, but is in a process of realisation. History has effects in terms of conditioning our historical understanding. An interpreter is subject to the way in which an object has already been understood in the tradition to which the interpreter belongs. Any understand-

动物")转向作为一个整体的地球自然——生态系统——当做一个整体。"——卡利科特:《为土地伦理学辩护》,1989年,第3页。

经济基础

见“生产关系”条。

经济决定论

马克思历史唯物主义的基本观点:生产方式决定法律的/政治的和意识形态的社会上层建筑。虽然某些学者用这个术语作为一种中性的描述,但许多批评家贬意地用这个词来指责这个理论,指出:非经济现象由经济结构所机械地决定,这是与人类自由和道德责任的存在不相容的。但马克思从未主张:经济结构和上层建筑之间只存在单向的因果关系。反之,他在他的晚年强调,虽然上层建筑从根本上受经济结构所决定,但并非是无作用的,它对于维持经济基础起着能动的作用。恩格斯也有此共识。某些注释评论家并不清楚,即使在最后的分析中,基础被赋予解释的优先性,可面对上层建筑的强大作用,这一基础与上层建筑的区分究竟在什么程度上可维持。

“人们一向比现在更经常地说马克思是‘经济决定论者’。某些批评家以此来反对他,另一些人把它看作对他有利的观点。”——普雷门尼兹:《卡尔·马克思的人的哲学》,1975年,第8页。

经济结构

见“生产关系”条。

逸出态〔或译“出神态”〕

见“时间性”条。

效果历史意识

见“效果历史”条。

效果历史

〔德文为 *Wirkungsgeschichte*〕伽达默尔认为历史或传统不仅仅是过去,而且也是一个实现的过程。历史通过制约我们的历史理解力而产生效果。一位解释者从属于这样一种方式,其中一个对象在这解释者所属的传统中已经得到了理解。任何理解都处于历史的形势之中,不可

ing is historically situated and is rooted in prejudice. Understanding is thus not the act of a subject, but rather an aspect of effective history. A pure "objective" understanding free from any special vantage point does not exist. History limits our knowledge, but also aids our development by means of determining what we can understand. Accordingly, no rejection of the tradition can be as completely radical as claimed by its proponents. The consciousness that is affected by history, through having a pre-history, and will in turn affect history, through having a post-history, is called effective historical consciousness. History is a unity of history with the understanding of it.

"The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. A proper hermeneutics would have to demonstrate the effectivity of history within understanding itself. I shall refer to this as 'effective-history'." — Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. by Glen-Doepel) 1975, p. 267.

Effective procedure

In contrast to a random procedure, an effective procedure is a mechanical step-by-step process with a finite number of steps before reaching an answer or calculating a solution. An effective procedure can be given as a finite set of instructions which determine what is to be done at each step. The notion of effective procedure is crucial for computer science. A Turing machine employs an effective procedure because in such a machine a computer program effectively specifies the information processing to be carried out by the machine. This mechanical procedure is a type of algorithm.

"[An effective procedure] denotes a set of rules (the program) specifying certain processes, which processes can be carried out by a machine processor built in such a way as to accept these rules as instructions determining its operations." — Boden, *Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man*, 1977, p. 7.

Efficiency

A term for assessing means to achieve ends. In contemporary philosophy, efficiency is mainly used as a welfare criterion to measure the condition of a society. A society is efficient if the institutions within it can work co-operatively to generate the greatest possible welfare. Hobbes claimed that virtually everyone is better off if there is a political-legal order and that a society is more efficient if it has a government than if it lacks one. Under Pareto-optimality, a distribution of goods is efficient if any alternative distribution would make some individual better off at the cost of making another individual worse off. The notion of efficiency attracts a widespread interest in contemporary political philosophy in debates about conflicts between equity and efficiency and be-

避免地带有偏见。因此,理解不是一个主体的行为,而是效果历史的一个方面。根本不存在纯“客观的”、无任何特殊视角的理解。历史限制了我们的知识,但也通过决定我们能理解什么而帮助了我们的理解的开展。因此,对于传统的拒绝没有能比它的拥护者所主张的更激进的了。意识因拥有一个前历史(pre-history)而被历史影响,并通过具有一个后历史(post-history)而反过来影响历史;这样一种意识就被称作“效果历史意识”。历史是历史与对它的理解的统一体。

“一个真正的历史对象根本不是一个对象,而是彼此两个方面形成的一个统一体,一种在其中存在着历史现实和历史理解的现实这两方面的关系。一种合适的解释学必须在理解本身内表明历史的效果性。我将用‘效果历史’来指称它。”——伽达默尔:《真理与方法》(格尔-多培尔英译),1975年,第267页。

有效程序

相对于随机程序而言,有效程序是一种机械性的逐步实现的过程,它以有限的步骤得出结论或计算出结果。有效程序可作为决定每一步将做什么的一组限定的指令而给出。有效程序这一概念对于计算机科学是至关重要的。“图灵机”使用的就是一种有效程序,因为在这样一台机器中,一种计算机程序有效地规定了由这台机器执行的信息处理过程。这一机械的程序是算法的一种类型。

“[有效程序]指的是一组规定某些过程的规则(程序),这些过程可以由信息处理机来执行,这种机器是以把这些规则作为决定其运行的指令来接受的方式制造出来的。”——博登:《人工智能与自然》,1977年,第7页。

效率

评估达到目的的方法的术语。在当代哲学中,效率主要用作衡量社会条件的福利标准。一个社会如果它的组织机构和制度能够协作产生最大可能的福利,它就是有效率的。霍布斯声称,在存在政治法律秩序的情况下每个人的处境实际上都会有所改善,有政府的社会比没有政府的社会效率更高。根据帕累托最优原则,如果所选择的分配以使某人处境变坏为代价而使另一个人的处境变好,这种利益的分配就是有效率的。在当代政治哲学中有关公平与效率之间,以及稳定、协调和效率之间的冲突的争论中,效率概念引起了人们广泛的关注。

“对于某种社会基本结构的安排来说,如果

tween stability, co-ordination and efficiency.

"An arrangement of the basic structure is efficient when there is no way to change this distribution so as to raise the prospects of some without lowering the prospects of others." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 70.

Egalitarianism

Also equalitarianism. The doctrine that all men are equal in the sense that they should receive equal treatment or consideration in moral, political and even economical life. The position, which is opposed to inequalitarianism, denies that any individual or group should be accorded prior moral concern over others. Each individual is to be counted as one. One aim of liberalism is to respect and advance equality, although different liberal doctrines give different weight to the claims of equality. Strict egalitarianism would insist upon an equal distribution of all primary goods, but many egalitarians allow different rewards to be attached to different positions so long as the positions are open to all on the basis of fair equality of opportunity.

"Egalitarianism: ... the doctrine that all human beings have the right to equal respect and consideration" — Haksar, *Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism*, 1979, p. 2.

Ego (Freud)

Freud rejected the view that the mind is a unity. Instead, he divides it into three parts: id [German: *Es*, literally, "it"], ego [German: *Ich*, literally, "I"] and superego [German: *Überich*]. For Freud, the id contains bodily appetites and unconscious instincts. It is not subjected to logical processing or to time, and it represents the resistance of human nature and what should be checked. The id replaced what Freud earlier called the unconscious. The superego is a human's moral faculty and is the agent of conscience. It is the location of ego-ideal, that is what one desires but cannot have. It represents an individual's social personality, and acts as a deputy for the culture outside oneself. It is a judge and a censor. The presence of the superego explains how it is possible for us to act in a way which serves something beyond our own self-interest. The ego, the subject of intentional actions and decisions, is the mediator between id and superego, and is the real "I" or genuine self. It has a conscious part and an unconscious part. It tries to measure itself by the ideal set by superego and to act on the demands of the superego to subdue the unsociable chaos of the id's desires. The ego also tries to keep its own perceptual responses free from the constraints of morality. The contents of the id can find expression in consciousness only through the ego, through the approval of the ego or by the ego falling prey to the id's manipulation. Freud compares the relation between the ego and id to the relation between a rider and horse. In

没有办法改变这种安排从而改善某些人的前景而又不损坏其他人的前景, 这种安排就是有效率的。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》, 1971年, 第70页。

平等主义

也称为平均主义。它是一种认为所有的人都是平等的, 即在道德上、政治上、甚至在经济生活上都应受到同等对待或考虑的学说。这一立场反对不平等主义, 否认应给予任何个人或群体比他人更为优先的道德上的考虑。每一个人都被视为是一个人。自由主义的一个目的就是尊重和推进平等, 尽管不同的自由主义学说对平等的要求有不同的侧重。严格意义上的平等主义坚持主张对所有基本商品的平等分配, 但很多平等主义者允许对不同职务给予不同报酬, 只要这些职务是基于机会公正平等对所有的人开放的。

"平等主义:……即那种主张所有的人都有权受到平等的尊重和考虑的学说。"——哈克斯萨:《平等、自由和至善论》, 1979年, 第2页。

自我(弗洛伊德)

弗洛伊德拒绝那种认为心灵(mind)是一个统一体的看法。与之相反, 他将心灵分为三部分: 伊底[德文为 *Es*, 原义为“它”。中文或译为“本我”]、自我[德文为 *Ich*, 原义为“我”]和超我[德文为 *Überich*]。对于弗洛伊德来说, 伊底或本我包含身体的欲望和无意识的本能。它不服从逻辑程序或时间, 代表人类本性中的抵触部分和那本应被抑制的部分。伊底代替了弗洛伊德早些时候所讲的无意识。超我是一种人类的道德能力和良心代表。它是理想自我之所在, 人对之可望而不可及。它代表个人的社会个性, 作为外在于自身的文化的代理角色而起作用。它是一法官和检查员。超我的存在解释了这样一个事实, 即我们居然可以为了某种超出我们自身利益的东西而行动。自我是意向行为和决定的主体, 是伊底和超我之间的调停者, 也就是一真实的“我”或真正的自身。它包含有意识的部分和无意识的部分。它试图以超我建立的理想来衡量自身, 并按照超我的要求而行动, 压抑住伊底的非社会的混沌欲望。自我也试图保持自己的知觉反应, 不受道德的限制。伊底的内容只有通过自我、通过自我的批准或让自我受伊底的操纵才能表现于意识之中。弗洛伊德将自我与伊底的关系比作骑手和坐骑的关系。总的说来, 自我代表了谨慎和理性这些典型的人类价值, 而伊底这一层次势必在外在现实

all, the ego represents characteristic human values of prudence and rationality. It is the layer of the id which has been modified by the influence of the external world of reality.

Freud's tripartite picture does not simplify the function of mind into a conflict between the rational and irrational. In a sense, it can be traced to Plato's division of the soul into reason, spirit and appetite, although Freud locates reason in the area of ego. As with all the major elements of Freudian theory, it is tempting to accept Freud's account of the ego, id and superego without suitable scrutiny.

"Putting ourselves on the footing of everyday knowledge, we recognise in human beings a mental organisation which is interpolated between their sensory stimuli and the perception of their somatic needs on the one hand and their motor acts on the other, and which mediates between them for a particular purpose. We call this organisation their 'Ich' ('ego', literally, 'I')." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 23, p. 194.

Egocentric particulars

A term introduced by Russell, which he also called emphatic particulars. Items designated by words such as "this", "I", "here", "now", "past", "future", "near" or "far", whose denotation is relative to the speaker and his position in space and time and depends on the contexts of their utterances. In a sense, all of them can be defined in terms of an ostensive "this". These words are neither proper names nor terms for general concepts nor descriptions and therefore are not easy to fit into the usual logical and semantic categories. They will affect the truth of the propositions in which they occur, for such propositions cannot have a constant truth-value. They may be said to denote without connoting anything. It therefore becomes a fundamental problem how to avoid egocentric particulars in the formulation of epistemologically basic propositions. Since the use of egocentric terms must involve the selective activity of the mind, the existence of such terms is also supposed to be a criticism of the no-ownership theory of mental states. Other authors call egocentric particulars token-reflexives, indicator terms, or indexicals.

"There is also difficulty about 'egocentric particulars', i. e. 'I', 'this', 'now', 'here'." — Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 116.

Egocentric perceptual statements

Shoemaker's term for statements which make use of egocentric terms such as "this", "here", "near", "far", "left" or "right" to describe events or objects in relation to the speaker. The truth or falsity of these statements is decided with reference to such circumstances as the speaker's location, orientation and point of view.

世界的影响下受到修正。

弗洛伊德的这个三元图像并没有将心灵功能简化为理性与反理性之争,在某个意义上,它可以回溯到柏拉图将灵魂分为理性、精神和欲望的作法,尽管弗洛伊德将理性置于自我领域。如弗洛伊德理论的所有主要原理一样,他对于自我、伊底和超我的说法很容易让人在没有深思熟虑的情况下就率然认可。

“将我们自己置于日常知识的基础上,我们就在人类存在者中辨认出一个精神上的机制,它处于感觉刺激和肉体需要的知觉为一方,原动行为为另一方的中间,并为了某个特殊目的而在它们之间调停。我们称这个机制为人类存在者们的‘我’(‘自我’,即第一人称的‘我’)。”——弗洛伊德,《S·弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第二十三卷,第194页。

自我中心特称词

该词由罗素引入,他也将其叫做“强调性特称词”。这些词以“这”、“我”、“这里”、“现在”、“过去”、“将来”、“近”、“远”等表示。它们的外延相对于讲话者及其时空位置,并有赖于说出它们时的语境。在某种意义上,它们全部都可以用实指词“这”来定义。这些词不是专名,不是表示普遍概念的词,也不是摹状词,因此不易纳入通常的逻辑学和语义学范畴。它们会影响包含有它们的命题的真,因为这样的命题不能有恒常的真值。可以说它们有外延而无内涵。因此,如何在表述认识论基本命题时避免自我中心特称词就成了一个重要问题。因为使用自我中心词必定要涉及到精神的选择性活动,这些词的存在也被认为是对心灵状态的无所有者理论的批评。其他人把自我中心特称词叫做反身符号、指示词或索引词。

“关于‘自我中心特称词’,如‘我’、‘这’、‘现在’、‘这里’,也有种种困难。”——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第116页。

自我中心知觉陈述

舒马克的术语,指使用像“这”、“这里”、“近”、“远”、“左”、“右”等等这样的自我中心语汇来描述相对于说话者的事件和客体的陈述。这些陈述的真伪应由像说话者的位置、取向、观点等这样的情况来决定。

“正是因为自我中心知觉陈述可能是错误

"It is just because egocentric perceptual statements can be false, and can be discovered to be false by reference to the speaker's point of view, that they are informative in the way they are."—Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, 1963, p. 180.

Egocentric predicament

The term, coined by the American philosopher R. B. Perry, refers to the situation according to which everyone's knowledge is limited by his or her own experience and cannot go beyond that experience. This situation has already been expressed in Berkeley's dictum to be is to be perceived. Because of this predicament, we cannot have empirical knowledge of other minds, for we cannot share their experience. We also cannot have empirical knowledge of the mind-independent external world, for any recognition of the world must be formed on the basis of one's experience. Idealism, although widely criticized in this regard, generally takes this predicament as a strong proof of its truth.

"The fallacious argument from the egocentric predicament is to confuse the redundant statement that 'everything which is known, is known' with the statement that 'everything which is, is known'; or to infer the second statement from the first."—Perry, *Realms of Value*, 1954, p. 447.

Egoism, ethical

Also called normative egoism or rational egoism. An ethical view which holds that satisfying some desire of mine is a necessary and sufficient condition for me to act. This theory places the self at the centre of ethical life in relation to other persons. According to this view, people will naturally behave unjustly and reject fundamental moral rules if they can do so without any negative consequences for themselves. It then follows that we do not have a natural regard for the public interest, and that a rational person will act to maximise selfish satisfactions. For an ethical theory based on this account of human psychology, moral life is the life that maximises the good-for-me. Psychological egoism provides a theoretical basis for ethical egoism, but the failure of psychological egoism would not entail that ethical egoism is false. It only shows that ethical egoism must find another basis. Egoism stands in contrast to altruism, which claims that morality must be based on our desire to help others. Egoism was explicitly argued for by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* and developed by Hobbes. To explain obvious acts of altruism and benevolence in many situations, egoists argue that altruism or the observance of the general moral order is disguised self seeking, for it will create a stable society which can preserve us and promote our long-term interests. The main difficulty of egoism is that it takes morality as an external bond, rather than being an internal feature of our moral personality. The prisoner's dilemma indicates that co-opera-

的, 并且可能由于说话者的观点而被发现是错误的, 它们才以它们的方式提供信息。”——舒马克:《自我知识与自我认同》, 1963年, 第180页。

自我中心困境

这个术语是由美国哲学家 R. B. 佩里提出来的, 指这种情况: 每个人的知识受他或她自己经验的限制, 不能超越自己的经验。这种情况已经表达于巴克莱的“存在就是被感知”这一原理之中。由于这种困境, 我们不能有关于他人心灵的经验知识, 因为我们不能分享他们的经验。我们也不能有关于独立于精神的外部世界的经验知识, 因为对世界的认识一定是基于人的经验而形成的。唯心主义虽然在这一点受到广泛批评, 但往往将此困境作为自己正确的强有力证据。

“出自自我中心困境的错误论证是将冗余的陈述‘任何已知的东西为已知’混同于陈述‘任何存在的东西为已知’; 或从第一个陈述推导出第二个陈述。”——佩里:《价值王国》, 1954年, 第447页。

伦理利己主义

也称“规范利己主义”或“理性利己主义”, 一种认为对自己的某种欲望的满足应是我行动的必要而又充分条件的伦理观点。这种理论在自我与他人的关系中, 把自我放在道德生活的中心位置。根据这个论点, 人们会自然地做不公正的事, 并拒绝基本的道德原则——如果他们这样做对自己没有消极后果的话。这就必然意味着, 我们对于公共利益并没有出于本性的尊重, 一个有理性的人的行动会是为了最大限度地达到自我的满足。对于任何基于这种人类心理学说明的伦理理论来说, 道德生活是使我的善最大化的生活。“心理利己主义”对于伦理利己主义提供了理论基础, 可心理利己主义的失败并不意味着伦理利己主义是错误的, 只是表明后者需要发现另一个基础。利己主义是与利他主义相对的, 利他主义主张, 道德的基础必须是我们帮助他人的欲望。利己主义在柏拉图的《国家篇》中为塞拉叙马库斯所明确主张, 后为霍布斯所发展。对于在许多情况下存在的明显的利他主义和仁慈的行为, 利己主义者解说, 利他主义或对一般道德秩序的遵守乃是伪装着的对自利的追求。因为这将创造一个能够保护我们和我们的长期利益的稳定的社会。利己主义的主要困难是它把道德看成是外在的束缚, 而不是我们道德人格的内在特征。“囚犯困境”表明合作行动也许可获得比自私行动更好的结

tive action may achieve better results than selfish action and has been offered as a serious basis for rejecting ethical egoism. However, it is also argued that egoism will allow us to act co-operatively as long as this promotes deeply-based long-term self interest. On this view, the prisoner's dilemma only shows that people should not pursue egoistic ends directly and does not entail the rejection of egoism itself.

"There is a theory of how we should act which has been called, confusingly enough, ethical egoism. This claims that each person ought to pursue his or her own self-interest." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 12.

Eidetic imagery

[from Greek: *eidos*, the thing to be seen] Persons are capable of having eidetic imagery if they can form an image of something as if that thing were really in front of them and if they can manipulate that image in some way. Such images are phenomenologically indistinguishable from perceptions, but are not illusory perceptions. Just as we can read off features of our visual phenomena, the person with eidetic images can project them upon physical surfaces and can read off their features. The existence of this kind of phenomenon suggests that we cannot easily dispense with the notion of inner-perception.

"In the unusual phenomenon of 'eidetic imagery', the subject can read off or count off the details of his memory image." — Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*, 1969, p. 137.

Eidetic intuition, see eidetic reduction

Eidetic reduction

Husserl's term for an intuitive act towards an essence or universal in contrast to an empirical intuition or perception. He also called this act an essential intuition, eidetic intuition or eidetic variation. In Greek, *eideo* means "to see" and what is seen is an *eidos* (Platonic Form), that is the common characteristic of a number of entities or regularities in experience. For Plato, *eidos* means what is seen by the eye of the soul and is identical with essence. Husserl also called this act "ideation", for *ideo* is synonymous to *eideo* and also means "to see" in Greek. Correspondingly, *idea* is identical to *eidos*.

Eidetic reduction is the stage subsequent to transcendental or phenomenological reduction and is sometimes viewed as the second stage of phenomenological reduction itself. Transcendental reduction lifts us to the transcendental realm, and turns empirical consciousness to transcendental or pure consciousness. For Husserl, eidetic reduction of an act of transcendental consciousness penetrates to essence. It is a procedure for acquiring insight into essence and places us in cognitive contact with general or universal knowledge. The

果,因而被看作是对伦理利己主义的严肃拒绝。不过,也有人认为,利己主义会允许我们合作行动,只要这会促进深远的和长期的自我利益。根据这一论点,囚犯困境只是表明人们不直接追求利己主义的目标,因而并不意味着对利己主义本身的拒绝。

"有一种关于我们应怎样行动的理论,一直被混乱地称作伦理利己主义。它主张每一个人应当追求他或她的自我利益。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第12页。

逼真映象

[源自希腊文 *eidos* (看见的东西)] 如果一个人能够形成某物的一个映象,就好像那个东西真的在他的面前,并且他能够以某种方式来操纵这个映象,那么这个人就能够产生逼真映象。这样的映象并非幻知觉,并且它们在现象上与知觉不能区分。正像我们能够读出我们的视觉现象的特征一样,具有逼真映象的人可以将它们“投射”于物理表面并能够“读出”它们的特性。这种现象的存在表明,内部知觉概念并不容易摆脱。

"在‘逼真映象’这一不同寻常的现象中,主体能够看着读出或挑出其记忆映象的细节。"——丹奈特:《内容与意识》,1969年,第137页。

本质直观

见“本质还原”条。

本质还原

这是胡塞尔用来表示朝向本质或普遍性的直观行为的词,与经验直观或[感性]知觉相对而言。他也将这种行为称作本性直观、本质直观或本质变更。在希腊语中, *eideo* 意味着“看”,而被看到的则是一个 *eidos* 或“本质”(柏拉图的“形相”或“理念”),即经验中多个存在者或规则性的共同特性。对柏拉图而言,“*eidos*”意味着被灵魂之眼所看到的东西,也就是本质。胡塞尔也将这种行为称为“观念直观”[*ideation*, 又可译为“观念化”],因为 *ideo* 与 *eideo* 同义,在希腊文中也意味着“看”。相应地, *idea* [观念化本质]也等同于 *eidos* [本质]。

本质还原是接着先验还原或现象学还原的步骤,有时被认为是现象学还原本身的第二阶段。先验还原将我们提到先验领域,将经验意识变为先验的或纯粹的意识。对于胡塞尔来说,一个先验意识行为的本质还原透及本质。这是一个获得本质洞察的程序,使我们能够与一般的或普遍的知识发生认识联系。这种还原的结果是一个对于普遍性看得更为清晰明确的意识。

result of this reduction is a clearer and more distinct consciousness of the universal. This reduction or intuition is a rule-governed act that direct intuition often resists. In eidetic reduction, we do not concentrate on the perceived instance, but on the essence which the instance exemplifies. Understanding this reduction, therefore, provides an explanation of how we transcend the contingency of our basic experience and extract what is essential.

"If the phenomenological reduction contrived a means of access to the phenomenon of real and also potential inner experience, the method found in it of 'eidetic reduction' provides the means of access to the invariant essential structures of the total sphere of pure mental process." — Husserl, *Shorter Works* (eds by McCormick and Elliston), 1981, p. 25.

Eidetic variation, an alternative expression for eidetic reduction

Élan vital

[French: *élan*, force or impetus] A central notion of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, introduced in *Creative Evolution* and translated as "impetus of life" or "vital impetus". Bergson was influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution, but claimed that evolution cannot be a process of random natural selection. He argued that the theory fails to explain why biological evolution leads towards greater and greater complexity. He therefore postulated the existence of an *élan vital* underlying and determining the course of evolution. *Élan vital* is a force which is not capable of scientific explanation, but which pervades the whole of nature and presents itself in innumerable forms. By pushing nature to evolve into new but unforeseen forms of organic structures, it makes evolution a creative process rather than a mechanistic one. Bergson denied that introducing *élan vital* as a theoretical entity makes evolution teleological, but claims that *élan vital* finds its most complete expression in human intelligence. Accordingly, human reason is at the highest level of evolution.

"The impetus of life [*élan vital*], of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation. It cannot create absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say with the movement that is the universe of its own. But it seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself and strives to introduce to it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty." — Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 1911, p. 265.

Elementary proposition

In Wittgenstein's philosophy, an elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition. It is the basis for analysing other kinds of propositions but cannot itself be

这种还原或直观是一个被规则主宰的、而且时常与直接的直观相抵触的行为。在本质直观中,我们并不集中于被知觉的实例,而是这个实例体现出的本质。因此,理解这个还原就可表明我们如何超越了基础经验的随机性并抽取出了本质的东西。

"如果说现象学还原给出了达到真实现象以及潜伏的内在经验的手段,那么在其中找到的'本质直观'的方法就提供了达到纯粹精神过程全部领域的不变本质结构的手段。"——胡塞尔:《短篇著作集》(麦考密克和埃利斯頓编辑),1981年,第25页。

本质变更

"本质还原"的另一种表达。

生命冲动

[在法文中, *élan* 表示"力量"或"冲动"]这是法国哲学家 H. 柏格森使用的一个中心概念,在《创造的进化》中引入并被译成"生命冲动"或"活的冲动"。柏格森受到达尔文进化论的影响,但认为进化不可能是一个随机的自然选择过程。他论证说,这个理论无法解释为什么生物进化导致越来越大的复杂性。因此,他假定有一种在进化过程之下并决定它的生命冲动的存在。生命冲动是一种不能被科学解释的力量,但它充斥于整个自然并以无数的形式来表现自己。它推动着自然,去进化到新的、不可预见的有机结构形式里;由此而使进化成为一个创造的而不是机械的过程。柏格森否认他引入"生命冲动"是为了将它当做一个理论存在物,以便使进化成为目的论意义上的过程;他所主张的倒是,生命冲动最完全地表现在人类理智中。因此,人类理性是进化的最高层次。

"我们正讨论的生命冲动存在于一种创造的需要之中。它不能绝对地创造,因为要面对物质,也就是面对运动;而这运动就是它自己的宇宙。但是它抓住这物质,这必要性本身,努力在里边引入最大可能程度的非决定性和自由。"——柏格森:《创造的进化》,1911年,第265页。

基本命题

在维特根斯坦的哲学中,基本命题是那种最简单的命题。它是分析其他种类命题的基础,但自身不能用其他命题来分析。因此,基本命题

analysed in terms of other propositions. Hence, elementary propositions are where the analysis of propositions terminates. Elementary propositions, which give language the fundamental capacity to picture the world, consist of names. The way in which the names are combined represents the way in which objects hang together in a state of affairs. Elementary propositions are meant to be logically independent of each other and not to contradict or entail one another, although Wittgenstein later recognized overwhelming difficulties with this requirement. What elementary propositions depict are always positive facts. By depicting the totality of possible states of affairs as the world, the totality of elementary propositions forms a complete description of the world. Wittgenstein never gives an example what such a proposition would be, and elementary propositions lose their importance in his later period.

For some logical positivists, an elementary proposition is also called a basic proposition or protocol sentence.

"The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4. 21.

Elenchus, see Socratic elenchus

Elimination of metaphysics

A slogan of logical positivism, representing the culmination of the anti-metaphysical tradition in the history of Western philosophy. Hume wanted to burn all books whose contents cannot be checked by our experience or by abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number. Kant criticised traditional metaphysics on the grounds of his examination of the nature and limits of knowledge. The attack by logical positivism, on the other hand, was based on a theory of language which was partly inherited from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Logical positivists claim that there are only two kinds of meaningful propositions: formal propositions, which are logical and mathematical principles, and factual propositions, which are empirically verifiable. Metaphysical propositions, which are about such things as the absolute, essences, transcendent entities and fate, are literally nonsensical or meaningless, because they contain pseudo-words or because they are pseudo-statements, with an arrangement of words violating the rules of logical syntax, and lack any criteria of application. Thus, metaphysics breaks the rules which any utterance must satisfy if it is to be literally significant. All metaphysical questions and answers are irreconcilable with logic and scientific thinking. The root of the problem is that metaphysics establishes an impossible task for itself, that is to discover a kind of knowledge which is beyond experience. Yet if something is beyond any possible experience, it could be neither said nor thought nor asked. Hence, according to

就是命题分析的终点。基本命题赋予语言以描画世界的根本能力,它们由名称组成。名称被结合的方式代表了对象在事态中构连在一起的方式。基本命题被认为在逻辑上相互独立,并且彼此不矛盾或蕴含,虽然维特根斯坦在后期承认这个要求有极大的困难。基本命题描画的总是“肯定性事实”。通过把可能事态的总体描画为世界,基本命题的总体就构成了对世界的完整描述。维特根斯坦从没有对何谓这种命题举出例子。在他的后期,基本命题失去了重要性。

对于有些逻辑实证主义者来说,基本命题也叫做原初命题或记录命题。

“最简单的那种命题,即基本命题,断定了事态的存在。”——维特根斯坦,《逻辑哲学论》, 4. 21。

问答法

见“苏格拉底问答法”条。

清除形而上学

逻辑实证主义的口号,是西方哲学史上反形而上学传统达到了顶点的表现。休谟想烧掉所有下面这样的书籍:其内容不能由我们的经验或关于数与量的抽象推理原则来核实。康德基于其对知识的本性和界限的考察来批判传统形而上学。另一方面,逻辑实证主义的攻击基于一种语言理论,它部分地来自于维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》。逻辑实证主义者主张只有两类有意义的命题:形式命题,即逻辑和数学原理;事实命题,它们是可由经验证实的。关于诸如绝对、本质、超验实体和天命这类事物的形而上学命题实际上是胡说或是没有意义的,因为它们包含假语词,或者因为它们是真陈述,即语词的排列违反了逻辑句法规则及缺乏应用的标准。因此,形而上学破坏了规则,这是说任何话时如果实际上要有意义就必须满足的。所有的形而上学问题和回答与逻辑和科学思维是不可调和的。问题的根子在于形而上学给自己确立了一个不可能完成的任务,即是要发现一种超越于经验的知识。然而,如果某种东西在可能有的经验之外,它就既不能说,也不能想,还不能问。所以,根据逻辑实证主义者的观点,形而上学虽然有诗意的优点和情感价值,但对知识无所贡献。如果哲学想要成为知识的一个真正的分支,它必须使自己从形而上学中解脱出来。维也纳小组的立场自身也受到了批判,这部分是因为

logical positivists, metaphysics, though has its poetic merit and emotional value, does not contribute to knowledge. If philosophy wants to be a genuine branch of knowledge, it must emancipate itself from metaphysics. This position of the Vienna Circle is itself criticised, in part because its division between two kinds of meaningful propositions is not exhaustive. Furthermore, its attack ignores the detailed analysis of various metaphysical arguments, some of which have every appearance of being meaningful.

The elimination of metaphysics is a major theme in the work of Heidegger and Derrida, but these authors have found their successive attempts to exclude metaphysics from their work to have failed.

"... Logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier anti-metaphysical standpoints." - Carnap, "The Elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language", in Ayer (ed) *Logical Positivism*, 1959, p. 61.

Eliminative induction, another expression for induction by elimination

Eliminative materialism

Also called the disappearance theory of mind, or eliminativism, the view that our standard mental concepts, such as belief and desire, are inappropriate for a serious scientific account of human beings. Our talk about propositional attitudes is misleading and should, or will be, eliminated. The mental phenomena to which these concepts are supposed to refer do not exist. Folk psychology, which employs these mental concepts, does not have the status of a serious theory. Instead, we must use the language of physics and neurophysiology to replace these notions. The leading advocates of this controversial theory include Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, Richard Rorty and Stephen Stich. Eliminative materialism should be distinguished from the identity theory of mind which believes in the existence of mental phenomena but insists that they are contingently identical with neurophysical states.

"[T]he eliminative materialists... have said, in effect, that our talk about the propositional attitudes is indeed just talk, but have then gone on to say that it is not only dispensable but should be dispensed with as soon as possible." - Lyons, *Approaches to Intentionality*, 1995, p. 38.

Eliminativism, another term for eliminative materialism

Elite

A group of persons who are pre-eminent according to

它对两类有意义命题的划分并非详尽无遗。此外, 它的批评忽略了对各式各样的形而上学论证作细致分析, 而其中有一些其实从哪一方面看都是有意义的。

清除形而上学也是海德格尔和德里达著作中的主题, 但这两位作者已经发现, 从其工作中排除形而上学的连续努力业已失败。

"..... 逻辑分析产生了否定性的结果: 在这个领域里所谓的陈述完全是无意义的。因此取得了对形而上学的彻底清除, 从早期反形而上学的标准出发, 这是不可能的。" - 卡尔纳普: 《通过语言的逻辑分析清除形而上学》, 载于艾耶尔编: 《逻辑实证主义》, 1959年, 第61页。

淘汰式归纳

"淘汰归纳法" 的另一种表述。

取消唯物论

又称为"心的消失理论"或"取消论"。这种观点认为, 我们诸如信念、欲望这种标准的心概念不适合关于人类的严肃的科学描述。我们关于命题态度的谈论是误导的, 因此应该或者将要被取消。这些概念所要指称的心的现象并不存在。使用这些心的概念的"常识心理学"并不具有一个严肃理论的地位。相反, 我们必须使用物理学与神经生理学的语言来代替这些概念。这种有争议理论的主要支持者是 P. 丘奇兰德、P. 丘奇兰德、R. 罗蒂、S. 斯迪席等等。取消唯物论应当与心的"同一论"相区别。后者相信心的现象的存在, 但坚持它们偶然同一于神经物理状态。

"实际上, 取消唯物论者说道, 我们关于命题态度的谈论只是谈论, 并且继续说, 它不但可以摆脱的, 而且应当尽快被摆脱。"——莱昂: 《意向性研究》, 1995年, 第38页。

取消论

"取消唯物论"的别名。

精英

在一个既定社会中, 依照某种地位或表现

some ideal of status or performance in a given society. Elites of various kinds occur in society, for example, scholarly elites contain the most learned academics, artistic elites contain the best writers and artists and moral elites contain the most virtuous. The membership of an elite is generally regarded as providing the paradigm of achievement in a given area. On epistemological grounds, Plato claimed that the moral elite and the political elite are identical. He held that the most learned are also the most just and should be the rulers. Each moral theory generally has an ideal of the hero who best exemplifies its moral principles. For Nietzsche, a member of an elite is someone who best exercises the will to power and overcomes resentment. The word "elite" itself does not imply any special or unjustified privilege, although elites are liable to defend their own position rather than serving the wider society. The existence of elites in various fields is a fact, reflecting individual differences in talent and power. In contemporary liberal moral and political theory, an elite is understood to hold certain powers and privileges which mark it off from the rest of society. Elitism is contrasted to egalitarianism and promotes the role of elites, in some cases with anti-egalitarian consequences for the distribution of goods.

"Majoritarian democracy, it is said, is therefore the most effective safeguard against the rule of a hypocritically self-interested elite" Wolff, in *Defense of Anarchism*, 1970, p. 39.

Elitism

The claim that society should train a group of pre-eminent individuals for positions of political leadership. The view was first elaborated by Plato in his *Republic*. He held that political power should be given to philosopher-kings, who would be the wisest and most intelligent members of society. An elite of the best people would make laws and determine policy, but an elitist programme faces many difficulties. First, unless there were indeed a special wisdom of political leadership, choosing an elite would be arbitrary. Secondly, if there were such wisdom, it would be necessary to identify those possessing it to receive a suitable education. Thirdly, there would be problems in installing these experts in ruling positions and in protecting their rule against those who see it as illegitimate. Finally, a procedure would be needed for the regular and peaceful replacement of members of the elite. Elitism seems incompatible with democratic liberalism, which promotes equality and liberty and proposes that leadership should be elected from the general citizenry, but many liberal systems have chosen their political leadership from a privileged social and economic elite which has been educated for leadership.

"To advance an elitist hypothesis today it is not enough merely to argue... that an elite always or usually exist and

的理想,是一群卓越的人。不同的社会领域都有精英,例如,“学术精英”,意味着最有学问的学者群,“艺术精英”指,最好的作家和艺术家群体,“道德精英”则是最具德性的一群人。精英身份一般被看做是在一定的领域中的成就典范。柏拉图出于认识论理由认为,道德精英和政治精英是等同的。最有学问的人也应当是最公正的,应该是统治者。每一种道德理论实际上都有一种英雄的理想,这种英雄最好地例证了它的道德原则。对于尼采而言,一个精英是最好地实践着他的权力意志和克服了愤恨的人。“精英”这词本身并不隐含任何特殊的或未加证明的特权,虽然精英们往往更倾向于维护自身的地位,而不是服务于更广泛的社会。每个领域里都存在精英是一个事实,反映了在天资和力量上的个体差别。但在当代自由主义道德和政治理论中,精英的概念隐含着它有一定的权力和特权,这使得他们与社会其他部分相分离。“精英主义”这词是与平等主义相对立的,旨在促进精英的作用;可在某些情形中它在商品分配中具有反平等主义的结果。

“多数人的民主,据说是最有效地防止伪善的利己精英统治的。”——沃尔夫,见《为无政府主义辩护》,1970年,第39页。

杰出人物统治论

主张社会应培养一批杰出的人担当政治领导职务。这一观点首先是由柏拉图在其《国家篇》中详细阐述的。他认为,政治权力应交给哲学王,这些人是社会中最聪明最理智的成员。最优秀人物中的杰出人物将制定法律和决定政策,但杰出人物统治论的方案面临许多困难。首先,除非的确存在特殊的政治领导的才智,否则,对精英的选择就是任意的。其次,即使存在这样的才智,还需识别出那些是受过适当教育具有这种才智的人。第三,使这些专家就任统治的职位并保护他们的统治免遭那些将这视为非法的人的反对,这也会出现问题。最后,对杰出人物成员的定期的和平的替换需要一种程序。杰出人物统治论与民主的自由主义似乎是不相容的,后者倡导平等和自由,提出领导人应从一般公民中选出,但许多自由主义的制度是从那些受到过充当领导人的教育、有特权的社会和经济的精英中挑选他们的政治领导人的。

“在现今提出杰出人物统治论的假设,仅仅论证杰出人物总是或通常是存在的以及他们很可能是具有决定性的重要人物是不够的。除此以外,现在需要反驳那种为人们广泛持有的假定,即认为像平等、自由和自主这类价值是普遍

that they are probably of decisive importance. In addition to this, it is now necessary to refute the widely held assumption that values such as equality, liberty, and freedom are universal and objective.” --Field and Higley, *Elitism*, 1980, p. 3.

Emanation

A term in Plotinus's *Enneads*, a metaphorical description of the manner in which a lower level reality is derived from a higher level reality. The supreme One is perfect, and its perfection is inevitably productive and creative. It spreads its goodness abroad by generating an external image of its internal activity. Thus, there is a necessary and spontaneous downward procession from the One to the Divine Mind, and then in turn to the Soul or Form, and finally to the material universe. This procession is one of emanation, like the radiation of heat from a fire or the diffusion of scent from a flower. It is simply a giving-out which involves no change or diminution in the higher reality. The lower reality is at first produced as an unformed potentiality, but then turns back to the higher reality in contemplation and is thus informed and filled in content. According to Plotinus, the process of emanation is not temporal, but only indicates the relations of priority and dependence. Plotinus' poetic vision and his attempt to explain priority have both influenced later philosophers.

“The generation of reality by the One is described by the Neo-platonists in terms of their well-known image of emanation.” --Wallis, *Neo-platonism*, 1972, p. 61.

Embodiment

The existence of states of the mind or soul caused by or identical with states of the body. In contrast, disembodiment is the existence of a person after bodily death. For materialists, a person can exist only in an embodied form. In the philosophy of mind, embodiment raises a problem about how consciousness relates to the brain and to the physical world more generally. If conscious states are causally determined by physical states, it is not clear how these physically caused states are governed. There are other difficulties in explaining why mental states are so different from the physical states that determine them. Another sense of embodiment is associated with the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who distinguished between one's objective body as a physiological entity, and one's phenomenal body, that is one's own body as one experiences it. He considered such experience to be an experience of embodiment.

“This is the puzzle of how conscious states relate to the physical world, specifically to the body; the problem of embodiment.” --McGinn, *The Problem of Consciousness*, 1991, p. 100.

Embraced desire

Actions are the results of human desires and intentions.

的和客观的。”——菲尔德和海格利：《杰出人物统治论》，1980年，第3页。

流溢

普罗提诺《九章集》中的一个术语，是对从高一级实在中引出低一级实在的方式的比喻性描述。至上的那个太一是完满的，它的完满必然要产生和创造。通过产生其内在活动的外在影像，它将自身的善向外散播。这样，就有了一个必然而又自发的向下过程，先从太一到神灵，再顺次到灵魂或形式，最后到物质世界。这个过程是流溢的过程，犹如从火放射热，或从花散发香味。它仅仅是散发，不造成高一级实在的变化或减少。低一级实在最初是作为无形式的潜能而被产生的，尔后，它就回转来凝视高一级实在，并以这种方式具有形式、充实内容。按照普罗提诺的观点，流溢的过程不是时间性的，仅仅是表示在先与从属的关系。普罗提诺这一诗化的见解及其对在先性问题的解释对后世哲人影响甚大。

“新柏拉图主义者用他们那有名的流溢影像来描述依靠太一的实在的生成。”——沃利斯：《新柏拉图主义》，1972年，第61页。

有壳

心的状态或灵魂的存在起因于或同一于身体状态。相反，无壳则是人在身体死后的存在。对于唯物论者来说，一个人只能以有壳的方式存在。在心的哲学中，有壳引发了这样的问题：意识如何与脑和更一般的物理世界相关联？如果意识状态因果地决定于物理状态，那就很难说明这些由物理原因所产生的状态是如何被规定的。另外的困难在于解释心的状态与决定它们的物理状态何以如此不同。有壳的另一涵义来自法国哲学家梅洛-庞蒂。他区分了“客观躯体”与“现象躯体”，前者指作为生理存在的躯体，后者则指一个人所经验到的自己的躯体。他认为这样的一个经验就是对于有壳的经验。

“这就是意识状态如何与物理世界特别是身体相关联的难题：有壳问题。”——麦金：《意识问题》，1991年，第100页。

情愿欲求

活动是人类的欲求与意向的结果。如果这

If these desires and intentions are those which we desire or like ourselves to have, they are called embraced desires. Embraced desires enable us to do what is desired happily and willingly. In contrast are reluctant desires, which are the desires we do not wish to have. Reluctant desires push us to do something we do not really want to do. They emerge especially when we are frustrated or in situations where we are being obstructed.

"Reluctant desires and intentions, we can say, are those which operate in situations to which the agent is somehow opposed. Embraced desires and intentions satisfy the condition that they operate in situations which the agent at least accepts." Honderich, *The Consequence of Determinism*, 1988, p. 26.

Emergence

Based on the assumption that a whole is more than the sum of all its parts, the doctrine of emergence holds that the whole has properties which cannot be explained in terms of the properties of its parts. Such a property is called an emergent property. The enormous complexity of the interactions among parts leads to the generation of a property of the whole which cannot be deduced from the properties of parts. This position, which was held historically by C. L. Morgan and S. Alexander, objects to the reductionist interpretation of organisation. One of its contemporary variants is methodological holism, which holds that facts about a society cannot be reduced to facts about individuals. A society or group has some characteristics which cannot be defined or explained by the characteristics of its members. This theory, also called emergentism, is also useful in explaining psychological and biological phenomena. An important version of anti-emergentist views is methodological individualism.

"The doctrine of emergence is sometimes formulated as a thesis about the hierarchical organisation of things and processes, and the consequent occurrence of properties at 'higher' levels of organisation which are not predictable from properties found at 'lower' levels." - Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, 1961, p. 367.

Emergent property

Complex systems such as a living organism seem to possess some properties which cannot wholly be reduced to the characteristics of its individual components or be predicted from them. These properties seem not to be the sum of the components of that system, but to be something new and different that emerges from their combination. They are called emergent properties. The thesis that there are such properties is called the doctrine of emergence or emergentism. Aesthetic qualities are often held to be emergent from the combination of other properties of aesthetic objects such as shape, colour, texture and size. In contrast, additive properties can

些欲求和意向是我们想要的或喜欢有的, 它们就被称为“情愿欲求”。情愿欲求使得我们愉快而情愿地做想要做的事。与之相反的是“不情愿欲求”, 它们是我们不想具有的欲求。不情愿欲求迫使我们做我们并不真正想做的事。它们特别出现于我们受到挫折或处于被阻碍的情境中时。

“我们可以说, 不情愿欲求和意向是那些在主体在某种程度上受到阻碍时起作用的东西。情愿欲求与意向则满足这样的条件: 它们在主体至少接受的情境中起作用。”——洪德里奇:《决定论的后果》, 1988年, 第26页。

突现

基于总体大于其全部组成部分的总和这一假设, 突现论认为, 总体具有的性质是不能根据它的组成部分的性质来解释的。这种性质被称作突现性质。各组成部分之中的极为复杂的相互作用导致了总体性质的产生, 这种性质不能从组成部分的性质推导出来。从历史上看, 这种观点曾为 C. L. 摩尔根和 S. 亚历山大所持有, 它反对对有机体做还原论的解释。它在当代的一个变种是“方法论的整体主义”, 后者认为有关社会的事实不能还原为有关个人的事实。一个社会或集团具有的某些特性不能通过其成员的特性来定义或说明。这一理论也被称为突现进化论, 它对解释心理和生物现象也是有益的。反突现进化论的一种重要形式是方法论的个人主义。

“突现论有时被系统表述为一种有关事物和过程的等级组织的论点, 它认为, 在‘较高’级组织出现的最后性质不可根据在‘较低’级组织发现的特征加以预见。”——内格尔:《科学的结构》, 1961年, 第367页。

突现性质

像活的有机体这样复杂的系统, 似乎具有这样一些性质, 它们不能被全部归结为它的个别组成部分的特性或不能由后者得到预见。这些性质看上去不是那种系统的组成部分的总和, 而是由它们的结合而产生的某种新的、不同的东西。它们被称为“突现性质”。认为这一性质存在的论点被称作突现论或突现进化论。审美特性常常被认为是出现于审美对象的其他特性如形状、颜色、质地、大小等等的结合。相比之下, 加和性质可以归结为一个系统的组成部分的性质。不过, 是否一切性质最终都是加和

be reduced to the properties of the components of a system. It is a matter of dispute whether ultimately all properties are additive.

"It may seem that we should make a further distinction between two sorts of regional property, which are sometimes called summative (or additive) and emergent ... We might say that the brightness of a white light made up of two white lights is summative; the colour of a light made up of two different coloured lights is emergent." — Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 1981, p. 84.

Emergentism, see emergence

Emotion

[from Latin: *e*, out — *movere*, move, agitating motions] Aristotle claimed that emotion, which he called passion [Greek: *pathos*, being acted upon] is a process or motion. Emotions are complex mental states with various degrees of intensity. Unlike moods, they are about some real or imagined objects. They give rise to actions or reactions. In this respect, they are associated with the will, but are distinguished from feeling in general because not all kinds of feeling are action-causing. Emotions are accompanied or expressed by bodily symptoms or external behaviour. Typical emotions include love, anger, fear, joy, anxiety, pride, contempt, compassion, indignation and can occur alone or in combination.

It is difficult to determine both the place and the role of emotions. Plato divided the human soul into three parts and held that emotion, as the state characteristic of the intermediate part, lies between the appetite and reason. It can either help reason to control appetite or take the side of appetite to rebel against reason. This ambivalent position led to two contrary attitudes towards emotion in the later development of ethics. Rational ethics considers emotion to be a threat to morality and requires it to be governed by reason, while others, represented by Hume and Nietzsche, believe that emotion rather than reason is the centre of moral life. Descartes' study of the passions initiated important seventeenth century discussion of the emotions.

William James and Carl G. Lange independently developed a position according to which emotion is a brute fact, a specific feeling caused by characteristic bodily changes in response to external stimuli. This thesis, which is called the "James-Lange view", initiated the modern discussion of emotion. If emotion is the mental expression of bodily change, is it subject to the assessment of reason? Many traditional philosophers deplore the irrationality of emotion, according to which emotion is neither rational nor irrational, but emotivism holds that emotion can cause cognition. Others consider that emotions can lead us to apprehend things in certain

的, 是一个有争议的问题。

“我们似乎应当对两种局部的性质做进一步的区分, 这两种性质有时被称作总和的(或加和的)和突现的。我们可以说由两束白光构成的一束明亮白色是总和的, 由两束不同颜色的光构成的一束光的颜色是突现的。” — 比尔斯利:《美学》, 1981年, 第84页。

突现进化论

见“突现”条。

情感

[源自拉丁语前缀 *e* (外面、在外) 和 *movere* (运动, 意为“激烈运动”)] 亚里士多德宣称情感——他把它称为“激情”, [在希腊语中为 *pathos*, 即被作用]——是一个过程或运动。情感是一个有着不同程度强度的复杂的精神状态, 与心境不同, 它涉及到某种真实的或想像的对象, 也引起了行动或反映。在这方面, 它们与意志相联, 但区别于一般的感情, 因为不是所有种类的感情都是有因可寻的行动。情感往往伴随着或表达为身体的征候或外在的行为。典型的情感包括爱、怒、惧怕、快乐、焦虑、自豪、轻蔑、同情、愤慨等, 它可以是单一的也可以是复合的。

要确立情感的地位与作用比较困难。柏拉图把人类的灵魂分为三部分, 认为情感是处于欲望和理性的中间状态。它或是帮助理性控制情欲, 或是站在情欲一边反对理性。这种两栖的位置导致在后来的伦理学发展中对待情感的两种对立的态度。理性主义伦理学把它看作是对道德的一个威胁, 要求它受到理性的支配。而另一方面, 以休谟和尼采为代表, 相信情感而不是理性是道德生活的中心。笛卡尔对激情的研究导致了17世纪对情感的极其重要的讨论。

W. 詹姆斯和 C. G. 朗格各自分别提出了一种观点。根据这个观点, 情感是一种纯粹事实, 一种身体在回应外部环境刺激产生的身体特征的变化而引起的一种独特的感情。这个观点被称作“詹姆斯—朗格理论”, 它启动了对于情感的现代讨论。如果情感是一种身体变化的心理反应, 它还能受到理性的评判吗? 许多传统的哲学家痛惜情感的这种“无理性”, 因为情感既不是理性也不是非理性的观点, 但情感主义相信, 情感能引起认知。其他人则认为, 它能导致我们以一定的方式理解事物, 并且是理性的补充。因此, 情感有道德的、审美的和宗教的价值。

情感与德性和恶习相关。某种类型的情感,

ways and is complementary to reason. According to this view emotion has moral, aesthetic and religious value.

Emotion is associated with both virtues and vices. Some types of emotion, such as jealousy and pride, are vices, while others, such as love and benevolence, are virtues. It is disputed whether emotions are objective or subjective. For example, when we love something, is it because the object is loveable in itself, or because we project a subjective feeling upon it? Freud claimed that emotion is a reaction to something in our unconscious, rather than to something external. Many other modern writers have explored the diversity, complexity and opacity of the emotions.

"Emotions do not form a natural class. After a long history of quite diverse debates about their classification, emotions have come to form a heterogeneous group; various conditions and states have been included in the class for quite different reasons and on different grounds, against the background of shifting contrasts." — A. O. Rorty (ed), *Explaining Emotions*, 1980, p. 1.

Emotive meaning

A term introduced by the logical positivists in their discussions of the verifiability criterion. According to that criterion, only statements that can be checked by empirical evidence are meaningful. However, there are many apparently meaningful statements, such as those associated with moral discourse, which cannot be tested by experience. The logical positivists claimed that such statements are not factually or cognitively meaningful, but have emotive meaning, that is emotive force. A detailed discussion of emotive meaning was developed by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, who distinguish the symbolic (referential) and emotive functions of language. In their symbolic function, statements refer to things; in their emotive function, they express and evoke feelings and attitudes. In his emotivism, C. L. Stevenson distinguished between the descriptive meaning and emotive meaning of expressions. The distinction lies in the kind of states of mind expressed or aroused. If the state of mind is cognitive, the meaning of the term conveys information and is descriptive. If the state of mind is affective or emotional, the meaning of the expression is emotive. Expressions in emotive meanings do not refer to the qualities of things, but prescribe a particular action or course of conduct. According to Stevenson, the meaning of ethical terms is descriptive in a sense, but primarily and chiefly emotive.

"The emotive meaning of a word or phrase is a strong and persistent tendency, built up in the course of linguistic history, to give direct expression (quasi-interjectionally) to certain of the speaker's feelings or emotions or attitudes; and it is also a tendency to evoke (quasi-imperatively) corresponding feelings, emotions, or attitudes in those to whom the speaker's remarks are addressed." — Stevenson, *Facts*

诸如嫉妒、自负是恶,而其他的,诸如爱和仁慈,是德性。有争议的是,情感是客观的还是主观的。例如,当我们爱某种事物,那是因为这个对象本身可爱呢,还是因为我们把一种主观的感情投射到这个对象上?弗洛伊德主张,情感是一种对我们无意识中的某种东西的反应,而不是对某种外在东西的反应。其他许多现代作者探索了情感的多样性、复杂性及晦涩性。

“情感没有形成一种自然的类型。在关于它们分类的相当多争论的漫长历史之后,情感终于形成了一个异质性的类别:出于相当不同的理由和根据,依照改变着的对照物背景,各种不同的条件和状态被包括在这个类中。”——罗蒂编:《解释情感》,1980年,第1页。

情感意义

这是逻辑实证主义在讨论“证实标准”时所引入的一个术语。根据证实标准,惟有能为经验证据所检验的陈述才是有意义的。不过,有许多显然是有意义的陈述,诸如那些与道德话语有关的陈述,就不能为经验所检验。逻辑实证主义宣称,这样的陈述没有事实上的或认知上的意义,但有情感的意义,这就是它们的情感力量。对情感意义的详细讨论为 C. K. 奥格登和 I. A. 理查兹所提供,他们区分了语言的符号(指称)功能和情感功能。就它们的符号功能而言,陈述指称事物;就它们的情感功能而言,它们表达并唤起情感和态度。斯蒂文森在他的情感主义中区分了表达式的描述意义和情感意义。这种区分在于所表达或唤起的那种精神状态。如果那种精神状态是认知性的,词的意义就传达信息而言,是描述性的,如果那种精神状态是表达感情的或情感性的,表达式的意义就是情感性的。具有情感意义的表达式并不指称事物的性质,但规定了一个具体的行为或行为过程。依据斯蒂文森,伦理词汇的意义在某种意义上是描述性的,但基本的和主要的是情感性的。

“一个词或短语的情感意义是一种强烈与持续的倾向,它是在语言的历史过程中建立起来的,旨在对某些言说者的感情、情感或态度,给予直接的表达(准感叹式的),它也是一种在接受言说者的评论那些人中唤起(准命令式的)相应情感和态度的倾向。”——斯蒂文森:《事实与价值》,1963年,第20—21页。

and Values, 1963, p. 20-1.

Emotivism

Also call the emotive theory of ethics. An account of the function of evaluative utterances in terms of the expression of the speaker's emotion and the evoking of the hearer's emotion and a theory of evaluative fields such as ethics and aesthetics in terms of this account. The position can be traced to Berkeley who claimed that evaluative terms such as "good" serve to raise some passion rather than to convey information. The view was developed in this century by the logical positivists, particularly Ayer, who claimed that ethical judgements are neither statements of non-ethical scientific facts nor statements of non-scientific ethical facts, but are only expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. In this way, to say that something is right or wrong amounts to saying "Hoorah!" or "Boo!". Hence, this version of emotivism is nicknamed the "boo-hoorah theory". A full and sophisticated theory of emotivism is elaborated by C. L. Stevenson in his classical work *Ethics and Language* (1944). It argues that traditional moral theories generally but mistakenly take moral judgements to be nothing but descriptive expressions. Ethical utterances might be descriptive, but their main or primary meaning is emotive, for they do not refer to qualities in things, but function like interjections ("Alas!"), imperatives ("Do such and such!"), optatives ("Would that this were so"), prescriptions ("You should such and such") or performatives ("I apologise"). An ethical statement is chiefly used to express (but not to report) one's attitude and to try to influence the attitudes and conduct of others. Hence any purely descriptive account of evaluative judgements must be deficient. Other major proponents of emotivism include P. H. Nowell Smith, Paul Edwards and R. M. Hare. Hare's theory has been called "prescriptivism" or, by Stevenson himself, "near-emotivism". Emotivism has been a major ethical theory in this century but has lost its dominant position in recent decades, partly through changing understanding of the role of language and analysis in philosophy and partly because of its failure to connect morality with reason.

"Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character." - MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 1981, p. 11.

Empathy

[from Greek: *en*, in, into + *pathos*, feeling or passion, literally being in or into a state of emotion] A term introduced by the psychologist E. B. Titchener (1867-1927). In aesthetics, empathy is the unconscious projection of one's own inner feelings into an aesthetic object or activity. In

情感主义

也称为“伦理学的情感理论”。根据对言说者情感的表达以及对听者情感的唤起而对评价性话语的功能所作的叙述,以及根据这一叙述而发展的关于(诸如伦理学及美学等)评价性领域的理论。这一论点可追溯至巴克莱,他主张,评价词诸如“好的”用于产生某些情感而不是传达信息。在20世纪这一理论为逻辑实证主义所发展,特别是艾耶尔,他认为伦理判断既不是对非伦理的科学事实的陈述,也不是对非科学的伦理事实的表达,而只是情感的表达,这种表达既不是真的也不是假的。因而以这种方式说某事是对的或错的,等于说“呸!”或“呜啦!”情感主义由于这种说法而得绰号“呸 呜啦”理论。一个充分发展和成熟的情感主义理论为斯蒂文森在他的经典著作《伦理学与语言》(1944年)中详尽阐发,它强调,传统的道德理论一般地可却是错误地把道德判断只是作为描述表达。伦理学的言语也许是描述性的,但主要的或基本的意义宁可说是情感性的,因为它们并不指称事物的性质,它们的功能像感叹(“哎呀!”)、命令(“做这个!”)、祈愿(“但愿……”)、规定(“你应”)或行动性的(“我道歉”)。一个伦理陈述主要用来表达(但不是报告)一个人的态度,并力图影响一个人的态度和行为。因此,任何对评价判断的纯描述性说明必定是内在不足的。其他主要的提倡者包括P. H. 诺威尔-史密斯、P. 爱德华兹和R. M. 黑尔。黑尔的理论也称为“规定主义”或为斯蒂文森称为“准情感主义”。情感主义是20世纪的一个主要的伦理理论,但近来已不再占主导地位。这部分地是由于哲学中对语言和分析的作用有了不同的理解,部分地是因为它未能把道德与理性相联系。

“情感主义是这样一种学说,所有的评价判断尤其是所有的道德判断,就它们在特性上是道德的或评价性的而言,仅仅是偏爱的表达,态度或情感的表达。”——麦金太尔:《德性之后》,1981年,第11页。

移情作用

[源自拉丁词前缀 *en* (意为“在内”或“进入”)加上 *pathos* (意为“情感”或“激情”),字面的意思是处在或进入一种情感状态] 这术语为心理学家E. B. 蒂奇纳(1867—1927年)所引入。在美学领域,移情意味着一个人把自己内

ethics, it is a person's insightful understanding of the inner feelings of another person on the basis of a sympathetic imaginative identification with that person, although the role of empathy in our ethical responses is much debated. Empathy corresponds to the German term *Einfühlung*, and is used in hermeneutics for a method characteristic of the humanities, involving the re-creation in the mind of the scholar of the thoughts, feeling and motivations of the objects of his study.

"The operations of sympathetic understanding or, as it is often now called, 'empathy', have been much discussed in the history of moral philosophy." —R. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 91.

Emphatic particulars, another term for egocentric particulars

Empiricism

A philosophical approach to knowledge and reality. Its central contentions are that all knowledge or all meaningful discourse about the world is related to sensory experience (including inner sense or introspection), and that the boundaries of possible sense-experience are the boundaries of possible knowledge. Different empiricists have different views about how knowledge is based on sensation. The major interest of empiricism is in the sphere of sense-perception, and it offers detailed examinations of problems concerning perception, the relation between sense-data and material objects, the problem of the external world and the results and methodology of the sciences. This approach embraces concreteness and particularity, and encourages rigorous standards of clarity and precision. Empiricism claims that the sciences provide our best knowledge of reality. It is suspicious of abstraction and generalisation and rejects all irrational and superstitious claims. The major difficulty empiricism faces is to provide a satisfactory account of universals, and of *a priori* necessary truths in mathematics and logic. Empiricism contrasts with rationalism, taken as an epistemological approach which gives a lesser role to sense-experience and emphasises the centrality of the faculty of reason itself in knowledge. When rationalism is taken broadly as respect for reason and a rejection of irrationality, empiricism is a type of rationalism. Modern scholarship rejects too sharp a distinction between rationalism and empiricism among some of the great seventeenth century philosophers.

Empiricism as a tradition can be traced to Aristotle, and has been deeply rooted in the British intellectual tradition since the Middle Ages. The classical British empiricists include Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and in this century Russell, Ayer and the Vienna Circle (also called logical empiricists) are its major representatives.

在的感情无意识地投射到一个审美对象或审美活动中。在伦理学中,它意为一个人在对另一个人同情的想像性认同的基础上,对于那个人的内在情感的透彻理解。不过,它在伦理反应中的作用还有着很大的争议。“移情”相应于德语 *Einfühlung* [同情、移情作用],在解释学中,被看作是代表人文学科的一种方法,意味着学者对他所研究的对象的思想、感情、动机在他心中的再创造。

“同情性理解,或如其通常所称之谓的‘移情’,其作用在道德哲学史上有过许多讨论。”——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第91页。

强调性特称词

“自我中心特称词”的另一说法。

经验主义

对知识和实在的一种哲学研究方式。它的中心论点是:一切知识或一切有关世界的有意义的论述,都与感觉经验(包括“内在感觉”或“内省”)相关,而且可能的感觉经验的范围就是可能的知识的范围。不同的经验论者对知识怎样建立在感觉的基础之上有不同的观点。经验主义主要对感性知觉的范围感兴趣,所以它对知觉问题、感觉材料和物质对象的关系问题、外部世界问题、科学的结果和方法论等诸如此类的问题,提供了详尽的考察。这一研究方式推崇具体性和特殊性,提倡严格的明晰性和精确性标准。经验主义主张,科学为我们提供了关于实在性的最佳知识。它怀疑抽象和普遍化,拒绝一切非理性的、迷信的主张。经验主义面临的主要困难是提供对普遍概念,以及对数学和逻辑的先天必然真理的满意说明。经验主义与作为一种认识论研究方式的“理性主义”相对照,后者贬低感觉经验的作用,强调理性能力本身在认识中的中心地位。不过,如果理性主义泛指尊重理性,拒绝非理性,那么,经验主义也是理性主义的一个类型。现代学术拒斥某些17世纪的大哲学家对经验主义与理性主义所作的过于尖锐的区分。

经验主义作为一个传统,可以追溯到亚里士多德,并已深深扎根于中世纪以来的英国思想传统中。古典的英国经验论者包括霍布斯、洛克、巴克莱和休谟,在本世纪,罗素、艾耶尔、维也纳学派(亦称逻辑经验主义)是它的主要代表。

“现代经验主义主要以两个教条为条件。一个教条是相信在分析的或以意义为根据而不依赖于事实的真理,与综合的或以事实为根据的真理之间有根本的分别。另一个教条是还原论:

"Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matter of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience." Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 20.

Empirio-criticism

A rigorously positivist and radically empirical philosophy established by the German philosopher Richard Avenarius and developed by the Austrian scientist and philosopher Ernst Mach. Developing the thought of Hume and Berkeley, empirio-criticism claims that all we can know is our sensations and that knowledge should be confined to pure experience. Any metaphysical claims, such as the objective existence of the external world or of causation, which transcends experience and cannot be verified by experience, must be rejected as a construct of the mind. Philosophy should be based on scientific principles. This position influenced logical positivism and James' pragmatism. Lenin severely attacked it in his *Materialism and Empirio Criticism* (1908) and even claimed that this type of philosophy represents the interests of capitalism. What he criticised was the espousal of Mach's views by his fellow Bolsheviks Bogdanov, Bazarov, and others.

"I shall refer to those arguments by which materialism is being combated ... Machians. I shall use this latter term throughout as a synonym for 'empirio critics' ..."

Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 1909, in lieu of introduction.

Empty class, another term for null-class

Empty name

A name which does not have a bearer or does not refer to any particular. These names are grammatical realities of a type that Russell called logical fictions. Empty names such as "Santa Claus" are intelligible, even they have no bearer, but the explanation for this is uncertain. Russell rejected Frege's account in terms of his distinction between sense and reference and gave his own account in terms of names and associated descriptions.

"Philosophers have thought that ... there can be names without bearers—what have been called 'empty names'."

Williams, *Being, Identity and Truth*, 1992, p. 124.

Enantiomorphs, another term for incongruent counterparts

相信每一有意义的陈述都等同于某种对指称直接经验的词语所作的逻辑构造。”——奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》，1953年，第20页。

经验批判主义

由德国哲学家 R. 阿芬那留斯创立，并由奥地利科学家、哲学家 E. 马赫发展的严格的实证主义和激进的经验哲学。经验批判主义发展了休谟和巴克莱的思想，认为我们所能知道的一切都是我们的感觉，知识应被限于纯粹的经验。任何诸如外在世界或因果关系的客观存在这些超越经验且不能为经验证实的形而上学的主张，作为精神的产物都必须加以拒绝。哲学应以科学原则为基础。这一见解影响了逻辑实证主义和詹姆斯的实用主义。列宁在他的《唯物主义和经验批判主义》(1908)一书中对它进行了严厉的批判，甚至认为这种哲学代表了资本主义的利益。他批评的是他的同事 B. 波格丹诺夫、巴札罗夫及其他人对马赫观点的拥护。

“我只提一提马赫主义者……用来攻击唯物主义的那些证据。我将到处把马赫主义者作为‘经验批判主义者’的同义语来使用……”——列宁：《唯物主义和经验批判主义》(代绪论)，1909年。

空类

“零类”的另一说法。

空名

没有承担者或者并没有指称任何个体的名称。这些名称是一种语法上的实在，罗素称之为“逻辑虚构”。诸如“圣诞老人”这样的空名是可以理解的，尽管它们没有承受者，可是对它的解释并不确定。罗素抛弃了弗雷格依据意义与指称的区分所作出的解释，而他自己的解释则是依据名词及相关的摹状词。

“哲学家们一直以为，……可以存在没有承担者的名称——这就是——一直被称作‘空名’。”——威廉姆斯：《是，同一和真理》，1992年，第124页。

对映结构体

“不一致的对等物”的另一个词。

Encompassing

A basic term of the German existentialist Karl Jaspers. We always think within a horizon, and a horizon itself indicates something which goes beyond it. The Encompassing is the horizon within which every particular horizon is enclosed and from which the closed whole of Being can be reached. The Encompassing transcends the division of subject and object, and its basic structure is the simultaneity of subject-being and object being. The Encompassing is a philosophical operation which is directed from totality toward the phenomenological totality of being in all its fullness and richness. With the Encompassing, our consciousness of being is free from any specific knowing. The Encompassing is prior to reason and is the source of all knowing and all being. It has seven modes: *Existenz*, transcendence, *Dasein*, consciousness-as-such, spirit, world, and reason. The basic difficulty with Jaspers' notion is to show how the Encompassing can be conceived while maintaining its special fundamental status. For once we think about the Encompassing, it becomes an object and a special kind of being.

"What is neither object nor act of thinking (subject), but contains both within itself. I have called the Encompassing." Jaspers, see *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (ed by Schilpp), 1957, p. 73.

End of art. another expression for death of art

End / means, see means / end

End-in-view

A term used by Dewey to criticise the mechanistic view of the means-end relationship popular in motivational psychology. Dewey claimed that although there is a fixed actual end, at the moment of deliberation one acts in terms of an end-in-view rather than the actual end. The end-in-view is a plan or a hypothesis which guides present activity and is to be evaluated by its consequences and revised throughout the activity guided by it. Its appraisal springs from the fact that there is something lacking or wanting in the existing situation. Things can be anticipated as ends only in terms of the conditions by which they are brought into existence. Thus, an end-in-view is also a means of organising actions. The term reflects the reciprocal characters of ends and means. With this term, Dewey attempted to extend the notion of a hypothesis, which is usually limited to science, to the domains of morality, education and other social theories in order to include all act guiding ideas.

"The end in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted on, will supply the existing need or lack and resolve

大全

德国存在主义者 K. 雅斯贝尔斯使用的一个基本词汇。我们总是在一个视域(horizon)中思想,而一个视域本身就指示出某种超出它的东西。大全是这样一种视域,在其中包含着每一个特殊视域,从它这里能达到被围绕的整个存在。这大全超越了主体与客体,它的基本结构就是主体存在与客体存在的同时性。大全是这样一种哲学运作,它从整体朝向最充实丰富的现象学的存在整体。凭借大全,我们的存在意识脱开了任何特殊认知的束缚。这大全先于理性,是所有认知和存在的源头。它有七种方式:生存(*Existenz*)、超越、缘在(*Dasein*)、意识本身、精神、世界和理性。雅斯贝尔斯这个观念面临的基本困难是去表明这大全如何能在保持其特殊的基础身份时被思想蕴含。一旦我们念及大全,它就成为一个对象和一种特殊的存在。

"那既不是对象又不是思想(主体)行为者,而是包含这两者于其自身中者,我称之为大全。"——雅斯贝尔斯,《K. 雅斯贝尔斯的哲学》(希尔普编),1957年,第73页。

艺术的终结

见“艺术的消亡”条。

目的/手段

见“手段/目的”条。

考虑中的目的

杜威用于批评动机心理学中流行的关于手段—目的关系的机械论观点的术语。杜威主张尽管存在一个确定的实际目的,但在具体考虑时起作用的并不是实际目的,而是一种考虑中的目的。它是一个指导当前活动的计划或假设,由它的结果来评价,并通过它所指导的活动来修正。它的评价发生于这一事实,即在现存情境中缺少或需要某种东西。事物可以仅依据使它们得以产生的条件,被预期作为目的。因此,考虑中的目的也是组织活动的一种手段。这一术语反映了目的和手段之间的互补特性。杜威试图用这一术语把假说的概念(它通常被限定于科学)拓展到道德、教育和其他社会理论领域,以包括所有指导行为的观念。

"考虑中的目的是如此形成和表现的,如果按它去行动,将能提供现存的需要或短缺,并解决目前的冲突。"——杜威:《评价理论》,1939年,第34页。

the existing conflict." —Dewey, *Theory of Evaluation*, 1939, p. 34.

Endoxa

[Greek; a commonly held opinion or common belief, in this sense a kind of *phainomenon*] Beliefs that can be the beliefs of ordinary people, but are especially the views of any notable group or wise person worth attending to. In Aristotle's dialectic procedure, he always began his argument with the opinions of his predecessors or the beliefs held by most people. After stating the conflicts among these beliefs, he tried to clarify what can justifiably be retained from them and then to reach an acceptable position reconciling as far as possible the views he considered.

"Reasoning, on the other hand, is dialectic, if it reasons from endoxa." —Aristotle, *Topics*, 100a30.

Enforcement of morals

A thesis that society should make use of criminal law to solve moral issues such as pornography and homosexuality. It presupposes that the law can justifiably act to shape or restrict private morality. We should not draw a clear-cut distinction between law and morality or between crime and sin. On this view, by softening these distinctions society will promote the development of noble morality and create suitable conditions for human flourishing. Representatives of this position included Sir J. F. Stephen and Lord Devlin. Their claims are based on natural law theory and on the belief that morality is a divine command. The position contrasts with Mill's harm principle, which suggests that law exists in order to protect one from demonstrable harm at the hands of others and that the only reason for society to restrict an individual's liberty in terms of law is that the individual's action causes harm to others. Supporters of legal positivism maintain that law and morality are independent and that it is therefore wrong to employ the criminal law to uphold morality. Major problems facing the thesis concern which morality the law should enforce in a morally complex society and how to strike a balance between individual freedom and the integrity of society.

"The morals which he [the law-maker] enforces are those ideas about right and wrong which are already accepted by the society for which he is legislating and which are necessary to preserve its integrity." —Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morals*, 1965, p. 90.

Enlightened self-interest. see self-interest

Enlightenment

A broad and powerful intellectual movement in seven-

共同意见

[源自希腊词,指一种共同认可的意见或共同信念,在这一意义上也被叫作现象]这些信念可以是一般人的信念,但更是指那受敬重的或值得听从的智慧人士的见解。在亚里士多德的辩证推论中,他总是以他的先驱者的观点或为大多数人所拥有的信念作为其论证的出发点。他先是陈述这些信念中的种种矛盾,然后提供理由说明它们之中那些信念可以保留,并进而尽可能地调和他所考察的种种观点,在此基础上达到一个可接受的立场。

"另一方面,推理是辩证的,因为它从共同意见开始推论。"——亚里士多德:《正位篇》, 100a30。

道德强制

这一命题是指社会应当运用刑法来解决色情描写和同性恋诸如此类的道德问题。其前提是法律可以正当地采取行动以影响或限制私人道德。我们不应将法律和道德,或者说犯罪和道德败坏二者截然分开。根据这一观点,通过弱化这些界限,社会将会促进高尚道德的发展并创造出适合人类繁荣的条件。持这一主张的代表人物包括斯迪芬爵士和德富林勋爵。他们的主张基于自然法理论和道德是神的命令这一信条。这一主张是与密尔的伤害原则相对立的,后者认为,法律的存在是为了保护个人不受可证实的他人的伤害。社会在法律上限制个人自由的惟一理由是个人行为造成了对他人的伤害。法律实证主义的支持者坚持认为,法律和道德是相互独立的,因此,运用刑法去弘扬道德是错误的。对道德强制这一命题来讲,主要问题是在一个道德复杂的社会中法律应当强制实行何种道德以及如何达成个人自由和社会整合二者之间的平衡。

"法律制定者强制实施的那些道德,是指那些已为他为之立法的社会所接受的,而且对维护这一社会完善是必要的有关正确和错误的观念。"——德富林:《道德强制》,1965年,第90页。

开明的自我利益

见“自我利益”条。

启蒙运动

在17世纪和18世纪的欧洲,特别是英国、

teenth and eighteenth century Europe, particularly in Britain, France and Germany, characterised by a rejection of superstition and mystery and an optimism concerning the power of human reason and scientific endeavour. Because of these features, it is also called The Age of Reason. The movement placed secular reason as the ultimate judge of all sorts of dogma or authority and attempted to overcome the control of the Catholic church over human affairs. According to major Enlightenment thinkers, everyone is equal and has the same status in virtue of his rationality. It advocated investigating everything openly and freely in accordance with the methods of natural sciences. Everything that could not sustain rational investigation had to be abandoned. The slogan for this movement was "Have courage to use your reason!" (Latin: *sapere aude!*). Theologically, the Enlightenment developed the doctrines of "deism", which claimed that religious doctrines should meet the standards of reason. Politically, it emphasised natural liberty and human rights and advocated religious toleration. Philosophically, the Enlightenment produced various forms of materialism and determinism. The *Encyclopaedia*, edited by the French philosophers Diderot and d'Alembert, was the representative document of the Enlightenment.

The movement completely rejected the role of tradition and culture. Critics claimed that by overemphasising the role of reason, it ignored the value of community and commitment. Hence the movement came to be criticised by many schools of counter-Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinking.

"In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy." —Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1972, p. 3.

Enlightenment project

Alasdair MacIntyre's term for the pattern of thought that underlies the entirety of moral and political philosophy since the Enlightenment. This pattern seeks to provide us with a neutral ground of morality and political principles. It appeals to pure reason and establishes an abstract and ruled-governed ethics which attempts to justify particular actions by applying universal standards. Yet it rejects teleology and denies that the human race has its own *telos* to fulfil. Consequently the distinction between what is and what should be is abolished, and the universal standards and principles themselves lose their necessary framework of values and their grounds of evaluation. The enlightenment project, especially in its liberal individualistic form, emphasises the free choices

法国和德国发生的一次广泛而有力的思想运动,其特点是拒绝迷信和神秘,对于人的理性力量和科学进展抱乐观主义态度。由于这些特点,这个时期也被称为“理性时代”。此运动将世俗理性当做对于各种学说或权威的最终法官,并努力摆脱天主教教会对于人类事务的控制。按照启蒙运动主要思想家们的看法,每个人都是平等的;而且,就其有理性而言,都具有同样的身份。此运动倡导按照自然科学的方法来公开地、自由地研究一切。任何经不住理性研究的东西都必须被抛弃。这个运动的口号是:“勇于使用你的理性!”(拉丁文为 *sapere aude!*) 在神学上,启蒙运动发展出了“自然神学”(deism)的学说,声称宗教学说应该满足理性的标准。从政治上讲,它强调天然的自由和人权,提倡宗教宽容。在哲学上,启蒙运动产生出了多种形式的唯物主义和决定论。由狄德罗和达朗贝尔编辑的《百科全书》是启蒙运动的代表文献。

这个运动完全否认传统和文化的作用。批判它的人们认为,过分地强调理性的作用使得这个运动忽视社团和参与的价值。因此,这个运动遇到了许多反启蒙运动和后启蒙运动思想流派的批评。

“在主张进步思想的最普遍意义上,启蒙运动的目的总是去将人们从恐惧中解放出来,建立起他们的自主性。然而,这被充分启蒙了的地球却得意洋洋地散播着灾祸。启蒙运动的宗旨是这世界的去魅(disenchantment),神话的消解和用知识代替幻想。”——阿多尔诺和霍克海默:《启蒙辩证法》,1972年,第3页。

启蒙运动工程

A. 麦金太尔的术语,指自启蒙运动以来决定着全部道德和政治哲学的思想模式。这种思想模式寻求为我们提供一个道德和政治原则的中性基础。它诉诸于纯粹理性和建立一个抽象的、由规则支配的伦理学。这种伦理学依靠运用普遍标准来证明具体行为的合理性。然而,它拒绝目的论和否定人类有它自己的目的要实现。结果是,“是什么”和“应当是什么”的区分被废除了,普遍标准和准则本身失去了它们必要的价值结构与评价根据。启蒙运动工程,尤其是其自由主义个人主义形式,强调自由选择和个人权利,但忽视现实的个人根植于其中的社会和历史环境。根据麦金太尔的观点,这个工程没

and rights of the individual, but disregards the social and historical context in which actual individuals are embedded. According to MacIntyre, the enlightenment project has failed to fulfil its promise, and its failure has led to the chaos of moral values in contemporary Western culture. His *After Virtue* (1981) aims to identify this failure and argues that the remedy is to replace rule-governed ethics with virtue ethics and to replace asocial individualism with communitarianism. His characterisation and criticism of the enlightenment project has stirred wide debates and has in some sense shaped the development of moral and political philosophy in the past decade.

"A central thesis of this book is that the breakdown of this [enlightenment] project provided the historical background against which the predicaments of our own culture can become intelligible." --MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 1981, p. 38.

Ens a se

[Latin, being from itself and in itself] A medieval term for a kind of being which contrasts with being out of itself (*ens ex se*) and with being that depends upon another thing as the ground of its existence (*ens ab alio*). In medieval philosophy, *ens a se* is a thing that is completely self-sufficient and depends on nothing else for its existence, and this description is ascribed solely to God. The idea is derived from the Biblical teaching that God is the Creator. God is *ens a se* by existing independent of anything else, but all created things, including human beings, are *entia ex se* because they depend on God for their existence. The term aseity (Latin: *aseitas*) was formed from *ens a se* for the abstract property of being completely independent. Some scholastics used the distinction between *ens a se* and *ens ab alio* as the basis of a proof of the existence of God. They argued that since we experience the things in this world as *entia ab alio*, which depend on another thing for the ground of their existence, there must be something which is *ens a se* on which they depend. Otherwise, an infinite regress would ensue. An account of God as *ens a se* on which we depend for our being poses the problem of how to reconcile the existence of God with human free will. Spinoza transformed the notion of *ens a se* into *causa sui* (self-cause), which he identified with substance, that is God or nature. He also transformed the notion of *ens ab alio* into his concept of mode.

"As well as being *a se*, I understand God to be 'metaphysically necessary'. By this I mean that he is the or a cause of every logically contingent 'fact', or state of affairs, at any time and at any place." --Padgett, *God, Eternity and the Nature of Time*, 1992, p. 124.

Ens ab alio, see *ens a se*

有实现它的承诺,并且它的失败导致了当代西方文化中的道德价值的混乱。他的《德性之后》(1981年)旨在识别这种失败和提出对它的修正,即以德性伦理学取代规则支配的伦理学,以共同体主义取代非社会的个人主义。他对启蒙运动的工程的特性的描述和批评,引发了广泛的争议,在某种意义上为过去十年的道德和政治哲学的发展定了调。

“本书的中心议题是,这个[启蒙运动]工程的失败提供了历史的背景,依据这个背景,我们自己文化中的困境才显得清楚明白。”——麦金太尔:《德性之后》,1981年,第38页。

由己之是

「拉丁语,由己的和本在的存在」这一中世纪哲学术语表示一类存在,相对于“无己之是”(*ens ex se*)和“由他之是”(*ens ab alio*)。在中世纪哲学中,“由己之是”指完全自足、绝对不依赖任何别物而存在的东西。这种描述只可归于上帝。该观念源出于上帝是创造主的圣经教示。上帝是“由己之是”,因为他是不依赖任何别物而存在的,所有的被造物,包括人类,都是 *entia ex se*,因为它们的存在要依常上帝。自足性(拉丁语 *aseitas*)一词是由 *ens a se* 构成的,指完全独立自主的一种抽象特性。有些经院哲学家把“由己之是”和“由他之是”之间的区别用作证明上帝存在的依据。他们的论证是,既然我们在这个世界上经验的事物是“由他之是”,即存在的根据要依赖另物,那就必定存在着某个它们所依的“由己之是”。否则,就会出现无穷倒退。把上帝解释为我们的存在所依的“由己之是”,提出了这样的问题:怎样使上帝的存在和人类的自由意志协调一致。斯宾诺莎把“由己之是”转换为 *causa sui* (自因),并使它和实体,即上帝或自然同一。他也将“由他之是”转换成他的“样式”概念。

“和 *a se* 存在一样,我也把上帝理解成‘形而上学的必然’。我这样说的意思是,他是在某时和某地的每个逻辑上偶然‘事实’或事态的惟一原因或一种原因。”——巴德杰特:《上帝、永恒和时间本性》,1992年,第124页。

由他之是

见“由己之是”条。

Ens ex se, see *ens a se*

Ens irreale, see *ens reale*

Ens necessarius

[Latin: a necessary being] A necessarily existing being, whose essence necessarily and directly implies its existence. It is the only being in which essence and existence coincide. This being is not constrained by reason and is self-sufficient because it is free from both rational motives and external causes. God is claimed to be such a being and moreover to be the only being of this kind. Spinoza argued that his substance is such a being and is identical with God or nature. Some philosophers argue that the notion of a necessary being is philosophically confused because only propositions or sentences can be necessary. Because existence is not a predicate, "X necessarily exists" does not say anything that could be true. Other philosophers reply that there can be *de re* necessity ascribed to things and that something would exist necessarily if it existed in all possible worlds.

"*Ens necessarius*, i. e. an entity of which the essence is such that it would not be what, qua essence, it is, if it did not also exist." —Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 1936, p. 151.

Ens rationis

A thing which has only rational or mental being (plural: *entia rationis*). An *ens rationis* can be thought or said, but does not really exist in the world. For example, abstract entities, universals, possibilities, fictions and ideal things are *entia rationis*. They exist as objects of knowledge and as mental constructs. The nature of beings of this kind is a topic of everlasting concern for metaphysicians and logicians. For Kant, an *ens rationis* was a concept without an object, excluded from the possibilities, but not on those grounds rendered impossible. Brentano, who calls an *ens rationis* an object-type that is conventionally introduced to express what there is, claims that we can call it being only in a loose and improper sense. Other writers defend a more robust ontological status for some sorts of *entia rationis*.

"*Entia rationis*, things which somehow exist in the mind." —Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (tr. McAlister), 1973, p. 346.

Ens reale

Brentano divided things into *ens reale* (plural: *entia realia*) and *ens irreale* (plural: *entia irrealia*). The former is ordinarily translated as "real (or actual) thing" and the latter

无己之是

见“由己之是”条。

非实在者

见“实在者”条。

必然之是

[拉丁语, 意为必然的存在] 必然现存着的存在, 其本质必然地、直接地蕴含着它的存在。它是本质和存在相一致的那种惟一的存在。这种存在不受理性约束, 是自足的, 因为它既无理性动因, 也无外在原因。上帝被认为是这样的一种存在, 并进一步被认为是惟一的这类存在。斯宾诺莎论道, 他的实体就是这样的存在, 且与上帝或自然同一。有些哲学家论证说, 必然存在的观念在哲学上被搞乱了, 因为只有命题或句子才能是必然的。因为存在不是谓词, “X 必然存在”并不是说某物能真。另一些哲学家应答道, 能够有归于事物的必然性, 如若某物在一切可能世界中存在着, 它就应是必然的存在。

“必然之是(*ens necessarius*), 即这样的一种实在, 假如它不存在, 其本质作为本质, 就会什么也不是。”——洛夫乔伊, 《存在之大链》, 1936年, 第151页。

理智存在者

一个仅有理智或心灵存在的东西(复数为 *entia rationis*)。一个理智存在者能被思想或言说, 但并不现实存在于世界之中。例如, 抽象实体、共相、可能性、想像物和理想之物都是理智存在者。它们作为知识的对象和心灵的构成物而存在。这种存在者的本性是形而上学家们和逻辑学家们永远关心的话题。对于康德来说, 理智存在者是没有对象的概念, 被排除于可能性之外, 但不是由于〔逻辑上的〕不可能性。布伦塔诺称理智存在者为一种对象类型, 被约定地引入来表达那存在着的東西。他认为我们只能够在不严格的和不适当的意义上称之为存在者。其他的著作家们则认为某些种类的理智存在者有更强的存在论身份, 并为之辩护。

“理智存在者即以某种方式存活在心中的东西。”——布伦塔诺, 《从经验立场看的心理学》(英译者为麦克阿里斯特), 1973年, 第346页。

实在者

布伦塔诺将事物(things)划分为实在者(*ens reale*, 复数为 *entia realia*)与非实在者(*ens irreale*, 复数为 *entia irrealia*), 前者通常被

as "unreal thing". But this is not precise. *Entia realia* are not only real things such as dogs, human beings and tables, but also imaginary things such as unicorns. Hence, Chisholm suggests translating this term as "individuals". *Entia irrealia* are such things as privations, possibilities, properties, concepts and propositions, and Chisholm translates the term as "non-individuals". An alternative translation renders *ens reale* as "concretum" and *ens irreale* as "nonconcretum". Brentano's realism holds that *entia realia* are the only things that exist and are the only things of which we can think. On this view, all statements about *entia irrealia* can be reduced upon analysis into statements about *entia realia*.

"Brentano's more general point may be put this way: we can think only of *entia realia*; and to think of an *ens reale* is to think of something which, if it existed, would be an individual." (Chisholm, *Brentano and Intrinsic Value*, 1986, p. 10.

Ens successivum

[Latin: successive being | An entity which changes one or another of its parts as it endures through time. The term was introduced by Augustine, who claimed that the universe is such an entity, in that it is composed of successively existing parts. For Aquinas, it is a thing with some parts which do not exist at the same time as other of its parts. The term was revived in mereological essentialism, which claims that the parts of an object are essential to its identity and cannot change so long as the object maintains its identity. The succeeding parts of a thing, therefore, are not parts in any real sense.

"This is what might be called the *ens successivum* — the 'successive table' that is made up of different parts at different times." (Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 98.

Entailment

The relationship between statements, by which one statement (the conclusion) follows logically from another statement or statements (the premises). Entailment permits the conclusion to be logically, necessarily or validly deduced from the premises. The traditional and classical criterion of entailment is that *p* entails *q* if and only if to assert *p* while denying *q* would result in inconsistency. Because this criterion involves the paradoxes of strict implication, some logicians have been trying to find a more precise criterion.

" '*S*₁ entails *S*₂' may be defined as '*S*₁ and not-*S*₂ is inconsistent.' " P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logic Theory*, 1952, p. 20.

Entelechy

[from Greek: *enteles*, end + *echein*, having within, having an end within | Aristotle's term, normally translated as actualisation but often merely transliterated as entelechy.

译为“现实的 (real 或 actual) 事物”, 后者则译为“不现实的事物”。但这不准确。实在者不只是像狗、人和桌子这样的现实事物, 而且包括如独角兽这样的想像事物。因此, 齐硕姆建议将这个译词译为“个体” (individuals)。不实在者是这样一类事物, 比如, 缺乏、可能性、性质、概念和命题。齐硕姆译之为“非个体”。另一种译法是将“*ens reale*”译为“具体物”, 将 *ens irreale* 译为“非具体者”。布伦塔诺的实在论认为, 只有实在者存在, 也只有实在者能被我们思想。按照这种观点, 所有关于非实在者的陈述都能被分析还原为关于实在者的陈述。

“布伦塔诺的更一般的观点可以这样来表达: 我们只能思考实在者, 而去思考一个实在者就意味着去思考这样的东西: 它如果存在的话, 就是一个个体。”——齐硕姆:《布伦塔诺和内在价值》, 1986年, 第10页。

接续之是

[拉丁语, 意为接续的存在] 指这样一种实在: 当它经历时间的持续时, 它的一个或另一个部分发生变化。这个术语由奥古斯丁引入, 他断言, 宇宙就是这样的实在, 它由接续的现存各部分构成。在阿奎那那里, 它意指这样的事物, 即它的某些部分与其他部分并不同时存在。该术语在纯逻辑本质主义中得以复活。这种观点主张, 对象的部分对它的同一性而言是本质的, 而且, 只要对象保持其同一, 这些部分就不能变化。所以, 一物接续存在的部分在任何实在的意义上都不是部分。

“这就是所谓的接续之是——在不同的时间由不同的部分编纂成的那张‘接续表’。”——齐硕姆:《人与物》, 1976年, 第98页。

衍推

陈述之间的关系, 凭借这种关系一个陈述 (结论) 从另一个或一些陈述 (前提) 逻辑地推演出来。衍推意味着结论能够逻辑地、必然地或有效地从前提中演绎出来。传统和经典的衍推标准是: *p* 衍推 *q* 当且仅当断定 *p* 而否定 *q* 将导致不相容。由于这个标准包含严格蕴涵悖论, 某些逻辑学家一直试图找出更精确的标准。

" '*S*₁ 衍推 *S*₂' 可以定义为 '*S*₁ 和非-*S*₂ 是不相容的。' "——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》, 1952年, 第20页。

隐德来希

[源自希腊文, *enteles* (目的) + *echein* (有……在其中), 字面意义为“有一个目的在自身内”] 亚里士多德的术语, 通常译作“实现”, 但

It is etymologically associated with the completion or perfect state towards which an action or a process internally leads. Entelechy is the form which becomes the end of motion for each thing or potential matter realised within itself. Aristotle used the term interchangeably with *energeia* (generally rendered as actuality). Leibniz used of this term for the primitive active force in monads. The vitalist Hans Driesch held that all organisms have an entelechy as an inner goal-directed non-material life-force which promotes their development towards becoming perfect adults.

"The term 'actuality' [*energeia*] is derived from 'activity' [*ergon*], and points to *entelechy* [actualization]." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1050a22.

Enthusiasm

[from Greek; *enthousiastikos*, to be inspired] Plato characterised poets in terms of *enthousiastikos* because their works proceed from inspiration by God rather than from rational knowledge. Thus they do not have knowledge regarding their works. Later enthusiasm was understood to be emotional zeal or impulse manifested in irrational behaviour. It is taken by John Locke as a third source of assent besides faith and reason, but was used pejoratively as a synonym of fanaticism by Leibniz and Kant.

"This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men than either of those two, or both together, men being most forwardly obedient to the impulse they receive from themselves." — John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 4, xix.

Enthymeme

[Greek; an inference based on a probable or an unstated premise or with an unstated conclusion] In Aristotle's original use, an inference based on a probable premise, but later a syllogism or other form of inference in which one premise or conclusion is not explicitly stated. The omitted premise or conclusion is in general easily supplied. For example, "Every person is mortal, so Smith is mortal". This is an enthymeme, for the premise "Smith is a person" is not stated. An enthymeme can produce a false conclusion if the supplied premise is false or if it does not render the argument valid.

"These syllogisms are expressed as enthymemes, i. e. with the omission of one at least of the requisite propositions." — Johnson, *Logic*, II, p. 100.

Entia per alio

[singular: *ens per alio*] A scholastic term for things which, like parasites, derive all their properties from other

直译“隐德来希”也很流行。在词根上,与一种行为或过程所内在地趋向的完成状态或完满状态相联系。隐德来希乃是形式,作为每一事物或潜在质料在自身中所实现的运动的目的。亚里士多德把这一术语与 *energeia* (一般译作“现实”)交替使用。莱布尼茨使用这一术语来表示单子中的原动力。生命主义的代表 H. 德里希认为,一切有机体都有一种内在的合目的的非物质性的生命力;这种生命力促使有机体完美地趋于成熟。

“‘现实’ [*energeia*] 一词得自‘活动’ [*ergon*], 并指向‘隐德来希’[实现]。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1050a22。

狂热

[源自希腊语 *enthousiastikos*, 意为“受灵感”] 柏拉图用 *enthousiastikos* 来形容诗人, 因为他们的作品源于神赋的灵感, 而不是理性的知识。因此, 他们不具有关于他们作品的知识。后来, 狂热被理解为易动的情或是在非理智的举止中表现出来的冲动。它被 J. 洛克视为信仰和理性之外的第三种赞同的缘由, 但莱布尼茨和康德却轻蔑地将其用作盲信的同义语。

“我所说的狂热原本是这样的, 它虽然不曾建立在理性或神圣的启示上, 而是从兴奋或傲慢的脑中幻想出来的, 但是, 一旦它立住脚, 就比理性和信仰的任何一种, 甚至比二者加在一起还更能有力地影响人的信念和行为, 人们往往是最迫不及待地服从源于自己的冲动的。”——洛克:《人类理智论》, 第四卷, xix。

省略三段论

[希腊语, 指建立在一个或然的或不说出的前提或带着一个不说出的结论基础上的推理] 在亚里士多德的最初用法中, 指建立在一个或然前提基础上的推理, 但后来, 它指不明确说出一个前提或结论的那种三段论或其他形式的推理。被省略的前提或结论一般容易被补充。例如, “每个人都有死, 所以, 史密斯是有死的”。这就是一个省略三段论, 因为小前提“史密斯是人”没被说出。如果补充的前提不真, 或者如果它不使论证有效, 省略三段论就会产生虚假的结论。

“这样的三段论被表述为省略三段论, 即至少省略了一个必需的命题。”——约翰逊:《逻辑学》, 第二卷, 第 100 页。

依存物

[单数为 *ens per alio*] 经院哲学的术语, 指这种事物, 它们像寄生虫一样, 从其他事物那里

things. The grounds of existence for them is not in themselves. They cannot persist through time, and they evaporate if the things which sustain them disappear. *Entia per alio* are in contrast to *entia per se*, which are entities that have their own independent identities.

"An *ens per alio* never is or has anything on its own. It is what it is in virtue of the nature of something other than itself." —Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 180.

Entia per se, see *entia per alio*

Entia rationis, see *ens rationis*

Entity

[from Latin: *ens*, being, thing] A term generally used interchangeably with thing or object. Joseph Owens has proposed that "entity" should be used to translate the Greek *ousia*, which is usually translated as substance, because *ousia* is derived from the Greek copula *estin* and entity is similarly derived from the Latin copula *ens*. Hence, this translation would maintain an important etymological relation. However, his suggestion has difficulties. While *ousia* can be used both independently and as "*ousia* of ...", in English we cannot say "entity of ...".

"In consequence of this perversion of the word Being, philosophers looking about for something to supply its place, laid their hands upon the word entity, a piece of barbarous Latin, invented by the schoolmen to be used as an abstract name, in which class its grammatical form would seem to place it, but being seized by logicians in distress to stop a leak in their terminology, it has ever since been used as a concrete name." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 49.

Entity of reason

[Latin: *ens rationis*, also called an ideal entity] In Scholastic philosophy, there are things which do not really exist, but which are apprehended by reason, that is, conceptual entities such as relations, orderings or general notions. A relation does not exist like a substance or accident, but is a conception obtained by abstraction from a consideration of things having certain associations to each other. An entity of reason is not an actual thing, but is an object of knowledge and has its foundations in actual things.

"If 'nothing' means something imaginary, or what they commonly call an entity of reason [*ens rationis*], then this is not 'nothing' but something real and distinctly conceived. Nevertheless, since it is merely conceived and is not actual, although it can be conceived, it cannot in any way be caused." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cot-

ter), 1955, p. 164. 得到自己的全部性质。它们存在的根据不在其自身。它们不能在时间中续存,如果支撑它们的事物消失了,它们也会消失。依存物与自存物不同,后者是有自己独立同一性的东西。

"依存物从不是靠自身而存在的东西,也不包含这样的东西。它借助于自身之外某物的性质才是其所是。"——齐硕姆:《人与物》,1976年,第180页。

自存物

见“依存物”条。

理性存在者

见“理智存在者”条。

存在体

[源自拉丁文 *ens* (是, 存在, 事物)] 一般与“事物”、“对象”交替使用的一个术语。J. 欧文斯主张,这个词应该用来翻译希腊文 *ousia* (它通常被译为“本体”),因为 *ousia* 是从希腊系词 *estin* 引申出来的,同时存在体一词与拉丁文系词 *ens* (是)有着类似的关系。因此这个翻译忠实地保持了这样一种词源学的关系。然而,他的提议有许多难处。因为 *ousia* 在希腊哲学中既能独立地使用,又具有 *ousia of*……的意义,而在英语中,我们从不谈“entity of……”。

“由于‘存在’一词滥用的缘故,哲学家到处寻找某种东西来代替它,他们抓到了存在体这个词,一个不规范的拉丁词,由经院哲学家发明出来,用作一个抽象名词;在这个词类中,它的语法形式看来已认定了它的地位,但被苦恼着的逻辑学家抓住用来填补他们术语上的一个空缺,从此它就一直被用作具体名词。”——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第49页。

理性存在者

[拉丁文 *ens rationis*, 亦称理想存在者] 在经院哲学中指并非实际存在,而是由理性来领悟的东西,即概念的存在,诸如关系、次序、普遍概念等。关系并不是像实体或偶性那样存在的,而是一个概念,是人们对某些相互联系的事物进行思考,通过对这个思考的抽象获得的。一个理性存在者不是一个实际的事物,而是知识的一个对象,并以实际事物为其根据。

“如果‘虚无’指某种想像的东西,或他们通常称作理性存在者 [*ens rationis*] 的东西,那么,这不是‘虚无’,而是某种实在的、清楚构想出来的东西。不过,因为它仅仅是构想的,不是实际的,所以,虽然它可以被构想,但无论如何不能被引起。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,1984年,第7页。

tingham et al) Vol. II, 1984, p. 7.

Entrenchment

A term introduced by Goodman, in association with Goodman's paradox or the new riddle of induction, as a function of the frequency and success of projection in producing true statements. If a predicate has been projected frequently in past generalisations, it is entrenched for future generalisations of the same sort and is highly projectible. For example, all observed emeralds have been both green and grue (green to some future time *T* and blue thereafter), and any evidence confirming the generalisation that all emeralds are green also confirms that all emeralds are grue. Nevertheless, we call them green rather than grue because "green" is better entrenched and more projectible than "grue", and we will conclude that future emeralds will be green, not grue. Entrenchment is not identical with familiarity, for relatively unfamiliar predicates can also be well entrenched. The entrenchment of a predicate results not only from the actual projection of that predicate alone, but also from the projection of all predicates cointensive with it. Entrenchment is the decisive factor for projectibility, and the degree of entrenchment of a predicate provides us with a criterion for deciding between projectible predicates. A predicate is unprojectible if it is not entrenched.

"Entrenchment depends upon frequency of projection rather than upon mere frequency of use." —Goodman, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, 1973, p. 97.

Entropy

In physics, the measure of disorder which is defined either in terms of the interchange of heat and other forms of energy or as proportional to the statistical probability of the random arrangement of particles in a physical system. According to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy always increases in an isolated system, that is the system becomes more and more disordered. Entropy is also employed in information theory as a measure of information content, defined by a formal probability function called Shannon entropy.

"In a qualitative interpretation the law of entropy asserts that a gas to which no energy is added and from which no energy is subtracted (an 'isolated system') will approach a state of uniform density and uniform temperature." —Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 1963, p. 270.

Enumerative induction, another expression for induction by enumeration

Environmental ethics

An ethics motivated by contemporary environmental crises such as air and water pollution, the degradation of

牢靠性

由古德曼引入的术语,与古德曼悖论或新归纳悖论相关,作为一个在产生真陈述中投射的频率和成功的函数。如果一个谓词在过去的概括中被频繁投射,它对于未来的同一类概括就是牢靠的并且是高度可投射的。例如,所有观察到的绿宝石都既是绿的又是绿蓝的(在某个未来时刻 *T* 之前是绿的,自那以后是蓝的),并且任何确证"所有绿宝石是绿的"这一概括的证据,也确证所有绿宝石是绿蓝的。然而我们称它们为绿色的而不是绿蓝的,是因为"绿"要比"绿蓝"更为牢靠,更可投射,我们的结论将是未来的绿宝石是绿色的而不是绿蓝的。牢靠性并不等同于熟识性,因为比较不熟悉的谓词也可以是相当牢靠的。一个谓词的牢靠性不仅由这个谓词的实际投射所单独引起,也与所有与它并存的谓词有关。牢靠性是可投射性的决定性因素,一个谓词的牢靠性程度给我们提供了在可投射谓词中作决断的标准。一个不牢靠的谓词是不可投射的。

"牢靠性依赖于投射的频率而不仅仅是使用的频率。"——古德曼:《事实、虚构与预测》,1973年,第97页。

熵

在物理学中,它意指系统无序程度的量度,这或者用热与其他能量形式的互换来定义,或者定义为比例于—物理系统中分子的随机排列的统计概率。按照热力学第二定律,孤立系统中熵总在增加,这就是说系统会愈来愈无序。熵也被应用于信息理论中作为信息内容的量度,被称作"申农熵"的形式概率函数所定义。

"熵定律的定性解释断言,当一个气体的能量既不增加也不减少(一个'孤立'系统)时,将趋于一种密度和温度均匀单一的状态。"——帕普:《科学哲学导论》,1963年,第270页。

枚举式归纳

"淘汰归纳法"的另一种表述。

环境伦理学

为当代的环境危机诸如空气与水污染、生态系统的退化、物种的灭绝、土壤的侵蚀等所推

ecosystems, the extinction of species and soil erosion. The basis of environmental ethics is an opposition to the historical anthropocentrism (also called speciesism or human chauvinism) of traditional ethics, which takes non-human living things and nature as objects of exploitation and as means to human ends, rather than as ends in themselves. Environmental ethics tries to establish human responsibility towards these entities and nature as a whole. It is not simply a branch of applied ethics, but involves establishing a new and distinctive theoretical framework.

There are various approaches to environmental ethics. Weak anthropocentrism accepts that human interest is still primary, but argues that human beings should cultivate an attitude of noble obligation towards the environment. Animal-centred ethics, also called the animal liberation movement or zoocentrism, claims that we must extend the scope of ethical consideration from human beings alone to members of all animal species, on the grounds that animals are sentient beings (Peter Singer) or "subjects-of-a-life" (Tom Regan). On this view, rationality is rejected as the criterion for membership of the moral community. Life-centred ethics or biocentrism, represented by K. E. Goodpaster and Paul Taylor, argues that all classes of living beings, including plants as well as animals, should be included in the moral community. Weak anthropocentrism, animal-centred ethics and life-centred ethics all hold that traditional human ethical theory is sound and with alterations can be applied to areas other than human society. Other versions of environmental ethics argue against the extension of human ethics to non-human beings and claim that we need a new ethics because human ethics is inescapably anthropocentric. Furthermore, traditional human ethics is individualistic, while an adequate holistic ethics should be concerned with the ecosystem as a whole and with relations amongst entities within the ecosystem. On this view, the integrity, diversity and stability of the ecosystem should be the primary standard by which the morality of an action is judged. This holistic approach, or ecocentrism, is sometimes accused of being an environmental fascism. Its major schools include land ethics, represented by Aldo Leopold, J. B. Callicott and H. Rolston III, deep ecology, represented by A. Naess, and ecofeminism, which argues that the subjection of nature to human beings corresponds to the subjection of women to men and sees the liberation of nature and the liberation of women as aspects of the same process.

"To fulfil the duties of environmental ethics does involve at times a sacrifice of at least some human interests." —Taylor, *Respect for Nature*, 1986, p. 10.

Environmental fascism

Tom Regan's epithet for the land ethics of Aldo Leopold and others, which proposes an holistic approach to the biotic

动的一种伦理学。环境伦理学有一个共同前提是反对传统伦理学的人类中心主义(也称“物种主义”或“人类沙文主义”),人类中心主义的特性把非人类的生物和自然看做是剥夺的对象;作为达到人类目的的工具而不是把它们自身看做目的。环境伦理学力图把这些存在物和自然作为一个整体来确立人对它的责任。它不只是“应用伦理学”的一个分支,而是涉及到建立一个新的理论构架。

环境伦理学有多种方法。“弱人类中心主义”提出,人类的利益仍然是首要的,但人类应该培育一种对待环境的崇高义务感。“动物中心伦理学”,也称“动物解放运动”或“动物中心主义”,主张我们必须把我们道德思考的范围从仅仅对人类而言扩展到动物,因为他们是有感觉能力的(P. 辛格),或是“一个生命主体”(T. 里根)。根据这种观点,理性被当做道德共同体成员资格的标准而加以抛弃。“生命中心伦理学”,也称“生物中心主义”,为K. E. 古德帕斯特和P. 泰勒所代表,他们论证说,不仅仅是动物,所有有生命的存在物的种类,包括植物在内,应包括在道德共同体之内。弱人类中心伦理学、动物中心论和生物中心伦理学,都相信传统的人类伦理学理论是健全的,在作了某种改变之后,仍能够运用到不是人类社会的那些领域。另一方面,环境伦理学的某些学说认为,把人类的伦理学扩展到其他非人类的存在物是不适当的,因为人类的伦理学本质上是人类中心主义的,因此我们需要一种新的伦理学。进一步说,传统的人类伦理学是个人主义的,而适当的伦理学应是整体论的。它应当关心整个生态系统以及生态系统内各事物的关系。根据这种观点,生态系统的整体性、多样性和稳定性应当是用于判断一种行为的道德性的首要标准。这种整体论的观念,或者说“生态中心主义”,有时被指责为“环境法西斯主义”。它的主要学派包括以A. 利奥波德、J. B. 卡利科特和H. 罗斯顿三世为代表的“土地伦理学”,和以A. 纳斯为代表的“深层生态学”以及“生态女性主义”。生态女性主义认为,自然对人类的隶属与妇女对男人的隶属是一致的,因此,自然的解放与妇女的解放是同一过程的不同方面。

“履行环境伦理的责任有时涉及到至少是某种人类利益的牺牲。”——泰勒:《对自然的尊敬》,1986年,第10页。

环境法西斯主义

T. 里根给以利奥波德为代表的“土地伦理学”贴上的标签。土地伦理学提出以一种整体论

community and claims that the criterion for the morality of an action is whether it promotes the integrity, diversity and stability of the biotic community. Regan, who stresses the central position of human individuals in moral considerations, claims that if land ethics faces a conflict between human interests and the interests of the environment, it would require the sacrifice of human interests for the greater biotic good. Since there are too many people and too few trees on this planet, for example, land ethics might demand that we eliminate much of the human population and plant many more trees. But defenders of land ethics have replied that this is by no means an inevitable consequence of this theory.

"It is difficult to see how the notion of the rights of the individual could find a home within a view that, emotive connotations to one side, might be fairly dubbed 'environmental fascism'." —Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1984, p. 362.

Envy

A negative feeling that arises from perceiving others as having some good which one desires but lacks or has to a lesser degree. Envy, which can lead to hostile and destructive actions aimed at harming the person one envies, is a major theme in literature. Envy is often due to a threat to one's self-esteem. Egalitarianism is proposed partly to reduce the phenomenon of envy, but opponents of egalitarianism often claim that its demand for equality is based on envy. Another proposal argues that strengthening the self-esteem of members of society will allow them to accept greater goods held by others without envy, although this outcome might depend on a shared conception of a just distribution of goods.

"We may think of envy as the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than us does not detract from our advantages." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 532.

Epicureanism

The philosophy founded by Epicurus, who established his Garden school in Athens in 306 BC. Metaphysically, Epicurus endorsed the atomism of Democritus, but revised the theory in accord with Aristotle's criticisms of it. Epistemologically, Epicurus proposed that all sensations are true. Ethically, he held that internal tranquillity and the absence of pain are the chief goods. He opposed the competitive nature of conventional society and advocated absolute egalitarianism, believing that real happiness is having peace of mind and a healthy body. His basic teachings about the guidance of life, presented in the fourfold remedy, include: the gods present no fears, death presents no worries, good is easy to attain and evil is readily endurable. Other major representatives of Epicureanism include Hermarchus of Mytilene (c.

的方法来对待生物共同体,主张行为的道德标准在于是否促进生物共同体的整体性、多样性和稳定性。里根自己强调人类个体在道德思考的中心地位,他认为土地伦理学面临人类的利益与环境的利益之间的冲突时,它会为了较大的生物的善而要求牺牲人类的利益。例如,由于在这个星球上,有太多的人口和太少的树木,土地伦理学就会要求消除大量的人口而种植更多的树木。土地伦理学的辩护者宣称,这决不是这个理论不可避免的后果。

"在这样一种观念内,难于看到个人权利的观念如何能够找到一个位置,把情感性的内涵放在一边,对这种观点也许可以公正地给一个绰号:‘环境法西斯主义’。"——里根:《动物权利问题》,1984年,第362页。

嫉妒

嫉妒作为一种否定性的情感,其起因是,知道他人有某种好的东西,这种好的东西为嫉妒者欲求但又并不为他所有,或者他有但并没有达到他所想要有的程度。嫉妒会导致目的在于伤害所忌妒的人的敌意和毁灭性的行为,它是文学的一个重大主题。嫉妒经常是由于某人感到对其自尊的威胁。平等主义的提出部分理由在于减少嫉妒现象。可平等主义的反对者们声称对平等的要求本身即基于嫉妒。另一种观点则认为,对社会成员的自尊的强调,将允许人们接受更多的善(财物)而不为其他人所嫉妒,虽然这个结果也许取决于一种对善(财物)的公正分配的共享的观念。

"我们可以把嫉妒看作是带有敌意地看待他人较大的善的倾向,即使他们具有比我们更大的运气并不减损我们的利益。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第532页。

伊壁鸠鲁主义

为伊壁鸠鲁所创立的哲学。他于公元前306年在雅典建立他的花园学派。在形而上学方面,伊壁鸠鲁信奉德谟克利特的原子论,并依据亚里士多德的批评而对其有所修正。在认识论上,他提出所有感性的东西都是真实的。在伦理学上,他提倡内在的平静和痛苦的缺失是主要的善,他反对世俗社会的竞争,追求绝对的平等,相信真正的幸福在于一个平和的心灵和一个健康的身体。他关于指导生活的基本学说,在于其提出的四重疗法,包括:在神面前不惧怕,在死亡面前不忧虑,善是易于获得的,恶要情愿去忍受。其他的主要代表人物包括米蒂利尼的赫玛奇斯(约公元前290年)和波利斯特劳斯(约公元前275年)。不过,伊壁鸠鲁学派是一个

290 BC) and Polystratus (c. 275 BC). However, the school was a quasi-religious community and there was little development of his teaching. Most writings of Epicurus were lost, but his doctrines were preserved by Lucretius. Epicureanism itself advocated an austere way of life, but the nature of the theory provoked many polemicists to argue against it, in particular the Stoics. They charged that it led to lives based on unchecked sensual enjoyment, and hence for many centuries Epicureanism carried the connotation of vulgar hedonism or atheism. The original Epicureanism was resuscitated in modern times by Pierre Gassendi and deeply influenced the development of utilitarianism in England.

"Like Utilitarianism, Epicureanism reduces all virtue to personal well-being understood hedonistically, but it differs from Utilitarianism in tying the virtue of any given individual not to the pleasure (or freedom of pain) of mankind generally but, in an egoistic manner, to the pleasure of the individual said to be virtuous," — Slote, *From Morality to Virtue*, 1992, xviii.

Epiphenomenalism

[Epiphenomenon, from Greek; *epi*, on or above + *phainein*, appear, meaning literally a by-product or incidental product of some process which has no effects of its own] Epiphenomenalism is a theory about the relationship between mind and body first defended by Thomas Huxley, and adopted in various versions of mechanistic materialism. On this view, conscious mental states or events are by-products of the brain processes of the central nervous system, as a shadow is to the body of which it is a shadow. Mental states themselves have no causal powers, and can affect neither bodily behaviour nor other mental states. The mind is not a thing, but a string of events. Each mental event can be fully explained by some bodily event or events. Mind cannot exist without body. Unlike dualism, epiphenomenalism denies that the mind is a fundamental entity.

"The thesis that they [the mental events] are not causal factors is known as epiphenomenalism." — Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 186.

Episteme

[Greek: knowledge] Knowledge, from which the word epistemology is formed. Plato regarded knowledge as a cognitive state of the soul concerned solely with unchanging and necessary objects, the Ideas or Forms. Knowledge contrasts with belief (*doxa*), the cognitive state concerned with sensible things. For Plato, the contrast between *episteme* and *doxa* is essential for establishing the theory of Ideas. Aristotle normally confined knowledge to the demonstrative sciences, which provide necessary and invariant truths about necessary and invariable states of affairs. These sciences start from necessary premises, proceed through syllogistic

准宗教的团体, 因此他的学说几乎没有得到发展。他的作品绝大多数都散失了, 但他的学说为卢克莱修所保存。伊壁鸠鲁主义本身提倡一种简朴的生活方式, 但这个理论的性质引起了许多辩论者来反对它, 尤其是斯多亚主义者。他们指责它导致不受约束的感性快乐的生活, 因此, 许多世纪以来, 伊壁鸠鲁主义是与粗俗的享乐主义和无神论相关联的。在近代, P. 伽桑狄复兴了原来的伊壁鸠鲁主义, 并且深刻地影响了英国功利主义的发展。

"像功利主义一样, 伊壁鸠鲁主义把所有的德性归结为享受主义至上的个人幸福, 但它不同于功利主义, 不把任何特定个人的德性系于一般人类的快乐 (或免于痛苦的自由), 而是以利己主义的方式, 把它系于据说是有德性的人的快乐。" —— 斯洛特: 《从道德到德性》, 1992年, 第 xviii 页。

附随现象论

[Epiphenomenon, 附随现象, 源自希腊文 *epi* (在……旁或在……上) 和 *phainein* (出现), 字面意义为某个过程的“副产品”或“伴随产品”; 这一产品对该过程本身无任何影响] 附随现象论是关于心身关系的一种理论, 由 T. 赫胥黎首先提出, 并被各种各样的机械唯物论所采纳。按照这种观点, 有意识的精神状态或事件是中枢神经系统的脑过程的副产品, 就像影子和它所影映的东西的关系一样。精神状态本身并没有因果力量, 既不能影响身体的行为, 也不能影响其他的精神状态。心灵不是一物, 而是一串事件。每个精神事件都可以根据某个或某些身体事件而得到充分解释。没有身体, 心灵不可能存在。与二元论不一样, 附随现象论否认心灵是一种基本实体。

"精神事件不是因果因素, 这一论点被称作是附随现象论。" —— 艾耶尔: 《20 世纪的哲学》, 1982 年, 第 186 页。

知识

[希腊词, 知识] “知识论” (epistemology) 一词即由此构成。柏拉图认为知识是灵魂的一种认知状态, 只关涉于不变的、必然的对象, 即形相或形式, 知识与意见相对。意见是关于可感对象的认知状态。在柏拉图看来, 知识与意见的对立对于建立他的形相论至关重要。亚里士多德一般把知识限制于证明科学, 因为证明科学提供了有关必然不变的事态的必然永恒的真理。这些科学从必然的前提出发, 通过三段论演绎, 进展到必然的结论。不过, 构成这些科学第一原则的必然前提不是由知识把握的, 而是由

deduction and reach necessary conclusions. The necessary premises which form the first principles of these sciences are not grasped by *episteme*, but by *nous* (intuition).

"Episteme then is by its nature directed to what is, to know it as it is." —Plato, *Republic*, 477b.

Epistemic holism

The core of this position is the Duhem-Quine thesis. According to Duhem, statements about physical things cannot be verified or falsified in isolation from the theory to which they belong. Quine further suggested that what should be tested against experience is not a sentence, not even a theory in isolation, but the whole of science, since all branches of science share logic and mathematics. Epistemic holism is the ground for Quine's rejection of the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements. It also paves the way for semantic holism which focuses on the essential interconnectedness that exists between thoughts.

"The central factor underlying it [epistemic holism] is the potential complex interconnectedness of things, both causally and evidentially." —Heal, in Carruthers and Smith (eds.), *Theories of Theories of Mind*, 1996, p. 80.

Epistemic justification

Although epistemic justification may concern objective justification regarding what we should believe given what is in fact true, it mainly concerns subjective justification. This seeks to determine what we should believe or should not believe, given what we actually do believe, even though what we do believe may not be correct. If and only if one is justified in believing that a proposition is true, is one justified in believing that proposition. To believe what is true one needs to believe what is justified, and to avoid believing what is false one must not accept what is not justified. Justification of belief requires specification of the norms under which one may hold a belief. Determining what to believe is a fundamental problem for epistemology. "Acceptance", "being beyond reasonable doubt", "being evident", "being certain", "having some proposition in its favour", etc. are all different senses of epistemic justification.

"Epistemic justification, unlike truth, is capable of degrees of the things that we are justified in believing, some are more justified than others." —Chisholm, *The Foundations of Knowing*, 1982, p. 5.

Epistemic modality

The mode in which a thing is said to be known to be true (verified), known to be untrue (falsified) or neither known to be true nor false (undecided). G. H. von Wright claimed that these epistemic modalities are related to each other logically as the alethic modalities (necessary, assertible and possible). Each of these modal concepts can either be *de dic-*

努斯(直观)把握的。

"知识在本性上导向真实的存在,去知道其本来状态。"——柏拉图:《国家篇》,477b。

认知的整体论

这个立场的核心是“杜恒-奎因论题”。根据杜恒的观点,关于物理事物的陈述离开了它们所属的理论是无法得到证实或证伪的。奎因进而提出,应该用经验加以检验的不是一个句子,甚至不是一个单独的理论,而是整个科学,因为科学的一切分支都使用了逻辑和数学。认知的整体论是奎因抛弃综合陈述和分析陈述区分的基础。它也为语义的整体论铺平了道路,后者关注的是存在于思想之间的主要关联。

“深藏于它[认知的整体论]的核心要素是事物之间复杂多变的相互联系,既有偶然的也有必然的。”——黑尔,载克拉塞斯和司密斯(编)《关于心的理论的理论》,1996年,第80页。

认知辩明

尽管认知的辩明可能是指对我们应该相信的而事实上又为真的东西的客观辩明,但它主要关心的是主观辩明。它寻求确定我们应该或不应该相信的东西,假定我们实际上相信某些东西,即使我们相信的东西可能并不正确。当且仅当人们有理由相信一个命题是真的,那么他们就有理由相信这个命题。要相信真的东西,就需要相信得到辩明的东西;要避免相信假的东西,就决不能接受没有得到辩明的东西。对信念的辩明需要专门的规则,人们可以根据这种规则持有信念,确定相信什么,这是认识论的基本问题。“接受”、“不可能有理由怀疑”、“明显的”、“确定的”、“倾向于某个命题”等等,都是认知辩明的不同意义。

“认知辩明与真理不同,它能够在某些程度上证明,我们有理由相信,某些事情比其他的事情更可得到辩明。”——齐硕姆:《认知的基础》,1982年,第5页。

认知模态

谈论事物的方式,即被认为是真的(证实的),被认为是不真的(证伪的),或者,被认为既不是真的也不是假的(未确定的)。G. H. 冯·赖特认为,这些认知模态在逻辑上是与真实模态(必然性、可断定性和可能性)相互联系的。这种模态的每个概念都是关于事实或命题的,

to when it is about the mode in which a proposition is known to be true or false (for instance "It is known that Socrates taught Plato"), or *de re* when it is about the mode in which an individual is known to have or not have certain attributes (for instance, "Socrates is known to be poor"). The study of the logical relations between epistemic modalities is the subject of modal epistemic logic, developed mainly by von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka.

"The basic epistemic modalities are: verified (known to be true), falsified (known to be false) and undecided (neither known to be true nor known to be false)." --von Wright, *An Essay in Modal Logic*, 1951, pp. 1-2.

Epistemic value, an alternative expression for cognitive value

Epistemic virtue

The personal disposition of character which tends to lead to the attainment of true knowledge and the avoidance of error, such as the desire to seek the truth, impartiality in scientific activities, and the courage to question orthodox views. It is also the internalised standard of belief-acceptance and belief-rejection. The opposite of epistemic virtue is epistemic vice. Since epistemic virtue is related to personal character, and does not involve empirical data, virtuously-formed knowledge is not necessarily justified knowledge. In this context, virtue means simply doing well, a notion of efficiency rather than morality. A person of epistemic virtue is more likely to be successful in his inquiry, but that does not mean that he is a morally good person. The concept is derived from Aristotle's notion of intellectual virtue. Epistemologists also talk about doxastic virtue which is the disposition leading to the formation of reliable beliefs. Its content is the same as epistemic virtue.

"Such concepts as epistemic character or epistemic virtue seem to have either their natural home in the conduct of inquiry project, since they focus on what it is to have the good judgement required by guidelines for going about inquiry." --Haack, *Evidence and Inquiry*, 1993, p. 204.

Epistemics, see epistemology

Epistemological atomism

Sluga's term for the view that there is a direct acquaintance with objects and that knowledge is not in the first instance knowing that or a matter of judging, but knowledge of objects and their properties. This term plays a role mainly in the interpretation of Frege's philosophy and the claim that Frege is committed to such a view, as many interpreters have held.

"Sluga connects my saying that, for Frege, the referent

因为它是关于所知的命题为真或为假的模态(譬如,“我们知道苏格拉底教过柏拉图”),或者是关于对象的,因为它是关于所知的个体具有或不具有某些特性的模态(譬如,“苏格拉底被认为很穷”),对认知模态之间逻辑关系的研究是“模态认知逻辑”的主题,主要是由冯·赖特和J. 辛提卡提倡的。

“基本的认知模态是:证实的(被认为是真的),证伪的(被认为是假的)和未确定的(既不被认为是真的也不被认为是假的),”——冯·赖特:《论模态逻辑》,1951年,第1-2页。

认知值

“认知值”的另一种说法。

认知德性

力图获得真知识并避免错误的个人特征禀赋,诸如渴望寻求真理、科学活动中的客观公正和质疑正统看法的勇气等等。它同样是接受或抛弃信念的内在标准。认知德性的反面是认知罪恶。由于认知德性与个人特性相关,并不涉及经验材料,因而由德性构成的知识,并不必然地是得到证实的知识。在这种语境中,德性只是指做得好,这是一个效用概念,而不是道德概念。具有认知德性的人更像是一位事业上的成功者,但这并不意味着,他在道德上是一个好人。这个概念来自亚里士多德的理智德性概念。认知主义者还谈论“信念德性”,这是导致构成可靠信念的禀赋,其内容与认知德性相同。

“认知特性或认知德性这种概念似乎在探究活动中有其自然之处,因为它们关注的是进行这个探究时准则所需要的那些必须具有完美判断的东西。”——哈克:《证据与探究》,1993年,第204页。

认知学

见“认识论”条。

认识论上的原子主义

这是由斯鲁格杜撰的词,是指这样一种观点,即认为存在着对对象的直接亲知,并且认为,知识首先并不是知道什么或判断什么,而是关于对象及其属性的知识。这个词主要用于解释弗雷格哲学,认为弗雷格像许多解释者所认为的那样承认了这种观点。

“我说过,对弗雷格来说,专名的指称就是它的承担者,斯鲁格把我的这种说法称作‘认识

of a proper name is its bearer with what he calls 'epistemological atomism', which he accuses me of ascribing to Frege." —M. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, p. 345.

Epistemological dualism

Any theory of sense-data which maintains that sense-data are distinct from the physical objects that they represent. Physical objects are constant, but different perceivers may have different sense data regarding the same object. Physical objects are public, while sense-data are private. Furthermore, not all of what we perceive, in particular secondary qualities, are inherent in physical objects. A change of sense data is not a real physical change. Since sense-data are not identical to physical objects, doubt arises with regard to the reliability of perception as the source of knowledge about the external world. According to this view, we do not really know physical objects themselves, although they are the cause of sense-data. From this position, Berkeley's immaterialism and phenomenalism are derived by denying the existence of unknown substances.

"Epistemological dualism, ... according to it, the sense-datum, i. e. that which is directly perceived, is always distinct from the physical object, even though it may be exactly similar to it like a faithful mirror image." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 120.

Epistemological necessity

A necessity that can be deduced from a thinker's other beliefs, and is generally associated with the "must" of certainty. It is a relation between certain features showing the dependence of one thing on another. Enquiry establishes such an epistemological necessity between the phenomenon to be explained and its necessary conditions. For instance, we will say, "it must be painful" if we see somebody struck by a stone.

"When it is shown that certain features are equally essential; when it is shown that certain features are interconnected so that some are necessary for others; when it is shown that certain features are not so closely connected as might be assumed, it is epistemological necessity, closeness, or lack of connection that is demonstrated" —Harrison, *On What There Must Be*, 1974, p. 49.

Epistemology

[from Greek: *episteme*, knowledge — *logos*, theory; Literally, theory of knowledge] The adjective "epistemic" pertains to knowledge. Epistemics is sometimes used as equivalent to epistemology or is used to denote a scientific approach to knowledge. Epistemology is also equivalent to gnoseology, (from Greek: *gnoskein*, to know). Epistemology generally starts with attempts to refute scepticism by

论上的原子主义',并由此责怪我把这种观点归咎于弗雷格。"——达米特:《弗雷格哲学解说》,第345页。

认识论上的二元论

任何关于感觉予料的理论,主张感觉予料与其代表的物理对象判然有别。物理对象是恒定的,但不同的知觉者对于同一对象可能有不同的感觉予料。物理对象是公共的,而感觉予料是私人的。此外,并不是所有为我们所知觉的东西,特别是第二性质,是物理对象所固有的。感觉予料的变化并非真正的物理变化。因为感觉予料与物理对象并不是一回事,因此关于知觉作为有关外部世界知识源泉的可靠性就产生了怀疑。根据这种观点,我们并不真正知道物理对象本身,虽然它们是感觉予料的原因。从这种立场出发,由于否认未知实体存在,可以得到巴克莱的反唯物论和现象论。

"根据认识论上的二元论……感觉予料,也即直接知觉到的东西,总是和物理对象有区别,虽然它可能像不走样的镜像一样与之完全相像。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第120页。

认识论上的必然性

可以从思想者的其他信念中推演出来的东西,通常是与具有确定性的"必须"有关。它是某些特征之间的关系,这些特征表明了事物的相互依赖。探究就是为了确立需要解释的现象与其必然条件之间的这种认识论上的必然性。譬如,如果我们看到某人被石头砸了,我们就会说,"这一定很疼"。

"当某些特征显然是同样基本的;当某些特征显然是相互联系的,使得某些特征对另一些特征是必然的;当某些特征显然并不像人们所想像的那样密切联系,这就是得到证明的认识论上的必然性、密切性或缺乏联系。"——哈里森:《论必定存在之物》,1974年,第49页。

认识论

[源自希腊文 *episteme* (知识) 和 *logos* (理论); 在字面上,是指知识论]"认识的"是它的形容词,即对知识的获得。"认知学"有时也用作认识论的同义词,或用于指探究知识的科学方法。认识论也等同于"知识学",后者来自希腊文 *gnoskein* (知道)。认识论通常开始于试图驳斥怀疑论,证明知识是可能的,然后进一步阐

justifying the claim that knowledge is possible and then proceeds to clarify the nature and the scope of knowledge. The standard analysis of knowledge claims that it is justified true belief, a definition initiated essentially by Plato, although it is challenged most recently by the Gettier problem. Because of this definition, philosophers have been working to analyse the relation between knowledge and belief, between knowledge and truth, and between knowledge and justification. The last issue is especially central. In a sense epistemology pays more attention to the problem of what it is to be justified in believing than to knowledge *per se*. Another main task of epistemology concerns the origin of knowledge, that is to assess the role of sense and reason in the acquisition of knowledge. Philosophers are divided into rationalists and empiricists with respect to this issue. Rationalism, represented by Plato, Descartes and Leibniz, takes reason to be the source of knowledge, while empiricism, represented by Locke and Hume, argues that experience is the source of truth. Kant attempted to reconcile both by claiming that knowledge is possible only by the combination of our *a priori* intuitions and concepts of the understanding and appearances. Contemporary epistemology is dominated by Anglo-American philosophy and is largely empirical. Corresponding to the development of the philosophy of language, speech and meaning become important issues. Since epistemology is closely associated with psychology and the philosophy of mind, perception, memory, imagination, other minds, and error are major topics. The discussions of induction and *a priori* knowledge are also prominent, in part through the association of epistemology with philosophy of science.

"Questions such as these, about the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge, motivated the enterprise of epistemology, past and present." —Moser and Nat., *Human Knowledge*, 1987, p. 3.

Epithumia, see concupiscence

Epoché, see suspension of judgement

E-proposition, see A-proposition

Equalitarianism, an alternative expression for egalitarianism

Equality

That all men are equal is a basic democratic principle, but it is not a statement of fact, for people differ in virtually all of their mental and physical capacities. The principle of equality, rather, claims that all persons have a right to equal

明知识的性质和范围。对知识的标准分析认为它是被证明为真的信念。这基本上是由柏拉图最初提出的一个定义,尽管它最近受到了“盖梯尔问题”的挑战。由于这种定义,哲学家们始终在努力分析知识与信念、知识与真理、知识与辨明之间的关系。这最后一个是特别核心的问题。在某种意义上,认识论特别关注得到证实的信念问题,而不是知识本身。认识论的另一个主要问题是关心知识的起源,即评价感觉和理性在知识获得中的作用。在这个问题上,哲学家们被分为理性主义者和经验主义者。以柏拉图、笛卡尔和莱布尼茨为代表的理性主义把理性看做是知识的来源,而以洛克、休谟等人为代表的经验主义认为,经验是真理的来源。康德试图调和两者,认为知识只有通过结合先天直觉与知性概念和表象概念才是可能的。当代认识论是由英美哲学支配的,基本上是经验主义的。伴随着语言哲学的发展,言语和意义成为重要的问题。由于认识论与心理学和心的哲学密切相关,知觉、记忆、想像、他人的心灵和错误都是主要论题。对归纳和先天知识的讨论也占主导地位,因为认识论与科学哲学同样密切相关。

“诸如人类知识的性质、起源和限度等问题,过去与现在都是认识论事业的动因。”——莫泽和纳特:《人类知识》,1987年,第3页。

欲念

见“情欲”条。

悬置

见“中止判断”条。

E命题

见“A命题”条。

平均主义

“平等主义”的另一种表述。

平等

人人平等是基本的民主原则,但这并不是一个对事实的陈述,因为人们的智能和体能实际上都是不同的。更确切地讲,平等原则主张所有的人都有权受到平等的对待。在康德看来,这

treatment. For Kant, this equality is based on our human rationality and gives humans the dignity of being moral ends, who are not merely means to the ends of others. Equal treatment entitles all persons to equal consideration and equal opportunity. In a democratic society, all members are equally assured of basic rights to freedom and political participation, regardless of factors such as their race, gender or religion. The vast gap separating the rich and poor today has led some egalitarian philosophers to extend the notion of equality from the equality of democratic citizenship to the equality of condition. On this latter claim, each person should have the same amount of goods or the same level of social and economic benefit. This simple equality seems to conflict with widely accepted principles of justice and liberty. Attempts at reconciliation have produced a better understanding of the equality of condition. Traditionally, equality has been limited to human beings, but some recent environmental philosophers have criticised the alleged anthropocentrism of this restriction and have sought to extend equality of concern to non-human animals or to nature as a whole.

"The essential equality is thought to be equality of consideration." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 507.

Equity

A basic requirement of social justice, involving fairness or fair shares, in contrast to equality or equal shares. Unlike strict equality, which does not take account of relevant difference, equity requires like cases to be treated equally and unlike cases to be treated unequally. The distribution of resources in society must be determined according to the merit, need and capacity of the recipients. Only persons within the same category, for whom all relevant conditions are the same, should receive the same treatment. Plato and Aristotle distinguished arithmetical equality from proportionate equality. According to arithmetic equality, everybody receives an equal share irrespective of worth. Proportionate equality corresponds to equity and calls for distribution according to morally relevant differences. Equity requires the modification of general rules to meet special situations and seeks to provide just decisions in particular cases. Normally, what is equitable is equivalent to what is just, although some theorists see equity as no more than one aspect of justice. The principle of equity, with its emphasis on merit and worth, can come into conflict with consequentialist moral theories.

"The principle of equity is that equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally." — Barry, *Political Arguments*, 1966, p. 152.

Equivalence

For words and expressions, equivalence can be divided into extensional and intensional equivalence. Words or expressions that have the same meaning (that is synonymous)

种平等是以我们人类的理性为基础的,并使人具有作为道德目的的尊严,即人不仅仅是实现他人目的的手段。平等对待给所有的人以受到平等考虑和得到平等机会的权利。在民主社会中,所有成员都可保证平等地获得自由和参与政治的基本权利,而不受其种族、性别和宗教因素的影响。当今贫富之间的巨大鸿沟已使得一些平等主义的哲学家将平等概念的含义从民主的公民权的平等扩展到境况的平等。根据后一要求,每个人都应拥有同样数量的商品或享受同等水准的社会、经济利益。这一简明的平等看上去是同为人们广泛接受的正义和自由的原则相矛盾。调和两者的努力引出了对境况平等的更深入的理解。从传统上讲,平等一直限于人类,但近来一些环境哲学家批判了这一限定的所谓的人类中心主义,并试图把平等的范围扩展到非人类的动物界或作为一个整体的自然界。

"基本的平等被认为是在受尊重方面的平等。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第507页。

公平

它是社会正义的基本要求,包括公平或公平的份额分享,与平等或平等的份额相对应。与不考虑有关差别的严格意义的平等不同,公平要求相同的情况要相同地对待,不同的情况要不同地对待。社会对资源的分配必须根据接受者的贡献、需要和能力来决定。只有当人们处于同一部门,而且相关条件都相同时,他们才应受到同样的对待。柏拉图和亚里士多德区分过数量的平等和比值的平等。根据数量的平等,每个人得到相同的一份而不问价值。比值的平等相当于公平,它要求分配依据道德上的有关差别。公平要求修改一般规则以适应特殊情况,并力图提供特殊情况下的公正的决定。在通常的情况下,公平的就等于公正的,尽管一些理论家把公平仅仅视为公正的一个方面。公平原则由于强调贡献和价值,因而会与结果论的道德理论发生冲突。

"公平原则是同样的事物要同样地对待,不同的事物要不同地对待。"——培里:《政治上的论证》,1966年,第152页。

等值

对词语和表达式来说,等值可以分为外延的和内涵的。具有相同意义的词语或表达式(即同义词)是"内涵等值的";具有相同指称或外

are intensionally equivalent; words or expressions that have the same reference or extension are extensionally equivalent. Words and expressions may be extensionally equivalent without being intensionally equivalent; but if two terms are intensionally equivalent, then they are extensionally equivalent as well.

Two statements or propositions p and q are equivalent if they have the same truth-value (either both true or both false). A distinction can be drawn between material equivalence (p and q have the same truth value) and logical equivalence (p and q are mutually entailing). The sign for material equivalence is " \leftrightarrow " or " $=$ "; " $p \leftrightarrow q$ " or " $p = q$ " means "if p then q , and if q then p ". That is, p is both a necessary and sufficient condition of q , and q is both a necessary and sufficient condition of p . If p and q are logically equivalent, each entails the other.

"' S_1 is logically equivalent to S_2 ' = df ' S_1 entails S_2 and S_2 entails S_1 '. " —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logic Theory*, 1952.

Equivalence relation

An equivalence relation is transitive, (that is if the relation R exists between a and b and exists between b and c , then it also exists between a and c), symmetric (that is if a has the relation R to b , then b also has the relation R to a) and reflexive (a bears the relation R to itself). An equivalence relation holds between equivalent things or between things which are exactly similar in some respect. "Being the same age as" and "having the same length as", are typical equivalence relations. The equivalence relation is essential for establishing certain measurements in mathematical logic. If there is a class of objects within which each member has an equivalence relation to every other member, and does not have this relation with anything in a different class, this class is called the equivalent class of the relation.

"Not only does every sameness predicate express an equivalence relation, but every equivalence relation is expressed by some sameness predicate." Hodges, *Logic*, 1977, p. 187.

Ergon

[Greek; work or what we do] A term having various translations, including process of production, product, achievement, action, task, activity and function. In philosophy, it is mainly used for a characteristic function or activity uniquely ascribed to a thing or kind of thing. Both Plato and Aristotle appeal to such functions to explain the essence of a thing and the good for man. It is thus connected with virtue (*arete*), "the excellence in performing one's *ergon*". The *ergon* of a knife is cutting. If it cuts well, it is a good knife and has virtue. Analogously, Aristotle argued, man has an *er-*

延的词语或表达式是“外延等值的”。词语和表达式可以外延等值但不内涵等值;但是,如果两个词项是内涵等值的,那么它们也是外延等值的。

两个陈述或命题 p 和 q 是等值的,如果它们有相同的真值(或者同真或者同假)。还可以在实质等值(p 和 q 有相同的真值)和逻辑等值(p 和 q 可以互推)之间作出区分。实质等值的记号是 " \leftrightarrow " 或 " $=$ "; " $p \leftrightarrow q$ " 或 " $p = q$ " 意味着“如果 p 则 q , 并且如果 q 则 p ”。也就是说, p 是 q 的充分必要条件并且 q 是 p 的充分必要条件。如果 p 和 q 逻辑等值,则它们中的每一个都衍推另一个。

"' S_1 逻辑等值于 S_2 ' = df ' S_1 衍推 S_2 并且 S_2 衍推 S_1 '." ——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》, 1952 年。

等价关系

等价关系是传递的(如果关系 R 存在于 a 和 b 之间,并且存在于 b 和 c 之间,则它也存在于 a 和 c 之间),对称的(a 与 b 有关系 R 蕴涵着 b 与 a 也有关系 R)和自返的(a 与它自身有关系 R)。等价关系出现在相互等价的事物之间,或者出现在某一方面完全类似的事物之间。“与……同龄”和“与……一样高”是典型的等价关系。在数理逻辑中,等价关系对于确立某种尺度来说至关重要。如果存在一个对象类,其中每一元素都与该类中的每一个其他元素有等价关系,但与不同类中的任何元素都没有这种关系,则这个类就叫做该关系的“等价类”。

“不仅每一个同一谓词表达一等价关系,而且每一个等价关系都被某个同一谓词所表达。”——霍奇逊:《逻辑》, 1977 年, 第 187 页。

功能

[希腊文, 字面意义为“工作”或“做什么”] 它有各种译法, 包括生产过程、产品、成就、行为、任务、活动以及功能。在哲学中, 它的主要作用是指独一无二地归属于一个或一类事物的“有特色的功能或活动”。柏拉图和亚里士多德都诉诸这样的功能来解释一物的本质和人的善。因而, 它与“德性”(*arete*)相连。德性的意义就是“优秀地履行自己的功能”。一把刀的功能是切割。如果它切割锋利, 它就是一把好刀, 就有一种德性。依此类推, 亚里士多德认

gon, rational activity, which is the feature distinguishing man from non-human animals and plants. He held that human virtue or human good, therefore, is performing rational activities rightly and well.

"... that is the ergon of each thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform." - Plato, *Republic*, 353a.

Eristic

[from Greek: *eris*, fight, conflict] For Plato and Aristotle, the art of dispute which makes use of invalid and fallacious arguments to persuade the audience. It is aimed at winning a debate rather than seeking the truth. According to its basic method, an interlocutor is required to answer yes or no and cannot qualify his reply. The eristic method, which was developed by the sophists and the Megarian school, was popular in the debates of the Athenian court and the assemblage. It is a sort of reasoning, but not genuine. The art is employed for nothing else but victory. The Megarian school called it dialectic, but Aristotle distinguished it from dialectic. Eristic is associated with words, while dialectic is concerned with reality. Eristic refutes everything that is said and is destructive, while dialectic is aimed at the truth and is constructive. In the *De Sophistic Elenchis*, Aristotle examined various types of eristic argument, and identified many general fallacies that they commit.

"When an argument seems to prove a conclusion but does not, which is called an eristic reasoning." - Aristotle, *Topics*, 162b3.

Eros

[Greek: love or erotic love, but not a mere appetite for sexual gratification] Sexual desire is a component of *eros*, but there are other elements as well. For Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, *eros* was normally confined to an older man's paederastic desire for a younger man, as sanctioned by the institutions and fashions of aristocratic circles of many cities in ancient Greece. *Eros* included intense interest in the beloved and desire for his presence and company. In *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, Plato saw this love for the beauty of a fair young body as only the earthly version of something far higher. It led successively to the love of a fair soul and character, the love of study, the love of a way of life, the love of the social order and finally ascended to the very presence of the Form of Beauty itself, of which all other kinds of beauty are only imperfect copies. Thus, *eros* is a way of grasping spiritual truth. Philosophers, poets and artists are all inspired by the divine power of *eros* as madness. This is Platonic spiritual love, although platonic love has also come to mean companionship without sexual desire. Hence, *eros* is distinguished from Christian love (*agape*) or Romantic love. For Aristotle, erotic love was a source of friendship. Freud borrowed

为,人也有一种功能,即理性活动,它是把人与非人的动物和植物相区别的特征。因此人的德性或人的善在于优秀地和正确地从事理性活动。

"每一事物的功能即是,只有该事物能做,或者它可比其他任何事物都做得好的特性。" - 柏拉图:《国家篇》,353a。

争辩术

[源自希腊词 *eris*, 原意为“打仗”,“冲突”]在柏拉图和亚里士多德看来,它所表示的是一种使用无效的和虚假的论证去说服听众的争辩术。它的目的只是在于赢得争论,而非寻求真理。根据其基本方法,回答者只要求回答“是”或“否”,不能对其回答作限定。争辩的方法是由智者及麦加拉学派发展的,在雅典的法庭和集会上很是流行。它不是一种真正的推理,只是用来取胜的。麦加拉学派称其为辩证法,可亚里士多德将它与辩证法相区别。争辩术与语言相关,而辩证法则关心现实。争辩术排斥一切话语,是摧毁性的,而辩证法以真理为对象,是建设性的。在《驳诡辩》中,亚里士多德考察了各种类型的争辩性论证,表明了许多它们普遍所犯的错误。

“当一个论证看似证明了一个结论,其实则不然时,它叫争辩术推理。”——亚里士多德,《正位篇》,162b3。

情爱

[希腊语,意为爱或情爱,但不同于仅为性满足的欲望]性欲是 *eros* 的一种成分,但它还有其他要素。对苏格拉底、柏拉图和亚里士多德而言, *eros* 被严格限制在年长者对年少者的鸡奸欲望范围内,因为这在古代希腊是许多城邦贵族圈内的制度和风俗所认可的。 *eros* 包括对被爱者的强烈兴趣以及对他的在场和陪伴的欲望。在《费得罗篇》和《会饮篇》中,柏拉图把这种对美丽的年轻躯体的爱看做仅是爱更高东西的世俗类型。它导致连续地爱美的灵魂和品性,爱学问,爱生活方式,爱社会秩序,最后上升到爱美的理念自身,一切其他种类的美都只是这种理念不完全的摹本。因此, *eros* 是把握精神真理的一种方式。哲学家、诗人和艺术家都被 *eros* 的神圣力量感应成“癫狂”。这就是所谓的“柏拉图的精神恋爱”,虽然这个短语也指无性欲夹杂的交谊。所以, *eros* 不同于基督教的爱 (*agape*) 或罗曼蒂克的爱。在亚里士多德那里,情爱是友谊的一个源泉。弗洛伊德借用了这个词,他断言,他的 *eros* 学说比较接近柏拉图的学说。然而,柏拉图的 *eros* 是对实在的真正表

the term and claimed that his doctrine of *eros* was closer to that of Plato. However, while Plato's *eros* is a longing for a true version of reality, Freud's love is the hope of recapturing a sexual bliss allegedly lost in infancy.

"If we are to make this gift our own, Eros will help our mortal nature more than all the world." —Plato, *Symposium*, 212b.

Eros (Freud)

[Greek: *eros*, love, desire] Freud claimed that there are two classes of ultimate instinct in the *id*. Our mental world contains *eros*, which is our life-preserving instinct, and *thanatos* (Greek: death), which is our death instinct. *Eros*, which replaced Freud's earlier notion of libido, is in the tradition of Plato and Spinoza a never satisfied desire and effort. *Eros* inspires us to strive for individual happiness and forms our wishes to unite with others. It drives living organisms to develop. *Thanatos* drives us toward a return to the inorganic. According to Freud, these two forces fight each other, and their conflict and interaction determine the development of individual life and culture. This pair of notions, *eros* and *thanatos*, can be traced to the cosmology of Empedocles.

"The other set of instincts would be those which are better known to us in analysis: the libidinal, sexual or life instincts, which are best comprised under the name of Eros; their purpose would be to form living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may be prolonged and brought to higher development." —Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 258.

Error theory

J. L. Mackie's term for his position rejecting ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism claims that all moral judgements refer to some objective moral property, are capable of truth and falsity and have their truth-value determined by an external objective meaning. According to naturalism, moral judgements are true through reflecting what is the case in nature. Mackie rejects ethical naturalism because he holds that there are no objective values or moral facts to determine the truth-value of moral judgements. Hence, all ethical theories which presuppose the existence of objective moral truth are systematically wrong. Mackie claimed that morality is a matter of free choice, rather than something imposed on us by an objective moral reality. His non-cognitivist position echoes Moore's naturalistic fallacy and Hume's is/ought gap.

"The denial of objective values will have to be put forward not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an 'error theory', a theory that although most people in making moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false." —Mackie, *Ethics*, 1977, p. 35.

现的渴望,而弗洛伊德的爱则是对夺回所认为的幼年失去的性喜悦的希冀。

“如果我们想使这个礼物成为我们自己的, Eros 给我们有死者本性的帮助会比世上的一切更多。” —柏拉图:《会饮篇》, 212b.

厄罗斯 (弗洛伊德)

[希腊文 *eros*, 意思是爱、欲望] 弗洛伊德认为在伊底 (*id*) 或本我之中有两种最终的本能: 我们的心灵世界包括厄罗斯或爱欲, 这是保存生命的本能; 以及坦那托斯 (*thanatos*, 在希腊文中意指死亡), 即我们的死亡本能。厄罗斯代替了弗洛伊德以前使用的“里比多” (*libido*) 这个观念; 它在柏拉图和斯宾诺莎的传统中指那永不会被满足的欲望和努力。厄罗斯激发我们去为了个人幸福而奋斗, 并塑造我们的愿望, 使之与他人的愿望统一起来。它驱动生命有机体去发展。坦那托斯则驱使我们去返回到无生机的状态。按照弗洛伊德的观点, 这两种力量相互斗争, 它们的冲突和相互作用决定了个体生命和文化的发展。厄罗斯和坦那托斯这一对观念可以追溯到恩培多克勒的宇宙论。

“另一组本能可在分析中被更清楚地了解; 它们是里比多的、性的或生命本能, 最好用‘厄罗斯’这个名字来表示。它们的目的是使生命体形成越来越大的统一, 以便生命可以延长并向更高处发展。” —弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》, 第十八卷, 第 258 页。

谬误论

J. L. 麦基提出的用以反对伦理自然主义的术语。伦理自然主义认为, 所有的道德判断都涉及某种客观道德特性, 都能有真伪之分, 都具有由外在的客观意义所决定的真值。根据自然主义, 道德判断之所以是真的由于它反映了实际的情况。麦基反对伦理自然主义, 因为他认为决定道德判断真值的客观价值或道德事实是不存在的。因此, 所有假设存在客观的道德真理的伦理理论都绝非是偶然的错误。麦基声称, 道德是一种自由选择的问题, 而不是由客观的道德事实强加于我们的东西。他的非唯知主义主张是对摩尔的自然主义谬误和休谟的“是”与“应该”之间的鸿沟的反响。

“对客观价值的否定将不是非得作为一种分析方法的结果提出来, 而是作为‘谬误论’提出来, 这一理论认为, 虽然大多数人在作道德判断时含蓄地主张指的是存在于其他事物中的某种客观规定的东西, 但这种主张全都是错误的。” —麦基:《伦理学》, 1977 年, 第 35 页。

Ersatzism

[from German; *ersatz*, substitute or fake] A theory which is intended to modify the modal realism of David Lewis. The claim of modal realism that there are countless concrete worlds has been criticised as being incompatible with common sense. Ersatzism suggests instead that we have only one concrete world, but that there are countless abstract entities which represent ways that this world might have been. We talk about what is the case according to these abstract entities, and they form an abstract realm. There are various versions of this theory, but in general the role played by these abstract entities is similar to that played by Lewis's plurality of concrete worlds. Lewis, himself, rejects these attempts to retain the benefit of his modal realism while making concessions in favour of common sense.

"According to ersatzism, we have a well-established division of all there is into the concrete and the abstract." — David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 1986, p. 136.

Eschatology

[from Greek *eschatos*, last, final + *logos*, theory, the theory about what is ultimate and final] A branch of theology that is concerned with the last things for humankind: death, resurrection and the last judgement of God. It is also concerned with the end of the world and the final moment of history. It aims to make full sense of the contingency of our existence and attempts to grasp the upper reaches of unified experience which we detect in the things around us. Some eschatologists argue that in our present life there are states analogous to states of an afterlife. This kind of belief is called realised eschatology.

"The eschatology we have elaborated is a rational and an a priori, not an empirical, eschatology; it bases itself on the philosophical surds of our present existence, and suggests the supplementation necessary to resolve them." — Findlay, *Ascent to the Absolute*, 1970, p. 76.

Esoteric, see exoteric

Esse est percipi

[Latin; to be is to be perceived] The central thesis or a priori ground for the subjective idealism or immaterialism of the Anglo-Irish empiricist, George Berkeley. It claims that the ordinary objects of experience exist if and only if they are perceived. Hence things cannot be independent of our minds and are what they appear to us to be. The major argument for this proposition is as follows: (1) every corporeal object is a collection or association of sensible qualities; (2) every sensible quality is relative to the percipient and is therefore an idea; (3) an idea cannot exist without our mind or sensa-

仿形论

[源自德语: *ersatz*, 替代或仿造] 一种旨在修正 D. 刘易斯的模态实在论的理论。模态实在论宣称, 存在无数多个具体世界。这一断言已被批评为与常识不相容。仿形论因此建议, 我们只有一个具体世界, 但存在无数多个抽象实体, 它们代表着这个世界的可能存在方式。我们根据这些抽象实体来谈论发生的事情, 它们构成一个抽象的王国。这个理论有各种不同版本。但一般而言, 这些抽象实体所扮演的角色类似于由刘易斯的多个具体世界所扮演的角色。刘易斯本人拒绝尝试既想保留他的模态实在论的方便之处, 又作出不少让步以符合常识。

“根据仿形论, 我们可以有理由把所有存在的东西划分为具体的和抽象的。” — 刘易斯: 《论多样世界》, 1986 年, 第 136 页。

末世论

[源自希腊语 *eschatos* (最后、终结) 和 *logos* (理论), 意为关于终极和最后的东西的理论] 作为神学的一个分支, 它关注人类最后的事情——死亡、复活及上帝的末日审判。它也关注宇宙的终结和历史的最后时刻。它的目的是要充分理解我们存在的偶然意义, 并企图从更高的层面上来把握我们在周围事物中所发现的统一经验。有些末世论者论证道, 在我们的现存生活中, 有些状况类似于来世的状况。这类信念被称为“现实的末世论”。

“我们苦心建构的末世论, 是一种理性的、先在的末世论, 而不是经验的末世论; 它本身建立在对我们现实存在的哲学沉思基础上, 并提出解决它们的必要补充。” — 芬得雷: 《上升到绝对》, 1970 年, 第 76 页。

秘传的

见“明传的”条。

存在就是被感知

[拉丁文, 意思是“存在就是被感知”] 它是英格兰-爱尔兰经验论者 G. 巴克莱的“主观唯心主义”或“非唯物论”的核心论点或先天根据。它断言, 经验的普通对象当且仅当它们被知觉时才存在。因而, 事物不可能独立于我们的心灵, 它们就是对我们呈现的那样。对这个命题的主要论证如下: (1) 每一物质对象都是可感性质的集合或联结; (2) 每一可感性质都与感觉者相关, 因而都是一个观念; (3) 一个观念不可能没有我们的心灵或感觉而存在; (4) 因此, 每一物

tion; (4) hence every physical object is an association of ideas and cannot exist in its own right. However, in this argument, premises (1) and (2) are controversial. The problem with (1) is that it denies the traditional distinction between underlying substance and peripheral accidents. Berkeley attempted to refute the notion of substance or substratum, but with uncertain success except against Locke's minimal account. Moreover, the achievements of physics in his time seemed to prove, contrary to his thesis, that external things have their properties intrinsically and are the basis for the laws of physics. Against this, Berkeley argued that scientific theories are not descriptive but predictive. This insight is surprisingly echoed by many twentieth century philosophers of science. The problem with (2) is that it denied Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. There is no strong argument to suggest that primary qualities are relative to perceivers in the way Berkeley suggested. Furthermore, ideas as things perceived must be caused, and should be accounted for by another ground. Berkeley denied that they are caused by external objects and argued that they are caused by God. There are also other arguments (including the master argument) for the thesis *esse est percipi*, but each faces serious difficulties. In general, this thesis is ill founded, and does not constitute the defence of common sense against scepticism that Berkeley intended it to be. Nevertheless, it is of deep philosophical interest. Berkeley's direct object is to deny the existence of anything unknowable behind the perceived corporeal world. His sensing should be understood not as my accidental sensing, but as sensing as such. We might be able to think coherently of a table as not seen by this or that man, but difficulties arise if we try to think of it as not seen at all. Modern phenomenism moves from the actual perceptions of God at the basis of Berkeley's account to the possible perceptions that we would have in appropriate circumstances as crucial to our account of objects.

"For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them." - Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1. 3.

Essence

[from Latin; *esse*, to be, a translation of Greek; *ousia* or, more properly, *to ti en einai*, what it was for a thing to be, in an attempt to retain a relation with the term to be | Aristotle introduced the phrase *to ti en einai*. Instead of using the present tense *esti* (is), the Greek expression uses the philosophical imperfect *en* (was), which implies something remaining or eternal, although this implication is interpreted variably. Aristotle's ontology begins with being and proceeds

理对象都是各种观念的联结,它不能自身存在。不过,在这个论证中,对前提(1)和(2)是有争论的。前提(1)带来的问题是,它否认了基础实体和表面偶性的传统区分。巴克莱试图驳斥实体或基质的概念,但除了对洛克的粗浅说明所作的反驳外,他并没有取得确切的成功。而且,他那个时代物理学所取得的成就似乎与他的论点相反。物理学证明,外界事物只有其内在的性质,并且是物理学规律的基础。为反对这一观点,巴克莱论证说,科学理论不是描述性的,而是论断性的。这一见解令人惊奇地得到了许多20世纪科学哲学家的响应。前提(2)带来的问题是,它否认了洛克关于第一性的质和第二性的质的区分。没有任何有力的论证表明第一性的质是以巴克莱所提出的方式与知觉者相关的。此外,观念作为被知觉到的东西,必定是被引起的,因而应当用其他的根据来说明。巴克莱否认观念是被外界对象引起的,并证明说,观念是由上帝引起的。对于“存在就是被感知”这一论点还有其他一些证明(包括“主论证”),但是,每一证明都面临严重的困难。一般而言,这个论点是站不住的,而且它没有很好地捍卫常识以反对怀疑主义,这本是巴克莱打算让它起的作用。不过,这个论点仍然有深刻的哲学意味。巴克莱的直接目的是否认被知觉的有形世界后面有任何不可知的东西存在。他的“感知”不应被理解成“我的偶然的感知”,而应理解成“感知本身”。我们或许可以合乎条理地想像一张桌子未被这个或那个人看到,但是我们若试图想像桌子根本未被看到,困难就出现了。近代现象论放弃了以巴克莱的说明为基础的上帝实际知觉论,而采取了一种可能知觉论,即在适当条件下,我们具有对于说明对象至关重要的可能知觉。

“因为所谓不思想的事物完全与它的被感知无关而有绝对的存在,似乎是完全无法理解的。它们的存在就是被感知,它们不可能在知觉它们的心灵或能思维的东西之外获得存在。”——巴克莱:《人类知识原理》,第一章,第3节。

本质

[源自拉丁词 *esse* (是), 对希腊词 *ousia*, 或更确切地说, 对 *to ti en einai* (希腊文, “一物之是其所是”) 的翻译, 旨在保留它与系词“是”的联系] *to ti en einai* 一词是由亚里士多德引入的。该术语没有用“是”的现在时 (*esti*), 却用了哲学的过去时 *en* (曾是); 它表示某种持久的、永恒的东西, 虽然对这一含义的解释颇有分歧。亚里士多德的本体论始自“是”, 进

to what it is, to substance (primary being) and finally to essence, which is primary substance identical to form. The expression *to ti en einai* is derived from the formal structure of a question asking for a definition. Thus, essence is the ontological correlate and primary object of definition. Traditionally essence is taken to be a common nature shared by things of a certain kind, with the function of essence being to identify species membership or to place individuals into a species. But there are also many passages in Aristotle suggesting that essence and form as primary substance is particular. This gives rise to much controversy about how to understand the ontological status of essence. In general, essence is the property of a thing without which the thing could not be what it is. As essential property, it is distinguished from accidental properties.

"What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence." Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1029b15.

Essential occurrence, see vacuous occurrence

Essential property, see accidental property

Essentialism

The doctrine that among the properties which a thing *X* possesses, we can distinguish between its essential properties and its accidental properties. According to this view, some of the properties of *X* form its essence, while the remaining properties are accidental. According to different kinds of essentialism, an essential property makes *X* the individual it is, the kind of thing it is or a member of its kind. Essential properties are revealed by a real definition, although it is disputed whether there can be definitions either of individuals or of particular essences. Essentialism originated from Parmenides, Plato and especially Aristotle, but has been in decline since the criticisms of British empiricism beginning in the seventeenth century. It was revived in the middle of this century and is represented in particular by Kripke. Contemporary essentialism claims that some properties of an object are essential to it and that so long as it existed the object could not fail to have them. If essence is inherent in things, then there are necessary truths about objects and their properties (necessity *de re*). Essentialism is focused on the relationship between essence and individual identity as well as on the relationship between essence and kinds. It is closely related to the causal theory of reference and the theory of modality in terms of possible worlds. Various versions of anti-essentialism claim that the notion of essence is trivial or that we are never in a position to specify what properties of a thing are essential or accidental. Popper refers to essentialism as the view that the aim of science is to provide explana-

展到“是什么”，然后到本体（第一意义的“是”），最后到本质。本质乃是第一本体，等同于形式。*to ti en einai* 这一表述是从寻求定义的问题形式结构中得出来的。故本质是定义的本体论相关物，是定义的第一对象。在传统上，本质被认为是为一类事物所共有的共同性质，故本质的功能是认同属的成员资格，或把个别放入一个属中。可亚里士多德在许多地方都主张，本质和形式作为第一本体是特殊的。于是，这便引起了关于如何理解本质的本体论地位的许多争论。一般而言，本质是这样一种属性，没有它，一物便不可能是它原来所是的样子。作为本质属性，它区分于偶然属性。

“你是什么，就你的本性而言，乃是你的本质。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，1029b15。

实现

见“空现”条。

本质性质

见“偶然性质”条。

本质主义

这种主张认为，在一事物 *X* 所具有的那些性质中，我们能够区分出它的本质属性和它的偶然属性。根据这种观点，*X* 的某些性质构成它的本质，而余下的性质则是它偶有的。在不同类型的本质主义看来，本质属性使得 *X* 成为它所是的那个个体，它所是的事物类型，或者它的类型的一个元素。真实定义揭示本质属性，尽管是否能够有对个体或对特殊本质的定义这一点是有争议的。本质主义起源于巴门尼德，柏拉图，特别是亚里士多德，但自从 17 世纪的英国经验论对它进行批评以来它一直处于衰败过程中。在本世纪中叶它得到复兴，特别是以克里普克为代表。当代本质主义宣称，一对象的某些性质对于它是本质的，只要该对象存在着，它就不能不具有这些性质。如果本质是内在于事物的，那么就存在着关于对象及其性质的必然真理（从物的必然性）。本质主义集中关注本质和个体同一性之间以及本质和类型之间的关系。它与指称的因果理论以及根据可能世界解释模态词的理论密切相关。各种版本的反本质主义断言，本质概念是不足道的，或者我们永远不能阐明一事物的哪些性质是本质的或偶有的。波普把本质主义说成是这样一种观点：科学的目标就是根据事物及其性质去提供解释，但这些解释本身不容许任何进一步的解释。

“从柏拉图主义的角度来理解，本质主义的最基本的观点是，有些事物本质性地拥有它们

tions in terms of things and properties which are not themselves susceptible of any further explanation.

"Understood Platonistically, essentialism holds, at the very least, that some things have some of their properties essentially." —Slote, *Metaphysics and Essence*, 1974, p. 5.

Estrangement, see alienation

Eternal recurrence

Nietzsche held that the world is cyclical, with everything that has occurred repeated over again in a process that extends to infinity. In eternal recurrence, the simplest forms strive towards the most complex, and then the most complex returns to the simple starting point. The world oscillates between these extremes in a never-ending cycle. This idea, which is influenced by Heraclitus and other Greek philosophers, was presented by Nietzsche to be his fundamental conception. He characterised himself as the teacher of eternal recurrence. This position is certainly not merely a cosmological theory. It is intended to banish all teleology from our account of the world and to reject all views that the world develops in a linear manner towards some final and perfect end. Further, it establishes the grounds for the claim that all purposes, aims and means are only different modes expressing a single principle inherent in the world, that is the will to power. Rather than being pessimistic, belief in the idea of eternal recurrence shows willingness for life to extend eternally, against the ascetic ideal. On this view, the meaningful is repeated eternally, and life is not consigned to a meaningless eternity. With Nietzsche's emphasis on striving, the valued life is seen as a process of living rather than as a fixed state.

"Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and we have already existed an eternal number of times, and all things with us." —Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III, 13, 2.

Eternal sentence

A sentence whose truth or falsity is fixed once and for all, without regard to the passage of time, the varying of circumstances and the speaker. If it is true, it is true forever; if it is false, it is false forever. Examples of this sort of sentence include laws of mathematics, of logic, and of nature, as well as reports of passing events. A proposition is said to be the meaning of a sentence, but strictly speaking, it is the cognitive meaning of an eternal sentence.

"By incorporating additional information into the sentence such as dates and the names of persons and places, we can obtain an eternal sentence: one that is fixedly true or false." —Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 139.

的某些属性。”——斯洛特:《形而上学与本质》, 1974年,第5页。

疏远

见“异化”条。

永恒轮回

尼采认为世界是循环的,每个已经发生了的事物都会在一个无限延伸的过程之中不断地重复出现。在永恒轮回中,最简单的形式努力趋向最复杂的,然后最复杂的又返回到最简单的起点。这世界在一个绝无终端的循环中摆动于这些极端之间。这个观念受到赫拉克利特和其他古希腊哲学家们的影响。尼采将它表达为自己的基本概念,并将自己说成是关于永恒轮回的教师。这种观点当然不只是一种宇宙论的理论,它意在清除掉我们对于世界的说法中的所有目的论,也就是拒绝一切认为世界在以直线方式朝向某个最后的完美的终极发展的观点。进一步,它提供了根据认为一切目的、终端及手段都只是表达一条内在于世界的单一原则的种种不同样式。这一原则即是权力意志。这种永恒轮回的信念不是悲观主义的,相反,它表现出要让生命永恒地延续并反对苦行理念的意愿。按照这个观点,富于意义的状态被永恒地重复,生命并没有被交付给一个无意义的永恒。由于尼采对于奋斗的强调,具有价值的生活被视为一个生机勃勃的过程,而不是一种固定的状态。

“注意,我们知道你教导的东西:所有的事物都永恒地再现,包括我们自己。我们已经在无数时代中生存过,并伴随着所有的事物。”——尼采:《查拉图斯特拉如是说》,第3卷,第13节,第2段。

永恒句子

这种句子的真假是被一劳永逸地确定了的,无须考虑时间的推移以及环境与说话者的变化。它一旦为真,即永远为真;一旦为假,即永远为假。这种句子的例证包括数学规则、逻辑规律、自然法则,以及对过去事件的报道。一个命题可以被说成是一个句子的意义,但严格地说,它是永恒句子的认识意义。

“通过把诸如日期、人名和地名等附加信息合并进句子,我们就可以得到永恒句子,即真假得到确定的句子。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性和其他论文》,1969年,第139页。

Eternal Thou

A term for God used by Martin Buber in *I and Thou*, in contrast to a human and temporal Thou. God, as the eternal Thou, is the grounds of all I-Thou relations, but is not merely an abstract power. According to Buber, we can meet Him in the concrete reality of the divine presence. God is inherent or implicit within the scope of human life. Our relation to God is an extension of the human I-Thou relation. The eternal Thou can never be limited by another Thou, and its nature prevents it from ever becoming an it. With this term, Buber hoped to clarify what people mean in using the term "God" and to indicate how God can be reached.

"In every sphere in its own way, through each process of becoming that is present to us, we look out toward the eternal Thou, in each we are aware of a breath from the eternal Thou; in each Thou we address the eternal Thou." —Buber, *I and Thou* (tr. by Kaufman), 1970, p. 6.

Eternity

One of the divine attributes, which has been interpreted in two different ways. According to the first, God is eternal by not being bound by time. He exists outside of or beyond time. He is timeless but is the creator of time. Since he is not in time, all events occurring in time are for him simultaneous. While our 'now' designates changing time and sempiternity, God's 'now' is abiding, unmoved, and immovable. It makes no sense to ask how long God has existed or to divide up his life into periods of time. Although this understanding of eternity can account for God's foreknowledge, immutability and immortality, it creates a paradox. If the Trojan War and my writing this entry are simultaneous for God, these two events must be simultaneous. But how can they be? Further, if our experience is essentially temporal, it does not seem to make sense to take the content of this experience non-temporally. According to the second interpretation, God has temporality, that is a past, present and future, but is eternal because he has always existed in the past, exists at present, and will always exist in the future. Eternity amounts to the totality of time. This understanding of eternity cannot account for God's being the creator of time and his immutability. Many philosophers reserve eternity for existence outside of time and use everlasting for existence throughout time. On either interpretation, God's eternity implies that he is free from those imperfections that make the passage of time for us a matter of regret.

"To say that God is eternal is to say that he is not in time." —Helm, *Eternal God*, 1988, p. 23.

Ethical individualism

The position that only individual persons are the subject of moral predicates and values and are the central object of

永恒的你

M. 布伯在《我与你》中用来表达上帝的一个词,与人类的和暂时的你相对而言。上帝作为永恒的你,是所有我一你关系的根据,但不只是一个抽象的力量。按照布伯的主张,我们能在神圣在场的具体现实中遇见他(Him)。上帝内在于或隐藏在人类生活的境域之中。我们与上帝的关系是人类之间的我一你关系的延伸。这永恒的你绝不会被另一个你限制住,其本性就使之不会成为一个“它”。通过这个词(即“永恒的你”),布伯希望澄清人们使用“上帝”这个词时意味着什么,并表明如何能与上帝相遇。

“在每一个有自己特性的领域内,通过每一个我们遇到的生成过程,我们寻觅着这永恒的你,感受到这永恒的你的气息。在每一个你那里,我们向永恒的你发话。”——布伯:《我与你》(考夫曼英译),1970年,第6页。

永恒

“神性”之一,有两种不同意义的解释。按第一种解释,上帝永恒指不受时间限制、他存在于时间之外或超越时间。他是超时间的,却是时间的创造者。既然他不在时间中,那么,在时间中发生的一切事情对他来说都是同时的。当我们的“现在”暗含变化的时间和永久时,上帝的“现在”是持续的、不动的、不变的。追问上帝存在了多久,或把他的生命分割成若干时期,都是毫无意义的。虽然对永恒的这种理解能够说明上帝的先知先觉以及他的不变性和不朽性,但也产生了悖论。如果特洛伊战争和我写下这个词条对上帝来说是同时的,这两个事件就必定同时。但是,它们怎么能够同时呢?再者,如果我们的经验本质上是暂时的,那么,非暂时地把握这种经验的内含真意似乎就没有意义。按第二种解释,上帝具有时间性,即过去、现在和将来,但他又是永恒的,因为他总是在过去存在,现在存在,将来也总会存在。永恒相当于时间的总体。对永恒的这种理解不能说明上帝是时间的创造者和他的不变性。许多哲学家都把“永恒”留给时间之外的存在,而用“永久”来称谓时间中的存在。无论哪种解释,上帝的永恒都蕴含着,他没有我们无法免除的那样一些缺陷,即使得时间的推移成为遗憾的问题。

“说上帝永恒也就是说他不在时间中。”——赫尔蒙:《永恒的上帝》,1988年,第23页。

伦理个人主义

这个观点认为,只有个体的人才是道德谓项和价值的主体,是道德考虑的中心所在,根据

moral concern. On this view, the choice of moral values is up to the individual, and the individual should be the final authority and arbiter of morality. This position is implied by the suggestion of Hume's fact-value dichotomy that moral evaluations are not constrained by factual descriptions of the world. Ethical individualism became prominent in the nineteenth century through the criticism of Christianity as a basis for morality in the works of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In the twentieth century, it is represented by existentialism, which holds that the individual is the only legislator of his or her morality, and by emotivism and prescriptivism, which claim that morality is nothing more than the expression of personal attitudes.

"According to this doctrine [of ethical individualism], the source of morality, of moral values and principles, the creator of the very concern of moral evaluation, is the individual." Lukes, *Individualism*, 1973, p. 101.

Ethical knowledge

Also called moral knowledge. Knowledge of moral truths or principles from which moral prescriptions can be derived, but it is a matter of dispute whether there is such a kind of knowledge. Relativism, scepticism and nihilism reject the existence of moral knowledge by denying that there are moral facts or moral truths to be known. Non-objective moral theorists hold that moral language expresses only sentiments, approval or disapproval or other emotional attitudes without involving truths. They claim that ethical problems are in principle insoluble and that ethical statements are incapable of being true or false. Other philosophers insist on the existence of moral knowledge, but must explain how we can recognise a complete and correct set of rules for human conduct. On this basis, some philosophers suggest that general moral rules can be derived from reason, according to Kantian ethical rationalism, or by intuition, according to ethical intuitionism. Other moralists argue that we may start from particular moral facts and move up to wider principles, as in Ross's intuitive induction and the common sense theory. Another problem is how to justify a moral belief or how to change moral belief into knowledge. Many disputes arise from using both foundationalism and coherentism to justify moral views. The attempts to support the possibility of moral knowledge by showing how we can establish and justify moral truths provide the content of moral epistemology.

"In the last decade or two serious doubts about the very possibility of ethical knowledge have become widespread." Baylis, *Ethics*, 1958, p. 4.

Ethical life

[German: *Sittlichkeit*, also called ethical order or ethical principles] For Hegel, the system of recognised ethical norms and principles of a culture and society, which consti-

这种观点,道德评价的选择取决于个人。个人应是道德的终极性权威和裁定者。这个观点为休谟的事实与价值的二分说所隐含。这个二分说认为,道德评价不为对这个世界的事实性描述所制约。在19世纪,伦理个人主义由于尼采和克尔凯郭尔的著作批评把基督教作为道德的基础而兴盛。在20世纪,它的代表是存在主义及情感主义和规定主义。存在主义相信,个人是他的或她的道德的惟一立法者,情感主义和规定主义主张,道德不过是个人态度的表达而已。

"根据这个(伦理个人主义)学说,道德的来源、道德价值和原则的来源、道德评价核心观念的创造者是人。"——鲁克斯:《个人主义》,1973年,第101页。

伦理知识

也称“道德知识”。道德规定能从关于道德真理或原则的知识中得到,可是否有这样一种知识却是有争议的问题。相对主义、怀疑主义和虚无主义通过否定有可知的道德事实或道德真理而否定道德知识的存在。非客观主义的道德理论也相信道德语言表达的只是情感、赞成或反对,或其他的情感态度而没有涉及到真理。他们认为,伦理问题在原则上是不能解决的,伦理陈述既不能是真的也不能是假的。其他的哲学家坚决认为有道德知识的存在,但必须解释我们怎样才能认识到一套对于人类的行为而言的完全而又正确的人类行为规则。在这方面,某些哲学家认为,普遍的道德规则能从理性(如康德的伦理理性主义)或直觉(如伦理的直觉主义)中引申出来。其他的伦理学家则认为,我们也许可从具体的道德事实出发,而达到较宽广的原则(如罗斯的直觉归纳法和常识理论)。另一个问题是,怎样证明一种道德信念的合理性,或者怎样将一种道德信念变为知识。许多争论之所以产生,是因为既以基础论又以连贯论来证明道德观点的合理性。通过说明我们如何能建立和说明道德真理而支持道德知识可能性的种种努力,提供了道德知识论的内容。

"在最近一二十年内,对于道德知识真正可能性的严重的怀疑变得很普遍了。"——贝莱兹:《伦理学》,1958年,第4页。

伦理生活

[德语词: *Sittlichkeit*, 也称为伦理秩序或伦理原则]对黑格尔来说,公认的文化和社会伦理规范和原则的体系,构成了它的所有成员的

tutes a communal end for all of its members and which all members recognise and accept. Individuals can guarantee their freedom and happiness by conforming to this system of ethical norms. It is not purely transcendent and is not merely a social substance of which individuals are accidents. Hegel's paradigm of ethical life in this sense is Greek culture. The concept of ethical life is distinguished from *Moralität*, which for Hegel is typified by Kantian ethics and concerns the individual and private morality of the modern bourgeoisie who are alienated from public life. In *Sittlichkeit*, one's duty is derived from one's relations to the concrete social order. It is the morality of a social order whose rational institutions and laws provide the content of conscientious conviction. In ethical life, moral sense and social sense are unified. Hegel claims that in *Moralität* they are severed, for in this abstract morality one's duty is derived from one's own abstract moral reflection and not from relations to a concrete social order. Thus, the distinction between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität* reflects the difference between Hegel's ethics and Kant's ethics. In modern society, ethical life is characterised by civil society.

"Ethical life is the idea of freedom in that on the one hand it is the good become alive—the good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing and actualised by self-conscious action—while on the other hand self-consciousness has in the ethical realm its absolute foundation and the end which actuates its effort." —Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, III, 142.

Ethical naturalism, see naturalistic ethics

Ethical objectivism

In contrast to ethical subjectivism, scepticism and relativism, ethical objectivism or objectivistic ethics argues that ethical judgements are not about the speaker or solely about the speaker and holds that at least some ethical judgements are concerned with moral facts and can be rationally justified. They are true or false independent of subjective matters such as the speaker's own feelings, desires, attitudes and beliefs. Ethical objectivism has many versions. Ethical logicism claims that the truth value of ethical judgements can be determined by logical rules. Ethical intuitionism holds that ethical generalisations are obtained by insight. Moral sense theories hold that we can gain knowledge through the perception of the difference between right and wrong just as we can gain knowledge through the perception of the difference between red and blue. Theological theories argue that God provides an objective criterion of what is right or wrong. Ethical naturalism holds that ethical judgements can be based on some scientific, empirical investigation of the natural or social world. According to Ideal Observer theories, ethical judge-

公共目的和所有成员公认和接受的东西。个人能通过遵守这个伦理规范体系而保证他们的自由和幸福。它并非纯粹地是超验的东西,也不单纯是以个人作为偶性的社会本体。黑格尔在这个意义上的伦理生活的模式是古希腊文化。伦理生活的概念不同于道德,在黑格尔看来,道德具有康德伦理学所刻画的特征,关注那些与公共生活相异化的近代有产阶级的个人和私人的道德。在伦理生活中,人们的责任来自人们对具体社会秩序的关系。正是社会秩序的道德,其理性的制度和法则提供了意识确信的内容。在伦理生活中,道德感和社会感得到了统一。黑格尔认为,在〔康德意义的〕道德中,道德感和社会感是分离的,因为在这种抽象的道德中,人们的责任来自人们自己的抽象的道德反思,而不是来自对具体社会秩序的关系。这样,伦理生活和道德之间的区别反映了黑格尔伦理学和康德伦理学之间的差异。在现代社会中,伦理生活具有市民社会的特征。

“伦理生活是自由的理念,在此理念中,一方面它正是那个成为活生生的善——这个善在自我意识中被赋予认识和意志,并通过自我意识的行动而达到它的现实性——另一方面自我意识在伦理王国中具有它的绝对基础和激励其努力行动的目的。”——黑格尔:《法哲学》,Ⅲ,142节。

伦理自然主义

见“自然主义伦理学”条。

伦理客观主义

与“伦理主观主义”、“伦理怀疑主义”和“伦理相对主义”相对立,伦理客观主义或客观主义伦理学认为,伦理判断不是有关说者的,或者不仅仅是有关说者的,并且认为,至少某些伦理判断涉及到事实,能够得到合理论证。它们的真假独立于诸如感情、欲望、态度、信念等主观的东西。伦理客观主义有许多形式。伦理逻辑主义主张,伦理判断的真值可以为逻辑规则所决定;伦理直觉主义认为,伦理的普遍性准则可以通过顿悟来获得;道德感理论认为,我们能够通过看出正当与错误的不同而获得正当与错误的知识,正如我们能够通过看出红与蓝的不同而获得红与蓝的知识一样;神学理论相信,上帝为判断正当与错误提供了一个客观的标准;伦理自然主义认为,伦理判断能够以对自然界和人类社会的某些科学的经验研究为基础;理想的观察者理论主张,伦理判断是有关某种“理想”的存在者可决定的某种东西——如果这种人存在的话。所有形式的伦理客观主义的共同困难

ments are about what some ideal being would determine if such a being existed. The common difficulty for all forms of ethical objectivism is to justify the source of objectivity and hence the existence of objective moral values.

"To be an (ethical) objectivist is to hold that whether something is or is not morally right is independent of the attitudes or inclinations of any particular speaker or set of speakers." — Mitchell, *Morality: Religious and Secular*, 1985, p. 32.

Ethical rationalism

A term describing Kantian moral theory and its claim that moral judgements are purely rational and do not concern the emotions or the development of character. Ethical rationalism is a formal and universalist position. It is related to ethical cognitivism, which believes that morality has cognitive elements instead of being a matter of personal attitude and preference.

"By 'ethical rationalism', by contrast, I mean a theoretical position which views moral judgements as the core of moral theory, and which neglects that the moral self is not a moral geometrician but as embodied, finite, suffering and emotive being." — Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, 1992, p. 50.

Ethical relativism

The view that ethical terms and principles are relative to cultures, societies, and even persons. There are different ethical judgements about the same subject, and there is no decisive method of reasoning that can adjudicate between these conflicting judgements. Accordingly, there is no objective ethical truth. Moral principles are not valid universally, and can do no more than follow the conventions of the societies to which we belong. The position can be traced to the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras and has subsequently had various proponents. Ethical relativism may be used to justify moral tolerance, but it has major theoretical difficulties. Its claim that all conflicting moral judgements have equal values is implausible. Furthermore, even if moral values are relative to societies, problems still arise. A given society may lack consistency in its principles. In addition, individuals may belong to different societies or other collective groups, such as families, communities, political parties or nations, which may adhere to conflicting principles.

"A Greek philosopher who lived in the fifth century BC, named Protagoras, seems to have believed two things: first, that moral principles cannot be shown to be valid for everybody; and second, that people ought to follow the conventions of their own group... Views roughly similar to those of Protagoras may be classified as forms of ethical relativism." — Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 271.

在于证明客观性的来源问题，因而也是客观道德价值的存在问题。

“成为一个伦理客观主义者就是主张，某物在道德上是否正确，独立于任何个别说者或一群说者的态度或偏爱。”——米切尔：《道德：宗教和世俗》，1985年，第32页。

伦理理性主义

一个用来描述康德的道德理论及其主张的术语。这种主张认为，道德判断是纯粹理性的，与感情和性格发展无关。伦理理性主义是一种规范的、具有普遍性的见解。它与伦理认识主义相关，后者认为道德具有认识的因素，而不是个人的态度和偏好的问题。

“相反，我用‘伦理理性主义’指的是这样一种理论上的主张，即把道德判断视为道德理论的核心，并且无视那种认为道德本身不是一个道德几何学家而是作为具体的、有限的、苦难的和感情上的存在物的观点。”——本哈比：《自我安置》，1992年，第50页。

伦理相对主义

这一理论认为，伦理术语和伦理原则是相对于文化、社会甚至个人的。关于同一个问题有不同的伦理判断，没有决定性的推理方法能够裁决这些冲突性的判断。因此，没有客观的伦理真理。道德原则不是普遍有效的，只能遵循我们所在的社会的习俗。这个观点可以追溯到古代希腊的普罗泰戈拉，在哲学史上，有许多提倡者。伦理相对主义也被用来说明道德宽容的合理性，但它有不少重大的理论困难。它声称所有冲突着的道德判断有同等的价值，但这是难于接受的。再者，即使道德价值是相对于社会的，问题仍然存在。一个给定的社会或许欠缺其道德原则的一致性。此外，个人可以属于不同的社会或其他的集合体（如家庭、社团、政党、国家），这些不同的团体和社会会持有相冲突的原则。

“一个生活在公元前5世纪的名叫普罗泰戈拉的哲学家，似乎相信两件事情，第一，道德原则不能被证明对每一个人都是有效的；第二，人们应当遵循他们自己社团的习俗和常规。……各种与普罗泰戈拉的这些观点大致相似的观点也许可以归为伦理相对主义的诸形式。”——布朗特：《伦理理论》，1959年，第271页。

Ethical subjectivism

In contrast to ethical objectivism, ethical subjectivism or subjective ethics claims that ethical judgements are about the speaker's feelings concerning something rather than about independent moral facts. In calling an action right, speakers state that they approve of it. In calling an action wrong, speakers state that they disapprove of it. Consequently, there are no moral truths independent of our feelings. This kind of approach to moral philosophy is explicitly expressed by Hume, who argued that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason. Ethical subjectivism is right in emphasising the connection in morality between the meaning of "good" and the pro attitude of the speaker, but it also faces many difficulties. A person's feelings are changeable, and different persons may have different feelings. Thus, subjectivism makes moral evaluation unstable and also makes moral disagreements insoluble. In this century, more refined versions of ethical subjectivism have been introduced, such as Stevenson's emotivism, Hare's prescriptivism and John Dewey's theory that moral statements do not express one's feelings *per se*, but rather express one's feelings after thinking things through. In a further refinement, it is claimed that one should think as reasonably and impartially as possible. Subjectivism hence has developed into noncognitivism or non-descriptivism.

"The best course is therefore to retain the term 'subjectivist' for those who think that moral judgements state facts about the states of mind etc. of person, and use some new term ('non-descriptivist' is the most perspicuous) for those who don't think that their central function is to state facts at all." —Hare, *Essays in Ethical Theory*, 1989, p. 34.

Ethical theory

Used by Bernard Williams as a technical term, opposed to the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics. According to this distinction, ethics concerns what one should do and how one should live, while meta-ethics concerns the status of ethical claims. They are separable and meta-ethics may involve only the analysis of ethical terms without ethical implications. For Williams this distinction is untenable. An ethical theory should combine both parts which are inherently not separable. The consideration of the subject-matter of ethics will affect the position about what tests for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles are appropriate, and this will in turn affect substantively ethical consequences. Ethical theory can be either positive or negative. A positive one believes that there is a general test for the acceptability of basic ethical principles, while a negative one thinks that holding an ethical position simply consists of choosing one and sticking to it. Williams himself takes a more complicated version of negative ethical theory which ar-

伦理主观主义

相对于伦理客观主义, 伦理主观主义或主观主义的伦理学认为, 伦理判断是关于说者对某物的感情, 而不是关于独立的道德事实的。称一种行为是正当的, 说者是在表明他们赞成它; 称一种行为是错的, 说者是在表明他们不赞成它。因此, 没有独立于我们感情的道德真理。这种道德哲学为休谟所明确表达, 他论证说, 道德是一种感情而不是理性的事情。伦理主观主义在强调“善”的意义与说者的倾向态度在道德中的关联是对的, 但它也有许多困难。一个人的感情是可变的, 不同的人也许有不同的感情。因此, 主观主义使得道德评价不能稳固, 也使得道德分歧不能解决。在20世纪, 伦理主观主义有许多更精致的版本, 如斯蒂文森的“情感主义”、黑尔的“规定主义”和J. 杜威的理论。杜威主张, 道德陈述表达的不是一个人的感情本身, 而是一个人对事物思考后的感情。从这以后有一个进一步的修正, 其大意是, 一个人应尽可能合理公正地思考。因而主观主义发展成为非认知主义和非规定主义。

“最好是把‘主观主义’一名留给那些认为道德判断表达的是个人精神状态等事实的人, 而对那些认为道德词汇的主要功能根本不是对任何事实的陈述的人使用新名(‘非规定主义’是最适当的词),”——黑尔, 《伦理论文集》, 1989年, 第34页。

伦理理论

被B. 威廉姆斯用作一个专用术语, 与“伦理学”和“元伦理学”两者的区分相对。依据这种区分, 伦理学关涉一个人应当做什么和怎样生活的问题, 而元伦理学关涉伦理主张的地位问题。两者是可以分开的, 而元伦理学也许只涉及到没有伦理意义的伦理词的分析。对于威廉姆斯来说, 这个区分是站不住脚的。一个伦理理论应当结合两者, 它们是内在不可分割的。对于伦理学主题的考虑将影响到有关如下问题的观点: 对于基本伦理信念和原则的正确性而言, 什么样的检验是适当的。这反过来又将实质上影响到伦理后果。伦理理论既可是积极的也可是消极的, 一种积极的伦理理论相信, 对于基本伦理原则的可接受性, 有一种一般性的检验标准, 而消极的伦理理论则认为, 持有一种伦理观点就在于选择了它并坚持下去。威廉姆斯自己持有消极的伦理理论的一种更复杂的观点, 这种观点认为, 在某种文化环境里, 也许有检验标

gues that there may be tests in some cultural circumstances and not in others. He claims that his position implies a scepticism, not about ethics, but about what philosophy can do in determining how we should think in ethics.

"An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethics thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 72.

Ethical virtue

[from Greek; *ethike arete*, also translated as moral virtue or excellence of character] According to Aristotle, the kind of virtue which belongs to the part of the soul which is not rational in itself but which obeys reason. In contrast, intellectual virtue is the virtue of the rational part of the soul. Ethical virtue is concerned with feelings and actions. It is a settled disposition of character willingly to do things admired by society in a regular way and is acquired through constant practice that creates a habit of action. Aristotle held that ethical virtue is a mean between two opposite vices. The mean is relative to us, that is to say it is to be determined by practical wisdom. Aristotle tried to bring all ethical virtues under the doctrine of the mean. Practical wisdom is itself an intellectual virtue, but according to Aristotle it cannot be a full virtue without ethical virtues. He also held that ethical virtues cannot be full virtues without practical wisdom.

"[Ethical] virtue is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, i. e. to the reason by reference to which the person of practical wisdom would define it." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a1-3.

Ethics, axiological, see axiology

Ethics, emotive theory of, an alternative expression for emotivism

Ethics, intuitionistic

Also called ethical intuitionism. One kind of objective ethical theory which has a long tradition in Britain. Its major proponents have included Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard and Ross. In a general sense, it is a thesis concerning the epistemological status of moral statements and claims that ethical knowledge is known to be true by immediate awareness or necessary insight. This position is established mainly through the rejection of alternative positions. It argues against moral scepticism, which holds that there is no moral truth. It denies the practice of defining basic ethical terms such as "good" and

准,而在其他的文化环境中则没有。他主张,他的观点隐含着一种怀疑主义,不是关于伦理学的,而是关于在决定我们应当如何思考伦理学这方面,对于哲学能做什么的怀疑。

"一种伦理理论是对伦理学思考什么和实践什么的一种理论性的解说,这种解说或是隐含着一种对于基本的伦理信念的正确性的一般性的检验标准,或是也隐含着不可能有这样一种检验标准。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第72页。

伦理德性

[源自希腊文 *ethike arete*, 也译作“道德德性”或“优秀品格”] 亚里士多德认为,这一类德性属于灵魂的那一个自身不是理性的可却服从理性的部分。与此相对的是“理智德性”,即灵魂的理性部分的德性。伦理德性涉及到感情和行为。它是一种固定的品格倾向,自愿经常地做为社会所敬重的事。它的获得是通过不断的实践而养成某种行为习惯。亚里士多德认为,伦理德性是两种相反的恶之间的中庸。中庸是相对于我们的,即是说,是由实践智慧决定的。亚里士多德力图把所有伦理德性都统一于其中庸学说中。实践智慧自身是一种理智德性,可根据亚里士多德,如果没有伦理德性它便不可能是一完满的德性。他还认为,伦理德性没有实践智慧也不可能是完满的德性。

"[伦理]德性是一种决定状态,在于一种中庸,相对于我们的中庸;它是通过理性而定义的,即那种通过它具有实践智慧的人会定义中庸的理性。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1107a1-3。

价值论伦理学

见“价值论”条。

伦理学的情感理论

“情感主义”的另一种表述。

直觉主义伦理学

也称伦理学的直觉主义,是一种客观主义伦理学,在英国历史上有悠久的传统。它的主要提倡者包括沙夫茨伯利、哈奇森、B. 巴特勒、里德、西奇威克、摩尔、普里查德、罗斯等。就它的一般意义而言,这是一种涉及到道德陈述的认识论地位的论点。它主张,伦理知识可通过直接的意识或必然的洞见而为真。这种观点主要是通过对其他观点的拒斥而确立的。它反对那种认为没有任何道德真理的怀疑主义。它否定依据自然性质来界定诸如“善”、“正当”等基本伦理术语的作法。在它看来,主张伦理普遍概括

"right" in terms of natural properties. It claims that the position that ethical generalisation is a process of ratiocination involves an infinite regress or a vicious circle. Accordingly, fundamental moral judgements must be neither inductively nor deductively justified, and they must be self-evident. In a narrow sense, ethical intuitionism is the view that we can immediately know that certain actions are morally right or wrong without consideration of their consequences.

Ethical intuitionism is also called *nonnaturalism* in the sense that it is opposed to the claim of naturalism that we know the truth or falsity of ethical statements by experience. However, since both intuitionism and naturalism claim that there is ethical knowledge, both are types of moral cognitivism and are opposed to noncognitivism. It is sometimes associated with ethical pluralism, which holds that there are more than one non-reducible moral principles. Rawls sees this as allowing unacceptable indeterminacy in ethics, but others embrace the flexibility such pluralism provides. The difficulty of intuitionistic ethics is that there are no criteria for checking the validity of our intuitions, and for solving the conflicts between intuitions.

"The intuitional view of ethics consists in the supposition that certain rules, stating that certain actions are always to be done or to be omitted, may be taken as self-evident premises." —Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 148.

Ethics, normative

A type of ethics, usually contrasted with meta-ethics. Its central concern is not with moral concepts or moral methods, but with substantive moral questions. Its basic aim is to determine what the moral principles are by which all moral agents ought to be guided for morally right actions, and thus to provide ways of resolving existing ethical disagreements. Normative ethics is usually divided into two parts. One is called consequentialism, which claims that actions are not right or wrong in themselves, but are morally determined by the good or evil consequences they cause. The right action is that which brings about the best possible balance of good over evil consequences. Consequentialist normative ethics includes ethical egoism, contractarianism, ethical altruism and utilitarianism. It is also called teleological ethics. The other part of normative ethics is called non-consequentialist or non-teleological ethics, for it holds that moral right and wrong are not determined, or at least are not solely determined, by appeal to the consequences of actions. Another name for this view is deontology [from Greek, *deon*, duty], since it takes duty to have prior and independent value. The distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics appeared in the early to middle part of this century, but has recently come to be less favoured, for a clear-cut distinction between these two types of ethics is very difficult to determine. Many ethical questions are both meta-ethical and normative.

是一种推论过程的观点犯有无穷后退或恶性循环的错误。因此,对基本道德判断的证明必须既不是归纳的也不是演绎的,它们必须是不证自明的。在它的狭义上,伦理直觉主义是这样一种观点:我们能够直接知道一定的行为在道德上是正当的或是错误的,而不必考虑它的后果。

伦理直觉主义在某种意义上也称为非自然主义,在这个意义上,它相对于认为我们是依靠经验知道伦理陈述的真假这一自然主义立场。不过,由于直觉主义和自然主义二者都宣称有伦理知识,它们两者都是道德认知主义而非认知主义相对立。它有时也与主张有更多的不可化简的道德原则的伦理多元论相联系。罗尔斯把这看作是在伦理学中允许不可接受的不确定性,但其他人则赞许这种多元论提供的灵活性。直觉主义伦理学的困难是,没有标准来检查我们直觉的正当性和解决不同直觉之间的冲突。

"伦理学的直觉观念在于认定,述说一定的行为应当去做或不应做的某些规则可被看作是不证自明的前提。"——摩尔:《伦理学原理》,1903年,第148页。

规范伦理学

伦理学的一种类型,通常与元伦理学相对。它的中心关切不是道德概念或道德方法,而是实质性的道德问题。它的基本目标在于确定道德原则是什么,这些原则指导所有的道德行为者去确立道德上对的行为并提供解决现存的伦理分歧的方法。规范伦理学通常被划分为两个类别。一类被称为效果论,它主张行为本身并无对错之分,而是在道德上由它们所引起的善恶后果所决定的。正当的行为是产生善超过恶的后果的最好可能平衡的行为。效果论的规范伦理学包括伦理利己主义、契约主义、伦理利他主义和功利主义。它也被称为目的论的伦理学。另一类规范伦理学被称为非效果论的或非目的论的伦理学。它认为,道德上的对错不是诉诸于行为的后果决定的或至少不单独为行为的后果所决定。这种观点的另一种名称是"道义论"[这词源自希腊词 *deon*, (意为职责)],因为它把职责看成是有着先在独立的价值。规范伦理学和元伦理学的区分出现在20世纪的早期和中期,但近来已经不再那么时兴了,因为将伦理学清楚地区分为两种类型是非常困难的。许多伦理问题既是元伦理的,又是规范伦理的。

"我们也许可以合理地对伦理陈述提出这样的问题: '什么样的伦理陈述是真的或有效的?' 以及 '为什么?' 一个人对这些问题的回答

"We may reasonably ask about ethical statements, 'Which ethical statements are true or valid?' and 'Why?'. A person's answer to these questions may be called his 'normative ethical theory'." — Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 4.

Ethics and morality

Ethics in Greek is *ēthikos*, literally meaning something concerned with *ēthos* (Greek: character), which in turn is connected with *ethos* (social custom, habit). Cicero employed the Latin *moralis* to translate the Greek *ēthikos*. *Moralis* literally means something concerned with *mores* (Latin: character, manner, custom and habit). Hence, etymologically ethics and morality mean the same thing.

Both ethics and morality can refer to social regulations which are embedded in cultural and historical traditions governing people's character and behaviour. Different societies have different moralities and the same society can have different morality at different times or conflicting moralities at the same time, but the overriding purpose of all moralities is to preserve social harmony.

Both ethics and morality also refer to a branch of philosophy which studies these social regulations, to answer the question "how should a person live?" or "how should a person act?". In this usage, ethics is also called ethical theory, and morality is called moral philosophy or moral theory. This study can be further divided into meta-ethics, that is the study of moral language and central moral terms such as right, duty, obligation, virtue, value and freedom; normative ethics, the establishment of moral principles and rules which people should follow; and applied ethics, the application of moral rules to solve practical issues arising in various social areas.

Starting from the middle of this century, there has been a tendency to distinguish ethics from morality. Morality (and therefore moral theory) is confined to the scope of modern ethical theories such as utilitarianism and deontology which try not only to incorporate diverse rules into a coherent system, but also to set up certain universal rules applicable to all societies. It is closely associated with the emphasis of duty or obligation, a strict demand of responsibility and an impartial concern for the non-instrumental goods of others. On the other hand, ethics is used to cover, in addition, the Aristotelian approach of emphasising the formation of virtues in the agent rather than his actions and is concerned with the happiness of agents rather than their duty or obligation. Such a distinction between ethics and morality is associated with the rise of contemporary virtue ethics and of the anti-theory movement. The value of the distinction is still in dispute.

"From now on, therefore, I shall for the most part use 'ethical' as the broad term to stand for what this subject is

也许可称作他的'规范伦理理论'." 布朗特:《伦理理论》, 1959年, 第4页。

伦理学和道德

"伦理学"一词在希腊文中为 *ēthikos*, 字面的意思是关涉 *ēthos* (希腊词, 意为"品格") 的, 而后者又与 *ethos* (社会习俗、习惯) 相关。西塞罗用 *moralis* 这一拉丁词来译希腊词 *ēthikos*。 *moralis* 的字面意思是与 *mores* (拉丁词, 意为"品格"、"作风"、"风俗"、"习惯") 相关的某种东西。因此, 在词源学上, "伦理学" 和 "道德" ("道德学") 在意义上是同一的。

伦理学和道德都可以指体现在文化和历史传统中的、支配人们的品格和行为的社會規則。不同的社會有不同的道德, 同一個社會在不同的時期有不同的道德, 或在同一時期有相衝突的道德, 但所有道德的最重要的目標是保持社會的和諧。

伦理学和道德也指研究这些社会规则的一个哲学分支, 这一部分哲学要回答: "一个人应当怎样生活?" 或 "一个人应当怎样行动?" 这样的问题。在这一用法上, 伦理学也可称为 "伦理理论", 道德学也可称为 "道德哲学" 或 "道德理论"。它也能进一步划分为 "元伦理学"、"规范伦理学" 和 "应用伦理学"。元伦理学研究道德语言和诸如正当、职责、义务、德性、价值、自由等主要的道德术语; 规范伦理学确立人们应当遵循的道德原则和规则, 应用伦理学应用道德规则去解决不同社会领域中所产生的实践问题。

从20世纪中叶开始, 有一种把伦理与道德区分开来的倾向。"道德" (因此还有道德理论) 被限定于指诸如 "功利主义" 和 "道义论" 这样的现代伦理理论, 它们不仅力图融合不同的道德规则成为一个连贯一致的体系, 而且也力图确立一套可运用于所有社会的普遍性规则。它是与对职责或义务的强调, 对职责的严格要求和对他人的非工具性的善的公正关怀紧密相关的。另一方面, "伦理学" 则用来指亚里士多德主义式的研究方式, 即强调作为主体的德性构成, 而不是他的行为, 关心主体的幸福而不是他的职责或义务。伦理学和道德的这样一种区分是与当代的 "德性伦理学" 和 "反理论" 运动的兴起有关的。对这个区分的价值仍处于争论之中。

"从现在起, 我将主要把 '伦理的' 用作一个宽泛的术语, 代表这一学科所确实关注的事物, 而 '道德的' 和 '道德' 则用来表示一种较窄的系统。" — B. 威廉姆斯: 《伦理学与哲学

certainly about, and 'moral' and 'morality' for the narrower system." Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 6.

Ethics of belief

The study of what we ought to believe, what we have right to believe, or how we can know that what we believe is certain. As ethics seeks to evaluate ethical behaviour, ethics of belief seeks to determine rules for the evaluation of doxastic states. It is called ethics of belief because what we ought to believe is not a private matter, but is a public concern with social consequences, and is hence a matter of morality. Nevertheless, as a part of epistemology, this type of belief formulation is different from the formulation of genuinely moral belief. This part of epistemic activity can be traced to Locke, but the term is introduced by the British philosopher W. K. Clifford who insisted that what determines belief choice is sufficient evidence. R. M. Chisholm claims that the rule of determination is logical consistency. Alternatively, William James believed that we can appeal to other elements beyond epistemological consideration in order to decide what we should believe.

"We can simplify Locke's rather complicated formulation of his 'ethics of belief' as follows: the degree of our assent to a proposition ought to be proportioned to the strength of the evidence for that proposition." —Price, *Belief*, 1969, p. 131.

Ethics of care

The feminist ethics which attempts to construct an entire ethical approach on the basis of caring or care. Care has been taken to be a central value and a fundamental ethical phenomenon. Care is not merely a feeling, but also an understanding of another person's real needs, welfare and situation. The ethics of care focuses on specific individuals rather than on universal principles. It extends from caring for children to care about the globe. In terms of this approach feminism labels all modern ethical theories the ethics of justice. The ethics of justice is characterised as male-biased because it emphasises rational moral law and ignores the role of feeling and the experience of women. Feminism claims that care ethics is modelled on the family, while the male ethics of justice or rights ethics is modelled on the social contract. Carol Gilligan in her book *In a Different Voice* argues that women speak in a different voice, the voice of care. However, care is generally involved in one-to-one encounters. It is still to be elaborated how the ethics of care can be elevated to a general and public level, and how it can be reconciled with the requirements of justice and rights. Besides, it is also disputed how much we should care, and what is the relation between care and self interest. It is realised that the voices of justice and of care should be presented as alternative ones. Justice is

的限度》，1985年，第6页。

信念伦理学

研究我们应该相信什么，我们有权相信什么，或我们怎样才能知道我们所相信的东西是确定的。正如伦理学寻求的是评价伦理行为，信念伦理学寻求的是确定评价信念状态的规则。它之所以被称为“信念伦理学”，是由于我们应该相信什么并不是一个私人的事情，而是一个有着社会后果的公众兴趣，因而也就是一个道德的事情。不过，作为认识论的一部分，这种信念构成方式不同于真正的道德信念的构成方式。这种认知活动可以追溯到洛克，但这个词却是由英国哲学家 W. K. 克里福特提出的。他认为，确定信念选择的东西就是充分的证明。R. M. 齐硕姆认为，确定的规则就是逻辑的一致性。另外，W. 詹姆斯相信，我们可以求助于认识论考虑之外的其他因素来决定我们应该相信什么。

“我们可以把洛克对‘信念伦理学’的相当复杂的表述，简化为这样：我们赞同一个命题的程度，应该是证明这个命题的有力部分。”——普赖斯：《信念》，1969年，第131页。

关怀伦理学

力图在关怀概念的基础上建构一种完整的伦理学方法的女性主义伦理学。关怀被看作是具有中心价值的和根本性的伦理现象。关怀不仅仅是一种感情，它也是对他人的真正需要、福利和处境的理解。关怀伦理学的焦点在于具体的个人而不是普遍的原则。它的范围从对儿童的关怀到对地球的关怀。依据这个论点，女性主义把所有的现代伦理理论都标为“正义伦理学”，正义伦理学被描述为是基于男性偏见的，因为它强调理性的道德法则而忽视感情的作用以及妇女的经验。女性主义宣称，关怀伦理学以家庭为模型，而男性的正义伦理学或权利伦理学是以社会契约为模型。C. 吉利根在她的著作《一种不同的声音》中论证道，妇女以一种不同的声音、一种关怀的声音说话。不过，关怀一般涉及到一个人对另一个人的特殊氛围。故关怀伦理学怎样才能提升到一个一般性的和普遍性（public）的水平，怎样与正义和权利的要求相调和，这仍需要得到详尽阐发。另外，我们应该给予多少关怀，关怀与自我利益的关系是什么，这都是易于引起争议的。有些人意识到，正义的声音或关怀的声音应被看作是相容的选择。正义是与制度相关的，而关怀则涉及到个性。某些

related to institutions, while care to characters. Some argue that we should combine them rather than idealising an ethics of care at the expense of the ethics of justice.

"In advocating an ethic of care these critics, we have seen, come close both to traditional misogynist positions and to ethical relativism. When the 'voices' of justice and of care are presented as alternatives between which we must choose, each is viewed as a complete approach to moral issues. However, the two in fact focus on different aspects of life." — Valdes, in Nussbaum and Sen (eds), *Quality Of Life*, 1993, p. 311.

Ethics of justice, see, ethics of care

Ethnocentrism

[from Greek: *ethos*, custom] The position of using the traditions of one's own culture or society as a starting point for judging any practice. In a sense, ethnocentrism is inevitable, because we are deeply shaped by the beliefs and values of the communities in which we are raised. We become people in the abstract by becoming members of such particular concrete groups. If this contingent fact is given too much weight, however, ethnocentrism will collapse into cultural relativism, chauvinistic conservatism and racism. One can balance ethnocentrism with an attempt to find a universal and more objective point of view. Even if this Enlightenment ideal cannot be achieved, ethnocentrism need not confine our outlook to narrow limits. One must have an open mind to converse with people who have grown up with a different *ethos*, and it remains a fallacy to take one's own *ethos* as objectively and universally correct.

"Ethnocentrism only involves taking one's language, beliefs, desires and the interests of one's community as a starting point." — Hall, *Rorty*, 1994, p. 176.

Ethnology

[from Greek: *ethos*, custom, habit + *logos*, theory] J. S. Mill's term for a theory about the laws of the formation of character, including both national and individual character. These laws are hypothetical and affirm tendencies. They are based neither on simple observation nor on the highest generalisations, but constitute a system of corollaries from experimental psychology. This science is supposed to contribute to educational improvements. Mill claimed that it is a deductive science and the "exact science of human nature".

"Ethnology will serve for the ulterior science which determines the kind of character produced in conformity to these general laws, by any set of circumstances, physical and mental." — Mill, *The Logic of the Moral Sciences*, 1897, p. 54.

人认为, 我们应该结合两者而不是以牺牲正义伦理学来理想化关怀伦理学。

"在提倡关怀伦理学时, 那些批评家, 正如我们所看到的, 是既近于传统的厌恶女性者的观点, 也近于伦理相对主义。当正义的'声音'和关怀的'声音'作为二者择一的东西而出现, 我们又必须作出选择时, 每一种声音都被看作是对道德问题的一种完整的观点。不过, 事实上两者关注于生活的不同方面。" —— 瓦尔德斯, 见纽斯堡姆和森合编:《生活质量》, 1993年, 第311页。

正义伦理学

见“关怀伦理学”条。

种族中心主义

[源自希腊语 *ethos* (习惯、风俗)] 指这样的立场: 从某人自己的文化或社会传统出发来判断任何实践。在某种意义上, 种族中心主义是不可避免的, 因为我们都深受我们成长于其中的共同体的信念和价值制约。我们是因为成为这样的特定具体团体的成员才成为抽象意义的人。但是, 如果我们过于看重这个可能有的事实, 种族中心主义就会陷入文化相对主义、盲目排外的保守主义和种族主义。人能努力发现一种普遍的、更为客观的观点来抵消种族中心主义, 即使这种开明的理想不能实现, 也不应把我们的眼界限制在种族中心主义的狭隘范围内。人必须有一种与成长于不同 *ethos* 的人交往的开放心态; 把某人自己的 *ethos* 认作客观的而且普遍正确, 这是荒谬的。

"种族中心主义只是蕴含着, 把某人自己共同体的语言、信念、欲望和兴趣当做起点。" —— 霍尔:《罗蒂》, 1994年, 第176页。

品格学

[源自希腊词 *ethos* (意为风俗、习惯) 和 *logos* (理论)] J. S. 密尔的词, 指一种关于品格形成的法则的理论, 包括民族的和个人的品格。这些法则是假设的肯定倾向。它们既不是根据简单的观察, 也不是基于最高的概括, 而是由实验心理学构成一个推论系统。这个科学的目的在于对教育改进作贡献。密尔宣称它是一个演绎的科学和“关于人性的精确科学”。

"品格学是决定这种品性的终极科学, 这种品性是在任何物质的和精神的环境中遵从这些一般法则而产生的。" —— 密尔:《道德科学的逻辑》, 1897年, 第54页。

Ethnomethodology

An approach to sociology initiated by Garfinkel, so-called because it emphasises the study of the methodologies of people (*ethnos*) in daily life in contrast to scientific method. Empirical sociology claims that sociology can establish firm connections between social facts on the grounds that social life is actually not regulated by rules and that social action has no intrinsic identity. Ethnomethodology rejects this position and claims that any imputation of beliefs and desires is incorrigibly contextual, depends on indexicals and is marked by uncertainty. Any purported sociological generalisations are based on the analyst's unexamined assumptions. Social facts should be dealt with by ethnomethodology, the characteristic of which is *ad hoc* rationality. It does not subject a social action to rigorous definition and does not set criteria for adequacy of its account. Instead, ethnomethodology holds that the properties of social life lie in the mutual dependence of meanings on their context and on the actor's motives. Rather than being generally endowed with a store of social knowledge which describes their surroundings, people constantly exercise their social knowledge and are forever theorising about each other's actions. In a word, people are fundamentally their own sociologists. Ethnomethodology is hence interested in the properties of intersubjectivity as exhibited by social factors in the day-to-day world.

"[Ethnomethodology] aims to examine the ordinary, common-sense, mundane world in which members live and do so in a way that remains faithful to the methods, procedures, practices, etc., that members themselves use in constructing and making sense of this social world." —Benson and Hughes, *The Perspectives of Ethnomethodology*, 1983, p. 30.

Ethos, see *êthos*

Êthos

[Greek: character, disposition, from *ethos*, habit, custom; the transliteration of its adjective *êthikos* is ethics and literally means being concerned with character] *êthos* is not the same as *ethos*. Aristotle divided *arete* (virtue or excellence) into two kinds: intellectual virtues and *êthika arete*. The latter is generally translated as moral virtues, although excellence of character or virtue of character might be more accurate. According to Aristotle, *ethos* is a significant element for us to gain *êthika arete*, but practical reason is also indispensable.

"virtue of character [of *êthos*] results from habit [*ethos*], hence its name ethical, slightly varies from *ethos*" —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a16-7.

人种学方法

一种由加芬科尔开创的社会学的研究方法,它之所以被称为人种学方法,是因为它强调研究与科学方法不同的对日常生活中人的(人种学意义上的)研究方法。经验的社会学声称,社会学可以在社会事实之间建立稳固的联系,因为社会生活实际上没有被规律所控制,社会活动没有内在的同一性。人种学方法反对这种见解,认为任何对信仰和欲望的非难都是顽固地前后联系的,都取决于指标,并且都以不确定为标志。任何所谓的社会学概括都是基于分析者未经检验的假定。社会事实应该用人种学方法来处理,其特征是特定的合理性。人种学方法不是使一个社会活动服从严格的定义,也不为它的说明适合与否制定标准。它认为,社会生活的性质就在于各种意义相互依赖于它们的环境和活动者的动机。人们一般不具有描述他们周围环境的社会知识,他们只是不断地运用他们的社会知识并常常把相互间的活动理论化。总之,人们从根本上讲是他们自己的社会学家。因此,人种学方法感兴趣的是由在逐渐转变的世界中的社会因素展现出的主体间的特性。

"[人种学方法]的目的是要检验这样一种普通的、通常意义的、世俗的世界,在这一世界中,成员生活于其中,而且是以这样一种方式生活于其中,即继续忠实于成员本身在构建这一社会的世界并弄懂其意义时使用的方法、程序、做法,等等。"——本森和休斯:《人种学方法视角》,1983年,第30页。

习惯

见“品格”条。

品格

[希腊词:品格、气质,出自于 *ethos* (习惯、习俗),其形容词为 *êthikos*,在英语中按字母直写为 ethics,字面意思为关涉品格的] *êthos* 与“ethos”不同。亚里士多德将 *arete* (德性或卓越) 划分为两个部分:理智的德性和“*êthika arete*”,后者一般被译为“道德德性”,虽然“品格的卓越”或“品格的德性”可能更准确。根据亚里士多德的观点,*ethos* (习惯) 对于我们获得 *êthika arete* (品格的德性) 是至关重要的,而实践理性也是必不可少的。

“品格 [*êthos*] 的德性来自于习惯 [*ethos*], 因此,它的名称是‘伦理的’,与习惯稍有不同。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1103a16—17,

Etiquette

The set of manners and hypothetical imperatives governing social behaviour, which is inherited through oral tradition rather than written code, and is manifested in virtually every aspect of social life in a community. To know the culture of a society is essentially to know its etiquette. Etiquette helps in establishing communal harmony, although its requirements are not as strict as those of morality. It changes continuously over time and helped to form the cultural tradition of a society.

"The rules of governing the least socially important customs are the rules of etiquette for that society." —Feldman, *Introductory Ethics*, 1978, p. 5.

Eudaemonism

[from Greek; *eudaimonia* happiness or well being] An ethical stance which claims that happiness is the property by which all intrinsic goods are good and by which all our rational behaviour is ultimately justified. Hence we ought to seek happiness as our ultimate end in life and pursue everything else for the sake of happiness. This ethical eudaemonism is related to psychological eudaemonism, but not identical with it. Psychological eudaemonism proposes that all intentional behaviour of an agent aims at the agent's own happiness. Although happiness has been taken in the history of Western ethics to be the ultimate good, there is no agreement about what constitutes happiness. For example, for Aristotle happiness is rational activity, but for the Epicureans and the Utilitarians, happiness is a life of greatest pleasure and least pain. Through its concern for ends, eudaemonism is teleological in nature. It was criticised by Kant, but has been revived in contemporary virtue ethics.

"It [the moral theory which prevailed in Kant's time] may be generally described as a system of eudaemonism which, when asked what man's chief end ought to be, replied Happiness. And by happiness eudaemonism understood the satisfaction of the private appetites, wishes, and wants of the man; thus raising the contingent and particular into a principle for the will and its actualization." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 54.

Eudaimonia

[Greek; human flourishing, from *eu*, good — *daimon*, a divinity or spirit, having a good divinity to look after one] The highest good for humans. *Eudaimonia* is normally translated as happiness, but this is not precise, because happiness tends to be identified with pleasure or the satisfaction of our sentient nature, and this is only one element in Greek *eudaimonia*. Another and philosophically more important element is the satisfaction of our nature as active beings. In this sense, it is equivalent in Greek to living well or doing well. Because *eudaimonia* concerns the shape of one's whole life

礼节

支配社会行为的规范和假言命令，它是通过口头的传统而不是成文的规则继承的，并体现在一个共同体内的社会生活的几乎每一个方面。了解一个社会的文化，在本质上是了解一个社会的礼节。礼节有助于确立社会的和谐，虽然它的要求不像“道德”的规则那样严格。它在历史中不断变化，并形成一个社会的文化传统。

“有着最起码的具有社会重要性的习俗性规范是那个社会的礼节规范。”——费尔德曼：《伦理学导论》，1978年，第5页。

幸福论

[源自希腊文 *eudaimonia*, 意思是幸福或健康] 一种伦理学观点，认为幸福是这样一种特性，根据这一特性，所有内在的善都是好的，而且我们所有的理性行为最终都可证明是正当的。因此，我们应把幸福作为最终的生活目标去追求，并为了幸福而从事其他一切事情。这一伦理学的幸福论与心理学的幸福论相关联但并不相同。心理学的幸福论提出，一个人的所有意向行为，目的都在于他自己的幸福。尽管幸福在西方伦理学史中一直被视为终极的善，但在什么构成善这一问题上却存在分歧。例如，在亚里士多德看来，幸福是合理的活动，而在享乐主义者和功利主义者看来，幸福是一种最大快乐和最小痛苦的生活。由于幸福论关心的是目的，因而它从本质上讲是一种目的论。它曾受到康德的批判，但在当代德性伦理学中又被复活。

“它[流行于康德时代的伦理学]概括起来可以描述为一种幸福论体系，当问及人的主要目的应是什么的时候，它的回答是幸福。幸福论对幸福的理解是对人的个人的爱好、希望和要求的满足，因此便把偶然的和特殊的东西上升为意志及其实现的原则。”——黑格尔：《小逻辑》，54节。

幸福

[希腊词，意为“人的兴旺”。该词由 *eu* (好) 和 *daimon* (神灵) 组成，字面意义为“有一个好的神灵在照顾”[或“吉星高照”]] 人类最高的善。英文一般将其译为“happiness” (幸福)。这并不确切，因为幸福经常等同于快乐或我们情感性质的满足。而这只是希腊词 *eudaimonia* 的部分含义。*Eudaimonia* 有另外一方面在哲学上更为重要的含义，即我们作为主动存在物的本性的满足。在这一意义上它在希腊文中等同于“活得好”或“做得好”。由于 *eudaimo-*

rather than particular moments or parts of one's life, it is also translated as well being. For many Greek philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus, *eudaimonia* is the state of life which is most worth living.

For Aristotle *eudaimonia* is the state of life in which man deeply fulfils his nature, and it is the complete end or *telos* of one's life. He defined *eudaimonia* as activity in accordance with virtue, so the genuine pursuit of happiness and the virtuous life are one and the same. In practical life, *eudaimonia* is generally activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason, but ideally it is activity in accordance with the virtue of the theoretical part of the soul, although we take part in this activity not in so far as we are men, but only in so far as there is something divine in us. Attempts to reconcile these claims affect our reading of Aristotle's ethics.

"As far as its name goes, most people virtually agree [about what the good is], since both the many and the cultivated call it happiness (*eudaimonia*), and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a16-9.

Euthanasia

[from Greek: *eu*, good — *thanatos*, death] The death of B brought about by A for B's sake, typically to terminate B's unbearable suffering caused by an incurable and terminal disease, B's serious paralysis, B's grotesque disfigurement, B's irreversible comatose state and so on. It is also called mercy killing.

There are two ways of distinguishing various types of euthanasia. One is to divide it into voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary acts. Euthanasia is voluntary if B requests it whilst in a rational state; non-involuntary if B has lost the capacity of choosing death or life, but is killed or allowed to die; and involuntary if B does not consent to end his life but is still killed. The other way is to divide it into active and passive euthanasia. Euthanasia is active if B is deliberately killed by some action and passive if B is not killed but is deliberately allowed to die.

Involuntary euthanasia is generally regarded as murder and to be morally wrong. Passive euthanasia is considered by many to be permissible. The debate about the morality of euthanasia usually surrounds active euthanasia. The arguments for it include mainly the principle of mercy (beneficence) and respect for autonomy. The arguments against it mainly concern the sanctity of life, and the slippery slope argument. In many countries, the moral debate about euthanasia has become a legal debate about whether we should legalise euthanasia.

"Let us insist, then, that when we talk about euthanasia we are talking about a death understood as a good or happy event for the one who dies." —Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 1978, p. 34.

nia 不是暂时性现象, 而是涉及到人的整个一生的状态, 它也被译作“福祉”。许多希腊哲学家, 包括柏拉图、亚里士多德和伊壁鸠鲁, 都认为 *eudaimonia* 乃是最值得过的生活状态。

在亚里士多德的学说中, *eudaimonia* 乃是一个人的最深刻地实现其本性的生活状态, 是一个人的生活的完满目的。他把 *eudaimonia* 定义为符合德性的活动, 故对幸福和对德性生活的真诚追求是同一回事。在具体的生活中, *eudaimonia* 一般是指符合道德德性和实践理性的活动, 但它最为理想的状态是符合灵魂理性部分之德性的活动, 尽管我们参与这种活动并非因为我们是人, 而是因为在我们之中有神圣的东西。如何调和这些论断, 影响到我们对亚里士多德伦理学的理解。

“仅就其名字而言, 大多数人都基本同意 [什么是善], 因为许多有教养的人都称其为幸福 (*eudaimonia*), 并认为活得好与行得好即等于幸福。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1095a16--19。

安乐死

[源自希腊词前缀 *eu* (意为“好”) 和 *thanatos* (意为“死”)] B 的死为 A 所造成但是为了 B 的缘故, 最典型的是为了终止 B 的不能忍受的痛苦, 这种不能忍受的痛苦的造成是由于一种不可医治的和死期可待的疾病, 或是来自于严重的残疾、毁容、不可逆的失去知觉等。安乐死也叫“慈杀”。

区分不同类型的安乐死有两种方式。一是将它划分为自愿的、非自愿的和不自愿的。安乐死是自愿的, 如果 B 在理智清醒状态时要求安乐死; 如果 B 已经失去了选择死或生的能力, 但被处死或允许去死, 安乐死就是非自愿的; 如果 B 不同意结束他的生命但仍被处死, 这就是不自愿的安乐死。另一种方式是把安乐死划分为主动安乐死和被动安乐死。如果 B 为某种有意的行动处死, 安乐死是主动的; 如果不是被杀, 而是故意地允许他死去, 就是被动安乐死。

不自愿的安乐死一般被看做是谋杀, 在道德上是错的。被动或消极安乐死被许多人认为是许可的。有关安乐死的道德争论一般是围绕着主动安乐死。赞成它的论点主要包括怜悯 (“仁慈”) 原则和对自主性的尊重。反对它的论点主要包括, 生命神圣不可侵犯性和滑坡论证。在许多国家, 关于安乐死的道德争论变成了一个法律的争论, 即是否我们应该使安乐死合法化。

“我们要坚持的是, 当我们谈到安乐死的时候, 我们正在谈论一种理解为对于行将死去的人来说是好的或幸福的事情。”——福特:《德性与邪恶》, 1978年, 第34页。

Euthyphro dilemma

Plato's dialogue *Euthyphro* is named after a person who engaged in dialogue with Socrates. Euthyphro wanted to sue his father who had caused a peasant's death, in the belief that God would punish him if he did not sue. But Socrates found it outrageous that a person should prosecute his own father, and the two of them started to discuss the nature of piety. In response to Euthyphro's claim that an action is pious because it is loved by the gods, Socrates asks: "Is 'what is pious' pious because the gods approve of it, or do they approve of it because it is pious?" This issue, whether a man's moral code ought to be influenced by beliefs about divine commands, is not solved in the dialogue. This dilemma reveals a structure which lies at the heart of various justifications of moral and other necessary truths by appeal to a divine authority or an ultimate rational authority. If a thing is good because some authority approves of it, then we need a further justification of the worth of the authority's approval or accept vacuously that what the authority approves is good. If an authority approves of a thing because it is good, then the approval of authority may be a guide to what is good, but it offers no justification of its goodness. The question raised by the dilemma has been a topic of intensive discussion, especially in theology, ethics and political theory.

"The difficulty here is commonly stated in the form of this dilemma: Given that it is right to do X, and that it is God's will that we should do X; is X right because God wills it, or does God will it because it is right? The classical statement of this problem is the Euthyphro dilemma in Plato's dialogue of that name." — Mayo, *The Philosophy of Right and Wrong*, 1986.

Evaluative meaning

The force of an expression which conveys the speaker's positive or negative attitude towards what the expression is describing, and is in contrast to descriptive meaning, which is a bare description of the fact and picks out the range to which the expression applies. Evaluative meaning varies with the reaction of the user of the expression and lacks truth-conditions. Evaluative meaning is related to advising and prescribing what should and should not be done. Emotivism and prescriptivism pay particular attention to the evaluative meaning of ethical terms, for they believe that morality is a matter of emotional attitude rather than belief.

"A word has evaluative meaning if its use implies a favourable or unfavourable attitude on the part of the speaker." — McNaughton, *Moral Vision*, 1988, p. 66.

尤息弗罗难题

《尤息弗罗》是柏拉图的一部对话，以与苏格拉底对话的主角命名。尤息弗罗要起诉他那造成一个农夫死亡的父亲，因他相信如果不这样做，神要惩罚他的。但苏格拉底感到愤怒，一个人怎么能够诉讼他自己的父亲。所以，他们开始讨论虔诚的性质。尤息弗罗认为，如果一个行为为神所爱，它就是虔诚的。对此，苏格拉底诘问道：“虔诚的东西是因为神赞许而虔诚呢，还是因为它本是虔诚的而获得神的赞许？”这里重要的问题是一个人的道德准则是否受对神的命令的信仰所影响。他们未能在那篇对话中解决这一问题。可这一难题揭示了一个结构：它对众多以诉诸神圣的或终极理性权威来证明道德或其他必然真理的理论都是关键的。如果一物是因为某一权威赞许它才是善的，那么我们就需要进一步说明权威之赞许的原因，或盲目地接受被权威赞许为善的东西的原因；如果一个权威赞许它是因为它是善的，那么权威的赞许可能就会导向善的东西，但它仍没有对善作出说明。这一问题一直受到激烈争论，尤其是在神学、伦理学和政治理论等领域中。

“这里的困难一般是以这样一个难题的形式提出的：假定做 X 是对的，并且我们应当做 X 是神的意志；则 X 是因为神意愿它才是对的呢，还是因为它是对的，神才意愿它？对这一问题的经典陈述是柏拉图在对话《尤息弗罗》中提出的尤息弗罗难题。” —— 迈耀：《对与错的哲学》，1986 年。

评价意义

一种表达式的力量，传达了说者对该表达式所描述事物的积极或消极的态度，它与描述意义相对立，后者是对事实的纯描述并指明该表达式所能应用的范围。评价意义随着表达式使用者的反应的不同而不同，并且不具备真值条件。评价意义是与劝告和规定应当做什么和不做什么相关的。情感主义和规定主义对于伦理词汇的评价意义给予了特别的关注，它们认为，道德是一种情感态度的事情，而不是有关相信的事情。

“一个词有评价意义，如果它的使用隐含着说者的赞成或反对的态度的话。” —— 麦克诺顿：《道德见解》，1988 年，第 66 页。

Event

[from Latin *ex*, out + *venire*, to come] A happening or occurring which does not persist in the relations of a thing, but occurs in a certain place during a particular interval of time. This is a widely used but very ambiguous conception. No agreement has been achieved with regard to its simple nature, its qualities or its relations. Scholars are divided whether an event should be classified as an object, a fact, a state of affair or simply a change, whether it is universal or particular, and over the criteria to individuate events. They also disagree whether events or objects should be more basic in our ontology. Davidson used to hold a position that two events are identical if their causes and effects are identical, but then are causes and effects themselves events? Quine claims that two events are identical if they happen in the same temporal-spatial location. But then several things could happen in the same temporal-spatial location. Are they one or several events? Because of Davidson's work, the discussion of events is now closely associated with accounts of action.

"An 'event' is supposed to occupy some continuous portion of space-time, at the end of which it ceases, and cannot occur." —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 97.

Everlasting, see eternity

Everydayness

Heidegger's term, also called averageness, for the ordinary and undifferentiated way in which human beings exist over most of their lifetime, taking everything that comes to them from the world. It is the average manner of human being, in which *Dasein* is blind to its own possibilities. The first division of *Being and Time*, entitled "the preparatory fundamental analysis of *Dasein*", attempts to reveal the complex and mysterious character of this most familiar way of one's being. The analysis of *Dasein*'s everydayness serves as a path for uncovering the essential structure of *Dasein*. For in our everyday lives we already have some vague and average understanding of Being. Heidegger portrayed our everyday situation in terms of Being-in-the-world. Everydayness is constituted by three modes of fallingness, that is idle talk (groundless understanding and interpretation), curiosity (a tendency to move from average intelligibility to closing off the understanding in idle talk) and ambiguity (the failure to distinguish what is genuinely known from what is not).

"Accordingly, *Dasein*'s 'average everydayness' can be defined as 'Being-in-the-world, which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with-others.'" —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 225.

事件

[源自拉丁词 *ex* (在外) 和 *venire* (来)] 一种产生或发生, 它并不关联着某物而续存, 而只发生于某一特定的时间间隙的某处。这是一个广泛使用的, 但极其模糊的概念。关于它的本性、特征和关系, 人们并未取得一致意见。一事件是否应归类于·客体、·事实、·事态或仅仅是一变化, 它是普遍的还是特殊的, 以及关于辨识单个事件的标准等问题, 把学者们分成了不同的派别。在我们的本体论中, 关于更为基本的东西究竟是事件还是客体这个问题, 学者们也没有一致意见。戴维森一度持这种立场: 如果两个事件的原因和结果是一样的, 那么它们就是一个事件, 但这样一来, 原因和结果本身也是事件吗? 奎因主张, 如果两个事件发生在同一时空域, 则它们为同一事件。但这么一来, 几件事都可能发生在同一时空域。它们是一个还是几个事件? 由于戴维森的工作, 对于事件的讨论现在与对于行动的说明密切相关。

“一‘事件’一般认为占据了某一连续的时空部分, 在此部分结尾, 它不再存在, 不能出现了。”——罗素:《人类的知识》, 1948年, 第97页。

永久

见“永恒”条。

日常性

海德格尔使用的一个词, 也叫做“平均性”, 被用来表示平常的和没有做区分的〔生存〕方式: 人们就是以这种方式度过他们绝大部分的生活时间, 并从世界取得与自己有缘分的一切东西。它是人类生活的平均样式, 在其中缘在(*Dasein*)对自己的可能性懵然无知。《存在与时间》第一部分冠以“对于缘在的准备性的基础分析”之题, 就意在显露出这个人们最熟悉的存在方式的复杂和神秘的特点。对于缘在的日常性的分析提供一条揭示缘在的本质结构的道路, 因为在日常生活中, 我们已经对于存在本身有了某种模糊和平均化的领会。海德格尔用“在此世界之中存在”(Being-in-the-world)来描述我们日常的形势。这日常性由三种沉沦的方式构成: 闲聊(无根据的领会和解释)、好奇(一种从平均理智移向在闲聊中阻塞领会的倾向)和耽关(不能将真切所知与不真切所知区别开来)。

“因此, 缘在的‘平均化日常性’能被定义为‘在此世界中存在’; 这种存在〔同时〕是沉沦和透露、被抛和投射; 对于它来讲, 缘在最切身的‘能存在’是一个问题, 不管是在缘在与‘世界’的遭遇中, 还是在缘在与其他人的共同存在之中, 都是这样。”——海德格尔:《存在与时

Evidence

[from Latin: *e*, out + *videre*, see] Originally meaning evident or obvious, the term has developed into meaning evidence for, rather than self-evident. Evidence is something or some consideration which is used to support or reject some claim, to confer a certain degree of probability upon a proposition or to decrease its probability. If a piece of evidence is supportive, it is favourable; otherwise it is unfavourable. In the law, evidence is governed by the rules of evidence and includes physical evidence as well as testimony. In epistemology, evidence is beliefs or propositions which may be used to justify other beliefs or propositions. If S has adequate evidence for h, it would be unreasonable for S not to accept h. There are many disputes regarding the nature of the beliefs which can provide evidential justification. A theory of epistemic justification which claims that a belief is justified if and only if it is supported by evidence is called evidentialism.

“‘Evidence’ eventually came to mean not just considerations which make a proposition evident or obvious, but any considerations which make it in any degree probable.” — Price, *Belief*, 1969, p. 93.

Evidentialism

A theory about epistemic justification. It claims that a belief or a doxastic attitude towards proposition P is epistemologically justified for a person S at the time t if and only if this belief fits the evidence S has at t and the evidence S possesses is certainly well supported epistemologically and is properly arrived at. The position is implicit in the philosophy of Chisholm and is explicitly expressed by Feldman and Conee. The major problem it faces is to provide a satisfactory account of the relations between experience and introspective or perceptual belief.

“What we call evidentialism is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer’s evidence for the belief.” — Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”, *Philosophical Studies*, 48, No. 1, 1985.

Evil

Evil is divided into moral evil and natural evil. While natural evil results from unusual natural occurrences such as earthquakes, disease or famine, moral evil is due to deliberate human action and its origin and nature are the concerns of ethics. Moral evil is the extreme form of moral wrong and causes much suffering and pain. Socrates believed that nobody rationally chooses evil and that evil is the result of ignorance. This raises a question about the relation between reason and evil. Orthodox theologians hold that evil can be intentional, for human beings have a fallen nature. Another

间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年, 第225页。

证据

[源自拉丁文 *e* (明显地) 和 *videre* (看)] 这个术语原初的意思是“明显的”或“显而易见的”, 现已演变为“对……的证据”而不是“自明的”。证据是某种东西或某种考虑, 它被用以支持或反对某种主张, 用以对一个命题给予某种程度的概率或减少其概率。如果一件证据是支持性的, 它就是有利的; 否则就是不利的。在法律中, 证据由证据法规所决定, 它既包括物理证据, 也包括证言。在认识论中, 证据是可用以为其他信念或命题辩护的信念或命题。如果 S 有关于 h 的适当证据, 这就意味着 S 不承认 h 将是非理智的。关于可以用作辩护证据的信念的性质, 有着许多争论。一种主张信念当且仅当为证据所支持时才得到辩护的认知辩明理论, 被称作“证据主义”。

“‘证据’最终所意指的, 并不仅为那些使一命题明显或易见的考虑, 而是那些使它有任何程度的可能的考虑。”——普赖斯:《信念》, 1969年, 第93页。

证据主义

关于认知辩明的理论。它主张, 一个信念或对命题 P 的一种信念态度, 对某个人 S 来说在时间 t 是在认识论上得到证明的, 当且仅当这个信念符合 S 在 t 时所具有的证据, S 所拥有的这个证据, 的确是在认识论上得到有力证明的, 而且是恰当地得到的。这个立场隐含在齐硕姆的哲学中, 并由弗尔德曼和科尼明确地提出来。它所面对的主要问题是, 如何对经验与反思或知觉信念之间的关系提供一种令人满意的说明。

“我们称做的证据主义是这样一种观点, 即, 对信念的认知辩明, 是由信仰者对信念的证据性质决定的。”——弗尔德曼和科尼:《证据主义》,《哲学研究》, 第48卷, 第1期, 1985年。

恶

恶被划分为道德的恶和自然的恶。后者来自于不寻常的自然事件诸如地震、疾病、饥荒等。前者是由于人的故意的行为, 它的起因和性质是伦理学所关切的。道德的恶是道德错误的极端形式, 造成了许多不幸和痛苦。苏格拉底相信没有一个人会故意选择恶, 恶是无知的结果。这产生了一个恶与理性的关系问题。正统的神学家认为恶可以是蓄意的, 因为人类有一种堕落的本性。关切到恶的另一个主要的问题是: 一个全能全善的上帝的存在与世界充满恶的事实

major problem regarding evil is the compatibility between the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good God and the fact that the world is full of evil. For if God knows everything and is all-powerful and benevolent, he can easily do something to prevent evil from happening. This is the so-called problem of evil, which atheism takes as evidence for denying the existence of God. Some theists argue that God deliberately allows some evil to make possible greater goods. Evil results from human free-will. If God denies evil, he would have to deny human freedom of will first, but the possession of free will is definitely a greater good. Others argue that the existence of evil is an illusion, or that evil is the privation of goodness proper to something.

"Many philosophers believe that the existence of evil constitutes a difficulty for the theist, and many believe that the existence of evil (or at least the amount and kinds of evil we actually find) make belief in God unreasonable or rationally unacceptable." —Plantinga, *God, Freedom And Evil*, 1975, p. 7.

Evolution

[from Latin: *evolutio*, unrolling, unfolding, developing] A theory that the world and its contents, in particular the organic world, are subject to a developmental process, on some theories of evolution from the simple to the complex. The idea gained popularity in the Enlightenment as an alternative to the Christian theory of creation and design. Philosophically, it also challenged Greek essentialism. But it was not until Darwin published *On the Origin of Species* (1859) that evolution became a well established scientific theory. The theory of evolution is hence virtually synonymous with Darwinism. Darwin's central tenet is that the organic world develops through a process of natural selection, in which the members of a species which are best adapted to the environment are most able to survive and reproduce. The theory has had an enormous impact on subsequent intellectual history. Many philosophers have attempted to use the framework of evolutionary thought to explain social phenomena and to deal with traditional philosophical issues, although many of these uses of the theory are controversial. The contemporary theory of evolution combines Darwin's insight with the new science of genetics, and there is debate whether the species, individual or the gene is the unit of survival in evolution. Two philosophical fields based on the theory of evolution, evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics, have attracted support.

"By 'evolution' I mean the natural unfolding and change of organisms down through the generations from earlier forms, widely different." — Ruse, *Taking Darwin Seriously*, 1986, p. 1.

Evolutionary epistemology

The analysis of human knowledge and of its develop-

的相容性。因为如果上帝是无所不知的,有着至上的权力而且是仁慈的,他就能够轻易地做点什么来防止恶的发生。这是所谓恶的问题。无神论把这看作是否定上帝存在的证据。某些神学家争论道,上帝故意地让某些形式的恶存在以使产生更大的可能的善。恶来自于人的自由意志。如果上帝否定恶,他将首先否定人的意志自由,但拥有自由意志无疑是更大的善。另一些人争论道,恶的存在是一个幻象,或者恶是专属于某种事情的善的缺失。

"许多哲学家相信,恶的存在构成了有神论者的一个困难,许多人相信,恶的存在(或至少是我们实际所发现的恶的那些种类和数量),使对上帝的信仰变得不合理性或在理性上不可接受。" — 普兰汀格:《上帝、自由和恶》,1975年,第7页。

进化

[源自拉丁文 *evolutio*, 显露, 展开, 发展] 一种认为世界及其中事物,尤其是有机界,按某些进化理论经历着从简单到复杂的发展过程的学说。这一观念在启蒙运动中,作为基督教创世和设计说的对立面而得以流行。在哲学上,它也提出了对希腊本质主义的挑战。但直到达尔文发表他的《物种起源》(1859),进化论才成为一个比较完善的科学理论。进化论由此实质上与“达尔文主义”同义。达尔文的主要信条是:有机界经过一种自然选择的过程而发展,在这种过程中,那些最适应于环境的物种成员,是最能够生存下来并繁衍的。这个理论对于自那以来的思想史有着极大的影响。许多哲学家致力于用这种观点去说明社会现象和讨论传统的哲学问题,尽管其中的许多应用是很有争议的。现代进化论把达尔文的思想与新近的遗传学结合起来并围绕究竟是物种、个体还是基因是进化中的生存单位展开了争论。两个基于进化论的哲学领域“进化认识论”和“进化伦理学”已吸引了人们的关注。

“我所说的‘进化’,指的是有机体从其早期的、广泛不同的形式出发,而经历的世世代代的自然展现和变化。” — 罗斯:《慎思达尔文》,1986年,第1页。

进化认识论

以进化的术语对人类的知识及其发展所作

ment in evolutionary terms. It has two basic approaches. The first considers the growth of knowledge as analogical to the growth of organisms and holds that the acceptance of knowledge is the result of selection among ideas. The ideas which gain attention and allegiance in the course of struggle will be established until displaced by a challenger. Advocates of this approach include Campbell and Toulmin. Popper claimed that this approach amounts to his theory of falsification. The other approach, represented by Lorenz and Ruse, claims that the human cognitive structure itself is a result of natural selection and, hence, is equipped with innate dispositions incorporating our principles of thought and reasoning. Evolutionary epistemology is part of a broader programme of naturalised epistemology. Rather than seeking to secure our knowledge claims against sceptical doubts, it tries to explain major features of our knowledge as necessary or inevitable features of ourselves as natural beings.

"[Evolution] has taught us appropriate intellectual responses to various contacts and collisions, by structuring the brain of the mind that responds. This is the central claim of evolutionary epistemology." —Schilcher and Tennant, *Philosophy, Evolution and Human Nature*, 1984, p. 170.

Evolutionary ethics

An ethics established on the basis of biological evolutionary theory. It claims that ethical principles can be derived from understanding the process of evolution. There are two major approaches. The first claims that the evolutionary process itself is morally positive and progressive. The good is whatever is the fittest for survival, that is, whatever can contribute to maintaining and developing the human species. Hence, it is morally wrong to do anything which might hinder the evolutionary process. A crude version of this claim, which is associated with Social Darwinism, advocates competition and liberty and rejects equality and the provision of welfare. Social Darwinism has been widely rejected, but other versions of this approach suggest that we should help those who are most fit for life. The second approach is associated with sociobiology, which suggests that organisms within the same species are not necessary in conflict and that co-operation is sometimes a better biological strategy than conflict. Some sociobiologists claim that altruism is a human evolutionary adaptation and that we are determined to be moral by our genes. Such an approach seems compatible with some versions of social contract theory and might help to explain how naturally selected tendencies can supplement rationality in explaining obligation. However, the empirical study of evolutionary altruism suggests that we tend naturally to co-operate with our closest kin and with those in a position to co-operate. This contrasts with any universal and equal obligation, and its altruism is rather narrow. Evolutionary ethics is also criticised by its attempt to derive ought directly from

的分析。它有两种基本方法。一种是认为知识的生长类似于有机体的生长，主张知识的接受是在观念之间“选择”的结果。那些在竞争中获得人们的注意和忠诚的观念将得以确立，直至为挑战者所取代。这一方法的倡导者包括坎贝尔、图尔敏等等。波普称这种方法等于他的证伪理论。另一种方法以洛伦兹和罗斯为代表，认为人类的认知结构本身就是自然选择的结果，因此配备有种种内在的意向，它们体现在我们的思维和推理的原则中。进化认识论是更为广泛的自然化认识论纲领的一部分。它不是去寻求确保我们的知识主张以避免怀疑论的质疑，而是试图把我们知识的主要特征解释为我们自己作为自然存在物的必然的不可避免的特征。

"[进化]已教给我们，通过构造作出反应的理智的脑，对种种交往和冲突作出适当的理性反应。这是进化认识论的中心主张。"——希谢尔和坦南特：《哲学、进化和人的本质》，1984年，第170页。

进化论伦理学

一种建立在生物进化论基础上的伦理学。它声称伦理原则可以来自对进化过程的理解。它有两种主要的观点。第一种观点主张，进化过程本身从道德上讲就是积极的和进步的。无论什么，只要最适合生存，即只要能有助于人类的维持和发展，就是好的。因此，做任何可能阻碍进化过程的事情在道德上就是错的。这种主张的一种赤裸裸的形式与社会达尔文主义相联，即鼓吹竞争和自由，反对平等和提供福利。社会达尔文主义已为人们广泛拒绝，但这一理论的其他变种仍然提出我们应帮助那些最适合生存的人。第二种观点与社会生物学相联，主张同一种类生物体的冲突是不必要的，有时合作是一种比冲突更好的生物策略。一些社会生物学家声称，利他主义是人对进化的适合，我们是道德的是由我们的基因决定的。这种观点看上去与社会契约论的某些说法相一致，它在解释义务时也许有助于说明自然选择的趋向如何能增强理性。然而，对进化论利他主义的经验研究却表明，我们自然地倾向于与我们最密切的亲属和那些能够合作的人合作。这与普遍的、平等的义务相矛盾，而且它的利他主义也过于狭窄。进化论伦理学还因为它试图从是什么直接导出应当做什么而受到批判。即使它现时的进化论的推测得到更为牢固的确立，它所断言的道德结论能否也得到确立仍是不清楚的。

“进化论伦理学体系的基础是从关于地球生命起源和增殖的进化论有目的地导出的价值

is. Even if its current evolutionary conjectures were established more firmly, it is unclear that its alleged moral consequences would also become established.

"A system of evolutionary ethics is one based on a criterion of value purportedly derived from the evolutionary theory of the origin and proliferation of life on earth."—Schilcher and Tennant, *Philosophy, Evolution and Human Nature*, 1984, p. 160.

Ex nihilo nihil fit

[Latin: Nothing can be made or emerge out of nothing.] A metaphysical principle that was first employed by Parmenides against the theory of change proposed by earlier natural philosophers. The principle implies that nothing in the world can arise without a cause. Christian theologians defended the doctrine of God's creation *ex nihilo* (from nothing) by claiming that this Parmenidean principle can be applied only to natural things and not to the activity of the supreme deity who exists outside nature.

"When we apprehend that it is impossible that anything can be formed of nothing, the proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit*, . . . is a common notion or axiom."—Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, I, 49.

Examination paradox, see surprise examination paradox

Excellence, an alternative translation of *arete* (virtue)

Excellence of character, another expression for ethical virtue

Excuse

The condition or reason which can free an agent who commits a wrong from censure or responsibility. Excuse is different from justification, for while an excuse implies that the agent's action is morally wrong or not permissible, justification is the condition or reason which makes an action not a wrongdoing but positively permissible. Strictly speaking, an excuse should also be distinguished from mitigating circumstance, which can reduce the degree of reprehension or severity of punishment for a wrongdoing agent, but which cannot fully eliminate the blame. For example, an extremely hungry man commits a robbery. His hunger is a mitigating circumstance, but not an excuse for his impermissible action. What conditions or reasons may, then, excuse a wrongdoing? According to Aristotle, if an action is caused by some uncontrollable external force, it is excusable. According to Hume, if an action is not caused by a defect of character, for example by evil motivation at the time of action, it is excusable. Generally, the conditions which may serve as excuses

标准。” 希谢尔和坦南特：《哲学、进化和人的本质》，1984年，第160页。

无中不能生有

[拉丁语，意为无物能从无中造成或出现] 一条首先被巴门尼德使用的形而上学原则，以反对在他之前的自然哲学家提出的变化理论。这条原则的蕴意是，世界上没有任何东西能无原因地出现。为辩护上帝 *ex nihilo* (从无中) 创世的学说，基督教神学家断言，这条巴门尼德的原则仅能适用于自然事物，不适用于存在于自然之外的那个至上之神的活动。

“当我们理解了任何事物都不可能从无形成时，无中不能生有 (*ex nihilo nihil fit*) 这个命题……就是一条通论或公理。”——笛卡尔：《哲学原理》，I，第49页。

考试悖论

见“意外考试悖论”条。

卓越

“德性 (*arete*)”的另一种译法。

优秀品格

“伦理德性”的另一表述。

藉口

一个做错事的人逃脱谴责或责任的条件或理由。藉口不同于辩护，因为藉口隐含着当事人的行为在道德上是错误的或不为允许的，而辩护是使一个行为不是一种错误而得到明确允许的条件和理由。严格地说，藉口也应与减责环境可酌情考虑的环境区别开来，即一种对于做错事的当事人来说，可以减轻严厉指责程度的情形，但这种情形并不能完全取消责备。例如，一个极其饥饿的人犯下的抢劫罪。他的饥饿是一种减责环境，但这不是他的不为允许的行为的一个藉口。那么，什么条件或理由是可以原谅一个错误行为的藉口呢？按照亚里士多德的说法，如果行为是由不可控制的外力引起，则是可原谅的，根据休谟的观点，如果行为不为品格的缺陷所致，即不为行动时的坏的动机所致，就是可原谅的。一般而言，作为藉口的条件包括无知、不成熟、精神错乱、强逼、意外等。

“一个藉口是一个陈述、主张或恳求，用于

include, among others, ignorance, immaturity, insanity, compulsion, coercion, and accident.

"An excuse is a statement, claim or plea, used to mitigate some true charge that tends to discredit a person in some way." — Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 471.

Exegesis

[from Greek: *ekseresis*, explanation, interpretation] Interpretation, particularly biblical interpretation. In the medieval period, exegesis became a sub-discipline of theology dealing with the interpretation of holy scripture, biblical criticism and biblical history. Because it presupposed faith and aimed at defending Catholic dogma, it was also called biblical theology. Exegesis tries to interpret a text by clarifying its authorship and earlier sources, by understanding it in its original context and by bringing out the author's meaning from the text itself. It contrasts with *eisegesis*, which reads meaning into a text. Exegesis is a predecessor of hermeneutics.

"The systematic understanding of fixed life-expressions we shall call Exegesis. Since mental life is capable of being objectively understood only when it is completely and creatively, i. e. verbally, expressed, so is the task of exegesis that of interpreting the written records of human existence." — Dilthey, in Gardiner (ed), *Theories of History*, 1959, p. 222.

Existence

[from Latin: *ex*, out of — *sistere*, cause to stand, meaning something there] Medieval philosophers, influenced by the doctrine that everything is created by God, distinguished between existence (*that it is*) and essence (*what it is*). Thomas Aquinas applied this contrast to interpret Aristotle's doctrine of substance as meaning that a substance is brought to be by conferring existence to an essence. God alone is the unity of essence and existence, while everything else has its existential ground in God. Against this background later philosophers have continued to discuss the relationship between essence and existence. Existence is the fact that there is a thing, while essence is the nature of that thing and is the necessary ground for the contingent being of the thing. The central theme of Existentialism is that for human beings existence precedes essence.

Although "being" has three distinct meanings, existence, the copula and the sign of identity, existence and being are often taken as equivalent. "What exists?" is considered by many to be the central question in philosophy. When traditional metaphysics asks "What is being?", it asks about being in the sense of existence. We can begin with the claim that things which exist are those which can bring about effects in the behaviour of other things and can in turn be affected by them. However, we can also talk about the exist-

减轻某些真正的指责, 这种指责使得在某些方面使某一个人丧失名誉。”——布朗特:《伦理理论》, 1959年, 第471页。

解释

[源自希腊语 *ekseresis* (解说、阐释)] 阐释, 尤指对圣经的阐释。在中世纪时期, 解释成了一门神学的次级学科, 从事圣经、圣经批评和圣经史的阐释。因为它以信仰为前提, 以辩护天主教教义为目的, 所以也被称为“圣经神学”。解释试图通过弄清其作者身份、早期来源, 按其原初内容来理解, 以及从原文本身出发明确作者的意思等手段, 来阐释原文。与此对应的是 *eisegesis*, 即把意思解读进原文。解释是解释学的先驱。

“我们把对固定的生命表现的系统理解称作解释。既然精神生命只有在得到完全的、创造性的, 即言语上的表现时, 才能够被客观地理解, 那么, 解释的任务就是阐释人类存在的书写记载。”——狄尔泰: 载加德纳 (编辑): 《历史理论》, 1959年, 第222页。

存在

[源自拉丁文 *ex* (出来) 和 *sistere* (引起站立), 原意为“有某物在那里”] 中世纪哲学家受万物为上帝所造这一学说的影响, 区分了存在 (“是在那里”) 和本质 (“是什么”)。T. 阿奎那用这一区分来解释亚里士多德的本体学说, 认为后者意味着本体是通过把存在赋予某一本质的而产生的。只有上帝才是本质与存在的统一体, 而其他事物都从上帝处获得存在的根据。后来的哲学家基本上在这一背景下继续讨论本质与本体的关系, 存在是有一个事物这一事实, 而本质是那一事物的本性, 是那一事物的偶然之“是”的必然根据。存在主义的中心论题即是, 对人类而言, 存在先于本质。

虽然“是”有三种不同意义: 存在, 系词以及等号, 存在和“是”常被当做同义词。“什么存在?” 被许多哲学家认为是哲学的中心问题。当传统形而上学问“什么是‘是’?” 时, 它是在问存在意义上的“是”。我们可以一开始说, 存在物是指那些可对它物的行为发生影响并转而它们所影响的事物。但我们也能谈论虚构事物及抽象事物, 而它们并不显得具有这样的能力; 哲学家们一直在争论在这样的语境中“存在”是什么意思。再者, 我们的心灵有时似乎受那些不存在的事物——如梦中显现的对象、幻

tence of fictitious entities and abstract entities, and these do not seem to have such powers; philosophers have disputed what "existence" means in these contexts. Also, it is not clear what to say when our minds seem to be affected by things which do not exist, such as by apparent objects in dreams, illusions or delusions.

The modern anti metaphysical tradition, in attacking the quest for being in traditional metaphysics, focuses on the thesis that existence is not a property. This thesis, initiated Hume and Kant, has been discussed in great detail in this century. According to it, the existential propositions share the same grammatical form with attributive propositions but are logically different from them. Existential propositions do not ascribe a property to a subject, and in spite of its grammatical role existence is not a logical predicate. For Russell, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, misunderstanding the nature of existential propositions is the root of traditional metaphysics.

Contemporary philosophical logic and philosophy of language offer further intensive discussion of what we mean by saying that existence is a grammatical predicate, but not a logical predicate. Various theories have been advanced concerning our talk about existence and its existential implications and assumptions, such as Russell's theory of descriptions, Pears' distinction between referential tautologies and referential contradictions, and Strawson's criticism of Russell's theory of descriptions. Quine's widely influential account of the quantificational apparatus of logic and his formula "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" raises questions about where quantification is possible and about the relations between logic and ontology.

"I think an almost unbelievable amount of false philosophy has arisen through not realising what 'existence' means." —Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 234.

Existence (Heidegger)

Etymologically, existence (*existere*) means "standing out" or "standing outside". On this basis, Heidegger claimed that not all actual entities can be said to exist. Existence is not, as traditionally conceived, something one simply encounters or comes across in the world (what Heidegger called presence at-hand). Rather, it is the mode of being of *Dasein* (human existence), for only *Dasein* can stand out from its own occurrence in the world and reflect on itself. For Heidegger, existence is *Dasein's* awareness that it is. *Dasein's* essence lies in its existence because we make ourselves be what we are in the course of living out our possibilities. For Heidegger, existence in this sense is also the ground of presence, that is the mode of Being of the world.

"That kind of Being towards which *Dasein* can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence' [*Existenz*]." — Heidegger, *Be-*

觉, 幻想——的影响, 如何解释这些现象尚不清楚。

近代反形而上学传统在攻击传统形而上学对存在的探究时, 集中论证存在都不是一个属性这一论题。这一始于休谟和康德的论题在本世纪也被详细讨论。根据它, 存在性命题与归属性命题具有相同的语法结构, 但在逻辑形式上则不同于它们。存在性命题并不把一个属性归属于一个主体, 不管其语法上作什么角色, 存在都不是一个逻辑谓词。对于罗素、维特根斯坦和逻辑实证主义者来说, 对存在性命题的性质的误解乃是传统形而上学的根源。

当代哲学逻辑与语言哲学进一步深入讨论, 当我们说存在是一个语法谓词而不是一个逻辑谓词时, 我们究竟是什么意思。人们提出了种种理论来解释我们对存在的谈论以及这种谈论的存在性含意与设定, 如罗素的摹状词理论, 皮尔斯关于指称性重言式与指称性矛盾的区分, 及斯特劳森对罗素摹状词理论的批评。奎因对逻辑的量化装置的论述和他的“‘是’乃是一个约束变项的值”的公式具有广泛的影响。它们提出了量化何处可能以及逻辑与存在论的关系等问题。

“在我看来, 多得几乎难以置信的假哲学之所以产生, 是由于未能明白‘存在’的意义。”——罗素, 《逻辑和知识》, 1956年, 第234页。

生存 (海德格尔)

从词源学上讲, 生存 (*existere*) 意味着“站出去”或“站到外边”。在这个基础上, 海德格尔认为并非所有的实际存在者能被说成是在生存着。生存不像传统认为的那样, 是人在世界中随便碰到的东西(也就是海德格尔称之为“现成的存在状态”中的东西)。它是缘在(“人类生存者”)的存在方式, 因为只有缘在从它在世界中的位置那里站出去并反观自身。对海德格尔说来, 生存是缘在对于自己存在的意识。缘在的本性就在于它的生存性, 因为我们是在消耗我们的可能性的生命过程中成为我们自身的。在海德格尔看来, 在这个意义上的生存也是在场的基础, 即世界的存在方式的基础。

“那种缘在能以这种或那种方式, 并且总能以某种方式使自己与之发生关联(或对之具有某种态度)的存在, 我们称之为‘生存’ [*Exis-*

ing and Time (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 32.

Existence proposition, another term for existential proposition

Existential generalisation

A rule of inference in predicate calculus that introduces existential quantifiers. If a statement fa contains a free variable a , it can be generalised into $(\exists x)fx$. Using an example in ordinary language, we can generalise from "Socrates is mortal" to "Someone is mortal". Existential generalisation is a process which generates an existentially quantified statement from one instance of it. This is valid on the assumption of predicate logic that at least one thing exists in the universe. Existential generalisation contrasts with existential instantiation, which generates one instance, say fa , from an existentially quantified statement like $(\exists x)fx$.

"Existential generalization... carries us from a theorem ϕ to a theorem $(\exists x)\psi$ where ϕ is like ψ except for containing free occurrences of 'y' in all the positions in which ψ contains free occurrences of 'x'." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 120.

Existential import

Also called existential presupposition, a sentence, statement or proposition has existential import if it implies a commitment to the existence of something. In Aristotelian logic, all universal propositions in the form of "all A's are B's" have existential import since they imply that there is at least one A that is B, that is that an A exists. Such propositions imply the existence of at least one object to which the subject-term A applies. However, this implication is not accepted in modern predicate calculus. Universal quantification is formalised as $\forall x (fx \rightarrow gx)$, "for all x, if x is f, then x is g". The proposition does not have existential import, because the proposition can be true even if there is no x, unlike propositions containing existential quantification.

"An expression 'a' may occur in a theory, we saw, with or without purporting to name an object. What clinches matters is rather the quantification $(\exists x)(x = a)$. It is the existential quantifier, not the 'a' itself, that carries existential import." —Quine, *Ontological Relativity*, 1969, p. 94.

Existential instantiation

A rule of inference in predicate logic that removes the existential quantifier by proceeding from an existentially quantified statement $(\exists x)fx$ to fa , which is an existential instantiation of it. Using an example in ordinary language, it is a procedure to infer from "Someone is mortal" to "Socrates is mortal". Existential instantiation contrasts with existential

generalisation." —海德格尔：《存在与时间》（马库阿里/罗宾逊英译），1962年，第32页。

存在命题

“存在命题 (existential proposition)” 的另一说法。

存在概括

谓词演算中引入存在量词的推理规则。如果一个陈述 fa 包含一个自由变量 a ，它可以概括进 $(\exists x)fx$ 。举一个日常语言的例子，我们可以从“苏格拉底是会死的”概括出“有的人是会死的”。存在概括是从一个例子中产生出存在量化陈述的过程。它是基于宇宙中至少存在一个事物这一谓词逻辑的假定而有效的。存在概括与存在个例化形成对照，后者由一像 $(\exists x)fx$ 这样的存在量化陈述中产生出实例，比如说 fa 。

“存在概括……使我们从定理 ϕ 得到定理 $(\exists x)\psi$ ，这里的 ϕ 与 ψ 相似，只是在 ψ 中包含 'x' 的自由出现的所有位置上， ϕ 都包含 'y' 的自由出现。” —奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》，1953年，第120页。

存在内含

也称作存在假定，一个句子、陈述或命题如果蕴涵对某物存在的承诺，则具有存在内含。在亚里士多德逻辑中，所有的形式为“所有的 A 都是 B”的全称命题都有存在内含，因为它们蕴涵着“至少有一个 A，这个 A 是 B”，即“一个 A 存在”。这样的命题蕴涵着至少存在一个主词 A 适用于它的物体。然而，这种含义却不为现代谓词演算所认可。全称量词被形式化为 $\forall x (fx \rightarrow gx)$ ，“对于每个 x，如果 x 是 f，则 x 是 g”。这个命题没有存在内含，因为不像包含存在量词的命题，即使不存在 x，这个命题也可以是真的。

“我们看到，一个表述 'a' 出现于理论中，可以具有或没有命名一个对象的含意。真正决定问题的是量化表示 ' $(\exists x)(x = a)$ '。带有存在内含的是存在量词，而不是 'a' 本身。” —奎因：《本体论的相对性》，1969年，第94页。

存在个例化

谓词逻辑中的一种推理规则，通过从存在量化陈述 $(\exists x)fx$ 到它的一个存在个例 fa 的程序，去除存在量词。举一个日常语言的例子，它是一种从“有些人是会死的”推出“苏格拉底是会死的”程序。存在个例化与存在概括形成对照，后者从存在量化陈述的一个例子中产生存

generalisation, which generates an existentially quantified statement from one of its instances.

"To substitute 'This girl is' for 'There is a girl' in 'There is a girl in father's chair' is to produce an existential instantiation of the latter." — C. J. F. Williams, *What is Existence*, p. 317.

Existential presupposition, another name for existential import

Existential proposition

In the traditional syllogism a proposition of the "I" form (Some P is Q) or the "O" form (Some P is not Q), which says that something having a particular property or lacking a particular property exists. Russell analyses existential propositions by appealing to the notion of a propositional function and saying that such propositions assert or deny the truth of at least one value of a propositional function and that their subject phrases are not referring terms. For instance, "some men are mortal" can be analysed into "there is at least one x, such that x is a man and x is mortal" and "some men are not mortal" can be analysed into "there is at least one x, such that x is a man and x is not mortal". The subject term in the original proposition moves to a predicate position in the analysis and thus loses its referring function. Sometimes Russell calls existential propositions negative general propositions, and they are also called existential statements.

"In ordinary language, the words 'some', 'a', and 'the' (in the singular) indicates existence propositions." — Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 468.

Existential quantifier

According to Frege, a particular categorical proposition in traditional logic of the form "Some S are P", can be analysed as "There is at least one thing x, such that x is S and x is P". This can be symbolised as $(\exists x)(Sx \wedge Px)$. $(\exists x)$ is called the "existential quantifier", and means "There is at least one thing x such that..." or "Something is...". An existential quantifier binds an open sentence into an existential proposition. Along with the universal quantifier, it is one of the two major operators in predicate logic. For Quine, the only satisfactory or intelligible sense of existence involves being an object which is a value of a variable bound by an existential quantifier. His claim raises questions about whether quantification and hence existence are limited to objects in first order predicate calculus.

"The existential quantifier $(\exists x)$ may be read 'At least one object x is such that...'" — Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981.

Existential statement, see existential proposition

在量化陈述。

“在‘在父亲的椅子上有一位姑娘’中用‘这个姑娘’取代‘有一个姑娘’，就产生了这个陈述的一个存在个例。”——威廉姆斯：《什么是存在》，第317页。

存在假定

“存在内含”的另一名称。

存在命题

在传统三段论中，“I”形式的命题（某些P是Q）或“O”形式的命题（某些P不是Q），它们说的是某种具有一特性的事物存在或某种缺少一特性的事物存在。罗素求助于命题函项的概念来分析存在命题，并说这样的命题肯定或否定了命题函项至少一个值为真，而它们的主词并非指称词。例如，“有些人是有死的”可以分析为“至少有一个x，使得x是人并且x是有死的”，而“有些人是不死的”可以分析为“至少有一个x，使得x是人并且x是不死的”。通过这种分析，原命题的主词移到了谓词的位置，于是失去了指称的作用。罗素有时又把存在命题叫做否定全称命题，它们又叫存在陈述。

“在日常语言中，‘有些’、‘有个’、（单称的）‘这’指示存在命题。”——罗素：《人类的知识》，1948年，第468页。

存在量词

按照弗雷格的观点，一个在传统逻辑中形式为“有些S是P”的特称直言判断，可以被分析为“至少存在一个事物x，并有x是S且x是P”。这可以被符号化作 $(\exists x)(Sx \wedge Px)$ 。 $(\exists x)$ 称为“存在量词”，意思是“至少存在一事物x并且……”或“某物是……”。存在量词把一个开放语句约束为存在命题。它与全称量词一起，是谓词逻辑中的两个主要算子。奎因认为，“存在”惟一令人满意和可理解的意义，牵涉到作为一个为存在量词约束的变量值的对象。他的观点引出了关于量化，从而“存在”是否仅限于一阶谓词演算中的对象的问题。

“存在量词 $(\exists x)$ 可以读作‘至少一个对象x如何如何……’”——奎因：《理论与事物》，1981年。

存在陈述

见“存在命题”条。

Existentialism

As a type of philosophy, existentialism began with the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, although the term "existentialism" was introduced by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel at the end of World War II. At that time, existentialism became a major philosophical movement in continental Europe. It grew from hostility towards the modern rationalism which characterised the Age of Reason. This rationalism claimed that reason is our highest faculty and that it is capable of solving any problem. It held that the universe is a coherent and intelligible system which can be comprehended in a deductive conceptual manner. The rationalism culminated in Hegel's Absolute Reason. Existentialism suggests that such belief in reason is itself irrational and rejects all purely abstract thinking. Instead of abstraction, it holds that philosophy should deal with the lives and experiences of individuals and their historical situations. Existentialism draws a fundamental distinction between essence and existence. Rationalist philosophy emphasises essence as the abstract common nature of things. In contrast, existentialism argues that existence precedes essence and starts its philosophical work from individual and particular existence. This doctrine is the source of its name. Existentialism is characterised by its concern with individuality and concreteness.

Existentialism further distinguishes two kinds of existence or being. One is the existence of things in the world that lack free will; the other, which Heidegger called *Dasein*, is human existence, characterised by reflection upon itself and free choice. Belief in the freedom of human beings is the most fundamental thesis of existentialism, which claims that the possibility of choice is the central fact of human nature. Existentialism takes human freedom as the basic subject-matter of its philosophical analysis. In relation to this freedom, intentionality, emotion, the absurdity of the world and basic human experiences of anxiety, dread and death become recurrent themes of existentialism. Major exponents of existentialism include Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Albert Camus. These authors present different existentialist perspectives. They are even divided into Christian existentialists (Jaspers and Marcel) and atheistic existentialists (the others mentioned above). Existentialism had important influence in literature and other artforms in Europe. Sometimes, existentialism is called philosophy of existence.

"What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity—a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch—and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment." —Sartre, *Existentialism & Humanism* (tr. by

生存主义 (一般译作“存在主义”)

作为一种哲学形态,生存主义(或存在主义)以克尔凯郭尔和尼采的著作为起点,尽管“生存主义”这个词是由法国哲学家G. 马塞尔于一次大战末才引入的。那时,生存主义在欧洲大陆成为了一个主要的哲学运动。对于作为理性时代特征的近代理性主义的反感促成了它。这种理性主义声称理性是我们最高的能力,它能够解决任何问题。它认定宇宙是一个能在演绎概念系统内得到理解的具有一致性和可理喻性的系统。这种理性主义在黑格尔的绝对理性中达到高峰,生存主义则认为,这种对于理性的信念本身就是非理性的,并拒绝所有纯粹抽象的思想。与抽象化相反,生存主义主张哲学应该与个人的生活和经验以及他们所处的历史情形打交道。它在本质和生存之间做出严格区分。理性主义哲学强调作为事物的抽象共同本性的本质。与之相反,生存主义则认为生存先于本质,并从个体的和特殊的生存那里开始其哲学工作。这样一个学说正是其名字的来源。生存主义以对个体性和具体性的关注为特征。

生存主义进一步区分了两种生存或存在。一种是缺乏自由意志的世中之物的存在;另一种是被海德格尔称之为“缘在”(Dasein)的人类存在,以反思自身和自由选择为特点。相信人类存在者的自由是生存主义最基本的主张;它认为选择的自由是人类本性的中心事实。生存主义将人类自由作为它哲学分析的基本主题。与自由相关,意向性、情绪、世界的荒谬性以及人类对于焦虑、恐惧和死亡的体验成为生存主义的经常话题。对于生存主义的主要阐发者包括K. 雅斯贝尔斯、G. 马塞尔、M. 海德格尔、J.-P. 萨特、M. 梅洛-庞蒂和A. 加缪。这些作家们提供了不同的生存主义视野。他们甚至被分成了基督教的生存主义者(雅斯贝尔斯和马塞尔)和无神论的生存主义者(上述的其他几位)。生存主义在欧洲的文学和其他艺术形式中有重要影响。有时,生存主义被称为“生存的哲学”。

“生存主义的中心(观点)乃是自由参与的绝对性和由此而来的文化类型的相对性。通过自由参与,每个人都在实现一种人性类型中实现他自己,这种参与不管是对谁而言,也不管在什么时代,总是可理解的;而这种绝对的参与就导致了文化类型的相对性。”——萨特:《生存主义和人道主义》(迈瑞特英译),1948年,第47页。

Mairei), 1948, p. 47.

Existentiell-existential distinction, see onto-ontological distinction

Existenz

A German term having a different meaning from its English equivalent "existence". Its specific connotations may be traced to Schelling and Kierkegaard, but it was brought to prominence by Karl Jaspers, who contrasted *Existenz* and *Dasein*. Contrary to Heidegger, he characterised *Dasein* as the empirical nature of a human being and the object of theoretical reflection. On his view, *Existenz* is authentic being or the genuine self. It is what is just mine. This authentic and unique self is infinitely open to new possibilities and cannot be thought conceptually by means of clear and distinct ideas. It is a self which is experienced and lived. *Existenz* is internally related to transcendence, on which it is directed, and it is realized through freedom. For Jaspers, *Existenz* and freedom are always interchangeable. *Existenz* is the ground for being, for freedom of thought and for action.

"*Existenz* is what never becomes object, the origin from which issues my thinking and acting, that where of I speak in ideas which discern nothing." — Jaspers, *Philosophie*, 1932, I, p. 15.

Exoteric

[from Greek; *exoterikos*, outer, external] Aristotle called his polished and published writings, most of which were in the style of Platonic dialogues, his exoteric writings. They were intended to be read by the public and non-specialists outside his school. In contrast, the Hellenistic Aristotelian commentators introduced the term esoteric (from Greek; *esoterikos*, inner) for Aristotle's treatises which were not published except as textbooks within the school and which were accessible only to a small circle of his own disciples. When Andronikos edited Aristotle's completed works in the first century AD, he did not include the exoteric writings. This might be the reason for their loss, and they survive only in a few fragments. Later on, exoteric doctrines and rituals were easily accessible and understood by the public, while esoteric doctrines and rituals were secret and mysterious and conveyed only to a small inner circle.

"There are external goods and goods of the soul, ... a distinction which we also draw in exoteric writings." — Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1218b34.

生存者的与生存论的区别

见“存在者的与存在论的区别”条。

生存

这是一个与其对应的英语词 "existence" (生存、存在) 的意义有所不同的德文词。它的特别含义可以追溯到谢林和克尔凯郭尔, 但在 K. 雅斯贝尔斯那里, 由于区分了 *Existenz* (生存) 与 *Dasein* (缘在或此在), 这种特殊含义被突出出来。与海德格尔 (的用语) 相反, 雅斯贝尔斯将 *Dasein* 视为人类的经验本性和理论反思的对象。按照他的观点, 生存 (*Existenz*) 是真正切身的存在或真的自我。它就是我。这种真切和独特的自我对于新的可能性无限地开放, 不能用明白清晰的概念对其做概念的思考。它是一个被体验着和生活着的自我。生存内在关联于它所朝向的超越性, 并通过自由而得到实现。对于雅斯贝尔斯, 生存和自由 (这两个词) 总是可互换的。生存是存在的基础、是自由思想和行为的基础。

"生存是那绝不会变成对象的东西, 是我思想和行为的源头, 是我在不分辨任何东西的观念中所言及者。" — 雅斯贝尔斯, 《哲学》, 1932年, 第1卷, 第13页。

明传的

[源自希腊语 *exoterikos* (外面的, 外部的)] 亚里士多德把他润色过的、公开了的著作 (其中的多数是柏拉图式的对话风格) 说成明传的著作。它们本来就是打算给公众和他学派之外的非专业人士阅读的。与此相对应, 希腊化时期的亚里士多德评注家们造出了另一个词 *esoteric* (源自希腊语 *esoterikos*, 即 "内部的"), 用以指称除了作为学派内部的教本之外未曾公开的、只有他自己弟子的小圈子内才见得到的亚里士多德的论著。在安德罗尼科于公元1世纪编纂亚里士多德全集时, 他没有把明传的著作包括进去。这样做的原因, 或许是它们的佚失, 现在, 它们也只有—些残篇保留下来。后来, "明传的" 意指容易被公众接近和理解的学说和仪式, "秘传的" 则指只在内部的小圈子中传递的秘密而神秘的学说和仪式。

"存在着外在的善和灵魂的善, ... 在明传的著作中, 我们也描述过这种区别。" — 亚里士多德: 《欧德谟伦理学》, 1218b34。

Expected utility

The likelihood of the various possible outcomes of an act and their value for the agent. Under many circumstances, an agent may be faced with several possible courses of action. To decide which course of action he should take, the agent, if he is rational, should calculate the expected utility of each act and then perform the available action with the highest expected utility. Expected utility thus serves as a major reason for a rational act. But the calculation of expected utility involves some paradoxes, such as Newcomb's paradox, and the St. Petersburg paradox.

"The expected utility of an act is the sum of all the utilities that might accrue from its performance, each multiplied by the probability that the act will produce that utility." Ackermann, *Belief and Knowledge*, 1972, p. 45.

Experience

[from Greek: *empirie* and Latin: *experientia*] That which contrasts to what is merely thought or to what is accepted on the basis of authority or tradition. In philosophy, experience is generally what we perceive by the senses (sensory experience), what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection. In this sense, experience is associated with observation and experiment. Empiricism stresses that our knowledge must be based on experience, but rationalism claims that experience is a potential source of error and prefers rational certainty to mere empirical generalisation. In ordinary usage, for every experience there must be something experienced that is independent of the subject of experience. But in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There must be something given in experience, yet the status of the given is very controversial. Different answers respectively ground positions such as realism, idealism and scepticism. The different ways of understanding the given also involve different ways of understanding the notion of sense data. There is also debate about the relation between experience and theory. Starting with Kant, there has been a tendency to deny an account of experience as bare sensation that is unprocessed by thought. In modern philosophy of mind a major theme, which bears on many theoretical issues, concerns the alleged privacy of an experience as an event knowable only to its possessor and the possibility of public access to that experience.

"Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." -Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 1. 2.

Experiential proposition, another term for basic proposition

期望效用

类似于行为的各种可能的结果及其对当事人的价值之类的东西。在许多情况中,一个人可以面临几种可能的行为进程。要决定这个人应该采取哪一种行为进程,如果他有理性的话,他就应该计算一下每一种行为的期望效用,然后以最高的期望效用完成适当的行为。因而,期望效用就是理性行为的主要理由。但期望效用的计算涉及到一些悖论,诸如“纽康悖论”和“圣彼得堡悖论”。

“一个行为的期望效用,就是可以在其活动中得到增长的一切效用的总和,而其中的每个活动,都会由于这个行为将可能产生这种效用而成倍地增长。” 阿克曼:《信念与知识》,1972年,第45页。

经验

[源自希腊文 *empirie* 和拉丁文 *experientia*] 它与纯粹思想的东西或根据权威或传统被接受的东西相对。在哲学中,经验一般是指我们通过感官所知觉到的东西(感觉经验),指我们从他人那里学到的东西,或凡是从外部源泉或内部反省而来的东西。在此意义上,经验与观察和实验相联系。经验主义强调我们的知识必须建立在经验的基础上,而理性主义主张,经验是错误的潜在来源,所以宁择理性的确定性,而不要纯粹的经验概括。在“经验”的通常用法中,每一经验必定有不依赖于经验主体的被经验的东西。但是,在哲学中,作为意识状态的经验 and 独立的经验对象之间的关系成为争论的焦点。经验中必定有某种东西被给予;然而对于“被给予者”的地位有非常激烈的争论。各种不同的回答分别为实在论、唯心论、怀疑论等观点打下了基础。对“被给予者”的不同理解方式也涉及到对“感觉材料”的不同理解方式。对于经验和理论的关系也有争论。从康德起就有一种否认把经验说成是未经思想加工的纯粹感觉的倾向。在近代心的哲学中,与许多理论问题有关的一个主要题目涉及到所谓经验的私人性(经验是只能被它的所有者所知的事件)问题,以及对这种经验的公共可达性问题。

“它(心灵)是从哪里得到理性和知识的全部材料的呢?对此我用一句话来回答,是从经验得来的;我们的全部知识是建立在经验中的,知识最终是来自于经验的。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第一章,第2节。

经验命题

or protocol sentence

Experimentalism

A term for Dewey's form of pragmatism, which he also called instrumentalism or practicalism. Dewey believed that the pattern and standard for knowledge should be modern science and modern scientific methods, in particular the method of experiment. His thinking focuses on the analysis and evaluation of experiment. He claimed that the task of philosophy is the critical evaluation of belief and that the function of concepts is practical. Problem solving is an experiment in coping with ever new situations. Knowledge can only be understood within its context and must be justified in practical matters. Experimentalism is a theory of knowledge. It places emphasis on direct action and scientific control and concerns methods and consequences. Dewey's claims have played an important role in American intellectual culture. His emphasis on experiment corrects an excessive concentration on theory and observation in rival approaches to science.

"Since the method of modern science culminates in experimentation, Dewey's philosophy becomes pre-eminently the philosophy of experiment. It becomes experimentalism." —Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 542.

Explanandum, see explanation

Explanans, see explanation

Explanation

An account characteristically telling us why something exists or happens or must exist or happen. To explain is to increase knowledge, remove perplexity and diminish surprise. All theories have the function of explaining, but the nature of explanation is a philosophical issue. In an explanation, the thing being explained is called the *explanandum*, and the things used to explain it are called the *explanans*. An explanation is a general conclusion about the *explanandum* derived from the *explanans*. The standard view about the nature of scientific explanation is the covering law model of explanation. This view was proposed by Mill and fully elaborated by Hempel, and it holds that to explain is to put a particular event under a general law. This model is further divided into two types. For deductive-nomological explanation, if a law is deterministic, we may deduce an explanation of an event from the law and the antecedent conditions. For statistical explanation, if a law is probabilistic or statistical, the explanation is probabilistic. One difficulty faced by the covering model is how to explain the highest level of general laws. Various alternative views about explanation have been developed. Some philosophers suggest a causal approach,

“基本命题”或“记录语句”的另一说法。

实验主义

一个用于实用主义的杜威形式的术语。他也称其为“工具主义”或“实践主义”。杜威认为知识的模式和规范，应当是近代科学和近代科学方法，尤其是实验方法。他的思考集中于实验的分析和评价。他主张哲学的任务是对信念的批判性评价，而概念的功能是实践性的。解决问题就是一种应付不断出现的新情形的实验。知识只能在其情境中得以理解，并且必须在实际问题中加以辩护。实验主义是一种知识理论。它强调直接行动和科学控制，关心方法和效果。杜威的主张在美国思想文化中起着重要的作用。他对实验的强调纠正了其他科学进路中对理论与观察的过度关注。

“由于近代科学方法在实验法中达到顶点，杜威的哲学成为杰出的实验哲学。它成为实验主义。”——韦克美斯特：《美国哲学观念史》，1949年，第542页。

被说明项

见“说明”条。

说明项

见“说明”条。

说明

一种其特征为告诉我们为什么某物存在或发生、或必然存在或发生的陈述。说明就是要增加知识，去除困惑，减少惊异。所有理论都有说明的功能，但说明的本性却是个哲学问题。在一个说明中，被说明的事件称为“被说明项”，而用于说明它的事物则称为“说明项”。一个说明，就是由说明项推导出关于被说明项的一般结论。关于科学说明本性的标准观点是说明的“覆盖律模型”。它由密尔提出，并为亨佩尔所系统阐释，主张说明就是把特殊事件置于一般规律之下。这个模型可以进一步区分为两种类型。对于演绎—规律说明，如果这规律是决定论的，我们可以从规律和前提条件中演绎出对事件的说明；对于统计说明，如果规律是概率的或统计的，则说明也是或然性的。覆盖律模型所面临的主要困难之一，是如何说明最高层的一般规律。关于说明的种种替代观点也发展起来。有些哲学家提出一种因果的方法，认为说明就是要识别出产生事件、状态和规则性的基础性机制。另一些人则相信，说明就是要提供现象的相容的统一。还有人论辩说，说明需要针对听众的认识

claiming that to explain is to identify the underlying mechanisms that produce events, states and regularities. Others believe that to explain is to provide a coherent unification of phenomena. Still others argue that explanation needs to be adjusted to the epistemic or practical needs of the audience. There is debate about whether explanation requires necessity (thus ruling out statistical explanation) and about how claims to natural necessity could be justified. There is also debate over Dilthey's contrast between scientific explanation and historical understanding. Some argue that particularistic historical explanation and narrative explanation differ in kind from explanation in terms of laws. To explain a human action is normally to appeal to the beliefs and desires which provide the agent's reasons for so acting. Whether this kind of explanation can conform to the covering law model is also a matter of controversy.

"An individual fact is said to be explained, by pointing out its cause, that by stating the law or laws of causation, of which its production is an instance." *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 464.

Explanation sketch

A term introduced by Carl Hempel, who argues that the paradigm of scientific explanation is given by the covering law model. According to this model, we explain a particular event by bringing it under a general covering law. Hempel claims that historical explanation also conforms to this pattern. However, there are rarely general laws in history in the way that there are general natural scientific laws, and normally historians do not explain particular actions by appealing to any universal law. Therefore, there seems to be a limitation to applying a model of scientific explanation to the work of historians. Hempel recognises this limitation, but maintains that historical explanation and scientific explanation remain the same type in principle. They differ only because scientists seek to offer full explanations, while historians offer explanation sketches, which vaguely and incompletely approximate fully warranted scientific explanations. An explanation sketch is an outline of what a full explanation would be if it could be discovered. The validity of an explanation sketch relies on its capacity to indicate what must be done in order to transform it into a completely satisfactory explanation. In spite of the attractions of a unified account of explanation, many philosophers of history have questioned the adequacy of the explanation sketch model and have explored alternative accounts of historical explanation.

"What the explanatory analysis of historical events offers is, then, in most cases not an explanation in one of the meanings developed above, but something that might be called an *explanation sketch*. Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant, and needs 'filling out' in order to turn

或实践的需要作调整。围绕着说明是否需要必然性(从而排除统计说明)和有关自然必然性的主张如何辩护,展开了争论。关于狄尔泰对科学说明和历史理解之间的对立也有争论。还有人争辩说,特殊化的历史说明和叙述说明,在类别上与按规律进行的说明不同。说明一个人类行动,通常要诉诸给行为者这么做以理由的信念和愿望。这一类说明是否能与覆盖律模型相符也是众说纷纭的。

"一个单个的事实通过指出其原因,即通过陈述规律或因果律而据说得到说明,这个事实的产生是这些规律的一个例证。"——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第464页。

说明框架

K. 亨佩尔提出的一个术语。亨佩尔论证说,科学说明的范式是由覆盖律模型提供。根据这一模型,我们通过把某一特定事件纳入一个一般覆盖律下来解释它。亨佩尔认为,历史说明也适合这一模式。然而,历史学中几乎没有像普遍的自然科学规律那样的普遍规律,而且在正常情况下,历史学家也不是通过求助普遍规律来解释某种特定行为的。因此,把自然科学说明模式运用于历史学家的研究似乎存在限制。亨佩尔认识到这种限制,但他坚持认为,历史说明和科学说明在原则上仍属同一类别。它们的区别仅在于科学家试图提供完满的说明,而历史学家提供的是粗略的说明,后者模糊地、不完全地近似于有充分保证的科学说明。如果说明框架能够被发现的话,它就是那种完满说明的一个大纲。一个说明框架的有效性在于它能表明为了将其转变为一个令人完全满意的说明而必须做的事情。尽管对说明的统一论述有吸引力,许多历史哲学家仍对这种说明框架模式的适用性提出了疑问,并已在探寻对历史说明的其他的说明。

"在大多数情况下,对历史事件的说明性分析所提供的并非是上述一种意义上的说明,而是可被称为'说明框架'的东西。这种框架包括或多或少的对规律的模糊的暗示和被认为是相关的初始条件,为使其变为完满的说明还需对它进行'填充'。"——亨佩尔:《普遍规律在历史学中的功能》,载于加德纳(编辑):《历史理论》,1959年,第351页。

into a full-fledged explanation."—Hempel, "The Function of General Law in History", in Gardiner (ed), *Theories of History*, 1959, p. 351.

Explanation / understanding, see understanding / explanation

Explication

A term introduced by Carnap for the modification or replacement of an expression of natural language or a pre-theoretic concept by a logically or theoretically more explicit expression or concept. The purpose of explication is to reduce or eliminate vagueness or ambiguity or to establish the logical relation between an expression and other explicit expressions in a domain. What is to be modified is called the *explicandum*, and it is replaced by the *explicatum*. In analytic philosophy, explication, as a synonym for analysis or explanation, has been considered to be the main task of logical analysis.

"By the explication of a familiar but vague concept we mean its replacement by a new exact concept."—Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, 1947, p. 7.

Explicit definition

An explicit definition defines a term by means of other terms and states directly and explicitly its intension, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the term's applicability. An explicit definition is equivalent to the word being defined. As a result, the *definiendum* and the *definiens* become interchangeable in any context without a change of meaning. For instance, that "man is a rational animal" is an explicit definition. So, wherever we use the term "man", we can substitute "rational animal" for it. An explicit definition is what we normally understand a definition to be. It can be contrasted to an implicit definition, which defines a term by stating that it is implied by certain axioms rather than by directly stating its intension.

"An explicit definition is a rule legitimising substitution of one symbol for another, and in virtue of such a rule the defined symbol may always be eliminated and replaced by the definiens without change of meaning of the sentence in which it occurs."—Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 288.

Exportation

A principle of inference which states that a conditional statement having conjunctive antecedents can be replaced by a conditional statement having conditional consequents. From the premise "If p and q, then r" [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$], we can conclude "If p, then if q then r" [$p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)$]. This inference is indeed a strict implication and can therefore be expressed as $\vdash [(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r] \leftrightarrow \vdash [p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)]$. The reverse of this inference is also true and is called importation.

解释和理解

见“理解和解释”条。

精释

由卡尔纳普引入的一个术语，它是指用逻辑上或理论上更明晰的表达式或概念去修正或替换自然语言中的一个表达式。精释的目标是减少或消除模糊性或歧义性，或者确立在某范围内的一个表达式和其他明晰的表达式之间的逻辑关系。将被修正的表达式叫做被精释项 (*explicandum*)，它要被精释项 (*explicatum*) 所代替。在分析哲学中，精释作为分析或说明的同义词，已被认为是逻辑分析的主要任务。

“所谓对一个熟知却模糊的概念进行精释，我们是指它被一个新的精确概念所代替。”——卡尔纳普：《意义与必然性》，1947年，第7页。

显定义

显定义用其他语词定义一语词，直接和明白地陈述其内涵，及该语词的可应用性的必要而充分的条件。显定义与被定义语词相等。其结果是，被定义词和定义词在任何语境中都可相互替换而意义不变。例如，“人是理性动物”是一显定义。因此，不论我们在何处使用“人”这一语词，我们都可代之以“理性动物”。显定义是我们通常所理解的定义。它和隐定义不同，后者定义语词是靠陈述它由某个公理所蕴涵，而不是直接陈述其内涵。

“显定义是使得以一个符号代替另一个符号合法的规则，借助于此规则，被定义符号总可以被定义符号消除和代替，而不改变包含它们的语句的意义。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949年，第288页。

输出

一条推理原则。它确定，一个具有合取前件条件陈述句可以作为一个具有条件后件的陈述句所取代。从前提“如果 p 和 q，则 r” [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$]，我们可以推得，“如果 p，那么如果 q 则 r” [$p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)$]。这一推理是严格蕴涵，可以表达为 $\vdash [(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r] \leftrightarrow \vdash [p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)]$ 。这一推理的逆转也是正确的，叫做输入。

“如果 p 隐含 p，并且 q 隐含 q，那么，如果

"If p implies p and q implies q , then if pq implies r , then p implies that q implies r . This is... called exportation." — Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, 1937, p. 16.

Expression theory

A theory, developed by Croce, Cassirer, Santayana, Dewey, Collingwood and Ducasse, holding that all works of art are expressions of the emotions and feelings of their artists. The properties of an artwork can be designated by the same words which designate the feelings, emotions, attitudes and moods of human beings. Artistic creation originates with the highly specific but chaotically indeterminate emotional states of an artist. Such a state drives an artist to endeavour to articulate, clarify and stabilise this emotion or feeling. An artwork is the intuitionlising of this feeling and the embodiment of it in some definite and tangible concrete form. Hence artistic creation is a process of achieving self-expression. Beauty is successful expression. For instance, the meaning of a musical work is its expression of a psychological state or quality, such as fortitude, melancholy or gaiety. The appreciation of art requires us to retrieve the psychological states undergone by the artist during creation.

The expression theory rejects any instrumentalist view of art. It argues that the production of art is not a matter of technique, which is essential only for crafts, rather than for art proper. The concrete form of an artwork is merely a vehicle for communicating artistic feeling. This theory is influenced by Hegel's idealism and a version of it has been associated with Freudian psychological theory. It has been criticised for ignoring the capacity for art to express religious and philosophical ideas as well as the artist's emotions and for ignoring the individuality and peculiarities of artworks. Critics also point out that judging a work of art does not require one to recreate the psychological processes involved in its production.

"Expression theory, in replacing the beauty theory of art and the concept of art as imitation, whether of a naturalistic reality or a beautiful reality, found the essence of art to lie in the very process of expression itself." — Hofstadter, *Truth and Art*, 1965, p. 15.

Extended logic, see deviant logic

Extended substance, see thinking substance

Extension

In contrast to intension, connotation or meaning, but sometimes used as a synonym for denotation or reference. The extension of a general term or a predicate expression is the class or the range of entities of which the general term or

pq 隐含 r , 则 p 隐含 q 隐含 r . 这叫做……输出。”——罗素:《数学原则》, 1937 年, 第 16 页。

表现说

表现说的倡导者有克罗齐、卡西尔、桑塔亚那、杜威、柯林伍德和杜卡锡等人。他们认为所有艺术作品都是艺术家之情绪和情感的表现。表明艺术作品特性的是用来表明人类情感、情绪、态度与心态的那些语言文字。艺术创造源自艺术家的那些极为独特但又朦胧不定的情感状态。这类情况驱动艺术家千方百计地设法表达、澄明和稳定这种情绪或情感。一件艺术作品是以某种鲜明可感的具体形式对这种情感的直觉与体现。因此, 艺术创造是获得自我表现的过程。美是成功的表现。譬如, 一部音乐作品的意义在于它对某一心理状态或特质的表现, 像刚毅、忧伤或欢快等等。艺术鉴赏要求人们追忆艺术家在创作过程中所经历过的各种心理状态。

表现说摒弃任何工具主义的艺术观, 认为艺术生产并非技术问题, 因为技术仅仅对工艺品而非艺术才具有本质意义。艺术作品的具体形式只是传达艺术家之情感的载体。表现说是受黑格尔唯心论的影响, 同时与弗洛伊德的心理分析理论相关。表现说一直遭到批评, 因为它忽视艺术表现宗教和哲学思想以及艺术家情感的能力, 忽视艺术作品的个性或独特性。批评家还进而指出, 评判一件艺术作品无需人们再创造艺术生产过程中所涉及到的心理过程。

"表现说取代了艺术美论与艺术即模仿的概念。无论是自然主义现实的表现说还是优美现实的表现说, 均发现艺术的本质就在于表现的过程之中。"——霍夫斯塔特:《真与艺术》, 1965 年, 第 15 页。

扩充逻辑

见“变异逻辑”条。

广延实体

见“思维实体”条。

外延

与内涵、内包或意义相对, 但有时用作所指或指称的同义词。普遍词项或谓词表达式的外延就是普遍词项或谓词表达式对之为真或所适用的那些实体的类或范围, 例如, 普遍词项“绿

predicate expression is true or to which this term applies. For example, the extension of the general term "green" is the whole set of things of which it is true to say that they are green. The extension of a proper name is the individual object to which it refers. For instance, England is the extension of the term "England". Frege held that a proposition also has an extension, namely its truth-value. Something is called extensional if it pertains to extension.

"The extension of a term ... is the set of things to which it is applicable." —W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 1962, p. 318.

Extension (metaphysics)

For Descartes geometric extension in length, breadth and depth is the defining characteristic of matter or corporeal substance, just as thought is of thinking substances. Extension and thought are respectively the principal properties or attributes of the two substances, for they constitute the essence of matter and mind. A body may extend in many ways and this is the grounding of the various properties of matter. But all these are simply modes of extension. This idea is echoed by Spinoza who also believed that extension and thinking are two attributes of substance. To explain physical phenomena in terms of the modifications of the simple geometrical attributes of extension is to replace the scholastic notion of substantial form.

"By 'extension' we mean whatever has length, breadth and depth, leaving aside the question whether it is a real body or merely a space." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al.), vol. 1, 1989, p. 59.

Extensional logic, see intensional logic

Extensionalism

An approach in the philosophy of logic and semantics, associated with Frege, Russell, Carnap and especially Quine, that reduces the intensional to the extensional. Intensional meaning presupposes the existence of meant entities and is definable only in terms of other intensional ideas. In contrast, extensional meaning implies that terms solely designate existent objects and that co-designating terms are interchangeable in any syntactical context without loss of truth-value (*salva veritate*). Extensionalism argues that the idea of intensional meaning is obscure and a myth and suggests that legitimate scientific theory can only be extensional. It rejects reference to non-existent objects and propositional attitudes expressed in intensional terms. This theory is based on the thesis of extensionality formulated by Carnap, which states that once the obscurities and confusions of ordinary language are revealed and all non-existents are excluded, all sentences made in an intensional language can be translated

色的"的外延就是说它们是绿色的为真的那些事物的整个集合。专名的外延是它所指称的个体对象,例如,英格兰是词项"英格兰"的外延。弗雷格认为,命题也有外延,就是它的真值。如果一事物从属于外延,就把它叫做外延的。

"一词项的外延,……就是它所适用的事物的集合。" — W. 涅尔和 M. 涅尔:《逻辑学的发展》,1962年,第318页。

广延(形而上学)

在笛卡尔看来,长、宽、高的几何广延是物质或有形实体的确定特征,正如思想是思维实体的确定特征一样。广延和思想分别是这两种实体的主要性质或属性,因为它们分别构成了物质和心灵的本质。一个物体可以在许多方面延展,这是物质的各种不同性质的基础。但是,所有这些性质只是广延的样式。这个思想得到了斯宾诺莎的响应,他也认为广延和思想是实体的两个属性。根据简单的几何广延属性的变化来说明物理现象,其目的是取代经院哲学的实体形式的概念。

"我们用'广延'是指具有长、宽、高的任何东西,而不问它是一个实在的物体或仅仅是一个空间。" ——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第一卷,1989年,第59页。

外延逻辑

见"内涵逻辑"条。

外延主义

与弗雷格、罗素、卡尔纳普,尤其是奎因相联系的一种逻辑哲学和语义学的方法,它把内涵还原为外延。内涵意义预设了所意指存在体的存在,并且只有用其他内涵观念才能定义。而与此对照,外延意义意味着术语仅指示存在的对象,并且共指术语在任何句法语境中可以互换而无损其真值(*salva veritate*)。外延主义争辩说,内涵意义的观念是含糊的,是一个神话,并且提出合理的科学理论只能是外延的。它反对指称非实存对象,以及以内涵术语表示的命题态度。这一理论立足于由卡尔纳普所阐述的"外延性论题",其表述为一旦日常语言的含糊和混乱被揭露,所有的非实存被排除,所有以内涵语言表述的语句都能被完全翻译成外延语言。外延主义为奎因所进一步发展,他提出,一种合适的逻辑应当排除所有像命题态度、引证语境和模态语境这样的内涵语境,因为它们不

entirely into an extensional language. Extensionalism has been further developed by Quine, who suggests that an adequate logic should eliminate all intensional contexts such as propositional attitudes, quotational and modal contexts because they fail to permit quantification and fail to support the substitution *salva veritate* of extensionally codesignating terms.

"Extensionalism, as we are using this term, is a version of scepticism, about the scientific feasibility of attempting to explicate the concept of meaning. According to the extensionalist position, the logical form of sentences and expressions in natural language can be accounted for on the basis of the concept of extension, without recourse to the concept of meaning." —Katz, *Semantic Theory*, 1972, p. 233.

Extensionality, axiom of

A postulate of set theory formulated by Zermelo which states that two sets or classes are identical if and only if they have the same members. Any sets A and B which are alike in members are identical. Hence, a set is determined by its members. This axiom is a form of the indiscernibility of identicals or Leibniz's law, according to which if two things are identical, their properties are the same.

"One axiom that we shall certainly want in some form or other is that of extensionality, also known as that of *Bestimmtheit* or definiteness; classes are the same whose members are the same." —Quine, *Set Theory and its Logic*, 1963, p. 30.

Extensionality, thesis of

A thesis introduced by Carnap and providing the basis for extensionalism. It states that once the obscurities and confusions of ordinary language are revealed and all non-existents are excluded, all sentences formed in an intensional language can be translated entirely into an extensional language. For any nonextensional system there is an extensional system into which it can be translated. In an extensional system, given any statement s which contains a proposition p as a part, we can substitute for p any other proposition which has the same truth-value as p without altering the truth-value of s . Thus, in any statement about a propositional function, any formally equivalent function may be substituted without changing the truth value of the statement. Accordingly, statements in any language can be translated while keeping the same truth-value. This thesis, however, is not true of propositions asserting propositional attitudes.

"We will now formulate the thesis of extensionality in a way which is at the same time more complete and less ambitious, namely, a universal language of science may be extensional; or, more exactly: for every given intensional language S_1 , an extensional language S_2 may be constructed such that S_1 can be translated into S_2 ." —Carnap, *The Logical*

允许量词限定, 不能支持外延共指术语的真值无损替换。

"外延主义, 当我们使用这一术语时, 是一种对尝试阐明意义概念的科学可行性的怀疑论见解。按照外延主义立场, 自然语言中的语句和表述的逻辑形式可以在外延概念的基础上得以解释, 无须求助于意义概念。" ——卡兹:《语义学理论》, 1972年, 第233页。

外延性公理

由策梅罗表述的一条集合论公设, 它陈述说: 两个集合或类相等, 当且仅当它们有同样的元素。任意两个集合, A 和 B, 如果元素相同, 则它们是相等的。所以, 一个集合由其元素所决定。这一公理是同一不可分辨原则或莱布尼茨律的一种形式, 后者是说: 如果两事物是相等的, 则它们的性质是同样的。

"我们确实需要的某种形式的公理是外延性公理, 它也以确定性公理而知名: 其元素相同的类是相同的。" ——奎因:《集合论及其逻辑》, 1963年, 第30页。

外延性论题

由卡尔纳普引入的论题, 它为外延主义提供了基础。它陈述道: 一旦揭示出日常语言的隐晦性和含混性, 并排除掉所有不存在的东西, 在一内涵语言中所形成的所有语句都能够完全翻译到一外延语言中去。对于任何非外延系统来说, 总存在一个可以将其翻译进去的外延系统。在外延系统中, 给定任何包含 p 作为支命题的陈述 s , 我们可以用任何与 p 有同样真值的另外命题去替换 p , 而不会改变 s 的真值。于是, 在任何有关一命题函项的陈述中, 任意形式等值的函项都可以被替换而不会改变该陈述的真值。相应地, 任意语言内的陈述都可以在保留同一真值的条件下被翻译。不过, 这一论题对断定命题态度的命题并不成立。

"我们现在将以一种更完善且更谨慎的方式去表述外延性论题, 即科学的通用语言将是外延的; 或者更精确地说, 对于每一个给定的内涵语言 S_1 , 都可以构造出一外延语言 S_2 , 使得 S_1 能翻译到 S_2 中去。" ——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》, 1937年, 第245页。

Syntax of Language, 1937, p. 245.

Extensive magnitude

For Kant, extensive magnitudes are the spatial-temporal dimensions which can be used to measure things of certain types. In contrast, intensive magnitudes are degrees of intensiveness of a sense experience and are matters of quality rather than quantity. A physical object has extensive magnitude, while beauty has an intensive magnitude. Kant held that the principal feature of the axioms of intuition is that "all intuitions are extensive magnitudes" and that the principal feature of the anticipations of perception is that "in all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree".

"I entitled a magnitude extensive when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B203.

External perception, see inner perception

External point of view, see internal point of view

External property, see right (Kant)

External questions, see internal questions

External relation

When A stands in relation R to B, if R is not a constitutive element of either A or B, it is an external and unessential relation, for it is a contingent matter for A and B to be related in this way. Otherwise, the relation is an intrinsic or internal relation. The distinction between external and internal relations can be traced to the Hume's distinction between relations of fact and relations of ideas, and became a major argument for the rejection of absolute idealism by Moore and Russell and a point of contention between Royce's idealism and neo-realism. According to idealism, the existence of things depends on their being experienced, and hence the relation between the things and experience of them is internal. But realism claims that things exist outside of experience and are connected with consciousness by external relations. The contents of things are not made up of their relations to consciousness. The knowledge relation is not constitutive of the objects of knowledge. The nature of reality cannot be inferred merely from the nature of knowledge. For realism, the idealist view of the internal relation between knowing and known involves an egocentric predicament.

外延量

在康德看来,外延量是空间-时间维度,它通常能用来衡量某些种类的事物。与此相反,内涵量是感觉经验的强弱程度,是质的而不是量的事情。一个物理对象有外延量,而美却有内涵量。康德认为,“直观之公理”的主要特征是,“一切直观都是外延量”,而“知觉之预想”的原理特征是,“在一切现象中,作为感觉对象之实在,皆有内涵量,即程度”。

“其部分的表象使其全体的表象成为可能,并必然先于全体表象,我把这种量命名为外延的。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B203。

外知觉

见“内知觉”条。

外在观点

见“内在观点”条。

外在所有权

见“权利(康德)”条。

外部问题

见“内部问题”条。

外在关系

当A在与B的关系R中,如果R是既非A、也非B的构成要素,它就是一种外在的和非本质的关系,因为它对A和B以这种方式相关是偶然的事。反之,这关系即为一种固有的或内在的关系。外在关系和内在关系的区分可以追溯到休谟对事实的关系和观念的关系的区分,并且成为摩尔和罗素反对绝对唯心论的主要论证,也成为罗伊斯的唯心论与“新实在论”之间争论的焦点。按照唯心论,事物的存在依赖于它们被经验,因此事物与它们的经验之间的关系是内在的。但是实在论主张事物存在于经验之外,通过外在关系与意识相联系。事物的内容并非由它们与意识的关系所构成。知识关系并非知识对象的构成要素。实在的本性不能仅仅由知识的本性推断出来。在实在论看来,唯心论关于认识和被认识者之间的内在关系的观点陷入了一种自我中心的困境。

“我所说的一个关系是内在的,是指当给定某些带有某些性质的项,这个关系必然存在于这些项之间。它存在于包含这些项且这些项具

"A relation is internal, as I shall use the term, when given certain terms with certain natures, the relation must hold between the terms. It holds 'in every possible world' that contains those terms and where these terms have these natures. With an external relation there is no such necessity." —Armstrong, *Universals*, 1989, p. 41.

External world

The external world comprises the system of things and events external to our perceptions. Since perception is relative to one individual, other persons may also be parts of the external world. The central philosophical problem about the external world is as follows. Since perception is the only channel by which we as subjects are connected with the world, how do we know whether perception gives us correct reports about the world? Formulated another way, the problem becomes how to make sense of perceptual statements. Our experience does not seem to be any different when it correctly represents the external world and when it does not. Can we directly perceive the external world, or must there be a medium of sense-data? This is one of the most important philosophical issues, and various major philosophical doctrines, such as realism, phenomenism and scepticism, arise from our attempts to solve problems about our knowledge of the external world.

"The experient himself has no way of telling, internally to his experience, whether the relationship holds between the immediate content of his experience and what it represents. This makes acute the so-called problem of the external world." —Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of Language*, 1963, p. 172.

Externalism

A theory of epistemic justification which is opposed to internalism. It denies that the justification of a belief requires the believer to be aware of the cognitive process of the given belief. Internalism, which holds that one must have this awareness, has difficulty in explaining the ascription of knowledge to unsophisticated adults or to young children, and in explaining some classical problems such as induction. Externalism suggests instead that the nature of a belief is at least partly determined by the surrounding objective world, rather than solely subjectively. Therefore justification requires the consideration of factors external to one's consciousness. Externalism thus links justification to truth. There are various forms of externalism, and the most influential include reliabilism, which claims that justification depends on the reliability of the cognitive process generating the belief, and probabilism which claims that justification should be evaluated in terms of probability. In the philosophy of language, externalism claims that to understand a sentence S descriptively is to know under what conditions S is

有这些性质的‘每一个可能世界之中’。对外在关系则不存在这种必然性。”——阿姆斯特朗：《普遍》，1989年，第41页。

外在世界

外在世界是指外在于我们知觉的事物和事件的系统。由于知觉相对于个人而言，因而其他的人也会成为外在世界的一部分。关于外在世界的核心哲学问题是这样：由于知觉是我们与世界相联系的惟一渠道，因而我们怎么能够知道知觉为我们提供的是对世界的正确报道呢？用另一种方法来说，这个问题就变成了，如何使知觉陈述具有意义。我们的经验在正确表现外在世界或没有正确地表现外在世界时，似乎并没有什么不同。我们能够直接知觉到外在世界吗，或者一定存在感觉材料的中介？这是最重要的哲学问题之一，各种主要的哲学问题讨论，诸如实在论、现象学、怀疑论等等，都开始于试图解决我们关于外在世界知识的问题。

“经验者自己无法（内在于其经验地）告诉说，这种关系是否还存在于他经验的当下内容与被描述出来的东西之间。这使所谓的外在世界问题变得尖锐起来。”——丹托：《分析的语言哲学》，1963年，第172页。

外在论

与“内在论”相对的关于认知辨明的理论。它否定对信念的阐明需要信念者意识到这个信念的认识过程。内在论认为，人们必须具有这种意识，但这很难解释把知识赋予头脑简单的成人和儿童，很难解释诸如归纳这样的传统问题。相反，外在论提出，信念的性质至少部分地是由客观的背景世界确定的，而不是仅仅由主观确定的。因而，阐明就需要考虑到个人意识之外的因素。这样，外在论就把阐明与真理联系起来了。有各种形式的外在论，最有影响的包括“可靠论”和“概率论”，前者认为，阐明依赖于产生信念的认识过程的可靠性，而后者认为，阐明应该用概率加以评价。在语言哲学中，“外在论”是指这样一种立场，即要描述性地理解句子S，就是要知道S在什么条件下是真的。

“外在论者……认为，即使知者对这种阐明无所知，信念仍然是可以得到证明的。”——曼蒂：《数学中的实在论》，1990年，第73页。

true.

"The externalist ... insists that a belief can be justified even though the knower is ignorant of that justification." — Maddy, *Realism in Mathematics*, 1990, p. 73.

Externalism (ethics)

Ethical externalism (also called motivational externalism) holds that the justification of an action is separate from the motivation, for the former is merely an issue about the degree to which an action conforms with the best moral principles. A person's belief that he ought to do something is the reason for him to do that thing, regardless of whether he has motivation. To recognise a moral truth is one thing, and to be motivated by it is quite another. Externalism is opposed to internalism (also called motivational internalism) which maintains that we accept a moral truth only if we have at least a *prima facie* motivation for acting under the guidance of that moral truth.

"Externalism holds ... that the necessary motivation is not supplied by ethical principles and judgements themselves, and that an additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance." — Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism*, 1970, p. 7.

Extra human fertilization, another expression for *in vitro fertilization*

Extrinsic value

Also called instrumental value or extrinsic good, the value which is pursued not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, especially for the beneficial consequences it will bring about. It is contrasted with intrinsic value, which is pursued in and for itself. A thing has an extrinsic value because it is a means to the achievement of intrinsic value or because it in some sense contributes to such achievement. For instance, if we exercise for the sake of health, exercise is extrinsically valuable while health is intrinsically valuable. One thing can sometimes be both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable.

"The intrinsically valuable is usually described as that which is good in itself or good for its own sake; the extrinsically valuable, as that which has value as instrumental to something else." — C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, 1946, p. 382.

外在论 (伦理)

伦理外在论 (又称“动机外在论”)认为, 对于一个行为的辩护是与动机相分离的, 因为前者仅是一个行为在多大程度上与最好的道德原则一致的问题。不管一个人是否有动机, 他相信他应当做某事, 对于他来说, 就是他做这件事的理由。认识到道德真理是一回事, 为它所推动是相当不同的另一回事。这是与“内在论” (也称“动机内在论”)相反的。内在论主张, 只有当我们至少具有愿在某一道德真理指导下行动这种条件性动机时, 我们才能接受那道德真理。

“外在论认为, ……必要的动机不为伦理原则和判断所提供, 需要一个心理上的约束力推动我们去遵守它们。”——内格尔:《利他主义的可能性》, 1970年, 第7页。

人体外受精

“试管受精”的另一种表述。

外在价值

亦称工具价值或外在的善, 指所追求的价值不是为了它自身, 而是为了另外的东西, 尤其是为了它将带来的有利的结果。与此对应的是“内在价值”, 即所追求的价值在自身中且为了自身。一个事物具有外在价值, 因为它是获得内在价值的手段, 或因为它在某种意义上有助于内在价值的实现。例如, 如果我们为了健康而锻炼, 那么, 锻炼有外在价值, 健康是内在价值。有时候, 一物能够既有内在的又有外在的价值。

“内在的价值通常被描述为自身是善或为了自身是善的东西; 外在的价值则被描述为作为工具对别物有价值。”——刘易斯:《对知识和价值的分析》, 1946年, 第382页。

F

Fact

[from Latin *factum*, originally something done, a deed or an action] Starting in the seventeenth century, a fact is described as a set of objects in the objective world related in certain ways which can be stated by a proposition or judgement. The constituents of facts are things and qualities or relations. While things are named but not asserted, facts are asserted but not named. Facts must be expressed by a sentence rather than by a single term. Facts are objects of propositions and decide their truth or falsity. Wittgenstein claims in his *Tractatus* that the world is the totality of facts, not of things and that the ultimate constituents of the world are atomic facts.

Facts can be either positive (the *s* is *p*) or negative (the *s* is not *p*). We can also distinguish between particular facts (the *s* is *p*) and universal facts (all *s*'s are *p*) and between brute facts (which involve no rules or institutions, such as the fact that I raise my hand) and institutional facts (which depend on rules or institutions, such as the fact that I promise). There is also a distinction between fact (what is) and value (what ought to be). The view that facts are independent of propositions and that the truth and falsity of propositions is determined by whether they are paired with the facts which they state is central to the correspondence theory of truth.

"We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a 'fact'." —Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 183.

Fact/ value gap, see *is / ought gap*

Facticity

Heidegger held that facticity comprises the concrete situations and the cultural and historical contexts into which *Dasein* finds itself thrown *a priori* and which constitute the concrete limitations of human possibilities. As one component of care, facticity is a mode of Being of *Dasein*. In contrast, Heidegger called what are merely material and non-human conditions factuality. *Dasein* exists not factually, but factically. Its facticity indicates that *Dasein* cannot transcend its concrete situations as a free floating spirit, but must have its Be-

事实

[源自拉丁文 *factum*, 原意为“已成之事”、“事迹”或“行动”] 从17世纪开始, 事实被说成是在客观世界中以某种方式相关联的一组对象, 它们可以用命题或判断来陈述。事实的组成部分是事物和性质, 或者关系。事物被命名而不是被断定, 而事实是被断定而不是被命名。事实必须用语句而不是用单个的词来表达。事实是命题的对象, 并决定命题的真假。维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中认为, 世界是事实的总和, 而不是事物的总和, 世界的最终构成部分是“原子事实”。

事实既可以是“肯定的”(这个*s*是*p*), 也可以是“否定的”(这个*s*不是*p*)。我们也可以在特称事实(这个*s*是*p*)和全称事实(所有的*s*是*p*), 以及没有理性的事实(它们不涉及规则或建制, 比如我举手这一事实)和建制性事实(它们有赖于规则或建制, 比如我许诺这一事实)之间作出区分。在事实(是什么)和价值(应该是什么)之间也有区分。认为事实独立于命题, 而确定命题的真假是根据它们是否与它们所陈述的事实相符, 这种看法是“真理符合论”的核心。

“例如, 当我们说某一事物具有某一性质, 或此事物对另一事物具有某一关系时, 我们就表述了一个事实。但有此性质或有此关系的事物并不是我所谓的‘事实’。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》, 1956年, 第183页。

事实/价值之分

见“‘是’和‘应该’之分”条。

实际性

海德格尔认为, 实际性由具体的形势和文化及历史的境况构成; 缘在(*Dasein*)总发现自己被抛投入了其中。并且, 它构成了人类种种可能性的具体限制。作为牵挂(*care*)的一个环节, 实际性是缘在存在的一种方式。与此相对, 海德格尔称那些仅仅物质性的和非人的条件为“现实性”。缘在不是现实性地而是实际性地生存。它的实际性显示出缘在不能像一个自由漂浮的精神那样超越它的具体形势; 而是必须在世界

ing in the world. Facticity is disclosed by one of *Dasein's* existentials, that is its state of mind. For Sartre, facticity was the set of facts relevant or given to the person, for example his physical characteristics, his parents and his unique position. It represents the contingency of human existence and belongs to being-in-itself. According to Sartre, this finitude of human existence does not determine our freedom or our fundamental project. Instead, it is the basis upon which we make our free choices. An infinite being does not need to exercise choice, and human choice consists precisely in discovering a person's facticity and seeking to negate or surpass its limitations towards existing as an ideal self-determining being.

"The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world." — Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 82.

Factual phenomenism, see phenomenism

Faculty

[from Latin: *facultas*, derived from *facilis*, easy + *facere*, make; Greek *dunamis*] Aristotle gave two definitions for faculty: (i) a power or function of soul to cause something, such as volition, sense, and intellect; and (ii) a potentiality which would be actualised by form. Both Aristotelian senses persisted through medieval philosophy to modern philosophy, but faculty has come increasingly to be used in the first sense. Kant distinguished the faculties (German: *Vermögen*) of the soul, which include the faculties of knowledge, feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and desire, and the faculties of cognition, which include the lower faculties of sensibility and the higher faculties of reason, judgement and understanding. He then established analogies between the faculties of soul and the higher faculties of cognition. The faculty of knowledge is related to that of understanding, and both are applied to the area of nature. The faculty of reason is related to that of desire, and both are applied to area of freedom. The faculty of judgement is related to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and both are applied to the area of art. Modern psychologists have criticised the use of the notion of faculty, but the extent to which this calls for revision in Kantian doctrine is uncertain. An appeal to the notion of faculty in doing philosophy was popular in German idealism, but was attacked by Nietzsche.

In an extended sense, since the middle ages a faculty has been a part of the structure of a University. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the faculties of law, medicine and theology were considered to be the higher facul-

中具有其存在。实际性通过缘在的生存方式之一，即处身情境 (state of mind) 而透露出来。对于萨特来说，实际性是涉及一个人或被给予一个人的一组事实，比如，他的身体条件、他的双亲和他的独特位置。它代表人类生存的暂时性，属于“在自身中的存在”（或“自在存在”）。按照萨特的观点，这种人类生存的有限性并不决定我们的自由或我们的基本谋划。相反，它只是我们据之以做出自由选择的基础。一个无限的存在并不需要去选择；人类的选择就正在于发现了人的实际性并去寻求否定或超越其限制，以朝向一种理想的自身决定的生存状态。

“‘实际性’概念意味着，一个‘在世界里边’的存在者以这样一种方式存在于世界之中，以致它能在自己的‘命运’中来领会自身，也就是将自身领会为被它在自己的世界里边遭遇到的那些存在者们的存在所约束着的。”——海德格尔：《存在与时间》（马库阿里和罗宾逊英译），1962年，第82页。

事实现象主义

见“现象主义”条。

官能

[源自拉丁文 *facultas* (出自 *facilis* (容易) 和 *facere* (制造); 希腊词 *dunamis*] 亚里士多德给予这个词两种定义：(1) 灵魂引起某种事情的功能或能力，诸如意志力，感觉和理智；(2) 可通过形式而现实化的潜能。亚里士多德所规定的两种意义经过中世纪哲学持续到近代哲学，但这个词逐渐越来越经常地限于指第一种意义。康德区分了灵魂的官能 (德语词: *Vermögen*) (它包括知识的官能、愉悦和不愉快的感情、欲望) 和认知的官能 (它包括较低的感性能力和较高的理性、判断及知性的能力)。这样，他建立了灵魂的官能 and 高级认知的官能的类比。知识的官能与知性的官能相联系，两者都应用于自然领域。理性的官能与欲望的官能相关，两者都应用于自由的领域。判断的官能与愉快和不愉快的感情相关，两者都应用于艺术的领域。近代心理学家批评对官能概念的使用，但在何种范围内需要修正康德的理论，这并不确定。通过诉诸于官能的概念来研究哲学是流行于德国唯心主义中的做法，但受到尼采的抨击。

在广义上，从中世纪以来，“官能”也指大学结构的一部分。在17世纪和18世纪，法律，医学和神学等学科被认为是较高的学科；哲学被认为属于较低的学科，因为它只是作为高级研究的预备学科。

“我认为，‘官能’一词的用法最好专门指心灵的基本不能再还原的能力。以这种方式来使用……把心理过程认作官能，即认知、意动和感

ties and the faculty of philosophy was considered to belong to the lower faculties because it was only propaedeutic to the above studies.

"It is best, I think, to confine the use of the word 'faculty' exclusively to ultimate and irreducible powers of the mind. Used in this way... the reference of mental process to faculties, e. g. to faculties of cognition, conation, and feeling, seems unexceptionable." —Campbell, *On Selfhood and Godhood*, 1957, p. 119.

Fairness

Equal, proportional and impartial treatment, constituting a virtue of any institution which involves the distribution of goods and responsibilities. Aristotle distinguished between a general notion of justice, as the obedience to laws and regulations, and a particular notion of justice, as the fair distribution of honours and money. This particular notion of justice connects justice with fairness, a bond which is fully exploited by John Rawls, who claims in his 1958 paper "Justice as Fairness" that the most basic and important idea in the conception of justice is fairness. The contemporary discussion of fairness is directed against utilitarianism which emphasises the total amount of utility in a given consequential state of affairs, but ignores the issue of whether that utility is distributed fairly among individuals. In contrast to traditional contractualism which considers consent to be the only basis for political obligation, the notion of fairness also provides an independent source for obligation. For if a person participates in and benefits from a rule-governed, co-operative and just society, that person has a duty to follow the rules. This is called the principle of fairness, but it is claimed by some critics to lead to tyrannical oppression of individuals.

"Now by definition the requirements specified by the principle of fairness are the obligations. All obligations arise in this way." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 112.

Faith

[from Latin: *fides*, also meaning trust or loyalty] Voluntary acceptance of views which are not supported rationally or empirically or which cannot be so supported, especially in association with religious belief. Faith is therefore contrasted with philosophical and scientific knowledge. The term became philosophically prominent with Paul, who took it as a Christian attitude of belief in the words or works of Christ. Paul's conception of faith as the gift of God was greatly developed by Augustine and Aquinas. How to reconcile the tension between faith and knowledge has been a major philosophical theme since medieval times. For Kant, faith is the acceptance of transcendental ideas, God, freedom and immortality, which are beyond the realm of experience and are therefore not objects of theoretical knowledge. They nevertheless play a great role in moral affairs. Hegel, Kierkegaard

情的官能,看来是无可指责的。”——坎贝尔:《论自我性和神性》,1957年,第119页。

公平

平等、合比例和公正的对待,是任何涉及到财物和责任分配的体制的一种德性。亚里士多德区分了正义的一般概念和正义的特殊概念:前者是对法则与规则的服从,后者是对荣誉与金钱的公平分配。正义的这种特殊概念把正义与公平连结起来,罗尔斯充分阐发了正义与公平之间的联结,他在他的1958年的“作为公平的正义”的论文中主张,正义概念的最基本和最重要的观念是公平。对于公平的当代讨论是直接针对功利主义的,因为功利主义强调一种既定的后果状态中的效果总量,但忽视了这种效果在个人之间的分配是否公平的问题。公平观亦与传统的契约主义相对照,传统的契约主义把同意看成是政治义务的惟一基础,而公平的概念也为义务提供了一个独立的来源。如果某人参与了和受益于一个为规则所支配的、合作的和公正的社会,他就有职责遵从这些规则。这被称为公平原则。可有些批评家认为这会导致对个人的专制压迫。

“从定义上说,为公平原则所说明的要求是义务,一切义务都是由此产生的。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第112页。

信仰

[源自拉丁文 *fides* (也有“信任”或“忠诚”的意义)] 自愿地把某些一直没有或不能得到理性或经验支持的观点作为真理,特别与对宗教信条的信奉有关。因此信仰是相对于哲学和科学知识而言的。随着保罗把这个词作为对基督的言行信奉态度,该术语在哲学上变得通行起来。保罗主张信仰是上帝的礼物,这种观念在奥古斯丁和阿奎那那里得到很大发展。从中世纪哲学以来如何协调信仰和知识之间的张力一直是主要的课题,对康德来说,信仰就是接受先验理念、上帝、自由和灵魂不朽。它们超越了经验的王国,不是理论知识的对象,但它们在道德事务中起着重要作用。黑格尔、克尔凯郭尔和尼采都大量论述了信仰的论题。“信仰”一词也用作伦理学术语,意为遵守诺言。

and Nietzsche all dealt extensively with the topic of faith. Faith is also an ethical term for keeping promises.

"For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God." —Paul, in *New Testament*, Ephesians, 2:8.

Fallacy

[from Latin: *fallax*, deceptive] A term for a seemingly valid but actually erroneous argument or piece of reasoning. An invalid inference which occurs as a result of mistakes in the logical form of an argument gives rise to formal fallacy. Formal fallacies are violations of the formal rules of inference and are dealt with in formal logic. More often, fallacies arise informally. They do not involve a mistake in formal inference, but arise from the misapplication of a contextual method or a tactic to get a conclusion accepted. The investigation of informal fallacies is an important part of logic because we must learn to avoid them if logic can be trusted. Each of the various principal types of informal fallacy receives an entry in this dictionary.

"A fallacy is an argument which appears to be conclusive when it is not." —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 566.

Fallacy of accent

A fallacy originally noticed by Aristotle in which an argument proceeds to a conclusion by changing the syllabic accent of a word and hence causing its meaning to be changed. Such an argument is, of course, invalid. It is later expanded to cover cases in which one argues by emphasising different parts of a sentence hence changing its meaning. It is also called the fallacy of emphasis, and usually occurs in spoken language.

"The fallacy of accent is committed whenever a statement is accented in such a way as to change its meaning, and is employed in an argument." —Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 1974, 2nd ed., p. 54.

Fallacy of accident

Aristotle claimed that it is a fallacy to take an accidental property to be an essential one. The most often quoted example is: "This dog is yours; this dog is a father; therefore this dog is your father". A fallacy of accident later came to be considered erroneous reasoning from a general rule to a particular case having accidental circumstances which prevent the general rule from applying to it unless the general rule is qualified in some way. For instance, "It is a virtue to tell the truth; so I should tell John that he has cancer". In such a characterisation, a fallacy of accident is always equated with a fallacy of *secundum quid*, although the latter covers a wider range.

"由于恩典，你已通过信仰而得到拯救，这并非你自己之所为，它是上帝的礼物。"——保罗：《圣经新约·伊非索人》，2：8。

谬误

[源自拉丁文 *fallax*, 欺骗性的]“谬误”一词指看起来有效但实际上错误的论证或推理片断。无效的推理是作为在论证的逻辑形式中所犯错误之结果而出现的，它产生了形式谬误。形式谬误违背了推理的形式规则，因而放在形式逻辑中讨论。更为经常的是，谬误出现在非形式意义上。它们并不包含形式推理方面的错误，而是表现为把语境方法或技巧错误地用于得到可接受的结论。如果逻辑值得信任，我们就必须学会如何去避免非形式谬误，因此，对这些谬误的研究也是逻辑的一个重要部分。存在多种类型的非形式谬误，本辞典对每一种主要的谬误都列有专条。

“谬误是一种看起来是但其实不是结论性的论证。”——约瑟福：《逻辑导论》，1916年，第566页。

重音错误

这个错误最初是由亚里士多德注意到的。他赋予的这个名称是指体现在论证中的这样一种错误，即对结论的推演是通过改变语词的重读音节并由此使其意义发生改变。这种论证当然是不可靠的。后来，这被推及包括通过强调句子的不同部分并由此改变其意义而进行论证的这种情形。这也被称作“重点错误”，通常出现在口语中。

“每当一个陈述得到强调以便改变其意义时，就是犯了重音错误，这是用在论证之中。”——卡雷和施尔：《逻辑基础》，1974年，第2版，第54页。

偶性谬误

亚里士多德认为，把偶有属性当做本质属性是一种谬误。最经常引用的例子是：“这条狗是你的；这条狗是一位父亲；所以这条狗是你的父亲。”后来，“偶性谬误”逐渐指从一普遍规则到一特例的错误推理，根据偶性该普遍规则不能应用于该特例，除非以某种方式对它加以限定。例如，“说真话是一种美德；所以我应该告诉约翰他得了癌症。”在这样一类刻画中，偶性谬误总是被等同于无视限制的谬误，但后者所包括的范围实际上更广。

“偶性谬误在于把一普遍规则应用于一特殊场合，而其‘偶然’情景显示出该规则对之是

"The fallacy of accident consists in applying a general rule to a particular case whose 'accidental' circumstances render the rule inapplicable." —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 7th ed., 1986, p. 99.

Fallacy of ambiguity

Also called the fallacy of clearness, or for Aristotle, a sophism. Aristotle held that this kind of fallacy arises from ambiguity in words or in the sentences that contain ambiguous words. It is a fallacy if during the course of argument the meanings of the ambiguous words shift so that the conclusion is not validly established. The major forms of this kind of fallacy include the fallacy of accent, fallacy of amphiboly, fallacy of equivocation, fallacy of composition and fallacy of division. To avoid these fallacies, we need to distinguish the meanings of the words carefully.

"Fallacies of ambiguity are arguments which are incorrect or invalid because of some ambiguity in the language, for example, because a word, phrase, or statement can be understood in different ways." —Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 1974, 2nd ed., p. 21.

Fallacy of clearness, see fallacy of ambiguity

Fallacy of complex question, another name for fallacy of many questions

Fallacy of composition

An erroneous kind of reasoning which argues that if each part of a whole has a certain property, then the whole has that property. For instance, "If each component of this car is of good quality, the car is of good quality". The term is also used for arguments from the premise that each individual member of a collection has a certain attribute, to the conclusion that the collection has that attribute. The argument is invalid because it mistakenly assumes that the whole or collection is a simple aggregation of the parts or individual members. The converse is the fallacy of division, which argues that if a whole or collection has a certain property, then each of its parts or members has that property. For example "The United States is rich, so each citizen of the US is rich". This fallacy fails to realise that there is not such a transference relationship between a whole and its parts. Both the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division are examples of the fallacy of ambiguity, for they often involve a confusion between the distributive use and the collective use of a word.

"The fallacy of composition consists in reasoning from what is true only of the parts of some whole to what is true to the whole." —Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 2nd ed., 1974, p. 13.

不适用的。”——柯比：《逻辑导论》，第7版，1986年，第99页。

歧义谬误

亦称“清晰谬误”，或者“诡辩”（亚里士多德术语）。在亚里士多德看来，此类谬误产生于词汇歧义或包含歧义词汇的语句歧义。如果在论证过程中，歧义词汇的意义发生改变使得其结论不是有效地确立的，就犯了歧义谬误。此类谬误的主要形式包括错置重音的谬误，意义含糊的谬误，一语多义的谬误，合举谬误和分举谬误。为了避免这些谬误，我们需要仔细分辨词语的意义。

“歧义谬误是因为语言中的某种歧义性，例如，因为一个词、短语或语句能够以不同方式加以理解而出现的不正确或不可靠的论证。”——卡雷和施尔：《逻辑基础》，1974年，第2版，第21页。

清晰谬误

见“歧义谬误”条。

复杂问语谬误

“叠题谬误”的另一名称。

合举谬误

一种错误的推理，它论证说：如果一整体的每一部分都有某种性质，则该整体也有此种性质。例如，“如果这辆汽车的每一零件都质量很好，则这辆汽车的质量很好。”这个词也指下述形式的论证，其前提是一集合的每一个别元素都有某种属性，结论是该集合也具有此种属性。这一论证是无效的，因为它错误地认为整体或集合是部分或个别元素的简单叠加。分举谬误则与合举谬误相反，它论证说：如果整体或集合具有某种性质，则它的每一部分或元素也具有此种性质。例如，“美国是富裕的，所以每一位美国公民也是富裕的。”它未能认识到在整体和部分之间不存在这种转换关系。合举谬误和分举谬误也被列为歧义谬误的例证，因为它们经常包含对词语的周延用法和集合用法的混淆。

“合举谬误在于从只对某个整体的各部分为真的东西，推出对该整体为真的东西。”——卡雷和施尔：《逻辑基础》，第2版，1971年，第13页。

Fallacy of converse accident, see, fallacy of *secundum quid*

Fallacy of division, see fallacy of composition

Fallacy of emphasis, another name for fallacy of accent

Fallacy of equivocation

The simplest form of fallacy of ambiguity. An ambiguous word or statement is used more than once in the same argument, with the meaning shifting implicitly but significantly between uses. It therefore leads to a misleading or mistaken conclusion. For example, "Chinese is difficult. I am a Chinese, therefore I am difficult." This fallacy is different from the fallacy of accent, for words differently accented are not strictly the same word.

"In the simplest case of fallacies dependent on language the ambiguity can be traced to double-meaning in a single word. This is the Fallacy of Equivocation." —Hamblin, *Fallacies*, 1974, p. 14.

Fallacy of false cause

Also called the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (Latin: after this, therefore because of this). The argument reasons that of two correlated things A and B, because A is prior to B in time, A is the cause of B. For instance, "I usually drink tea after lunch; therefore, lunch is the cause of my drinking tea". This is incorrect because it confuses succession and causation. It moves from a merely temporal sequence of events to a causal sequence. The alleged cause is not really responsible for the consequence and is not the cause at all. Hence this fallacy is also called *non causa pro causa* because it mistakes what is not the cause for a real cause.

"Any argument in which one mistakes what is not the cause of a given effect for its real cause is a false cause fallacy." —Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 2nd ed., 1974, p. 42.

Fallacy of hasty generation, see fallacy of *secundum quid*

Fallacy of many questions

Also called the fallacy of the complex question. A asks B a question and demands a simple yes or no answer. But the question implies some unwarranted presupposition which needs to be answered separately. A simple yes or no answer will make B concede the unwarranted presupposition. For example, "Have you stopped beating your father?" No matter whether B answers yes or no, he concedes that he has

逆偶性谬误

见“无视限制的谬误”条。

分举谬误

见“合举谬误”条。

重点错误

“重音错误”的另一个名称。

一语多义的谬误

歧义谬误中最简单的一种。歧义词或歧义陈述在同一论证中使用了不止一次，其意义在每一次使用时都暗中发生了重大的改变。所以它导致了一个致人迷误的或使人误解的结论。举例来说，“Chinese〔中文〕难学，我是Chinese〔中国人〕，所以我难学。”这不同于错置重音的谬误，因为在不同情形下所强调的词严格说来并不是同一个词。

“就依赖语言的谬误中最简单的情形而言，歧义性可以追溯到单个词所具有的双重意义。这就是一语多义的谬误。”——哈姆柏林：《谬误》，1974年，第14页。

错为因果的谬误

在拉丁文中亦称 *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (在这之后，所以因为这)的谬误，即对于两个相互关联的事物A和B所进行的下述论证：因为A在时间上先于B，所以A就是B的原因。举例来说，“我通常在午餐后饮茶，所以午餐是我饮茶的原因。”这一论证是不正确的，因为它混淆了先后相继关系和因果关系。它从一个纯粹是时间上的事件序列进到了事件的因果序列。所谓的原因实际上并不对结果真正负责，它根本就不是它的原因。所以这一谬误也叫做“错为因果的谬误”，即错误地把不是原因的东西当做是真正的原因。

“错为因果的谬误是这样一种论证，其中人们把不是一给定效果的原因的东西错误地看做是它的真正原因。”——卡雷和施尔：《逻辑基础》，第2版，1974年，第42页。

轻率概括的谬误

见“无视限制的谬误”条。

叠题谬误

亦称“复杂问语谬误”。A问B一个问题，并要求他简单地回答是或否。但他的问题隐含某个无根据的预设，后者需要单独回答。简单地回答是或否，都将使B不可避免地承认那个无根据的预设。例如，“你已经停止打你的父亲了吗？”无论B回答是还是否，他都得承认他在某个时候打过他父亲，但这一点可能根本不是真

beaten his father at some time, but that might not be true at all.

"There remains lastly the fallacy of many questions. This consists in putting questions in such a form that any single answer involves more than one admission." — Joseph, *Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 597.

Fallacy of scope, see scope

Fallacy of *secundum quid*

[Latin, derived from Greek: *para to pe*; in a certain aspect] The fallacy of neglecting qualification, which trades on the mistaken idea that what is true with certain qualifications is also true without them. It is always identified with the fallacy of accident, which applies a general principle or rule without regard to the specific aspects of the circumstances of its application. *Secundum quid* has an additional form which generalises a rule from one instance which may be atypical or exceptional. In this form it is the fallacy of hasty generalisation or the fallacy of converse accident, because contrary to the fallacy of accident, it moves from the particular to the general. For example, "Smith is British, and he is very cold towards other people; therefore all British people are cold".

"The fallacy of *secundum quid*... consists in using a principle or proposition without regard to the circumstances which modify its applicability in the case or kind of cases before us." — Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 589.

Fallacy of the undistributed middle

One basic rule for a valid syllogistic inference is that the term common to the two premises (the middle term) must be distributed in at least one premise, that is, the premise must imply every other premise formed by replacing the original term by other terms with part of its extension. If this rule is violated, the inference commits the fallacy of the undistributed middle, and is invalid. For example, "Smith is intelligent", and "All philosophers are intelligent", therefore "Smith is a philosopher". This syllogism is incorrect, because the middle term "intelligent" in both premises is a predicate of an affirmative proposition and is distributed in neither premise.

"Since people may be persuaded that syllogisms with undistributed middle terms are valid when they are not, the term 'fallacy' is used." — Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 1974, p. 240.

Fallibilism

Peirce's term for the view that none of our beliefs, even the apparently most fundamental, is certain and that any of our beliefs can be revised. A false conclusion might be de-

的。

"最后剩下的是叠题谬误。这一谬误在于以这样一种方式提问,使得任何简单的回答都包含不止一个(对其他说法的)承认。"——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第597页。

范围错误

见“范围”条。

无视限制的谬误

[拉丁语,源自希腊语: *para to pe*, “在某一方面”] 无视限制的谬误,它出现在利用下述错误观念的论证中:凡在某些限制条件下为真的东西,在去掉这些限制条件之后仍为真。它总是被等同于“偶性谬误”,后者在应用普遍原理或规则时无视它所应用情境的特殊方面。不过, *secundum quid* 还有另一形式,它从一个例证中概括出一个规则,而那个例证却可能不够典型或者只是一个简单的例外,因此它被叫做“轻率概括的谬误”或“逆偶性谬误”,因为与偶性谬误相反,它是从特殊到普遍。例如,“史密斯是英国人并且他待人很冷淡,所以所有的英国人都待人冷淡。”

“无视限制的谬误……在于当使用一原则或命题时,没有考虑到这样一些场合:它们改变了该原则或命题对我们所面临的那种或那类情形的可应用性。”——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第589页。

中项不周延谬误

有效的三段论推理的一条基本规则是,两个前提共有的词项(中项)必须至少在一个前提中是周延的,这就是说,该前提必须蕴含每一个其他前提,这些前提是通过置换原先的词项,而代之以含有其部分外延的其他词项而构成的。如果违反了这条规则,推理就要犯中项不周延的错误,因而是无效的。例如:“史密斯很聪明”,“所有哲学家都很聪明”,因此“史密斯是哲学家”。这个三段论推理不正确,因为中项“聪明”在两个前提中是肯定命题的谓词,而且在两个前提中都不是周延的。

“因为当中项不周延的三段论推理是无效的时,有可能使人相信它们是有效的,因此就用了‘谬误’一词来称这种现象。”——卡雷和施尔:《逻辑基础》,1974年,第240页。

可错论

皮尔士的术语,指这么一种观点,即我们的所有信念,包括那些看上去最基本的信念,都是不确定的,都是可以修正的。一个错误的结论可

rived from inductive or deductive inferences. An individually held proposition that is considered to be certain might be false in a web of belief. Rightly understood, relinquishing certainty does not open the way to sceptical doubt, but is instead a motivation for further investigation. This attitude is opposed to infallibilism which is held, for example, by religions that declare that their teachings are absolutely right and are not subject to error. All views which accept the possibility of error or hold that knowledge is in principle indeterminate and modifiable are fallibilist. Hence, Reichenbach, Popper, and Quine are all fallibilists.

"For years in the course of this ripening process, I used for myself to collect my ideas under the designation fallibilism; and indeed the first step toward finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already." — Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1, para. 13.

Fallibility, see authenticity

Falsifiability

Popper's term, also called testability or refutability, for the property of a theory that it is potentially refutable. In opposition to Logical Positivism, Popper held that science is not about verifying hypotheses or theories, but falsifying them. Falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-science. A genuine explanation must have falsifiable consequences. If a statement or a theory is unfalsifiable, it is pseudo-scientific. Any hypothesis or conjecture, once refuted, must be superseded by other hypotheses. This is the logic of scientific discovery. If a conjecture survives refutation, then it is temporarily corroborated, but that does not mean that it is confirmed. The theory of falsifiability expresses Popper's hostility to justificationism.

"Since a low probability means a high probability of being falsified, it follows that a high degree of falsifiability, or refutability, or testability, is one of the aims of science." — Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1972, p. 219.

Falsification

Popper's term for the rejection or refutation of a scientific hypothesis or theory on the basis of its confrontation with counter-examples. Falsifiability, which is opposed to verifiability, is a property of a theory itself. Falsification, which is opposed to verification, is an empirical method for testing the truth of a theory. Popper claimed that it is impossible to verify a theory, that is to guarantee its truth, by the inductive method. A theory supported by confirming evidence has not been confirmed, but only corroborated. It is still open to countless chances of falsification. Scientific claims need the test of falsification rather than verification. A theory that is unfalsifiable is unscientific. Science develops

能由归纳推理或演绎推理推衍出来, 一个单独持有的被认为是确定的命题在信念网络中则可能是错的。这应被正确地理解为, 放弃确定性并没有打开通向怀疑论的道路, 而是进一步研究的动因。这种态度与“不可错论”形成对立, 后者例如宗教所持有, 它宣称他们的教义是绝对正确的, 不会错的。所有承认错误的可能性, 或认为知识在原则上是不确定的和可修正的观点都是可错论的。因此赖兴巴赫、波普和奎因等人都是可错论者。

“在那些成熟过程的岁月里, 我习惯于把自己的思想汇集在可错论的名称下; 确实, 通向发现的第一步, 就是承认你还没有满意的认识。”——皮尔士:《文集》, 第一卷, 第13节。

沉沦

见“真切己状态”条。

可否证性 (也译“可证伪性”)

波普的术语, 也称作可检验性或可反驳性, 用来指理论的潜在可反驳的性质。与逻辑实证主义相对立, 波普认为科学不是要证实假说或理论, 而是要否定它们。可否证性是科学与伪科学之间分界的标准。一个真正的说明必须具有可否证的结论。如果一个陈述或一个理论是不可否证的, 它就是伪科学的。任何假说或猜想一旦被反驳, 就必须为其他假说所取代。这就是科学发现的逻辑。如果一个猜想经受住了反驳, 则它暂时得到了确认, 但这并不意味着它已被确证。可否证性理论表明了波普对于证明主义的反对。

“既然低概率意味着被否定的高概率, 由此较高程度的可否证性、或可反驳性、可检验性, 也是科学的目标之一。”——波普:《猜想与反驳》, 1972年, 第219页。

否定 (也译“证伪”)

波普的术语, 指基于一个科学假说或理论与其反例的对立, 而对它的拒斥或反驳。与证实性相对立的可否证性, 是理论自身的一种性质。与证实相对立的否定, 是检验理论真实性的一种经验方法。波普认为, 不可能用归纳方法证实一个理论, 即保证它的正确。一个为确定证据所支持的理论并未得以确证, 而只是得到确认。它仍然有无数否定的可能。科学陈述需要的是对否证的检验而不是证实。一个不可否证的理论是不科学的。科学通过否定而发展。

“因此, 不存在归纳: 我们的论证绝非从事实到理论, 除非经由反驳或否证的方式。”——

through falsification.

"Thus, there is no induction: we never argue from facts to theories, unless by way of refutation or falsification." — Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (ed. Schilpp), 1974, p. 68.

Falsificationism, see justificationism

Family resemblance

The term can be traced to Nietzsche, but becomes prominent through the later Wittgenstein's discussion about the essence of language. Traditional essentialism holds that a general term such as "language" or "game" must have a single common property to connect all entities subsumed under it. But Wittgenstein rejects this view. Items under many general terms are like a family, the different members of which resemble one another in different ways with a whole series of overlapping similarities. These relationships and similarities are called family resemblance. This notion is meant to show that there is no need to depart from actual ordinary languages to search for a sublime underlying structure in which each term would have a uniform essence. Accordingly, we should trace out those relationships needed for any investigation, rather than seeking a definition specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term. This account of family resemblance can be applied more generally as an attempted general solution to the traditional problem of universals.

"I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 'family resemblance'." — Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I. 67.

Fascism

[from Latin: *fasces*, the bundle of axe and rods carried before Roman consuls as a symbol of authority] A political doctrine, in opposition to liberalism and socialism, which was originally proposed in early twentieth century Italy by Mussolini and the Neo-Hegelian philosopher Giovanni Gentile. The doctrine was deeply influenced by the Hegelian theory of the state and combined extreme nationalism with extreme communitarianism. Fascism rejects individualism by claiming that a nation is an organic entity rather than an aggregate of individuals with basic rights. It propounds irrationality and particularity in contrast to rationality and universality. It supports the role of the government as the upholder of moral integrity and the nation's collective purpose. It advocates an authoritarian state in which the government controls all aspects of social life. In practice, Mussolini's fascist government denied freedom of speech to individuals and appealed to violence. The term 'fascism' was later used to characterise Hitler's National Socialism (Nazi) and other Eu-

波普:《K. 波普的哲学》(希耳普编), 1974 年, 第 68 页。

否认主义〔也译“证伪主义”〕

见“证明主义”条。

家族相似

这个术语可以追溯至尼采,但通过后期维特根斯坦对语言本性的讨论而广为人知。传统的本质主义认为,像“语言”或“游戏”这样的一般词项必须有单一的共性,以便把归之于它的所有东西联系起来。但维特根斯坦驳斥了这种观点。在许多一般词项之下的词项就像一个家族,其不同成员以不同的方式彼此相像,形成一整套交叉重叠的相似性。这些关系和相似性就叫做家族相似。提出这个概念是想表明,不必脱离实际的日常语言来探寻一种终极的深层结构,每个词项在此结构中会有一种统一的本质。因此,我们应该描述这些为任何研究所需要的关系,而不是去寻求说明应用词项的必要和充分条件的定义。这种对于家族相似的说明,可以更广泛地应用于试图一般性地解决传统的共相问题。

“除了‘家族相似’,我想不出更好的表述来说明这些相似性的特征。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第 67 节。

法西斯主义

〔源自拉丁文 *fasces*, 在古罗马执政官前手执的作为权力象征的插着战斧的木棒束〕在 20 世纪初的意大利,由墨索里尼和新黑格尔主义哲学家 G. 金蒂莱最初提出的一种与自由主义和社会主义相对立的政治学说。这一学说深受黑格尔的国家理论的影响,并把极端的民族主义与极端的共同体主义结合起来。法西斯主义反对个人主义,宣称民族是一个有机的整体,而不是具有基本权利的个人的集合体。它提出非理性和特殊性以反对理性和普遍性。它支持政府作为道德整体和民族道德集体意愿的支撑者而起作用。它鼓吹独裁主义的国家,在这样的国家里政府控制社会生活的各个方面。在实践上,墨索里尼的法西斯政府否定个人的言论自由并诉诸暴力。“法西斯主义”这一概念后来被用来特指希特勒的国家社会主义(纳粹)和受希特勒和墨索里尼影响的其他欧洲国家的政权。通过希特勒,法西斯主义开始同灭绝种族的反犹太

ropean regimes influenced by Hitler and Mussolini. Through Hitler, fascism became associated with genocidal anti-Semitism, but other fascist regimes were militaristic. Since World War II, the term has been taken as a symbol of evil which is applied to any oppressive and totalitarian political regime or action. Some political theorists seek to understand how fascist regimes arose in the context of modernity.

"Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism." —Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, 1991, p. 26.

Fatalism

The doctrine that what will happen is predetermined and will happen whatever attempt we make to intervene. Human action is ineffectual regarding these events. Fatalism might be derived from logical principles, especially about future contingents, from the assumption of perfect divine foreknowledge or from the principle of causality, which claims that everything is causally determined. Fatalism is distinguished from determinism in the sense that determinism, although it is also based on the principle of causality, still admits that human action may effectively cause one event rather than another, while fatalism characteristically denies any human effect on the future. Stoicism is a typical representative of fatalism.

"That the course of events will be what it will be is a logical truism; yet many people are reluctant to admit it, because they think that it commits them to some sort of fatalism." —Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, p. 190.

Fate

[from Latin: *fatum*, what is spoken or decreed] The necessity in things which makes them happen as they do and, in particular, a person's appointed lot which is beyond his own control. Fate is usually personified as an agency acting according to its own will and not bound by causation. Fate is cursed or praised according to the bad luck or good fortune it brings to a person. In ancient Greece, Stoics claim that it is idle to speak of free will if a man's fate is not up to himself. In *On Fate*, Cicero argues that if there is free will, everything does not happen by fate; if everything does not happen by fate, there is no predetermination; but without predetermination, God has no foreknowledge. Medieval philosophers ask how we can be responsible for the evil we do if God predetermines our fate.

"'Fate': a name given by some people not to the position of the stars but to a chain of causes dependent on God's will." —Augustine, *City of God*, V. 8.

主义相联系,而其他法西斯主义政权则实行军国主义。自第二次世界大战以来,这一概念一直被作为实施压迫和极权主义的政治制度或行为的罪恶的象征。一些政治学家试图弄清法西斯主义的政权在现代背景下是如何产生的。

“法西斯主义是一种政治思想,在它的各种变体中,其神话般的核心是一种民粹派的极端民族主义的再生形式。”——格里芬:《法西斯主义的本质》,1991年,第26页。

宿命论

这种学说主张将要发生的事情是前定的,不管我们怎样试图去干预它也要发生。人的行动对这些事件是无能为力的。宿命论可能得自于逻辑原理,特别是关于未来偶发事件的原理,得自于神的完美的预知的想法,或得自于因果律,它认为每件事在因果关系上都是被决定的。宿命论在这种意义上不同于决定论:决定论虽然也是基于因果性原则,但仍然承认人的行动可能有效地影响此一事件超过彼一事件,而宿命论的特征是否认人类对于未来有任何作用。斯多亚主义是宿命论的典型代表。

“说事件的过程将是其所是,这是逻辑上的自明之理;但许多人不情愿承认这一点,因为他们认为这会使得他们承诺某种宿命论。”——艾耶尔:《知识问题》,1956年,第190页。

天命

[源自拉丁文 *fatum*, 被说出或被裁决的]事物中的必然性,它使事物如其所是地发生,特别是人被指派的,不由他自己控制的命运。天命通常被拟人化为按照自己的意志行动的作用者,不受因果性制约。天命根据其带给人的恶运或好运而受到诅咒或赞扬。在古希腊,斯多亚派的人认为,如果一个人的命运与他不相适,那么谈自由意志是无效的。西塞罗在《论天命》中论证说,如果有自由意志,每件事都不会因天命而发生;如果每件事不因天命而发生,就没有事先注定这回事;但若没有这回事,上帝就没有预见。中世纪哲学的一个主要问题是,如果上帝预先决定了我们的命运,我们何以能对自己犯下的罪过负责。

“‘天命’:人们不是对于星星的位置,而是对于依赖于上帝意志的因果链所取的名称。”——奥古斯丁:《上帝之城》,第五章,第8节。

Fear, see anxiety

Feeling

[Greek: *pathos*, feeling, passion, from *paschein*, to undergo, to be affected, to suffer] What happens to anything that suffers or is affected. As a reaction to external stimuli, *pathos* is a mode of passivity rather than activity. Feeling or passion is generally taken to be a synonym for emotion, that is the intense impulses, such as anguish, rage or love, which directly affect one's perception and behaviour. From Plato onwards, the central tradition of Western philosophy has contrasted passion with reason and has regarded passion with suspicion as something displaying a lack of discipline, exercising a corruptive power and distorting perception and deliberation. Aristotle usually confined *pathos* to states of the soul which involve pleasure or pain, including the desires and feelings of the non-rational part of the soul. A virtuous person has feeling but can control it, whereas the young and the incontinent are always controlled by their feeling. Many philosophers believe that a good man should have reason as the master of his passions, and Spinoza especially had subtle and interesting things to say about the use of emotions in the rational management of emotion. Hume claimed that reason has no motivating role in action and is the slave of passion. There is a counter-discourse which positively evaluates the role of passion. This tendency is apparent in the irrationalism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and in the work of Heidegger and subsequent existentialists. The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues that passion has its own cognitive role, and other philosophers try to distinguish between rational and irrational passion.

"I call feeling appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, emulation, pity and in general what is accompanied by pleasure or distress." (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b22-4).

Felicity calculus, see hedonistic calculus

Feminism

A movement based on the belief that the traditional relationship between men and women is one of male domination over women. Feminism has the overall goal of removing all forms of subordination of women to men and obtaining equality between men and women in all fields, especially in terms of political and legal rights. Feminist philosophy seeks to understand the origin and various forms of this domination and to explore its contemporary consequences for women as a basis for its elimination. It challenges various dualistic ontological dichotomies which associate women with their inferior or negative terms, for example linking men with logic and ratio-

害怕

见“畏惧”条。

情感

[希腊语 *pathos*, 意为情感、激情, 源出于动词 *paschein*, 即承受、受影响、遭受] 指什么发生了, 要承受某种东西或被某种东西影响。作为对外部刺激的一种反应, *pathos* 是被动的而不是主动的方式。情感或激情一般被认作是情绪的同义语, 即诸如痛苦、愤怒、情爱等直接影响某人行止的强烈冲动。从柏拉图开始, 西方哲学中的主流传统都把激情与理性相对立, 并疑心地将激情视为表明修行欠缺的东西, 使人堕落的力量、对知觉和沉思的扭曲。亚里士多德通常把 *pathos* 限于陷在快乐或痛苦中的灵魂状态, 包括灵魂的非理性部分的欲望和情感。德性之人具有情感, 但能控制它, 相反, 年轻人和不能自制者却总被自己的情感支配。许多哲学家相信, 善良者应有理性作为其激情的主人, 斯宾诺莎在谈到受理性支配的情绪的用途时, 尤有精妙和有趣的论点。休谟却主张, 理性对行为无动力作用, 是激情的奴隶。然而, 也有一种肯定评价激情作用的相反议论。这种倾向在诸如尼采和叔本华等非理性主义中, 以及在海德格尔的著作和后来的存在主义者中, 表现得很明显。美国哲学家 M. 纽斯堡姆论证激情有它自身的认识作用的观点, 而其他哲学家则力图区分理性的与非理性的激情。

“所谓情感, 我说的是欲望、愤怒、恐惧、自信、嫉妒、喜悦、友爱、憎恨、期望、骄傲、怜悯等, 总而言之, 是由快乐或痛苦相伴随的东西。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1105b22-24。

幸福演算

见“快乐主义的演算”条。

女性主义

一种建立在传统的男女关系是男人统治女人的关系这一信念基础上的运动。女性主义有着全面的目标, 它要消除所有形式的女人对男人的从属, 在所有领域获得男女之间的平等, 特别是政治和法律方面的平等。女性主义的哲学试图弄清男人统治女人的起源和各种表现形式, 并试图探究这种统治在当代对妇女的影响, 以此为基础去根除这一统治。它反对各种将妇女与她们能力的低下或与否定的措辞联系起来的二元本体论的二分法, 例如, 把男人与逻辑和理性连在一起, 把女人与直觉和感情连在一起。

nality and woman with intuition and emotion. It rejects the traditional centrality of rational principles and emphasises interpersonal relationships, caring and the role of community. From a perspective of upholding the value of women's experience and ways of thinking, it reassesses many central notions of Western political philosophy, such as autonomy, equality, liberty, justice and rights. Feminists generally support a sharp distinction between biologically determined sex and socially constructed gender and the possibility that changing gender roles will emerge. Feminism has influenced recent developments in many areas of philosophy, especially ethics, political and social philosophy and epistemology.

Because a diversity of experiences and pre-occupations have led to different theoretical understandings about women's experience, feminism has never been a unified system but presents versions having significant differences among themselves. Feminist philosophy in France, Britain and the United States reflect in part the broader philosophical contexts in which they developed. Liberal feminism focuses on equal opportunities in education and employment for women. Marxist feminism argues that women must socialise their family work and join the working class. Radical feminism argues that subordination has its deepest cause in the reproductive and sexual roles of women and argues that women should be autonomous in these regards. Existentialist feminism contends that women must define themselves in terms of the Self, rather than in terms of the Other in relation to man. Some psychoanalytic feminists find the origin of women's subordination in their early childhood experience, although others look more to Lacan than to Freud for inspiration. Different fields of philosophy has different forms of feminism, such as feminist ethics, feminist epistemology and eco-feminism. A major challenge to feminism is to determine how it can be systematised theoretically.

"A fundamental premise of feminist theory is that socio-political life— and traditional accounts of socio-political life— are prejudiced to women." — Gatens, *Feminism and Philosophy*, 1991, p. 1.

Feminist epistemology

A feminist theory of knowledge which claims that traditional mainstream epistemology is androcentric, and is filled with gender biases. According to this view, the enlightenment or Kantian conception of rationality considers the epistemic subject as an abstract individual, and authoritative knowledge in Western societies is largely based on the experiences of white males. Women have long been in an epistemic underclass. The conceptual frameworks and methods in all branches of knowledge are virtually androcentric. Feminists argue that the central problem of epistemology should be "whose knowledge is it?". An adequate epistemology should be free of all prejudices of androcentricity. The acqui-

的做法。它还拒绝把理性原则置于中心地位的传统做法,而强调人与人之间的关系、人与人之间的关心和共同体的作用。从它坚持妇女的经验和思维方式的价值这一观点来看,它对西方政治哲学的许多核心概念,如自主、平等、自由、正义和权利,都进行了重新估价。女性主义者一般支持对从生物学意义上确定的两性与社会意义上形成的两性做明确的区分,赞同将会出现改变社会意义上的性别角色的可能性。女性主义对哲学许多领域的新近发展,特别是伦理学、政治和社会哲学以及认识论方面的发展,产生了影响。

由于经验和成见上的差异导致了对妇女的经验在理论上的不同理解,女性主义从来不是一个统一的体系,而只表现为一些存在重大差别的不同看法。法国、英国和美国的女性主义哲学部分地反映了他们在其中发展的那种更为宽泛的哲学环境。自由主义的女性主义关注的是妇女在受教育和就业方面的平等机会。马克思主义的女性主义论证说,妇女必须使她们的家庭工作社会化并加入到工人阶级的队伍中。激进的女性主义认为,妇女从属男人的最深层的原因在于妇女在生殖和性生活方面的角色,并论证说妇女在这些方面应具有自主性。存在主义的女性主义争论说,妇女必须根据自我而不能根据与男人相关的他人来定义自己。一些精神分析的女性主义者在妇女幼年时代的经历中发现了妇女从属于男人的起因,虽然另一些精神分析的女性主义者期待更多地从拉康那里而不是从弗洛伊德那里得到启示。在哲学的不同领域有女性主义的不同表现,如女性主义的伦理学、女性主义的认识论和生态女性主义。对女性主义的一个主要挑战是确定它如何能够实现理论上的系统化。

"女性主义理论的一个基本前提,是社会政治生活以及对社会政治生活的传统的说明对妇女的歧视。"——盖坦斯:《女性主义和哲学》,1991年,第1页。

女性主义认识论

一种女性主义的知识理论,它认为,传统的主流认识论都是以男性为中心的,充满了性别偏见。根据这种观点,启蒙的或康德的理性观念把认识主体看作是抽象的个人,而西方社会中的权威知识,又大部分都是基于白种男人的经验。妇女一直处于认识的底层。一切知识分支中的概念框架和方法,在根本上都是以男性为中心的。女性主义者认为,认识论的中心问题应该是:"它是谁的知识。"恰当的认识论应该是彻底摆脱了一切男性中心的偏见。对知识的获得必须说明这个主题的各种特殊性,因而这基本上是历史的、社会的和政治的活动。可以说,女性

sition of knowledge must take into account the particularities of the subject, and hence is essentially an historical, social and political activity. Accordingly, feminist epistemology joins the anti essentialism of post-modernism, and challenges the traditional idea of objectivity. It claims that although feminism is by nature a political movement, it can still find a distinctive place in epistemology by asking questions such as "who are the subjects of legitimate knowledge?", "whose experience should be used to test knowledge?", "what is the nature of objectivity?", "how can a researcher be dispassionate?". There are many versions of what a feminist perspective of epistemology should be. Some feminists focus on criticising the alleged traditional male dominated nature of epistemology. Others believe that the oppressive position in which women have been might provide a different perspective for examining the central issues of epistemology and therefore endeavour to analyse women's experience. But others believe that there is no special female way of knowing.

"Feminist epistemology consists rather in attention to epistemological concerns arising out of feminist projects, which prompt reflection on the nature of knowledge and our method for attaining it." —Lennon and Whitford (eds.), *Knowing the Difference*, 1994, p. 13.

Feminist ethics

Feminist ethics contrasts with the allegedly male biased traditional Western ethics. It argues that traditional ethics ignores women's issues and interests, fails to recognise feminine values and experience and identifies human experience with male experience. The traditional lists of virtues are always gender-characterised. Hence, women's actual subordination is rationalised by traditional ethics, and this must be revealed and criticised for the liberation of women.

The criticism of the Western tradition concerning the position of women can be traced to figures such as Wollstonecraft, Mill, Engels and Simone de Beauvoir. In this century Carol Gilligan's *In A Different Voice* (1982) elaborates the different moral development of men and women. She argues that in opposition to the traditional ethics of justice, which emphasises rights and rules, we should establish an ethic of care, that is a women-centred ethic, based on women's experience and a new conceptual framework. It will replace male values with female values and stress responsibility, empathy and the relationships between people. Motherhood is the paradigm of this ethic. Sometimes the contrast between an ethics of justice and an ethics of care is described as contrasting rationality and emotion. Feminist ethics expands from the general situation of women's subordination to almost every particular problem faced by women, such as abortion, equality, family planning, militarism, the environment, pornography and all sex-related issues. Its criticism of the traditional bias is remarkable, but the positive delineation

主义认识论融入了后现代主义的反基础主义,对传统的客观性概念提出了挑战。它认为,尽管女性主义在本性上是一种政治运动,但由于它所提出的问题仍然在认识论中占有独特的地位,如“谁是合法知识的主体?”“应当用谁的经验来检验知识?”“客观性的性质是什么?”“怎样才能成为一个没有偏见的研究者?”等等。对女性主义的认识论观点究竟应当是什么,有许多不同的看法。某些女性主义者集中批评所谓的以男性为主导的传统认识论。而另一些人则相信,妇女一直处于的受压迫地位可以为考察认识论的核心问题提供一个不同的视角,并进而努力分析妇女的经验。但其他人则相信,并不存在女性的特殊认识方法。

“女性主义认识论只是在于关注从女性主义纲领中提出的认识论问题,它竭力反思知识的性质以及我们获得知识的方法。”——伦农和怀特福德(编):《了解差别》,1994年,第13页。

女性主义伦理学

女性主义伦理学是与被断言为男性偏见的传统西方伦理学相对立的。它认为,传统的伦理学忽视了妇女问题和妇女的利益,没有认识到女性的价值和经验,并把人类的经验与男性经验相等同。传统的德性总是有着性别特征的,因此,传统的伦理学把妇女的实际从属合理化了。妇女解放运动必须揭露和批判之。

从妇女的立场对西方传统的批判可以追溯到沃尔斯通克兰、密尔、恩格斯、西蒙·波伏娃等人。20世纪,C.吉利根的《以一种不同的声音》(1982年)阐发了男人和女人不同的道德发展。她提出,相对于传统的强调权利和规则的正义伦理学,我们应该建立一种关怀伦理学,即以妇女为中心的伦理学,它基于妇女的经验和新的概念框架,它以女性的价值取代男性的价值,强调责任、同情和人们之间的关系。母亲性质是这种伦理学的范例。有时正义伦理学和关怀伦理学的对立被叙说成理性与情感的对立。女性主义伦理学从妇女的从属地位这种一般性的情况扩展到妇女所面对的几乎每一个具体问题,例如堕胎、平等、计划生育、军事主义、环境、色情文学和一切与性有关的问题。它对传统偏见的批评是令人注目的,但这种伦理学尚缺乏明确的轮廓,更不用说系统性。是否妇女的经验就如此惊人地与男人不同,这种区别是否可以被看做比阶级、种族和文化的区别更为基本,这些都是争论中的问题。

of this ethics is not yet clear, let alone systematic. It has been disputed whether women's experience is so strikingly different from men's and whether this difference can be seen as being more basic than the differences of class, race and culture.

"Feminist ethics is born in women's refusals to endure with grace the arrogance, indifference, hostility, and damage of oppressively sexist environments. It is fuelled by bonds among women, forged in experiments to create better environments now and for the future, and tried by commitments to overcome damage already done." —Card (ed.), *Feminist Ethics, introduction*, 1991, p. 4.

Fictional names

Names of invented objects, characters and places in novels, myths and other forms of narration. Examples include "Hamlet" and "the Golden Mountain". These names do not refer to existing things, but they appear to refer to something rather than nothing. The existence of fictional names creates many philosophical puzzles. If a name obtains its meaning from the object to which it refers, it is difficult to understand how fictional names gain their meaning. Various responses have been proposed. Some claim that fictional names refer to beings of a special kind which subsist rather than exist. Others attempt to analyse the sentences in which fictional names occur into sentences in which they do not occur. Others suggest that fictional names do not refer, but merely pretend to refer. Others use the apparatus of possible worlds to claim that a fictional name refers to an individual in a possible world with the unity of that individual given by the narratives in which its name occurs or in terms of a causal theory of reference. Understanding fictional names will help us to understand meaning and reference more generally as well as our response to fictional characters in novels and drama.

"For each fictional name in a story, I suggest, a stylised sentence expressing its Story Line will contain a quantifier and a conjunct introducing that name." —Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 1974, p. 160.

Fideism

A position which holds that in establishing and accepting religious convictions, faith is primary and reason is either secondary or entirely dispensable. To avoid placing reason above God, we cannot on this view subject religious beliefs to the assessment of reason. Fideism has two versions. The extreme version claims that faith and reason are contrary, that only faith can grasp the profound mysteries of religion, and that according to rational assessment religious truths are impossible. This position is represented by Tertullian's dictum: *credo quia absurdum est* (I believe because it is absurd). In modern time this view was developed by

"女性主义伦理学诞生于妇女不再愿意谦和地忍受压制性的性别歧视环境的傲慢、冷漠、敌意和损害,妇女的联合为它提供动源,为了现在和将来创造一个较好的环境的实验把它锤炼,克服已经遭受的损害的责任和义务使它尽力。"——卡德(编):《女性主义伦理学》,导论,1991年,第4页。

虚名

在小说、神话和其他形式的叙述中想像出来的物体、人物和地点的名称。例如“哈姆雷特”、“金山”等。这些名称并不指称存在物,但它们显然在指某种东西,而不是虚无。虚名的存在造成了许多哲学难题。如果一个名称是从它所指的对象中得到其意义的,那么,虚名怎样获得意义却难以理解。人们提出了各种不同的答案。有些人断言,虚名指称一类特别的持久着可又不存在的东西。另一些人则试图把虚名出现于其中的那些句子分析成不使用虚名的句子。还有一些人假定,虚名不指称,仅仅是装作是在指称。还有人以可能世界理论解释说,“虚名是指可能世界中的一个个别;这一个别的统一性要么是由它的名称出现于其中的叙述给予的,要么可由因果指称论来说明。对虚名的理解会帮助我们更一般地理解意义与指称,理解我们对小说和戏剧中的虚拟人物的反应。

“对于故事中的虚名,我认为,表现其故事线索的文体句,会含有一个引入这个虚名的量词和一个联结词。”——普兰汀格:《必然性的本性》,1974年,第160页。

信仰主义

这样的见解认为,在建立和接受宗教信仰的过程中,信仰第一,理性或是第二,或者完全无必要。按这种观点,为了避免把理性置于上帝之上,我们不能让宗教信条服从理性评定。信仰主义有两种形式。极端的信仰主义宣称,信仰和理性是对立的,只有信仰能把握宗教的深远奥秘;若按理性评判,宗教真理就不可能。这种见解以德尔图良的名言 *credo quia absurdum est* (荒谬,故我信) 为代表。在现代,克尔凯郭尔发展了这种观点,他断言,接受宗教真理需要信仰跳出理性之外。温和的信仰主义相信,在追求

Kierkegaard, who claimed that the acceptance of religious truths requires a leap of faith beyond the rational. The moderate version of fideism claims that faith precedes reason in seeking and accepting fundamental religious beliefs, but that reason can play a role in explicating and comprehending these beliefs. This position has been held by the Christian Augustinian tradition and is represented by St. Anselm's dictum: *credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order that I may understand). In recent times, some religious philosophers have developed a fideism based on Wittgenstein's view that some claims have a fundamental role for us in making rational assessment of our ordinary beliefs possible. If religious claims had this special status, there would be no room for reason to justify or reject them. Others respond that there is no grounds for awarding this status to religious beliefs and that we should be suspicious of attempts to shelter them from rational examination.

“Fideism, the doctrine that faith alone determines whether a man recognises or fails to recognise the truth of a doctrine which is nevertheless an objectively true doctrine, independently of being believed or recognised to be true.” — Bambrough, *Reason, Truth and God*, 1969, p. 44.

Fidelity

[from Latin: *fides*, faith, literally faithfulness or trustworthiness.] The virtue of living up to the commitments or obligations acquired from one's participation in an institution or by one's promises or contracts. The former is identical with loyalty, while the latter is identical with honesty, or fairness, and is the traditional focus of fidelity. W. D. Ross considered fidelity to be one of his *prima facie* duties. Its opposite is infidelity, that is the breaking of one's promises or faith. Adultery has been regarded as a paradigm of infidelity. Feminist ethics, due to its emphasis on human relationships, pays a great deal of attention to fidelity. Significant problems surrounding the notion of fidelity include such matters as the relation between the reasonableness of promises and fidelity and how intimate the personal relation should be in order to raise questions of faithfulness.

“The principle of fidelity is but a special case of the principle of fairness applied to the social practice of promising.” Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 344.

“Fido-fido” theory of meaning

My dog Fido is an entity, and is designated by the name “Fido”. On analogy, some theories of meaning claim that every meaningful expression refers to or designates an extra-linguistic entity, including abstract entities, and derives its meaning from what it designates. Gilbert Ryle applied a derogatory label to this theory of meaning. According to him, this analogy is naive and incorrect. “Fido” stands in the relation of designation to my dog Fido. However, not every

和接受基本的宗教信念方面,信仰先于理性,但是,在阐释和领悟这些信念方面,理性能起一定作用。这种立场为基督教的奥古斯丁主义传统所坚持,以安瑟尔谟的格言 *credo ut intelligam* (我相信是为了能理解) 为代表。近来,有些宗教哲学家依据维特根斯坦的下列观点发展出一种信仰主义。维特根斯坦认为,在使对我们的日常信念进行理性评判成为可能方面,有些主张具有根本性的作用。如果宗教主张具有这种独特地位,理性就不可能对它们进行辩明或反驳。另一些人则回应说,我们没有根据赋予宗教信仰以此等地位,而且应对任何力图使它们免受理性考察的尝试表示怀疑。

“信仰主义是这样一种学说:只有信仰才能决定一个人是否认识教义的真理,该教义在客观上真,与被相信或被认为真无关。”——班布拉夫:《理性、真理和神》,1969年,第44页。

忠诚

[源自拉丁词 *fides*, 字面的意思是“忠诚”或“可信赖的”] 履行承诺或义务的德性,这种承诺或义务,得自于一个人对某种制度的参与或由于他的诺言或契约。履行对制度参与的承诺与忠诚相等同,而履行诺言和契约则与诚实、公平相等同,这是忠诚问题的传统焦点。W. D. 罗斯把忠诚看成是他的初步职责之一。它的对立面是不忠,即不履行诺言或失信。通奸被看作是不忠的范例。女性主义伦理学,由于它对人的关系的强调,对于忠诚给予了极大的关注。围绕着忠诚观念的有意义的问题包括承诺的合理性与忠诚的关系,以及为了提出忠诚的问题,个人关系应怎样亲密等。

“忠诚的原则是把公平原则的一个特例运用于遵守诺言的社会实践上。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年版,第344页。

“菲多—菲多”的意义理论

我的狗菲多是一个实体,并被命名为“菲多”。由此类推,某些意义理论声称,每个有意义的表达式都指称了或指示了一个语言之外的实体,包括抽象的实体,并由它所指示的东西派生其意义。吉尔伯特·赖尔给这个意义理论贴了一个贬义的标签。在他看来,这种类推过于天真,是完全不正确的。“菲多”与我的狗菲多处于命名关系之中。然而,并非每一个有意义的表

meaningful expression is a name which stands for some entity. For all expressions to be meaningful in this way, we would in the first place have to invent whole classes of abstract entities to which expressions which do not function in a designating way could seem to stand in a relation of designation. The expression "red" would, for example, would give rise to the expression "redness" to stand for the objective property of redness. But this multiplication of entities would be futile. The central objection here is that having meaning is not identical with standing for. Other philosophers call this theory Platonic realism or hypostatisation.

"I am still not quite sure why it seems so natural to assume that all words are names, and even that every possible grammatical subject of a sentence, one-worded or many-worded, stands to something as the proper name 'Fido' stands for the dog Fido, and what is a further point, that the thing it stands for is what the expression means." — Ryle, *Collected Papers*, vol. II, p. 355.

Fifth element, see aether

Final cause

[from Latin: *finis*, end or purpose, the equivalent of Greek: *telos*] According to Aristotle's theory of explanation, a final cause is one of four causes, the others being the material, formal and efficient causes. His expression for a final cause is *to ou heneka* (Greek: for the sake of which). By appealing to a final cause, we explain a thing through its goal or end. An explanation based on a final cause is called a teleological explanation (from *telos*). In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle argued that form, as primary substance, is the final cause and that as final cause form is actuality. In his physical works, Aristotle made extensive use of final causes in explaining the generation and structure of natural things and their parts. He also claimed that as the unmoved mover, God is the final cause of the world. His teleology deeply influenced the later development of Western philosophy of science, although much modern philosophy of science has been hostile to teleology, either by denying it entirely or by reducing it to standard causal relations. Discussion of teleological or functional explanations remains active in philosophy of biology and philosophy of social science.

"Clearly then we are inquiring for the cause (to speak abstractly, the essence); which is in some cases, e. g. that of house or bed, the final cause, and in others the moving cause." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1041a28-30.

Final end, see final good

达式都是代表某个实体的名称。要想使所有的表达式都以这种方式具有意义,我们首先得要虚构整个抽象实体,使得并没有以命名方式起作用的表达式,看上去也处于一种命名关系之中。例如,“红”这个词就产生了“红性”词,它代表了红性这个客观属性。但对实体的这种增加可能是毫无用处的。这里的关键反对意见是,“具有意义”并不等同于“代表”。其他哲学家把这种理论称为“柏拉图的实在论”或“实体化”。

“我仍然无法非常肯定,为什么人们会很自然地断定所有的词都是名称,甚至由单个词或多个词组成的句子的每种可能的语法对象,都代表某个东西,就像‘菲多’这个专名代表着菲多这只狗,而且进一步说,它所代表的东西就是这个表达式的意义。”——赖尔:《文集》,第二卷,第355页。

第五元素

见“以太”条。

目的因〔也译“终极因”〕

[源自拉丁文 *finis*, “终结”或“目的”,等同于希腊文 *telos*]按亚里士多德的说明理论,目的因是四种原因之一,其他为质料因、形式因和动力因。他用于目的因的表达式为 *to ou heneka* (希腊文:为了它的缘故)。通过诉诸目的因,我们可以经由一个事物的目标或目的来说明它。一个基于目的因的说明称作目的论说明(源自 *telos*)。亚里士多德在《形而上学》一书中论证说,作为第一实体的形式是目的因,而作为目的因的形式是现实性。在他的物理学著作中,亚里士多德广泛应用目的因以说明自然物及其部分的产生和结构。他同时宣称上帝作为不动的动者,是世界的目的因。他的目的论深刻地影响了以后西方科学哲学的发展,尽管许多近代科学哲学家对目的论始终怀有敌意,或者是全然否认它,或者是把它还原为标准的因果关系。关于目的论说明或功能说明的讨论,在生物学哲学和社会科学哲学中依然很活跃。

“于是显然,我们是在探求原因(抽象地说即探求本质);这在某些情形中为目的因,如房屋或床的目的因,而在其他情形中则为动力因。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1041a28—30。

终极目的

见“终极善”条。

Final good

The notion of a final good is fundamental in ancient ethical systems. Every action is pursued for an end or *telos*, and this end is good for the agent. Some goods are themselves pursued for other higher goods, and hence there is a hierarchy of goods. To proceed in this way, there must be a single good which is sought for its own sake while all other goods are sought for the sake of it. This single good is the final (or best or highest) good, also called the final end. It should be terminal, comprehensive, and self-sufficient, although this final condition is in dispute. In ancient Greek philosophy, each ethical school agreed that this final good is *eudaimonia* (well-being or happiness), but differs with regard to what happiness is. Different schools respectively took it to be honour, pleasure, virtue, contemplation, or tranquillity. For an individual's life, the final good is the direction of his or her life as a whole, that is, that person's life plan. To answer the fundamental ethical question "how should I live?", one needs first to deliberate and determine what the final good is for one's life, which will organise the priorities in life and make life a unity. The notion of final good fell into neglect in modern moral theory because the latter emphasises the impartiality of moral agents rather than their life as a unity. However, it has been revived in contemporary virtue ethics.

"Suppose, then, that there is some end of the things we pursue in our actions which we wish for because of itself, and because of which we wish for the other things; and we do not choose everything because of something else, since if we do, it will go on without limit, making desire empty and futile; then clearly this end will be the good, i. e. the final good." Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a18-22.

Finite-state grammar

One of three models for the structure of a language (the other two are phrase structure grammar and transformational grammar). It is based on the Turing machine model. Suppose that we have a machine which is in one of a finite number of internal states, and operates by moving from one state to another by producing a symbol, for example a word. After producing a number of symbols, such as a sequence of words which is called a sentence, the machine ends in a final state. Chomsky calls this machine finite-state grammar, and the language thus produced finite-state language. This model holds that a grammar is a finite set of rules and that an infinite number of sentences are generated in accordance with these rules. A speaker can be conceived of as a machine, producing one sentence, or even one morpheme, at a time; and a hearer is also a machine which receives one sentence, or even one morpheme, at a time. This model can only be applied to some special cases and is not very useful in practice, for it can describe or specify only a finite number of sentences of fi-

终极善

终极善的概念在古代伦理学体系中是根本性的。每个行为都是为了追求一个目的,这个目的对于行为者而言是善的。对某些善的追求自身是为了更高的善,因此有一个善的等级体系。由此推论,必定有一种单一的善,它由于其自身之故而被追求,而其他的善都是因它的缘故而被追求。这个单一的善是终极性的(或最好的、最高的)善,也称为最终目的。它是终极性的、综合性的、自足的,虽然这一最终的条件是存有争议的。在古希腊哲学里,每一个伦理学派都认为,这个终极性的善是 *eudaimonia* (兴旺或幸福),但不同于我们所说的幸福。不同的学派把它看作是荣誉、快乐、德性、沉思、宁静等。对于个人生活而言,终极性的善是他或她的生活作为一个整体的方向,也即是其生活计划。要回答基本的伦理问题“我应该怎样生活”?一个人首先需要思考和决定对于他或她的生活的终极的善是什么。这种终极性的善将组织生活中优先考虑的事情并使生活成为一个整体。终极性的善在现代道德理论中被忽略,因为后者强调道德行为者的公平性而不是他或她的作为一个整体的生活。不过,它已为当代的德性伦理学所复苏。

“设想有某种为我们的行为所追求的事情的目的,我们是为它自身而希求,我们是由于它而去希求其他事物,而且我们并非总是为其他某物而追求什么。因为如果我们这样做了,我们所做的就将漫无边际,必然使得欲望空而无益,那么,很清楚,这个目的将是善,即终极性的善。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1094a18—22。

限定状态语法

语言结构的三种模式之一(另外两个模式是“短语结构语法”和“转换生成语法”)。它基于图灵机模式。假设我们有一部机器,它处于有限的一些内在状态之中,操作它从一种状态转向另一种状态,就会产生一个符号,比如一个词。当产生了一些符号,比如一个被称作句子的词序,这个机器就停止在最终状态。乔姆斯基把这种机器称作“限定状态语法”,因而这种语言就产生了“限定状态语言”。这种模式认为,语法就是一套有限的规则,而根据这些规则就可以产生无限多的句子。一个说者可以被看作是一部机器,他每次生产一个句子,甚至生产一个词素;而听者也是一部机器,他每次接收一个句子,甚至接受一个词素。这种模式只能用于某些特殊的场合,实际上并没有多大的用处,因为它只能描述或区分有限数量的一些长度有限的句子,而我们一定拥有比这部机器更有力的能够使用语言的内在生成能力。

nite length, but we must have more powerful internal generative capacities than such a machine to have our ability to use language.

"A finite-state grammar is the simplest type of grammar which, with a finite amount of apparatus, can generate an infinite number of sentences." —Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures*, 1957, p. 19.

Finite-state language, see finite-state grammar

First cause argument for the existence of God

One of the classic arguments for the existence of God, a variant of the cosmological argument and the second of Aquinas' five ways to prove the existence of God. Everything in the world has something else as its cause, and each cause has its own cause. This chain of causation could stretch to infinity. Because this is unintelligible, there must be a cause which is not caused by anything else and this is the first cause. This first cause is God. From the logical point of view, the argument does not show that there is only one first cause rather than many first causes. Also it does not explain why a first cause is omnipotent or perfectly good. Russell pointed out that the argument starts from a premise that everything is caused by something else, but contradicts this in its conclusion that there is one thing, the first cause, which is not caused by something else.

"The first cause argument is itself of no value for the establishment of theism; because no cause is needed for the existence of that which has no beginning." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, X, p. 440.

First entelechy, another term for substantial form

First philosophy

In Aristotle, first philosophy is either the study of the highest type of being (the unmoved mover or God) in theology or the study of being *qua* being in ontology. Theology is called first philosophy because its object is superior to physical entities, the study of which is second philosophy. Ontology is called first philosophy because it investigates the principles and laws which all other branches of science presuppose and the first causes of the whole world of being. From this latter sense, the general meaning of first philosophy as the foundation of all science is derived. For Francis Bacon, first philosophy is the mother of other sciences. According to Descartes, first philosophy is the science of the principles of knowledge. For Christian Wolff, first philosophy is concerned with the first principles and concepts of thought. For Husserl, first philosophy is the methodological and theoretical foundation of all other philosophical disciplines. Critics

"限定状态语法是一种最简单的语法,它用一些有限的装置可以产生无限多的句子。"——乔姆斯基:《句法结构》,1957年,第19页。

限定状态语言

见“限定状态语法”条。

上帝存在的第一因论证

关于上帝存在的经典论证之一,宇宙论论证的一个变种。阿奎那证明上帝存在五法中的第二法。世上的每一事物都有别物作为原因,而每个原因本身又有自己的原因。这种因果链条可无穷回溯。既然无穷回溯是不可理喻的,就必定有一个不以别物为原因的原因,这个原因就是第一因。这个第一因即为上帝。从逻辑的观点看,该论证并没表明只有一个而不是多个第一因。它也没有解释为什么第一因是全能的或完全善的。罗素指出,这个论证开始的前提是每物都以别物为因,但得到的结论却是有一不以别物为因之物,即第一因,因而陷于自相矛盾。

“对于有神论的建立而言,第一因论证本身毫无价值,因为没有开端的那种东西,其存在无需任何原因。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,第十卷,第440页。

原始的隐德来希

“实体形式”的另一用语。

第一哲学

在亚里士多德那里,第一哲学或者指神学中对于最高存在者(不动的推动者或神)的研究,或者指存在论(本体论)中对于作为存在之存在的研究。神学之所以被称为第一哲学,是因为它的研究对象高于物理存在者;而对后者的研究是第二哲学的事。存在论之为第一哲学是由于它研究所有其他科学分支预设的原理、规律,并研究整个存在世界的第一因。在这个(即存在论的)意义上,第一哲学获得了它作为所有科学基础的普遍意义。对于F. 培根来说,第一哲学是其他科学之母。按照笛卡尔的主张,第一哲学是关于知识原理的科学。在C. 沃尔夫看来,第一哲学关注思想的首要原理和概念。对于胡塞尔,第一哲学是所有其他哲学学科的方法论和理论的基础。批评者们则不同意这类说法,他们怀疑在哲学中是否有第一哲学或第一哲学

disagree whether there is first philosophy within philosophy or first philosophy prior to science.

"All attempts at discovering ultimate foundations, in which the intentions of first philosophy live on, have broken down." —Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 1, 1984, p. 2.

First principle

[Greek: *arche*, beginning, starting point] A fundamental principle, rule or law for a systematic enquiry. From first principles other principles, rules or laws of that system are derived or explained, but first principles themselves cannot be derived or explained from any other principles within that system. Mathematical axioms and logical principles are recognised as having the status of first principles. First principles are regarded as being self evident, *a priori*, or capable of being grasped only through intuition. Traditionally, it was thought that a system without first principles could not be coherent or consistent. Some philosophers argue that instead of offering justification to subordinate rules, first principles are themselves justified by their success in organising or deriving the right set of subordinate rules. They also argue that in some cases or in principle we have a choice in deciding the first principles of a system. The study of first principles normally belongs to the domain of metaphysics. Aristotle claimed that a principle is the starting-point from which a thing is or comes to be or is known.

"These [first] principles must satisfy two conditions. First, they must be so clear and so evident that the human mind cannot doubt their truth when it attentively concentrated on them; secondly, the knowledge of other things must depend on them, in the sense that the principles must be capable of being known without knowledge of other matters, but not vice versa." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, p. 181.

First-level concept

Frege distinguished between first-level concepts and second-level concepts, although he sometimes used the expressions "first-order concepts" and "second-order concepts" for the same purpose. Since Frege's distinction between concept and object corresponds to his distinction between predicate and subject, this is also a distinction between first-level predicates and second-level predicates. A first-level concept or predicate is applied to an object to ascribe a property to that object. A second-level concept or predicate is applied not to an object, but to a concept or a predicate. It is a concept of first-level concepts or a predicate of first level predicates. A first-level concept is also called an n th level concept, while a second-level concept is called an $n+1$ th-level concept. This doctrine can be traced to Kant's view that existence is not a real property. Accordingly, existence is a second-level rather

是否先于科学。

"所有要发现那使第一哲学得以存在的终极基础的努力都已落空。"——哈贝马斯:《交往行为理论》,第一卷,1984年,第2页。

第一原理

[源自希腊词 *arche* (开端, 起点)] 一个系统研究中的基本原理、规则或法则; 该系统或体系的其他原理、规则或法则都是从它那里推导出来或从它那里得到解释, 而它本身却不是从那个体系或系统中的任何其他原理或规则推导出来或得到解释的。数学公理和逻辑原理被认为具有第一原理的资格。第一原理被认为是自明的、先天的, 只能通过直观来领会。传统的看法是, 没有第一原理的体系不可能是连贯的或前后一致的。有些哲学家论证说, 第一原理不是要说明从属的规则, 而是第一原理本身需要通过在组织或推导一套适当的从属规则方面的成功而得到说明。他们还认为, 在某些情况中或在原则上我们可以选择确定某一系统中的第一原理。对第一原理的研究通常属于形而上学的领域。亚里士多德认为原理是事物由之而存在或生成或被认识的起点。

"这些 [第一] 原理必须满足两个条件。第一, 它们必定是如此清楚, 如此明白, 以至于当人类心灵把注意集中于它们时, 不能怀疑它们的真理性。第二, 其他事物的知识必须依赖它们, 也就是说, 这些原理没有其他事物的知识就能被认识, 但反过来则不成立。"——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》, 第一卷, 第181页。

一阶概念

弗雷格区分了一阶概念和二阶概念, 尽管他有时也在同样的意义上使用“一序概念”和“二序概念”这种表达式。由于弗雷格对概念和对象的区分对应于谓词和主词的区分, 这也是“一阶谓词”和“二阶谓词”的区分。把一阶概念或一阶谓词用于一个对象, 就是把特性归属于这个对象。二阶概念或二阶谓词不能用于对象, 而只能用于概念或谓词, 它是关于一阶概念的概念或关于一阶谓词的谓词。一阶概念也可以称作 n 阶概念, 而二阶概念则称作 $n+1$ 阶概念。这种理论可以追溯到康德的这样一个观点, 即存在并非是一个真正的特性。由此可见, 存在是二阶概念, 而不是一阶概念。说“ X 存在”意味着“概念 X 是被具体说明了的”。与此相似, 数字也是二阶概念。当我们说 X 是一个数字,

than the first-level concept. To say "X exists" means that the concept X is instantiated. Analogously, number is also a second-level concept. When we say that X is a number, we do not mean that X is an object which has the property of being a number, but rather that the concept X has numerous instantiations. Frege's famous doctrine that existence is a second-level concept or predicate is inferred from his doctrine of number.

"The ontological proof of God's existence suffers from the fallacy of treating existence as a first-level concept."

Frege, "Function and Concept", in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, 1966, p. 38.

First-level predicate, see first-level concept

First order language, see first-order logic

First order logic

If in a logical language the quantifiers only contain variables ranging over individuals, this language is called a first-order language, and these variables are called first order variables. The study of the rules of inference in a first-order language is called first-order logic. In this logic, individuals are the only arguments of predicates. If the variables range over properties, relations, functions and classes of the individuals, they are called second-order variables. A language containing second-order variables is a second order language, and the logic of this language is second-order logic. The domain of second-order logic is determined by the first-order logic. If the variables range over the domain of properties or of the relations of properties, then we have third-order variables, language and logic. This construction can go on to even higher orders. Any logic which is at least a second-order logic is called higher-order logic. Strictly speaking, first-order logic emerged with Hilbert in 1917. For most mathematicians, it is the proper and natural framework for mathematics.

"I have distinguished between a logician's use of first-order logic (where quantifiers range only over individuals), second-order logic (where quantifiers can also range over sets or relations), w -order logic (essentially the simple theory of types), and various infinitary logics (having formulas of infinite length or rules of inference with infinitely many premises)." —Moore, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. xi, 1988, p. 96.

First-order predicate, see predicate

我们并不是说 X 是一个有着作为数字这种特性的对象,而是说概念 X 有大量的事例可以说明。弗雷格从他的数字理论中推出了他关于存在是一个二阶概念或二阶谓词的著名理论。

“对上帝存在的本体论证明,错误地把存在看作是一个一阶概念。”——弗雷格:《函项和概念》,戴吉奇和布莱克(编):《G. 弗雷格哲学文集》,1966年,第38页。

一阶谓词

见“一阶概念”条。

一阶语言

见“一阶逻辑”条。

一阶逻辑

如果在一种逻辑语言中,量词仅包含值域为个体的变量,这种语言就称作“一阶语言”,这些变量就称作一阶变量。对一阶语言中推理规则的研究称作一阶逻辑。在这种逻辑中,个体是谓词仅有的中项。如果变量的值域为个体的性质、关系、功能和类,就被称作二阶变量。包含二阶变量的语言称作二阶语言,这种语言的逻辑称作二阶逻辑。二阶逻辑的定义域为一阶逻辑所决定。如果变量的值域为性质的定义域,或性质的关系,则我们有三阶变量、语言和逻辑。这种构造能持续至更高阶。任何至少是二阶的及其以上的逻辑称作“高阶逻辑”。严格说来,一阶逻辑随希尔伯特而形成于1917年。对大多数数学家来说,它是数学的适当的自然的框架。

“我已经区分了逻辑学家所使用的一阶逻辑(其中量词的值域仅为个体)、二阶逻辑(其中量词的值域也能是集合或关系)、 w 阶逻辑(实质上简单的类型论)和种种无穷逻辑(有着无穷长的公式或具有无穷多前提的推理规则)。”——摩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》1988年,第11期,第96页。

一阶谓词逻辑

见“谓词”条。

First-person perspective

We may ascribe mental concepts either to ourselves (first person ascriptions through our inner awareness of our mental states) or to others (third person ascriptions through outer manifestations in behaviour and speech). These two kinds of ascription give rise to puzzles about the unitary nature of mental phenomena, for given the special character of the subject, my description of my own mental states could be quite different in nature and content from my description of other minds. We can then ask whether, in order to offer a satisfactory account of mental phenomena, we should proceed from the perspective of the subject with the mental states or from the perspective of forming judgements about the states of other minds. The former is the first person perspective and is associated with Cartesianism, and the latter is called the third-person perspective and is associated with behaviourism. The first-person perspective is private and peculiar to the subject. Its advocates hold that this perspective affords privileged access to the mental states of the subject. The third-person perspective is public and observable. Its advocates believe that our conception of mental states is informed by the behavioural criteria we use to apply mental concepts to others. It is also possible to occupy the middle ground between these two positions. Different perspectives provide different theories about the nature and essence of mental states, and about the mind-body relationship. The dichotomy of the first-person perspective and the third person perspective corresponds to the contrast between of the subjective and the objective, and has been central in modern philosophy.

"It was the nature—indeed the very existence—of the allegedly public, physical world that was felt to be dubious, or at least doubtable, from within one's private movie theatre. This Cartesian first-person perspective dominated the philosophy of mind, as well as metaphysics and epistemology generally, from the seventeenth century through the first half of our time." —Lycan, *Consciousness*, 1987, p. 1.

Firstness

The metaphysics of Peirce claims that there are three universal categories of elements among phenomena, respectively Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Firstness comprises the qualities of phenomena, such as red, bitter, tedious and hard. These qualities merge into one another and have no perfect identities. Secondness includes the facts of experience, which we know by their resistance and consequences. They are not the mind's creation. Thirdness includes laws or thoughts which determine how facts may be. Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness. Thirdness is the mediation between Secondness and Firstness. Metaphysics deals with phenomena in their Thirdness.

第一人观点

我们可能将心的概念或者归于自己（第一人归结，亦即，我们对于自己的心的状态的“内部”觉知）或者归于他人（第三人归结，亦即，它们的行为和语言的“外部”表现）。这两种归结引起了关于心的现象的统一本质的难题，因为根据主体的特殊本性，我对于我的心的状态的描述可能在本质与内容上与我对他心的描述颇为不同。这样就提出了下面的问题：为了令人满意地描述心的现象，我们是应当由具有这一心的状态的主体的观点出发，还是应当由关于构成他心状态的判断的观点出发。前者是笛卡尔主义的“第一人的观点”，后者则是行为主义的“第三人观点”。第一人的观点对于主体是私密和独特的，其支持者认为这一第一人的观点对于主体的心的状态提供了优先通道。第三人的观点被认为是公开的 and 可观察的，其支持者相信我们关于心的状态的概念是由我们用来将心的概念应用于他人的行为标准决定的。也可以取这两种观点的中间立场。不同的观点提供关于心的状态的本质与实质及心身关系的不同理论。第一人观点与第三人观点的二分法与主观与客观的二分法相对应，这在现代哲学中处于中心地位。

“从一个人的私人剧场来看，就会觉得正是那被认为是公开的、物理的世界的本质——实际上是其存在——才是可疑的或至少是不能确定的。这一笛卡尔式的第一人的观点从17世纪到本世纪上半叶一直统治着心的哲学，并在广义上统治着形而上学和认识论。”——里库：《意识》，1987年，第1页。

第一性

皮尔士的形而上学认为，在现象中存在三种普遍的要素范畴，分别称作第一性、第二性和第三性。第一性包含现象的性质，诸如红色的、苦味的、沉闷的、坚硬的等等。这些性质彼此结合，没有完全的统一性。第二性包括经验的事实，我们通过它们的耐久和效果而认识它们。它们不是精神的创造。第三性包括决定事实可能怎样的定律或思想。第一性是第二性和第三性二者的基本要素，第二性是第三性的基础部分，第三性是第二性和第一性之间的中介。形而上学论述的是在其第三性中的现象。这三个范畴也是三种存在方式：可能性、现实性和必然性。

“第一性例证于总体感觉的每一种特性中

These three categories are also three modes of existence: possibility, actuality and destiny.

"A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling... the word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation which exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself." —Peirce, *Collected Works*, I: 531.

Fittingness

We generally explain our moral actions in terms of moral principles, or of long-term self-interest. However, there are many cases which are not covered by either of these considerations. In these situations we claim that an action is morally permissible if we assess that it is fitting, suitable and appropriate to a particular agent in a particular situation. This is the moral consideration of fittingness, a common concern emphasised by Cicero and revived in contemporary virtue ethics. The practice of determining what is fitting requires a good character and consistency. The action of a virtuous person is always regarded as an example to follow, because it is fitting.

"We often explain both why we did something and why we intend to do something by saying that it is fitting or appropriate to a situation or that it is in accordance with a moral rule." —Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 106.

Five ways

[Latin: *quinque viae*] Aquinas' five proofs for the existence of God. The five ways employ the different Aristotelian notions of cause or explanation in what can be seen as five formulations of one basic argument. All five ways are *a posteriori* in the sense that they start with empirical facts about the physical world and then argue to the existence of a transcendent cause to explain them. Thus they are distinct from *a priori* proofs which start from the essence or definition of God. The first way argues from the fact that things move or change to the existence of an unmoved mover. The second way argues on the basis of a hierarchy of efficient causes existing in the world that there is an ultimate uncaused cause. The third way proceeds from the contingency of things, that is their being subject to generation and corruption, to the conclusion that there must be an absolute being. The fourth way, also called the henological argument, moves from our experience of a gradation of perfection in the world to the conclusion that there must be an absolute perfection. The fifth way argues that since every natural body exists for some end, there must be an absolute final cause. The five ways employ the different kinds of Aristotelian cause or explanation to argue for the existence of God.

"If these 'five ways' are not singly or collectively wholly convincing, and... rest on an interpretation of causality which requires very considerable modification in the light of

……可能性一词适合于它，除了那种意味着现存关系的可能性，而普遍的第一性则是其自身存在的方式。”——皮尔士：《文集》，第一卷，第531页。

适当

我们一般依据道德原则或长期的自我利益来解释我们的道德行为。不过，有许多情况是这些道德考虑所不能覆盖的。在这种情况下，如果我们估计，一种行为对于一个处在特定情况下的特定的个人来说是适当的、合适的话，我们就主张这种行为在道德上是许可的。这种对适当的道德考虑，是为西塞罗所强调，并为当代的德性伦理学所复苏的一种普遍性关注。决定什么是适当的，需要一个优良品格及一致性。一个有德性的人的行为总被看作是可追随的榜样，因为它是适当的。

“在解释我们为什么做某事和我们为什么打算做某事时，我们常常说这在某种情况下是适当的或合适的，或这符合一种道德原则。”——诺威尔-史密斯：《伦理学》，1954年，第106页。

五法

[拉丁语为 *quinque viae*] T. 阿奎那关于上帝存在的五种证明。它们采用了不同的亚里士多德主义的原因或解释观念，可以看作是一种基本论证的五个公式化表述。所有的五种方法都是后天的，因为它们都开始于关于物理世界的经验事实，然后论证说，有一种超验的原因来解释这些事实。因此，它们是与出发于上帝的本质或定义的先天证明相区别的。第一种方法是从事物运动或变化的事实出发，得出不动的动者存在的结论。第二种方法以世上存在动力因系统为基础，论证有一种终极的无因之因存在。第三种方法从事物的暂时性，即从它们都有生成和毁灭出发，得出必定有一绝对存在的结论。第四种方法（也被称为合一论论证）从我们经验着世上的完善等级这一事实出发，得出必定有一绝对完善的结论。第五种方法是，既然每一自然物体都是为了某个目的而存在，那么，必定有一绝对的终极因。这五种方法均是采用不同类型的亚里士多德主义的原因式解释理论来论证上帝的存在。

“虽然这‘五法’不是单独地或集合地完全使人信服，而且……所依靠的因果阐释也需要按照自然过程运作的现今知识作出很大修正，但是，它们毕竟构成了上帝存在及其属性的令人难忘的理性证明。”——詹姆斯：《神的概念》。

present day knowledge of the working of natural processes, nevertheless, they constitute an impressive rational demonstration of the existence and attributes of God." —James, *The Concept of Deity*, 1950, p. 132.

Flaccid designator

A term which contrasts with Kripke's rigid designator. While a rigid designator designates the same thing in all possible worlds, a flaccid designator designates different things in different possible worlds. For example, the term "China's capital" currently designates Beijing, but it used to refer to Nanjing or Xian, and it could have referred to other cities had circumstances been different. The expression "the best seller" is another example of a flaccid designator, for the term refers to different books at different times and could have designated other different books had circumstances been different.

"There is no widely accepted name for terms such as these, which refer to different things in different possible worlds; but we might call them flaccid designators (because 'flaccid' is the opposite of 'rigid')." —Martin, *The Meaning of Language*, 1987, p. 160.

Flux

[from Greek: *rhein*, to flow] The Greek philosopher Heraclitus claimed that the world is an ever-living fire and is hence in an unceasing process of flux or change. We are and are not at any given moment, and because of constant change "one cannot step into the same river twice". Plato accepted this view of the sensible world, but argued that if there were nothing more than such a changing world, we would be led to relativism and no account of truth would be possible. He concluded that there must be another eternal world, the intelligible world of really existing ideals which is the primary source of knowledge. For Plato, the sensible world of flux participates in the world of ideals, and the contrast between these two worlds corresponds to the contrast between genesis and being.

"In his youth Plato first became acquainted with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines that all perceptible things were in everlasting flux, and that there is no knowledge of them. He continued to hold these views later." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 987a32-3.

Flying arrow, paradox of the

One of Zeno's paradoxes designed to show the impossibility of motion. On the assumption that time is composed of atomic instants, Zeno inferred that motion is discontinuous. The flying arrow, at any given instant during its flight, occupies a space equal to itself. What occupies a space equal to itself is at rest. Hence, the arrow is at rest at every instant. Since time is composed of instants, if the arrow does not

1950年,第132页。

松散指示词

与克里普克的“固定指示词”相对立的一个术语。固定指示词在一切可能世界里都指示同一个事物,而松散指示词则在不同的可能世界中指示不同的事物。例如,“中国的首都”这个词现在指的是北京,但是它曾用于指南京或西安等城市,如果将来情况改变了,它也可能指其他城市。“最畅销书”这个表达式是松散指示词的又一个例子,因为这个词在不同时候指称不同的书,并且如环境改变,亦可指其他不同的书。

“对于像这样在不同的可能世界指称不同的对象的词,没有广泛接受的名称;但是我们可以称它们为松散指示词(因为‘松散的’是与‘固定的’相对立的)。”——马丁:《语言的意义》,1987年,第160页。

流变

[源自希腊词: *rhein* (流动)] 希腊哲学家赫拉克利特认为,世界是一团永恒的活火,因而处于不断的流动变化过程中。在任何特定时刻我们既是又不是,并且由于不断的变化,“人不能两次踏进同一条河”。柏拉图接受了这种关于感觉世界的观点,但认为如果只有这样一个变化世界,我们会陷于相对主义,不可能叙述真理。因而,必定有另外一个永恒的、可理解的世界,即形相的世界,它乃是真正的存在,是知识的第一源泉。对于柏拉图来说,流变的可感世界分有形相世界,而这两个世界间的区分相应于变动与存在间的区分。

“在他的青年时代,柏拉图结识了克拉底鲁并熟知赫拉克利特的学说,即一切可感事物都处于永恒的流变中,对它们无知识可言。后来他继续持有这样的观点。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,987a32-33。

飞矢悖论

芝诺悖论之一,旨在表明运动的不可能性。这一悖论的设定是,时间是由原子瞬间组成的,由此芝诺推出运动是不连续的。飞矢在飞行的任何特定瞬间,都占据一个与自身相等的空间;而占据一个与自身相等的空间的事物是静止的,因而这箭在每一瞬间都是静止的;由于时间是由各瞬间组成的,而箭在任何瞬间都不动,故

move at any instant, it is at rest throughout its flight.

"The third [paradox] is just given above, that the flying arrow is at rest." --Aristotle, *Physics*, 239b30.

Focal meaning

[from Greek: *pros hen legesthai*, being said in relation to one point] A term connected with Aristotle's doctrine of the different senses of being in the different categories. Although being has many senses, these senses are not disconnected or isolated, but are all related to one central point, that is, being in the category of substance. Quality is said to be because it is quality of substance; quantity is said to be because it is quantity of substance, and so on for the other categories. In virtue of this pattern, Aristotle claimed that a universal science of being (the science of being *qua* being) is possible. Aristotle himself made use of this pattern only to connect substance with other categories. Influenced by Thomas Aquinas, some scholars have extended the account of focal meaning beyond Aristotle's own use to cover the relation between sensible substances and God, saying that God is the focal meaning of all substances. By these means, they intend to reconcile the tension between the science of being and theology in Aristotle.

"There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one focal meaning, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity." --Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a32-4.

Folk psychology

Also called common sense psychology, a term for common sense understanding about intentional mental states and overt behaviour, using such terms as "belief", "desire", "intention", "fear", "imagination" and "hope". In contrast to scientific or experimental psychology and academic psychology in general, folk psychology is governed by a putative network of principles which is taken to underlie our ability to explain and predict human behaviour. It is familiar since childhood and is used effortlessly by all of us in everyday life. It is folk psychology in the way that our common sense talk about material objects is called folk physics. Eliminativism in the philosophy of mind, presented in the 1980s by P. M. Churchland, claimed that folk-psychology, as an outdated pre-scientific view of the world, should be replaced by a more scientific theory of the mind-brain. These claims provoked a continuing debate about the status and adequacy of folk psychology. In opposition to eliminativism, Fodor and Dennett argue that folk psychology can be vindicated, to a greater or lesser extent, by scientific psychology; others argue that folk psychology is not a theory, for it does not have generalisations about the relations among mental states and about the relations between mental states and behaviour. Philosophers argue about the claim that the central concepts

它在飞行的全过程都是静止的。

"上面给出的是第三个[悖论],即飞矢是静止的。"——亚里士多德:《物理学》, 239b30。

中心意义

[源自希腊文 *pros hen legesthai* (相连于一个点而被述说)]该术语与亚里士多德关于不同范畴的存在("是")有不同意义的学说相联。尽管存在["是"]有许多意义,这些意义不是互不相关、彼此孤立的,而是都指向一个中心点,即本体范畴的存在["是"]。质被说成"是"〔或存在〕,是因为它是本体的质;量被说成"是",乃是因为它是本体的量,如此等等。由于这一模式,亚里士多德声称一门关于"是"〔或存在〕的普遍科学(关于"作为是的是"的科学)是可能的,亚里士多德自己只是使用这一模式来联系本体与其他范畴。由于受阿奎那的影响,有些学者也扩展亚里士多德的用法,将中心意义的模式应用至可感本体与神的关系上,认为神是一切本体的中心意义。据此,这些学者力图调和亚里士多德哲学中存在论与神学的关系。

"在许多意义上一物可被说成'是'〔或存在〕,但所有这些'是'都相联于一中心意义,某一特定类的事物,而不只是在许多意义上被说成是'是'。"——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1003a32-34。

常识心理学

又作"常识心理学",指人们对意向性的心的状态和外显行为的常识理解,所使用的语汇包括"信念"、"欲求"、"意向"、"恐怕"、"想像"或"希望"。与科学的或实验的心理学以及一般意义上的学术心理学不同,常识心理学由一个假定的原则网络所支配,这些原则使得我们具有解释和预测人类行为的能力。人们自童年就熟知它,并且我们所有的人都毫不费力地在日常生活中使用它。就像我们关于物质对象的常识谈论被称为"常识物理学"一样,它则是"常识心理学"。80年代由P.M. 丘奇兰德所提出的心的哲学中的取消论声称,常识心理学作为一种过时的关于世界的前科学的观点,应当被更为科学的心脑理论所取代。这一主张引起了关于常识心理学的地位和恰当性的持续争论。与取消论相对立,福多和丹奈特等人论证说常识心理学能够在某种程度上通过科学心理学得到辩护;其他人则论辩说常识心理学不是一种理论,因为它没有关于心的状态之间的关系和心的状态与行为之间的关系的概括。哲学家们就这样的主张展开争论:像信念、欲求这样的常识心理学的中心概念具有像意向性这样足以将它们排除于科学心理学之外的特征。

of folk psychology, such as belief and desire, have features, such as intentionality, which exclude them from any scientific psychology.

Folk psychology in another sense flourished in Germany and was represented by the work of Wilhelm Wundt. Here the term means cultural psychology, that is a study of the mentality of a people who share a social practice as that mentality is expressed in culture, myths and customs.

"Briefly, folk psychology is the tag given to ordinary talk about the mind." — Christense and Turner (eds), *Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind*, 1993, xvi.

Footnotes to Plato

In a famous remark, A. N. Whitehead said that the development of Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato. This was not a substantive claim that every subsequent development is nothing more but an expansion or exegesis of what Plato said in his works, but should be considered as a metaphor to indicate how powerfully Plato's thought has influenced the Western tradition. Various contemporary philosophical achievements are deeply indebted to him. Plato's works are an inexhaustible mine of suggestion. The remark also points to the reflective nature of philosophy, by which earlier thought remains crucially important for later work. In contrast, science generally supersedes its past.

"The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." — Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 1929, p. 53.

For itself. see in itself

Force/sense. see sense/force

Foreknowledge

Knowledge about what will happen in the future before it actually happens. This knowledge is ascribed to God as a divine attribute and as a natural aspect of God's omniscience. God knows what is going to happen, and his knowledge admits no alternatives. God's foreknowledge implies that there is a fixed or predestined future. If this is the case, then all future human actions and the course of history are predestined rather than free. Humans will have to act in the predestined way. The resulting conflict between foreknowledge and free will is a perennial problem in both philosophy and theology. To accept the existence of foreknowledge involves the rejection of free will. If we admit free action, then God's foreknowledge must be modified in some way. Some philosophers argue, for example, that because an omniscient God is

另一种涵义上的常识心理学兴盛于德国,以 W. 冯特的工作为代表。在这里,这一术语是指文化心理学,所研究的是具有共同的社会活动的人的心理,因为这个心理是表达于文化、神话和习俗之中的。

"简单地说,常识心理学就是给关于心的日常谈论所加的标签。" — 克里斯丹斯和特纳(编):《常识心理学与心的哲学》,1993年,第 xvi 页。

对柏拉图脚注

A. N. 怀特海的一句名言。他说,西方哲学的发展是对柏拉图的一系列脚注。这句话的实质,不应认作断言每一后续的发展只不过是对柏拉图在其著作中所言内容的注解或阐释,而应视为一个比喻,以说明柏拉图的思想如何有力地影响了西方传统。当代哲学的不同成就深受他的恩惠。柏拉图的著作是启发人们的不尽矿藏。这一名言也指出了哲学的反思性质,早期的哲学思想对后期工作依然非常重要。与此相对立,科学一般是在超越过去。

"欧洲哲学传统最确实的一般特征是,它由对柏拉图的一系列脚注构成。" — 怀特海:《过程与实在》,1929年,第 53 页。

自为

见“自在”条。

力量/意义

见“意义/力量”条。

预知

在事物实际发生之前,就知道什么会在将来发生。这种知识作为一种神性,作为上帝全知的本性而被归于上帝。上帝知道什么将会发生,他的知识不容替换。上帝的预知蕴含着,有一种不变的或前定的将来。如果真是这样,那么,人类的一切未来行为和历史的进程都是前定的,而不是自由的。人类将不得不按前定的方式行动。预知和自由意志之间的这种冲突无论在哲学中还是在神学中,都是一个永久性难题。接受预知的存在,意味着对自由意志的否定;而如果我们容许自由行为,上帝的预知又必定受到某种意义的限制。有些哲学家论争说,例如,因为全知的上帝是不现身的,外在于时间的,他有关于法则及普遍的知识,但缺乏对特殊事物,例如

unembodied and outside time, he has knowledge of laws and universals, but lacks knowledge of particular things, such as human actions.

"There exists in the history of thought a deterministic idea...that the course of world-history is determined...by the foreknowledge of a supreme being. This being, as it were, 'sees' the world states follow one upon another in a linear succession." --von Wright, *Causality and Determinism*, 1974, p. 112.

Forgery

A duplicate of an original work intended to be taken as that work or a work in the style of an artist intended to be taken as the work of that artist. The problem of determining whether an artwork is genuine has been a troublesome issue for collectors and museums. Philosophers are interested in the issue of forgery because no matter how similar a forgery is to an original work, the forgery is regarded as having less aesthetic value and is sometimes denied having any aesthetic value at all. How can we explain this phenomenon? Some regard this rejection of forged works as merely a matter of snobbishness or financial self-interest of the art market. Some believe that the rejection is a response to the immorality of the forgers and dealers who lie about the identity of the work. Others claim, more reasonably, that the original artwork embodies its historical context and the artist's originality, which cannot be duplicated. Some believe that forgeries are another sort of artwork in their own right, not the same as their originals. Where, then, is the artistry of forgeries? All these problems raise important questions about the identity of artworks, aesthetic value and aesthetic enjoyment. Some questions about forgery also arise concerning plagiarism, in which writers present as their own work material copied from others.

"The hard-headed question why there is any aesthetic difference between a deceptive forgery and an original work challenges a basic premise on which the very functions of collectors, museum, and art historian depend." -- Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 1976, p. 99.

Forgiveness

A trait of character of a morally offended or injured person who overcomes a natural and generally proper resentment directed at the person who commits the offence and refuses to blame to the latter. Forgiveness is neither a justification of the wrongdoing, nor an excuse for it. Forgiveness reflects one's benevolent disposition and is generally regarded as a virtue. It is emphasised in Christian ethics which holds that the forgiveness of enemies corresponds to God's forgiveness of us. It is also widely discussed in contemporary virtue ethics, for it is a popular ethical phenomenon to offer forgiveness and to ask to be forgiven. However, forgiveness

人类行为的知识。

"在思想史上,存在着一种宿命论观念,……世界历史的进程……被一位至上存在的预知所决定。这位存在仿佛'看见'世界的情形以一种直线接续的方式一个接一个地发生。"——冯·赖特:《因果性与决定论》,1974年,第112页。

赝品

意在被当做原作的复制品,它模仿一作者的风格并意图被看做是那艺术家的作品。确定一件艺术作品是否是真品的问题,向来是收藏家和博物馆感到头痛的问题。哲学家之所以对赝品问题感兴趣,是因为无论赝品与原作多么相似,人们总认为赝品的审美价值少于原作,甚至有时认为赝品根本就没有什么审美价值。如何解释这一现象呢?有些人认为这种否定赝品的作法,只是艺术市场中的一种势利的或关乎个人财物利益的问题。有些人则认为这种否定赝品的作法是对伪造者和以假乱真的经营者之不道德行为所做出的反应。另有一些人更有理由地认为,艺术原作体现着历史的语境与艺术家的独创性,这是无法复制或伪造的。而另有一些人则认为,赝品凭其自身的实力属于另外一类与原作不同的艺术作品。那么,赝品的艺术性何在呢?所有这些问题对艺术作品的身份、审美价值与审美欣赏提出了许多重要的疑问。一些关于赝品的问题也涉及到抄袭问题,也就是作者在自己的作品中所搞的那种偷梁换柱的勾当。

"在欺世盗名的赝品与原作之间为什么会有审美差异这个难题,对决定收藏家、博物馆与艺术史家之职能的基本前提提出了挑战。"——古德曼:《艺术语言》,1976年,第99页。

宽恕

指这样一种品格,一个在道德上被冒犯或伤害的人,克服了对于犯有过错者的自然的和一般适当的怨恨,而拒绝对后者的责备。宽恕既不是对于所宽恕者的错误行为的合理性的证明,也不是这种行为的一个藉口。宽恕反映了一个人的仁慈的性情,因此一般被看作是一种德性。基督教伦理学强调宽恕。它认为,对敌人的宽恕是与上帝对我们的宽恕相应的。它也在当代的德性伦理学中得到广泛的讨论,因为要求给予宽恕或被宽恕,是一个常见的伦理现象。不过,宽恕必须有一个限度,这取决于犯罪者的自

must have a limit, depending on the degree of remorse of the offender. For proper resentment is not a bad thing, but a manifestation of self-respect and a respect for moral rules. Unlimited and unprincipled forgiveness will turn out to be a kind of moral wickedness and even a manifestation of the vice of servility.

"To forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the resentment." —P. F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment*, 1974, p. 6.

Form

[Greek: *eidōs*, derived from the verb *idein*, to see, literally the sensible shape of a thing; has the same sense as Greek: *morphe* | Plato and Aristotle use *eidōs* to mean the inner structure or intelligible form of a thing, the shape grasped by the eye of the soul, which serves as the object of knowledge or thought. For Plato, forms exist in some way independently of particulars; they are paradigms, while the particulars are imperfect copies of them. He uses form (*eidōs*) synonymously with idea (which is also derived from the verb *idein*). Hence, Plato's theory of Ideas is also called the theory of Forms (see Idea, Plato).

Aristotle sometimes uses *eidōs* in contrast to genus. *Eidōs* in this sense is always translated as species rather than as form. As species, it is a common predicate and a kind of secondary substance in the *Categories*, but in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle denies that it is a substance. More often, form contrasts with matter in Aristotle's philosophy. It denotes the inner structure of a thing, which is expressed in its definition; it is in this sense that form is synonymous with essence (*to ti en einai*), and is called primary substance. In Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes, form is designated the formal cause, which is responsible for unifying material elements into an organic thing. In this sense, form is usually identical with the final cause and sometimes also with the efficient cause, and is also identical with actuality. How these claims can be reconciled is a matter of controversy. There are also disputes concerning whether Aristotle asserts the existence of particular form as well as the existence of universal form. A doctrine of particular form is developed in Plotinus, and in medieval philosophy, especially by Aquinas.

"By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1032b 1-2.

Form of life

For later Wittgenstein, the context of practice or culture in which speaking a language is embedded in the form of language games. Since language is a set of social activities, speaking a language becomes part of a communal activity and a way of living in society. Wittgenstein calls the totality of communal activities, the culture into which language games are embedded, a form of life. A form of life comprises shared

责程度,适度的怨恨不是件坏事,而是自尊和对道德规则的尊重的表现。没有限度的无原则的宽恕是一种道德上的恶,甚至是对恶的屈从的表现。

“宽恕就是接受忏悔及放弃怨恨。”——斯特劳森:《自由与怨恨》,1974年,第6页。

形式

[在希腊语中称作 *eidōs*, 源自动词 *idein* (即“看见”或“观看”), 字面上意味着事物的感性外观或形状, 并且与另一希腊词 *morphe* (即“形状”) 同义] 柏拉图和亚里士多德用 *eidōs* 一词是指事物的内在结构或可理解形式, 也就是通过心灵的眼睛来把握的外观, 这实际上成了认识或思维的对象。在柏拉图看来, 形式存在于某种独立于殊相的方式之中; 形式就是范式, 殊相则是这些范式的不完美的模仿。柏拉图将形式用作形相 (该词也源自希腊语的动词 *idein*) 的近义词。因此, 柏拉图的形相说也被称为形式说 (参阅柏拉图对形相的论述)。

亚里士多德有时用 *eidōs* 与种进行比较。在此意义上, *eidōs* 经常被译为属而非形式。作为种, 它是一个共同的谓项, 是《范畴》中的第二本体, 但在《形而上学》中, 亚里士多德否认了这是一个本体。通常, 在亚里士多德的哲学中, 形式与物质形成对照。形式意指事物的内在结构, 是在其定义中表现出来的; 正是在此意义上, 形式与本质 (*to ti en einai*) 同义, 因此被称为第一本体。在亚里士多德的四因说中, 形式来自形式因, 其职责在于将物质因素统一为有机物。所以, 形式通常与终极因等同, 有时也与动力因等同, 有时也与实存性等同。如何调和这些看法是一个有争议的问题。另外, 亚里士多德是否断言存在特殊形式与一般形式的问题也有争论。特殊形式的学说在普罗提诺和中世纪哲学中, 尤其是阿奎那的哲学中, 得到了发展。

“我用形式是指每件事物的本质及其第一本体。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1032b 1-2。

生活形式

对后期维特根斯坦而言, 讲语言的实际境况或文化深藏于语言游戏的形式中。由于语言是一套社会活动, 因而讲语言就成了社会中公共活动的一部分和一种生活方式。维特根斯坦把公共活动的总体, 把体现于语言游戏中的文化, 叫做一种“生活形式”。生活形式包括人们共有的自然反应和语言反应, 包括在定义、判断

natural and linguistic responses, broad agreement in definitions and judgements and corresponding behaviour. Language is connected with our life through our shared playing of language games and is thus interwoven with non-linguistic contexts. To imagine language is to imagine a form of life which in itself can neither be justified nor unjustified. This indicates that grammatical rules are an integral part of human historical practice and are subject to change. Insofar as there are foundations for language for the later Wittgenstein, what must be accepted as given are forms of life. Wittgenstein's remarks about this term are not always consistent and clear and have consequently led to exegetical controversy. In particular, he sometime speaks of multiple forms of life as specific patterns with limited scope.

"Hence the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."—Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 23.

Form of proposition

Russell's term, referring to a formula that contains only variables, from which a class of propositions can be obtained by substituting other constituents for one or more constituents contained by the original proposition. Hence a form of proposition is the common structure which propositions of the same class share.

"The form of a proposition is that which is in common between any two propositions of which the one can be obtained from the other by substituting other constituents for the original ones."—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VIII, p. 209.

Form of representation, another term for representational form

Formal

The adjective "formal" is derived from form, that is, the general nature or structure to which a type of thing belongs. In general, formal considerations or approaches have to do with the abstract structure, or pattern, of a subject, rather than with its content or meaning. It is thus opposed to factual or material considerations. Hence formal logic, for example, is concerned not with the content of particular sentences in an argument, but only with the structure of their truth values. A formal language consists merely of variables and connectives.

"A theory, a rule, a definition, or the like, is to be called formal when no reference is made in it either to the meaning of the symbols...or to the sense of the expressions...but simply and solely the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed."—Carnap,

及相应行为方面的广泛一致。语言通过我们共用参与的语言游戏而与我们的生活相关,并因而与非语言的境况交织在一起。想像语言就是想像一种生活形式,这种生活形式本身既不能被证明为有理,也不能被证明为无理。这表明语法规则是人类历史实践的组成部分,并且是要变化的。后期维特根斯坦认为语言是有基础的,就此而言,必须当做给定的东西而予以接受的是生活形式。维特根斯坦对这个术语的说法并非总是一致和清晰的,结果就引起了注释方面的争论。特别是他有时把多重生活形式看作是范围有限的专门的模式。

"因此,‘语言游戏’一词意在凸显这一事实:讲语言是活动的一部分,或是生活形式的一部分。"—维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第23节。

命题形式

罗素的术语,指只包含变项的公式,可以将原命题所包含的一个或多个组成部分代之以其他成分,由此公式可得一类命题。因此,命题形式是同一类命题所共同具有的普遍结构。

"命题形式是这样的,它为任何两个这样的命题所共有;其中之一可以从另一个中通过用其他组成部分替换原来的组成部分而得到。"

——罗素:《罗素文集》,第八卷,第209页。

表现的形式

"表现形式 (representational form)" 的另一说法。

形式的

形容词"形式的"派生于"形式",这是一类事物所属的一般性质或结构。一般来说,形式的考虑或方法是与一个对象的抽象结构或模式有关,而不是与其内容或意义有关。因而这是与事实的或实质的考虑相对的。例如,形式逻辑并不关心论证中的个别句子的内容,而只关心它们真值的结构。一种形式语言仅仅是由变项和连词构成的。

"一种理论、一个规则、一个定义或类似的东西被称作是形式的,当且仅当它没有对符号的意义做出指称,……或没有对表达式的意义做出指称,……它只是和唯一地是构成这些表达式的符号的种类和秩序。"—卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第1页。

The Logical Syntax of Language, 1937, p. 1.

Formal analysis, see analysis

Formal concept

Wittgenstein's term in the *Tractatus* for a variety of concepts which differ from ordinary concepts. Ordinary concepts reflect things independent of language. If formal concepts, such as thing, colour, fact, event, function, object, concept and number, were like ordinary concepts, they would denote arcane entities of which we could have a special logical experience, but this is not so. Formal concepts are used in relation to a diverse range of related phenomena and cannot be properly expressed by a predicate or general term. No analytical definition is available for a formal concept, and like a variable, a formal concept must be understood through the signs which are its values.

"When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4. 126.

Formal distinction

A term associated with Duns Scotus. A distinction can be real, between two separate, non-identical entities, or mental or conceptual, drawn purely by reason and not existing objectively in things. A formal distinction, which is between different formulations of one and the same reality, is intermediate between a real distinction and a merely mental distinction. Form, in this sense, provides an objective basis for a concept, and Scotus used this notion to provide an objective basis for our knowledge of God. Traditionally, God was conceived as simple, and distinctions between his attributes were thought to exist merely from our human point of view rather than in reality. For this reason, our statements about God would have no objectivity. The notion of a formal distinction allowed God's attributes to be neither real nor merely mental. The notion was also used to explain the Trinity by claiming that the three persons are formally distinct rather than really distinct. Furthermore, the notion gave insight into the validity of our universal conception of individuality by being intermediate between the species to which an individual belongs and its individual form, what Scotus called *haecceitas*.

"In the same real thing there are always formally distinct realities (be they in the same real part or the same real whole)." — Scotus, in *Duns Scotus: Metaphysician* (eds. Frank and Woitke), 1995, p. 187.

Formal fallacy

Violations of logical rules of inference that result in in-

形式分析

见“分析”条。

形式概念

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中用来表示不同于普通概念的各种概念的术语。普通概念反映独立于语言的事物。如果像“事物”、“颜色”、“事实”、“事件”、“函项”、“对象”、“概念”、“数”之类的形式概念也与普通概念一样的话,它们将指谓我们对之有特殊的逻辑经验的神秘实体。但事实并非如此。形式概念是相对于不同范围内的相关现象而使用的,它们不能被一个谓词或普遍词项所适当表达。对于形式概念没有合用的分析定义;形式概念与变元类似,必须通过作为它的值的那些记号来加以理解。

“当某物处于一形式概念之下并作为它的对象之一时,这一点是不能用命题来表达的,而是体现在表示这个对象的那个记号之中。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,4,126。

形式差别

D. 司各脱的一个术语。两个分离的、不同的实体之间的差别可能是实在的;而纯粹被理智抽引出来,并不客观地存在于事物之中的差别则只能是思想的或概念性的。形式差别是关于同一个实在的不同公式化表述之间的差别,这种差别是实在差别和纯思想差别之间的中介。形式在这个意义上,提供概念的客观基础。司各脱意图用这个观念为我们的上帝知识提供客观基础。传统上,上帝被认为是单纯的,他的属性之间的差别被视为仅从我们人类的观点看才是存在的,并不现实地存在着。正因如此,我们关于上帝的说法完全没有客观性。形式差别的观念认为,上帝的属性既不是实在的,也不仅是思想的。这种观念也被用来解释三位一体说,断言三个人不是实在的差别,而是形式上的差别。这种观念还进一步洞悉了我们关于个体性的普遍概念的确实性,因为它是个体所属的种和个体形式(即司各脱所谓的 *haecceitas*)之间的中介。

“在同一个实在事物中,总存在着形式上不同的实在(但它们处在同一的实在部分或同一的实在整体中)。”——司各脱,见《D. 司各脱:形而上学家》(弗兰克和沃尔特编),1995年,第187页。

形式谬误

违反推理的逻辑规则而导致的无效推理。

valid inference. They can be detected merely by checking the logical form of argument. Formal fallacies are contrasted with informal fallacies, which can only be found through analysis of the content and context of an argument. Each branch of formal logic has many specific formal fallacies; for example, affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent in propositional logic, the undistributed middle term in syllogism, and the illicit quantifier shift in predicate logic.

"A formal fallacy is one that may be identified through mere inspection of the form or structure of an argument." — Hurley, *A Concise Introduction to Logic*, 1982, p. 70.

Formal language, another term for logical calculus

Formal logic

The systematic presentation of the valid patterns (forms) of inference and certain implications which hold among propositions, relying heavily on the meaning of structural words such as "all", "some", "if", "not", "and" and "or". It is divided into standard (or classical) logic, non-standard logic and inductive logic. Standard logic includes traditional logic (Aristotelian syllogism) and modern classical logic, which is an expansion of traditional logic and is composed mainly of the propositional calculus and predicate calculus. Non-standard logics include the extensions of classical logic, sometimes called extended logic, and deviations from classical logic, sometimes called deviant logic. Extended logic includes logics such as modal logic, tensed logic, deontic logic, epistemic logic, preference logic and imperative logic. Deviant logic includes logics such as many-valued logic, intuitionist logic and quantum logic. We can gain additional insight into the form of some systems of logic by seeing that they can be mapped onto one another. Systems of formal logic can be developed by proof from axioms or through natural deduction, which gives rules of inference from given assumptions. Formal logic contrasts with informal logic, which deals with the relations of implication arising from context-related words.

Logical systems seek to attain consistency and completeness, although Gödel showed that for any consistent logical system capable of expressing arithmetic there are true sentences which cannot be proved in the system, thus rendering the system incomplete. He also showed that such systems cannot prove their own consistency. Both results show the limitations of the procedures of any formal system.

"The subject-matter of formal logic will be the investigation of those general logical laws which hold in virtue of the meanings of the structural words and the syntax of natural languages." — Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1964, p. 121.

只有通过检查论证的逻辑形式才能将其识别出来。它们与非形式谬误形成对照,后者只有通过分析论证的内容和语境才能被发现。形式逻辑的每一分支都有许多特殊的形式谬误;举例来说,命题逻辑中的肯定后件式和否定前件式,三段论中的不周延中项,谓词逻辑中的不正当的量词变换。

"形式谬误是仅通过审视论证的形式或结构就能识别出来的一种谬误。"——赫尔利:《简明逻辑导论》,1982年,第70页。

形式语言

"逻辑演算"的另一个名称。

形式逻辑

有效推理模式(形式)和在命题之间成立的某些蕴涵关系的系统展示,这些模式和关系严格依赖于像"所有"、"有些"、"如果"、"并非"、"并且"、"或"等结构词的意义。形式逻辑分为标准(经典)逻辑、非标准逻辑和归纳逻辑。标准逻辑包括传统逻辑(亚里士多德三段论)和现代经典逻辑,后者是传统逻辑的扩展,主要由命题演算和谓词演算组成。非标准逻辑包括经典逻辑的扩充系统(有时称"扩充逻辑")和变异系统(有时称"变异逻辑")。扩充逻辑包括模态逻辑,时态逻辑,道义逻辑,认知逻辑,优先逻辑,命令逻辑等。变异逻辑包括多值逻辑、直觉主义逻辑、量子逻辑等。我们通过弄清楚某些逻辑系统能够相互映现,而能对其形式获得额外的洞见。形式逻辑系统能够以从公理出发进行证明的形式展开,也能够通过自然演绎加以展开,后者给出了从给定假设出发进行推理的规则。形式逻辑与非形式逻辑形成对照,后者处理从语境相关的词语中产生的蕴涵关系。

逻辑系统力求获得相容性和完全性,尽管哥德尔证明,对任何能够表达算术的逻辑系统来说,都存在着不能在该系统内证明的真语句,这使得该系统是不完全的。他还证明,这些系统不能证明它们自身的相容性。这两个结果显示了任何形式系统程序的局限性。

"形式逻辑的题材将是研究那些普遍的逻辑规律,它们是依据结构词语的意义和自然语言的句法而成立的。"——米切尔:《逻辑导论》,1964年,第121页。

Formal mode of speech, see material mode of speech

Formal semantics

In contrast to general linguistic semantics, formal semantics is characterised by its appeal to formal logical method in discussing the meaning of linguistic signs. Richard Montague laid down foundational work in this field. Its main representative is truth-conditional semantics, developed by Tarski and Davidson on the basis of Frege's logic. This approach ascribes semantic values to the basic symbols of a language, takes these symbols as elements of the structure of the language, and then derives the semantic values of complex expressions from these elements in accordance with formation rules. The meaning of every sentence is determined by the truth-conditions of its component sentences. Generally, a formal semantics proceeds by first setting up a language, and then laying down rules for matching up sentences of that language with propositions or truth values. Formalization is used as a way of clarifying what the truth conditions are.

"Formal semantics itself was decided as a means of providing a precise interpretation for formal languages, i. e. the logical and mathematical languages that are opposed to natural languages that are spoken or written as the native languages of human beings." —Carnap, *Formal Semantics*, 1993, p. 2.

Formal universal

One kind of linguistic universal. It is the grammar which expresses the formal conditions that the grammar of every language must meet, such as the sequence of rules for the phonological component of a grammar, the transformational rules which map semantically interpreted deep structures into phonetically interpreted surface structures, and the ways that the rules of a grammar can be interconnected. It seeks abstract universal properties of languages in contrast to another kind of linguistic universal, the substantive universal.

"The property of having a grammar meeting a certain abstract condition might be called a formal linguistic universal, if shown to be a general property of natural languages." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 29.

Formalism (aesthetic)

A term for all theories of art which claim that the essence of art is given through the formal unity of an artwork, involving such features as structure, balance, harmony and integrity. Our appreciation of art lies in recognising these formal qualities and, furthermore, in responding to them. The content of an artwork and its relations with the outside world are all subordinate to its formal features. For-

形式的说话方式

见“实质的说话方式”条。

形式语义学

与普通语言学的语义学相反,形式语义学被描述为在讨论语言记号的意义时诉诸于形式逻辑的方法。R. 蒙塔古在这个领域做了一些基础性工作。它的主要代表是由塔斯基和戴维森根据弗雷格逻辑提出的真值条件语义学。这种方法为语言的基本符号赋予语义值,把这些符号看作语言结构的要素,然后根据构成规则,从这些要素中派生出复杂表达式的语义值。每个句子的意义都是由其分句的真值条件确定的。一般而言,形式语义学首先是要建立一种语言,然后制定规则,使这个语言的句子与命题或真值相匹配。形式化是用于阐明什么是真值条件的一种方法。

“形式语义学本身曾被看作是对形式语言提供精确解释的方法,这种语言即逻辑语言和数学语言是与人类生而说写的自然语言相对的。”——凯恩:《形式语义学》,1993年,第2页。

形式共相

一种语言共相,即表达形式条件的一种语法,这些形式条件是每种语言的语法都必须满足的,譬如一种语法的语音成分的规则次序,把在语义上所解释的深层结构描述为在语音上所解释的表层结构的转换规则,以及可以相互连接语法规则的方式。它寻求的是各种语言抽象的普遍特性,并相对于另一种语言共相,即“实质共相”。

“具有满足某个抽象条件的语法这个特性,可以称作形式的语言共相,它表现为自然语言的一种普遍特性。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第29页。

形式主义(美学上的)

该术语代表所有宣称艺术本质在于艺术作品之形式整一性的艺术理论。这种形式的整一性包括结构、均衡、和谐与完整等特征。人们对艺术的鉴赏有赖于认识这些形式特质以及对其所做出的反应。一件艺术作品的内容及其同外部世界的关系都从属于作品的形式特征。形式主义惯于把艺术作品当做自足的实体,与其内

malism tends to take a work of art to be a self-sufficient entity and has no concern with its content, meaning and function. The beauty of a painting consists in the relations of colour, line and mass. In sculpture, beauty consists in the rhythms and symmetries of line and plane. Along with the representational theory and the expression theory, formalism, represented by Kant and Clive Bell (1881-1964), is a major theory of art. Objections to formalism include the claims that the conception of form is ambiguous and that form should be viewed as a vehicle through which an artwork expresses its meaning.

"[Formalism] is the theory that all intrinsic value in art belongs to its 'form'—using this term to designate the organisation of the sensuous medium or 'surface' of the work of art." Parker, *The Principles of Aesthetics*, 1947, p. 37.

Formalism (ethics)

Ethical formalism holds that to decide whether one is morally obliged to perform or to avoid a certain act, one should not focus on the nature of act itself, but should rather elaborate a set of highly abstract moral principles or laws which can be applied universally, without regard to the particular persons and diverse circumstances in which ethical problems arise. The essence of moral philosophy is to justify abstract moral laws and moral reasoning is typically rule-governed. The main proponents of formalism include Bishop Joseph Butler, Kant and W. D. Ross. Sometimes formalism is used interchangeably with deontology. It is thus opposed to other ethical theories such as contextualism, existentialism, intuitionism, feminism, and relativism, which claim that ethical thinking must attend to and judge particular cases. Formalism is the chief target of the contemporary anti-theory movement and virtue ethics, for virtue is generally regarded as being responsive to social and cultural contexts.

"It is, for instance, an easy consequence of our principles that moral formalism—i. e. a rigid adherence to the letter, with no appeal to the spirit, of the rules—will tend to be at a maximum in a static and isolated society."—P. F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment*, 1974, p. 40.

Formalism (law)

A position in legal philosophy which claims that law is a logically complete and coherent body of rules and that we can apply these rules universally to solve all particular cases, without need to refer to non-legal considerations such as those arising from social and moral phenomena. This position flourished in the middle of the nineteenth century, but was bitterly attacked by moral realism or rule-scepticism, which argued that legal rules are unimportant and that law is nothing more than the actual decisions of courts or legal officers. Hart agreed that law is a set of rules, but rejected the claim that rules can settle everything, for rules are often

容、意义和功能无关。一副绘画的美是由色彩、线条与块体组合而成的。在雕刻艺术中,美是由线条与平面的节奏和对称因素组合而成的。连同“再现说”与“表现说”在内,以康德和 C. 贝尔(1881—1964)为代表的形式主义是主要的艺术理论。对形式主义的异议包括如下观点:一是形式的概念是歧义性的,二是形式应当被视为艺术作品表达其意义的载体。

“[形式主义]理论认为艺术中的所有内在价值属于其‘形式’——使用形式这一术语旨在表明艺术作品之感性媒介或‘表象’的组合。”——帕克:《美学原理》,1947年,第37页。

形式主义(伦理学的)

伦理学的形式主义认为,决定人在道德上是否应当履行或避免一定的行为,一个人不应当注意行为本身的性质,而应当构建一套非常抽象的道德原则和法则;这些原则和法则可以普遍地应用,并不考虑具体的人和伦理问题在其中产生不同的环境。道德哲学的实质在于论证抽象的道德法则的合理性,道德推理主要地是为规则所支配的。形式主义的主要提倡者包括 B. J. 巴特勒、康德和 W. D. 罗斯。有时形式主义可与“道义论”互换使用。因而,它是与其他的伦理理论如语境主义、存在主义、直觉主义、女性主义和相对主义等相对立的,这些伦理理论认为,伦理思想必须关注和判别特殊情形。形式主义是当代的反—理论运动和德性伦理学的主要攻击目标,因为德性一般被看作是对社会和文化背景的回应。

“例如,我们的原则的一个易于导致的后果就是,道德形式主义——即对于本本的一种严格的信奉,而不是诉诸于规则的精神——在一种静止的和孤立的社会中将趋于达到最大化。”——斯特劳森:《自由与怨恨》,1974年,第40页。

形式主义(法律上的)

法哲学中的一种主张,认为法律是一个逻辑严密、条理清晰的规则体,我们可以将这些规则普遍用于处理所有的特殊案件,而无需涉及非法律方面的考虑,如那些由社会和道德现象引起的东西。这种主张在19世纪中期曾很盛行,但后来受到道德现实主义或规则—怀疑主义的猛烈攻击,后者认为,法规是不重要的,法律只不过是法院或法官的实际的判决。哈特同意法律是一套规则,但反对那种认为规则能解决一切的主张,因为规则本身有时是含糊不清的和不确定的。此外,由于人的知识是有限的,

vague and indeterminate. In addition, because human knowledge is limited, we cannot formulate rules for all future cases. Formalism is also criticised by Dworkin in his rights thesis. He holds that there are hard cases which cannot be resolved by the simple application of rules.

"The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimise the need for such choice, once the general rule has been laid down." —H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, p. 126.

Formalism (mathematics)

As a type of philosophy of mathematics, formalism is the view that mathematical knowledge is a formal system of propositions, that these propositions are meaningless formulae which are operated on by fixed rules, and that mathematics consists in knowing what formulae can be derived from the axioms according to the rules. There is no need to go beyond the symbols and the rules of combination to claim the existence of abstract entities. This theory is initiated in the non-Euclidean geometry of the nineteenth century and in the work of Peano. Its major development is D. Hilbert's philosophy of mathematics. This position has been attacked, initially by Frege and then by Russell, for failing to analyse mathematical concepts and for failing to account for the practical use of mathematics.

"Formalism, associated with the name of Hilbert, echoes intuitionism in deploring the logicist's unbridled recourse to universals" —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 15.

Formalization

The practice of stipulating a correspondence scheme between ordinary language and a formal language such as the propositional or predicate calculus and translating the ordinary language into the formal language. The purpose of formalization is to make the implicit logical structure of ordinary language explicit in order to assess the validity of arguments in ordinary language. For example, consider "If Socrates is a man, he would be dead. Socrates is a man, so he would be dead". If we let " p " correspond to "Socrates is a man", and " q " to "He would be dead", the formalization is $(p \rightarrow q), p; q$. Analytic philosophers such as Russell have claimed that most traditional philosophical problems arise from the confusing structure of ordinary language and hence that ordinary language should be replaced by an artificial language. But this remedy was criticised by the later Wittgenstein and by the Oxford ordinary language philosophers.

"We stipulate that if a formalization is to be adequate, the associated correspondence scheme should be such that if we replace the P-letters by the corresponding English sentences, and then replace the P-connectives by the corre-

我们不可能为所有未来的案件制定出规则。德沃金在其权利论中也批判了形式主义。他认为总有一些不能靠简单运用规则解决的疑难案件。

"一旦总的规则制定出来,为形式主义或概念论这样的法学理论所知的罪恶就在于对逐字制定出的规则的态度,这种规则试图不但掩饰对于选择的需要,而且把其降到最低限度。"——哈特:《法的概念》,第126页。

形式主义(数学中的)

作为数学哲学的一种,形式主义是这样的观点:数学知识是命题的形式系统,这些命题是无意义的公式,人们按一定的规则使用它们,数学的构成在于知道什么公式可以根据规则从公理推导出来。没有必要超出符号和组合规则宣称存在抽象实体。这种理论首先在19世纪非欧几何学和皮亚诺的著作中提出。其主要发展是D. 希尔伯特的数学哲学。这种主张遭到了攻击,首先是弗雷格,然后是罗素,理由是它不能对数学概念作分析,不能说明数学的实际使用。

"与希尔伯特的名字联系在一起的形式主义对直觉主义的呼应,在于它们对逻辑主义者毫无约束地求助于共相这一点深感惋惜。"——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第15页。

形式化

指下述做法:制订一份在日常语言和像命题演算或谓词演算这样的形式语言之间的对应方案,并把日常语言译为形式语言,其目标在于明确揭示隐含在日常语言中的逻辑结构,以便评价日常语言中论证的有效性。例如,考虑"如果苏格拉底是人则他将会死;苏格拉底是人,所以他将会死。"我们令" p "对应于"苏格拉底是人",令" q "对应于"他将会死"。于是上述论证的形式化就是 $(p \rightarrow q), p; q$ 。像罗素这样的分析哲学家断言,大多数传统哲学问题都是由日常语言的致人迷误的结构引起的,所以日常语言应被人工语言所代替。但这一补救方案受到后期维特根斯坦和牛津日常语言哲学家们的批评。

"我们规定:如果形式化是适当的,那么与之相联的对应方案将满足下述要求,即如果我们用相应的英语句子来替换P-字母,用相应的英语联结词来替换P-联结词,所得到的语句(论证)应与地道的英语所说的相同。"——塞斯伯里:《逻辑形式》,1991年,第52页。

sponding English connectives, the result is a sentence (argument) that says the same as the original English.”——Sainsbury, *Logical Form*, p. 52.

Formally correct condition, see material adequacy

Formula, see well founded formula

Foundationalism

The term may be used in the rationalist sense, referring especially to Descartes' project of constructing a system of knowledge on a foundation of clear and distinct ideas of reason. However, in contemporary philosophy it is a type of theory of epistemic justification in Anglo-American epistemology which holds that knowledge can be exhibited as a structure, with a foundation and superstructure. Since the senses are our only contacts with the external world, some basic beliefs resulting directly from sense-perception have a privileged epistemic status. They are self-warranting without standing in need of further justification, while all other non-basic beliefs must be justified ultimately by appeal to them. These basic perceptual beliefs provide the ultimate foundation of justification. There are various views among different versions of foundationalism about the nature of the basic, incorrigible perceptual beliefs, and the modes of the derivation of the superstructure from the foundations. In opposition to foundationalism are coherentism and other forms of anti-foundationalism, which deny the any beliefs are incorrigible or basic. The affirmation of foundational beliefs is attacked as "the myth of the given".

"I assume that, for anything H that is evident for us, there is something E which is a basis of H for S (This assumption might be said to characterise 'foundationalism')."——Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 180.

Four elements

In ancient Greek thought, water, air, fire and earth. While Thales, Anaximenes and Heraclitus took water, air and fire respectively as the sole first principle for generating everything else in the cosmos, Empedocles was the first to consider these three plus earth as first principles with equal status and called them the "roots of everything". He held that the four elements were each ungenerated and indestructible and created all other things together with the cosmic agents Love and Strife. Plato in the *Timaeus* made use of the doctrine of four elements, and Aristotle, taking it as a basis for his physics, claimed that the four elements are capable of mutual transformation and that their nature is decided by two pairs of opposites: hot and cold, wet and dry.

形式正确性条件

见“实质充分性”条。

公式

见“合式公式”条。

基础主义

这一术语可以在理性主义意义上使用，特别是指笛卡尔在清楚明白的理性观念基础上构造知识体系的纲领。但是，在当代哲学中，它是指英美认识论中的一种认知辨明理论，这种理论认为，知识可以展现为具有基础和上层建筑的结构。由于感觉是我们与外在世界的惟一联系，因此，直接产生于感性知觉的某些基本信念就有了一种优先的认知地位。它们是自明的，无须经受进一步的辨明，而其他的非基础信念则必须最终借助于它们才能得到证明。这些基本的知觉信念提供了辨明的最终基础。关于这种基本的、不可改变的知觉信念以及从这个基础中派生出上层建筑的方式，在不同的基础主义理论中存在着各种不同的观点。与“基础主义”相对的是“融合主义”以及其他形式的反基础主义，它们否认存在不可改变的基础信念。基础主义肯定这种信念的存在，往往被批评为“神秘的给予”。

“我假定，对于我们明显的东西 H 来说，存在一个 E，它是 H 对 S 的基础（可以说这个假定刻画了‘基础主义’）。”——齐硕姆：《人与物》，1976 年，第 180 页。

四元素

在古希腊哲学中，指水、气、火和土。泰勒斯、阿那克西美尼和赫拉克利特分别以水、气、火作为产生宇宙中其他一切事物的惟一本原，恩培多克勒首次把所有这三种元素加上土看作是具有同等地位的本原，称它们是“万物之根”。他认为，这四元素的每一个都是不生不灭的。它们与宇宙动因爱与恨一起创造了其他一切事物。柏拉图在《蒂迈欧篇》中使用了这一学说。亚里士多德以此作为其物理学的基础，认为这四元素可以互相转化，并且它们的性质是由热和冷、湿与干这两对对子决定的。

“恩培多克勒是第一个谈及四种物质元素的。”——亚里士多德：《形而上学》，985a31。

"Empedocles was the first to speak of four material elements." Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 985a31.

Four freedoms, see rights, human

Four-term fallacy

Also called in Latin *quaterno terminorum* (a quadruplet of term) or fallacy of ambiguous middle. A normal syllogism carries with it three terms, with the middle term appearing twice in the premises. But sometimes the two appearances of the middle term have different meaning, although the word is the same. As a result, the syllogism has four rather than three terms, and there is no connection between two premises. Such a syllogism is defective and commits the four-term fallacy. For example, "light is the absence of darkness", and "a pen is light", therefore, "a pen is the absence of darkness". This inference is wrong, because the word "light" has entirely different meanings in the premises. The four-term fallacy is a form of the fallacy of equivocation or ambiguity.

"The tag 'fallacy of four terms' has usually been applied, . . . , to arguments involving an ambiguous middle term." —Hamblin, *Fallacies*, 1970, p. 197.

Frankfurt school, see critical theory

Fraternity

A brotherhood or an emotionally intimate political relationship between members of a society or group dedicated to a common aim and characterised by feelings of affection, mutual help and looking after the weak. It has been regarded as a virtue, much like friendship, and is modelled on an idealised view of the relation that exists between siblings. As a political ideal, it attempts to subordinate people's fratricidal impulses through commitment to shared values and positive feelings. Nationalism generally advocates the nurturing of this kind of feeling among fellow-countrymen. Christianity regards fraternity as natural, for human beings are all brothers by nature. Liberty, equality and fraternity were equally promoted as goals of the French Revolution. Marxism holds that this relationship exists between working classes all over the world. Fraternity is widely thought to be impractical and is ignored in much modern democratic theory. But Rawls argues that fraternity is required by his second principle of justice which permits economic inequalities in a democratic society only if they benefit the least favoured group in the society.

"The principle of fraternity [is] that in spite of all the divisions and distinctions between members of a community, they should treat one another as fellow members and individ-

四重自由

见“人权”条。

四词项谬误

在拉丁语中又叫 *quaterno terminorum* (四词项) 或中项歧义谬误。正常的三段论推理是有三个词项, 中项词在前提中出现两次。但有时这两次出现的中项词有不同的含义, 虽然词是相同的。结果, 三段论推理有四个词项而不是三个, 而两个前提之间并无联系。这种三段论推理是无效的, 犯了四词项谬误。例如, “光亮 (light) 是黑暗的缺失”, “笔是轻的 (light)”, 因此 “笔是黑暗的缺失”。这个推理之所以错, 是因为词 “light” 在前提中有完全不同的含义。四词项谬误是含混或歧义谬误的一种形式。

“‘四词项谬误’这个标签通常加之于……涉及到歧义中项词的论证。”——哈姆柏林:《谬误》, 1970年, 第197页。

法兰克福学派

见“批判理论”条。

博爱

一个社会或一个群体致力于共同目标的成员间的一种兄弟般的或感情亲密的政治关系, 其特征是友爱之情、互相帮助和照顾弱者。它一直被视为一种与友谊很相似的美德, 它是以一种把存在于同胞兄弟或姐妹间的关系加以理想化的观点为模式的。作为一种政治理想, 它试图使人们自相残杀的冲动服从人们共同的价值和积极的感情。民族主义一般倡导在本国人中培养这种感情。基督教把博爱视为自然而然的, 因为人类生来就都是兄弟。自由、平等和博爱曾作为法国大革命的目标被并列提出。在马克思主义看来, 这种关系存在于全世界无产阶级之间。在很现代的民主理论中, 博爱被广泛认为是行不通的, 因而受到忽视。但罗尔斯争论说, 博爱是他的第二条正义原则所要求的, 这一原则容许民主社会中的经济不平等, 但只有在它们使社会中处于最不利地位的群体受益时才容许。

“博爱的原则是, 不管社会成员间的分歧和差异如何, 他们都应相互以同样的成员并拥有自己权利的个人来对待。”——鲁卡斯:《政治学原理》, 1985年, 第53页。

uals in their own rights.” —Lucas, *The Principles of Politics*, 1985, p. 53.

Free logic

The branch of the logic of terms which is free of existential assumptions or presuppositions with respect to both general terms and singular terms. Traditional logic permits inference from A-propositions to I-propositions or from E-propositions to O-propositions. That implies that no general term is empty. Modern predicate logic rejects this point, but still believes that singular terms refer. Free logic proposes that statements containing quantificational phrases have existential import if and only if there is an object G for all general terms G or there is an object S for all singular terms S. Hence free logic is also called “logic without existence assumptions”. Technical study in this area started in the mid-1950s, and various systems have been proposed by Schock, Leonard, Hintikka, Lambert and Leblanc.

“In classical logic, individual constants carry existential commitment. . . In free logic, the constants do not carry this commitment. This is not to say that they may fail to denote, but rather, that their denotata may not be within the range of the ordinary existential quantifier—the denotata may be non-existent objects.” —Forbes, *Language of Possibility*, 1989, p. 4.

Free variable

A variable occurring in an unquantified sentence, without being prefixed by a quantifier. In contrast, a bound variable falls within the scope of a prefixed quantifier. A sentence containing one or more free variables is called an open sentence. Russell and Whitehead also called bound variables apparent variables, free variables, and real variables.

“An occurrence of a variable in a sentence is called free in that sentence in which it is unquantified.” —Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1952, p. 128.

Free will, problem of

There are threats to freedom involving the apparent determination of human action by factors independent of our will. These include divine foreknowledge and, in modern philosophy, the possibility that our actions are determined by causal laws. The problem seems to pose a dilemma whether one accepts or denies determinism. If determinism is true, one's acts are determined by events beyond one's control, and hence one has no free will. If determinism is false, one's acts are undetermined and due to chance, which is also beyond one's control, and hence one has no free will. One way out of the dilemma is to argue that free will is a dispositional causal power which can exist in a wholly determined world and is thereby compatible with determinism. Another response attempts to show that determinism has weaker impli-

自由逻辑

语词逻辑的一个分支，它对普遍词和单个词都没有存在性假定或预设。传统逻辑允许从 A 命题推导到 I 命题，或从 E 命题推导到 O 命题。这就意味着没有任何普遍词是空洞的。现代谓词逻辑抛弃了这种观点，但仍然相信单个词是有所指的。而自由逻辑则提出，包含量化短语的陈述具有存在性意义，当且仅当对一切普遍词 G 都存在一个对象 G，或对一切单个词 S 都存在一个对象 S。因而，自由逻辑也称作“没有存在假定的逻辑”。在这个领域的专门研究始于本世纪 50 年代中期，苏克、伦纳德、辛提卡、朗姆贝特、勒布朗克等人已经提出了各种体系。

“在古典逻辑中，单个常项带有存在性承诺……在自由逻辑中，常项并不具有这种承诺。这并不是说它们不能够指称，而是说它们的所指物可以不在日常存在量词的范围之内——即所指物可以是不存在的对象。”——福布斯：《可能性语言》，1989 年，第 4 页。

自由变元

在一非量化语句中出现的变元，其前面没有冠上一量词。它与约束变元形成对照，后者处于一前缀量词的辖域内。含有一个或多个自由变元的语句叫做开语句。罗素和怀特海还把约束变元叫做“表面变元”，把自由变元叫做“真实变元”。

“一变元在一句子中的出现叫做自由的，如果在该句子中它未被量化。”——奎因：《逻辑方法》，1952 年，第 128 页。

自由意志问题

自由包含着明显的由不依我们的意志为转移的因素对人的行动的决定，对这种自由存在着威胁。这些威胁包括神的预知，以及现代哲学中那种我们的行动受因果规律决定的可能性。这一问题似乎提出了一个人们接受还是否认决定论的二难推理。如果决定论是对的，那人的行动就是由不受人控制的事件决定的，因此人没有自由意志。如果决定论是错的，那人的行动就不是被决定的，而只能归结为偶然性，而偶然性也不是由人控制的，因此，人也没有自由意志。解决这一二难推理的一条出路，是论证自由意志是能存在于一个全都被决定的世界中的具有因果性质的力量，因而它是与决定论一致的。另一种反应试图表明决定论具有的含义要弱于妨

cations than any which would prevent it from being compatible with free will. Some philosophers argue that what we value in freedom is not challenged by determinism and is not aided by indeterminism. Rather free will is constrained by coercion rather than determinism. Some argue further that any account of action, choice and free will would be incoherent without determinism. Nevertheless, some philosophers still claim that on a proper understanding of freedom and foreknowledge or freedom and causal laws, we cannot have both. These philosophers tend to retain a strong notion of necessity linked to foreknowledge or causality and a distinctive account of agency that does not fall under causal laws.

"The problem of the freedom of the will is concerned with the question whether the human will is subordinated to the general principle of causality or whether it escapes from its constraints." —Ajdukiewicz, *Problems and Theories of Philosophy*, 1973, p. 105.

Freedom

A concept concerning thought and action which has two related aspects: negative freedom, or freedom from, is the power to act in the absence of external constraint, coercion or compulsion; and positive freedom, or freedom to, is the power to choose one's own goals and course of conduct among alternatives. Under these general determinations, freedom has various forms, of which freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of association and various economic freedoms are historically the most important. If one can claim freedom regarding an interest, then one has a right to pursue that interest. Freedom is used as a synonym of liberty, and J. S. Mill's *On Liberty* has had greatest influence among books on the concept of freedom.

For Plato, a man is free if he is governed by reason, but a slave if he is ruled by desires and passions. Kant distinguished the theoretical sense of freedom, that is the spontaneity of understanding as opposed to receptivity of the sensibility, from the practical sense of freedom, that is the autonomy of the will as opposed to heteronomy. Fichte and Schelling transformed spontaneity and autonomy respectively into subjective or objective absolutes, a tendency inherited by Sartre but criticised by Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno. This latter position has claimed that freedom is intrinsically qualified. The liberal tradition generally connects freedom with our concept of humanity.

"That there is freedom in our will, and that we have power in many cases to give and withhold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (eds. and trans by Cottingham et al), 1985, I, p. 205.

碍它与自由意志相容的东西的含义。一些哲学家论证说,我们对自由的重视既没有受到决定论的挑战,也没有得到非决定论的帮助。相反,自由意志受到限制是由于强迫而不是由于决定论。一些人进而论证说,如果没有决定论,任何对行为、选择和自由意志的说明都是不一致的。然而,一些哲学家仍认为,即使基于对自由和预知、或自由和因果规律的恰当的理解,我们也不能两者都要。这些哲学家倾向维系一个强有力的与预知或因果性相联的必然性概念,以及一个对不归属于因果律的能力的特定说明。

"意志自由的问题涉及到这样一个问题,即人的意志是否要服从普遍的因果原则,或者说,人的意志能否摆脱它的强制。"——阿吉图库威茨:《哲学问题和哲学理论》,1973年,第105页。

自由

涉及思想和行动的概念,它有两个相关联的方面:一是消极的自由或“解脱”,即没有外部的约束、强制或强迫而行动的力量,另一个是积极的自由或“自主”,即主体在各种选择方案中选择他自己的目标和行为方式的力量。在上述的一般规定之下,自由具有各种形式,诸如言论自由,思想自由,出版自由,结社自由和各种经济自由,它们在历史上是最重要的自由形式。如果人们能声称对某个特定兴趣的自由,那么他们就有权利追求实现那种兴趣。自由被用作另一个“自由”(liberty)的同义词。J. S. 密尔的《论自由》一书是关于自由概念的最有影响的著作。

对于柏拉图来说,如果一个人由他的理性来支配,那么他是自由的;但如果他受欲望和情欲所统治,那么他便是奴隶。康德把理论意义的自由与实践意义的自由区分开来,前者是指对立于感性接受性的知性自发性,后者是与他律相对立的意志自律。费希特和谢林分别把自发性和自律转变为主观和客观的绝对。这种思想倾向由萨特继承下来,但遭到黑格尔、尼采、海德格尔和阿多尔诺等人的批判。这些批评者们强调,自由是内在地受限制的。自由主义的传统一般把自由与我们的人性概念相联系。

"我们有意志的自由,在许多情况下我们具有可任意地给予或撤销我们的同意的能力。这是如此地明显,以至于自由必须算作是大赋予我们的一个最基本的和最共同的概念。"——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等编译),1985年,第一卷,第205页。

Freedom of speech

The freedom to express one's own mind in speech, writing or some other way without prior restriction, contemporary constraint or subsequent punishment. The fundamental justifications for freedom of speech are its essential role in the pursuit of truth and in free political life and its fundamental contribution to our dignity as rational and self-determining beings. Hence, freedom of speech has both instrumental and intrinsic value. Freedom of speech has been regarded as one of the basic human rights which governments have a basic requirement to protect. Even those fully committed to maintaining freedom of speech recognise that some speech can rightly be restricted by law. Speech which seriously endangers individuals, groups or the nation as a whole is often judged to lie outside the protection of freedom of speech. There are various conflicts over the kinds of speech which may be restricted and over the competing rationales for restricting them. While certain kinds of speech are recognised as being harmful, suppressing freedom of speech without rational grounds is seen as a greater evil. The discussion of free speech is related to questions about the rationality of censorship and to the consideration of other basic freedoms.

"We may take for granted that a democratic regime presupposes freedom of speech and assembly, and liberty of thought and conscience." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 197, p. 225.

Freedom of the will

The doctrine of freedom of the will or free will derives from the natural feeling that we can choose what we do according to the dictates of our own soul, without being compelled, and that in the conditions of our action we could have acted otherwise. Only because our will is free can we speak meaningfully of ethical conceptions such as responsibility, duty, obligation, self-determination and commitment. The concept of free will is contrasted to the notion of determinism. If everything is causally determined, how can there be a freewill? While freewill is supported by our everyday consciousness, determinism gains its ground in science. With regard to their relation, philosophers are divided into compatibilists, who claim that there is some way to reconcile determinism and freewill, and incompatibilists, who reject the possibility of reconciliation. Some incompatibilists reject determinism, while others claim that freewill is illusory.

"The freedom of the will consists in the possibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.1362.

Free-rider

A person who enjoys a benefit provided by a public good but who does not contribute to this good. Some of the free-rider's consumption of the public good does not prevent the

言论自由

言论自由指的是没有事前的限制、当时的强迫和事后的惩罚,以语言、文字或其他方式表达一个人自己的思想的自由。言论自由的基本理由,是它在追求真理和自由的政治生活中所起的本质作用,和对我们的作为理性的、自我决定的人类的尊严做出的重要贡献。因此,言论自由既有作为手段的价值,又有其内在的价值。言论自由一直被认为是政府应首要予以保护的基本人权之一。不过,即使那些完全赞同维护言论自由的人也承认某些言论可以由法律加以正当的限制,严重危害个人、集团或作为一个整体的国家的言论常常被判定不受言论自由的保护。在哪类言论可加以限制,以及为限制它们所做的对抗性的理论说明这些问题上存在着各种争论。尽管某些言论被视为是有害的,但没有合理的根据而对言论自由的压制仍被看做是较大的恶行。有关言论自由的讨论是与检查制度的合理性问题,以及对其他基本的自由的考虑相联系的。

"我们可以认为下面一点是理所当然的:一个民主的社会制度是以言论和集会的自由、思想和良心的自由为前提的。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第225页。

意志自由

意志自由或自由意志的学说出自于以下自然的感情:我们可以按照自己心灵的命令而不是被强迫做我们想做的事,在行动时,我们也可以有另外的行动。正是因为我们的意志是自由的,我们才能有意义地谈论诸如责任、职责、义务、自决和承诺等等伦理概念。自由意志的概念和决定论的概念相反。如果所有的事情都是因果决定的,那么怎么会有自由意志?自由意志得到了我们日常意识的支持,而决定论则在科学中找到了根据。根据他们对意志自由和决定论的关系的态度,哲学家分为认为力图设法调和决定论和自由意志的可兼容论者,以及否认调和的可能性的不可兼容论者。有些不可兼容论者否定决定论,而其他人则声称自由意志是幻想。

"意志自由在于知道将来的行动的可能性。"——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,5.1362。

逃票乘客

一个享有公共的善给他的好处,但并不对这个善做出贡献的人。某些对公共的善的逃票乘客式消费,并不妨碍其他人的同样的消费,例

same consumption by others, for example the free enjoyment of radio broadcasts, but some will inevitably be at the expense of others, for example getting welfare benefits without paying taxes which support the system of welfare. Either way, if everybody contributes nothing, the public good will not exist. If a public good permits many free-riders, it cannot be maintained. An ethical question thus arises about whether a free-rider's consumption is just and about whether the public can be justified in getting rid of free-riders or forcing them to contribute. There are difficulties in explaining why the behaviour of the free-rider is irrational.

"While from a purely egoistic point of view it would be rational for me to take a free ride at the expense of others, if everybody reasoned in this way, everybody would be worse off." Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 273.

Fregean principle, an alternative term for compositionality

Friendship

A prominent moral topic in Greek ethics from Socrates to the Stoics. The word is generally used to translate the Greek word *philia*, although the latter covers a broader area, including all personal relationships motivated by mutual love and the relationships amongst family members. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* deals with the problem of friendship in detail. He divides friendship into three types, that based on mutual pleasure, that based on utility and that based on the mutual appreciation of virtuous character. The last type is the real and genuine kind of friendship. Only a virtuous person can be a friend to another virtuous person, and a friend in this relationship is another self, a mirror of one's character. Aristotle characterises friendship as involving the pursuit of the goods of one's friends for their own sake, and involving reciprocity of sentiment. The issue of friendship has fallen into neglect in modern ethics, for it believes that friendship is a private affair, a matter of personal choice, rather than a part of common morality. The topic has been revived with the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics, and especially of feminist ethics, both of which emphasise personal relationships rather than universalistic moral considerations.

"Friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155b35.

Full theory of the good, see thin theory of the good.

Fully generalised proposition

Also called a completely general proposition, a quite general proposition or a logical proposition. A fully gener-

如不交税而享受收音机的广播节目,而另外的事则不可避免地要牺牲其他人的利益.例如,享用公共福利但不纳税去支持福利系统.不管怎样,如果每一个人都贡献什么,那么公共的善就不存在.如果公共的善允许许多逃票乘客,它就不能维持.由此产生的一个伦理问题就是,是否逃票乘客的消费是公正的,以及公众除掉逃票乘客或迫使他们贡献是否是合理的.难于解释的是,逃票乘客的行为为什么是不合理的。

“从一个纯粹的利己主义的观点来看,牺牲他人来做一个逃票乘客对我而言总是合理的.可是如果每一个人都以这种方式推理,每一个人都将过得更糟。”——库珀:《道德思考的多样性》,1981年,第273页。

弗雷格原则

“构成性”的别名。

友谊

在从苏格拉底到斯多亚派的希腊伦理学中,友谊是一个主要的道德话题.这术语一般被用来翻译希腊词 *philia*. 虽然后者的意思更广,包括为相互的爱所推动的所有的人际关系,以及家庭成员之间的关系.亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》详尽地论述了友谊的问题.他把友谊分为三种类型:即基于相互愉快的友谊,基于互利的友谊,基于对有德的品格相互欣赏的友谊.最后这种友谊是真正的和真诚的友谊.惟有一个有德的人能够对另一个有德的人是朋友,在这种关系中的一个朋友是另一个自我.一个人的品格的一面镜子.亚里士多德所描述的友谊的特性涉及到为朋友们自身之故而去寻求朋友们之善,涉及到情感上的相互关系.友谊的问题在现代伦理学中被忽略了,因为它相信友谊是一件私人的事情,一种个人的选择,而不是公共道德的一部分.随着当代德性伦理学的出现,特别是由于女性主义伦理学,这个话题已经复苏,这两者都强调人际关系而不是普遍性的道德考虑。

“友谊据说是交互性的善良意志。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1155b35。

善的强理论

见“善的弱理论”条。

充分普遍化命题

又叫完全普遍命题、相当普遍命题或逻辑命题.充分普遍化命题只包含变项和真值函项,

alised proposition contains only variables and truth-functions, and does not mention any particular thing at all. It thus provides a purely logical structure. Russell claims that such a proposition is analytic and *a priori*. Wittgenstein believes that a fully generalised proposition can also describe the world in virtue of its articulated or composite structure; but this claim has attracted the criticism that such a proposition cannot say anything about the world through its structure alone without saying of anything that it has some character.

"We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalised propositions, i. e. without first correlating any name with a particular object." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5. 526.

Function

In ordinary language, a function roughly means a purpose or role. In logic and mathematics, a function is a particular kind of relation in which given any object or objects (called an argument of the function), another object (called the value of the function for that argument) will be yielded. A function has one or more variables which can take different arguments. Giving definite values to the variables of a function yields a definite value to the whole function. Truth-functions in propositional logic (also called functional calculus) are special functions in which the truth value of a compound proposition is determined by the truth values of its propositional components and by the logical terms connecting them. A function is applicable to a certain class of objects. The class to which the function applies is called the domain of the function, and the class of values is called the range of the function. Frege held that concepts are functions which map objects onto truth-values.

"A function is, as observed, a relation. But it is a relation of a special sort, having the peculiarity that no two elements bear it to the same element." —Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, 1951, p. 222.

Function and argument

A mathematical function is as an operational relation which can apply to a domain. An argument is an object to which a function is applied within this domain. An argument is a variable part within a function, for one argument can always be replaced by another object in the same domain. The output which results from applying a function to an argument is called the value of the function for that argument. For instance, for the function $f = 2x$ and the argument 3, the value is 6. Frege introduced the concepts of function and argument into logic and claimed that a function is analogous to a concept or a predicate expression, while an argument is analogous to an object or a subject expression in a proposition. In applying these concepts to propositions, Frege used the

完全不涉及特殊事物。因此它提供了纯逻辑的结构。罗素认为,这种命题是分析的和先天的。维特根斯坦认为,完全普遍化命题也可以因其明晰或复合的结构描述世界,但这一主张招致了如下批评:这种命题如果只靠其结构而不及任何有其特征的东西,则不能对世界有任何述说。

"我们可以用充分普遍化命题,即不是首先把名称和一定对象相联系的命题,来完全地描述世界。"——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》, 5. 526。

函项

在普通语言中,该词大略是指目的或作用。在逻辑和数学中(该词译为函项),它是一种特殊的关系,在此关系中,给予的任何对象或诸对象(也称为函项的主目),另一对象(称为对于那个主目的函项值)将会产生。一个函项有一个或多个能容纳不同主目的变项。对某一函项的变项给予确定值就会产生对整个函项的确定值。前置逻辑(也称为函项演算)中的真值函项是特定的函项,其中,复合命题的真值是由它的命题的组成部分的真值和与它相关的逻辑项所决定的。一个函项是可应用于某类对象的,函项所应用的类被称为函项的前域。值的类被称为函项的变程。弗雷格认为,概念是表示对象真值的函项。

"一个函项,正如所看到的,是一种关系。但它是特殊种类的关系,它的特殊性就是,没有任何两个元素使它成为同样的元素。"——奎因:《数理逻辑》,1951年,第222页。

函项和主目

数学函项是能够应用于一个论域的运算关系。主目则是此论域中该函项所适用的对象。主目是一函项中的可变部分,因为一主目总是可以被同一论域内的另一对象所代替。把一函项应用于一主目所产生的结果叫做该函项相应于该主目的值。举例来说," $f = 2x$ "是一个函项,"3"是一个主目,"6"是值。弗雷格把函项和主目这对概念引入逻辑,并认为函项类似于命题中的概念或谓词表达式,主目则类似于对象或主词表达式。在把这些概念应用于命题时,弗雷格看到了真假在评价命题时的极端重要性,因而使用了"真值函项"和"真值"等术语。

"假设一简单或复合的符号在一表达式(其

terms truth-function and truth-value in light of the crucial importance of truth and falsity in assessing propositions.

"Suppose that a simple or complex symbol occurs in one or more places in an expression (whose content need not be a possible content of judgment). If we image this symbol as replaceable by another (the same one each time) at one or more of its occurrences, then the part of the expression that shows itself invariant under such replacement is called the function; and the replaceable part, the argument of the function." — Frege, *Begriffsschrift*, Part 1, Sect. 9.

Function stroke, see Sheffer's function

Functionalism

A term for any theory which takes the notion of function as the first explanatory principle. In the philosophy of mind, it is currently a widely supported theory of the mind-body relationship. This theory was developed as a result of the recognition of the defects of the identity theory of mind. Its chief characteristic is that it asks what makes a mental state a mental state rather than asking about the intrinsic property of a mental state. According to functionalism, a mental state or event should be explained by its functional role, that is its causal relationship with other mental states, with sensory inputs and the consequential output behaviour of a subject. Unlike the identity theory of the mind, it does not claim that mental states are directly *per se* neural states, but sees mental states in terms of something more abstract, that is the causal or functional roles some neural states possess. The theory can be traced to the later Wittgenstein and his account of meaning as use, and its major representatives include Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. Functionalism is closely associated with cognitivism, artificial intelligence, and the computer model of the mind. There are various versions of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Ned Block distinguishes between psycho-functionalism and conceptual functionalism. Psycho-functionalism views mental states not from the biological point of view, but from organisational point of view. Mental states are analogous to the functional states of a computer, and the mind is a program that can be multiply realised, that is shared by various physio-chemical systems. Conceptual functionalism is a development of analytical behaviourism and considers a mental state to be a contribution to a disposition to behave. Another distinction is between machine functionalism, which understands function in terms of the operation of the whole organism, and teleological functionalism, which understands function as what the thing is for. Homuncular functionalism is one version of teleological functionalism. The main objections faced by functionalist accounts of the mind are that it cannot account for *qualia*, that is what it is like to feel a sensation, and for intentionality.

内容不必是可能的判断内容) 中一处或多处出现。如果我们设想这个符号在其出现位置的一处或多处可被另一个符号所代入(每一次用同一个符号代入), 那么, 该表达式中在这样的代入之下保持不变的那一部分叫做函项; 可代入的那一部分, 叫做该函项的主目。”——弗雷格:《概念文字》, 第1部分, 第9节。

竖函项

见“谢弗函项”条。

功能主义

这一术语指任何将功能概念视为第一解释原则的理论。在心的哲学中, 它是当前受到广泛支持的身心关系理论。这一理论是由于认识到心的同一论的缺陷而提出的。其主要特点在于, 它所问的是究竟什么使得一个心的状态成为心的状态而不是问心的状态的固有特性是什么。根据功能主义, 一个心的状态或事件应当由其功能作用亦即它与主体的其他的心状态、感觉输入和作为结果的行为(输出)之间的因果关系来解释。与心的同一论不同, 它宣称一个心的状态并不直接是一个神经状态, 而是某种更为抽象的东西, 即某些神经状态所具有的因果作用或功能作用。这一理论可以追溯于后期维特根斯坦及其意义作为用法的理论, 其主要代表是H. 普特南和J. 福多等人。功能主义与认知论、人工智能和心的计算机模型密切相联。在心的哲学中有各种不同形式的功能主义。N. 布洛克区分了“心理功能主义”和“概念功能主义”。心理功能主义不是从生物学的观点而是从组织学的观点来看待心的状态。心的状态可以类比为计算机的功能状态, 而心则是可以“以多种方式来实现”的程序, 即为各种不同的生化系统所共有。概念功能主义是“分析行为主义”的发展, 它认为心的状态对行为倾向起作用。另一种区分是“机器功能主义”和“目的论的功能主义”, 前者用整个机体的操作来理解功能, 而后者则将功能理解为事物的存在目的。小人功能主义是目的论的功能主义的一种形式。功能主义所面临的主要反驳是, 它不能说明感受性(即具有一个感觉是什么样子)和意向性。

“根据功能主义, 某物, 比如一个计算机, 它的行为, 并非由这个计算机的物理学和化学来解释, 而是由机器的程序来解释的。”——普特南:《心智、语言与实在》, 1975年, 第xiii页。

"According to functionalism, the behaviour of, say, a computing machine is not explained by the physics and chemistry of the computing machine. It is explained by the machine's program." — Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, xiii.

Fundamental ontology, see being (Heidegger)

Fundamental project

Sartre denied the transcendental ego and tried to account for our identity by means of the notion of fundamental project or original choice. A fundamental project is an act which is responsible for the whole mode of life of a person, which makes him recognisable in every particular situation. The project or choice is neither given nor fixed, but is actively constructed. It is manifested in various actions across many years. Because the project is a choice, we are not passively subjected to the external causal world. We always define ourselves by projecting beyond causality. In this way, our life history should be conceived as a coherent, long term and self-determining process of life experience. The project is fundamental and the choice is original through relation to a person's being-in-the world in its entirety. The project is not related to any particular object in the world and is not empirical. We exist with this choice or project and are therefore responsible for our lives. The fundamental project is the expression of our freedom and is the ground of our responsibility.

"This fundamental project must not of course refer to any other and should be conceived by itself. It can be concerned neither with death nor life nor any particular characteristic of the human condition: the original project of a for-itself can aim only at its being." — Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 556.

Fusion of horizons

Gadamer follows Husserl and Heidegger in arguing that we live and understand within horizons, which provide a framework for the possibility of meaning. Although an horizon is formed in tradition and culture, there is, in interpreting a historical text, a tension between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the present and of the interpreter. In understanding, we need to acquire the historical horizon, but it is also impossible to eliminate our own criteria and prejudices. We should be aware of the particularities of both horizons and overcome them by establishing a relation which brings them together. Any real understanding involves such a fusion of horizons in the course of which tradition acquires new life and our own prejudices are challenged. Since language is crucial to understanding, a fusion of horizons is essentially a fusion of language.

基础存在论

见“存在〔或译为‘是’〕(海德格尔)”条。

基本谋划

萨特否认先验自我, 试图通过基本谋划或原初选择的观念来说明我们的身份。一个基本谋划是这样一个行为, 它造成了一个人的整个人生样式, 体现于与之相关的每一个特殊的形势之中。这种谋划或选择既不是被给予的, 也不是固定的, 而是被主动构成的。它表现于多年的各种行为中。由于这种谋划是一个选择, 我们就并非被动地服从于外在的因果世界。我们总是通过超出因果性的谋划而确定我们自己。以这种方式, 我们的生活史应被当做一个一致的、长期的和自身决定的生活体验过程。通过个人的整个在世存在之关系, 这种谋划是基本的, 而这种选择则是原初的。谋划与世界里的任何特殊对象无关, 也不是经验性的。我们就与这选择或谋划共生存, 并因此而对我们的生活或生命负责。这基本谋划表达出我们的自由, 也是我们〔对自己生活〕负责的根据。

“这基本谋划绝不涉及任何他者, 而只应通过它自身而被理解。它既不可能与死亡、生命有关, 也不可能与人类状况中的任何特殊性质有关; 一个自为者〔即人〕的原初谋划只能投向它的存在。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译), 1957年, 第556页。

视域的融合

伽达默尔跟从胡塞尔和海德格尔, 主张我们是在视域中生活和理解; 这视域为意义的可能性提供了一个构架。虽然一个视域在传统和文化中形成, 但在解释一个历史文本时, 在这个文本的视域和解释者当前视域之间存在着张力。在理解中, 我们需要获得历史的视域, 但不可能完全清除我们自己的标准和偏见。我们应该意识到双方视域的特殊性, 并通过建立一个将其结合的关系而克服这些特殊性。任何真实的理解都涉及这样一种视域的融合, 在其过程中传统获得新的生命, 我们自己的偏见受到挑战。由于语言对于理解来说是关键性的, 视域的融合本质上是一种语言的融合。

“在理解过程中, 发生一种视域的真实融合; 它意味着, 当历史视域被投射出来时, 同时

"In the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed." —Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen-Doepel), 1975, p. 273.

Future contingents

The problem of future contingents concerns ascertaining the truth-value of statements about future events. If we adhere to the classical principle of bivalence that every statement must be either true or false, then future contingent statements will be either true or false in advance of the event. This conclusion, which seems to commit us to fatalism, has led some to scepticism regarding the principle of bivalence, although other philosophers argue that a proper understanding of bivalence for future contingent statements does not ensnare us in fatalism. The problem, which originated in Aristotle's discussion of the sea-battle tomorrow, was much disputed by medieval logicians, because if future contingent statements are neither true nor false, divine foreknowledge would come into question. In this century Lukasiewicz sought to deal with this problem by introducing three-valued logic, which in turn led to the development of various many-valued logics.

"Aristotle dismissed of the truth-states of alternatives regarding future contingent matters, whose occurrence — like that of the sea battle tomorrow — is not yet determinate by us, and may indeed actually be undetermined." —Rescher, *Topics in Philosophic Logic*, 1968, p. 54.

Future generations

Since certain actions of the present generation of human beings, such as natural resource depletion, chemical waste, birth control, and the use of nuclear weapons, have inevitable effects upon the life quality, identity and the size of future generations, we feel we have moral duties and obligations towards the members of future generations. Consequentialists argue that we should promote the interests of future generations as we do those of our own generation, and deontologists claim that we should always act in ways that make people better off or at least not worse off than they would otherwise be. However, each position is open to question, because future generations are created by us and their sizes are determined by us. The major philosophical question concerns the basis of our duty to future generations. Some refer to the rights of the future generation. But how can we talk about the rights and interests of non-existent people? Others refer to intergenerational justice according to which each generation should obtain its own share. But since the number of people belonging to future generations is uncertain, what is the ground for deciding equal shares? Some moralists object to the view that we have moral responsibility towards future generations, for ethical relations can only be

就被置换了。”——伽达默尔：《真理与方法》（格兰-多培尔英译），1975年，第273页。

未来偶然性

未来偶然性问题是确定关于未来事件的陈述的真值的问题。如果我们坚持经典的二值原则，即每一陈述必定或者真或者假，那么，未来偶然事件陈述在该事件之前就是或者真或者假的。这一结论似乎使我们承诺命定论，它促使某些人接受对二值原则的怀疑论，尽管其他哲学家论证说，对于未来偶然陈述的二值性的适当理解，并不使我们落入命定论的陷阱。这一问题起源于亚里士多德对明天海战的讨论。中世纪逻辑学家在此问题上进行了很多论战，因为如果未来偶然陈述既不真也不假，那么何来神的先见之明？在本世纪，正是为了解决这一问题，卢卡西维茨引入了三值逻辑，它反过来导致了各种多值逻辑的发展。

“亚里士多德不考虑与未来偶然事件有关的不同选择的真值状态，它们出现与否——像明天是否发生海战一样——不是由我们决定的，并且实际上的确可能是未被决定的。”——雷谢尔：《哲学逻辑论集》，1968年，第54页。

后代

由于这一代人的某些行为，例如自然资源的耗尽、化学废品、生育控制、核武器的使用等等，不可避免地要影响到后代的生活质量、认同和规模，我们感到我们对于他们有道德上的职责和义务。效果论认为，我们应该增进后代的利益，正如我们对我们自己这代人所做的那样。道义论者主张，我们总是应该以使人们过得更好而不是更坏的方式来行动。不过，因为后代是被我们所创造的，以及他们的规模是被我们所决定的等事实，因而每一种观点都有可以讨论的余地，主要的哲学问题是在什么基础上确立我们对他们的责任，某些人认为这应基于后代的权利。但我们怎么能谈非存在的人的权利和利益呢？另外有些人则认为基于代际间的正义，即每一代人应获得自己这一代人的那一份。但由于未来人的数量是不确定的，决定平等的分享的根据在哪里呢？有些道德学家反对我们对于后代有道德责任的观点，因为伦理关系只是相互有益或有害的人们之间的。关切到后代的道德问题的争论表明当前的道德理论是有缺陷的。

“较少地考虑到后代可能是不理智的，但我

between agents who can benefit or harm each other. The debate about moral issues regarding future generations indicates that important aspects of current moral theory are defective.

"It may be irrational to be less concerned about the further future. But we cannot be sure of this while we are undecided on the reason why." —Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 1984, p. 186.

Future-referring term, see past-referring term

们并没有确定为什么，故我们并不能确信这一点。”——帕菲特：《理性与人》，1984年，第186页。

指称将来的用语

见“指称过去的用语”条。

G

Gaia hypothesis

[from Greek: *Gaia*, the earth goddess] Lovelock's hypothesis that sees the earth as a living self-regulating organism. On this view, the earth is a creature which is not merely the sum of its parts, but is a complex entity with properties extending beyond those of its constituents of biosphere, atmosphere, oceans and soil. All of these components are related to the complex interactions of organisms. If the system loses its equilibrium, there could be disastrous consequences for life. The hypothesis emphasises the interdependence between life and ecosphere. It is intended to challenge the view that nature is nothing but an object to be conquered, controlled and exploited for human ends. Consequently, we should live with nature and shift our traditional bias of human-centrism. The hypothesis captures the spirit of deep ecology and has affected environmental philosophy and the environmental protection movement. It is a matter of dispute whether it is a serious new paradigm for understanding nature and our relation to it or merely a body of evocative and persuasive imagery.

"The Gaia hypothesis is for those who like to walk or simply stand and stare, to wonder about the Earth and the life it bears, and to speculate about the consequences of our own presence here." — Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*, 1987, p. 12.

Gambler's fallacy

Also called the Monte Carlo fallacy. Two fallacious way of reasoning starting from the same premise. The initial premise is that a particular given outcome has occurred many times in succession. From here one person infers that the same outcome will occur again next time; and the other infers that the opposite outcome will occur next time. Both are wrong because the system does not have a memory. A coin will not come up heads or tails because it has come up heads many times in succession. The probability of past outcomes does not affect the probability of a future event. It will neither increase nor decrease, but remains the same on each occasion.

"The simplest available explanation of the prevalence of the 'gambler's fallacy' is that it seems from a quite legitimate use of the counterfactualizable conception of probability in contexts where it is not assumed, or not taken as estab-

该亚假设

[源自希腊文: 该亚, 大地女神] 洛夫洛克的假设, 即把地球视为一个活的、自我调节的有机体。根据这种观点, 地球不完全是其全部组成部分的组合物, 而是一个复杂的整体, 其具有的特性超出了它的组成部分即生物圈、大气、海洋和土地的那些特性。所有这些组成部分都与有机体复杂的相互作用相联系。如果这一系统失去平衡, 就会对生命造成灾难性的后果。这一假设强调生命和生态圈的相互依存。它有意识地对那种认为自然只不过是为了人的目的而被征服、控制和利用的对象的观点提出挑战。因而, 我们应与自然共存并应转变我们传统的人类中心主义的偏见。这一假说抓住了深层生态学的精神, 并对环境哲学和环境保护运动产生了影响。不过, 这一假设究竟是一个用来理解自然及我们对它的关系的全新范式, 还是只是一种唤起人们注意的劝导性的比喻, 人们对此持有不同意见。

"该亚假设是对那些人提出来的, 他们喜爱散步或只是站着凝视, 他们为地球及其所养有的生命而惊叹, 并思索我们本身在这里的存在所带来的结果。" — 洛夫洛克, 《该亚: 对地球上生命的新审视》, 1987年, 第12页。

赌徒谬误

又称“蒙特卡洛谬论”, 从相同前提出发的两种错误推理方法。最初的前提是, 一个具体的特定结果已经连续出现多次。人们由此可以推出同样的结果在下一次将出现, 而其他人则推出相反的结果将在下一次出现。两者都是错的, 因为系统并没有记忆。一个钱币将不会因为连续出现正面许多次而下次就一定会出现正面或反面。过去结果的可能性并不影响一个将来事件的可能性。它既不增加也不减少, 而每一次机会仍然是相同的。

"对于‘赌徒谬误’的流行, 最简单的可能的解释是, 它似乎是出于或然性的反事实概念在那些既未被设定, 亦未认作已确立的环境中的合法使用, 即纯机遇在起作用。" —— 柯亨: 《理性的对话》, 1986年, 第171页。

lished, that pure chance is operating.” — L. J. Cohen, *The Dialogue of Reason*, 1986, p. 171.

Game theory

The mathematical theory of game like human situations in which each rational agent strategically acts so as to maximise preferred utility or outcome. However, the realisation of this strategy depends on the actions of other players in the same situations, and on the assumption that each of them is equally rational in his or her choices. Each player must take the strategies of other players into account, since it is impossible for all players to maximise simultaneously their preferred utility. A situation which yields such a consequence that no agent can improve his or her position if such an agent unilaterally withdraws from it, is called the Nash equilibrium. Game theory tries to find what the most rational strategy should be in such situations. It was systematically developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1940s, and has a wide application in the contemporary discussion of moral and political theory. Game theory is a part of decision theory.

“Game theory therefore starts with games where initial choices are to be made without prior communication and where any emergent conventions exist without being enforced by any kind of sanctions.” — Hollis, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1995, p. 377.

Geisteswissenschaften

[German: human sciences or human studies, but including social sciences as well as humanities] A term particularly associated with Wilhelm Dilthey and contrasted to *Naturwissenschaften* [German: natural sciences]. Natural sciences offer objective knowledge and can explain phenomena in terms of laws, but these features are lacking in the humanities. Hermeneutics, according to Dilthey, can defend the human sciences as an integrated body of disciplines with their own methods and principles in contrast to those of the natural sciences. Their dependence upon the cognitive capacity of understanding gives them a distinct status as a source of knowledge. The human sciences possess a peculiar relation to human experience. Rather than establishing laws to explain events, they describe historical facts and formulate standards of value and practical imperatives. Some philosophers propose hermeneutics as the methodology which is appropriate to provide objectivity for humanities. This claimed objectivity is challenged by those who wish to free interpretation from the need to have an objective end-point and by the positivist claim that human knowledge must meet the standards for a unified science which are essentially set by the natural sciences.

“All the disciplines that have socio-historical reality as

游戏理论

关于类似游戏的人类处境的数学理论,在这种处境中,每一个有理性的人的行动在战略上是为了最大化所选择的功利或后果。不过,这种战略的实现取决于在同样的处境中的其他游戏者的行动,取决于这样一个假定,每一个其他游戏者的选择都有他或她的合理性。既然并非所有的游戏者都可能同时最大化他们所选择的功利,因而每一个游戏者必须把他人的战略考虑进去。有一种处境叫“纳西均衡”,在那种处境中,我们面临这样的结果,即没有一个当事人能够改进他或她的处境。如果这样一个当事人单方面从中撤离的话。游戏理论力图发现在这样一种处境中最合理的战略应是什么。游戏理论为J. 冯·纽曼和O. 摩根斯坦在20世纪40年代系统提出,在当代道德理论和政治理论的讨论中有着广泛的运用。游戏理论是决策论的一部分。

“游戏理论开始于这样的游戏:在那里最初的选择是在没有事先沟通的条件下作出的,在那里,任何出现的约定都存在,且不为任何一种法令所强制。”——霍利斯,见布宁和崔·詹姆斯编:《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》,1995年,第377页。

人文科学

[德文词,意为人文科学或对于人的研究,但既包括社会科学,也包括人文学科(humanities)] 这是一个与狄尔泰有特别关联的词,与“自然科学”(Naturwissenschaften)相对。自然科学提供客观的知识,并且能通过规律来解释现象;但这些特点与人文科学无缘。按照狄尔泰的观点,解释学(或译“诠释学”)能保证人文科学成为一个有自己方法和原则的众学科的整体,并以此而与自然科学的方法和原则对峙。它们[人文科学]依靠理解这种认知能力,由此而给予它们以知识源头的特殊身份。人文科学与人类体验有一种特殊的关系。它们不是去建立能解释各个事件的规律,而是去描述历史的事实,形成价值的标准及实践规则。一些哲学家将解释学当做能够提供适合人文学科的客观性的方法论。这种客观性的要求受到两种人的挑战。一种人希望将解释从客观目标的要求中解放出来;另一种人是实证主义者,他们主张人文知识也必须满足一个统一科学的标准,而这统一科学从本质上正是由自然科学建立起来的。

“在这本著作中,所有那些以社会—历史现实作为其论题的学科都被认为是属于‘人文科学’的范围。”——狄尔泰:《选集》,第一卷,1989

their subject-matter are encompassed in this work under the name *Geisteswissenschaften* [human sciences].” —Dilthey, *Selected Works*, I, 1989, p. 56.

Gender

The distinction between sex and gender is a central feature of recent feminist thought. While sexual distinctions between male and female have been understood as being biologically and anatomically determined, especially with respect to reproductive roles, gender has been understood as a variable social construction, with gender difference determined socially and culturally. Sex has to do with facts, while gender has to do with values. These values, however, are generally those of male domination and masquerade as a factual basis for male social superiority. By distinguishing between sex and gender, feminist theory provides a standpoint from which alleged male superiority can be challenged. Because some feminist theorists have rejected the distinction between sex and gender on the grounds that sex is also socially constructed, the boundaries between the biological and the social remains a matter of dispute in this domain. In addition, some feminists are seeking a new way to base their critique of male-dominated society.

While discussion of gender is largely confined to humans, questions about sex, sexual desire and sexual behaviour can also be asked about members of other animal species. Some theorists claim that such investigations can illuminate our understanding of human sexuality. The relationship between sexual desire and reason and the role of sex in explaining human behaviour have been explored by Freud, his successors and his critics. Non-standard forms of sexual activity, such as homosexuality, have become major topics in applied ethics.

Gender is also a grammatical term. While many languages distinguish nouns, pronouns and adjectives into masculine and feminine gender, some languages such as Greek, Latin and German, distinguish these parts of speech into three genders: masculine, feminine and neutral, with each having different patterns of inflection.

“The concept of gender carries in one word both a recognition of the social aspect of the ‘sexual’ dichotomy and the need to treat it as such.” —Delphy, *Close to Home*, 1984, p. 24.

Genealogy

An inquiry into origin and descent. Nietzsche defined genealogy as the investigation of the origin of moral prejudices in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887). He traced the root of human morality back to the most naked struggle for power. Foucault took over this term and developed it into a concept of history and a discipline. In contrast to the standard historical approach which traces a line of inevitability and demon-

年, 第 56 页。

性别

性 (sex) 与性别 (gender) 之间的区分, 是近来女性主义思潮的一个主要特征。男性和女性之间的性的 (sexual) 区别一直被认为是由生物学和解剖学确定的, 尤其是由生殖方面的作用确定的; 而性别 (gender) 则一直被理解为一种可变的社会结构, 性别 (gender) 的不同是由社会和文化所决定的。性 (sex) 与事实相联, 而性别 (gender) 与价值观相联。然而, 这些价值观通常表现为男性统治和对作为事实依据的男性社会地位优越性的掩饰。通过对性 (sex) 与性别 (gender) 的区分, 女性主义理论提出了一个观点, 根据这一观点, 所谓的男人优越性会受到挑战。由于一些女性主义理论家以性 (sex) 也是社会性的构成为依据而拒绝对性 (sex) 和性别 (gender) 之间的区分, 在这一问题上, 生物学的与社会的之间的界线仍是一个有争议的问题。此外, 一些女性主义者正在探寻一种新方式以便为其对男性统治的社会的批判提供根据。

虽然有关性别 (gender) 的讨论主要被限于人类, 但有关性 (sex)、性欲和性行为的问题也可涉及其他动物种类的成员。一些理论家声称, 这样的探索也可启发我们对人类性特征的理解。弗洛伊德、他的后继者及批判者对性欲与理智之间的关系, 以及性欲在解释人类行为中的作用已进行了探索。非正常形式的性活动, 例如同性恋, 已成为应用伦理学中的主要论题。

性别 (gender) 还是一个语法上的用语。虽然绝大多数语言将名词、代词和形容词分为阳性和阴性, 但一些语言, 如希腊语、拉丁语和德语, 将这些词类分为三性, 即阳性、阴性和中性, 每一词性都有不同的变化形式。

“性别 (gender) 这个概念是以一个词既表示对‘性 (sex)’的两方面中的社会方面的承认, 又表示需要如此对待它。”——德尔菲:《贴近家庭》, 1984 年, 第 24 页。

谱系学 (或“谱系”)

对于起源和祖系血统的研究。尼采在《论道德的谱系》(1887 年) 中将谱系学定义为对于道德偏见的起源的研究。他将人类道德之根源追溯到对于力量或权力的最赤裸裸的斗争。福柯采用了这个词, 并将它发展为一个历史的和学科的概念。与通常的那种寻求一条必然线索并表明现在基于过去的历史研究方式不同, 谱系

strates that the present is based on the past, genealogy begins with the present and goes backward in time until a difference is located. It intends to break off the past from the present and undercuts the legitimacy of the present. Genealogy rejects the role of cause or explanation and rejects the claim of a unitary body of theory. It focuses instead on local, discontinuous knowledge, and attempts to reveal the multiplicity of factors behind an event and the fragility of historical forms. By demonstrating the foreignness of the past, it exposes the relativity of present phenomena that are taken for granted. Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* presents a genealogic approach to intellectual history, in order to account for the transition from one system to another by connecting them to their social, economical and political backgrounds.

"What I would call genealogy... is a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history." —Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 1980, p. 117.

General proposition

The "A" (all ps are q) and "E" (all ps are not q) propositions in the traditional syllogism, which assert or deny the truth of all values of a propositional function. They correspond to general facts and are also called universal propositions. General propositions might be tautologies, and they might also obtain through induction or complete enumeration. Russell's account of general propositions also includes existence propositions, i. e. "I" (some p is q) or "O" (some p is not q) propositions in the traditional syllogism, for I is the denial of E, and O is the denial of A. He therefore names "A" and "E" as positive general propositions and "I" and "O" as negative general propositions.

"We will call propositions containing the word 'some' negative general propositions, and those containing the word 'all' positive general propositions." —Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 65.

General propositional form

Although different propositions have different logical forms, they share something in common with one another in virtue of each of them being a proposition. This common form underlying all superficial differences of propositions is what the early Wittgenstein calls the "general propositional form". It is the essence of being a proposition and is contained in every proposition. It is both the real logical constant and the most general propositional variable, whose range is the totality of propositions. This form is implicit in the rules of logical syntax, but Wittgenstein sometimes also

学从现在开始,并沿时间回溯,直到找到一个区别。它倾向于破坏过去与现在的联系,动摇现在的合法性。谱系学不承认因果或解释的作用,并拒绝对于一个理论统一体的诉求。它关注的是地域性的、不连续的知识,并力图去揭示一个事件后面的多重因素和历史构型的脆弱。通过表明过去的异质性,它暴露出被视为当然的当前现象的相对性。福柯在其《知识考古学》中提出了一个对思想史的谱系研究,以便通过将不同系统与其社会的、经济的和政治的背景联系起来而说明它们之间的相互转化。

"我所说的谱系学……是一种历史形式,它能解释知识、谈论、对象域等等的构成,而不必涉及这样一种主体,它或者相对于事件领域而言是先验的,或者以一种空洞的同一性的方式贯穿历史过程。"——福柯:《力量/知识》,1980年,第117页。

全称命题

传统三段论推理中的"A"(所有的 p 是 q)和"E"(所有的 p 不是 q)命题,它们肯定或否定命题函项的所有值为真。它们对应于普遍事实,也称为普遍命题。全称命题可能是重言式,它们也可能通过归纳或完全枚举而得到。罗素对全称命题的说明还包括存在命题,即传统三段论中的"I"(有些 p 是 q)或"O"(有些 p 不是 q)命题,因为I是E的否定,O是A的否定。他因而称"A"和"E"为肯定全称命题,"I"和"O"为否定全称命题。

"我们将称包含有语词'有些'的命题为否定全称命题,称包含有语词'所有'的命题为肯定全称命题。"——罗素:《我们关于外部世界的知识》,1926年,第65页。

普遍的命题形式

虽然不同的命题有不同的逻辑形式,但它们彼此间也有某种共同的东西,因为每一个都是命题。这深藏于一切命题表面区别之下的共同形式就是早期维特根斯坦所谓的"普遍的命题形式"。这是作为命题的本质,并包含于每一命题之中。它既是真正的逻辑常项,也是最普遍的命题变项,它的范围是命题的总体。这种形式内含于逻辑句法的规则之中,但维特根斯坦有时也认为,普遍的命题形式表明事物处于什么状态,在这种命题形式中代表事物和关系的符

claims that the general propositional form indicates how things stand, and that the combination of the symbols for things and relations in this propositional form corresponds to the things having these relations in reality.

"It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give a description of the proposition of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meanings of the names are suitably chosen." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.5.

General term

Quine's expression, in contrast to a singular term. While a singular term denotes an individual object, a general term denotes a kind or a type of individual thing. General terms include both adjectives such as "wise" and "human" and common nouns such as "man" and "horse". They can be predicated of more than one object and are also called predicates. For Quine, general terms fill a position in propositions which is not available to quantified variables. Common nouns as general terms can be divided into sortal general nouns which are countable (for example "dog" and "car") and mass general nouns which cannot be counted (for example "water" and "sugar").

"The general term is what is predicated, or occupies what grammarians call predicative position; and it can as well have the form of an adjective or verb as that of a substantive." — Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 96.

General will

A term introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau for the collective will or the common interest, that is what we all really and truly want. The general will derives from the sovereign body, which is composed of all the adult members of the state and provides the legitimate authority of the state. We have an obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the state because the authority of the state represents the general will directed to the common good. The general will, which is superior to the individual will, stands in contrast to the will of all. The will of all is the mere aggregate of private and individual wills, although the general will can be worked out from the will of all. Rousseau's theory of the general will is an alternative to the social contract as justification for the ground of political obligation. In subjecting oneself to the authority of the community, one is subjecting oneself to being directed by the general will. The general will is expressed in laws which are established on the basis of majority vote by a general assembly composed of all adult men of the community. The notion of the general will was developed by Hegel and by British Hegelians such as Green and Bosanquet. The main objection to this theory is that it assumes that the state

号组合与在现实中具有这些关系的事物相对应。

"现在似乎可以给出最普遍的命题形式了：就是说可以用这样的方式来对任何符号语言的命题作出描述，以使得每一种可能的涵义都能够由满足此描述的符号来表示，而满足此描述的每一符号都能表示一种涵义，只要名称的意义是恰当选择的。"——维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》，4.5。

普遍词

奎因引入的一个词，对应于“单个词”。单个词指称的是一个个体对象，而普遍词则指称一种或一类个体对象。普遍词既包括诸如“聪明的”和“人类的”这样的形容词，也包括诸如“人”和“马”这样的普通名词。它们可以断定一个以上的对象，也被称作“断定”。在奎因看来，普遍词在命题中处于不能用于量词变项的位置。作为普遍词的普通名词可以被分为可数的一般类名词（如“狗”、“猫”）和不可数的一般物质名词（如“水”、“糖”）。

“普遍词就是被谓项述说的东西，或者占据着语法学家称作的谓项位置；它也可以有形容词或动词形式以及名词形式。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第96页。

公意

J.-J. 卢梭提出的一个概念，其含义是集体的意志或共同的利益，即我们所有的人实际和真正想要的东西。公意来源于主权体，后者是由国家所有成年的成员构成的，并为国家提供合法的权威。我们有义务承认国家的管辖权，因为国家权威代表的是致力于公共利益的公意。优于个别意志的公意不同于众意。众意仅仅是私人的个别意志的总和，尽管公意可以从众意中得出。卢梭的公意论是为政治义务的根据做论证的社会契约论的另一说法。使自己服从共同体的权威，就是使自己服从公意指导。公意是在法律中表现出来的，而法律的确立又是以由共同体所有成年人参加的全体大会中的多数票为基础的。公意这一概念后来为黑格尔及英国的黑格尔主义者格林和鲍桑葵所发展。反对这一理论的主要意见，是它假定了国家具有自身的超越其个别成员意志之上的意志，并论证了无视这些个别意志的合理性。此外，为什么一个社会的成员会必然关注它的公意？或公意是否会必然提供共同的利益？这些问题也不清楚。

“只有公意才能够按照建立国家的目的，即

has its own will which overrides the will of its individual members and which justifies ignoring these individual wills. Furthermore, it is not clear why membership in a society would necessarily give insight into its general will or whether the general will would necessarily provide the common good.

"The general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance with that end which the state has been established to achieve—the common good." —Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, II, 1.

Generalisation

A generalisation is usually a universal statement which is true of all particular things of a certain kind. For instance, "all men are mortal", which can be read "for all x , if x is a man then x is mortal". Such a statement is made through induction and other logical procedures. A generalisation is law-like if it supports a counterfactual conditional. We say that "all men are mortal" is law-like because "for all x , if x were a man, then x would be mortal". In predicate calculus, if a well-founded formula X holds for any arbitrary individual a , we may infer from X to $(\forall a) X$. This is called the rule of generalisation.

"We mean by a generalisation a statement that all of a certain definable class of propositions are true." —Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 1921, p. 222.

Generalised other, see concrete other

Generalization argument

An argument and moral principle which holds that if the results of everyone's doing a certain action are undesirable, no one has a right to do that action. Similarly, if the results of no one's doing a certain action are undesirable, every one ought to do it. The validity and the conditions of application of this argument are fully discussed by Marcus Singer in *Generalization in Ethics* (1961). According to him, the validity of this argument is established on two premises: one is called the principle of consequences which states that if X 's doing A has undesirable results, then X does not have a right to do A . The other, called the Generalisation Principle, states that if some persons ought not to A , then no one who is in a similar situation ought to do A .

"The generalisation argument has the general form: 'if everyone were to do x , the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable); therefore no one ought to do x .'" —Singer, *Generalization in Ethics*, 1961, Ch. 4.

Generalization principle

A principle formulated by Marcus Singer, but traceable

共同的利益,来指导国家的各种力量。”——卢梭:《社会契约论》,II,第1页。

概括

概括通常是一全称陈述,它对于某种类型的所有特殊的事物都成立。例如,“所有的人都是有死的”,可以将其读作:“对于所有的 x 而言,如果 x 是人则 x 有死。”这一类陈述是通过归纳和其他逻辑程序得到的。一个概括是类似于规律的东西,如果它支持了一反事实条件句。我们说“所有的人都是有死的”是类似于规律的,是因为“对于所有的 x 而言,如果 x 是人,则 x 有死”这一说法是真的。在谓词演算中,如果一个有充分根据的公式 X 对任意个体 a 都成立,则我们可以从 X 推出 $(\forall a) X$,这叫做“概括规则”。

“所谓概括,我们是指这样一个陈述,其内容是:某个可定义的命题类中的所有元素都是真的。”——凯恩斯:《论概率》,1921年,第222页。

一般化的他人

见“具体的他人”条。

普遍化的论证

这个论证也是一道德原则,它认为,如果每一个人的某种行为的结果是不良的,那么没有一个人有权利做这种事情,相类似地,如果没有一个人的某种行为的结果是不良的,那么每一个人都应当这样做。这种论证的合理性和运用的条件在 M. 辛格的《伦理学中的普遍化》(1961年版)中得到了充分的讨论。根据他的观点,这种论证的有效性是建立在两个前提上的。一是被称为效果的原则,它的表述为,如果 X 做 A 有一种不良的后果,那么 X 就没有做 A 的权利。二是被称为“普遍化的原则”,它的表述为,如果某人不应当做 A ,那么在类似的情况下,任何人都不应做 A 。

“普遍化的论证有一般性的形式:‘如果每一个人要做 x ,其结果将是灾难性的(或不良的);所以没有一个人应做 x ’。”——辛格:《伦理学中的普遍化》,1961年,第4章。

普遍化原则

由 M. 辛格系统阐述,但可追溯到西奇威

to Sidgwick, which states that what is right for one person must be right for every relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar circumstances. What is right for one person cannot be wrong for another unless there is some difference with respect to their natures or circumstances. The principle is similar in spirit to the golden rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative. It is the basis for what Singer calls the "generalization argument" which infers from "not everyone has the right to..." to "no one has the right to...". This implies that there are general grounds for an act to be right or wrong. An act must be right or wrong for a class of relevantly similar people. The principle can be challenged because it is unclear how we can decide whether circumstances are similar or not similar.

"The principle that what is right (or wrong) for one person must be right (or wrong) for any similar person in similar circumstances. For obvious reasons, I shall refer to this principle as 'the generalization principle'." —Singer, *Generalization in Ethics*, 1963, 5.

Generative grammar

Chomsky's term for his own approach to grammar and language. He defines language as consisting of a set of sentences, and grammar as a device for producing or generating grammatical sequences. Generative grammar is the internalised capacity or set of rules which is acquired by a person unconsciously when he learns a language, by means of which he is able to formulate and understand an infinite number of grammatical utterances from finite observational materials. It assigns structural descriptions that indicate the ways of deriving perfectly well formed sentences in a language. Thus, although a person is exposed to only a limited number of sentences, he can construct and understand many new ones without difficulty. What it is to be generative is not explicitly explained, but has to do with the notions of production, analysis, description and specification. Chomsky's linguistics emphasises especially the speaker or writer rather than the hearer or reader. Generative grammar is contrasted to traditional grammar which gives only an enumeration of typical structures with common variants and relies on the intelligence and linguistic intuition of the hearer or reader.

"By a generative grammar I mean simply a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 8.

Generosity

[from Latin; *generous*, noble, associated with *genus*, race or family.] Generosity means literally noble-mindedness and is identical with the Greek virtue of magnanimity. In this sense, generosity is taken as a crowning virtue by Descartes and others. It is the knowledge that our will is free and re-

克的一个原则,这一原则提出,对一个人是正确东西,对处在相应类似情况下的每一相应类似的人也必定是正确的。对一个人是正确东西不可能对另一个人是错误的,除非他们的本质或环境有所不同。这一原则在精神上与黄金律或康德的绝对命令相类似。它是辛格称之为“普遍化的论证”的基础,这一论证是由“不是每个人有权去做……”推导出“任何人无权去做……”。这意味着一个行为是正确还是错误是有普遍根据的。一个行为对于由相应类似的人构成的阶级来说肯定或者是正确的或者是错误的。这一原则会受到非议,因为它没有表明我们如何才能断定环境是类似的还是不类似的。

“对一个人是正确(或错误)的对处于类似环境下的类似的人必定也是正确的(或错误)的。出于明显的原因,我将把这一原则称为‘普遍化原则’。”——辛格:《伦理学中的普遍化》,1963年,第5页。

生成语法

乔姆斯基用于他自己的语法方法和语言方法的词。他把语言定义为由一系列句子构成,把语法定义为产生或生成语法后件的工具。生成语法是一种内在化的能力或一套规则,是人们在学习语言时无意识地获得的;通过这种能力或规则,人们就可以从有限的观察材料中构成和理解无限多的符合语法的话语。它确定了结构上的描述,而这种描述则表明了在一个语言中派生出完美构成句子的方式。因而,尽管人们只是看到了有限的一些句子,但他可以毫不费力地构成和理解许多新的句子。什么东西是生成的,并没有得到清楚的解释,但它肯定与生产、分析、描述和分类这些概念有关。乔姆斯基的语言学特别强调说者或作者,而不是听者或读者。生成语法是与传统语法相对的,传统语法只是阐明了有通常变项的典型结构,它依赖于听者或读者的智力和语言直觉。

“我用生成语法只是指一套规则系统,它以某种清晰确定的方式为句子赋予了结构上的描述。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第8页。

高尚

[源自拉丁文 *generous*, “高尚的”、“尊贵的”,与拉丁文名词 *genus* “种族或家族”有关系] generosity 的字面意思是“心灵高尚”,与希腊的大灵魂的德性相同。笛卡尔等人将这个意义上的高尚当做至高无上的德性。高尚是这

sponsible for every action and the firm resolution to carry out what we judge to be best. A generous person depends not on external circumstance, but on his own power. In another and probably most popular usage, generosity is taken as a special virtue: the disposition to give freely or let others share what one possesses. It is an overflow of good will.

"We may excite in ourselves the passion, and then acquire the virtue of generosity, which, being so to speak the key of all other virtues, and a general remedy for all the disorders of the passions." —Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, p. 161.

Genetic epistemology

Genetic epistemology was founded as a distinct approach to epistemology on the basis of genetic psychology by J. M. Baldwin and was fully developed by J. Piaget. In contrast to traditional epistemology, which emphasises logical relations between belief, justification and truth, genetic epistemology argues that knowledge is neither *a priori* nor innate, but results from a constant construction involving the human subject and the external object in a dialectical process of biological and intellectual transformation. It is essentially an evolutionary theory of knowledge, based on a combination of a structural conception of the human subject with an evolutionary theory of mental development. It still needs development as an independent discipline.

"In both Great Britain and American philosophers in the main stream of the philosophy of knowledge base themselves not on psychological but on logical and linguistic analysis, whereas genetic epistemology concerns itself with the psychological development of concepts and operations, that is, with psychogenesis." —Piaget, *The Principle of Genetic Epistemology*, 1972, p. 10.

Genetic fallacy

An argument which judges, evaluates or explains something in terms of its origin or the original context in which it was generated. Since it is very likely that there might be some essential differences between a thing's origin and its current state, such an argument is always considered as a fallacy, especially when it is used in rejecting an opposing view. That human beings originated from apes does not entail that they are still apes.

"The genetical fallacy [is that], according to which the nature of a phenomenon is determined entirely by its origin." —Evans, *The Subject of Consciousness*, 1970, p. 96.

Genetic method, see developmentalism

样一种认识:我们的意志是自由的,而且对每一个行为负责;高尚还是这样一个坚定的决心:做我们断定为最好的事情。一个高尚的人不依赖于他所处的外部环境,而依赖于他自己的能力。*generosity* 一词的另一个、也许是最流行的用法,是把它当作一个特殊的德;是一种免费赠送、或者让他人分享自己的物品的性情。它是善良意愿的涌流〔通常译作“慷慨”或“大方”〕。

“我们可以在自身激起这个情感,然后获得高尚之德,这个德可以说是其他一切德的关键,是一切情感错乱的普治良方。”——笛卡尔:《灵魂的激情》,第161页。

发生认识论

发生认识论是在发生心理学基础上对于认识论的一种独特研究,由J.M. 鲍德温建立,并被J. 皮亚杰充分发展。与强调信念、证明和真理的逻辑关系的传统认识论相左,发生认识论主张知识并非是先天内在于的,而是一个不断的建构过程的结果;此过程涉及处于一个生物和智力的转化的辩证过程中的人类主体和外在对象。它在本质上是一个关于知识的进化理论,基于人类主体的结构概念和心智发展的进化理论的结合。作为一门独立学科,它还需进一步发展。

“在英国和美国,处于知识哲学主流的哲学家们的研究基础不是心理学分析,而是逻辑的和语言学的分析。发生认识论则关注概念和操作的心理发展,即心理发生学。”——皮亚杰:《发生认识论原理》,1972年,第10页。

生成错误

用其起源或得以产生的最初环境来判断、评价或解释某物的论证。由于在事物的起源与其目前的状态之间很可能存在着某些根本的差别,所以这种论证往往被看作是一个错误,特别是在把它用于拒斥一种对立的观点时。人类起源于猿,并不意味着他们现在还是猿。

“生成错误[就是],根据这种观点,现象的本质完全是由其起源决定的。”——埃文斯:《意识的主体》,1970年,第96页。

发生法

见“发生论”条。

Genidentity

An account of objects as sequences of states was initiated by Heraclitus' maxim that "one can and cannot step into the same river twice". This position raises the question of how we determine that different stages at different times belong to the history of the same object. The German philosopher Kurt Lewin introduced the term genidentity in 1922 to characterise this problem. Different philosophers provide different criteria of genidentity. The most influential one, proposed by Reichenbach and Carnap in accordance with modern physics, suggests that genidentity is an equivalence relation established by a continuity of observation. It is a relation between world points, or moments of particles, holding in either temporal direction.

"Two world points of the same world line, we call genidentical; likewise, two states of the same thing." Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World*, 1967, p. 199.

Genus

A kind or class of things which share a common nature and can therefore be predicated of each member within the given class. A genus (plural: genera) can be further divided into sub-classes, called species. A genus itself can be a species of a higher genus. The highest genus (Latin: *genus summum*) is the most inclusive and ultimate class which is not a sub-class of any further genus. The division of a genus into species is specified according to a differentia, which distinguishes the defined species from other species within the same genus. Genus plus differentia is the standard Aristotelian definition and is still the most typical form of definition.

Genus has both metaphysical and logical senses. Plato used genus synonymously with Idea, and in *Sophist* he discusses the relationship among the most universal genera, such as being/not being, sameness/difference and motion/rest. Aristotle not only elaborated the pattern of genus plus differentia definition, but in *Categories* also took genus and species as secondary substances because both are predicated of, and reveal, the essence of individuals, that is primary substances. His ten categories are indeed ten ultimate genera of being. The notions of genus and species are widely applied in biology.

"In a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species."

Aristotle, *Categories*, 2a14-5.

Genus summum, see genus

Gestalt psychology

[from German: *Gestalt*, form, organised whole or

生成同一性

源自赫拉克利特的信条“一个人可能且不可能两次踏入同一条河”，它将对象解释为连续的状态。这一观点提出了这样的问题：我们如何确定不同时刻的不同阶段是属于同一对象的历史？德国哲学家 K. 莱汶于 1922 年引入“生成同一性”一词来描述这一问题。不同的哲学家提出不同的生成同一性标准。最有影响的标准由赖兴巴赫和卡尔纳普根据现代物理学提出，认为生成同一性是由观察的连续性所建立的等同关系。它是在任意时间方向上的世界点或粒子瞬间之间的关系。

“我们称同一世界线上的两个世界点是生成同一的；同样地，同一事物的两个状态也是生成同一的。”——卡尔纳普：《世界的逻辑结构》，1967 年，第 199 页。

种

复数为 genera，一组具有共同本性的事物的类。它能述说于所给定的类中的每个成员。种可进一步划分为许多亚类，称为属。一个种自身可以是更高层次的种的一个属。最高的种（拉丁语：genus summum）是指无所不包的和最高的类，它不再是任何更高的种的一个亚类。把种划分为属，是按照属差来确定的；属差把所要规定的属与同一个种的其他的属区分开来。种加属差是标准的亚里士多德式的定义，并且仍然是定义的最典型的形式。

种有形而上学的意义和逻辑的意义。柏拉图把“种”这个词看作是“形相”的同义词。在《智者篇》中，他讨论了最普遍的种之间的关系，诸如存在/非存在，同一/差别，运动/静止。亚里士多德不仅阐发了种加属差的定义模型，而且在他的《范畴》中把种和属作为第二本体，因为它们两者都对个体，即第一本体的本质有所述说和有所揭示。他的十个范畴其实是存在的十个最高的种。种和属的概念也广泛用于生物学。

“在次要的意义上，那些作为属而包含第一本体的东西以及那些作为种而包含属的东西，也称为本体。”——亚里士多德：《范畴》，2a14-15。

最高的种

见“种”条。

完形心理学

[源自德文 *Gestalt*，有“形式”、“被组织的

figure]. *Gestalt* psychology is a theory of sensation which suggests that we are primarily aware of organised wholes of our environment and not of the irreducible elements into which these whole might in theory be analysed. On this account, we can see nothing simpler than a figure, for it can be shown that we naturally organise a series of lines and dots into a coherent pattern. Thus, *Gestalt* psychology rejected British empiricism's prevailing psychological atomism of sensations, according to which sensations are minute elements that we synthesise into patterns or wholes. The *Gestalt* school of psychology was founded in 1910 by Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler. Their work is philosophically important because of the insight it gives to the nature of perception and especially for undermining the myth of the given.

"The experiments made by gestalt psychologists are adduced to show that Locke... was mistaken in supposing either that the mind is actually supplied with unitary impressions or that it is a merely possible receptor." —Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, p. 120.

Gettier problem

Also called Gettier's paradox or Gettier's example. Since Plato's *Theaetetus*, propositional knowledge has been standardly defined as justified true belief, whose analysis is as follows: A knows P if and only if (1) P is true, (2) A believes P and (3) A is justified in believing P. This traditional tripartite analysis is challenged by Gettier in a paper entitled "Is justified true belief knowledge?" (*Analysis*, 1963). Gettier constructs counter-examples to this definition. One of them is as follows. Smith applied for the same job as Jones. He believes that Jones will get the job and also that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. He is thus justified in deducing the belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. As it turns out, Smith himself gets the job and he happens to have ten coins in his pocket. Thus the belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is true, and Smith is justified in believing it. But he does not know it. It shows that the traditional analysis of knowledge is problematic, for A does not know P even though all three conditions are met.

Gettier's problem has caused a long-standing debate about the nature of propositional knowledge and has changed the course of epistemology to a considerable extent. There are many attempts to challenge the validity of Gettier's counter examples. There are also many attempts to discard the tripartite analysis of knowledge. More scholars believe that Gettier's paradox only shows that the traditional analysis is insufficient, and so they attempt to add a further condition. Various proposals have been made, but none has achieved consensus. The problem is still open.

"We have learned from Gettier's paradox that not every sound justification for a true belief is sufficient to entitle the

整体"或"图形"之意]。完形心理学是一种感觉理论,它主张我们一开始就知道的是我们周围环境的组织化了的整体,而不是整体在理论上被分解成的不可还原的要素。根据这个说法,我们不能看见比图形更简单的东西,因为可以表明,我们自然地会将一组线和点组织成一个融贯的模式。因此,完形心理学抛弃了英国经验论的十分流行的关于感觉的心理原子论,后者认为感觉是细微的原素,我们将其综合为模式和整体。完形心理学派由M. 韦特海默、K. 考夫卡和W. 柯勒于1910年建成。他们的著作在哲学上很重要,因为它们对于知觉的本质提出了真知灼见,尤其是打破了"关于所予的神话"。

"完形心理学家所做的实验被引用来表明,当洛克认为统一的印象提供给了心灵,或者心灵不过是可能的接受者时,他是错的。"——艾耶尔:《知识问题》,1956年,第120页。

盖梯尔问题

也称做“盖梯尔悖论”,“盖梯尔例证”。自从柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》以来,命题知识一直被标准地定义为已被证明的真信念,这种分析如下:A知道P,当且仅当(1)P是真的,(2)A相信P,(3)A有充分的理由相信P。这种传统的三重分析受到了盖梯尔在题为《明辨了的信念就是知识吗?》(《分析》,1963年)一文中提出的挑战。盖梯尔对这个定义提出了一些反例,其中之一如下:史密斯与约翰申请同一份工作。他相信约翰将会得到这份工作,他还知道约翰的口袋里有十个硬币。因此他就有理由推出这个信念:将会得到这份工作的人,口袋里有十个硬币。最后的结果是,史密斯本人得到了这份工作,而且碰巧他的口袋里也有十个硬币。因而,相信将会得到这份工作的人在口袋里有十个硬币,就会是真的了,而且史密斯有充分的理由相信这一点。但他并不知道这一点。这表明,传统对知识的分析是有问题的,因为A并不知道P,尽管所有这三个条件都得到了满足。

盖梯尔问题引起了对命题知识性质的长时间争论,并把认识论进程扩展到相当广泛的领域。有许多人试图对盖梯尔反例的可靠性提出挑战。同样有许多人试图抛弃对知识的三重分析。更多的学者相信,盖梯尔的悖论只是表明了传统的分析是不充分的,所以他们试图补充更多的条件。各种建议已经提出,但没有一种得到了共识。问题依然存在。

"我们从盖梯尔的悖论中得知,没有一个合理的对真信念的辨明足以使信念的持有者有权陈述知识;辨明必须与使这个信念成真的东西有着适当的联系。"——达米特:《语言之海》,

holder of the belief to claim knowledge; the justification must be suitably related to what makes the belief true.”

Dummett, *The Seas of Language*, 1993, p. 9.

Ghost in the machine

Ryle's phrase to characterise the Cartesian concept of mind. According to Descartes, the human mind and the human body are independent substances that are ordinarily harnessed together. Human bodies are in space and subject to mechanical laws. Their processes and states can be observed externally. Minds, on the other hand, are not in space, and are not subject to mechanical laws. Their processes and states are private and can be accessed only by their possessors. After the death of the body the mind may continue to exist and function. This dualistic account of human beings is caricatured by Ryle as the dogma of the ghost in the machine. For him the view is mistaken in construing the mind as an extra object situated in a body and controlling it by a set of unwitnessable activities. Ryle's object in *The Concept of Mind* is to demolish this dogma.

“Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’.” — G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 17.

Given, the

That which is presented immediately to consciousness, the direct content of sense-experience. For many empiricist philosophers, sense-data are the given, offering the basis of certainty, the ultimate foundation of knowledge and the material from which we infer the existence of other objects. What is given can be known non-inferentially and provides the basis presupposed by other forms of knowledge. It is the ultimate resort for all factual claims about the world. The existence of the given and its epistemic status are at the core of sense-datum theories of various forms. Other philosophers, although admitting an element that is given in our experience, reject the traditional place of the status of the given as “the myth of the given”.

“For to say that an object is immediately ‘given’ is to say merely that it is the content of a sense-experience.” — Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 1946, p. 121.

Gnoseology, another name for epistemology

Gnosticism

[from Greek: *gnosis*, knowledge] A religious and philosophical movement prominent in the early Christian centuries, which drew on the doctrines of Plato's *Timaeus* and the Christian myth of Genesis. Gnosticism focused on the role of revealed knowledge in salvation. There are two

1993 年, 第 9 页。

机器中的幽灵

赖尔的说法,用以描述笛卡尔的心的概念。根据笛卡尔的观点,人类的心与身是彼此独立的实体,它们通常只是被套在一起的。人的躯体处于空间之中并服从机械定律。它们的过程和状态是可以从外部观察到的。而心则不处于空间之中,不服从机械定律。其过程和状态是私密的,只有其拥有者才能获知。在躯体死亡以后,心可能继续存在并行使功能。关于人类的这种二元论的说明被赖尔戏称为“机器中的幽灵”说。在他看来,这一观点的错误在于将心理解为身体中的额外对象并通过一系列不可见的活动来控制身体。赖尔的《心的概念》一书的目标就是推翻这一教义。

“这就是那个通行理论。我将故意污辱地将它说成是‘机器中的幽灵说’。”——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949 年,第 17 页。

所予

直接呈现给意识的东西,感觉经验的直接内容。对许多经验主义哲学家来说,感觉予料就是所予。它们提供了确定性的基础,知识的最终根据和我们由之推论出其他对象存在的材料。何为所予可以不靠推理知道,它提供了其他种类知识所预设的基础。它是一切关于世界的事实性论断的最终源泉。所予的存在及其认识论地位处于各种各样感觉予料理论的核心。其他一些哲学家虽然承认在我们经验中有所予的成分,但否认关于所予的地位的传统看法,将其称为“所予的神话”。

“因为要说一个对象是直接‘所予’不过就是说它是感觉经验的内容。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1946 年,第 121 页。

生成论

“认识论”的另一个名称。

诺斯替教

[源自希腊语 *gnosis*, 意为知识] 在早期基督教的几个世纪中兴起的一个宗教和哲学运动,导源于柏拉图《蒂迈欧篇》的学说和基督教的《创世纪》神话。它着重于启示的知识在拯救中的作用。按照它的观点,有两个世界,即善的

worlds, the good spiritual world and the evil material world created and ruled by a lower god or demiurge. God is transcendent and unknown. Man in his nature is essentially akin to the divine, with a spark of heavenly light imprisoned in a material body. A spiritual saviour, normally Jesus, has come to impart *gnosis*, that is revealed knowledge about the divine origin of the soul and about the way of redemption from the world. *Gnosis* is the redemption of the sinner who is a spiritual man. The human beings who possess this knowledge, called *gnostics*, will be saved, for by means of that knowledge they awaken to the recognition of their true origin and nature and can hence be liberated from the bondage of the material world. Faith is inferior to *gnosis*. The dualistic cosmological doctrine of Gnosticism and its belief that salvation is dependent upon knowledge rather than faith are incompatible with orthodox Christianity. Consequently it was banned by the Christian emperors as a heresy. Yet gnosticism spread into the Middle East and was absorbed into Manicheism. It also appeared frequently under different names in the middle ages. A number of gnostic texts were rediscovered in Nag Hammadi in Egypt in 1945.

"This is the first and most important point in defining Gnosticism. It is a religion of saving knowledge, and the knowledge is essentially self-knowledge, recognition of the divine element which constitutes the true self. To this recognition is added a bewildering variety of myths and cultic practices." Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity*, 1966, p. 10.

God

It is difficult to offer a universal definition of this term which has such a wide and varied application. In general usage, God is represented as being the ultimate source of all that is, the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and loving creator of the world, who preserves the natural order of the world and sustains its moral order. The concept of God has both religious and metaphysical aspects. While religion proceeds on the assumption that God exists, metaphysics takes great pains to examine rational arguments for the existence of God. The account of God differs greatly according to religion and metaphysical system. Is there one supreme God or many lesser gods? What are the attributes of God, and are some divine attributes more fundamental than others? What are the implications of divine perfection? Is God immanent or transcendent in relation to the world? How can we have knowledge of God? Must God be a personal being in order to be a suitable object of worship? What is the place of faith and revelation in our relation to God? Does evil in the world show that there is no all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good God? Does it matter whether we can prove or disprove God's existence? Can we explain belief in God in psychological or sociological terms? Various theological and philosophical doc

精神世界和恶的物质世界,后者是由低级神祇或造物主创造并统治的。上帝是超验的、不可知的。人就其本性而言,实质上与神类似,带有一丝天光的灵气,只不过被物质的肉体束缚而已。一位精神救星(普通的叫法是耶稣)降临,赐予 *gnosis*,即启示出灵魂的神圣起源和脱离尘世的救赎方式的知识。*Gnosis* 是对作为精神之人的那种罪人的救赎。拥有这种知识的人类(叫做 *gnostics*)将得救,因为凭借这种知识,他们唤醒了对于自己真正由来和本性的认识,并因此能从物质世界的奴役中获得解放。信仰次于 *gnosis*。诺斯替教的二元宇宙论学说及其获救靠知识而不是信仰的信条,是与正统基督教相冲突的。因此,它被基督教的皇帝们作为异端禁止。但是,诺斯替教传播到了中东,并被吸收进摩尼教。在中世纪,它也经常以不同的名义出现。大量的诺斯替教原文史料于1945年在埃及的拉·哈马迪被重新发现。

“界定诺斯替教的首要之点也是最重要的一点是,它是知识拯救的宗教,而这知识本质上是自知,是对构成真自身的神圣要素的认识,各种多得令人眼花缭乱的神话传说和宗教仪式活动加于这种认识之上。”——格伦特:《诺斯替教和早期基督教》,1966年,第10页。

神

这个词具有如此宽泛的含义和多种的应用,要给它下一个普遍定义是困难的。按一般的用法,神被说成是万物的最终源头,即是世界全能、全知、全善、至爱的创造者,他维护世界的自然秩序并维持它的道德秩序。神的概念既有宗教方面的,也有形而上学方面的。宗教按神存在的假定行事,形而上学则花大力气考察神存在的理性论证。由于宗教和形而上学的不同体系,对神的说明差别很大。存在着位至上神还是许多小神?神的属性是什么,一些神性是否比另一些更为根本?神的完满性的寓意是什么?神对世界的关系是内在的还是超然的?我们如何才能拥有神的知识?为了适于作为崇拜的对象,神必须是一位“人格”存在吗?在我们与神的关系中,信仰和启示的地位是什么?世上的邪恶是否表明,根本不存在全能、全知和全善的神?我们能证明或证伪神的存在是否紧要?我们能用心理学或社会学的术语解释对神的信仰吗?在这些问题以及相关问题上,不同的神学和哲学理论都有它们的根由。

“我理解的有神论者是指相信有神存在的人。所谓的‘神’,他理解为像无躯体的‘人’

trines have their origin in these and related problems.

"By a theist I understand a man who believes that there is a God. By a 'God' he understands something like a 'person' without a body (i. e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe." —R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 1.

God is dead

Nietzsche's formula for the cultural and intellectual crisis in traditional religious and metaphysical thinking, which is characterised by its attempt to explain the world and the meaning of life by appealing to God as an ultimate transcendent reality. Nietzsche's proclamation marked a rebellion against the interpretation of the world and ourselves in terms of Christian morality and also rejected the superiority of reason. According to Nietzsche, we should eliminate the idea of the existence of God and should destroy both our faith in God and our accustomed ways of thinking based on that faith. He sought to undermine Judeo-Christian morality and values and advocated a revaluation of all values. Through such a revaluation, we would reconsider everything in a manner faithful to the earth and free from any God-hypothesis. Nietzsche claimed that this will provide our greatest relief, but will also cause universal madness. This slogan has had great impact on existentialism and on other intellectual movements of the twentieth century.

"God is dead. God remain dead. And we have killed him... There has never been a greater dead." —Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, p. 125.

Gödel's theorems

Two fundamental theorems about incompleteness and consistency in formal systems proved by the Austrian mathematical logician Kurt Gödel in work initiated in his paper "On formally undecidable propositions in *Principia Mathematica* and related systems I" (1931). According to the first, any formal system which is capable of expressing arithmetic must contain true sentences which can be formulated in the system but which cannot be proven employing only the system's own resources, although their construction shows that the sentences are true. According the second, no formal system is powerful enough to prove its own consistency. By showing that no formal system can prove every truth it can formulate or prove its own consistency, these theorems indicate the limits of purely formal methods in mathematics and undermine Hilbert's formalist programme. Gödel's theorems have deeply influenced our understanding of consistency, completeness, truth, provability, computable functions and the relationship between arithmetic and metamathematics.

"The 'incompleteness theorem' of Kurt Gödel showed

(即精灵) 一样的某种东西,他是永恒的、自由的,能做任何事情,知道每件事情,是完全善良的,是人崇拜和服从的恰当对象,宇宙的创造者和维护者。"——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第1页。

上帝死了

尼采的口号,用以对传统的宗教和形而上学思维进行文化与精神批判。这种传统思维的特征是把上帝作为终极的超验实在来求助,力图据以解释世界和生命的意义。尼采的这句口号,标示着对按基督教道德来阐释世界和我们自己的传统的反叛,也是对理性至上的否认。按照尼采的观点,我们应该排除上帝存在的观念,销毁我们对上帝的信仰以及以这种信仰为基础的习惯思维方式。他致力于破坏犹太—基督教道德和价值的根基,倡导重估一切价值。通过这样的重估,我们会以对大地忠实和摆脱任何神的假说的方式,重新考虑每一事物。尼采宣称,这将为人们提供最大的救助,但也会引起普遍的疯狂。这句口号对存在主义和20世纪的其他思想运动具有很大影响。

"上帝死了。上帝依然死了。我们杀死了他……从没有过更大的死。"——尼采:《快乐的科学》,第125页。

哥德尔定理

由奥地利数理逻辑学家K. 哥德尔在起始于其论文《论〈数学原理〉和有关系统中的形式不可判定命题》(1931年)的工作中所证明的关于形式系统的不完全性和一致性的两条基本定理。按照第一个定理,任何能表达算法的形式系统必定包含这样的真语句,它们可以在系统内被表述,但却不能仅在系统中证明,尽管它们的结构表明这些语句是真的。按照第二条定理,任何形式系统都不能有效至证明其自身的一致性。通过表明任何形式系统都不能证明它能表述的每一个真语句,或证明它自身的一致性,这些定理指出了数学中的纯形式方法的局限性,动摇了希尔伯特的形式主义纲领的基础。哥德尔定理深深地影响着人们对于一致性、完全性、真理、可证明性、可计算函数和算术与元数学之间关系的认识。

"K. 哥德尔的'不完全性定理'表明,没有一组逻辑关系的确立能不意味着还存在着其他这组关系自身无法处理的关系。"——理查兹:

that no set of logical relations can be established that does not also imply the existence of still other relations with which the set itself cannot cope." —Richards, *Philosophy and Sociology of Science*, 1983, p. 75.

Golden rule

The rule originates in Western culture with Jesus in *Matthew* (7, 12) in the *Bible*. Its commonest formulation is "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you". It has also a negative formulation which is "Do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you". The word "golden" in the expression of "Golden Rule" is an early English usage, meaning "of inestimable value". The same rule had been formulated in the Oriental tradition by the Chinese philosopher Confucius. His version is "What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others". The Golden Rule has been widely accepted as the first principle of conduct and is embodied in the core of many social and moral codes. However, many philosophers have questioned its nature and value. Both Kant and Sidgwick suggest that it is imprecise in formulation and cannot be a rule guiding action, for it is too formal and too general and can be used either in moral or evil circumstances. There are many counter-examples to using it as a moral principle. Other moralists have tried to reformulate the rule in order to address such criticism, but no alternative formulation has won general acceptance. Now it is generally held that the Golden Rule must be used together with other principles of conduct. Another major problem concerns the essence of this rule. Some believe that it teaches impartiality through a role-reversal test; others consider it as a principle of autonomy, by which one judges one's own conduct by referring to the conduct others.

"In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, I read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility." — Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. 2.

Good

Many approaches to ethics are centred on achieving what is good, although others are based on doing what is right. Giving priority to one goal need not exclude the other, but might shape its contents or limit how we pursue it. In either case, goodness has a place in moral psychology, motivating our actions and explaining our emotions. However, the notion of the good is extremely complex. Plato, in the *Republic*, claimed that the good, while being the source of being and knowledge, is beyond conceptual analysis. This position was developed by Plotinus and Aquinas. Aristotle suggested that the good is that to which everything aspires, but argued that the word is used in many ways and belongs to each category. In this respect it is similar to what Wittgenstein calls a family resemblance notion, and a unified definition is difficult to achieve. A good man and a good knife, for example, are

《哲学与科学社会学》，1983年，第75页。

金规

这个规则在西方文化中起源于《圣经·马太福音》(7, 12) 中的耶稣。它的最一般的表述是：“对待他人如像你愿他人待你一样。”它也有另一种否定性的表述：“你不愿他人怎样待你，你也不要那样待人。”在“金规”中的“金”字是一种早期的英语惯用法，意思是“不可估量之价值”。同一规则在东方传统中是由中国哲学家孔子表述的，他的说法是“己所不欲，勿施于人”。金规作为行为的第一原则而被广泛接受，它体现在许多核心的社会道德准则中。不过许多哲学家对它的性质和价值提出了问题。康德和西奇威克认为，它在表述上是不确切的，不能作为指导行为的规则，因为它太形式化和太一般化，因而既能被运用于道德的也可被运用于邪恶的环境。有许多相反的例证存在，说明它作为道德原则是不适当的。为了应付这种批评，另外一些道德学家力图将它重新表述，但没有一个取代性表述被普遍接受。现在一般认为，金规必须与其他行为原则一起使用。另外的主要的问题是，这个规则的实质是什么。有些人相信，它通过一种角色转换的检验来教人什么是公正，其他人则把它看成是一种自主性原则，即参照他人的行为来判断自己的行为。

“在拿撒勒的耶稣的金规里，我读到功利理论学的完整精神。”——密尔：《功利主义》，第2章。

善

许多伦理学的研究思路是，以获得善的东西为中心，虽然另一些以做正确的事情为基础。确定一个目标的在先性无需排除另外的目标，但可能形成它的内容或我们怎样追求它的界限。无论如何，善在道德心理学中具有地位，因为它促动我们的行为，解释我们的激情。但是，对善的见解极其复杂。柏拉图在《国家篇》中断言，当善作为存在和知识之源时，就超出了概念分析。这种见解也被普罗提诺和阿奎那所发展。亚里士多德提出，善是每物所热望的东西，但他又阐明，这个词用于多种含义，属于每个范畴。在这个方面，它与维特根斯坦所谓的“家族相似”概念相类似，难以获得统一的定义。例如，好人和好刀在不同的意义上都是善。对善的说明可以区分为认识论的和非认识论的理论。认

good in different senses. Accounts of goodness can be divided into cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories. Cognitivist approaches takes goodness to be a real property to which the term "good" applies. Non-cognitivist approaches claim that we construct what is good or use the term to express approval. For some ethical systems, goodness is reduced to one quality, like happiness or pleasure or satisfying desire. But G. E. Moore argued that goodness is a simple non-natural property which cannot be analysed and is not subject to empirical investigation. It is indefinable and can only be grasped through intuition. Any attempt to define goodness in terms of natural properties is charged by Moore as committing the naturalistic fallacy. In spite of the influence of Moore's attack, naturalistic ethics has been revived. Rawls' thin theory of the good provides a basis for his theory of justice by specifying those things that all members of society will want whatever else they desire. His liberalism allows different fully elaborated theories of the good to be sought by different members of society so long as they are pursued within constraints established by the theory of justice. Geach drew a distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives. A phrase like "a red house" can be analysed as "this is a house and it is red", while a phrase like "a good mother" cannot be analysed as "she is a mother and she is good". For she might be good as a mother, but not good in other respects. Hence, the adjective "red" is predicative, while "good" is attributive. In a phrase "a good x", the meaning of "good" is intimately connected with the meaning of the noun it qualifies, and is at least partly determined by the latter. Geach argues that we should take "a good x" as a whole and understand it differently for different kinds of x.

"Every craft and every investigation, and likewise every action and decision, seems to me to aim at some good; hence the good has been well described as that at which everything aims." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1, i, 1094a1-2.

Good will

Kant's term for a self-conscious disposition to make morally commendable choices. The acts of a good will are done for the sake of duty or in accordance with the categorical imperative. For Kant, there will always be circumstances under which traditional moral virtues or goods will be misused. Only a good will is good without qualification. A good will is the only thing that can guarantee the correct use of traditional virtues. It is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes. Even if an action which it chooses causes harm, it is still good as a will. A good will constitutes the indispensable condition of our being worthy of happiness. Kant's notion provided a new foundation for moral philosophy. A good will can be achieved by a human being and is thus contrasted to a holy will, which is a spontaneous and willing acceptance of moral requirements without being dis-

识论的方法是把善认作“善”这个词适用的实在特性。非认识论的主张断言,我们构想善的东西或使用这个词是表达认可。有些伦理学体系把善还原为一种性质,如幸福、快乐、满足欲等。但是,G. E. 摩尔论证说,善是一种单纯的非自然特性,不能被分析,也不属于经验研究。它是不可定义的,只能通过直觉把握。用一套自然特性来定义善的任何企图都被摩尔斥为自然主义的谬误。尽管摩尔的攻击广有影响,自然主义伦理学仍得到复兴。罗尔斯的关于善的窄理论阐明了一切社会成员不论其他欲求是什么都会需要的事物,因而为他的正义论提供了基础。他的自由主义允许各种关于为不同社会成员寻求的善的充分阐发的理论,只要对这些善的追求是在正义论所界定的范围内进行的。吉奇指出了归属形容词和断定性形容词之间的区别。像“一幢红房子”这个短语,能被分析成“这是一幢房子并且它是红的”,但像“一位好母亲”这样的短语就不能被分析成“她是一位母亲并且她是好的”。因为她作为母亲或许是好的,但在另外的方面可能不好。因此,“红的”这个形容词是断定性的,“好的”则是归属性的。在“一个善的x”这个短语中,“善的”的含义与它所修饰的名词的含义有着内在的关系,至少部分地由后者决定。吉奇认为,我们应该把“一个善的x”当做整体,对不同种类的x进行不同的理解。

“一切技艺、一切研究以及一切行为和决定,在我看来,似乎都以某种善为目标。因此,善被人们很好地描述为每一事物向往的目标。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,I, i, 1094a1-2。

善良意志

康德的术语,指一种会作出道德上值得称赞的选择的自我意识倾向。出自善良意志的行为是为了职责,或为遵照绝对命令而作的。对于康德来说,总是存在着传统的道德德性或善被误用的情形。但只有善良意志才是无条件的善。善良意志是惟一能保证正确使用传统德性的东西。它之为善不是由于它的效果或收获。即使它选择的行为引起了伤害,但它作为意志依然是善的。善良意志看来构成了我们值得幸福的不可缺少的条件。康德的这个概念为道德哲学提供了新的基础。善良意志是人类所能达到的,因而与“神圣意志”相对立;神圣意志是对道德要求的自发的和心甘情愿的接受,不受人类感性欲望的干扰。

“在世界之中,甚至在世界之外,除了‘善

turbed by human sensuous desire.

"There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can regard as good without qualification, except a *good will*." Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 393.

Goodman's paradox, another name for the new riddle of induction

Grace

In theology, God's free gift by which sinful human beings are saved, for human beings cannot achieve salvation through their own efforts. While human gifts might be motivated by self interest, God's grace is disinterested, for God does not need anything from human beings. Grace is given unilaterally, but there are theological disagreements whether we can act to gain or to deserve grace and whether grace is available for all humans or only for some predetermined for salvation.

"The grace of God could not be commended in a way more likely to evoke a grateful response, than the way by which the only Son of God ... clothed himself in humanity and gave to men the spirit of his love by the mediation of a man, so that by this love men might come to him..." — Augustine, *City of God*, X, Ch. 29.

Grammar

A system of rules which structures a natural language. The traditional study of grammar contain two branches; morphology, which concerns word-formation, word-class, declensions and conjunctions; and syntax, which concerns the principles governing sentence-formation. A traditional grammar is generally prescriptive, that is legislating over the correct use of a natural language. The contemporary study of grammar is more descriptive and aims to provide a general theory to account for the actual usage of natural languages. The categories and rules of a universal grammar are applicable to all human languages. Contemporary grammar is dominated by Chomsky's attempt to determine a universal grammar and his notion of a generative grammar, that is a system of rules specifying all and only the grammatical sentences of a language, plus a specification of their relevant structural properties. A generative grammar focuses more on linguistic competence rather than on performance. Richard Montague developed a new approach to grammar that applies the techniques of model theory to natural languages and takes a categorical grammar as its syntactic component. Grammar, as a theory of natural languages can be contrasted to the logical grammar of Wittgenstein and Carnap.

"We use the term 'grammar' with a systematic ambiguity. On the one hand, the term refers to the explicit theory

良意志',完全不可能设想一个无条件的善的东西。"——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第393页。

古德曼悖论

"新归纳之谜"的另一个名称。

恩典

在神学中,它意为上帝赐予人类的慷慨礼物,罪孽深重的人类通过这种礼物而得到拯救,因为人类不能通过他们自己的努力而获得拯救。人类的恩典可以建立在私利的动机上,而上帝的恩典是一个无私的概念,因为上帝并不需要从人类那里得到任何东西。恩典是单方面的赠予。但关于我们的行为是否能获得或值得获得恩典,以及恩典究竟是适用于所有人类还是只适用于某些先定得到拯救的人,神学上还存在各种不同观点。

"神赐予恩典不是为了有可能得到感恩戴德式的回报,而是通过这种方式:神的惟一儿子显现为人,以某人为中介而把他的爱心给予人类,旨在通过这种爱,人类就可以接近他……"——奥古斯丁:《上帝之城》,第十卷,第29章。

语法

一套构成一种自然语言的规则系统。传统的语法研究有两大分支:一是关于构词、词性、词形变化与连词的词法,二是关于支配造句之原理的句法。传统语法一般是规定性的,是为正确使用一种自然语言而立法的语法。当代语法研究更侧重于描述,旨在提供一种基本理论来说明自然语言的实际用法。一种普遍语法的范畴与规则可应用于人类的所有语言。当代语法受乔姆斯基的影响,他试图确定一种普遍的语法,并且提出了自己的生成语法观念,即一套表明语言所有语法句子的规则,同时还包括对其相关结构特性的描述。生成语法更注重语言能力而非语言运用。蒙塔古发展了一种研究语法的新方法,此法将模态论的技巧运用于自然语言,并将范畴语法当做它的句法组成部分。作为自然语言理论的语法可与维特根斯坦和卡尔纳普的逻辑语法形成对照。

"我们使用'语法'一词有着系统的歧义性。一方面,这个词是指由语言学家建构的、用来描述说话者语言能力的明确理论。另一方面,我们用这个术语是指说话者的语言能力本身。"——乔姆斯基和霍尔:《英语的发音形式》,1968年,第3页。

constructed by the linguist and proposed as a description of the speaker's competence. On the other hand, we use the term to refer to his competence itself." —Chomsky and Halle, *The Sound Pattern of English*, 1968, p. 3.

Grammatical predicate, see predicate

Grammatical proposition

Many propositions, such as "I know I am in pain", or "Red is a colour", are usually thought to be empirical and to represent what is the case in the world. The meaning of the proposition is determined by the nature of the external world. However, Wittgenstein claims that these seemingly empirical propositions are actually grammatical. They do not represent the world, but merely give rules in accordance with which their constituent words are used. The meaning of a word is determined by the rule. Hence, "I know whether I am in pain" means that "It is meaningless to say that 'I doubt whether I am in pain'". "Red is a colour" means "If something is red, it is coloured".

"'An order orders its own execution'. So it knows its execution, then, even before it is there? —But that was a grammatical proposition and it means: If an order runs 'Do such-and such' then executing the order is called 'doing such-and such'." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 458.

Grammatology

[from Greek: *gramma*, that which is drawn or written + *logos*, theory, hence a science of writing]. Derrida's term for a science of writing. Because the Western metaphysical tradition has ranked speech or voice over writing, it is charged by Derrida with phonologism. Derrida argues that we should reverse the priority between speech and writing and establish a science of writing, that is grammatology. His wide definition of writing includes in general all that gives rise to an inscription, such as cinematography and choreography as well as pictorial, musical, sculptural "writing". Grammatology can accommodate what Lévi-Strauss calls general linguistics. According to Derrida, Hegel's system is the end of the tradition of phonologism, but it is also the beginning of the era of grammatology. The positive details of grammatology need to be developed further before its implications can be assessed.

"Science of 'the arbitrariness of the sign', science of the immotivation of the trace, science of writing before speech and in speech, grammatology would thus cover a vast field within which linguistics would, by abstraction, delineate its own area." —Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (tr. Spivak), 1974, p. 51.

语法谓词

见“谓词”条。

语法命题

许多命题，诸如“我知道我痛”，或“红是一种颜色”，通常被认为是经验命题，表现了世界是怎么回事。命题的意义由外部世界的性质来决定。但维特根斯坦认为，这些看起来是经验性的命题实际上是语法性的。它们并不表现世界，只是给出了组成命题的语词如何使用的规则。词的意义是由规则决定的。因此，“我知道我是否痛”意味着“说‘我怀疑我是否痛’是毫无意义的”，“红是一种颜色”意味着“如果有什么东西是红色，它就是有色的”。

“‘一个命令命令其自身的执行’。因此，甚至在它有执行之前，它就知道它的执行吗？——但这是一个语法命题，它说的是：如果一个命令说‘做如此这般的事’，那么人们就把执行该命令叫做‘做如此这般的事’。”——维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》，第一部分，第458节。

书写学（或译“文字学”）

「源自希腊文 *gramma*（被画出和写下的东西）和 *logos*（理论），所以意味着“书写的科学”] 这是德里达用的一个词，指一种书写的科学。由于西方形而上学传统将说话或语音置于书写之上，它被德里达指责为“语音主义”。德里达主张，我们应该颠倒说话和书写的优先次序，并建立一种书写的科学，即文字学。他对于书写的广义定义一般包含了一切导致铭刻（inscription，划道道）的东西，比如电影摄影术、用符号来表示舞蹈动作的艺术以及图像的、音乐的、雕塑的“书写”。书写学能容纳列维·斯特劳斯所谓的“一般语言学”。按照德里达的观点，黑格尔体系是语音主义传统的终结，但也是书写学时代的开端。书写学的含义要能被人估价的话，还需进一步展示其中的明确细节。

“作为关于‘符号的任意性’的科学、痕迹的无动因性的科学、在说话之前和之中的书写科学，书写学因此而将包括一个广大的领域，在其中语言学通过抽象而画出其外形。”——德里达：《论书写学》（斯庇瓦克英译），1974年，第51页。

Gratitude

[from Latin: *gratus*, pleasing] A sentimental and thankful emotion on the part of the recipient of a favour directed at the benefactor and motivating actions which return some good to that person. The favour received must have proceeded from direct intentional goodwill on the part of the benefactor, rather than as an unintended consequence, or there is no reason to feel gratitude. The return of the favour is not bound to be a proportionate repayment, and the benefactor has no moral right to ask the beneficiary to return it. What counts in gratitude is to reciprocate love with love. It is a natural rather than imposed desire to benefit the benefactor and to do the latter a justice. Different philosophers emphasise respectively the elements of love, beneficence and justice in the emotion of gratitude.

"Gratefulness or gratitude is the desire or zeal for love by which we endeavour to benefit him who has benefited from a similar emotion of love." --Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, Prop. 34.

Great chain of being

A term introduced by the American philosopher A. O. Lovejoy, according to which all beings in the world are not equal with regard to their metaphysical or ontological status. They are hierarchically ordered, with Absolute being or God at the top and things of the slightest existence at the bottom. There are an infinite number of things with different existential grades between them. Absolute being is pure actuality, whilst at the bottom of the hierarchy are pure potentialities. This idea of a great chain of being can be traced to Plato's division of the world into the Forms, which are full beings, and sensible things, which are imitations of the Forms and are both being and not being. Aristotle's teleology recognised a perfect being, and he also arranges all animals by a single natural scale according to the degree of perfection of their souls. The idea of the great chain of being was fully developed in Neo-platonism and in the middle ages. Dante's *Divine Comedy* presents a literary illustration of this hierarchy. The notion is connected with the principle of plenitude, which claims that every possibility is actualised.

"The result was the conception of the plan and structure of the world...the conception of the universe as a 'Great Chain of Being', composed of an immense, or...of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents (which barely escape non existence), through every possible grade up to the ens perfectissimum." Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 1936, p. 58.

Great year

Also called the perfect year. On the basis of observation, the ancient Greeks believed that time is cyclical, and

感激

「源自拉丁词 *gratus*, 意为“愉快”] 一种受惠者指向恩人或帮助人的一种情绪性的感谢的情感, 它促动旨在一种回报后者的行为。所接受的恩惠必须是出自施惠者的直接有意识的善良意志, 而不是由于一种非意愿的后果, 否则就没有理由来感恩戴德。对于恩惠的回报并不是一种合比例确定性的偿还。施惠者没有要求这种恩惠返回的道德权利。感激的价值在于以爱来回报爱。欲有益于施惠者并给他予公平待遇, 这是自然的而不是一种强加的欲望。不同的哲学家分别强调了感激情感中的爱、仁慈和正义等不同成分。

“感谢或感激是对爱的欲求或热望, 藉着它, 我们努力有益于那从一种相似的爱的情感中受益的他。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, 第三章, 命题 34。

存在之大链

美国哲学家 A. O. 洛夫乔伊引入的一个术语, 说明世上的一切存在物在其形而上学或本体论地位方面不是平等的。它们按尊贵等级排序, 绝对的存在或上帝处在顶点, 分量最轻的存在物处于底层。在它们之间, 有无数事物按其不同的存在等级排列着。绝对的存在是纯粹现实性, 而在等级最底层的东西是纯粹潜在性。存在之大链这种观念可以追溯到柏拉图, 他把世界分成形相世界和感觉事物世界, 认为前者是完全的存在, 后者只是对形相的摹仿, 既存在又不存在。亚里士多德的目的论设立了一个完全的存在, 他还根据灵魂的完满程度, 按单一的自然等级序列排列所有的动物。存在之大链的观念在新柏拉图主义和中世纪得到了充分发展。但丁的《神曲》代表着对这种等级的文学解说。这种观念与断言每种可能性都要实现的充分性原则有关。

“其结果是设计概念和世界结构……作为‘存在之大链’的宇宙概念, 由无限的, ……或无数的链环构成, 这些链环按等级式的次序排列, 从最不足道的那类存在(它们仅仅逃离非存在)开始, 经由每个可能的阶级, 上升到完满的……”——洛夫乔伊:《存在之大链》, 1936年, 第59页。

大年

也称作“完满年”。古希腊人基于观察相信时间是循环的。他们扩展这一思想, 认定宇宙有

they extended this idea to claim that the universe has a cyclical renewal. One cycle forms a great year in which the sun, moon and planets are all destroyed and begin again after returning together to the same positions that they had occupied at a given previous time. On this view, there is an everlasting repetition of history. This notion pervades Greek philosophy; and some philosophers like Empedocles and Plato even made the cycle of the soul's incarnations parallel the cycle of the great year. Heraclitus claimed that the length of a great year is 10,800 years, but this length varies in different sources. Although rejected by modern astronomy, this idea has been expressed in modern times in the philosophy of Nietzsche and Peirce.

"And yet there is no difficulty in seeing that the perfect number of time fulfils the perfect [or great] year when all the eight revolutions ... are accomplished together and attain their completion at the same time." — Plato, *Timaeus*, 39d.

Great soulness

[from Greek: *megalo*, large, great + *psukhia*, soul] Also translated as magnanimity, a virtue that Aristotle describes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a virtue concerning greatness. A person who has a great soul, namely, a magnanimous person, is perfectly virtuous and is the best person. He will not be calculating or suspicious, and he is happy to give benefits but shamed to receive them. He is of a distinguished position and is indifferent to the opinions of his inferiors. He is aware that he is worthy of great things and is indeed worthy of them. He takes a suitable attitude towards honour for his virtues, not discarding it or pursuing it indiscriminately. He cannot have his life determined by others. The deficiency of this virtue is pusillanimousness, and its excess is vanity. Usually this virtue is taken to contrast with the Christian virtue of humility.

"Great-soulness seems, even going by the name alone, to be concerned with great things." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1123a34.

Greatest happiness principle

A principle providing the central idea of classical utilitarianism. It is often considered another name for Bentham's principle of utility, although its well-known formulation was provided by Hutcheson in 1725. According to this principle, an action is moral if it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers of people involved. The greatest happiness involves the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of pain. Classical utilitarianism derives from this principle the meaning of key moral terms, such as good, right and duty. As it stands, however, the principle needs explanation because of a problem about the distribution of happiness in a population. An action is not necessarily good if it procures

一个循环性的更新过程。一个周期构成了一个大年,在一个大年中,太阳、月亮和星球都被摧毁,一同回归到它们以前某时曾所处的位置,重新开始。按照这种看法,这是不断重复的历史。这样一种观念贯穿希腊哲学。有些哲学家,如恩培多克勒和柏拉图,甚至让灵魂化身的周期与大年相平行。赫拉克利特主张大年的长度为10,800年,但不同记载对此有不同说法。大年观念为现代天文学所抛弃,可仍保留在尼采及皮尔士的哲学中。

“不难理解,完满的时间数实现了完满(或大)年,那时,所有八个旋转都一起完成,同时获得了它们的完满。”——柏拉图,《蒂迈欧篇》,39d.

伟大的心灵

[源自希腊词 *megalo* (意为“大、伟大”)和 *psukhia* (意为“灵魂”)] 也译为“人格伟岸”(magnanimity)。亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》中描述的德性,是一种与伟大相关的德性。一个心灵伟大的人,即人格伟岸的人,有着完善的德性而且是最优秀的人,他既不算计也不猜疑,他乐善好施但羞于接受他人的恩惠。他有一个显著的地位但又能公正对待比他低下的人的意见。他意识到他配得上伟大的事情,而且也确实配得上它们。他以适当的态度对待他的德性所带来的荣誉,不会不分青红皂白地拒斥它或追求它。他不能使他的生活为他人所决定。这种德性的欠缺是懦弱,它的过度则是自负。一般把这个德性看做是与基督徒的谦卑德性相对立的。

“伟大的心灵,仅就这个名称而言,是与伟大的事情相关的。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1123a34.

最大幸福原则

这条原则提出了古典功利主义的核心思想。它常被看做边沁的功利原则的另一名称,尽管对它的众所周知的系统阐述是由哈奇森在1725年提出来的。根据这条原则,如果一个行为给有关的最多数人带来了最大幸福,这个行为就是道德的。最大幸福意味着最大的快乐和最小的痛苦。古典功利主义从这个原则中引出了诸如善、权利、责任等主要道德术语的意义。不过,这个原则本身需要说明,因为有一个幸福在全体人中的分配问题。如果一个行为给一小团体巨大的幸福,却给其他人微小的幸福,以此达到给最多数人带来最大幸福,那么,这

the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers by giving immense happiness to a small group and meagre happiness to the rest. Furthermore, there are difficulties about how to measure quantities of happiness.

"That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers; and that worst, which in the like manner occasions misery." —Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, iii, p. 8.

Grelling's paradox

Also called the heterological paradox, formulated by Kurt Grelling in 1908. Some adjectives such as "English" may apply to themselves (for "English" is also an English word), while others adjectives such as "German" do not apply to themselves (for "German" is not a German word). The adjectives in the second group may be called heterological. Then, is the adjective "heterological" itself heterological or not? If it is, then according to the definition of heterological it does not apply to itself and is not heterological; if it is not, then according to the definition it does apply to itself and is heterological. Grelling's paradox is a prime example of the semantic paradoxes. It inspires the distinction between an object language and its metalanguage and thus had great impact on Tarski's semantic theory of truth.

"In view of Grelling's paradox, we know a set which is determined by no sentence of the object language; namely, the set of all sentences of the object languages that do not satisfy themselves." —Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, 1970, p. 53.

Group mind

[French: *âme collective*] Durkheim's term for a descriptive property of a society or a group, represented through the statistically average rate of typical social interactions such as birth, marriage and suicide among its members. Because all individual features are neutralised in such a rate, it cannot be determined by any single individual's consciousness or behaviour. Accordingly, society is not merely a totality of individuals, and the behaviour of the group is not determined by the behaviour of its members. The group mind is the collective aspect of the beliefs, tendencies and practices of a group that characterise truly social phenomena. Durkheim held that this collective aspect is a natural consequence of individuals living together. The existence of group mind indicates that society is an organism, and it is a basic condition for sociology to be an independent discipline. It is further inferred that methodological holism should be the proper method for analysing society. Whether there is such a super entity as a group mind and how it might be characterised have been important matters of dispute.

"The average, then, expresses a certain state of the group mind (*l'âme collective*)."—E. Durkheim, *The Rules of*

个行为未必是善的。而且,这里还有怎样对幸福的量加以测量的问题。

“使最大多数人获得最大幸福的行为是至善,给最大多数人带来最大痛苦的行为是至恶。”——哈奇森:《关于我们的美与德性观念的起源的研究》,第三章,第8节。

格里林悖论

亦称“非自谓悖论”,由K. 格里林在1908年所表述。某些形容词如“中文的”可以应用于它们自身(因为“中文的”也是一个中文词),另外一些形容词如“德文的”并不适用于自身(因为“德文的”本身并不是一个德文词)。第二组形容词可以叫做“非自谓的”。那么,形容词“非自谓的”本身是不是非自谓的?如果它是,那么根据非自谓的定义它并不适用于自身,所以它不是非自谓的;如果它不是,那么同样根据那个定义它适用于自身,所以它必定是非自谓的。格里林悖论是语义悖论的基本例证之一,它触发了元语言和对象语言的区分,并对塔斯基关于真的语义理论产生了重大的影响。

“根据格里林悖论,我们知道一个不被对象语言的任何句子所决定的集合,即该对象语言中所有不满足自身的句子的集合。”——奎因:《逻辑哲学》,1970年,第53页。

团体意识

[法语: *âme collective*] 杜克海姆的术语,用作对一个社会或一个团体特征的描述,它是统计出来的社会成员中的出生、婚姻、自杀这些典型的社会相互作用的平均率来表示的。由于在这样一种平均率中所有个人的特性都被中和,因而,团体意识不为任何单个人的意识或行为所决定。这样一来,社会就不仅仅是一个由个人构成的整体,团体的行为也不是由其成员的行为决定的。团体意识是一个团体的信仰、倾向和习俗的共同的方面,这一方面具有真正的社会现象的特征。杜克海姆认为,这一共同的方面是个人的共同生活的自然结果。团体意识的存在表明社会是一个有机体,它是社会学成为一门独立学科的基本条件。它还进而推出“方法论的整体主义”应是分析社会的恰当方法。是否存在作为团体意识的这样一种超级存在物,以及如何才能表示其特性,一直是重大的有争议的问题。

“于是,平均率表示的是团体意识的某种状态。”——杜克海姆:《社会学方法的规则》,1938年,第8页。

Sociological Method, 1938, p. 8.

Group responsibility, an alternative expression for collective responsibility

Grue paradox, another name for the new riddle of induction

Guardians

[Greek: *phulakes*] In Plato's *Republic*, initially the army or watch-dogs of the Ideal City, but from 412c the older and wiser rulers as distinguished from the young ruled or Auxiliaries. As the top administrators, the Guardians were to look after the City as a whole and maintain its operation. Their virtue was wisdom, and they corresponded to the rational element in the soul. Plato's account of the Guardians contained radical features. Women and men could both be Guardians and would enjoy equality in education and public duties. In order to secure the unity of the City, the Guardians would not have families and would share their spouses and children. The Ideal City could be realised only if it were ruled by philosopher-kings, that is if philosophers became the rulers or if the present rulers became genuine philosophers. Plato used the term philosopher here in its original sense of a lover of knowledge and not for a professional role. Through their training, the Guardians beheld the Form of the Ideal City and possessed real knowledge. As philosophers, they ruled the City not because of their desire for power, wealth or influence, but out of duty.

"Let us now boldly say that those who are our guardians in the most precise sense must be philosophers."—Plato, *Republic*, 503b.

Guilt

Guilt is the state of violating the legal or moral rules through wrongdoing and upon which punishment should be imposed. The absence of guilt is innocence, that is the condition of moral purity. An innocent person is not culpably responsible for an action. The state of guilt usually arouses the sense of guilt in the agent, although not every guilty person has this feeling. The feeling of guilt results from wrongdoing and leads to the recognition of one's responsibility and to the state of remorse, which is the desire to expiate the wrong done.

A neighbouring conception is shame, a state of failing to comply with the basic standard of worth or excellence which is endorsed both by oneself and by the public. Shameful states include the exposure of physical indelicacy and of intellectual and moral weakness. Feelings of shame result from defects of one's worth, honour and integrity, arising from the violation of the sentiment of self-respect and the standard of public esteem. Sometimes guilt and shame overlap, for a

群体责任

“集体责任”的另一种表述。

绿蓝悖论

“新归纳之谜”的另一个名称。

护卫者

[希腊文: *phulakes*] 在柏拉图的《国家篇》中,它先用来指称理想国的军人或卫士,但从412c开始,它又用来指称年纪较大、更为明智的统治者以区别年轻的被统治者或辅助者。作为最高的管理者,护卫者照管作为一个整体的国家并维持其运行。他们的美德是智慧,它们与灵魂中的理性部分相对应。柏拉图对护卫者的描述含有激进的特征。妇女和男人都可以是护卫者,并在教育和公共职务方面享有平等权利。为了保证国家的统一,护卫者没有家庭,他们的配偶和孩子都是共有的。只有理想国为哲学王所统治,即只有当哲学家成为统治者或当前的统治者成为真正的哲学家时,理想国才能实现。柏拉图在这里使用的哲学家概念是在其原初意义上使用的,其含义是爱智慧的人,而不是指职业的哲学家。通过他们的训练,护卫者关注理想国的形相并拥有真正的知识。作为哲学家,他们统治国家不是因为他们对权力、财富和影响的欲望,而是出于责任。

“现在让我们勇敢地说,从最准确的意义上讲,我们的护卫者必须是哲学家。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》,503b。

负罪

负罪是一种由于做错事而侵犯了法律或道德原则,并且由此要遭受惩罚的状态。没有负罪就是无辜,那是一种道德纯粹的状态。一个无辜的人对于一种行为没有应受指责的责任。负罪的状态一般会在行为者身上唤起罪恶感,虽然并不是每一个负罪的人都有这种感觉。负罪感来自于做错事和导致对某种责任的认定,导致懊悔的状态,也就是欲求为所做的错事赎罪。

一个相邻的概念是羞愧,一种未能遵守价值或卓越的基本标准的状态,这种标准既为自己也为公众所赞同。羞耻状态包括对身体的不适当的暴露,对于理智上的或道德上的弱点的暴露。羞耻感产生于个人的价值、荣誉和正直方面的缺陷、产生于对于自尊和公众尊敬标准的违犯。有时负罪和羞耻是重叠的,因为一种负罪感一般伴随着一种羞耻感。不过,在负罪感中所强调的是做错事和责任,而在羞耻感中所强调的是缺乏或不足。

sense of guilt generally accompanies a sense of shame. However, what is emphasised in guilt is wrongdoing and responsibility, while what is emphasised in shame is shortcoming or defect.

"When we go against our sense of justice we explain our feelings of guilt by reference to the principle of justice." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 474.

Gyge's Ring

A story told in Plato's *Republic* in order to illustrate the claim that no one is just willingly, but only under compulsion. If a just man could get away without the bad consequences of doing wrong, he would commit unjust acts. Gyge was a shepherd in the service of a king, who found a ring which made him invisible whenever he turned the hoop inwards. Gyge used this invisibility to do many things and eventually usurped the kingdom. Hence, it was claimed that if a just man came into possession of such a ring, he would use it to do exactly what the unjust man does. On this view, what is really valued is not being just, but only seeming to be just. The whole of the *Republic* is an argument against it, and Plato tried to show that it is not worth being unjust even if one has Gyge's ring.

"We have found that justice in itself is best for the soul itself, and that it must do what is right, whether it has the ring of Gyge or not." — Plato, *Republic*, 612b.

"当我们违背了我们的正义感时,我们是在通过正义原则解释负罪的感觉。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第474页。

盖奇的戒指

柏拉图的《国家篇》中所讲的故事,旨在阐明这一论点:人们之所以公正是出于压力,而非自愿。如果一个公正的人可以做坏事而免受其不利后果,他也会行不义之事的。盖奇是某一国王的一个牧羊人。某日他碰巧拾到这样一枚戒指,如果他将环内转,他就不会被看见。盖奇使用这枚戒指做了许多事情,并最后篡夺了王位。假定一个公正的人拥有这样一个戒指,他也会用它做那不公正之人所做的事。这一观点表明,真正被看重的不是公正自身,而是显得公正。《国家篇》的全部论证是要反对这种观点,柏拉图力图表明,即使你拥有这样一枚戒指,也不值得行不义。

"我们已经发现,公正本身对灵魂本身是最好的;不管有无盖奇的戒指,都应当做对的事。"——柏拉图:《国家篇》,612b。

H

Haecceitism, see haecceity

Haecceity

[from Latin; *haec*, this, *haecceitas*, thisness, individual essence.] A term introduced by Duns Scotus, much discussed by Aquinas, and revived in contemporary metaphysics. Originally it was used for an individual essence by which a thing is the individual that it is, and by which one instance of a species is distinguished from other members of the same species. It was claimed to be the necessary property which a thing must possess and which no other thing could possibly have, for example Socrates' soul is peculiar to Socrates who possesses it. A theory which claims the existence of haecceity is called haecceitism. According to this theory, individuals within the same species are not merely numerically different, but each has a unique inner essence after abstracting from their shared repeatable properties. A haecceity to an individual corresponds to a quiddity to a kind or a universal.

"G is an individual essence (or haecceity) = df G is a property which is such that, for every X, X has G if and only if X is necessarily such that it has G, and it is impossible that there is a Y other than X such that Y has G." —Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 29.

Hallucination

An experience that a subject has about something, but the experienced thing does not exist. In a typical example, a drunkard "sees" snakes. Such an experience is private, that is available only to the subject. Hallucinations are common in acute fevers, in madness and in many extreme physical and emotional conditions. One major issue in the analysis of hallucinations is whether what we apparently perceive exists in any sense or is nothing at all. Hallucination is different from illusion, where something material is seen but is presented other than it is. The occurrence of hallucination is used by sense-datum theorists, who call what is presented in hallucination wild sense-data, to reject naive realism and to support the existence of sense-data independent of material things. Hallucinations suggest that what we are aware of directly may have no relation to external things and that what we directly perceive are not material things. A possible objection to this argument allows that hallucination is a type of mental imagery, but rejects the claim that it is a form of perceptual

此性主义

见“此性”条。

此性

「源自拉丁语 *haec* (这)、*haecceitas* (此性、个体本质)」D. 司各脱引入的术语, 而阿奎那讨论较多, 并重新流行于当代形而上学中。本义上讲, 它指个体的本质, 依靠它, 一事物才是它的那个体, 依靠它, 种的一个成员也才得以和同种的其他成员相区别。它意指一物必定拥有且其他任何事物都不可能具有的那种必然特性。例如, 苏格拉底的灵魂是拥有它的苏格拉底特有的。断定此性存在的理论叫“此性主义”。按照这个理论, 同一种内的个体并不只是数目上的不同, 每一个体在被抽象出它们分有的可重复性特性后, 都有独特的内在本质。此性对个体的关系相应于“本质”(quiddity) 对类或共相的关系。

“G 是一个体本质(或此性) = df G 是这样的一种特性: 对于每一 X, X 有 G 当且仅当 X 必然有 G, 而且, 不可能存在一个不同于 X 却又有 G 的 Y。”——齐硕姆:《人与物》, 1976 年, 第 29 页。

幻觉

幻觉是这样一种经验: 主体经验到某物, 但被经验到的事物却并不真的存在。典型的例子包括一个醉酒的人“看见”蛇, 这样的经验是完全私秘的, 只有主体才能知道。幻觉常见于高烧、疯狂及许多极端的物理的和情绪的状态。在幻觉分析中的一个主要问题是, 我们在幻觉中所明显知觉到的东西究竟是否在任何意义上存在。幻觉不同于错觉。在后一种情况中, 某种物质的东西确实被看到, 只不过不是以其本来的样子来呈现。幻觉的存在被感觉材料论者(他们将幻觉中呈现的东西称为“失控的感觉材料”)用来反驳朴素实在论并证明感觉材料可以独立于物质的东西而存在。幻觉表明我们直接意识到的东西可能与外部的东西没有关系; 因此我们直接知觉到的东西并不是物质的东西。对这一论证的一个可能的反驳承认: 幻觉是一种心的映象, 但否认它是一种知觉意识。

“我遵循一个颇为标准的做法, 用‘幻觉’来

consciousness.

"I follow the fairly standard practice of using... 'hallucination' for cases where nothing material is seen." — Jackson, *Perception*, 1977, p. 4.

Hard cases

Cases where established rules or laws cannot provide conclusive answers and about which informed people can reasonably disagree. If we view law as a body of rules, hard cases constitute indeterminacy in law or legal gaps. Dworkin therefore claims that we must understand law as comprising more than rules. To solve hard cases, judges must be guided by standards which are not rules, and these non-rule standards are either principles which concern the rights of individuals or policies which concern social or collective goals. In contrast to the traditional view which claims that judges should be guided by appeal to policies in settling hard cases, Dworkin argues that the appropriate technique should involve appeal to principles, that is, to the consideration of the abstract rights of individuals such as liberty, equality, respect and dignity. According to his rights thesis, judicial reasoning about hard cases takes place against a background of assumptions about rights.

"If the case at hand is a hard case, when no settled rule dictates a decision either way, then it might seem that a proper decision could be generated by either policy or principle." — Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, 1978, p. 83.

Hard data, see data

Harm

Plato in the *Republic* claims that harm is an internal moral defect due to the disharmony of the different elements of the soul. Harm is a mental illness for a person to whom we should give pity. Currently, harm generally refers to the external violation of one's interests, that is some adverse effect caused by another person's wrongdoing. The person who produces harm should be condemned and even punished. To say somebody has been harmed amounts to saying that this person has been wronged or treated unjustly. However, while harm is morally wrong, the justified and deserved punishment of wrongdoing is not regarded as harm.

An associated conception is offence which refers to an uncomfortable and resentful mental state arising from the wrongful conduct of someone else. An offence itself does not directly cause the impairment of one's interests, although an offence which leads to adverse effects becomes a harm. Sometimes the distinction between harm and offence is challenged on the grounds that the unpleasant state of mind is itself a harm.

"Our full paradigm of (wrongful) harm will include a

指没有物质的东西被看到的情形。”——杰克逊：《知觉》，1977年，第4页。

疑难案件

它指的是这样的案件，即现行的规则或法律不能对其提供明确的答复，了解情况的人能够对其合理地持有不同的意见。如果我们把法律视为一套规则，那疑难案件就是法律中含糊不清的部分，或者说是法律的漏洞。因此，德沃金主张法律并不仅仅是由规则构成的。要解决疑难案件，法官就必须以一些并非是法规的准则为指导，这些非法规的准则要么是涉及个人权利的原则，要么是有关社会的或集体的目标的政策。针对认为法官在解决疑难案件时应当求助于政策的指导这一传统观点，德沃金争论道，适当的方法应包括对于原则的求助，即应当包括对诸如自由、平等、尊重、尊严这些个人的抽象权利的考虑。根据他的权利论，有关疑难案件的司法推论要在有关权利的假定这一背景下来进行。

“如果手上的案件是一个疑难案件，而此时既定的法规无论怎样也无法做出判决，那适当的判决可能会或者根据政策，或者根据原则而产生。这看起来是可能的。”——德沃金：《认真对待权利》，1978年，第83页。

硬予料

见“予料”条。

伤害

柏拉图在《国家篇》中指出，伤害是一种内在的道德上的缺陷，是由灵魂中的不同要素的不和谐而造成的。伤害是我们要为之感到遗憾的人的一种精神病症。现在一般把伤害看成是对于某人利益的外部侵犯，即另一个人的不端行为所产生的某种有害的后果。导致伤害的人应受到谴责和惩罚。说某人受到伤害，等于说这个人被错待了或不公正地对待了。不过，虽然伤害是一种道德上的恶，但对错事或恶行的公正的和应得的惩罚并不被认为是伤害。

一个相关的概念是冒犯，它指的是一种由于某人的错误行为而产生的不愉快的和有怨恨的精神状态。冒犯本身并不直接引起对某人的利益的伤害，虽然冒犯导致有害的后果便成为一种伤害。有时，对于伤害和冒犯的区分受到挑战，因为精神的不愉快状态本身就是一种伤害。

“我们关于错事造成的伤害的完整的范例包括对受害者进行伤害的人，使得受害者的利益受损的伤害行为。”——芬伯格：《对他人的伤害》，1984年，第105页。

person who acts on a victim, and the act of harming that produces the setback of the victim's interest.”——Feinberg: *Harm to Others*, 1984, p. 105.

Harm principle

A principle proposed by J. S. Mill in *On Liberty*, claiming that the individual is sovereign over his mind and body and hence that the only proper ground for limiting his liberty is that his act concerns others and causes harm to others. This principle is considered to be essential for securing individual liberty against the interference of law. Mill denied that society is entitled to use law to uphold conventional moral standards or to restrict a person's liberty to act in ways which harm no-one else. Society often violates the principle on the grounds that the person is not mature enough to realise his own real interests or that the action, although affecting only himself, is intrinsically wrong. Mill argued that in these cases we may reason with the person or attempt to persuade him, but we have no right to compel him. Mill's position was criticised by Devlin, who proposed instead the thesis of the enforcement of morals, that is that law should enforce publicly accepted standards of private morality.

“The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle... That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”——Mill, *On Liberty*, preface.

Harmony

[from Greek: *harmonie*, derived from the verb *harmonizein*, to fit together, also translated as adjustment or concord] The mutual adjustment of different components according to rational principles to form an organic and coherent whole. It is a key-word for the Pythagoreans who used it to refer to the musical scale, and analogically to refer to the proportional movements on a cosmic scale of the sun, moon and fixed stars. When they say that number is the first principle they mean that all physical things are composed of elements harmonised in a certain ratio. This is the Pythagorean mathematics of harmony. Heraclitus also claims that everything is the harmony of the opposites. Ancient Greek medicine took health as a harmony of physical opposites.

“It is clear that the theory that the movement of the stars produces a harmony, ... is nevertheless untrue.” Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 290b12-13.

Health care ethics, see bioethics

伤害原则

这一原则是由 J. S. 密尔在他的《论自由》中提出的,它主张,个人对他的心理和身体拥有全权,因此,限制其自由的惟一正当的理由是他的行为影响他人并造成对他人的伤害。这一原则被视为是保护个人自由不受法律干预的关键。密尔否认社会有权运用法律维护传统的道德标准或在人的行为不伤害他人的情况下限制人的自由。社会常常违反这一原则的理由是,人还没有成熟到足以认清他自身的真正利益,或有的行为虽然仅影响到自身,但这一行为从本质上讲就是错误的。密尔争论道,在这些情况下,我们可以说服他,或尽量劝服他,但我们没有权利去强迫他。密尔的主张受到德富林的批判,后者提出了道德强制的论点,即法律应当执行已为人们公认接受的私人道德准则。

“这篇论文的主题是维护一个非常简单的原则……这一原则就是,人类有理由对其任何一个成员的行动自由进行个人的或集体的干涉,其惟一的目的是自我保护。这一权力可被正当行使于文明社会的任何一个成员,并反对他的意志,其惟一的目的是防止伤害他人。”——密尔:《论自由》,序言。

和谐

[希腊语 *harmonie*, 源自动词 *harmonizein*, 意指“适合一起”,也被译为调和或和谐] 依据理性原则将不同的部分通过相互调和而构成一个有机连贯的整体。在毕达戈拉斯学派那里,和谐是个关键术语,用来表示音乐的音阶,同时也表示由太阳、月亮与恒星构成的宇宙规模的合乎比例的运动。当毕达戈拉斯学派说数是第一原理时,他们的意思是指所有自然事物是由包含某一和谐比例的因素构成的。这便是毕达戈拉斯学派的和谐数学观。赫拉克利特也认为万物是对立的和谐。古希腊医学也把健康视为身体中各对立因素的和谐。

“显然,天体运动构成和谐的观点,……不管怎么说也是不真实的。”——亚里士多德:《论天》,290b12-13。

保健伦理学

见“生命伦理学”条。

Heaven

[Greek: *ouranos*] In Hesiod's theogony, an archaic cosmogonical concept. Aristotle, in his *On the Heavens* (Greek: *Peri Ouranoi*; Latin: *De Caelo*), distinguishes three senses of heaven: (1) the outermost circumference of the universe; (2) the sky or heaven in general, (3) the universe as a whole, a synonym for *kosmos*. In Christian tradition, heaven is the place reserved for saved sinners after death, in contrast to hell, which is reserved for unrepentant sinners, and purgatory, an intermediate place for sinners to expiate sins before going to heaven. On this view, God is in heaven, which lies beyond the cosmos.

"When the Westerner dreams of another world he very often dreams of heaven or purgatory or hell—these are bad dreams." —N. Smart, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1970, p. 29.

Hedonism, ethical

[from Greek: *hedone*, pleasure] An ethical position which claims that pleasure or happiness is the highest or most intrinsic good in life, and that people should pursue as much pleasure and as little pain as possible. This position was defended by the Greek philosophers Aristippus and Epicurus, the British empiricists Hobbes, Locke and Hume, and the utilitarians. However, there are significant differences among hedonists concerning the meaning of pleasure. Different understandings yield the different varieties of hedonism. Pleasure is in general an unfortunate word, for it is commonly associated with carnal desires. But sensual pleasure is not what hedonist philosophers intend. For Epicurus pleasure was simply the absence of pain. Modern hedonists often include any experience that one enjoys. So thinking, reading and creation are all included as pleasures. Some hedonists appeal to psychological hedonism in support of their position; for example, Epicurus based his view on the observed phenomenon that all living things are content with pleasure. Other hedonists, such as Locke, argued that hedonism is an analytic truth, for it is the main characteristic of good to be able to cause pleasure. Utilitarianism is the most systematic version of ethical hedonism. The thesis that pleasure and happiness are identical has been criticised since the time of Socrates and Plato. The difficulties of hedonism include the fact that some pleasures, such as pleasure in the suffering of other people, are intrinsically bad; furthermore, some things, such as medical treatment, are intrinsically good, but not positively pleasant. Since the pleasure in question is one's own pleasure, and pain is one's own pain, hedonism is usually related to egoism.

"Ethical hedonism may be, somewhat roughly, defined by the principle that 'x is good' is equivalent to 'x produces pleasure'." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949,

天

[希腊语 *ouranos*] 在赫西俄德的神谱中,是古宇宙论概念。亚里士多德在他的《论天》(希腊语 *Peri Ouranoi*; 拉丁语 *De Caelo*) 一书中,区分了天的三种含义:(1) 宇宙的最外边界;(2) 天空或一般的天体;(3) 作为整体的宇宙, *kosmos* 的同义词。在基督教传统中,天是为获救的罪人死后所留的地方,与此相反的是为没有忏悔的罪人所留的地狱,以及为罪人在上天以前赎罪所留的中间地方炼狱。根据这种观点,上帝也在天上,处于宇宙之外。

“当西方人梦想着另一个世界时,他经常梦到的是天堂,或者恶梦中的炼狱或地狱。”——斯马特:《宗教哲学》,1970年,第29页。

伦理快乐主义

[源自希腊语 *hedone*, 意为“快乐”] 一种伦理观点,它主张愉快或幸福是生活中最高的和最内在的善,人们应追求尽可能多的愉快和尽可能少的痛苦。这个观点的捍卫者包括希腊哲学家亚里斯提卜和伊壁鸠鲁、英国的经验主义者霍布斯、洛克和休谟以及功利主义者。不过,在快乐主义者之间关于“愉快”的意义问题存在着相当的区别。而不同的理解产生不同种类的快乐主义。快乐一般而言是个不幸的字眼,因为它总是与肉体的欲望相联的,但肉体的欲望不是快乐主义哲学家所要提倡的。对于伊壁鸠鲁来说,快乐只是痛苦的缺乏。现代的快乐主义经常包括一个人所享有的任何经验。因而思考、阅读和创造都被包括进来作为愉快。某些快乐主义者诉诸于心理快乐主义来支持他们的观点。例如,伊壁鸠鲁把他的观点建立在所有有生命的事物都对快乐感到称心这一经验现象的基础上。其他的快乐主义者(如洛克)则认为,快乐主义是一种分析真理,因为正是善的主要特点能够引起快乐。功利主义是伦理快乐主义的最系统的形式。把快乐与幸福等同起来的论点自从苏格拉底和柏拉图以来就受到了批评。快乐主义的困难包括这样的事实:某些快乐(例如使他人受害而得到愉快)在实质上是恶的,而且,某些事情如医疗实质上是善,可却不是积极的快乐。既然这里的快乐总是一个人自己的快乐,痛苦总是自己的痛苦,因此快乐主义总是与利己主义相关的。

“伦理学的快乐主义大致可以以‘x是善的’等同于‘x产生愉快’这一原则来界定。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第43页。

p. 43.

Hedonism, paradox of

A paradox showing that egoistic hedonism as a theory has a self-defeating limit. The more you deliberately pursue the maximisation of pleasure, the less you can attain. If you go directly to seek pleasure, you tend to get less pleasure than those who seek pleasure indirectly by studying or making other efforts. The most profound pleasures, such as those obtained from child raising and professional achievement, can only be obtained as a result of undertaking unpleasant tasks.

"...that a rational method of attaining the end at which it aims requires that we should to some extent put it out of sight and not directly aim at it. I have before spoken of this conclusion as the 'fundamental paradox of Egoistic Hedonism'." Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, II, iii, 2.

Hedonism, psychological

A psychological position which claims that human actions are determined by the desire to secure pleasure and to avoid pain. Everyone acts in order to gain the greatest possible personal satisfaction. There are many forms of this view, which respectively assert that a person is motivated to do A rather than B only because he thinks A is more pleasant than B, only because his thought of A is more attractive or only because his choice of A is causally correlated with his past enjoyment. Psychological hedonism is the theoretical basis of many forms of ethical hedonism. However, the extent the former can support the latter is a matter of dispute, for psychological hedonism only asserts that something is more desirable because it is more pleasant, but never says that people only desire pleasure. In addition to its relation to ethical hedonism, psychological hedonism is also important as a theory of human motivation in psychology.

"Psychological hedonism, ... is not a theory concerning the criterion of morality, but concerning the genetic question: what motivates human conduct? The psychological hedonist answers: expectation of pleasure or pains." — Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 43.

Hedonistic calculus

Also called the utility calculus or felicity calculus, a device for calculating quantities of pleasure and pain, appealed to by Jeremy Bentham. When we need to choose between alternative courses of action, we should calculate the amount of pleasure or pain that each action can produce for all the people affected. The right action in the circumstances is the action which can contribute most to the sum of happiness. The criteria which one needs to consider in calculating the amount of pleasure include intensity, duration, certainty (or uncertainty), propinquity (or remoteness), fecundity (their

快乐主义的悖论

这一悖论表明,利己主义的快乐主义作为一种理论,具有一种自我摧毁的局限。因为你越有意追求最大程度的快乐,你所得到的就越少。如果你直接去追求你所想要的快乐,那么相比于通过学习或作其他努力间接地追求它的人,你所获得的快乐却是愈少。最深沉地感受到的愉快如抚育孩子和职业上的成就,只有通过从事不快乐的劳作才能获得。

“要达到其目的所在的目标,一种合理方法是要求我们应在某种程度上,把我们的注意力调开,不直接地对准它。我在以前已把这个结论说成是‘利己主义的快乐主义的基本悖论’。”——西奇威克:《伦理学方法》,II,iii,第2页。

心理学的快乐主义

一种心理学的观点,认为人类的行为是由获得愉快和避免痛苦的欲望所决定的。每个人的活动在于获得最大可能的个人满足。这种观点有多种形式,但都分别断言,一个人被推动去做A而不是B,只是因为他认为A比B有更多愉快,只是因为他认为,A更有吸引力,或只是因为,由于A与他过去的快乐有关因此而选择了A。心理学的快乐主义是许多形式的伦理快乐主义的理论基础。不过,对于在什么程度上前者支持了后者,是有争论的。因为心理学的快乐主义只是断言:某种东西是更可欲求的,因为它是使人更愉快的,但并没有说人们只欲求愉快。除了它与伦理快乐主义的关系之外,心理学的快乐主义作为心理学中一种关于人的动机理论,本身也是重要的。

“心理学的快乐主义……不是一种与道德标准有关的理论,而是关涉下面这一发生性问题的:是什么推动了人的行为?心理学的快乐主义回答:对于快乐或痛苦的期望。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第43页。

快乐主义的演算

也称“功利演算”或“幸福(felicity)演算”,为J.边沁所采用的计算愉快和痛苦的量的工具。当我们需要在不同行为道路间作出选择时,我们应该计算那个行为对所有相关人所产生的所有的快乐或痛苦的量。在一种条件下,正当的行为是那种能够贡献最大幸福总量的行为。一个人需要考虑的计算快乐的量的标准包括强度、持久性、确定性(或不确定性)、远近、丰厚度(它们倾向于促进或导致更多的愉快)、纯度(不与其他不令人舒服的情感相混,也不引

tendency to promote or lead to more pleasure), purity (not mixed up with or followed by unappealing feelings) and extent (the number of persons who are affected by it). Bentham made it clear that he does not expect this process to be strictly pursued before every moral judgement or judicial operation, but these factors should always be kept in view. Bentham also described the implications of the hedonistic calculus on legal reform. However, this calculus is widely criticised because it is hard to compare different types of pleasure, a problem which has led to a reassessment of the nature of pleasure.

"Bentham devised what is called the 'Hedonistic calculus' for calculating the amount of pleasure or pain that would occur as a result of one's actions."—Hospers, *Human Conduct*, 1961, p. 56.

Hegelianism

A term for the philosophy of Hegel and for the various metaphysical, aesthetic, ethical, religious and political theories developed by his followers in the spirit of his philosophy. The rich, complex, difficult and ambivalent nature of Hegel's doctrines has generated divergent and even contradictory schools of Hegelian thought, each representing and developing one-sided interpretations or partial elements of his whole system. Right-wing "Old Hegelians", represented by Karl Göschel and Hermann Hinrichs, emphasised the Christian and conservative elements in Hegel's thought and tried to reconcile them with contemporary political conditions. Left-wing "Young Hegelians" were politically and religiously radical and developed Hegel's humanistic and historical dimensions. Their major representatives included Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and David Friedrich Strauss. Among them, Feuerbach made important contributions to the history of philosophy. Marx and Engels were once Young Hegelians. Although Hegel's philosophy fell into neglect in Germany from the middle of the nineteenth century until its revival at the beginning of the twentieth century, it has since stimulated the development of philosophy in various schools, including neo-Marxism and hermeneutics. In Denmark Hegelian thought was introduced by J. Heinberg and provoked Kierkegaard to oppose Hegel's doctrines. In Britain, Hegelianism was initiated by J. H. Stirling's *The Secret of Hegel* (1865) and developed into absolute idealism, represented by T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet and John McTaggart. These philosophers embraced Hegel to challenge empiricism and utilitarianism in the so-called Neo-Hegelian movement. This movement became a target of attack by Russell, Moore and Popper. In the United States Hegelianism, represented by William Harris and Josiah Royce, had considerable influence on pragmatism. In Italy, Hegelianism, represented in liberal and conservative versions by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, became a main-

起它们)和范围(受到这种愉快影响的人数)。边沁清楚地说明,他并不希望在每一道德判断或法庭活动中都严格地遵循这个过程,但这些因素总应该考虑到。边沁也描述了快乐主义的演算对于法律改革的意义。不过,这个演算受到了广泛的批评,因为它难于比较不同类型的愉快。这一问题已导致人们重新评价快乐的性质。

"边沁设计了所谓的'快乐主义的演算'来计算一个人的行为后果的快乐和痛苦的量。"—霍斯培斯:《人类行为》,1961年,第56页。

黑格尔主义

对黑格尔哲学和他的追随者以其哲学精神来发展的形而上学、美学、伦理学、宗教和政治的各种理论的专称。黑格尔学说的丰富、复杂、晦涩和矛盾的本性产生了多种多样的、甚至是矛盾的黑格尔思想学派,每一学派都代表和发展了他的整个体系的某一方面的解释或某一部分的原理。右翼“老年黑格尔派”以K. 格歇尔和H. 欣里屈斯为代表,强调黑格尔思想中的基督教的和保守的因素,企图把它们与当时的政治形势相协调。左翼“青年黑格尔派”在政治上和宗教观点上是激进的,并发展黑格尔的人本主义和历史的倾向。他们的主要代表人物是L. 费尔巴哈,B. 鲍威尔和D. F. 施特劳斯。在他们中,费尔巴哈对哲学史作出了重要贡献。马克思和恩格斯曾经一度是青年黑格尔派。虽然黑格尔哲学在德国处于被冷落的地位,这种状况从19世纪中期一直到20世纪初期哲学复兴为止,但是它一直通过各种各样的学派,包括新马克思主义和解释学,来促进哲学的发展。J. 海因堡把黑格尔的思想引进了丹麦,招致了克尔凯郭尔对黑格尔学说的反对。在英国,黑格尔主义是由J. H. 斯特林的《黑格尔的秘密》(1865)所开创的,并发展为绝对唯心主义,它以T. H. 格林,F. H. 布拉德雷,B. 鲍桑葵和J. 麦克塔加特为代表。这些哲学家信奉黑格尔,兴起所谓新黑格尔主义运动,向经验主义和功利主义挑战。这个运动成为罗素、摩尔和波普的攻击目标。在美国,黑格尔主义以W. 哈里斯和J. 罗伊斯为代表,他们对实用主义有相当影响。在意大利,在自由主义和保守主义的解释中以B. 克罗齐和G. 金蒂莱为代表,成为哲学的主流。在法国,黑格尔主义由V. 考辛所创立,并在20世纪通过对黑格尔的马克思主义——存在主义的解释而复兴。近年来,部分地由于共同体主义伦理学的发展和A. 麦金泰尔和C. 泰勒的著作,

stream of philosophy. In France, Hegelianism was established by Victor Cousin and revived in the twentieth century through the Marxist-Existentialist interpretation of Hegel. Currently, the English-speaking world has another wave of interest in Hegel, in part through the development of communitarian ethics and the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor.

"The appropriation of Hegelianism by members of different historical generations living in different political and cultural environments naturally exacerbated existing tensions and produced new conflicts within the Hegelian school. But Hegelians remained convinced that there was an essential core of Hegelianism that they all shared." — Toews, *Hegelianism*, 1980, p. 88.

Hegelians, young

A Hegelian philosophical movement which flourished in Germany from 1830-48 with the University of Berlin as its central base. It emerges through criticising what came to be called the "Old Hegelians" or "right-wing Hegelians", who believed that the absolute idea achieved its actual end in Hegel's philosophy. Young Hegelians believed in reason as a continually unfolding process and took their task to be its herald. They claimed that philosophising did not end in Hegel and that the reflective spirit in its continuing development transcends any fixed system of thought, including Hegel's own. They took a critical attitude towards Hegel and believed that they could overcome or sublate Hegel and develop Hegelianism beyond Hegel. Young Hegelians were politically and religiously radical and focused their interest on developing the humanistic and historical dimensions of Hegel's thought. Active Young Hegelians included David Friedrich Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Max Stirner and Karl Schmidt. Marx and Engels quickly developed criticisms of this movement in *The German Ideology*. The Young Hegelian movement receives special attention at present due to interest in the origins of Marxism.

"In sum, the Young Hegelian movement rests upon the belief that Hegelianism did not die with Hegel." — Slepelevich (ed), *The Young Hegelians*, 1983, x.

Hegemony

[from Greek: *hegomai*, to lead or command] Domination by force and, hence, a kind of domination by one country over another. For Plekhanov and subsequent Western Marxist writers, hegemony is a form of social and political control which is based more on intellectual, moral and cultural persuasion or consent than on physical coercion. In this way, the proletarian class can amalgamate all sections of the working class into a greater whole which has a single unified aim. This sense of hegemony is fully developed by the Italian

说英语的世界广泛地兴起了对黑格尔兴趣的另一次浪潮。

“生活在不同政治和文化环境的不同历史的数代人对黑格尔主义的传播和发展，自然加剧了现存的趋向，并产生了黑格尔学派内部的新的争论。但黑格尔信徒仍坚持相信：存在着一个为他们大家所共同具有的黑格尔主义的本质核心。”——托厄斯：《黑格尔主义》，1980年，第88页。

青年黑格尔学派

指1830—1848年在德国兴盛的、以柏林大学为中心基地的黑格尔主义的哲学运动。它通过批判那逐渐被称为“老年黑格尔学派”或“右翼黑格尔学派”的思想而形成。老年黑格尔学派认为，绝对理念在黑格尔哲学中实现了它的现实目的。青年黑格尔派相信理性是连续不断的展开过程，并把他们的任务看作是它的传达者。他们主张，哲学体系化没有在黑格尔那里终结，反思的精神在它的连续发展中超越任何固定的思想体系，包括黑格尔本人的体系。他们对黑格尔采取批判的态度，认为他们能克服或扬弃黑格尔，发展超越黑格尔的黑格尔主义。青年黑格尔学派在政治上和宗教观点上是激进的，并把他们的兴趣集中于黑格尔思想的人本主义和历史方面。青年黑格尔学派的活跃人物包括D. F. 施特劳斯、L. 费尔巴哈、B. 鲍威尔、A. 鲁格、弗里德里希·恩格斯、卡尔·马克思、马科斯·施蒂纳和K. 施米特。马克思和恩格斯很快就在《德意志意识形态》中对这个运动提出了批判。青年黑格尔学派的运动现在得到特别的注意是由于对马克思主义起源的兴趣。

“总而言之，青年黑格尔学派运动依据这个信念：黑格尔主义没有随黑格尔一起死亡。”——斯列普列维奇（编）：《青年黑格尔学派》，1983年，第x页。

强权

[源自希腊词：*hegomai*，领导或统帅]以强力来支配，因而是一种一国对另一国的支配。对于普列汉诺夫和后来的西方马克思主义作家来说，强权是一种社会和文化控制形式，它更多地建立在思想的、道德的和文化的说服或赞同的基础上，而不仅是物理强制的基础上。以这种方式，无产阶级能把工人阶级的一切派别都合并为一个更大的、有着统一目标的整体。这种意义的强权由意大利马克思主义哲学家A. 葛兰

Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci took hegemony [Italian; *diregere*] to be moral and intellectual leadership which allows a leading group to compromise with various allies who are unified into a whole. Political leadership in a democratic revolution should be based on an alliance with other sections which have similar goals. Gramsci used this concept to analyse all forms of class association, including those within a dominant social group. He even used it to explain the capacity of the bourgeoisie to hold power. For Gramsci, the concept of hegemony was central to Marxist philosophy, which he called the philosophy of praxis in his *Prison Notebooks* to escape the attention of the prison censor.

"What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society', or 'the state'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'directed domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical government'." — Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Hoare and Smith, eds), 1971, p. 12.

Hell

In Christian doctrine, the place a person is sent after death if judged by God to be an unrepentant sinner. There the person will be cut off from the vision of God and will suffer all sorts of physical pain. Hell is described in the imaginative language of fire and brimstone and of weeping and gnashing of teeth. It is in contrast to heaven which is reserved after death for persons judged by God to be worthy of salvation. The notion of hell warns people to behave well during their lives, but its existence is thought by many to be incompatible with God's goodness. Hence the problem of hell becomes a version of the problem of evil: how we can explain the evil of hell if God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.

"According to the standard tradition, being in hell is the worst thing that could ever happen to anyone." — Kvanvig, *The Problem of Hell*, 1993, p. 3.

Hellenistic philosophy

Hellenistic is a chronological term for the period dating from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC to the end of the Roman Republic in 31BC. Hellenistic philosophy was the development of post-Aristotelian philosophy in a period that ended with the revival of interest in Plato and Aristotle in the first century BC, roughly corresponding to the political period. Its main philosophical trends were Stoicism, founded by Zeno of Citium, Epicureanism, founded by Epicurus, and Scepticism, founded by Pyrrho. Philosophy in this period narrowed its scope to logic, ethics and philosophy of nature,

西充分发展。葛兰西把强权 [意大利词: *diregere*] 看作是道德的和思想的领导, 它要求领导者协调各个同盟者, 团结成为一个整体。民主革命的政治领导应当建立在与其他具有相同目标的派别相联盟的基础上。葛兰西用这个概念来分析阶级联合的一切形式, 包括统治的社会集团内部的联合形式。他甚至用它来解释资产阶级掌握权力的能力。对葛兰西来说, 强权概念是马克思主义哲学的核心, 他在《狱中笔记》中把马克思主义哲学称为实践哲学, 以避免引起监狱检查官的注意。

"目前我们所能做的事情, 就是要确定两个主要的上层建筑 '层次': 其一可称为 '市民社会', 那是通常称为 '私人' 的有机整体; 其二称为 '政治社会' 或 '国家'。这两个层次一方面相应于 '强权' 的功能, 统治集团对整个社会行使这种强权; 另一方面相应于 '指导的统治' 或通过国家和 '法律的政府' 来行使的命令的功能。" —— 葛兰西, 《狱中笔记选集》: (荷阿尔和史密斯编), 1971 年, 第 12 页。

地狱

在基督教教义中, 指一个人在死后将被遣往的地方, 如果她或他被上帝审判为是尚未忏悔的罪人的话。在那里, 这个人将不能窥见上帝, 并遭受一切种类的生理苦痛。人们用富于想像力的语言把地狱描述为火烧硫磺烤, 鬼哭魂嚎, 青面獠牙。与此对照的是天堂, 这是为上帝审判值得救助之人死后保留的地方。地狱的观念是为警醒人们在生命期间要有良好行止, 但它的存在被许多人认为是与上帝的善相冲突的。因此, 地狱问题成为罪恶问题的一个说法, 即我们如何能解释地狱的恶, 如果上帝是全知全能并且全善的?

"按照标准的传统观点, 地狱中的存在对任何人来说都是所能发生的最糟糕的事情。" —— 克万威格, 《地狱问题》, 1993 年, 第 3 页。

希腊化哲学

"希腊化" 一词是个编年学术语, 指从亚历山大大帝在公元前 323 年之死到公元前 31 年罗马共和国结束这段时期。希腊化哲学指亚里士多德以后的哲学的发展, 其时期结束于公元前 1 世纪对柏拉图和亚里士多德兴趣的恢复, 与政治生活上的上述时期大体一致。它的主要哲学派别是: 基底恩的芝诺创立的斯多亚主义、伊壁鸠鲁创立的伊壁鸠鲁主义和皮浪创立的怀疑主义。这一时期的哲学将其范围缩小到逻辑学、伦理学和自然哲学。在这每个领域中, 希腊

and Hellenistic philosophy contributed significantly in each of these areas. Traditionally, Hellenistic philosophy has been thought to concentrate on ethics and to lack originality, but much recent scholarship has given a more positive account of its wide ranging philosophical achievements.

"These [Stoicism, Scepticism and Epicureanism] are the movements of thought which define the main line of philosophy in the Hellenistic world, and 'Hellenistic philosophy' is the expression I use... to refer to them collectively." A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, p. 1.

Heloise complex

The French philosopher and writer Heloise was seduced and later betrayed by her private tutor, the scholastic philosopher Peter Abelard. Nevertheless, Heloise retained a strong passion for Abelard and wrote books and letters addressed to him. According to Michele Le Doeuff, in the Heloise complex feminists tend to give priority to a male exponent of feminism or to a male philosopher whose ideas have been borrowed to justify feminist claims. As a result, we have, for example, Lacanian feminism or Foucaultian feminism. This tendency generally treats the philosophy of the male master as complete in itself and requiring no more than application to issues concerning women. Le Doeuff claims that the tendency contradicts the spirit of feminism and undermines the independence of feminist thinking about issues concerning women.

"Since the days of antiquity, women have been admitted into the field of philosophy chiefly when they took on the role of the loving admirer: we can call this the 'Heloise Complex'." —Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice*, 1989, p. 59.

Hempel's paradox

Also called the ravens paradox or paradox of confirmation, a paradox concerning the nature of confirmation. There are three principles in the background of this paradox. First, Nicod's criterion, put forward by the French philosopher Jean Nicod (1893–1924), holds that for a generalisation "All As are Bs", an instance of an A being B provides confirming evidence, and instances of something that is neither A nor B are irrelevant to it. Secondly, the equivalence principle holds that if a piece of evidence confirms a generalisation G_1 , it also constitutes confirming evidence for any generalisation G_2 which is logically equivalent to G_1 . Thirdly, a principle of deductive logic holds that "All As are Bs" is equivalent to "All non-Bs are non-As".

Hempel discovered that, whilst all these principles are valid separately, a paradox arises if they are taken together. Take the generalisation "All ravens are black". According to the third principle, it is equivalent to the generalisation "All non-black things are non-ravens". Instances of non-black things include such items as white shoes and green leaves.

化哲学都有许多重要贡献。传统的观点认为,希腊化哲学只专注于伦理学,缺乏独创性。但是,近几年在这个领域作出了大量研究,对它取得的广泛哲学成就给予了更为积极的认可。

“这些哲学[即斯多亚主义、怀疑主义和伊壁鸠鲁主义]是在希腊化世界中规定哲学主要路线的思想运动,‘希腊化哲学’是我使用的表述……集合地指称它们。”——朗:《希腊化哲学》,第1页。

埃罗伊兹情结

埃罗伊兹,法国哲学家、作家。她被她的私人教师经院哲学家P. 阿布拉诱奸,后又被其抛弃。然而,埃罗伊兹对阿布拉保留着强烈的爱情,并写书、写信给他。根据M.L. 多尤夫的看法,在埃罗伊兹情结中,女性主义者倾向给女性主义的男性倡导者以优先权,或给其思想被用来为女性主义的主张做辩护的男性哲学家以优先权。结果我们就有了诸如拉康的女性主义或福柯的女性主义。这一倾向一般把男性主宰的哲学当做哲学的全部,其要求仅仅是把这样的哲学应用到有关妇女的问题。勒·多尤夫认为,这一倾向是与女性主义的精神相矛盾的,并且从基础上削弱了思考妇女问题的女性主义者的独立性。

“从古代起,当妇女主要承担起爱的赞美者的角色时,就一直被允许进入哲学的领域。我们可以称这为‘埃罗伊兹情结’。”——多尤夫:《喜帕恰亚的选择》,1989年,第59页。

亨佩尔悖论

也称为“渡鸦悖论”或“确证悖论”,是关于确证的性质的一个悖论。这个悖论的背景中有三条原理。第一条称作尼柯德标准,由法国哲学家J. 尼柯德(1893–1924)提出,认为对一个概括“所有的A都是B”,一个例证“A是B”提供了确证证据,而某些既非A又非B的例证则与这概括无关。第二条原理为等价原理,认为如果一个证据确证概括 G_1 ,则它也构成对另一与 G_1 逻辑上等价的概括 G_2 的确证证据。第三条是演绎逻辑原理,认为“所有A都是B”等价于形式“所有的非B都是非A”。

亨佩尔发现,虽然这些原理分别都是有效的,但一旦我们把它们放在一起,就出现了悖论。以概括“所有渡鸦都是黑色的”为例。按照第三条原理,它等价于概括“所有非黑色的都是非渡鸦”。非黑色的事物包括白色的鞋、绿色的树叶等等。按照尼柯德原理,白色的鞋和绿色的叶子是对概括“所有非黑色事物是非渡鸦”提供证据的确证事例,但与概括“所有渡鸦是黑色

According to Nicod's principle, white shoes and green leaves are among the confirming instances that provide evidence for the generalisation "All non-black things are not-ravens", but are irrelevant to the generalisation "All ravens are black". But according to the second principle, since these two generalisations are logically equivalent, white shoes and green leaves are paradoxically confirming instances that provide evidence for the generalisation "All ravens are black". There are various attempts to find a solution, but none of them has achieved general approval.

"Hempel's paradoxes of confirmation...are generated by the fact that three highly plausible principles of confirmation prove incompatible." —Swinburne, *An Introduction to Confirmation Theory*, 1973, p. 53.

Henological argument

[from Greek: *hen*, one] A type of theistic argument for the existence of God with a form resembling the fourth of Aquinas' five ways. From observations that there are various degrees of goodness, perfection, truth and reality in the world, the argument infers that there must be one being which represents the highest degree of all these positive attributes as their full realisation. This being is the best, most perfect, truest and most real being and is God. If positive attributes can exist in different degrees without being realised in one being at the highest level or if there is no such highest level, the arguments fails.

"The henological argument is so called because in it we reason from multiplicity to unity (*hen*): from goodness, truth, reality in the various forms in which experience makes them known to us, to a Being who is the Good, the True, the Real." —Joyce, *Principles of Natural Theology*, 1923, p. 105.

Henotheism

[from Greek: *hen*, one + *theos*, god] Max Müller's term for a doctrine that allows many gods to exist, while claiming that one God is their supreme ruler who deserves their loyalty and obedience. It is a compromise between polytheism, the belief that many gods exist, and monotheism, the belief that there is only one God. Some religious philosophers consider henotheism to be an intermediate phase in the development from polytheism to monotheism.

"Henotheism is the recognition of one God for purposes of devotion and worship without denying the existence of other Divine beings." —C. Taliaferro, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 446.

Heresy

[from Greek: *hairein*, taking of something, later the taking or holding of an opinion] In ancient times, any

的"无关。而按照第二条原理,由于这两个概括是逻辑上等价的,白色的鞋和绿色的叶子也是为概括"所有渡鸦都是黑色的"提供证据的确证事例。这是一个悖论。有着种种解决它的尝试,但是没有有一个获得普遍的认可。

"亨佩尔的确证悖论……是由三个高度似真的确证原理证明为不相容的这一事实产生的。"——斯文布勒:《确证理论导论》,1973年,第53页。

合一论论证

[源自希腊语 *hen*, 意为一]关于上帝存在的一种有神论论证,其形式与阿奎那"五法"中的第四法相似。该论证从世界上存在着不同等级的善、完美、真理和实在等等经验观察出发,推出这样的结论:必定有一位存在表示所有这些肯定属性的最高等级以及它们的完满实现。这位存在最善、最完美、最真实,也是最实在的存在,它便是上帝。如果肯定属性可以在不同程度上存在而不在一个最高层次的存在中实现,或者,如果没有这种最高层次的存在,则这一论证不能成立。

"合一论论证之所以得到如此称谓,是因为在该论证中,我们从多样性推到合一性(*hen*):从经验使我们知晓的、以多种形式出现的善、真和实在出发,推出一位存在,他是上帝,是大写的真,大写的实在。"——乔依斯:《自然神学原理》,1923年,第105页。

大神论

[源自希腊语 *hen* (一) 和 *theos* (神)]这个术语是M. 缪勒造出的,指这样一种学说:允许许多神祇存在,但断言有一位大神是他们至高无上的统治者,其他诸神必须对他忠诚和服从。它是多神论(信仰多个神存在)和一神论(只信仰一位神存在)之间的折中。有些宗教哲学家认为,大神论是从多神论向一神论发展过程中的中间状态。

"大神论为了祈祷和崇拜起见,认定一位大神,但不否定其他神圣存在物的存在。"——塔里亚斐洛,载布宁和崔-詹姆斯(编):《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》,1996年,第446页。

异端

[源自希腊文 *hairein*, 意思是"取得某件东西",后来指"得到或持有一个观点"]在古代,

school, whether the Peripatetics, Academics, Epicureans and Stoics, was considered as a heresy. Hence, heresy was originally not a term of abuse. A heretic was a person who teaches his own view. Christianity at the very beginning also considered itself a heresy, but when it gained dominance, it used the term for any view which does not conform to orthodox Christian teaching or for any sect whose interpretation of the Bible was different from the official interpretation of the Church. The Church determined which beliefs were a heresy and, hence, who should be punished. Many heretics were burned in the Middle Age. Similar patterns of heresy, intolerance and expulsion can arise in secular fields, especially where authority is more important than reason in resolving disputes about doctrine.

"Heresy is a separation made in ecclesiastical communion between men of the same religion, for some opinions no way contained in the rule itself." —Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, in *The Works of John Locke*, 1824, Vol. 5, p. 55.

Hermeneutic circle

A notion introduced by Schleiermacher, originally referring to the relation of the whole and the part in interpretation. The parts cannot be interpreted without an understanding of the whole, but the whole cannot be understood without an interpretation of the parts.

When Heidegger radically reinterpreted "understanding" from a species of human cognition to the primordial mode of *Dasein's* being, the hermeneutic circle became the principal method for his fundamental ontology. Starting from our traditional understanding of Being, we assume that the analysis of *Dasein* serves as a basis for the understanding of Being. Thus, we have a pre-understanding of Being derived from the practices and language of our culture. This characterisation is still incomplete and serves only to guide further investigation. We then proceed to analyse all of *Dasein's* characters of Being, the existentialia, and eventually reach a more primordial horizon for the understanding of Being. This investigation moves in a circle, but it is not a vicious one. Through it, philosophy makes explicit something that is implicitly known in life. Fundamental ontology is hence a back-and-forth movement between a pre-understanding of Being and the uncovering of the structural features of *Dasein*. Because both inquiry and justification are contextualised by a pre-understanding rooted in tradition and culture, the hermeneutic circle becomes a fundamental feature of all human activities. This idea is further developed by Gadamer. For him, the hermeneutic circle for human studies is similar to the *ad hoc* revision of hypotheses in the natural sciences. Human studies are caught up in this circle, for there are no axioms or self-evident truths upon which we can make linear progress in understanding. In proposing a basic role for the hermeneutic

任何学派,不论是逍遥派、学园派、伊壁鸠鲁派和斯多亚派,都被认为是一种异端。因此,该词原来并不是一个贬义词。一个异教徒就是一个讲授他自己观点的人。基督教最初也认为自己是异端,但当它取得了统治地位,它就把这个词用在任何不符合正统基督教学说的观点上,或用在任何对《圣经》的解释不同于教会的正式解释的派别上。教会决定哪个信仰是异端,并由此决定谁应受到惩罚。在中世纪,许多异教徒被烧死了,与对待异端的模式相似,不宽容和压制也在世俗领域中出现,尤其是在解决有关学说的争论中权威比理性更重要时。

"异端是基督教团在同一宗教的人之间因某些与规则本身不容的观点而造成的分离。" — 洛克:《论宽容》,载于《J. 洛克著作集》,1824年,第五卷,第55页。

解释学循环

由施莱尔马赫引入的一个观念,原本指解释中的整体与部分的关系。部分不能离开对整体的理解而得到解释,而整体也不能没有对部分的解释而得到理解。

当海德格尔将"理解"〔或"领会"〕从人类认知的一种方式彻底地重新解释为缘在(*Dasein*)存在的原发方式时,解释学的循环就成为他的基础存在论的主要方法。从我们对于存在的传统理解出发,我们假定对于缘在的分析提供了一个理解存在的基础。这样,我们就从我们所处的文化实践和语言中得到了对于存在的一种在先的理解。这种说法仍不完整,只是引进到进一步的研究。接下来我们就会去分析存在的所有缘在特性,即缘在的诸生存方式,从而最终达到理解存在的一个更原本的视域。这种研究导致了循环运作,但不是恶性循环。通过它,哲学使那隐含于生活中的某些东西彰显出来。因此,基础存在论是处于对于存在的在先理解和对于缘在结构特点的揭蔽之间的一种往返运动。由于探究和辩明都处于那源于传统和文化的语境之中,因此解释学循环就成为所有人类行为的基本特点。这种观点在伽达默尔那里得到进一步发展,对他说来,为人文研究而进行的解释学循环类似于自然科学中对于假设的特定修正。人文研究躲不开这循环,因为其中没有我们据之而在理解中作线性进步的公理或自明真理。通过让解释学循环扮演如此关键的角色,伽达默尔否定了将〔自然科学中的〕假设—演绎方法用于人文学科的做法。

"这〔解释学的〕循环从本质上不是形式的,它既非主观的,亦非客观的,而是将理解描述为

circle, Gadamer resists the application of the hypothetico-deductive method to human studies.

"The [hermeneutic] circle, then, is not formal in nature, it is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter." —Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen Doepel), 1975, p. 261.

Hermeneutic phenomenology, see phenomenology

Hermeneutics

[from Greek: *Hermenia*, the god who conveys the messages of Zeus, thus associating hermeneutics with the problem of understanding and interpretation] Hermeneutics started as a methodology of interpretation, based by Schleiermacher on his own experience in studying Plato and the New Testament. Beside grammatical understanding, which concerns the written text, he claimed that we should seek a psychological understanding to uncover the living principles or ideas in the mind of the author of a text. Dilthey further developed hermeneutics as a methodology aiming to recreate an author's original process of creation and to provide grounds for objectivity in the human sciences, in contrast to the grounds for objectivity in the natural sciences.

Traditional hermeneutics in Schleiermacher and Dilthey took understanding to be a subspecies of knowing and took hermeneutic itself to be a technique rather than being philosophy. In contrast, Heidegger considered understanding to be a central mode of human existence, the projection of the possibilities of *Dasein* tied to the world. For him, hermeneutics should deal with human existence as "text-analogous", that is as a meaningful text for which we uncover its underlying meaning. In this way hermeneutics becomes philosophy itself. The hermeneutic circle becomes involved in explaining *Dasein*'s being rather than in explicating literary texts.

Gadamer, on the basis of Heidegger's notion of understanding, developed a general hermeneutics which he called "philosophical hermeneutics". He claimed that understanding is not a methodological problem and does not aim to formulate a set of interpretative rules. Rather, understanding is the basic feature of human existence. Hence, hermeneutics is ontological rather than methodological and should seek to reveal the fundamental conditions that underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes. The object of human sciences is part of our heritage. It is part of the effective history to which we already belong and it orients our normal understanding. It is irrelevant to demand objectivity in the human sciences, because all understanding must be prejudiced and is not purely objective. No interpretation can be final. Understanding is a constant play between the interpreters and the text.

传统的运动和解释者的运动的相互作用。”——伽达默尔：《真理与方法》（格兰·多培尔英译），1975年，第261页。

解释学的现象学

见“现象学”条。

解释学〔或译“诠释学”〕

〔来自希腊文 *Hermenia*，即为宙斯传递消息的神，因此，解释学就与理解与解释的问题相关〕解释学一开始指解释的方法，基于施莱尔马赫在研究柏拉图和新约中的独特体验。除了涉及文本的语法上的理解，他主张我们还应该寻求一种心理学意义上的理解，以便去揭示那活在此文本作者心头的原则和观念。狄尔泰进一步发展了解释学，将它当做重视作者的原本创作过程并为人文学科提供了一个客观性基础的方法论；这种基础不同于自然科学中的客观性基础。

施莱尔马赫和狄尔泰的传统解释学将理解当做认知的一个亚种，将解释学本身当做一种技巧而非哲学。与此不同，海德格尔将理解视为人类生存的根本方式，或者与世界相连的缘在 (*Dasein*) 的各种可能性的抛投。对他说来，解释学看待人类生存如同看待“类似文本者”：这是一份我们要揭示其潜在含义的充满意义的文本。以这种方式，解释学成为哲学本身。解释学的循环也就涉及到解释缘在的存在，而不是澄清字面的文本。

伽达默尔在海德格尔关于理解或领会的看法的基础上，发展出了一般解释学，被他称之为“哲学解释学”。他认为理解不是一个方法论问题，其目的也不是制定一组解释规则。理解或领会应被视为人类生存状态的基本特点，因此，解释学是存在论的而不是方法论的，其目标应去揭示各种理解现象所依据的基本条件。人文科学的对象是我们遗产的一部分，又是效果历史的一部分；我们已经属于效果史，它引导着我们正常理解的方向。在人文科学中要求客观性是不得要领的，因为所有理解一定会带有偏见而不会是纯客观的。没有任何解释能是最终性的，理解是在解释者和文本之间的不断游动。

解释学中的其他主要人物包括 E. 伯尔蒂和 P. 利科。这种对于人类知识的语境性 (contextuality) 的强调影响到了 R. 德沃金、C. 泰勒、A. 麦金泰尔和 R. 罗蒂的工作。

“因此，这里展示的解释学不是人文学科的方法论，而是试图超出这些学科的方法论自我

Other major figures in hermeneutics include Emilio Berti and Paul Ricoeur. The emphasis on the contextuality of human knowing has influenced the work of Ronald Dworkin, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty.

"The hermeneutics developed here is not, therefore, a methodology of the human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world." —Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen-Doepel), 1975, xiii.

Heterological paradox, another name for Grelling's paradox

Heteronomy

[from Greek: *hetero*, other + *nomos*, law] Being bound by the legislating of other agents, not of oneself. A mode of action in which reason acts under a law which it has not prescribed. In ethics, a heteronomous will is controlled by an external cause or interest. In contrast, an autonomous will is free and decides actions itself. Kant considered most traditional moral theories to be based on heteronomous moral principles, whose validity depends upon the interests that we hold rather than being imposed by reason. They contain hypothetical imperatives, while Kant's own principle of autonomy is a categorical imperative. A person is heteronomous if his actions are determined by the passions or inclinations rather than by reason. A will is heteronomous if it follows the guide of desire.

"If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy always results." — Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Sect. II, 441.

Heuristic

[from Greek: *heuristikein*, to find out, to discover] An experimental process of discovery, which is conducive to an investigation or to understanding without the use of algorithms. A heuristic act requires originality and invention. In this sense, it contrasts with the process of mere routine application of established knowledge or to a teacher demonstrating the established results of the sciences. In modern logic, a heuristic procedure aims at problem-solving, but offers no guarantee of providing a proof. In this sense, heuristic contrasts with proof. In education theory, a heuristic method trains students to find problems and solutions for themselves.

"Intellectual acts of a heuristic kind make an addition to knowledge and are in this sense irreversible, while the ensuing routine performances operate within an existing frame-

意识,去理解人文科学到底是什么,以及什么将它们与我们对于世界的总体经验联系起来。"——伽达默尔:《真理与方法》(格兰-多培尔英译),1975年,第xiii页。

非自谓悖论

“格里林悖论”的另一个名称。

他律

[源自希腊文 *hetero* (其他) 和 *nomos* (法则)], 由其他行为者而不是由自己来立法; 指理性在一种不是由自己规定的法则下而行动的行为方式。在伦理学中, 他律的意志受外部原因或利益所控制, 相反, 自律的意志是自由的并自己决定其行动。对于康德来说, 大多数传统的道德理论是建立在他律的道德原理基础上, 它们的有效性依赖于我们所具有的利益, 而不是由理性赋予的。因此它们是假言命令, 而康德自己的自律原理是绝对命令。如果一个人的行为是由激情或倾向而不是由理性决定的, 那么, 他就是他律的。如果意志听从欲望的指引, 则它是他律的。

“如果意志寻找这样一种规律, 这种规律随处都在规定它, 而就是不使它的准则适合它自己的普遍立法; 如果它这样走出自身之外, 在它的任何对象的属性中寻找这种规律, 那么, 他律就会产生。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》, 第二章, 第441页。

助发现 (也译作“启发式”)

[源自希腊文 *heuristikein*, “去找出”, “去发现”] 指一种发现的实验过程, 它有助于不用算法的研究或认识。助发现行为需要创见和发明。在这种意义上, 它与仅对已确立的知识作常规应用的过程, 以及教师对已确立的科学成果所做的验证形成对照。在现代逻辑中, 助发现旨在一种解题程序, 但并不保证提供证明。在这种意义上, 助发现与证明形成对照。在教育理论中, 助发现方法训练学生去自己发现和解决问题。

“一种助发现的智力活动对知识有所增加, 在这种意义上是不可逆的, 而接下来常规行为活动于现存知识框架以内, 因而在这个范围内是可逆的。”——波兰尼:《个人知识》, 1958年, 第71页。

work of knowledge and are to this extent reversible.” — Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, 1958, p. 71.

Highest good, English translation of *summum bonum*

Historical determinism

The position that a fundamental factor is or must be responsible for the happening of all historical events. Events are determined by this factor and are functions of it. Because it is determined in this way, history develops according to objective historical laws and has an inevitable tendency or fixed direction. There are various versions of historical determinism, depending on what is regarded as filling the role of the fundamental factor. Historical determinists use their theory to make factual statements about actual historical events and tend to predict future developments on the basis of what they see as historical laws. For this reason, historical determinism is sometimes regarded as another name for speculative philosophy of history. Philosophers have challenged the claim that there must be an underlying factor and that there can be such a factor. Every proposal for the determining factor in history has attracted critical examination.

“The advocates of such a [historical] determinism may fix on geography, climate, race, religion, philosophy, or the material conditions of life and may argue that one such variance is fundamental, that all the other variables of history are functions of it.” —White, *Foundations of Historical Knowledge*, 1965, p. 181.

Historical explanation

The task of historians is to explain what happened in the past. When they claim to provide understanding, what is the form of their explanation and what is its character and nature? Philosophers are generally divided over this issue. Some believe that historical explanation is an application of a paradigm of scientific explanation, especially Carl Hempel's covering law model or the deductive-nomological model. On this view, to explain a particular event is to bring it under some general causal law as an instance of that law. Accordingly, explaining an historical event is to subsume it under the general regularity to which it belongs. Because well established causal laws are rarely found in history, Hempel concedes that historical explanations are explanation sketches, that is vague and incomplete preliminary accounts leading to fully supported explanations like those in science. New insights into the nature of science might lead to altered versions of Hempel's original argument using different paradigms of scientific explanation.

Other philosophers argue that explanations in history and science are distinct on the grounds that they address different subject matters. While science is concerned with the

至善

“至善 (*summum bonum*)” 的英译。

历史决定论

这种主张认为, 有一个基本因素应对所有历史事件的发生负有责任或必定负有责任。事件都是由这一因素决定的, 并且是它的作用的结果。由于历史是这样被决定的, 因此, 历史是按照客观的历史规律发展的, 具有一种不可避免的趋向或确定的方向。历史决定论有各种不同的形式, 这取决于把什么视为担当基本因素的角色。历史决定论者用他们的理论对实际的历史事件做出事实性的陈述, 并倾向以他们认为的历史规律为基础预言未来的发展。因此, 历史决定论有时又被看作思辨的历史哲学的别名。哲学家们已对那种认为必定有一个基本因素而且能够有这样一个因素的主张提出了挑战。有关历史中的决定因素的每一种建议都引起了批判性的考查。

“这种 [历史] 决定论的提倡者可能专注于地理、气候、种族、宗教、哲学或生活的物质条件, 而且可能论证说其中一种的变化是根本性的, 历史的一切其他变化都是因之而起的。” ——怀特: 《历史知识的基础》, 1965 年, 第 181 页。

历史解释

历史学家的任务是解释过去所发生的事。当他们声称提供解释时, 他们解释的形式是什么? 其特性和本质又是什么? 哲学家们在这些问题上一般存在很大的分歧。一些人认为, 历史解释是对科学解释范式的一种应用, 尤其是对 K. 亨佩尔的覆盖律模型或演绎—思维法模式的应用。根据这种观点, 解释一个特定事件, 就是将其作为某一一般的因果律的例子将其置于这一因果律之下。因此, 解释一个历史事件就是将其归入它所从属的一般规律中。因为完全确立的因果律在历史中难得发现, 亨佩尔承认历史解释是粗略的解释, 是模糊的、不完全的、初步的说明, 但认为这种说明是通向得到充分证明的、与那些科学中的解释相同的解释的。对自然科学本质的新认识可能导致人们改变对亨佩尔使用科学解释不同范式所做的最初论证的看法。

另一些哲学家争辩说, 由于谈论的是不同的论题, 历史学中的解释和自然科学中的解释是不同的。科学关注的是一般的和普遍的东西, 是寻求对机械的物理世界的规律性的解释, 而历史学涉及的是独特的、受时空制约的、特殊的

general and universal in seeking to explain the regularities of the mechanical physical world, history deals with unique, spatiotemporally bounded, particular events. Historical events are made by human beings, and each individual human being has beliefs, desires, motives and intentions which cannot be generalised. They argue that the covering law model is not applicable in history. As an alternative, R. G. Collingwood and William Dray developed a rational explanation model, according to which historical understanding requires historians to establish the relation between a particular historical event and the reasons for agents to cause that event.

Disputes over historical explanation sometimes turn to the examination of concrete examples to explore the strengths and weaknesses of rival approaches.

"The term historical explanation is not as clear as one would like, and a brief cautionary note seems called for accordingly. For what I intend to discuss under this heading is only one of the main types of historical explanation, that whereby we explain actions by referring deeds to the 'thoughts' of individual agents (to their purposes, situation-conceptions, means/ends beliefs, and so on)." —Martin, *Historical Explanation*, 1977, p. 14.

Historical knowledge

Knowledge about the past, but derived from present evidence. It is often characterised as knowledge giving insight into particular past events in contrast to scientific knowledge, which is concerned with discovering general laws applicable to the past, present and future. Many philosophical problems arise concerning historical knowledge. Is there a real past beyond current experience which can determine the truth and falsity of historical statements? Some philosophers hold that there must be, for the existence of a real past is the best explanation of the present, but Russell questioned this claim. Even if there is a real past, many disputes concern the possibility of justifying our claims to have knowledge about it, partly because direct current experience of the past is apparently not available. Also, explanations proposed by historians seem to be inevitably subject to their own principles, beliefs and sympathies, which can distort their claims. Historical accounts retain value for us even if they are conflicting or are shown to be mistaken, possibly because some aspects of historical knowledge are carried by features other than factual accuracy. Some philosophers are more inclined to characterise the main features of historical knowledge than to discuss sceptical questions about its possibility.

"Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, and at the same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present." —Dilthey, *The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies*.

事件。历史事件是人造成的，每一个人都有自己的信念、欲望、动机和意图，这些是无法加以普遍化的。他们论证说，覆盖律模型不适用于历史学。作为一种替代物，R. G. 柯林伍德和 W. 德莱提出了一种合理解释的模型，按照这种模型，历史理解要求历史学家在特定历史事件和人们引起这一事件的理由之间确立起一种关系。

对历史解释的争论有时还转变为对具体事例的检验，以探究双方方法的长处和弱点。

“历史解释这个术语并不像人们期望的那样清楚，因此一个简短的告诫还是需要的。在本标题下我想讨论的只是一种主要的历史解释类型，根据这种解释类型，我们是通过把行为归结为个人的‘思想’（归结为他们的目的、与环境相关的观念、手段和目的、信仰，等等）来解释人们的行为的。”——马丁：《历史的解释》，1977年，第14页。

历史知识

根据现在的证据得出的关于过去的知识。与涉及发现适用于过去、现在和将来的一般规律的自然科学知识相比，历史知识常被说成是洞察特定的过去事件的知识。关于历史知识提出了许多哲学问题。能够决定历史陈述真伪的是现时的经验，那么存在超越这一经验的真正的过去吗？一些哲学家认为肯定存在，因为真正的过去的存在是对现在的最好解释，但罗素对这种主张提出疑问。即使有一个真正的过去，要证明我们拥有关于它的知识这一主张是否成立仍有很多争论，这部分是因为，对过去的直接现时经验显然是得不到的。而且，历史学家提出的解释似乎不可避免地受到他们自身的原则、信仰和同情心的影响，这些都会歪曲他们的主张。历史叙述即使在它们是相互抵触或被证实是错误的情况下，也仍然对我们有价值，这可能是因为历史知识的一些方面是由其特征而不是由事实的准确性支撑的。一些哲学家更倾向于揭示历史知识的主要特征，而不是探讨有关它的可能性的怀疑性问题。

“历史知识是关于精神在过去的所做所为的知识，同时也是这一切的重演，是过去的行为在现在的永存。”——狄尔泰：《人文科学中历史世界的形成》。

Historical materialism

The theory about human society and history proposed by Marx and Engels and developed by their followers. It is a model for historical explanation, based on dialectical materialism. A systematic exposition of this theory is not provided by its founders, but a framework is offered by Marx in *A Preface to The Critique of Political Economy* (1859). The theory holds that social being determines social consciousness. Human history is a developmental process of labour. The forces of production, by which humans obtain the material means of existence, is the real foundation of history. Humans, who enter into the relations of productions in labour, are divided into different economical classes according to their place in these relations. The forces of production and the relations of production form the economical structure of a society, which determine the superstructure, including the social and political superstructure and the ideological superstructure. To understand features of the superstructure such as religion, philosophy, literature or law, we must look to the productive or economic structure of society. When the forces of production develop to a certain extent, they come into conflict with the existing relations of production, and the latter become a fetter constraining the further development of the former. Such conflicts lead to a period of social revolution, and contradictions between the forces and relations of production are solved by class struggle. This struggle will result in a new society, in which the relations of production correspond to the productive forces and the superstructure corresponds to the economical structure. According to orthodox interpretations, the development of human society will go through five phases: primitive, slave and feudal society and capitalism and communism. Each new stage is formed by overcoming the internal contradictions between the forces and relations of production in the previous stage. Historical materialism predicts that capitalism will eventually be replaced by an ideal communism of which socialism is the preliminary stage.

Some critics question whether there can be any single explanatory scheme for historical development and others, on theoretical or empirical grounds, question the pattern of explanation offered by historical materialism. Within Marxism, many of the main features of the historical materialism have been reassessed.

"I hope, even British respectability will not be overshocked if I use, in English as well as in so many other languages, the term, 'historical materialism', to designate that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another." —Engels, *Socialism, Utopianism and Scientific*, introduction to the first English

历史唯物主义

由马克思和恩格斯提出,并由他们的追随者所发展的关于人类社会和历史的理论。它是建立在辩证唯物主义基础上的历史解释的模式。这个理论的系统阐发不是由它的创立者所提出的,马克思在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》(1859)中所提出的只是一个框架。这个理论主张,社会存在决定社会意识。人类历史是劳动的发展过程。生产力,人们赖以获得生存的物质手段,是历史的真正基础。人类在劳动中结成了生产关系,并按照他们在这些关系中所处的地位而划分为不同的经济阶级。生产力和生产关系构成社会的经济结构,它决定上层建筑,包括社会的和政治的上层建筑和意识形态上层建筑。要理解像宗教、哲学、文学或法律这样的上层建筑的特征,我们必须考察社会的生产结构或经济结构。当生产力发展到某种程度,它们就开始与现存生产关系相冲突,后者成为阻碍前者进一步发展的桎梏。这样一种冲突导致了社会革命时期的到来,生产力和生产关系之间的矛盾通过阶级斗争来解决。这种斗争导致了新的社会,在此社会中,生产关系适合于生产力,上层建筑适合于经济结构。按照正统的解释,人类社会的发展将经历五个阶段:原始社会,奴隶社会,封建社会,资本主义社会和共产主义社会。每个新阶段都是通过克服先前阶段中生产力和生产关系之间的内在矛盾而形成的。历史唯物主义预言,资本主义最终将被理想的共产主义社会所代替,社会主义是它的初级阶段。

某些批评家提出质疑,对于历史发展是否只能存在单一的解释图式;其他批评家则从理论的和经验的根据出发,怀疑这种由历史唯物主义提出的解释模式。在马克思主义内部,历史唯物主义的许多主要特征一直在重新被评价。

"如果我在英文中也像在其他许多文字中一样,用'历史唯物主义'这个名词来表达一种关于历史过程的观点,这种观点认为一切重要历史事件的终极原因和伟大动力是社会的经济发展,由此产生的社会被划分为不同的阶级,以及这些阶级彼此之间的斗争,那么,即使英国的体面人物也不致于感到太震惊吧。"——恩格斯:《社会主义从空想到科学的发展》,英文版第一版导言。

edition.

Historical objectivism, see historical relativism

Historical relativism

The claim that historical explanation cannot be objective on the model of scientific explanation, which is based on a methodology of theory, observation and experiment. Some philosophers agree that history does not have scientific objectivity, but claim that history and other subjects have their own appropriate notions of objectivity, but others explore the implications of the claim that historical explanation cannot be objective. Historians draw conclusions from documentation, but historical records may be neither faithful nor complete. In analysing historical documentation, an historian is not a perfectly neutral investigator, but is equipped with an array of horizons, biases and prejudices which can limit or distort historical work and also makes it possible. For this reason, different historians may reach remarkably different conclusions from the same material. Historical knowledge apparently must be relative to the minds of different historians or to the wider factors which shape their minds. Unless we have reason to believe that some factors are more likely to produce truth than others, we can clarify the patterns of relativity, but we cannot choose among historical interpretations based on them. In contrast to historical relativism, historical objectivism claims that historical knowledge can provide an exact reconstruction of what really happened in the past, and historical scepticism denies the possibility of historical knowledge at all. These different attitudes toward historical knowledge lead to different attitudes toward the reality of the past and the nature of history. For objectivism, the past is what actually happened independent of our minds. For scepticism, we cannot justify the claim that such a past exists. For relativism, the past comprises the often conflicting constructions of historians on the basis of evidence.

"Now the fact that every historical work, like any intellectual endeavour, is limited by psychological and sociological conditions (to mention only two) is indisputable. The radical novelty in historical relativism lies in the fact that it claims that the truth of the work, its meaning and validity, can only be grasped by referring its content to these conditions." — Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*, 1938, p. 19.

Historical scepticism, see historical relativism

Historical sentence

A sentence which describes what happened in the past. It is the main type of sentence that historians employ in their

历史客观主义

见“历史相对主义”条。

历史相对主义

认为历史解释不可能像以理论、观察和实验为方法论基础的自然科学解释模型那样客观。一些哲学家同意历史不具有科学意义上的客观性,但宣称历史学和其他学科都有自己的适当的客观性概念,另外一些哲学家则在探究历史解释不具有客观性这一主张的含义。历史学家是从历史文献中得出结论的,但历史记录可能既不真实也不完全。在分析历史文献时,历史学家不是一个完全中立的观察者,而是带有一系列的见识、倾向和偏见,这都会限制和歪曲历史研究并使其成为可能。由于这一原因,不同的历史学家从同一材料中可能会得出显然不同的结论。显而易见,历史知识肯定与不同历史学家的思想或形成他们思想的众多因素有关。除非我们有理由相信其中一些因素比其他因素更可能展现真理,我们才能阐明相对性的模式,但我们无法从以这些模式为基础的历史解释中进行挑选。与历史相对主义相反,历史客观主义宣称历史知识能够对过去发生的历史事件提供精确无误的重建,历史怀疑论则根本否认历史知识的可能性。对历史知识的不同态度导致了对过去的真实性和历史学的本质的不同态度。对客观主义而言,过去是实际发生的不以我们意识为转移的事物,在怀疑论看来,我们不能证实存在这样一种过去这一断言。相对主义则认为,过去是由历史学家的以证据为基础的、常常是冲突的建构组成的。

“现在这样一个事实是不容置疑的,这就是:像任何智力工作一样,每一项历史研究,都受到心理的和社会的条件(仅提及这两方面)的限制。历史相对主义的特别新异之处就在于,它认为这种研究的真理性、它的含义和有效性,只有在将其内容归诸这些条件时才能够捕捉到。”——曼德尔鲍姆:《关于历史知识的问题》,1978年,第19页。

历史怀疑论

见“历史相对主义”条。

历史句子

历史句子是描述过去发生的事情。它是历史学家在其写作中应用的主要类型的句子。历

writing. The subject of a historical sentence can either be an individual historical agent, such as Napoleon and Alexander, or a social entity, such as a class, group, religious organisation, social movement or political party. Why individual human beings and social entities can both be subjects of historical sentences and how they are related to one another are contested matters. They are central to the debate between methodological individualism and methodological collectivism, but they also enter disputes between individualism and holism at epistemological and metaphysical levels. Because historical sentences are based on memory and evidence rather than on current observation, their reliability is a main issue debated by supporters of historical objectivism, historical relativism and historical scepticism.

"By historical sentence I shall mean: a sentence which states some fact about the past." —A. C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 1965, p. 258.

Historicality, see historicity

Historicism

In one use, the view that the nature of a thing can be understood only by tracing its position and role in the context of historical development. In continental philosophy, the term has metaphysical as well as methodological significance. Historical development is viewed as objectively necessary and governed by its own laws. For Hegel, this objective process is the self-development of the world spirit or absolute self. This view is also shared by Italian philosophers Vico and Croce. For Marx this process is purely objective and independent of human agency. This continental notion of historicism leads to the claim that the historical approach is distinct from the naturalistic approach. It is this notion that Karl Popper has in mind when he attacks historicism in his *The Open Society and its Enemies*, and *The Poverty of Historicism*.

Analytical philosophy of history generally confines historicism to its methodological usage, claiming that an adequate explanation and evaluation must be historical. Many philosophers also believe that historical development can only be assessed relative to our outlooks or conceptual frameworks, and that these are historical in themselves. Consequently, any ahistorical and objective standpoint in evaluating human history is impossible. There is some dispute over how to distinguish historicity in this sense from relativism. This sense is close to what Popper calls "historism", that is explaining the differences between various sociological doctrines and schools by referring to their connection with the predilections and interests prevailing in a particular historical period.

A further sense of "historicism" refers to the attitude which requires that inquiry concerning historical events must

史句子的主语既可以是一个历史人物,如拿破仑、亚历山大,也可以是一个社会实体,如阶级、集团、宗教组织、社会运动或政党。为什么个人和社会实体都能作历史句子的主语,以及它们之间如何发生联系,这些都是有争议的问题。这些问题是方法论的个人主义和方法论的集体主义争论的主要问题,也是个人主义和整体主义在认识论和形而上学层面上争论的问题。由于历史句子是基于记忆和证据,而不是基于现时的观察,因而它们的可信性成为历史客观主义、历史相对主义和历史怀疑论的支持者争论的一个主要问题。

“我说的历史句子,指的是陈述关于过去的某一事实的句子。”——丹托:《分析的历史哲学》,1965年,第258页。

历史性

见“历史性 (historicity)”条。

历史主义

在某种用法上,是认为事物的性质只有通过追溯其在历史发展背景中的地位和作用才能得到理解。在欧洲大陆哲学中,这个词有着形而上学的以及方法论的意义。历史的发展被看作是客观必然的,受到历史自身规律的支配。在黑格尔看来,这种客观进程是世界精神或绝对精神的自身发展。意大利哲学家维柯和克罗齐也持有这种观点。在马克思看来,这个进程是完全客观的,独立于人类的影响因素。欧洲大陆的这种历史主义观念认为,历史的方法不同于自然主义的方法。这正是K.波普在他的《开放的社会及其敌人》和《历史主义的贫困》中攻击历史主义时所意指的目标。

分析的历史哲学通常把历史主义限定在方法论的用法上,认为恰当的解释和评价必定是历史的。许多哲学家还相信,对历史发展的评价只能相对于我们的视角或概念框架,而这些本身就是历史的。结果,在评价人类历史中的非历史的客观的立场就是不可能的。对于如何区分这种意义上的历史性与相对主义,还有争论。这种意义与波普所谓的“历史论”有关,即通过涉及各种社会学理论和学派与在某个特定的历史时期普遍流行的偏好和兴趣之间的联系,解释这些理论和学派之间的差别。

“历史主义”的另一个意义是指这样一种态度,它要求对历史事件的探究必须完全是历史的,即不受我们目前原理或信念的影响。但没有什么迹象表明这种方法在实践上是可能的。

“在社会学领域,与方法论的自然主义形成强烈对照,历史主义认为,物理学的某些有特色

be purely historical, that is, not influenced by our current principles or beliefs. But there is little evidence for the practical possibility of this approach.

"In strong opposition to methodological naturalism in the field of sociology, historicism claims that some of the characteristic methods of physics cannot be applied to the social sciences, owing to the profound differences between sociology and physics."—K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, 1957, p. 5.

Historicity

[German: *Geschichtlichkeit* or *Historizität*, also translated as historicality, a term in the phenomenological tradition denoting the feature of our human situation by which we are located in specific concrete temporal and historical circumstances.] For Dilthey, historicity identifies human beings as unique and concrete historical beings. According to Jaspers, it involves an essential characteristic of everything that is concrete and not universal and represents a synthesis of freedom and necessity. For Heidegger, historicity has two senses. First, *Dasein* must be understood as contextualized by the stream of concrete events of world-history. The second and more fundamental sense is based on Heidegger's claim that *Dasein* is not an object, but a life history, a happening, an unfolding between birth and death and a flowing outward into the future and backward into the past. Hence historicity is defined by Heidegger in terms of temporalization or structure of temporality. It denotes *Dasein's* way of taking up the possibilities of the past by projecting itself onto its ownmost possibility of being-as-whole. The human past is constitutive of the self and its future possibilities. Heidegger himself saw difficulties in harmonising these two senses.

"Authentic Being-towards-death—that is to say, the finitude of temporality—is the hidden basis of *Dasein's* historicity." — Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 438.

Historism, see historicism

Holism

The view that wholes have some metaphysical, epistemic or explanatory priority over the elements, members, individuals or parts composing them. A whole cannot be reduced to its parts. A part cannot be understood apart from the whole to which it belongs. Knowledge of the whole is not the simple aggregation of knowledge of its parts. Epistemological holism in the philosophy of science (the Duhem-Quine thesis) and semantic holism in the philosophy of language propose that the meaning and truth of our claims cannot be assessed one by one, but must be assessed as part of theo-

的方法不能用于社会科学, 因为社会学与物理学之间有着深刻的差别。”——波普:《历史主义的贫困》, 1957年, 第5页。

历史性

[德文原文是 *Geschichtlichkeit* 或 *Historizität*; 也在英语中译作 “historicality”。这是现象学传统中使用的一个词, 意指我们人类所处的形势的特点; 由于这种特点, 我们处于特殊的、具体的时间和历史环境之中]对于狄泰尔而言, 历史性的思路将人类存在者看作是独特的和具体的历史存在者。按照雅斯贝尔斯的观点, 它涉及每个具体的和非普遍的事物的一个本质特点, 代表了自由和必然的一个综合。对于海德格尔来说, 历史性有两个意义。首先, 缘在 (*Dasein*) 必须被视为处于世界历史的具体事件之流的语境之中。第二个也是更基本的含义基于海德格尔的这样一种主张, 即缘在不是一个对象, 而是一个生活历史, 一种发生, 一种在生与死之间的展开, 一种朝向将来和回到过去的涌流。因此, 海德格尔用时间化 (时机化) 或时间结构来定义历史性。通过缘在抛投 (筹划) 自身于它作为一整体存在的最切己的可能性, 这时间化指示出缘在承担过去的可能性的方式。人的过去构成着其自身和这自身的未来可能。海德格尔本人感到要协调这两种“历史性”的含义是困难的。

“真正切己的朝向死亡、即时间性的有限终极的存在乃是缘在历史性的隐蔽着的基础。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年, 第438页。

历史论

见“历史主义”条。

整体论

这一观点认为, 整体在形而上学、认识论或解释力上优于其所由组成的元素、成员、个体或部分。整体不能还原为其部分。一个部分不能离开它所属的整体来理解。关于整体的知识不是关于部分的知识简单相加。科学哲学中的认识论的整体论 (杜恒-奎因论题) 和语言哲学中的“语义整体论”提出, 我们的主张的意义和真不能一个一个地来评价, 而必须作为理论、理论整体或我们关于世界的所有信念的一部分来评价。在社会科学中, 与方法论的个体论相对立的

ries, bodies of theory, or everything we believe about the world. In the social sciences, methodological holism, in contrast to methodological individualism, claims that individuals can be understood only in terms of the practices or institutions in which they take part. It is a rival to some aspects of individualism which seek to reduce statements about groups, institutions and culture to statements about certain of their components. Metaphysical holism claims that wholes are distinct entities, whose existence cannot be reduced to that of the items composing them. On some views these wholes are prior to their parts, but on others they emerge from the interaction between parts.

"Holism blurs the supposed contrast between the synthetic sentence, with its empirical content, and the analytic sentence, with its null content." — Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 71.

Holistic property, see anatomic property

Holy

In the broad sense, anything that people worship. The holy is a religious quality which is distinguished from the ordinary by virtue of its mighty power. Human experience of the holy is parallel to the aesthetic experience of the sublime. Before Christianity, gods were not considered to be naturally friendly and hence the holy is associated with supernatural, unpredictable, fearful or threatening power. The God of Christianity is omnipotent but also morally perfect. Although the holy is still associated with awesomeness, God, as a holy object, is the primary source of beauty, love and moral reverence. The holy is thus used as a synonym of the sacred. The Bible refers to itself as holy books, and theology calls the Old and New Testaments the holy Scriptures. The Trinity consists of the holy father, the holy son and the holy spirit. For Christians, the holy family is Jesus, his mother Mary and St. Joseph. On this basis, holy is also used for absolute and complete moral goodness and becomes a moral term as well. For Kant, a will which unconditionally obeys the categorical imperative out of a sense of duty is a holy will.

"'Holy' becomes 'good', and 'good' from that very fact in turn becomes 'holy', 'sacrosanct'; until there results a thenceforth indissoluble synthesis of the two elements and the final outcome is thus the fuller, more complex sense of 'holy', in which it is at once good and sacrosanct." — Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, 1950, p. 54.

Holy will, see good will

方法论的整体论宣称,个体只能通过它所参与的实践或机构来理解;而相反,方法论的个体论的某些观点则试图将关于团体、机构和文化的陈述还原为关于其某些组成成分的陈述。形而上的整体论声称,整体是不同的存在,其存在不能被还原为它所由组成的东西。某些观点认为整体先于部分,而另外一些观点则认为整体产生于部分之间的相互作用。

“整体论涂抹了具有经验内容的综合句子与不具有内容的分析语句之间的假定区别。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第71页。

整体特性

见“结构特性”条。

神圣

从广义上讲,指人所崇拜的任何东西,神圣是一种宗教性质,靠其非凡的力量而与平凡相区别。人类的神圣体验和无神论的崇高体验相似。在基督教之前,人们并不认为诸神是本性友好的,因此,神圣与超自然的、不可预言的、恐惧的或危险的力量相关联。基督教的上帝是全能的,但在道德上也是完美的。所以,虽然神圣依然与威严关联,但上帝作为一位神圣的对象,是美、爱和道德崇敬的首要来源。这样,“神圣”就用作至圣的同义语。圣经本身说成神圣之书,神学把旧约和新约称为神圣的经典。“三位一体”由圣父、圣子和圣灵构成。对基督徒来说,“神圣家庭”指耶稣与他的母亲玛莉及圣约瑟夫。以此为基础,神圣也用以指称绝对的、完美的道德善,成为一个道德术语。在康德那里,无条件地服从出自义务意义的绝对命令的意志是神圣意志。

“‘神圣’成为‘善’,‘善’从那个事实出发,又反过来成为‘神圣’、‘至圣’;直到产生出两种成分不可分解的综合结果,最后的结果是‘神圣’的含义更充实、更复杂,在其中,它同时是善和至圣。”——奥托:《神圣观念》,1950年,第54页。

神圣意志

见“善良意志”条。

Homonym

For Aristotle two different kinds of things are homonymous if they have the same name, but the name applies to them for different reasons. For example, a man and a picture of a man can both be called animal, but the man is so-called because according to Aristotle's definition of animal it is a living thing that moves itself, and the picture is so-called, not because it fits the definition of animal, but because it is a representation of something which is an animal. These meanings are obviously different. In Aristotle's metaphysics, a finger, in a normal sense, is a finger of a living body. Once it is separated from that body, it is dead and can only be called a finger homonymously. This point is important in his discussion of matter and definition.

"Things are said to be named 'homonymously' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each." --Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a1-2.

Homosexuality, problem of

A homosexual relationship is an erotic relationship between persons of the same sex. It has historically been generally regarded as immoral, for it is disapproved of by the majority of social customs and the majority of the population. However, this wide disapproval seems merely a matter of opinion rather than something with a rational foundation. According to rational moralists, there is a distance between a mere opinion and moral truth. Another reason proposed to condemn homosexuality is the claim that it violates natural law and cannot lead to the fulfilment of the reproductive function of genitals. However there are many ways to consider what a thing's nature is, and the body has more functions than reproduction. Moreover, progress in biology and psychology has indicated that homosexuality is a natural state rather than a freely-chosen sinful condition.

"If I am right, then constraints on liberty that can be justified only on the ground that the majority finds homosexuality distasteful, or disapproves of the culture that it generates, are offensive to equality and so incompatible with a theory of representation based on equal concern and respect." —Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 86.

Homunctionalism

Also called homuncular functionalism. A theory in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, associated with W. G. Lycan and D. Dennett. In opposition to reductionism, it explains a mind or intelligent system by considering it to be a system made up of interconnecting departments. Each department can be seen as a homunculus, a small sub-personal agent, with its own function to perform. These homunculi are co-ordinated with each other to produce the overall behavioural response of a mind or an intelligent system to stim-

同名异义词

在亚里士多德看来,如果两类不同的事物有着相同的名称,它们就是同名异义的,但这名称是因为不同的理由而适于它们。例如,一个人和一张人的画像,两者都能被称作“动物”;但如此称谓人乃因为按照亚里士多德对动物的定义,它是一个自己运动的有生物,画像得到如此称谓,并不因为它适合动物的定义,而在于它是某物的代表,而这某物是动物。这些含义显然是不同的。在亚里士多德的形而上学中,一根手指就其正规含义而言,是一生命躯体的手指,一旦它与该躯体分离,即成为死的,虽也能称作手指,但只是同名异义。在他对质料和定义的讨论中,这点很重要。

“当与名称相符的定义各不相同,虽然事物有共同的名称,但它们会被说成‘同名异义’的。”——亚里士多德:《范畴》,1a1-2。

同性恋问题

一种同性恋关系就是相同性别的人之的性爱关系。这在历史上被看作是不道德的,因为它不为大多数的社会习俗和大多数社会成员所赞许。不过,这种多数不赞许似乎仅仅是一种意见而不是有着某种合理性基础的东西。在理性主义伦理学家看来,一种只是意见的东西和道德真理之间是有距离的。谴责同性恋的另一个理由是说,它违反了自然法则,因而不能导致性的再生产功能的实现。不过,有许多方法去考虑什么是一物的自然本性。肉体的功能并不限于再生产。而且,生物学和心理学的的发展表明,同性恋是一种自然状态,而不是一种自由选择的恶的状态。

“如果我是对的,那么,只是依据多数人发现同性恋是令人可厌的,或不赞许同性恋导致的文化这样一些理由为基础所证明的对于自由的限制,就是对平等的冒犯,是与在平等关怀和尊重的基础上建立起来的表象理论不相容的。”——德沃金:《原则问题》,1986年,第86页。

小人论

又称“小人功能主义”。心的哲学与认知科学中的一个理论,与W. G. 里库和D. 丹奈特有关。与还原论相反,它通过将心或智力系统视为一个由相互关联的部门所组成的系统来解释它。每一个部门都可以看作是一个具有自己的功能的“小人”(一个小的亚人行为者)。这些小人彼此协调以产生一个心或一个智力系统对刺激的整体行为反应。每一个部门或小人又可以转而被视为一个由互相关联的亚部门或亚小人

uli. Each department, or each homunculus, can in turn be viewed as a system composed of interconnected sub-departments or sub-homunculi. This process can go down to the neurological level. In this hierarchy, the task performed by lower level units are simpler and easier than the task of the higher level unit which they are supposed to explain.

"The irreducibility of institutional types makes for a mark in favour of homunctionalism as a philosophical theory of the mental." —Lycan, *Consciousness*, 1987, p. 42.

Homuncular functionalism, another term for homunctionalism

Homunculus

[Latin: small man] Generally used for those fallacious theories in the philosophy of mind which explain mental states and processes in terms of the hypothesis that there is a further human-like agent within us who has the same mental states and processes as ourselves. This kind of theory involves a regress *ad infinitum*, for we may ask whether there is a further human-like agent within in this entity to whom we must appeal in order to explain our mental states. However, Dennett argues that the homunculus hypothesis can be a useful explanation if there is a hierarchy of homunculi, where each performs a simpler task than the task they are together employed to explain. He subscribes, on this basis, to the position of homuncular functionalism.

"Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entirely the talents they are run in to explain. If one can get a team or committee of relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculi to produce the intelligent behaviour of the whole this is progress." —D. Dennett, *Brainstorms*, 1978.

Homunculus fallacy, see homunculus

Honour

Honour is a state of being esteemed as a result of one's social position, one's achievements, or of one's excellence of any sort. The moral worth of honour and whether it should be morally pursued are matters of dispute. For Aristotle, the magnanimous person should seek honour for otherwise he shows a weakness or defect. In Christian ethics, humility is a chief virtue, and honour should be ascribed to God. Hobbes believed that the pursuit of honour is a basic human drive and is morally neutral. To honour someone is the same as respecting that person. We have a duty to honour others and honour oneself.

"The desire to join others in friendship to himself, with which a man living according to the guidance of reason is possessed, I call 'honour'." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37.

组成的一个系统。这一过程可以一直下行到神经水平。在这个等级结构中,低一级水平的单位所完成的任务比它所解释的高一级水平所完成的任务要简单和容易。

"机构类型的不可还原是支持小人论作为心的哲学理论的一个标志。"——里库,《意识》,1987年,第42页。

小人功能主义

"小人论"的别名。

小人

[拉丁文:小人]通常用来指心的哲学中那些错误理论。这些理论用这样一种假设来解释心的状态和过程,即认为我们中间有一个更像人的行为者,他像我们一样有着同样的心的状态和过程。这种理论包含着一个无限后推,因为我们可以问,在这个更像人的行为者中是否还存在另一个像人的行为者,使得我们必须求助于它才能解释我们的心的状态?然而,丹奈特论辩说,如果有一个小人等级,其中每一个都完成比它们一起被用来解释的小人更为简单的任务,那么小人假设就可以是一个有用的解释。在此基础上,他同意小人功能主义的观点。

"只有当小人完全复制它们所要解释的东西的才能时,它们才是怪物。如果我们有一队或一组相对无知、兴趣狭窄、盲目的小人来产生整个的智力行为,这就是进步。"——丹奈特:《奇思妙想》,1978年。

小人谬误

见"小人"条。

荣誉

荣誉是一种受到尊重的状态,它归因于某人的社会地位,某人的成就,或任何一种卓越。荣誉的道德价值和是否应在道德上追求它,是一个有争论的问题。对于亚里士多德来说,人格伟岸的人应当追求它,否则他就会表现出一种软弱或不足。在基督教伦理学中,谦卑是主要的德性,而荣誉则应被归之于上帝。霍布斯相信,对于荣誉的追求是一种人的基本欲求,在道德上是中性的,给某人以荣誉等于是尊敬那个人。我们有职责使他人有荣誉,使自己有荣誉。

"一个其生活依照理性指导的人所拥有的以友谊的方式把他自己与他人联结起来的欲望,我称之为'荣誉'。"——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第四章,命题37。

Horizon

A term given a special philosophical meaning in the works of Husserl, Heidegger and Dilthey and other phenomenologist and hermeneutic philosophers. An horizon is a framework or field of vision within which one understands. Everyone as an historical being is conditioned by a tradition and culture and hence dwells in some horizon. An horizon is one's life world. An understanding which is purely objective and, hence, free from one's particular horizon cannot exist. The meaning of a text is determined within some horizon. To achieve historical understanding one must acquire an historical horizon and interpret in terms of historical being itself and of the horizon of the past tradition, rather than in terms of one's contemporary criteria and prejudice. An horizon itself is always in the process of formation. The phenomenon of horizons is the basis for the hermeneutic circle. It also suggests that since all understanding is achieved against the background of a horizon of intelligibility, no understanding is complete or free from error. The perspectival nature of the notion of horizon is captured by the notion of a point of view, but this more modest notion, for better or worse, leaves out some deeper aspects.

"A horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further." — Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen-Doepel), 1975, p. 217.

Horizontal stroke, see assertion sign

Horseshoe, the logical symbol " \supset "; see material implication

Hule, Greek term for matter

Human being

[from Latin; *homo*] For Aristotle, a human being is a rational animal. For Descartes, as a consequence of his dualism, a human being is not an organic whole, but the amalgam of two distinct elements, mind and body. In spite of this difference, however, both Aristotle and Descartes took rationality as the essential characteristic of human beings. "Human being" in this sense has been used as a synonym for "person", viewed as a being that possesses inalienable rights to life and liberty and that is superior to non-human animals. Contemporary moral philosophy tends to distinguish "persons" from "human beings", holding that the former is a self-conscious being, while the latter is simply a member of the species *Homo Sapiens*. We can use this distinction to ask how notions such as "I", "the self", "human being", "person" and "individual" differ in their content and application.

视域

一个在胡塞尔、海德格尔、狄尔泰和其他现象学及解释学哲学家们的著作中被赋予了特殊哲学意义的词。视域是一个人在其中进行领会或理解的构架或视野。每个人作为一个历史的存在者都处于某个传统和文化之中，并因此而居于某个视域之中。一个视域就是一个人的生活世界。不可能有纯客观的、与人的特殊视域无关的理解。一个文本的意义是在某个视域中被确定的。要获得对于历史的理解，一个人必须〔尽力〕得到一个历史的视域，并且通过历史存在者本身和过去传统的视域来进行解释，而不能只通过这个人的当代尺度和偏见来进行解释。一个视域本身总是一个形成的过程。视域现象是解释学循环的基础。它还包含这样的意思，即由于所有的理解都是在一个理智视域的背景下取得的，因此，没有任何理解是完全的或毫无偏差的。视域概念的视觉特性在“观点”(a point of view)这个词那里也有，但后者是个更温和的概念，不管是更好还是更糟，已失去了前者中所包含的某种更深的意义。

“一个视域不是一个僵硬的领域，而是那与人共行并邀请人进一步前行的东西。”——伽达默尔：《真理与方法》(格兰-多培尔英译)，1975年，第217页。

水平线

见“断定记号”条。

马蹄号

指逻辑符号“ \supset ”；参见“实质蕴涵”条。

质料

英文“matter (质料)”的希腊词。

人

[源自拉丁文 *homo*] 在亚里士多德看来，人是理性的动物。笛卡尔出于其二元论，认为人不是一个有机物的整体，而是心灵和肉体这两个不相容成分的混合。不过，尽管有这样的差异，亚里士多德和笛卡尔仍然都把具有理性作为人的本质特征。在这个意义上，人类被用作“人”(person)的同义词，被看作优于非人的动物，对生活、自由等具有不可剥夺权利的存在物。当代道德哲学倾向于将人同人类区分开来，认为前者是自我意识的存在，后者应指“有理智的人”(Homo Sapiens)这一物种中的一员。运用这一区分，我们就可以问这样的问题：“我”、“自我”、“人类”、“人”、“个体”之类的概念在内容和使用上有何不同。

“我们断言，人是由肉体 and 灵魂组成的，不

"We affirm that human beings are made up of body and soul, not by the mere presence or proximity of one to the other, but by a true substantial union." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham et al), III, p. 209.

Human chauvinism

A term introduced by Val Routley and Richard Routley, referring to the traditional anthropocentrism existing in Western culture according to which human beings are the only subjects of moral consideration and are the only objects with intrinsic values. Non-human species are not entitled to membership of the moral community, and they have value only insofar as they are instrumental to human interests or purposes. The ground for supporting this attitude is the belief that the human species has special characteristics such as reason, which make it superior to other species. Human chauvinism, which is also called speciesism by other authors, is the target of criticism of environmental ethics. On this view, human beings should change our moral consciousness towards animals and include them in the moral community in certain ways.

"Western ethics still appears to retain, as its very heart, a fundamental form of chauvinism, namely, human chauvinism. For both popular Western thought and most Western ethical theories assume that both value and morality can ultimately be reduced to matters of interest or concern to the class of humans." —R. and V. Routley, "Against the inevitability of human chauvinism", in Goodpaster and Sayre (eds), *Ethical Problems of the 21st Century*, 1979, p. 36.

Human nature

Starting with Greek essentialism, the philosophical tradition has generally held that there is a human nature and that it is made up of one or more qualities which determine what it is to be a human being and distinguish human beings from other kinds of animals. Different accounts of what qualities constitute human nature led to different views about how we should live. Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle argued that a human is essentially a rational animal. This standard view has been challenged by such figures as Hume, evolutionary theorists and Freud, who questioned the primacy of human rationality and in some cases found much continuity between humans and other animals. Some philosophers also reject rationality as the ultimate criterion to distinguish human from other animals because we accept persons lacking important rational capacities as human beings, yet exclude animals displaying significant rationality. The question of rationality in human nature has led to debates over many issues, concerning, for example, human identity, the distinction between the concept of a person and the concept of a human being, the human status of fetuses and infants, the senile and humans whose rational capacities are

is只通过其中一个呈现或接近了另一个,而是通过真正实质上的结合而组成的。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第三卷,第209页。

人类沙文主义

为V. 罗特勒和R. 罗特勒所采用的术语,指的是存在于西方文化中的传统的人类中心论,根据这种观念,人类是惟一的道德考虑的主体,是惟一的有着内在价值的对象。非人类的物种没有成为道德共同体成员的资格,它们所共有的价值仅是就它们可作为人类利益或目的追求的工具而言的。支持这种态度的理由是,相信人类种族有着特别的特征,诸如理性,这使得她超越于其他物种。人类沙文主义,也为其他作者称之为“物种主义”,是环境伦理学批评的目标。根据环境伦理学,人类应该改变对待动物的道德意识,以一定的方式把它们包括在道德共同体中。

“西方伦理学在它的核心部分仍然保留着沙文主义的基本形式,即人类沙文主义。因为流行的西方思想和西方伦理理论认定,价值和道德最终能够归结为人类种族的利益和对人类的关注。”——R. 和 V. 罗特勒:《反对人类沙文主义的必然性》,载古德帕斯特和莎耶尔(合编):《21世纪的伦理问题》,1979年,第36页。

人性

从古希腊的本质主义开始,在哲学传统中人们普遍认为有一种人类的本质,它由一个或更多的性质组成,它们决定了什么是人以及是什么将人与其他动物区别开来。关于什么性质构成了人类本质有不同的说法,由此而导致了有关我们应该如何生活的不同观点。希腊哲学家,比如柏拉图和亚里士多德,论证说人类从本质上是一种理性动物。这个通行的观点已受到像休谟、进化论者和弗洛伊德这些人的挑战;他们对在人类本性问题上的理性至上论表示怀疑,并在某些情况中发现人与其他动物之间的许多相似性。有些哲学家也不同意将理性作为区别人与其他动物的最终标准,因为我们将那些缺少重要理性能力的个人仍当做人类存在者,而将那些表现出相当程度理性的动物排除于外。人类本质中理性地位的问题已导致关于许多更具体问题的争论,比如关于辨别人类的一致性身份的问题,人的概念与人类概念之间的区分,胎儿与婴儿、衰老者与那些理性能力受到彻底损坏或为疾病所破坏者的人类身份问题。其他的问题还包括:人类本性是善的还是

radically damaged or diseased. Other issues include whether human nature is benevolent, sinful or selfinterested and the relationship between freedom and rationality. Modern political theory has been closely related to sharply contrasting views of human nature. In addition to offering different accounts of the contents of human nature, some philosophers have challenged the methodology of specifying human nature through finding a distinguishing essence.

The rise of anti-essentialism and the sociology of knowledge led to the rejection of human nature as a biologically fixed substratum which determines variable socio cultural formations. On this view, all our human features are moulded by our social environments or socially constructed within them. What seems to be a fixed human nature is a socio-cultural variable.

"It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the system or construction of human nature." — Butler, *Fifteen Sermons*, 1726, Preface.

Human sciences, see *Geisteswissenschaften*

Humanism

In the early Renaissance, the disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and philosophy were called *studia humanitatis*, that is the humanities. A teacher of one of these disciplines was called a "humanist". At that time the study of these disciplines was stimulated by the newly discovered literature of classical Greece and Rome. These teachers found a human ideal involving features such as a unity between humans and nature, a confidence in the power of human understanding, the ability to enjoy the pleasures of life. They tried in their teaching to develop the human personality in accordance with this model. Petrarch is generally called the father of humanism, and Erasmus is regarded as its most outstanding representative. Hence humanism originally meant the pursuit of a desirable kind of humanity. Since this human ideal was believed to have been lost in medieval times, such an educational programme became a movement aiming to liberate thought and was the most pervasive element of Renaissance culture.

In another sense, humanism was an American movement of thought in the early twentieth century. It was an attitude which emphasises the dignity of human beings by ascribing a fundamental set of human values to them. There were, however, significant variations among different versions of American humanism. Literary humanism accepted the dualism between humanity and nature and claimed that human value is derived from intuitive glimpses of a reality higher than nature. Scientific humanism argued that modern

罪的或自私自利的,自由与理性的关系,等等。当代政治理论与这些对于人类本质的尖锐对立的观点紧密相关。除了对于人类本质的内容提供不同的说法之外,一些哲学家已向这种通过找出某个特定本质来确定人性的方法论提出挑战。

反本质主义和知识社会学的兴起导致了对于这样一种人类本质观的拒绝:它将人类本质当做那决定可变的社会和文化构成体的固定基底。按照这种〔反本质主义的〕新观点,我们所有的人类特性都被我们的社会环境塑成,或者在这种环境中被社会性地构造出来。似乎是一种固定的人类本质的东西乃是社会—文化的变项。

“正是出自对于内在状态中的数种爱好和感情的相互关系的考虑,而且最重要的是,出自对于反思或良心的至上性的考虑,我们得到了关于人性的系统或结构的观念。”——巴特勒:《十五篇宣讲》,1726年,前言。

人文科学

见“人文科学 (*Geisteswissenschaften*)”条。

人文主义

在文艺复兴的早期阶段,语法、修辞、诗歌、历史、哲学等学科都被称为 *studia humanitatis*,即人文学。教授其中某门学科的教师被叫做“人文学者”。在那个时代,这些学科的研究受到了新发现的希腊和罗马的古典文献的刺激。这些教师找到了一种人类理想模型,这包含了人与自然之间的统一,对人类理解力量的自信及享受生活的快乐的能力。他们力图在自己的教育中发展与这种模型相符的人的个性。佩脱拉克一般被称为人文主义之父,爱拉斯谟则被当做最杰出的代表。因此,人文主义最初的含义是对一种想望人性的追求。由于人们相信这种人类理想已在中世纪失落,因而,这样的教育纲领就成为一场其目的在于解放思想的运动,成为文艺复兴文化中最为普及的内容。

在另一意义上,人文主义也是20世纪早期发生在美国的一场思想运动。它是一种通过肯定一系列人的根本价值来强调人类尊严的态度。但是,在美国人文主义的不同说法之间,存在着很大差异。文学人文主义接受人性与自然之间的二元论观点,断言人的价值源出于比自然更高的一种对实在的直觉一瞥。科学人文主义则主张,现代科学能够赋予价值和新的意义,断言依靠知识和力量,我们能够获得真正的启蒙和进步。主要倾向是宗教人文主义,它否认圣者和俗人之间的区别,主张人是自然的一部分,是作为连续的进化过程的结果而出现的。宇宙

science can offer value and new meanings and claimed that by means of its knowledge and power we can achieve true enlightenment and progress. The main trend was religious humanism which denied the distinction between the sacred and the secular. It claimed that man is a part of nature and has emerged as the result of a continuous process of evolution. The universe is not created, and religion consists of those actions, purposes and experiences which are humanly significant. The British pragmatist and humanist thinker F. C. S. Schiller believed that humanism is a tradition that proceeds from Protagoras' maxim that man is the measure of all things.

"The term 'humanism' has been associated with the Renaissance and its classical studies for more than a hundred years, but in recent times it has become the source of much philosophical and historical confusion. In present discourse almost any kind of concern with human value is called 'humanistic'." — Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, 1979, p. 21.

Humanity

[Latin: *humanitas*] The idea of humanity originated with the Stoics, who referred to the unity of mankind as a whole. The substance and essence of human beings or of the human species determines human beings as human and distinguishes human beings from animals. Humanity, furthermore, involves a set of moral and aesthetic characteristics which are valuable in themselves. Kant's Categorical Imperative, which requires that one treats a person as an end and not merely as a means is an expression of humanity as human dignity. Humanity is the object of respect in moral life. The moral and aesthetic characteristics of humanity are embodied in human expression and behaviour. Cicero and Seneca established *humanitas* as a moral-aesthetic ideal or way of life, an idea that is revived in the Renaissance. The subjects which constitute an educational programme to cultivate the ideal of humanity are called the humanities. In this century, Cassirer proposed that humanity should be understood in terms of the activities leading to its historical and cultural achievements.

"For the subject we wish to know is not the individual consciousness but the universal subject. If we refer to this subject by the term 'humanity', then we must affirm that humanity is not to be explained by man, but man by humanity." — Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, 1944, p. 64.

Hume's fork

A term is used in two different senses. In one sense, it is Hume's distinction between ought and is and his principle that if the premises are factual and do not contain normative elements, then no normative conclusion can be inferred. This follows from the more general principle that there can be nothing in the conclusion of a valid argument which is not al-

not be created, religion by those actions, intentions and experiences which are meaningful to man. British utilitarians and humanist thinkers F. C. S. Schiller believed that humanism is a tradition that proceeds from Protagoras' maxim that man is the measure of all things.

"'Humanism' — a word which has been associated with the Renaissance and its classical studies for more than a hundred years, but in recent times it has become the source of much philosophical and historical confusion. In present discourse almost any kind of concern with human value is called 'humanistic'." — Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, 1979, p. 21.

人性

[拉丁文为 *humanitas*] 人性的观念出自斯多亚主义者, 他们将人类看做一个完整的统一体。人类存在者或人类这个物种的实体和本质, 决定了人类之所以为人类, 并将人类存在者与动物区别开来。而且, 人性还涉及一组其本身就有价值的、道德的和美学的特点。康德的绝对命令要求将人作为目的而非手段来对待, 它表达出了作为人类尊严的人性。人性在道德生活中是尊敬的对象。人性的道德特性和美学特性由人的言行体现出来。西塞罗和塞涅卡将人性 (*humanitas*) 作为一个道德和美学的理念或生活方式而建立起来。这个观念在文艺复兴中得到了复活。那些去开发人性理念的教育项目的主科就被称为人文学科 (*humanities*)。在本世纪, 卡西尔提出, 人性应通过那些导致历史和文化成就的活动来得到理解。

"我们希望去了解的主体不是个人的意识, 而是普遍的主体。如果我们用 '人性' 这个词去指称这个主体, 我们就必须确认, 人性并不由人解释, 而是人由人性解释。" — 卡西尔: 《人论》, 1944 年, 第 64 页。

休谟的叉子

这一用语是从两种不同意义上使用的。从一种意义上讲, 它指的是休谟对应该与是所做的区分, 以及他的这样一个原则, 即如果前提是事实性的并且不包含规范的因素, 那就不能推出规范的结论。这遵循的是一个更为一般性的原则, 即一个有效的论证如果不是在前提中已

ready present in the premises.

In another sense, Hume's fork is his claim that there are only two valid kinds of reasoning: demonstrative reasoning concerning relations of ideas and empirical reasoning concerning matters of fact. This distinction provided a major argument against the validity of inductive reasoning in Hume's *Enquiries* (Sect. iv, Part 11). Inductive reasoning is not demonstrative reasoning, for demonstrative reasoning is *a priori* and implies no contradiction, while inductive reasoning admits contradictions. Nor is inductive reasoning empirical reasoning, which is based on experience and infers claims about the future on the assumption that the future will conform to the past. Because this assumption itself presupposes the validity of induction, a circularity is involved if induction is empirical reasoning. Therefore, induction is not a valid form of reasoning.

Both arguments based on kinds of Hume's fork have provoked deep and important philosophical controversy.

"The argument, sometimes known as 'Hume's fork', claims that there is a logical gap in any argument which seeks to derive moral conclusions from purely factual descriptive premises." — Plant, *Modern Political Thought*, 1991, p. 48.

Hume's law, see is/ought gap

Humility

Humility is the state of having a low opinion of oneself and of one's achievements. Humility seems to be a kind of inaccurate assessment of oneself, but it is still widely taken to be a virtue. For Christian ethics, we are from God and are determined by God, and every merit we achieve we owe to God. We should be grateful rather than be proud. Accordingly, humility is viewed as a distinctive virtue in dealing with the relationship between God and human beings, and in putting human beings in their proper place. For other ethical theories, humility involves not crediting too much to oneself. As human beings, we are determined by nature, helped by the contributions of others and are subject to various kinds of luck. Humility reflects these facts and is therefore admired.

"Humility is pain arising from the fact that man regards his want of power or weakness." Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, Prop. 26.

Humour

Humour is a psychological phenomenon which has a variety of objects, modes and institutional settings. Appreciation of humour characteristically involves laughter, although laughter can also express such things as pain, hysteria or embarrassment. It has been notoriously unclear what makes something funny, amusing or comical. One theory originated

经存在, 其结论就不会有任何东西。

从另一种意义上讲, 休谟的叉子指的是他的只有两种有效的推理这一主张: 涉及观念间关系的证明的推理, 和涉及实际事情的经验的推理。在休谟的《人类理智研究》(第四节, 第二部分中), 这一区分提供了一个反对归纳推理的主要论据。归纳推理不是证明的推理, 因为证明的推理是在先的而且不含有矛盾, 而归纳推理承认矛盾。归纳推理也不是经验的推理, 后者是以经验为基础的, 并且指的是有关未来的一些说法, 这些说法是以未来将与过去相一致的假设为根据的。因为这一假设本身是以归纳的有效性为前提的, 这样, 如果归纳是经验的推理, 它将包含一个循环论证。因此, 归纳不是一种有效的推理形式。

基于休谟的叉子的这两个论证引发了深入而重要的哲学论争。

“这一论证(有时被称为‘休谟的叉子’)认为, 任何试图从纯事实描述的前提得出道德结论的论证都存在一种逻辑上的缺陷。”——普朗特:《当代政治思想》, 1991年, 第48页。

休谟定律

见“‘是’和‘应该’之分”条。

谦卑

谦卑是对自己和对己的成就所做的一种较低估价的状态。谦卑似乎是对某人自己的一种不确切的估价, 但它仍普遍地被看做是一种德性。对于基督教伦理学来说, 我们来自于上帝并为上帝所决定, 因此我们所获得的每一个功绩都应归于上帝。我们应该感恩而不是自豪。因此, 谦卑被看做是一种在处理上帝与人类的关系中的德性, 是把人类置于一个适当的位置的优良美德。对于其他伦理学理论而言, 谦卑意味着一个人对自己没有太多的信心。作为人类, 我们为自然所决定, 得到他人贡献的帮助, 也易受各种运气的支配。谦卑反映了这些事实, 因此也得到人们的认可。

“谦卑是来自于人们认识到自己缺少力量或软弱这一痛苦的事实。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, 第三章, 命题26。

幽默

幽默是一种心理现象, 具有形形色色的对象、模式与习惯背景。就特征而论, 有关幽默的鉴赏活动包含发笑, 尽管发笑也可以表达痛苦、歇斯底里或尴尬等心理现象。那么, 到底是什么让事情显得可笑、可乐或具有喜剧性, 这一直极不清楚。由T. 霍布斯提出的理论认为, 幽默来

by Thomas Hobbes claims that humour arises if there is an insult to other people. We laugh because we feel a sense of superiority in some way to the object of humour. But this account is narrow and leaves out much which falls within the scope of humour. Another influential theory, developed by Kant and Schopenhauer, claims that humour arises if there is an insult to reason. Humour is a response to incongruities involving such things as logical impossibility, ambiguity, irrelevance and general inappropriateness. A theory developed by Freud holds that humour provides a release of nervous and psychical energy. Humour is related to such phenomena as wit, sarcasm and irony.

"The capacity to see and feel what is lovable, admirable, in a thing, and what is laughable in it, at the same time, constitutes humour." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, XX, p. 163.

Hylomorphism

[from Greek: *hyle*, matter + *morphe*, form, the doctrine of form and matter] Also spelled *hylomorphism*, a theory first elaborated by Aristotle, who claimed that reality is constituted by form and matter and that each living thing is composed of soul as form and body as matter. But hylomorphism had different senses in Aristotle. In one sense, the generation of a thing is the introduction of form into matter, but the pair of form and matter is not associated with the pair of actuality and potentiality. In the other sense, form is associated with actuality and matter is always understood as being potential. The generation of a thing on this account is the gradual development of potential matter, so that it becomes an individual upon obtaining form or actuality. This latter view of hylomorphism concerns the continuity of substantial change. Hylomorphism underwent further subtle development in medieval philosophy, especially in the metaphysics of Aquinas, and it was also the basis for philosophical anthropology.

"Aristotle's theory of the soul and its relation to the body is sometimes called 'hylomorphism', from the word *hyle* (matter) and *morphe* (form)." — J. Ackrill, *Aristotle*, p. 71.

Hylozoism

[from Greek: *hyle*, matter + *zoe*, life, the whole material world as endowed with life] A term credited to the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth to account for the relationship between the soul and the body, in contrast to dualism, materialism and hylomorphism. Hylozoism, which denied any distinction between spirit and matter and between life and body, is generally used interchangeably with panpsychism. Nevertheless, some argue that while hylozoism claims that life is inherent in all matter, panpsychism proposes that there are different degrees of consciousness in

自对旁人的奚落或捉弄。人们发笑是因为感到自己在某个方面优越于幽默对象。但是,这种说法比较狭隘,未能包括许多有关幽默的东西。由康德和叔本华提出的另一有影响的理论认为,幽默来自对理性的捉弄。幽默是对包括逻辑的不可能性、歧义性、无关性和普通的荒唐性之类不协调事物所做出的反应。而弗洛伊德提出的理论则认为,幽默有助于放松神经与心理能量。幽默与机智、嘲笑和反话等现象有关。

"在同一时刻对某一事物中可爱的、可羡慕的及其可笑的因素的感悟能力,即可构成幽默。"——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第20卷,第163页。

形质论

[源自希腊语, *hyle* (质料) 和 *morphe* (形式), 指形式和质料学说] 也拼成 *hylomorphism*。这个理论首先由亚里士多德作了详细说明, 他主张, 实在是由形式和质料建构而成的, 每一个生物, 都由作为形式的灵魂和作为质料的躯体组成。但是, 形质论在亚里士多德那里有多种不同的含义。在一种意义上, 事物的生成是把形式引入质料的结果, 但形式和质料这对范畴并不与现实和潜能那对范畴相关联。在另一种意义上, 形式与现实关联, 而质料则总是被理解为潜能。在这后一种意义上, 物的生成是潜能质料的逐渐发展过程, 因而这个事物也就成为赖以获得形式或现实的个体。这后一种形质论观点关系到实体性变化的连续。形质论在中世纪哲学中得到了进一步精巧的发展, 尤其是在阿奎那的形而上学中。它也是哲学人类学的基础。

"亚里士多德的灵魂及其与肉体关系的理论, 有时被称作 '形质论', 该词源出于 *hyle* (质料) 和 *morphe* (形式)。" ——阿克里尔: 《亚里士多德》, 第71页。

物活论

[源自希腊语 *hyle* (质料、物质) 和 *zoe* (生命), 意指整个物质世界都被赋予了生命] 一般把这个术语的创造归于17世纪剑桥柏拉图主义者R. 库沃完斯, 他提倡这种与二元论、唯物论、形质论相对照的理论, 用以说明灵魂和肉体之间的关系。物活论否认精神与物质之间以及生命和肉体之间的任何区别, 一般来说, 可和万物有灵论交换使用。但是, 有些人争辩说, 物活论主张生命乃一切物质所固有, 而万物有灵论则提出一切物质中有不同的意识等级。现今,

all matter. Nowadays, this term is widely employed for the cosmogony of early Greek natural philosophers such as Thales, Anaximandes and Anaximenes, who believed that the world ultimately originated from living stuff.

"Hylozoism, the doctrine that matter as such has the property of life and growth." — Furley, *The Greek Cosmologists*, 1987, p. 18.

Hypocrisy

[Greek; answer, including the sort of answers actors give each other on the stage] A state in which one's outward appearance is not a sign of one's inner state. The outward appearance is in accordance with ethical requirements, while the inner and hidden state is morally blameworthy. Hypocrisy is morally condemnable because it is a kind of deception or pretence, a failure to live up to one's avowed moral principles. It is therefore associated with lack of trustworthiness, insincerity and inauthenticity, and has generally undesirable consequences. Hypocrisy can also be directed at oneself, and in that case it is identical with self deception or bad faith.

"The word 'hypocrisy'... its present meaning is: the assumption of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real characters or inclinations." — Bok, *Lying*, 1978, p. 84.

Hypokeimenon, Greek term for substratum

Hypostasis

[Greek; *stasis*, standing — *hupo*, under] A key Neoplatonist term for ultimate reality, roughly a synonym of being or substance. Plotinus held that the One, Divine Mind and Soul are three hypostases, and all other things are manifestations of them. A large part of his philosophy is devoted to explaining the nature of these hypostases and how other things manifest them. The idea influenced the Christian conception of the Trinity, according to which the father, son and holy spirit are three persons. The term should not be confused with hypothesis.

"We must affirm that they [One and Good] are the same: not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find." — Plotinus, *Enneads*, II, 9.2–3.

Hypostatization

A fallacy of confounding different types or categories of things. It arises as a result of treating abstractions and relations as if they were actually existing objects, as in the claim that ideas have an independent subsistence. Hypostatization is also called abstractionism, substantialization or reification.

这个词广义地用指泰勒斯、阿那克西曼德、阿那克西美尼等早期希腊自然哲学家的宇宙演化论,因为他们相信,世界最终源出于有活力的材料。

“物活论是这样的学说:质料本身具有生命和生长的特性。”——福尔雷:《希腊宇宙论者》,1987年,第18页。

伪善

[在希腊语里,这个词的意思是“回答”,包括那种在戏台上演员的相互回答。现在指一个人的外在的表现状态不是他或她的内在状态的反映。外在的表现依据伦理的要求,而内在的和隐藏的状态是在道德上值得谴责的。伪善在道德上应受谴责,因为这是一种欺骗或虚伪,没有履行一个人自己所信誓的道德原则。它是与缺乏真诚、伪善、不诚实相关的,一般会导致不值得欲求的后果。伪善也是针对自己的,在这方面,它是与“自欺”和“坏的忠诚”相等同的。

“‘伪善’这一术语……现在的意思是:拥有一种虚假的德性或善的外表,这种外表不同于真正的品格或倾向。”——博克:《说谎》,1978年,第84页。

基质

表示“基质(substratum)”的希腊词。

本在

[希腊语, *stasis* (站) 和 *hupo* (在下面)]它是新柏拉图主义的一个关键术语,指终极实在,大体上说,是存在或实体的同义语。普罗提诺认为,太一、神圣的心智和灵魂是三个本在,一切其他事物都是它们的表现。他的哲学的大部分内容都专注于解说这些本在的本性以及其他事物如何表现它们。这个观念影响了基督教的“三位一体”概念。按照三位一体说,圣父、圣子和圣灵是同一个人。不要把这个词与“假说”(hypothesis)混淆起来。

“我们必须肯定,它们[太一和善]是相同的——的确,不是力图对那个本在断定任何主谓关系,而只是作为用我们所发现的最好的术语来把它表示给我们自己。”——普罗提诺:《九章集》, I, 9.2–3。

实体化

一种混淆事物不同种类或范畴的错误。它的出现是由于把抽象物和关系看作现实存在的对象,譬如,认为“观念具有独立的实存”。实体化也被称作“抽象化”、“实存化”或“具体化”。这种错误在弗雷格哲学中受到了严厉的批

This fallacy is severely criticised in Frege's philosophy.

"As I understand it, a hypostatization or substantialization or reification consists in mistaking as things entities which are not things." —Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, 1956, p. 233.

Hypothesis

[from Greek: *hypo*, under + *thesis*, position, supposition, assumption] A tentative and speculative explanation of a problem or a provisional affirmation before proof. Such an explanation is made because of its explanatory power regarding the phenomenon. An hypothesis is subject to revision or abandonment through observation, experiment and argument. If it is shown to be acceptable after these further investigations, it may be elevated to the status of a scientific theory or law. The use of hypotheses is essential for the development of science.

"An hypothesis is a supposition which we make (either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endeavour to deduce it from conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 490.

Hypothetical fact

A term used by Ryle in his early discussion about meaning and propositions. What one knows is the meaning of a sentence expressing what one knows. If the sentence is a factual sentence, its meaning is the fact it states. Such a theory must also account for the meanings of beliefs which are not yet known to be true and for false beliefs. Ryle claims that the meaning of these beliefs is a hypothetical fact. Unlike a fact, a hypothetical fact is not a subsisting reality, and indeed is not a fact at all. A hypothetical fact specifies what the world would be like if the statement of one's belief were true. This is actually a would-be factual statement. Hence, a hypothetical fact is identical with the statement expressing it and is a description. Ryle's notion can be compared with Kripke's later account of possible worlds as descriptions of how the world might be in contrast to Lewis' realism regarding possible worlds.

"By a hypothetical fact I do not of course mean something of which it is a matter of conjecture whether it is a fact or not, but simply a fact the statement of which is of the form 'if X then Y'." —Ryle, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 35.

Hypothetical imperative

For Kant, a form of command issued by the will in contrast to another form of command, the categorical imperative. In his account of morality, the fundamental role is assigned to categorical imperatives rather than to hypothetical imperatives. While the categorical imperative commands an

判。

“根据我的理解，实体化、实存化或具体化是错误地把并非事物的实体当做事物。”——卡尔纳普：《意义与必然性》，1956年，第223页。

假说

[源自希腊文 *hypo* (在……之下，……不足) 和 *thesis* (立场、见解)，意思是猜测，假定]指对问题的一种试探性和推测性的说明，或在证明之前暂定的断言。之所以作出这种说明，是由于它对现象的解释力。一个假说有符于通过观察、实验和论证而修正或放弃。如果它在这些进一步的研究之后证明为可接受的，就可提升到科学理论或定律的地位。假说的运用对于科学的发展是必不可少的。

“假说是我们（或者没有实际证据、或者基于公开声明为不充分的证据）所作出的猜测，用以努力从中演绎出与已知为真实的事实一致的结果。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第七卷，第490页。

假想事实

赖尔在其早期关于意义与命题的讨论中所使用的术语。一个人所知道的是表达其所知道的语句的意义。如果这个语句是一个事实语句，其意义就是它所陈述的事实。这样一个理论还必须说明尚不知为真的信念和错误信念的意义。赖尔声称这些信念的意义是一个假想事实。与事实不同，一个假想事实不是一个存在的现实，实际上根本就不是一个事实。一个假想事实所指定的是如果关于一个人的信念的陈述为真，世界就是将要成为的样子。这实际上是一个将来事实陈述。因此，假想事实等同于表达了它的陈述，并且是一个描述。赖尔的观念可与克里普克晚期关于可能世界是作为对世界或许是的样子的描述这一观点相比较，后者与刘易斯关于可能世界的实在论不同。

“我当然不是用假想事实来指某种东西是否是一个事实只是一种推测，而只是指这样一个事实：其陈述的形式为‘如果X则Y’。”——赖尔：《文集》，第二卷，第35页。

假言命令

在康德哲学中，它是由意志发布的一种律令形式，相对于另一种律令形式，即绝对命令。在他对道德的说明中，起根本作用的是绝对命令而不是假言命令。绝对命令是把一种行为作为一种自在的客观必然性去命令它，而不考虑

action as an objective necessity in itself, without regard to any inclination or end, a hypothetical imperative commands an action as the means for satisfying some inclination or purpose. The necessity of action it imposes is conditional or hypothetical on the given end that the agent wills; you must do something if a certain purpose is to be satisfied. Once the end is removed, there is no longer a command. It commands or counsels a man only if he has the desire in question. The dynamic element in obedience to such an imperative is desire or impulse, with a cognitive factor concerning the relation of means to end. Since the hypothetical imperative is concerned with the intended result of action, it is determined heteronomously. Hypothetical imperatives are divided into two kinds: problematic or technical practical principles point to the means of attaining a possible end; and assertoric practical principles point to the means of attaining a given end.

"A hypothetical imperative thus says only that an action is good for some purpose, either possible or actual." -Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 415.

Hypothetical induction, an alternative expression for inference to the best explanation

Hypothetico-deductive method

A model of scientific explanation, abbreviated as the H-D method. It proposes that in creating a scientific theory, we should first formulate a general theory or hypothesis that can immediately explain the results already obtained and from which further particular statements or predictions can be derived. These inferred predictions can be verified and falsified in experimental and observational tests. On this basis we decide whether to accept or to reject the general hypothesis. The hypothetico deductive method contrasts with the inductive method. In the philosophy of science it has been regarded during this century as an ideal scientific method. Karl Popper and his followers have argued that the method is effective in testing a general theory by falsification and concentrate on the formal relationship between hypothesis and its consequential statements. Some critics claim that this method oversimplifies the actual relation between theory and observation.

"As it is frequently characterised, the hypothetico-deductive method consists of (1) setting up a hypothesis, (2) deducing consequences from a hypothesis, and (3) checking by observation to see whether these consequences are true." -Salmon, *Logic*, 1963, p. 78.

任何爱好或目的。假言命令则把一种行为作为满足某些爱好或目的的手段去命令它。它所施加于行为的必然性是以主动者所意愿的某种给定目的为条件的或假言的：如果要满足某种目的你就必须做某事。但一旦目的消失，它就不再是一个命令。只有当一个人具有这样的欲望，它才命令或劝告他。遵守这样的命令的动力因素是欲望或冲动，并带有关于手段和目的关系的认识因素。既然假言命令与有意图的行动结果相关，因而它是由他律所决定的。假言命令被划分为两种：“或然的”或“技术性的”实践原则，它指出达到可能目的的手段；以及“实然的”实践原则，它指出达到既定目的的手段。

“假言命令式只是说，一种行为对某些目的是善的，这些目的或者是可能的，或者是现实的”。——康德：《道德形而上学基础》，第415页。

假说演绎

“最佳说明推理”的另一种说法。

假说—演绎法

科学说明的一种模型，缩写为H-D方法。它提出在创造一个科学理论时，我们首先应当构建一个一般的理论或假说，它能立即说明已获得的结果，并由它推衍出进一步的特定陈述或预言。这些推导出的预言可以在实验和观察检验中证实和证伪，由此我们能决定是接受还是拒斥这个一般假说。假说—演绎法与归纳法形成对比。它在本世纪的科学哲学中被看作是理想的科学方法。K. 波普及其追随者认为，它在通过证伪来检验一般理论中是有效的，因而集中注意力于假说与其推出的陈述之间的形式关系。有些批评者认为这种方法过分简化了理论和观察之间的实际关系。

“如它所经常被表述的，假说—演绎法包括(1) 确立一个假说，(2) 从假说中演绎出推论，(3) 由观察来检验这些推论是否正确。”——萨尔蒙：《逻辑》，1963年，第78页。

I

I think

[German: *Ich denke*] Kant's account of the 'I think' which accompanies all our representations originated from Descartes' *cogito*. Leibniz turned the *cogito* into the conscious and self-conscious in general. Kant denied that it is possible to prove the existence of the self in terms of consciousness, but assigned a great role to the "I think" in epistemology as the form of transcendental apperception, the mind of a self-conscious or self-aware being. The 'I think' is neither an experience nor a substantial subject of experiences. It is rather a necessary vehicle or accompaniment of experience which precedes experience and relates experiences to a numerically identical self. It is an original or non-derivative unity of consciousness rather than an object of consciousness.

"All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B132.

I think, therefore I am, The English translation of Latin: *cogito ergo sum*

Icon

[from Greek: *eikon*, image, likeness, picture] A sign or symbol which resembles or behaves similarly to the thing or process it represents and is thus an analogue of that thing or process. Scientific experiments can employ iconic models for processes which do not exist under laboratory conditions. A cultural icon is a thing or individual which epitomises the character of a particular society or period. In psychology, an icon or iconic memory is a visual image that lingers briefly after its physical stimulus is removed. The icon for hearing is called an echo. An icon can be stored briefly in some medium. Before it disappears, it can be read and explained as if the physical stimulus were still present. This transient visual persistence is also called an after-image.

"There seems no alternative but to introduce a new term for the transient visual memory in question. I will call it 'the icon' or 'iconic memory'." — Neisser, *Cognitive Psychology*, 1967, p. 20.

我思

「德文为 *Ich denke*」康德关于伴随着我们一切表象的“我思”的叙述，源于笛卡尔的 *cogito*。莱布尼茨把 *cogito* 转化成一般性的“意识”和“自我意识”。康德否认自我的存在可由意识得到证明，但赋予“我思”在认识论中以重大作用，即认为“我思”是先验统觉的形式，是自我意识或自我意识存在的心灵。它不是一种经验，甚至不是实质意义上的经验主体。它是经验的必然工具或伴随物，它先于经验并把经验与一个在数目上相等的自我相联系。它是一个原生的或非派生的意识统一体而不是意识的对象。

“因此一切直观之杂多，与这些杂多所在的同一主体中的‘我思’，有必然的关系。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，B132。

我思想，所以我存在

“我思故我在 (*cogito ergo sum*)” 的英译

映象

「源自拉丁文 *eikon*，映象，肖像，图像」一种记号或符号，类似于或表现得相似于它所表征的事物或过程，故而是某种事物或过程的类似物。科学实验能对在实验室条件下不存在的过程采用映象模型。文化映象是指集中体现具体社会或时期的特征的事物或个体。在心理学中，一个映象或映象记忆是指其物理刺激物移去后仍短暂停留的视觉形象。对听觉的映象称为“回响”。映象可以短暂地储存在某种媒质中。在它消失之前，可以被阅读和解释，就像物理刺激物依然存在一样。这种短暂的视觉存留也叫做“余象”。

“看来除了对谈论中的这种短暂视觉残留引入一个新的词语外别无他法，我把它称为‘映象’或‘映象记忆’。”——尼塞尔：《认知心理学》，1967年，第20页。

Iconoclasm

The demand that images or icons must be destroyed or have their putative power amputated. This position responds to the ascription of a high spiritual, cultural and moral status to images in a way or to a degree considered inappropriate by the iconoclasts. The use of images as objects of worship is called idolatry and has been widely condemned in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for the image is felt to substitute for the real object of worship. Popular devotion to the social, religious and sensuous power of images has led historically to many iconoclastic movements, especially in periods of social transition period. This is unfortunate for art because many of the religious images destroyed by iconoclasts were works of art. Iconoclasm is used more generally to characterise those who would attack the most central features of their culture and society.

"You after all have to ask yourself why there has been at various times in history such intense controversy over the making of graven images, why there have been movements of iconoclasm at all." —Danto, *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, 1986, p. 127.

Id. see ego (Freud)

Idea (Hegel)

Hegelian ideas are similar to Platonic ideas, but unlike those of empiricism. For Hegel, an idea is not a mental representation of an object, but is actually present in things as the ground of their existence. An idea is equivalent to truth and exists in a primary sense which does not derive from the existence of things. It is the full realisation of a concept and is the unity of concept and object. The identity between concept and object suggests that a concept can provide adequate knowledge of an object. When we know an object, we know its concept and its idea, rather than its material constituent. Hegel claimed that an idea is the nature of an object and that all finite things depend upon ideas for their being. In a sense, his philosophy is a kind of idealism. The idea which is in and for itself is the absolute idea.

"The idea is truth in itself and for itself, — the absolute unity of concept and objectivity." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 213.

Idea (Hume)

While Locke called all objects of mind ideas, Hume thought that this use perverted the original meaning of the word "idea". Instead, he called all objects of the mind perceptions and divided perceptions into two kinds: impressions and ideas. Impressions are the mental objects involved when we are feeling and experiencing and can be either sensations, passions or emotions. Impressions include Locke's ideas of sense and of reflection. Ideas, on the other

打破偶像

要求捣毁想像或偶像，或者切除它们假定存在的权力。这一立场是打破偶像者抵制以某种不妥当的方式或程度给某些想像赋予高级精神、文化与道德地位所做出的反应。把想像当做崇拜对象的做法被称之为“偶像崇拜”，这在犹太教、基督教与伊斯兰教中均遭到广泛的谴责，因为想像被感觉取代了实在的崇拜对象。在历史上，大众对想像之社会、宗教与感官享受力量的钟爱引发了多次打破偶像的运动，特别是在社会转型时期。这对艺术来讲是不幸的灾难，因为许多被打破偶像者捣毁的宗教想像是艺术作品。通常，打破偶像被用来刻画那些抨击自身文化与社会中主要特征的人上。

“你毕竟要自问在不同历史时期为什么会在雕像制作上出现激烈的争论，为什么会出现多次打破偶像运动。”——丹托：《哲学对艺术的剥夺》，1986年，第127页。

伊底

见“自我（弗洛伊德）”条。

理念（黑格尔）

黑格尔的理念类似于柏拉图的形相，但不同于经验论的观念。在黑格尔看来，理念不是对象的心理表象，而是现实地存在于事物之中作为它们存在的根据。理念等同于真理，它的存在不是由事物的存在派生的、而是第一性意义的存在。它是概念的完全实现，是概念和对象的统一。概念和对象之间的同一性意味着概念能提供关于对象的适当知识。我们认识一个对象就是认识它的概念和它的理念，而不是认识它的质料成分。黑格尔主张，理念是对象的本性，所有有限事物的存在都依赖于理念。在某种意义上，他的哲学是一种理念论。自在自为而存在的理念是绝对理念。

“理念是自在自为的真理，——概念和客观性的绝对统一。”——黑格尔：《小逻辑》，213节。

观念（休谟）

洛克将“心灵的对象”全部称作观念，休谟认为对“观念”的这种用法歪曲了“观念”一词的原义。他将心灵的一切对象称作“知觉”，并将知觉分为两类：“印象”和“观念”。印象是我们在感受和经历时所涉及的内心对象，它们可以是感觉、情感或情绪。印象包括了洛克的感觉观念和反省观念。另一方面，观念是思维和推理中涉及的内心对象。根据休谟的观点，印象和观

hand, are the mental objects involved in thinking and reasoning. According to Hume, this distinction was based on the difference between thinking and feeling, of which everyone can naturally be aware. Impressions are what we have when we are actually perceiving something, while ideas are what we have when we think about the thing in its absence. Hume held that ideas are formed on the basis of impressions and are exact representations of the latter. Every simple idea is caused by its corresponding simple impression. The difference between impressions and ideas is not essential, but is a matter of the degree of force and liveliness with which perceptions strike upon the mind. Ideas are of two kinds; simple ideas that are derived directly from impressions and complex ideas that are combinations of simple ideas and need not represent the actual relation of impressions. Hume's view that there is a corresponding relationship between impressions and the idea is controversial. Nevertheless, he distinguished between ideas and impressions in order to defend the basic contention of empiricism that there can be no thoughts or ideas unless there are first some sensations or feelings.

"Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." — Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 1.

Idea (Kant)

In contrast to the categories or pure concepts of the understanding corresponding to the various forms of judgement, there are ideas or pure concepts of reason corresponding to the various kinds of logical inference. There are three kinds of inference in traditional logic: the categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. Accordingly there are also three kinds of ideas, namely the idea of the soul as the absolute unity of the thinking subject, the idea of the absolute unity of the sequence of the condition of appearance, and the idea of the absolute unity of the conditions of objects of thought in general.

While categories can determine objects of experience, there are no corresponding empirical objects for ideas. Hence they are transcendental ideas. Ideas are only regulative and subjective in providing guidance to inquiry. They are orders or advice to the faculty of reason in its logical employment. However, reason has a propensity to take ideas as belonging objectively to things in themselves, hence generating dialectical errors. The three ideas provide spurious subject matter for three spurious metaphysical disciplines: rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology.

"I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense.

念的区分是建立在思维和感觉的区别基础上的,对于这种区别每个人都能自然而然地意识到。印象是我们实际知觉某物时我们所具有的东西;观念是我们在某物不在的情况下思考它所具有的东西。休谟认为,观念是在印象的基础上形成的,是印象的精确表象,每一简单观念都由其相应的简单印象引起。印象和观念的区别不是实质性的,而是知觉打动心灵的强烈和生动程度的问题。观念有两类:直接由印象得来的简单观念和作为简单观念之结合,而且不一定表示各个印象之实际关系的复杂观念。休谟认为在印象和观念之间有对应关系,他的这个观点是有争议的,不过,他区分它们是为了捍卫经验主义的基本主张,即除非先有某些感觉或感受,就不可能有思想或观念。

"进入心灵时最强有力的那些知觉,我们可以称之为**印象**;在这个名称之下,我包括了所有初次出现在灵魂中的感觉、情感和情绪。我用**观念**一词指我们的感觉、情感和情绪在思维和推理中的微弱意象。"——休谟:《人性论》,第1页。

观念(康德)

与相应于各类判断形式的范畴或知性的纯粹概念不同,存在着相应于各种逻辑推理的“观念”或“理性的纯粹概念”。在传统逻辑中存在着三类推理,即直言的、假言的和选言的推理,相应地,也存在着三种“观念”,即作为思维主体绝对统一的灵魂观念,现象的条件系列的绝对统一的观念和一般思维对象所有条件的绝对统一的观念。

范畴可以确定经验对象,对于观念来说则没有相应的经验对象,因此它们是“先验观念”。观念在提供研究的指导时只是范导性的和主观性的。它们是对理性官能的逻辑应用的命令或劝告,然而,理性有一种把观念作为物自身特性的客观观念的倾向,辩证的谬误由此而产生。而这三个理念为三门虚假的形而上学学科,即理性心理学、理性宇宙学和理性神学提供了虚假的题材。

“所谓观念,我理解为理性的必然概念,对此概念,没有相应的对象能在感性经验中给予。因此现在所考察的理性的纯粹概念,乃是先验观念。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A327/B383。

experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under consideration, are transcendental ideas." -Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A327/B383.

Idea (Locke)

For Plato an Idea was something objective, an intelligible archetype. The Christian Platonists replaced the archetypes with inborn memories, which they call innate ideas. The possession of these innate ideas and reflection upon them are necessary conditions for obtaining necessary truths. Locke rejected the existence of innate ideas, but accepted the assumption that the mind forms its picture of the world through ideas. He used the word "idea" widely and not very carefully. His various uses of this word in his works are hard to render consistent with one another. Sometimes he identified idea with perception. In this sense, ideas are what we are immediately aware of when we are perceiving things through senses or when in reflection we are introspectively aware of our own feelings and thoughts. Sometimes they are the copies of such sensory or introspective items in understanding. For Locke, ideas are the contents of thought or sensory experience, the thoughts we have about some object. This interchangeable use of idea and thought is also found in Hume. Sometimes ideas are objects, the immediate objects of the mind. Ideas, not physical objects, are what we immediately perceive. Ideas are also said to be the objects of memory and imagination. This account offers a kind of representative theory of perception. Sometimes ideas are even explained as qualities or collections of qualities of which we may have ideas. Locke divided ideas into simple ideas and complex ideas. Simple ideas cannot be broken down any further into component parts. Such ideas include our ideas of red, pain and point. Complex ideas are ideas built up into combinations out of simple ideas, including abstract ideas, general ideas, universals, and some ideas of reflection. Locke defined knowledge as the perception of the connection and agreement of ideas.

"I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my readers for the frequent use of the word *idea*, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks." —Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, l. 1. 8.

Idea (Plato)

from Greek; *idea*, what a thing looks like, in turn from *idein*, to see, to look, a declension of *eidein*, to see, to look, from which comes *eidos*, form, the synonym of *idea*] Plato used *idea* and *eidos* interchangeably for the non-sensible entities which are unchanging, eternal and universal absolutes, the objects of knowledge, and the paradigms from

观念 (洛克)

在柏拉图那里, Idea [译作“形相”] 是某种客观的东西, 是理智性的原型。基督教柏拉图主义者用天生的记忆代替原型, 称作“天赋观念”。具有这些天赋观念和对它们的反省, 是获得必然真理的必要条件。洛克驳斥天赋观念的存在, 但接受了心灵通过观念形成其世界图景的假设。他宽泛地、不很仔细地使用“观念”一词。在他的著作中, 这个词的各种用法很难互相一致起来, 有时他将“观念”等同于“知觉”。在此意义上, 观念是我们通过感官感知事物时, 或者在反省中以内省方式意识到我们自己的感觉和思想时, 直接意识到的东西。有时观念是理智中这些感觉事项和内省事项的摹本。在洛克看来, 观念是思想或感觉经验的内容, 是我们所具有的关于某个对象的思想。对观念和思想的这种换用在休谟那里也能看到。有时, 观念是对象, 是心灵的直接对象。我们直接知觉到的东西是观念而不是物理对象。观念也被说成是记忆和想像的对象。这种说法是一种知觉表象论。有时观念甚至被说成是我们可以对其具有观念的性质或性质的集合。洛克将观念分为简单观念和复杂观念。前者是不能进一步分解为组成部分的观念。这种观念包括我们关于红色、痛苦和点的观念。后者是由简单观念结合而成的观念, 包括抽象的观念、普遍的观念、共相和某些反省观念。洛克把知识界定为对观念的联系和一致的知觉。

“我在此一开始就应当请求读者原谅在下文中将经常使用的“观念”一词。我认为, 正是这个词最适合代表一个人在思想时作为理智对象的任何东西。”——洛克:《人类理智论》, 第一卷, 第一章, 第8节。

形相 [或译“理念”] (柏拉图)

[源自希腊词 *idea*, 原意为, 一物的样子; *idea* 与动词 *idein* (看) 同根; 而 *idein* 又是动词 *eidein* (看) 的一个变格。从后一动词得出了“形相”的同义词“形式”(希腊词, *eidos*)] 柏拉图不加区分地使用形相 (*idea*) 和形式 (*eidos*) 来表示那超感性的、不变的、永恒的、

which sensible things derive their reality. He held that these supreme entities are the essence or inner structure of things. The transition of *idea* from outer look or shape to inner structure is by way of a metaphor. If you see with eyes, what you see is outer shape, but if you "see" with the soul, that is think, what you get is essence or the common characteristic. Platonic Ideas are objective, in contrast to ideas as subjective, mental ideas in modern philosophy. To avoid confusion, many modern scholars prefer to call Plato's doctrine the Theory of Forms rather than the Theory of Ideas.

"You remember then that I did not ask you to indicate to me one or two of the many pious actions, but the very Form (eidos) itself by which all pious acts are pious. For you said, I think, that it is by one Idea (idea) that impious things are impious and pious pious." — Plato, *Euthyphro*, 6d.

Ideal (Kant)

An ideal or transcendental ideal for Kant is a special kind of idea, the subject matter of rational theology. When we try to think of the conditions for the complete determination of any individual thing, we are led inevitably to the concept of a supreme being as the pure rational idea of an individual possessing all realities, that is God, which serves as an archetype for imitation and as a source of being. This is the ideal of pure reason. According to Kant, this ideal is a mere idea of a ground of all possibilities and a subjectively necessary hypothesis for our reason. But once we take it as an objective necessity and conclude the necessary existence of such a being, we commit a dialectical illusion. This occurs in the ontological proof, cosmological proof and physico-theological proof.

"By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individual, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A568/B596.

Ideal language, another term for logically perfect language

Ideal observer theory

A theory originating with Adam Smith in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, although he himself used the term "impartial spectator". It was fully developed by Roderick Firth in his paper "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer". The theory holds that moral judgements should be analysed by reference to the feelings of an Ideal Observer. To say "X is right" means that X would be approved of by such an observer, and to say "Y is wrong" means that Y would be disapproved of by him. This observer, as a

普遍的、绝对的实在。这些真正的实在是知识的源泉，是可感事物得出其存在性的模型。他认为，这些在上的实在是事物的本质或内在结构。将“形相”一词从“外部相貌或形状”转变成“内在结构”是通过一个隐喻。如果你用眼睛看，你看到的是外在的形状；但如果你以灵魂的眼睛“看”（即，想），你所得到的本质或共同特征。（形相与现代英文中的观念一词相同，过去中文将其译作“理念”。）柏拉图的形相是客观的，而在现代哲学中，idea（观念）乃是心灵中的主观的东西。为了避免混乱，现代许多学者宁愿把柏拉图这方面的思想叫做“Theory of Forms（形相论）”，而不是“Theory of Ideas”。

“你记得我不是要你向我表明许多虔诚行为中的一二个，而是由于它一切虔诚行为变得虔诚的形式(eidos)自身。因为我想你说过，由于一个形相，不虔诚行为变得不虔诚，而虔诚行为变得虔诚。”——柏拉图：《尤息弗罗》，6d。

理想（康德）

康德哲学中的理想或先验的理想是一种特殊的观念，是理性神学的主题。当我们试图思考任何个体事物的完满规定的条件时，我们便不可避免地导向一个最高存在的概念，这种实在是拥有一切实在的个体的纯理性观念，即上帝。他乃是存在的来源和摹本的原型。这就是纯粹理性的理想。按康德的观点，这个理想只是一种对一切可能性根据的观念，是为我们的理性而立的一种主观必然性假设。一旦我们把它作为客观必然性，并得出结论说这样一种事物必然存在，我们就犯了辩证幻象的错误。这种错误出现在本体论证明、宇宙论证明和自然神论的证明中。

“所谓理想，我理解为观念，不仅是具体的观念，而且是个体的观念，即可规定的，甚至可由观念自身来规定的个体事物。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A568/B596。

理想语言

“逻辑上完善的语言”的另一说法。

理想的观察者理论

这个理论起源于 A. 斯密的《道德情感论》，虽然他自己用的名称是“公正的旁观者”。R. 弗思在他的论文《伦理的绝对主义和理想的观察者》中充分地发展了这个论点。这个理论认为，道德判断参照理想的观察者的感情应是可分析的。说“X 是对的”，意思是 X 应当得到这样一个观察者的赞许；说“Y 是错的”，意思是 Y 为他所否决。这个观察者，作为一个假设的存在者，拥有所有相关的知识（他是充分了解情况

hypothetical being, has all the relevant knowledge (he is well-informed), has equal love for all (he is impartial), is totally without passions towards persons and objects, is infallible and is consistent. In other respects this observer is a "normal" person. This theory can overcome the difficulties of ethical subjectivism by avoiding the problem fallible agents, and is also different from theological theories because it is not committed to asserting the existence of God but only assumes that an observer could have some god-like attributes such as full knowledge and equal love. It is a form of ethical naturalism because what a fully informed being would probably approve of is empirically testable. Its problem is that all the characteristics ascribed to the Ideal Observer are themselves evaluative terms, and therefore should also be analysed by appeal to an Ideal Observer. This involves a regress *ad infinitum*.

"Using the term 'ideal observer', then, the kind of analysis which I shall examine in this paper is the kind which would construe statements of the form 'x is P', in which P is some particular ethical predicate, to be identical in meaning with statements of the form: 'Any ideal observer would react to x in such and such a way under such and such conditions.'" — Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1952), p. 321.

Ideal type

According to the sociologist Max Weber a methodologically indispensable device in theory construction for the social sciences. An ideal type is a theoretical construct abstracted and summarised from certain characteristic social phenomena of an epoch and presented either as a system of concepts or as a system of statements. It is not a description of social reality and cannot be observed, but is a conceptual pattern or an organising principle for social scientists to establish certain relationships among social events and phenomena and conceive them as a consistent system. Unlike natural scientists employing natural laws, social scientists do not deduce social phenomena from the notion of an ideal type, but apply an ideal type as an heuristic device in the analysis of concrete social events.

"An ideal type is formed by the one sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct." — Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 1949, p. 90.

Idealism

Any philosophical position claiming that ideas are the

的), 对所有的人都拥有同等的爱(他是公正的), 他对人对物完全没有激情, 因而是绝对可靠和一贯的。在其他方面, 这个观察者是个“正常”人。这个理论因为避免了主体的可错性问题, 而克服了伦理主观主义的众多困难。同时, 它也不同于神学理论, 因为它并不承诺上帝的存在, 只是假定观察者可能具有某种类似神的品质, 诸如全知和平等的爱。这是一种伦理自然主义的形式, 因为一个充分了解情况的人可能赞成的东西是经得起经验检验的。它的问题是, 归之于理想观察者的那些特性本身是评价词, 因此, 也应当诉诸于一个理想观察者来分析。这就包含了一个无穷后退。

“使用‘理想的观察者’这一术语, 在这个论文中我将考察的那种分析将是: 构成‘x 是 P’的形式的陈述(在这种形式中, P 是某种特定的伦理谓项), 是与如下的陈述的意义一致的: ‘任何理想的观察者总是在如此这般的条件下以如此这般的方式对 x 作回应。’”——弗思: 《伦理的绝对主义和理想的观察者》, 见《哲学和现象学研究》(1952 年), 第 321 页。

理想型

在社会学家 M. 韦伯看来, 理想型是社会科学理论建构中一种方法论上必不可少的工具。一个理想型是一种理论结构, 是从一个时代某些特有的社会现象抽象和概括出来的, 它既表现为一个概念的体系, 也表现为一个陈述的体系。它不是对社会现实的描述, 而且也观察不到, 但它是社会科学家确立社会事件和现象中的某些联系并把它们视为一个一致的体系的概念范式或建构原则。与自然科学家应用自然科学规律不同, 社会科学家不是从理想型概念推演出社会现象, 而是把理想型作为分析具体社会事件的一种启发性的工具。

“一个理想型是由单方面对一个或更多观点的强调, 以及对大量分散的、孤立的、或多或少存在但偶尔又不存在的具体的个人的现象的综合而形成的, 这些现象按照那些单方面强调的观点被纳入一个统一的分析的结构。”——韦伯: 《社会科学方法论》, 1949 年, 第 90 页。

唯心主义

任何认为观念是知识的真实对象, 观念先

true objects of knowledge, that ideas are prior to things and that ideas provide the grounds of being to things. On this view, ideas have priority both metaphysically and epistemologically, and external reality as it is known to us reflects mental operations. Idealism does not suggest that mind creates matter or the material world in a substantive sense. Nor does this view confuse thought with the object of thought, but rather it claims that the external world can be grasped only by reference to the work of ideas and that all we can say about the external world is mediated by operations of the mind. The world in itself is certainly mind independent, but the world as conceived by us must be constructed by mind. Idealism is a philosophical position about how the world as we know it can be the case and is not directly related to any political position. Since there are various understandings of the nature of idea, there are also correspondingly many types of idealism.

"Values exist, but their existence and their character are both somehow dependent upon us, upon our choices, attitudes, commitments, structures, or whatever. This position might be called philosophical idealism or creationism." — Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 355.

Idealism, absolute

A modern version of objective idealism, represented by Hegel and his followers. In contrast to the metaphysics and epistemology of empiricism, Hegel claimed that ideas are not formed by a human mind through experiencing objects. On the contrary, he claims that ideas or concepts come first and determine the being of things. Things are what they are in virtue of revealing the concepts or ideas immanent in them. Although ideas or concepts determine the structure of reality, the individual human mind is not the source of reality. Ideas develop as a means of self-actualisation. Their systematic development exhibits the whole structure of an absolute idea, which is also the structure of reality. As a result, the world has an inherent all-embracing rational order and value conforming to the structure of the absolute idea. Hegel's absolute idealism is an attempt to describe systematically both nature and human social existence. It does not deny the existence of an external and objective world, but explains the world by assuming that there is a purposive intelligence at the heart of nature, which controls nature just as our minds control our bodies.

Absolute idealism was popular in Britain from the 1860s to the 1920s, represented by Bradley, Green, Bosanquet, Royce, McTaggart and the Oxford-trained American Blanshard. These figures disagreed over details, but all believed the Absolute to be the only true thing, with other things considered as being partial aspects of the Absolute or illusory appearances generated by the Absolute. Absolute

于物体,以及观念为事物的“是”提供根据的哲学立场,都可叫做唯心主义。根据这一观点,观念在形而上学上和知识论上都是在先的。我们所知的外部现实反映了精神活动。唯心主义并不主张心灵在一种实质性的意义上创造了物质或物质世界。这种观点也没有混淆思想与思想的对象。它的中心论点是,外在世界只有通过观念的工作才能得到把握;我们对于外在世界所能够说的一切都是以心灵活动为中介的。世界自身当然不依赖心灵,但为我们所认识的世界一定是由心灵构造的。唯心主义是关于我们所认识的世界如何能够是这样的一种哲学观点,它并不直接与任何政治立场相联系。由于对观念的性质有多种理解,相应地,也有许多种类的唯心主义。

“价值存在,可它们的存在及特性都以某种方式依赖于我们,依赖于我们的选择、态度、承诺、结构等等。这一立场可叫作哲学唯心主义或创造主义。”——诺齐克,《哲学解释》,1981年,第355页。

绝对唯心主义

客观唯心主义的一种近代形式,以黑格尔及其追随者为代表。与经验主义的形而上学和知识论相对立,黑格尔认为,观念不是由人的心灵通过经验对象而形成的。相反,在他看来,先有观念或概念,是它们决定了事物之是(存在)。事物是其所“是”,是因为显示了内在于它们之中的观念或概念。尽管观念或概念决定了实在的结构,单个人的心灵并不是实在的源泉。各种观念以发展作为自我实现的途径。它们的系统发展展示了一个绝对观念的全部结构,也即是实在的结构。结果,世界具有与绝对观念的结构相符合的内在的涵包一切的理性秩序和价值。黑格尔的绝对唯心主义旨在系统描绘自然的存在和人类社会的存在,它并不否定外在的客观世界的存在,只是为了解释这个世界而设定了在自然的中心存在着有目的的理智,这一理智控制自然,如同我们的心灵控制身体。

从19世纪60年代到20世纪20年代,绝对唯心主义在英国风行一时,以布拉德雷、格林、鲍桑葵、罗伊斯、麦克塔加特及牛津训练的美国哲学家布兰夏德为代表。这些人在许多具体问题上意见分歧,但都相信“绝对”是惟一真实的事物,而其他事物则被认为是“绝对”的部分或是由“绝对”产生的虚幻现象。绝对唯心主义的逻辑基础是一切联系都是内在的这一命题。摩尔和罗素起初接受绝对唯心主义的观点,但后来抛弃了它对联系的论述及这一立场的其

idealism depends on the logical claim that all relations are internal. Moore and Russell initially accepted the claims of absolute idealism, but then rejected its account of relations and also other aspects of the position.

"Absolute idealism holds that there is only one particular, namely God or the Absolute, and only one kind of fact, namely the kind which attributes a property to the Absolute." --Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, IX, p. 282.

Idealism, objective

A type of idealism initiated by Plato and holding that the real, which is the object of knowledge, is constituted by the inner immaterial structure or essence of things, which Plato called ideas or forms. Objective idealism rejects the claim that we have knowledge of unstable appearances given as the objects of experience. By holding that the organisation or form of the world is independent of our minds, this idealism is objective or absolute, rather than subjective. Platonic ideas provide the basis not only for knowledge, but also for moral principle. Absolute idealism is a variant of objective idealism. When Leibniz first employed the term "idealism", he was referring to Plato's theory of ideas.

"There are types of objective idealism which describe and explain the world in the same way as realism with only the additional assertion that the whole system is mental or spiritual." --D. C. Williams, *Principles of Empirical Realism*, 1966, p. 231.

Idealism, subjective

A form of idealism associated with Berkeley, although he himself called his own philosophy immaterialism. Locke distinguished primary qualities (such as size and shape) and secondary qualities (such as colour and smell) and claimed that secondary qualities are not in material things but are mind-dependent. Berkeley argued that even primary qualities are mind dependent and that both kinds of qualities as objects of experience are ideas in our mind. Material objects are simply collections of ideas, and do not exist independent of a perceiver. For Berkeley, "to exist" means to be perceived by some mind, thus leading to his dictum: "*esse et percipi*". Minds and ideas are the only real things, but this does not mean that the world disappears when I close my eyes and returns when I open them again. Berkeley thought that the natural world would still exist, because it is perceived by God. Some philosophers prefer a phenomenalist rendering of subjective idealism, according to which objects are determined by our actual experiences and by the experiences we would have were certain conditions fulfilled. In either religious or phenomenalist versions, subjective idealism accepts the existence of the ordinary world, but provides special ways of interpreting its existence. Opponents of

他方面。

"绝对唯心主义主张, 只有一个特殊, 即上帝或绝对; 并且只有一类事实, 即把属性归属于绝对的事实。" ——罗素:《罗素文集》, 第九卷, 第282页。

客观唯心主义

柏拉图发端的一类唯心主义。它认为, 作为知识对象的实在是由事物内在的非物质结构或本质构成的。柏拉图称这类结构或本质为形相或形式。客观唯心主义否认我们能从作为经验对象而给定的不稳定的现象中获得知识。这类唯心主义是客观的, 而非主观的, 乃是因为它主张世界的组织结构或形式是独立于我们的心灵的。柏拉图式的形相不仅为知识, 而且也为道德原则提供了基础。绝对唯心主义是客观唯心主义的一个变种。当莱布尼茨最初使用“唯心主义”一词时, 他就是在指柏拉图的理念论。

"客观唯心主义有各种类型, 它们描绘和解释世界的方式与实在论是一样的, 只是加了一个论断说, 世界系统是心灵的或精神性的。" ——威廉姆斯:《经验实在论原理》, 1966年, 第231页。

主观唯心主义

这一形式的唯心主义与巴克莱的名字相联, 虽然他自己把他的哲学叫做“非物质论”。洛克区分了第一性质(如大小和形状)与第二性质(如颜色和气味), 并认为第二性质不是在物质事物中, 而是依赖于心灵的。巴克莱争论说, 即使第一性质也是依赖于心灵的, 而且, 作为经验对象, 两类性质都是我们心灵中的观念。物质对象乃是观念的集合, 不能独立于感知者而存在。在巴克莱看来, “存在”意为某个心灵所感知, 由此得出他的名言: “存在即是被感知。”只有心灵和观念才是真实的。不过, 这并不是说当我闭上眼睛时, 世界就消失了; 而当我睁开时, 世界又回来了。巴克莱认为自然界确是存在的, 因为它为上帝所感知。有些哲学家倾向于对主观唯心主义作一种现象主义的解释。按照那种解释, 决定对象的既包括我们的现实经验, 也包括如果某些条件满足的话我们会有的经验。无论是其宗教的还是现象主义的形式, 主观唯心主义都接受日常世界的存在, 但提供了特殊的方式来解释这一存在。反对唯心主义的人时常认为, 主观唯心主义会堕入唯我论, 即主张我或我的观念是仅有的实在的立场。不过, 巴克莱的思想至

idealism sometimes argue that subjective idealism collapses into solipsism and the claims that my ideas and I are the only reality. Berkeley's thought remains highly influential, however, because its arguments reveal in a negative way some of the deep philosophical problems which empiricism has difficulty in avoiding.

"It is extremely important to realise that the psychological reflection is a transcending of the given every whit as much as the physical; indeed even more, if anything. It was the failure to notice this which led Berkeley to subjective idealism."—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, I, p. 196.

Idealism, transcendental

Kant's description of his own basic philosophical position, which he also called critical idealism. In developing his position, Kant rejected both rationalism and empiricism, and claimed that it is impossible for us to gain knowledge of the world either by sense experience alone or solely by rational thought, and our knowledge must employ both sensibility and understanding. Knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world and cannot inform us about noumena or things in themselves. Nevertheless, the world we experience is real, and Kant linked his transcendental idealism with empirical realism. His metaphysics explores the conditions of the possibility of experience rather than attempting to provide knowledge beyond the limits of our experience. For knowledge of the world to be possible, our sense experience must conform to the *a priori* intuitions of space and time and the categories of understanding. Space, time and the categories are not features of things, but constitute the conditions of the possibility of experience. Their origin is not the empirical self, but what he calls the transcendental unity of apperception (the "I think" which accompanies all my representations). About this "I" we know nothing except that it is, for it is a formal condition of knowledge rather than an object of knowledge. Objects in the natural world depend on the constitution of our sensibility and understanding. Fichte and Schelling draw on some Kantian texts to extend the metaphysical role of the spontaneity of the "I", but this was a departure from Kant's own orientation. Philosophers disagree over the value of transcendental idealism to Kant's philosophy. Some defend it as ineliminable, whilst others consider it to be incoherent.

"By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A367.

今仍是极其有影响的，因为它从反面揭示了经验主义所难以避免的一些深刻的哲学问题。

“极端重要的是要意识到，心理学上的反思多少超越于物理上所给予的东西，而且这的确更多些。而没有注意到这一点就使巴克莱走向了主观唯心主义。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第一卷，第196页。

先验唯心论

康德对他自己的基本哲学立场的称谓（他也称之为“批判唯心论”）。在发展他的学说时，康德既批判了经验主义，也批判了理性主义。他认为只用感官经验或只用理性思想都不可能使我们获得对世界的知识。我们的知识必须既使用感性也使用知性。知识只局限于现象世界，不能告知我们关于本体或物自体的情形。尽管如此，我们经验的世界是真实的。康德把他的先验唯心论与经验实在论相联系。他的形而上学探索经验可能性的条件，而不是力图提供超越我们经验范围的知识。为使对世界的知识变成可能，我们的感觉经验必须符合时空先天直观和知性范畴。时间、空间及范畴都不是事物的特征，而是构成经验可能性的条件。它们的起源不是在于经验自我，而在于他叫作先验统觉的事物（即那伴随我的一切表象的“我思”）。对于这一“我”，我们除了知道它存在外一无所知，因为它是知识的形式条件，而非知识的对象。自然界中的对象依赖于我们的感性与知性的构成。费希特和谢林从康德的某些论述出发，扩展了“我”的形而上学的自主性作用。可是这偏离了康德哲学的本来方向。哲学家们对康德的先验唯心论的价值有不同的评价。有些认为它是无法拒斥的，而另一些则断定它是不一致的。

“所谓先验唯心主义，我是指这样一种学说：它认为，全部现象都永远只是表象，而不是物自体；因而时间和空间只是我们感性直观的形式，不是作为独立存在的给定的规定，也不是被看作物自体的对象的条件。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A367。

Ideas of ideas

Spinoza's theory, according to which God has an idea of everything that follows from any of his attributes. Because the ideas in God themselves are among the things following from his attribute of thought, there is necessarily in God an idea of every idea that there is in him. This process can go on *ad infinitum*. The levels of these ideas are distinct from one another because what they represent is different. Hence, besides mental-physical parallelism (extra cognitive parallelism), there is infinite mental-mental parallelism (intra-cognitive parallelism). Spinoza intended this account to serve as a theory of self-knowledge. But an infinite hierarchy of ideas of ideas is criticised by many commentators as being profligate.

"The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God and are related to God in the same way as the ideas themselves of modifications." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, proposition 22.

Ideation, see eidetic reduction

Ideational theory of meaning

A theory holding that the meaning of a word is the idea with which it is regularly associated or for which it stands. According to the theory, ideas are private and independent of language. Language is a tool for providing publicly observable indications of private ideas and to convey these ideas to others. A linguistic expression gets its meaning by being used to indicate ideas. The classical version of this theory was elaborated by Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I, 2, III. He says, "The use, then, of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification". Since the ambiguous word "idea" for Locke refers to mental images, this theory is also called the "Image theory of meaning". The strength of this theory is that it catches the insight that language is an instrument for the communication of thought. However, according to this theory, we do not understand what someone is saying until we get the idea. This is not usually the case. More often, an idea itself is derived from meaning rather than vice versa. Moreover, the theory must answer claims that either language and thought cannot be separated or, if they can, language has priority. Fodor's language of thought thesis reasserts the thesis that thought is prior on the basis of a theory of thinking for which thought has the same kind of syntactic structure as language.

"The ideational theory [of the meaning] would be that two expressions have the same use if and only if they are associated with the same ideas." —Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, p. 22.

观念的观念

斯宾诺莎的理论,根据这个理论,上帝对于出自他的任何属性的每一事物都有一个观念。然而,与那些事物一样,上帝中的观念本身也源自于他的思想属性,所以,在上帝那里必然对他之内的每一观念都有一个观念。这个过程可以无限进行下去。这些观念的层次互不相同,因为它们所表象的东西是不同的。因此,除了心—身平行论(有时也称作“认识之外的平行论”)之外,还有一个无限的心—心平行论(有时也称作“认识之内的平行论”)。斯宾诺莎打算把这个理论当做一个自我认识理论。但是,由于观念的观念具有无限的等级划分,所以,许多评论家批评它是过于铺张。

“样式的观念的观念出自于上帝并与上帝相关联,其方式与样式的观念本身相同。” —斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第二部分,命题 22。

观念直观(或译“观念化”)

见“本质还原”条。

意义的观念理论

这个理论认为,一个词的意义是与它有固定联系的、或由它所代表着的那个观念。根据这个理论,观念是私人的,不依赖于语言。语言是一个工具,这个工具提供了使私人观念可以公开观察的指示,并将这些观念传达给其他人。一个语言表达式由于用来指示观念而获得其意义。这个理论的古典形式是洛克在《人类理智论》的第一卷第二章第二部分中详细阐述的。他说:“词的使用是观念的明显标记;词所代表的观念是词的恰当和直接的意义。”由于洛克用“观念”这个歧义词指内心的影像,所以这个理论也被称作“意义的影像论”。这个理论的力量在于,它看到了语言是思想交流的工具。不论怎样,根据这个理论,在我们得到相应的观念之前,我们并不理解某个人说的是什么。可是事情通常并不是这样的。更常有的情形是,一个观念本身是从意义引出的,而不是相反。而且,这个理论应当对如下主张作出回答:要么语言和思想是不可分的,要么,如果它们可分,语言是在先的。福多的思想语言理论重申了以下论点:如果一个思维理论认为思想和语言具有同样一种句法结构,那么,根据这个理论,思想是在先的。

“意义的观念理论似乎是这样:两个表达式具有同样的作用,当且仅当,它们与同样的观念相联系。” —阿尔斯通:《语言哲学》,1964年,第22页。

Ideatum

[Latin, plural: *ideata*, generally translated as object, although object is also used to translate *objectum*] Originally a scholastic term for something produced by God as a copy of the idea which He himself has. In Spinoza's philosophy, an *ideatum* corresponds to an idea and is what an idea is of, that is the thing which is presented in an idea.

"A true idea must correspond with its ideatum, that is what it conceives." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, axioms, 6.

Identity

[from Latin: *idem*, the same] Identity has been interpreted in two ways; as singleness over time and as sameness amid difference. These two notions are connected, for to identify something as the same over time cannot be separated from distinguishing one thing from others. However, each interpretation introduces its own peculiar problems.

Identity as singleness over time amounts to sameness amid change. Common-sense suggests that a thing can remain itself in spite of alterations, yet it is difficult to explain how this can be so. Identity over time leads on to questions such as the nature of substance, the relationship of appearance to reality and the conditions of personal identity. Identity as sameness amid diversity raises questions concerning kind-identity, the sameness which is shared by a number of things, and questions concerning individual identity, the identity by which one thing is itself and can be distinguished from other things of the same kind. This latter question is called the problem of individuation.

To tell whether two or more things of a given kind are identical, we must specify their identity conditions or criteria of identity. Different kinds of things are determined according to different criteria of identity. In logic, identity is characterised by an equivalence relation and is determined by what is called Leibniz's law, or the identity of indiscernibles: two things are identical if every property belonging to one belongs to the other.

A major dimension of contemporary discussion of identity places the question of identity within the theory of meaning. Identity is considered as a relation rather than as a property and, furthermore, as a relation between names or signs of objects rather than a relation between objects. Many philosophers follow Frege in arguing that an identity sentence would be cognitively insignificant if it were about a relation between objects and that it is meaningful because it is about a relation between signs of objects. Frege made the brilliant but controversial claim that in order to understand how identity statements are meaningful we must distinguish between the sense and the reference of signs.

The claim that items can be contingently identical has

对象

[拉丁文, 复数是 *ideata*, 一般译作 object (对象), 尽管 object 也用于翻译 *objectum*] 起初它是经院哲学的术语, 指由上帝制造的某种东西, 作为他自己所具有的观念的摹本。在斯宾诺莎的哲学中, 它与观念相对应, 观念就是关于它的观念, 即它就是在观念中被呈现的东西。

“真观念必定符合它的对象 (ideatum), 即真观念所表示的东西。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, 第一部分, 公理 6。

同一性

[源自拉丁文 *idem*, 同样] 同一性有两种解释; 其一解释成跨时间的单一性, 其二解释成差异中的同样性。这两个概念是联系着的, 因为要将某个事物认作跨时间上同样的, 不能不将一个事物同其他事物区分开来。不过, 每一解释都带来它自己特有的问题。

作为跨时间的单一性的同一性相当于变化中的同样性。常识认为一个事物可以不顾各种变化而保持自身不变, 但要说明这如何可能却是很困难的。跨时间的同一性引出了诸如实体的性质、现象对实在的关系、人格同一性的条件这一类的问题。作为差异中的同样性的同一性引出了有关类型同一性 (由许多事物共同享有的同样性) 的问题, 以及有关个体同一性 (一事物之为其自身, 并能与同类的其他事物区分开来所依赖的同一性) 的问题。后一个问题被称作个体性问题。

要说出—既定种类的两个或更多事物是否相同, 我们必须指明它们的同一性条件或同一性的标准。不同种类的事物是根据不同的同一性标准来确定的。在逻辑学中, 同一性是以等值关系为特征的, 是根据所谓的“莱布尼茨定律”或不可分辨者的同一性来确定的。不可分辨者的同一性是指, 如果属于一个事物的每一性质也属于另一个事物, 这两个事物是同一的。

当代关于同一性讨论的一个主要特点是把同一性问题放入意义理论中。同一性被认作关系而不是性质, 并进而被认作是对象的名称或记号之间的关系而不是对象之间的关系。许多哲学家追随弗雷格论证说, 如果一个同一性句子真的是关于对象之间关系的, 那么它在认知上是无意义的; 而正因为它是关于对象的记号之间的关系, 所以它才是有意义的。弗雷格提出了如下卓越而有争议的主张: 为了理解同一性陈述怎样成为有意义的, 我们必须区分记号的含义与指称。

关于事项可以偶然同一的观点已经受到克里普克的有力挑战, 他论证说, 虽然各种同一性可以根据经验来发现, 但它们仍然是必然性的问题。

been vigorously challenged by Kripke, who argues that identities, although open to empirical discovery, are matters of necessity.

"Problems concerning identity have been extensively discussed in the history of philosophy at least since Heraclitus worried about how anything could persist through change." — Brody, *Identity and Essence*, 1980, p. 1.

Identity, law of

The law expressed in the formula $A = A$ and stating that everything is what it is or that if anything is A , then it is A . Something cannot be what it is and fail to be what it is at the same time. Along with the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle, the law of identity is one of the three traditional laws of thought which are regarded as basic and fundamental to all thought.

"The law of identity is 'If and only if p , then p '." — Prior, *Formal Logic*, 1962, p. 29.

Identity, numerical

Aristotle distinguished three kinds of sameness or identity: (1) specific identity, according to which one thing is identical with another in respect of their species, that is the two things belong to the same species; (2) generic identity, according to which one thing is identical with another in respect of their genus, that is the two things belong to the same genus; and (3) numerical identity, according to which one thing is identical with another if the two things share the same space and time and have all their characteristics in common. If two things are numerically identical, they are in an equivalence relation and are actually one and the same thing, except for having different names. Numerical identity is sometimes called particular identity.

"We generally apply the term [identity] numerically or specifically or generically—numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing, for example 'doublet' and 'cloak'." — Aristotle, *Topics*, 103a8–9.

Identity, the paradox of

Identity, signified by expressions such as "the same as", is generally thought to be a relation either between two distinct things, or between one thing and itself. However, if it is the former, then the statement of identity must be false because two distinct things cannot be the same. If it is the latter, the statement of identity is true, but is the most trivial tautology. The paradox, which can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, was explicitly expressed by Wittgenstein: "to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all" (*Tractatus*, 5. 5303). Frege attempted to solve the paradox by saying that a true meaningful identity statement involves expressions with the same reference but

"关于同一性的问题在哲学史上至少从赫拉克利特起已经被广泛讨论了, 赫拉克利特曾为任何事情如何能在变化中维持下去的问题而苦恼。"——布洛迪:《同一性和本质》, 1980年, 第1页。

同一律

以公式 $A = A$ 表示的定律, 表述为: 每一事物都是其所是; 或者表述为: 如果任何事物是 A , 那么, 它是 A 。某物不可能既是其所是同时又非其所是。同一律是与矛盾律和排中律并列的三个传统的“思想律”之一, 人们认为这三个定律对一切思想都是基本的和根本的。

“同一律是: ‘当且仅当 p , 那么 p ’。”——普赖尔:《形式逻辑》, 1962年, 第29页。

数目的同一性

亚里士多德区分了三种同样性或同一性: (1) 属的同一性。根据这种同一性, 一事物与另一事物在属上是同一的, 即两事物属于同一属; (2) 种的同一性。根据这种同一性, 一事物与另一事物在种上是同一的, 即两事物属于同一种; (3) 数目的同一性。根据这种同一性, 一事物与另一事物是同一的, 如果它们共同处于同一地点和时间, 而且具有一切共同特征。如果两事物在数目上是同一的, 它们就处于等值关系中, 除了有不同的名称, 它们实际上完全是同一事物。数目的同一性有时被称作特殊的同一性。

“我们以数目上或属上或种上等不同方式使用「同一性」这个词……: 说数目上同一是指存在不止一个名称而只有一个事物这种情况, 例如 doublet (紧身上衣) 和 cloak (风衣)。”——亚里士多德:《正位篇》, 103a8–9。

同一性悖论

由像“与……同一”这样的表达式所意味的同一性, 通常被认为是两个不同的事物之间或者一事物和它自身之间的关系, 不过, 如果是前者, 那么同一性陈述必定为假, 因为两个不同的事物不可能是同一的。如果是后者, 同一性陈述是真的, 但它却是最不足道的同语反复。这一悖论可以追溯到柏拉图和亚里士多德, 并且为维特根斯坦以下述方式所明确表达: “说两个事物同一是没有意义的; 而说一事物与它自身同一, 根本就什么也没说。” (《逻辑哲学论》, 5. 5303) 弗雷格试图解决这个悖论, 他指出: 一个真的有意义的同一性陈述包括有相同指称但有不同含义的表达式。罗素认为此悖论产生于

different senses. Russell claimed that the paradox is due to the confusion of two levels of predicates, and Wittgenstein denied that identity is a relation.

"The paradox of identity similarly proceeds from an assumption—the assumption that a statement of identity asserts a relation." —C. J. F. Williams, *What is Identity?*, 1989, p. 1.

Identity criteria

The conditions in accordance with which we determine whether items are the same at a given time or whether a given thing is the same over time. This notion can be traced to Frege and was examined by the later Wittgenstein. A criterion of identity is generally understood to provide logically necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the truth or falsity of an identity claim, but some philosophers take the criterial relation as being looser than one which provides necessary and sufficient conditions. Since identity admits of different kinds, there are various kinds of identity criteria.

"That in accordance with which we judge whatever identity holds I call a criterion of identity" —Geach, *Reference and Generality*, 1980, p. 64.

Identity of indiscernibles, see indiscernability of identicals

Identity statement

A statement in which an expression of identity, such as "is" or "are", unites two expressions aiming to identify the same thing or kind of thing. All identity statements are symmetric, that is if "A is B", then "B is A". An identity statement is not a kind of subject-predicate statement, for one cannot distinguish subject and predicate roles for the expressions to perform. There are various kinds of identity statements. For meaning identity, a statement presents two general nouns as synonyms, for example "Motor cars are automobiles". For referential or name identity, a statement gives two proper names of a subject, for example "Mount Everest is Chomolungma". For contingent identity, a statement gives two expressions that accidentally and perhaps temporarily pick out the same individual, for example "Beijing is the Capital of the People's Republic of China". For necessary identity, a statement gives two expressions that necessarily designate the same individual. The necessity can be explained in terms of the kind of expressions used (rigid designators) or by logical, mathematical, metaphysical or scientific theoretical considerations.

"We may say that identity statements are a distinct class of statements, not to be assimilated to subject-predicate statements." —P. F. Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 242.

混淆谓词的两个层次,而维特根斯坦否认同一性是一个关系。

“同一悖论同样产生于一个假定,即同一性陈述断定了一个关系。”——威廉姆斯:《什么是同一性?》,1989年,第1页。

同一性标准

我们据以决定事物在一特定时间是否同一或一特定事物在时间中是否同一的条件。这个概念可以回溯到弗雷格,并为后期的维特根斯坦所考察。一般而言,同一性标准被认为是提供了确定一个同一性断言之真假的逻辑上必要的和充分的条件,但有些哲学家认为标准关系不一定非得似必要的和充分条件般严格。因为同一性容许有不同种类,因而有各种不同的同一性标准。

“我称那些我们据以判定无论什么样的同一性是否成立的东西为同一性标准。”——吉奇:《指称与概括》,1980年,第64页。

不可分辨者的同一性

见“等同物的不可分辨性”条。

同一性陈述

在一个陈述中,一个像“是”这样的同一性表达式将旨在确认同一事物或同种事物的两个表达式联结起来。所有的同一性陈述都是对称的,亦即,如果“A是B”,那么“B是A”。一个同一性陈述不是一个主谓陈述,因为一个人对这里的两个表达式不能真正区分主词和谓词的作用。同一性陈述有不同的种类。在意义同一中,陈述中所出现的两个普通名词是同义的,例如,“碟子是盘子”。在指称或名称同一中,陈述给出的是一个主体的两个专名。例如,“故宫是紫禁城”。在偶然同一中,一个陈述所给出的两个表达式是偶然地且可能暂时地对应于同一个体,例如,“北京是中华人民共和国的首都”。在必然同一中,一个陈述给出两个必然指称相同个体的表达式。必然性可以通过所使用的表达的类别来解释(严格指称者),也可以通过逻辑的、数学的、形而上学的或科学理论的思考来解释。

“我们可以说同一性陈述是一种独特的陈述,不可等同于主谓陈述。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第242页。

Identity theory

A materialist account of the relationship between mental states and events and physical states and events according to which mental states such as thinking, believing, feeling and hoping as a matter of fact turn out to be identical to physical states in the brain. Although things could have been otherwise, to have a mind is to have a brain, and to be in a certain mental state is to be in a certain neural state. Mental states and events actually occur in their owners' central nervous systems. For example, pain is identical with a certain firing of c-fibres. Identity theory is a widely held version of materialism or physicalism. It is sometimes used as a synonym for central-state materialism. It originated in the late 1950s with Herbert Feigl and U. T. Place, and versions of it have been fully defended by J. J. C. Smart, David Armstrong, Hilary Putnam, David Lewis and Donald Davidson. The identity theory of mind shares the behaviourists' criticism of dualism, but it also accommodates the inner and the episodic and therefore overcomes important weaknesses of behaviourism. The earlier version of the theory, type-type identity theory, claims that every type of mental event is identical with some type of physical state. However, this turns out to be problematic since, for example, it is reasonable to assume that persons with the same beliefs need not always have similar neural states. This gives rise to the token-token identity theory, according to which there is no necessary correspondence between a given type of mental state and a certain type of bodily state. Instead an instance or token of a mental state is identical with a token physical state of some type or other. Some critics argue that the token-token theory lacks the explanatory power of the type-type theory. The notion of contingent identity employed by identity theory is severely criticised by Kripke. Functionalism may be seen as a recent successor to the identity theory put forward by those continuing to seek a materialist or physicalist account of the mind.

"The so-called 'identity theory' may be characterised roughly as the theory that the mind is a brain, or more concretely that mental events, states, and processes are brain events, states and processes." —Smart, *Essays Metaphysical and Moral*, 1987, p. 215.

Ideology

[from Greek: *idea* + *logos*, literally, the doctrine of ideas, but used both positively and negatively in the social sciences.] A term introduced by Destutt de Tracy at the end of the eighteenth century and initially used in the modern critique of religion. His use led to a positive sense of ideology as any world view and body of philosophical thought. In this sense, ideology covers the whole sphere of culture, including science, and can be seen as a necessary intermediary between

同一论

一种关于心的状态和事件与物理状态和事件之关系的唯物论解释。根据这一理论,像思维、相信、感觉、希望等等这样的心的状态原来是同一于大脑中的物理状态。尽管这纯属偶然,但具有一个心就是具有一个脑,而处于一个心的状态就是处于某个神经状态。心的状态和事件实际上发生于其所有者的中枢神经系统。例如,疼痛同一于某个C神经通路的激活。同一论是一种广为接受的唯物论或物理主义。有时它被用作“中心状态唯物论”的同义语。它于50年代后期由H. 费格尔和U. T. 普雷斯提出,其不同的形式在J. J. C. 斯马特、D. 阿姆斯特朗、H. 普特南、D. 刘易斯和D. 戴维森那里得到充分的辩护。心的同一论同意行为主义对二元论的批评,但它也容纳内部的和偶发的东西,因此克服了行为主义的主要弱点。同一论的早期形式被称为“类型-类型同一论”,它声称每一类心的事件都同一于某一类物理状态。然而,人们发现这里存在一些问题。例如,我们有理由认为,具有相同信念的人并不总是具有相同的神经状态。这样就产生了“单例-单例同一论”。根据这一理论,一个给定的心的状态的类型与某个身的状态的类型并不存在必然的对应。而一个心的状态的特例或单例则同一于这样或那样一种物理状态的单例。有的批评者论辩说单例-单例同一论缺乏类型-类型同一论所具有的解释力。同一论所使用的偶然同一的概念遭到S. 克里普克的激烈批评。功能主义或许可以被看作是那些继续寻求对心作出唯物论的或物理主义解释的人所提出的同一论的最新后继者。

“所谓的同一论或许可以被大致地描述为这样一个理论:心即脑,或更为具体地说,心的事件、状态和过程就是大脑的事件、状态和过程。”——斯马特:《形而上学与道德文集》,1987年,第215页。

意识形态

[源自希腊文:*idea* (观念)和*logos* (逻各斯),从字面上讲,指的是观念的学说,但在社会科学中既有正面的用法,也有反面的用法]由D. de. 特拉西在18世纪末提出的一个概念,最初用于对宗教的现代批判。他的用法导致了对意识形态概念的正面意义,即把它作为世界观和哲学思想的主体。从这种意义上讲,意识形态覆盖了包括科学在内的整个文化领域,可以看

ourselves and the world. Marx made prominent use of the term, but in a pejorative or negative sense. For Marx, ideology is false consciousness; an interrelated set of value judgements which guide social and political actions, but which have not been subjected to rational scrutiny. These judgements are necessarily deceptive through distorting our understanding of social reality. Ideology, according to Marx, covers religion and all other forms of distorted consciousness. In this sense, ideology is the antithesis of science and functions politically as a specific element of the superstructure of society. The term is still used in both its positive and negative sense.

"In this, its origin, the term ideology has a positive connotation. It is the rigorous science of ideas which, by overcoming religions and metaphysical prejudices, may serve as a new basis for public education." —Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, 1992, pp. 27-8.

Idiolet

[from Greek: *idio*, peculiar] A lect is a variety of some basic language. For example, a dialect is a variety of language based in a particular region. An idiolet is a language which is peculiar to an individual, in contrast to a language shared by a community or sociolinct. For instance, you and I both speak and write English, but you and I may have different levels of English competence and performance. An idiolet is closely related to one's intentional state, and hence becomes the common object of study of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind.

"Idiolet [is] the dialect of a certain speaker at a certain time." —Bar-Hillel, *Language and Information*, 1964.

Idol

[From Latin: *idolum*, image] Anything which powerfully influences the common people but whose existence is really ungrounded. These kind of idols widely exist in religion, culture, social and economic life. Idol worship or idolatry has been condemned by orthodox Christianity and in contemporary philosophy by Nietzsche, Marx, Freud and others.

The English philosopher Francis Bacon used the term in its original sense of an illusion or false appearance. He distinguished four idols, that is four common hindrances to the acquisition of knowledge arising through prejudice or false ways of thinking. (1) The idols of the tribe (*idola tribus*), the tendency inherent in the human mind to take the human view of nature as the way the nature works in itself. (2) The idols of the cave (*idola specus*), prejudices caused by the nature of each individual's mind and the mental habits due for example to one's education. The term is borrowed from Plato's allegory of cave. (3) The idols of the marketplace (*idola fori*), caused by the daily intercourse of

做是我们自己与世界之间的必要中介。马克思非常重视对这一概念的使用,但却是从贬义或反面意义上使用的。在马克思看来,意识形态是虚假的意识,因为它是一组指导社会和政治行动但没有得到理性检验的相互联系的价值判断。这些判断由于歪曲我们对社会现实的理解,因而必然是靠不住的。按照马克思的论述,意识形态包括宗教和所有被歪曲的意识形式。从这种意义上讲,意识形态是科学的对立面,是作为社会上层建筑的一个特殊因素而在政治上起作用的。这一概念现在仍被在正反两种意义上使用。

"在这里,从它的起源上看,意识形态概念有着正面的涵义。它是严谨的观念的科学。由于克服了宗教和形而上学的偏见,它可以作为公共教育的新的基础。"——拉雷恩:《意识形态概念》,1992年,第27—28页。

特殊语

[源自希腊文 *idio*, 意为“特别的”] 特殊语是某些基本语言的变种。例如,方言就是一种某个具体地区的语言变种。特殊语是对个人而言很特别的一种语言,与此相对的是共同体共同使用的语言或“社会语”。譬如你我都在说写英语,但我们的英语能力和运用却有着不同的水平。特殊语与一个人的意向状态密切相关,因而成为语言哲学和心灵哲学共同研究的对象。

“特殊语:是[某个说话者在某个时间的方言。]”——巴·希尔:《语言和信息》,1964年。

偶像

[源自拉丁文 *idolum*, 幻象] 它指对普通人有强烈影响但其存在却没有现实根据的任何东西。这种偶像在宗教、文化、社会和经济生活中广泛存在。偶像崇拜(称做 idoltry)已受到正统基督教的谴责,而在当代哲学中,则受到尼采、马克思、弗洛伊德和其他人的谴责。

英国哲学家弗兰西斯·培根在该词的原意,即虚假现象或幻象的意义上使用这个词。他区分了四种偶像,也就是在获得知识中由偏见或错误的思维方式所引起的四个通常的障碍。(1) 种族的偶像 (*idola tribus*): 人类心灵中固有的倾向,它将人的自然观当做自然本身的运行方式。(2) 洞穴的偶像 (*idola specus*): 由每一个别心灵的性质和(例如)由教育造成的心智习惯所引起的偏见。这个词是从柏拉图的“洞穴比喻”借用来的。(3) 市场的偶像 (*idola fori*): 由普通生活的日常交往和一个人的语言影响而引起的偏见。(4) 剧场的偶像 (*idola theatri*): 由传统和权威理论或权威观点的影响

common life and by the influence exerted by one's language.

(4) The idols of the theatre (*idola theatri*), influences exerted by traditions and authoritative theories or opinions. For Bacon, idols are the antithesis of ideas. Idols stand in the same relation to the true interpretation of nature as fallacies stand to ordinary logic. Roger Bacon had earlier put forwards four hindrances to obtaining true knowledge in the beginning of his *Opus Maius*: the use of insufficient authority, custom, popular opinions, and the concealment of ignorance. Some argue that Francis Bacon derived his theory of idols from Roger Bacon. However, the work of Roger Bacon was not published when Francis Bacon was alive.

"The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance obtained, they will again in the very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being fore-warned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults." —F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, in *The Works*, 1905, p. 263.

Idolatry, see iconoclasm

If, abbreviation of if and only if, see biconditional

Ignoratio elenchi

[Latin; ignorance of refutation] An informal fallacy in traditional logic, in which one argues against something that is not really the position of the opponent. An advocate of such an argument is hence ignorant of what his opponent is trying to refute or prove. It is any fallacy of irrelevance in which one argues for or proves something that is not an issue at hand and is also called an irrelevant conclusion or missing the point. An argument involves this fallacy if it passes from one area of ideas to another.

"To pass in argument from the world of psychology to that of philosophy, or vice versa, or to subordinate either world to the other, cannot fail to involve us on every occasion in *ignoratio elenchi*." —Oakeshott, *Experience and its Modes*, 1933, p. 242.

I-It

According to Martin Buber, the world is twofold because the human attitude towards it is twofold. This twofold attitude is reflected in the formulations I-It and I-Thou (or I-You). For Buber, they are the two primary relationships between oneself and another. In the I-It relationship, it can be both non-human objects and other persons, covering everything with which the I comes into contact and uses for its own utility. This is a relation

引起的偏见。在培根看来，偶像是“观念”的对立面。偶像之于自然解释的关系与荒谬学说之于普通逻辑的关系是一样的。R. 培根早先在他的《大著作》的开始已经提出了阻碍人类获得真知识的四个障碍：运用不恰当的权威、习惯、舆论，以及掩饰无知。有些人论证说，F. 培根从 R. 培根那里引出他的偶像理论。不过，F. 培根在世时 R. 培根的著作尚未出版。

“现在占据着人的理智并且在里面已经根深蒂固的各种假象和错误概念，不仅非常扰乱人心，使真理很难进来，而且即使进来以后，如果人们事前不提防这种危险，使自己尽量巩固起来抵御它们的进攻，它们就会在科学复兴的时候，又找上我们和扰乱我们。”——F. 培根：《新工具》，载于《著作集》，1905 年，第 263 页。

偶像崇拜

见“打破偶像”条。

当且仅当

“当且仅当”的缩写，见“双条件句”条。

混淆论题

[拉丁语：对于拒斥的无知] 传统逻辑中的一种非形式谬误，其中人们在论辩时所反对的并不是论敌的真正立场。该论证的提出者因此并不知道他的论敌正试图拒斥什么或证明什么。它指任何不相干谬误，人们在其中争论或证明的东西并不是当时的分歧所在，因此被叫做“不相干结论”或“不得要领”。一个论证如果从一个观念领域滑入另一个观念领域，它就包含这种谬误。

“在论证中从心理学领域滑入哲学领域，或者与此相反，或者使这两个领域中的某一个从属于另一个，在这每一种情形下我们都必定犯了混淆论题的谬误。”——奥克肖特：《经验及其样式》，1933 年，第 242 页。

我与它

按照 M. 布伯的主张，这个世界是双重的，因为人类对待它的态度是双重的。这种双重态度反映在“我与它”和“我与你”（I-Thou, I-You）的表达模式中。对于布伯而言，它们是某人与他者之间两种主要的关系。在“我与它”的关系中，“它”既可以是非人类的对象，也可以是其他的人；总之是一切我与之遭遇并因其有用而加以利用的东西。这是一种使用者与被使

between a user and an object of use or between an observer and an object of observation. This is a one-sided relation, within which the I concentrates upon its own purposes and concerns and keeps the It at a distance, where it is measured and studied. Once there is personal engagement and commitment, the I-It relation becomes the I-Thou relation.

"It becomes unmistakably clear how the spiritual reality of the basic words emerges from a natural reality: that of the basic word I-you from a natural association, that of the basic word I-It from a natural discreteness." —Buber, *I and Thou* (tr. by Kaufman), 1970, p. 62.

Illicit major

A rule for categorical syllogisms states that no term may be distributed in the conclusion which is not distributed in one of the premises. The violation of this rule leads to logical fallacies. If a major term which is undistributed in the premises becomes distributed in the conclusion, the fallacy is called the illicit process of the major term (or the illicit major). For example, "All persons are mortal; No tree is a person; therefore, no tree is mortal". This inference is erroneous because the major term "mortal" is asserted only partly in the premises but is asserted wholly in the conclusion. If it is the minor term which is undistributed in the premises but distributed in the conclusion, the logical fallacy is called the illicit process of the minor term (or the illicit minor). For example, "All persons are mortal; all persons are two-legged; therefore, all two-legged things are mortal". This syllogism is incorrect because the conclusion asserts the whole of "two-legged" and hence goes beyond what is implied in the premises.

"When a syllogism contains its major term undistributed in the major premise but distributed in the conclusion, the argument is said to commit the fallacy of illicit process of the major term (or, more briefly, the illicit major)." —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, p. 220.

Illicit minor. see illicit major

Illocutionary act

Austin's term, one of three ways in which saying something is doing something. To perform a locutionary act is to utter a meaningful utterance. But over and above this there is a further act which gives the force of the utterance, the way it is to be taken. An illocutionary act makes clear this aspect of an utterance and is the further act that is performed in performing a locutionary act. Asking or answering a question; giving an assurance or a warning; making an appeal or a criticism are only a few examples of this kind of speech act. The illocutionary force of an

用对象、观察者与被观察对象之间的关系,是一种单面的关系,其中的这个“我”只关注自己的目的和欲望所在,而将这个“它”置于一个使它能够被衡量和被研究的距离。一旦出现个人的卷入和参与,这种我与它的关系就变成了我与你的关系。

“我们在这里极其清晰地看到基本词的精神实在如何从一种自然实在中涌现出来:‘我与你’这个基本词的精神实在就出自一种自然的联合,而‘我与它’这个基本词的精神实在就出自一种自然的分离。”——布伯:《我与你》(考夫曼英译),1970年,第62页。

大项不当周延

直言三段论的一条规则,表述为:在前提之一中不周延的词项,在结论中不能周延。违反这个规则将导致逻辑谬误。如果大项在前提中不周延,在结论中变成周延的,这个错误称作“大项不当周延”(简称为“illicit major”)。例如,“一切人都会死,树不是人,所以,树不会死”。这个推理是错误的,因为大项“会死的”在前提中只是部分地被断定,但是在结论中被全部断定。如果在前提中不周延而在结论中周延的是小项,那么这个逻辑错误被称作“小项不当周延”(简称为“illicit minor”)。例如,“一切人都会死,一切人都有两条腿,所以,一切有两条腿的东西都会死”。这个三段论是错误的,因为结论断定了全部“两条腿的”东西,超出了前提所指的范围。

“当一个三段论的大项在大前提中不周延而在结论中周延,我们就说这个论证犯了大项不当周延的错误(或者较简单地称作 the illicit major).”——柯比:《逻辑导论》,1986年,第220页。

小项不当周延

见“大项不当周延”条。

以言行事的行为

奥斯汀的术语,是三个说即做的方式之一。完成一个以言表意的行为就是说出一句有意义的话。但在这之外,还有赋予这句话以分量的另一个行为,即它被说出的方式。以言行事的行为就清楚地表明了这个方面,它正是在完成以言表意的行为中所完成的进一步行为。提出或回答一个问题;做出一个保证或给出一个警告;提出一个请求或一种批评等等,这些都只是这种言语行为的少量例子。一句话的以言行事的分量,在很大程度上取决于约定、语境或说者的意

utterance is largely dependent on conventions, contexts, or a speaker's intention, rather than on the truth or falsity of an utterance. Unlike a perlocutionary act, according to Austin, an illocutionary act need not produce any effect on others, but is nevertheless a way of understanding the sentence uttered. Austin's chief interest lay in analysing illocutionary acts on the grounds that they represent a dimension of language which is not meaning but which is at least equally important as meaning in understanding an utterance. Although some argue that illocution is still a kind of meaning, Austin's theory of illocution has exerted great influence on contemporary philosophy.

"To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution." — Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, p. 98.

Illusion, argument from

An argument starting from the fact that our senses sometimes deceive us, for they vary with the physical and psychological condition of the observer and with the nature of the circumstances in which objects appear. From this common premise, rationalism and empiricism derive different conclusions. For rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, the deceptive nature of the senses shows that appearances are not real and cannot be the true objects of knowledge. Thus an alternative metaphysical foundation of knowledge must be sought. Empiricists such as Berkeley claim that since sensible appearances are unstable, they cannot characterise material things and are the products of mind. If, however, we know nothing other than such appearances we have no grounds to believe in material things. This view leads to phenomenalism if we take the common objects of experience to comprise actual sensible appearances and the appearances which would exist were we to be in different circumstances. Philosophers object to the different versions of the argument. Although our senses sometimes deceive us, they do not, and perhaps could not, always do so.

"All that this argument from illusion proves is that the relationship of a sense-content to the material thing to which it belongs is not that of part to whole." — Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1946, p. 143.

Image

[from Latin: *imago*, a representation], A mental picture purportedly representing external objects, with certain visual similarities to the latter. This position is called the picture view and is associated with the notion of introspection. In this century with the rise of behaviourism, the notion of introspection came under attack, and the picture view of imagism became a matter of controversy. A once popular alternative was J. B. Watson's descriptionism according to which an image is a representation in the manner

向,而不是这句话的真假。根据奥斯汀的观点,与以言取效的行为不同,以言行事的行为不必对他人产生影响,但它仍然是理解所说出的句子的方式。奥斯汀的主要兴趣在于分析以言行事的行为,他相信,这种行为代表了语言的一个方面,虽然这不是意义方面,但这方面在理解一句话时至少与意义同样重要。尽管有人不同意以言行事仍然是一种意义,但奥斯汀的以言行事理论还是对当代哲学产生了极大的影响。

“要确定是什么样的以言行事的行为在起作用,我们就必须确定我们是以什么样的方式在使用话语。”——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》,1962年,第98页。

幻觉论证

从以下事实出发的论证:我们的感觉有时会欺骗我们,因为它们要随观察者的生理心理条件,要随对象所呈现的环境的性质的变化而变化。从这共同前提出发,唯理主义和经验主义得出了不同的结论。对于像柏拉图和笛卡尔这样的唯理主义者来说,感觉的欺骗性表明现象是不真实的,不能是知识的真正对象。因此,必须另寻知识的形而上学的基础。像巴克莱这样的经验主义者认为,既然可感现象是不稳定的,它们就不能表征物质性事物,它们是心灵的产物。但是,如果我们除了这些现象之外别无所知,我们就没有理由相信有物质事物。这种观点导致现象主义,如果我们认为通常的经验对象由实际可感现象构成,那么假如我们处在不同的环境中,这些现象仍然会存在。哲学家们反对这种论证的各种不同形式,因为虽然我们的感觉有时会欺骗我们,但它们不会(或许不能)永远欺骗我们。

“幻觉论证所证明的全部内容,是感觉内容与它所属的物质事物的关系,并不是部分与整体的关系。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1946年,第143页。

影像

[源自拉丁 *imago*, 一个表象] 一个据称是表征外部客体的心的图画,与后者具有一定的视觉相似性。这种观点被称为图画观点,与内省概念相关联。在本世纪,随着行为主义的兴起,内省概念遭到攻击,而影像主义的图画观亦引起争议。一个曾经流行的取代观点就是 J. B. 华生的描述主义。根据华生的观点,一个影像是一个借助于语言描述的表象。最近,图画观借助于经验心理学的研究材料而得以复活。关于影像

of a linguistic description. Recently, the picture view has been revived based on the data of empirical psychology. The issue of image is related to various modern forms of representationalism.

Traditionally, images are thought to have a close relationship with thinking, and understanding the meaning of a word was believed to bring to mind an appropriate image associated with the word. But Frege established a contrast between image and thought and considered an image to be merely psychological, with no place in an account of meaning. Wittgenstein further attacked the supposed role of images in thought. If an image, as a picture of an external thing, can confer meaning on a word, then vividly seeing the external object should be an even better way of conferring meaning. But seeing an object does not settle matters of meaning. If a seeing of a red thing does not explain the meaning of redness, how can a red mental image do so?

"What is the meaning of the words: 'this image'? How does one point to an image? How does one point twice to the same image?" Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 382.

Image theory of meaning, another term for ideational theory of meaning

Imagination

The ability to represent objects or states of affairs which cannot exist, which do not exist or which do not exist here and now. Imagination is both condemned for its link with falsity and prized for its role in artistic creativity, especially in romantic art. Aristotle suggested that imagination (Greek: *phantasia*) lies in the middle between perception and thought. The British empiricists held an imagist conception of the imagination, according to which to image is to see with the mind's eye. They held that to image something is to have an image which represents its physical correspondent and that all ideas in the mind are mental images. In Kant's account, imagination is not so crucial for forming concepts, but performs an indispensable role in perception as an intermediary between our sensibility and understanding which allows us to have knowledge of a unified world. Wittgenstein proposed that we should study how the word 'imagination' is used. He also claimed that although mental images exist and are important for imagination, not all kinds of imagination involve them. He characterised imagination in terms of "seeing-as" and seeing under an aspect. His view raises problems about the status of images and the relation between imagination and perception.

"Imagination is the reorganization of available memories in the light of a particular goal. It can be called creativity in the sense that every such reorganisation is original with the

的争论与表征主义的各种当代形式有关。

在传统上,影像被认为与思维有密切的关系,而理解一个词汇的意义被认为是将与那个词汇相关联的适当的影像带到心中。但是弗雷格将影像与思维对立起来,并将前者仅仅视为心理的东西,在关于意义的说明中没有地位。维特根斯坦则进一步攻击了影像在思维中所被假定的作用。如果影像作为一个外部事物的图画能够将意义赋予一个词汇,那么生动地看见外部客体就应是赋予意义的更好方式。但看见一个客体并不解决意义问题。如果看到一个红色的东西并不能解释红色的意义,那么一个红色的心的影像又如何能够做到这一点呢?

“词汇‘这个影像’是什么意思?一个人如何可能指向一个影像?一个人如何可能两次指向同一影像?”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第382节。

意义的影像论

“意义的观念理论”的另一名称。

想像

表征不可能存在、不存在或此时此地不存在的对象或事态的能力。想像既因其与谬误的联系而遭谴责,亦因其在艺术尤其是浪漫艺术的创造中的作用而获褒扬。亚里士多德提出,想像(希腊语, *phantasia*)居于知觉与思维之间。英国经验论者对于想像持意象主义的看法,认为想像就是以心之眼来看,他们认为想像某事即是具有一个表征其物理对应物的映象。心的所有观念都是心的映象。在康德的解释中,想像对于形成一个概念并不那么至关重要,但它在知觉中起某种不可替代的作用,它是我们的感觉与使得我们具有关于统一世界的知识的理解之间的中介物。维特根斯坦提出,我们应当研究“想像”一词是如何被使用的。他还声称,尽管心的映象存在并对想像十分重要,但并不是说所有的想像都包含映象。他将想像描述为“看作”和从一个侧面来看。他的观点在心的哲学中引发了映象的地位以及想像与知觉的关系这样的问题。

“想像是为了一个特定目标对现有记忆的再组织。每一个这样的再组织都是个体的独创,在这个意义上,想像可以被称为创造性。”——阿诺德,见米谢尔编:《人类活动》,1969年,第196页。

individual." — Arnold, in Mischel (ed.), *Human Action*, 1969, p. 196.

Imitation

[Greek: *mimesis*] (1) Plato used imitation, like participation, to describe the relation between the particulars and Forms. Forms are the originals, analogous to painter's or sculptor's models, and the particulars are resemblances or copies of them. It shows that the particulars are inferior to Forms, as in general originals do not depend on copies, while copies must rely on the originals. Forms are not dependent on the particulars, while the latter cannot exist without Forms. (2) Plato also uses this word to describe the nature of art; art is mainly imitation of the particulars which are themselves imitations of Forms, so it is far away from the truth; furthermore, art as imitation has had effects on the actor's personality; for these reasons Plato orders the expulsion of all imitative arts from his ideal state. Nevertheless his view that "art is imitation" has lasting influence in the theory of literature.

"For imitation is surely a kind of production, though it be only a production of images, as we say, not of originals of every sort." —Plato, *Sophist*, 265a.

Imitation game, see Turing test

Imitation theory

The oldest theory of art, whose central claim is that the essence of art is to imitate or display things in the real world. "Imitation" is the translation of the Greek word "*mimesis*" (hence the theory is also called "mimetic theory of art"). *Mimesis* is sometimes translated as "representation" (hence the theory is also called the "representation theory of art"). This theory originated with Plato and Aristotle and was the dominant theory of art until the rise of Romanticism. It has retained a deep metaphysical concern for knowing how things are and argues that art has a cognitive role. However, there has been much debate about the precise meaning of "imitation" and "representation" and about questions relating to the nature of representation. Some writers claim that to imitate is to portray the visible form of nature, while others believe that imitation requires idealisation. The basic criticism of the imitation theory is that not all forms of art are imitation or representation. Music, for example, is not essentially representational. Contemporary abstract painting further stands outside the scope of this theory. Nevertheless, the theory still has able defenders. An influential version has been developed by Nelson Goodman, who argues that representation means denotation. On this view, the relation between an artwork and the thing it represents is analogous to the relation between a description

模仿

[希腊语 *mimesis*]。(1) 就像“分有”一词一样，柏拉图用“模仿”一词旨在描述殊相与形式之间的关系。形式是原作，类似于画家或雕刻家的模特；而殊相则是原作的相似物或摹本。这表明殊相低于形式，因为一般说来原作不依赖于摹本，而摹本必然依赖于原作。形式不依赖于殊相，但殊相没有形式则不能存在。(2) 柏拉图也用“模仿”一词来描述艺术的本质；艺术主要是对殊相的模仿，而殊相本身则是对形式的模仿，所以艺术与真理相去甚远；另外，艺术作为模仿会对演员的人格产生坏的影响；鉴于这些理由，柏拉图要求把所有模仿艺术驱逐出他的理想国。尽管如此，柏拉图关于“艺术即模仿”的论点文学理论有着长久的影响。

“模仿的确是一种生产制作，但它可以说只是生产想像而非各种原作。”——柏拉图：《智者篇》，265a。

模拟游戏

见“图灵测验”条。

模仿说

最古老的艺术学说，主要认为艺术的本质在于模仿或者展现现实世界的事物。“模仿”是希腊语 *mimesis* 的译文（因此把这种理论称为“艺术的模仿说”）。*Mimesis* 有时也被译为“再现”（representation）（因此这种理论也被称为“艺术的再现说”）。模仿说为柏拉图与亚里士多德首倡，在浪漫主义兴起之前一直在艺术理论中占主导地位。这种学说包含一种深层的形而上学内容，所关切的是认识事物是如何成其所是的，同时还认为艺术具有一种认知作用。然而，关于“模仿”与“再现”的确切含义以及与再现本质相关的种种问题，一直存在许多争论。有些作家认为模仿就是描绘自然界的可见形式，而有些作家则认为模仿需要理想化的描述。对模仿说提出批评的基本论点是：并非所有艺术形式都是模仿或再现。譬如，音乐在本质上就不是再现性的。当代抽象画与模仿或再现理论更无多少关系。尽管如此，模仿说仍然有人为其辩护。N. 古德曼就曾发展了一种颇有影响的学说。他认为再现意味着外延。根据这一观点，艺术作品与其再现之物间的关系，类似于描述与其描述对象之间的关系。

“模仿说所关注的焦点是艺术作品的显而易见的关系特性，即艺术与主题材料的关系。

and what it describes.

"The imitation theory focused on a readily evident relational property of works of art, namely, art's relation to subject matter"—Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic*, 1974, p. 20.

Immaterialism

Berkeley's own designation for his philosophy, which is always taken as a synonym for subjective idealism. Berkeley referred to his opponents as materialists. Matter for him was not the corporeal as such, but rather that which is inaccessible by the finite perceiving mind or something whose existence has no bearing to any perceiving mind, such as Descartes' material substance or Locke's unknown underlying essence. Berkeley held that to be is to be perceived. The corporeal is exactly as it is perceived to be, and the existence of absolute and independent matter is unintelligible. What is real are sense-impressions and ideas.

"If there are difficulties attending immaterialism, these are at the same time direct and evident proofs for it. But for the existence of matter, there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lies against it." — Berkeley, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, III, p. 259.

Immediate inference

Inference must start with one or more premises. If we draw a conclusion simply from one single premise, one proposition from another single proposition, the inference is immediate. It does not use a middle term or any other means for reaching a conclusion. For instance, from the single premise "All humans are mortal", we can infer validly that "Some humans are mortal". This contrasts with mediate inference in which a conclusion is drawn from more than one premise, such as a syllogism and polysyllogism. In the square of opposition of traditional logic, given the truth or falsity of one of the categorical propositions, we may immediately infer the truth or falsity of some or all of the other three categorical propositions. Other major forms of immediate inference include conversion, obversion and contraposition.

"Where a conclusion is drawn from only one premise, ... the inference is said to be immediate." — Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, 7th ed., p. 180.

Immediate perception

A distinction between immediate and mediate or indirect perception that originated with Berkeley, and is also called the distinction between direct and indirect awareness. One may say that "I hear a train", but what one actually hears is a sound. In this case the sound is what a person perceives immediately without any inference, while the train is perceived mediately, for the person may not perceive the

系。”——迪基：《艺术与审美》，1974年，第20页。

非物质论

巴克莱赋予他自己哲学的名称，一直被用作“主观唯心主义”的同义语。巴克莱把他的对手称作“唯物主义者”。对他来说，物质不是指有形物本身，而是指进行感知的有限心灵无法接近的东西，或者其存在与任何进行感知的心灵无关的某种东西，诸如笛卡尔的物质实体，洛克的不可知的、作为基础的本质。巴克莱认为存在就是被感知。有形物与它被感知的样子精确相像。绝对的、独立的物质的存在是难以理解的。实在的东西是感觉印象和观念。

“如果有各种困难伴随着非物质论，那么这些困难同时又是对它的直接而确实的证明。可是，对于物质的存在，这里一个证据也没有，然而却有多得多的而且不可克服的反驳反对它。”——巴克莱：《希勒斯和斐洛诺斯的三篇对话》，第三卷，第259页。

直接推理

推理必定从一个或多个前提开始。如果我们从一个单独的前提引出结论，从一个单独的命题推出另一个命题，该推理就是直接推理。它并不利用中项或任何其他手段达到结论。举例来说，从单个命题“所有的人都是有死的”我们能够有效地推出“有些人是有死的”。这与三段论和复合三段论之类的间接推理恰成对照，在后者那里结论是从不止一个前提推出的。在传统逻辑的对当方阵中，给定某个直言命题的真或者假，我们可以直接推出另外三个直言命题中的某些或全部的真或假。其他主要的直接推理形式包括换质、换位和换质位。

“如果结论只从一个前提推出，……则称该推理是直接推理。”——柯比：《逻辑导论》，1986年，第7版，第180页。

直接知觉

直接知觉与间接知觉的区分始于巴克莱，这一区分又被称为直接觉知与间接觉知之间的区分。在日常经验中，一个人可能说“我听见一辆火车”，但一个人实际上听到的是一个声音。在这个情况下，声音是他直接地、不经由任何推理而知觉到的东西；而他对于火车的知觉则是间接的，因为他可能根本没有知觉到火车而只

train at all but only infer from hearing the sound that there is a train. We have mediate perception only when we have immediate perception, although the immediate perception need not be temporally prior. What, then, is the nature of this distinction between immediate and mediate perception? Different responses are the basis of a division in the philosophy of perception between naive or direct realism on the one hand, and representationalism and phenomenalism on the other. Both representationalism and phenomenalism take this distinction seriously, arguing that the objects of immediate perception are sense-data or sense-impressions, while the objects of mediate perception are physical existents which are represented by the sense-data (representationalism) or are constructed out of sense data (phenomenalism). Naive or direct realism argues that what we immediately perceive are nothing but the physical objects themselves. According to this theory, both immediate and mediate perception is the acquiring of beliefs about the world by means of senses and this distinction is not a sharp one. The analysis of immediate perception is indeed a central problem in contemporary philosophy of perception.

"Immediate perception, then, is perception which involves no element of inference, while mediate perception does involve such an inference." —Armstrong, *Perception and the Physical World*, 1961, p. 21.

Immortality

[from Latin *in*, not + *mort*, death] A state of existing eternally or timelessly, specifically regarding personal immortality through the survival of the soul after the death of the body. The immortality of the soul, an ancient idea found in almost every primitive religion, was fully developed in Christianity. It claims that a soul never dies and will be punished or rewarded according to its behaviour in the earthly life. Immortality in this sense has served as a presupposition of morality, or in Kant's words, "a postulate of pure practical reason". Metaphysically, the soul's immortality was elaborated in Plato's *Phaedo*. He argued that because the soul is immaterial and simple in the sense of having no parts and occupies no space, it cannot be decomposed. This kind of argument was influential in the history of philosophy, but it has been opposed by the Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and cannot exist separately. On some views, one's present body is no more than a temporary home for one's soul, and one is immortal through reincarnation or transmigration into another body when one's present body perishes.

Plato also claimed that human beings have a natural desire to seek immortality. There are two basic ways of pursuing this end. One is to have bodily offspring, and another, preferred by Plato, is to produce something which is eternal, especially through the discovery of truths. One's

是由听到那个声音而推断有一个火车。我们只有在具有直接知觉的时候才具有间接知觉, 尽管直接知觉并不必然在时间上为先。那么, 直接知觉与间接知觉之间的这一区分的本质何在呢? 对于这一问题的不同回答构成了知觉哲学中朴素或直接实在论与表征主义和现象论的分野的基础。表征主义和现象论都认真看待这一区分, 认为知觉的直接对象是感觉材料或感觉印象, 而知觉的间接对象则是由感觉材料所表征(表征主义)或由感觉材料所构成(现象论)的物理存在。而朴素或直接实在论则论辩说, 我们所直接知觉的东西只是物理对象本身。根据这一理论, 直接知觉和间接知觉都是通过感官来获得关于世界的信念, 因此这一区分并不严格。对于直接知觉的分析实际上是当代知觉哲学中的中心问题。

"因此, 直接知觉是不包含推理因素的知觉, 而间接知觉则的确包含这样的推理。" ——阿姆斯特朗:《知觉与物理世界》, 1961年, 第21页。

不朽

[源自拉丁语 *in* (不) 和 *mort* (死)] 一种永久的或超时间的存在状态, 尤指人的不朽, 即在肉体死后的灵魂存留。灵魂不朽是一个古老的观念, 几乎在所有的原始宗教中都能发现, 在基督教中, 这种观念得到了充分的发展。它主张, 灵魂不死, 并将根据其在尘世生活中的行为受到惩罚或奖赏。在这个意义上, 不朽用作道德的一个预设, 或按康德的说法, "纯粹实践理性的公设"。在形而上学方面, 灵魂的不朽在柏拉图的《斐多篇》中有细致的论证。他论证说, 因为灵魂是非物质的, 而且只是指它没有部分和不占空间, 所以, 它就不能被分解。这类论证在哲学史上有影响, 但与亚里士多德的观点相对立, 因为亚氏认为, 灵魂是肉体的形式, 不能单独存在。根据某些观点, 某人现存的肉体只是其灵魂的暂时居所, 灵魂是不朽的, 因为当其现存肉体消逝时, 它会再生或转移到另一个肉体中。

柏拉图也断言, 人类有追求不朽的自然欲望。追求这个目的的基本方式有两种。一种是拥有肉体意义的子孙, 另一种(这是柏拉图更为喜欢的)是生产出某种永久性的东西, 尤其是发现真理。一个人的精神事业能够在他死后, 继续存在于其他人的心智中。

"我们知道, 大脑不是不朽的, 一个活的躯体的有机能量在死亡时仿佛被驱散了, 所以, 不

spiritual work can continue to exist in other people's minds after one's death.

"We know that the brain is not immortal, and that the organised energy of a living body becomes, as it were, demobilised at death and therefore not available for collective action. All the evidence goes to show that what we regard as our mental life is bound up with brain structure and organised bodily energy. Therefore it is rational to suppose that mental life ceases when bodily life ceases." —Russell, *Why I am not a Christian*, 1957, p. 51.

Impartial spectator, see ideal observer theory

Impartialism

A tendency reflected in every kind of altruistic moral theory, and especially Kantian ethics. It advocates the view that moral consideration should be isolated from all forms of partiality and self concern and emphasises the universalizability of moral reasons. Moral principles are universally applicable and cannot be principles that favour oneself or those close to one on pain of being rationally unacceptable. Impartialism extensively employs the analogical argument that one should consider events from another person's point of view and should hypothetically put oneself in the position of those whom one's acts will affect.

"The idea behind the Golden Rule is that of impartialism—that one should make no exception in one's own favour." Boer and Lycan, *Knowing Who*, 1986, p. 157.

Impartiality

If an agent is included in a group with regard to which the issue of impartiality arises, impartiality is the virtue of treating oneself and others on an equal basis. If one is not in the group regarding which one is impartial, impartiality is a virtue of being personally uninvolved with any party in the group. Impartiality is associated with equality, justice and fairness. It is objective and impersonal. Since it is an essential requirement of moral behaviour to consider each individual equally, impartiality is a basic feature of morality. There are various tests of impartiality, such as the Golden Rule, the reverse-role test, the Categorical Imperative, universalizability, and Rawls' veil of ignorance.

"What is it to be 'impartial'? It is to take an attitude that would not be changed if positions of individuals involved were reversed, or if the individuals were different from whom they are." —Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 249.

Imperative

Originally the mood of sentences that issue commands or requests. Kant took it as the form of moral commands for

可用于集合行动。一切证据都趋于表明,我们当做精神生命的东西,与大脑构造和身体的有机能量密切相关。因此,在肉体生命停止时精神生命亦停止,这个假定是合理的。”——罗素:《为什么我不是基督教徒》,1957年,第51页。

公正的旁观者

见“理想的观察者理论”条。

公正主义

在各种利他主义道德理论,尤其是康德的伦理学中反映出的一种倾向。它倡导道德思考应脱离各种形式的不公平和自私自利的观点,并强调道德理性的普遍化。道德原则是普遍适用的,只有利于自己或与自己接近的人而在理性上不能接受的原则不能是道德原则。公正主义广泛运用类推论证,如一个人应从其他人的观点来考虑问题,应假设自己处于人们的行为将会影响到他们的那些人的位置上。

“金规背后的观念是公正主义的观念——人不能只做对自己有利的事。”——布尔和莱坎:《知道谁》,1986年,第157页。

公正

如果一个人属于一个在其中会产生公正问题的团体,公正就是在一种平等的基础上对待自己和他人的德性。如果某人自己不是在一个团体里,即对于这个团体而言,他或她是公正的,那么公正就是他本人利益不涉及该团体中任何一方的一种德性。公正是与平等、正义、公平相联的,是客观的和非个人的。由于平等地对待每一个人足道德行为的本质要求,所以公正是道德的基本特征。有多种公正的标准,诸如金规、角色转换标准、绝对命令、可普遍化和罗尔斯的无知之幕。

“什么是公正?它是一种这样的态度,如果卷入其中的个人把他的位置反转过来,或者如果个人的现在状况与过去不同,这种态度仍不会改变。”——布朗特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第249页。

命令

原意是发出要求或请求的句子语气。康德把它作为道德命令的形式,依据一定的意志原

determining an action in accordance with a certain principle of the will. It is expressed by an ought. According to him, there are fundamentally two kinds of imperatives: the hypothetical and the categorical. A hypothetical imperative commands an action with regard to the agent's ends. If the end is only possible, it is a problematic or technical imperative, also called a rule of skill. If the end is actual, it is an assertoric imperative, also called a counsel of prudence. A categorical imperative commands an action as an objective necessity in itself, without regard to the agent's ends, and is also called the apodeictic imperative. It requires that one should act only on maxims that are universalizable.

An account of imperatives under Kantian influence is also important for prescriptivism. The philosophy of language is interested in the relationship between this commanding function of imperatives and other functions in language, such as communicating information. Contemporary logicians have attempted to develop an imperative logic.

"The conception of an objective principle so far as it constrains a will, is a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an imperative." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Sect. 2, 414.

Imperfect duty

Kant drew a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect duty must be fulfilled under any circumstances and specifies a particular action, while an imperfect duty may be overridden and allows a significant degree of freedom in deciding how to comply with it. A perfect duty, such as the duty not to lie, establishes a necessary goal for an action and is commanded apodeictically. An imperfect duty, such as the duty to support the poor, allows exceptions and various ways in which it may be satisfied. It allows contingently good action under a necessarily good maxim. The distinction can be traced to scholasticism, in which perfect duties could be enforced by external legislation, while imperfect duties could not.

"Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only duties of virtue. Fulfilment of them is merit ..., but failure to fulfil them is not in itself culpability ... but rather mere deficiency in moral worth, unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with such duties." —Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, II, 7.

Imperialism

A term with many senses. In Marxism, imperialism is the world system of political domination and economic exploitation which emerged from the competition amongst highly developed capitalist powers especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Lenin, imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. On this view,

则来规定行为。它表达为“应该”。按他的观点,存在着两种基本的命令:假言的和绝对的。假言命令命令一种与主动者的目的有关的行为。如果这个目的只是可能的,那么它就是或然的或技术性的命令式,也称为“技术规则”;如果目的是现实的,它就是实然的命令式,也称为“明智的规劝”。绝对命令把一种行为作为自在的客观必然性而命令它,不考虑主动者的目的,因此也称为必然的命令式。它要求人们仅按照可作为普遍规律的准则而行动。

在康德影响下,对命令的说明对于规范主义也是重要的。语言哲学感兴趣于语言的这种命令功能和交流信息的语言功能之间的关系。当代逻辑学家一直在发展一种命令逻辑。

“客观原则的概念,仅就其对意志具有强制性来说,是一种(理性的)律令,这种律令的形式表述称为命令。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第二章,第414节。

不完全职责

康德作出了完全职责和不完全职责的区别。完全职责是在任何情况下都必须完成的职责,它是指明特殊行为的。而不完全职责是一种可能无效的职责。我们有很程度的自由来决定如何遵照不完全职责。在完全职责中,行为有必然的目的,并由一种必然的命令式所要求,如“不要撒谎”。另一方面,在不完全职责中我们可以应用例外的规则,允许采用可满足职责的各种方式,例如,救济穷人。它允许在必然的善良准则之下有偶然的善良行为。这种区别可追溯到经院哲学。它认为,完全职责可由外部立法所强迫,而不完全职责则并非如此。

“不完全职责相应地只是德性的职责。实行它们是优点,……但不实行它们并非本身即应受谴责……而只是道德价值上有缺陷,除非主体把不履行这样的职责作为他的原则。”——康德:《道德形而上学》,Ⅱ,第7页。

帝国主义

具有多种含义的一个概念。马克思主义认为,帝国主义是政治统治和经济剥削的世界体系,它出现于高度发达的资本主义列强,尤其是在19世纪和20世纪。在列宁看来,帝国主义是资本主义发展的最高阶段。按照这一观点,资本主义进入帝国主义阶段是因为剩余资本不能为

capitalism entered the imperialist phase because surplus capital which could not be absorbed in the home market had to be invested in colonies and other dominated countries. A few imperialist countries divided the world into different spheres of influence. When the balance of the division of the world market was broken, world war resulted. There have been rival accounts of the origin and nature of imperialism. For Kautsky, imperialism is the oppression and exploitation of underdeveloped countries by developed countries. In contemporary ethics, imperialism is mainly used in a cultural sense to characterise the claim that the point of view of one special group, based on nation, culture, race, religion, gender or other considerations, is privileged. According to a feminist version of this theory, it is cultural imperialism to hold that only the position of white bourgeois men is scientific.

"What we mean when we speak of empire or imperialism is the relationship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control." — Lichtheim *Imperialism*, 1971, p. 5.

Impersonal verb

Verbs appearing in sentences such as "It is snowing". In this kind of sentence the word "it" does not have the logical function of a subject. The speaker does not intend to pick out something it designates. This sort of sentence is a subjectless sentence, and the standard subject-predicate distinction does not apply to it. Hence, the verb in it does not introduce an action performed by a subject, and we never significantly ask, for example, "What is snowing?".

"When verbs occur in phrases like 'It is raining' or 'It is freezing', they are traditionally called 'impersonal verbs'." — Williams, *Being, Identity and Truth*, 1992, p. 193.

Implication

In its ordinary sense, implication is a synonym of entailment, a logical relation between one or a set of premises and a consequence deduced from this premise or set of premises. It is most commonly expressed in sentences of the form "if p then q", when p is the implying proposition (also called the antecedent or protasis), and q is the implied proposition (also called the consequent or apodasis). Russell and Whitehead used the term material implication to express the relation between the antecedent and consequent of a true conditional proposition, which is symbolised as $p \supset q$ or as $p \rightarrow q$. In order to avoid the so-called paradoxes of material implication, C. I. Lewis introduced a notion of strict implication, saying that p strictly implies q if and only if it was impossible that p should be true and q false. Other attempts to further clarify the meaning relation between antecedent and consequent include Carnap's I-implication and the system of entailment.

国内市场所吸收而不得不投向殖民地和其他被统治的国家。少数帝国主义国家将世界划分为不同的势力范围。当世界市场划分的平衡被打破时,世界战争就会爆发。对帝国主义的起源和本质一直存在不同的说明。在考茨基看来,帝国主义是发达国家对不发达国家的压迫和剥削。在当代伦理学中,帝国主义主要是从文化意义上使用以表明这样一种主张,即基于民族、文化、种族、宗教、性别或其他考虑的某一特殊集团的观点是特权的观点。根据对这一理论的一种女性主义的看法,认为只有白人资产阶级男人的见解是科学的,它就是文化帝国主义。

“当我们说帝国或帝国主义时,我们意指的是一个霸权国家与它控制下的人民或民族的关系。”——李希特海姆:《帝国主义》,1971年,第5页。

无人称动词

在诸如“下雪了”这种句子中出现的动词。在这种句子中,“it”这个词实际上并不起主语的逻辑作用。说者并不想指出它所指示的东西。这种句子是“无主语的句子”,而标准的主谓语法区分在这里不起作用。因此,其中的动词并没有引入由主语完成的行为,我们决不能有意义地问(例如):“是什么在下雪?”

“当动词出现在像‘下雨了’或‘太冷了’这些句子中,传统上把它们称作‘无人称动词’。”——威廉姆斯:《是,同一和真理》,1992年,第193页。

蕴涵

就其普通意义而言,蕴涵是“衍推”的同义语,表示在一个或一组前提与从该个或该组前提中推出的结论之间的逻辑关系。表达蕴涵最常用的语句形式是“如果p则q”,这里p是起蕴涵作用的命题(亦称前件),q是被蕴涵的命题(亦称后件)。罗素和怀特海使用“实质蕴涵”一词去表示真条件命题前后件之间的关系,并把它符号化为 $p \supset q$ 或 $p \rightarrow q$ 。为了避免所谓的实质蕴涵悖论,C. I. 刘易斯引入了“严格蕴涵”概念,并指出: p 严格蕴涵 q ,当且仅当不可能 p 真而 q 假。进一步阐明前后件之间的意义关系的其他尝试包括卡尔纳普的I-蕴涵和衍推系统。

“为了能够有效地推出一命题的真,我们必须知道某些另外的命题是真的,并且在这两者之间存在那种叫做‘蕴涵’的关系,即(如我们所说的)前提‘蕴涵’结论。”——罗素:《数理

"In order to be able validly to infer the truth of a proposition, we must know that some other proposition is true, and that there is between the two a relation of the sort called 'implication', that is that (as we say) the premise 'implies' the conclusion." —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 146.

Implicit definition

Also called definition by axioms or definition by postulates. In contrast to an explicit definition, which gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a term to be applied, an implicit definition of a term does not directly state the extension and intension of a term, but defines the term by showing that it satisfies certain axioms, the validity of which is strictly guaranteed. Thus the axioms of a system of geometry implicitly define the primitive geometrical signs that the axioms contain by delimiting the interpretations of the signs which satisfy it. This notion gains its importance in modern mathematics through the work of Hilbert. For he claims that the quest for explicit definitions for many mathematical terms such as "straight line", "point" and "plane" is extremely difficult and that we should define such terms implicitly as whatever entities satisfy the formal axioms formulated by means of them. As a result, although non-Euclidean geometry still uses Euclidean terms such as "point", "plane" and "straight line", these terms do not mean the same in the two systems, since they are implicitly defined by the postulate set in which they occur. A similar use of implicit definitions in natural science, in which terms are defined through satisfying the theories in which they are embedded, also raises questions of the stability of meaning in the face of changes in theory.

"When the term 'implicit definition' is used in connection with formal postulational systems, it refers to a set of formal postulates, i. e. postulates whose extralogical terms, the 'primitives' of the system, are not interpreted. Such a set is said to implicitly define the primitive extralogical terms it contains." —Arthur Pap, *Semantics and Necessary Truth*, 1958, p. 203.

Importation

A principle of inference which states that from the premise "If p, then q and r" [$p \rightarrow (q \wedge r)$], we can conclude "if p and q, then r" [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$]. This inference is a strict implication and can be expressed in propositional logic as [$p \rightarrow (q \wedge r)$] \leftrightarrow [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$]. The reverse of this inference, which is also valid, is called exportation.

"If q implies q, and r implies r, and if p implies that q implies r, then pq implies r. This is the principle of importation." —Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, 1937, p. 16.

哲学导论》，1919年，第146页。

隐定义

亦称“得自公理的定义”或“得自公设的定义”。与给出了所用语词的必要而充分的条件的显定义不同，语词的隐定义没有直接陈述它的外延和内涵，而是以指明它所满足的某条公理（其有效性得到严格保证）来定义语词。这样，几何系统的公理就以界定它们所包含的满足系统的初始几何符号的解释来隐含地对它们下定义。在现代数学中，这个概念通过希尔伯特的工作而获得其重要性。因为他主张，对于许多数学语词，例如“直线”、“点”、“平面”，要给出显定义是极为困难的。我们应该隐含地将其定义为任何满足由它们所阐明的形式公理的东西。其结果是，虽然非欧几何学仍然使用“点”、“面”、“直线”等欧氏语词，这些语词在两个系统中并不指相同的东西。因为它们是由包含它们的一组公设隐含地定义的。隐定义在自然科学中的类似用法——语词通过满足包含它们的理论而得到定义——也引起了当理论中发生变化时意义的稳定性问题。

“当语词‘隐定义’用于与形式的公设系统相关时，它指称一组形式公设，即这样的公设，其非逻辑语词（系统的‘初始词’）是未经解释的。这组公设被说成是隐含地定义了它所包含的原初非逻辑语词。”——帕普：《语义学与必然真理》，1958年，第203页。

输入

一条推理法则。它确定，从前提“如果p，则q和r” [$p \rightarrow (q \wedge r)$]，我们能得出结论“如果p和q，则r” [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$]。这一推理是严格蕴涵，可以用命题逻辑表达为 [$p \rightarrow (q \wedge r)$] \leftrightarrow [$(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$]。这一推理的逆转也是正确的，叫做输出。

“如果q隐含q，r隐含r，并且如果p隐含着q隐含r，则pq隐含r。这叫作输入原则。”——罗素：《数学原则》，1937年，第16页。

Impredicative definition

A definition of an object by reference to the totality to which the object belongs. The term is credited to Russell and Poincaré. Both argued that this kind of definition must be banned from the conceptual foundation of mathematics. No totality can contain members defined in terms of itself for this implies a vicious circle and leads to logical paradox. For example, it is an impredicative definition if we define a set A as "the set of all sets that are not members of themselves". Then if asked whether A is a member of itself or not, the answer is paradoxical, that is, A is a member of itself if and only if A is not a member of itself. This is the famous Russell's paradox.

"It appears that if one were seriously to outlaw all impredicative definitions, that is to say, definitions of an object by reference to a totality which includes itself or object definable only in terms of itself, one would not only have to sacrifice a great deal of accepted mathematics but would also be jeopardising the complete programme of deriving mathematics from Logic."—Ayer, *Russell and Moore*, 1971, p. 26.

Impression (Hume), see idea (Hume)

In and for itself, see in itself

In itself

[German: *an sich*, also translated as by itself or as such] Hegel contrasted in itself with for itself [German: *für sich*]. In itself is essentially or intrinsically potential, unreflective and underdeveloped, while for itself is actual, reflective and developed. In itself is implicit and self-identical, while for itself is exteriorised and lies before itself. A baby is rational in itself but not for itself until its rationality is actualised. In and for itself [German: *an und für sich*] is the completely developed state in which in itself and for itself are unified and a thing is at home with itself. A thing develops from being-in-itself to being-for-itself and ends up as being-in-and-for-itself. This development conforms to the Hegelian pattern of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. In this sense, in itself is implicit and does not imply the development of relations to something else.

Generally, in itself is not distinguished from for itself or from in and for itself, but is rather contrasted with for us or for others. To call something in itself means that it is at least mainly independent of other things and has its own essence apart from its relations with others. In itself corresponds to Greek: *kath'hauto* or *to auto*, which Plato uses for his Idea or Form. In this sense, if we consider a thing to be in itself, we take it not to be related to our consciousness. Kant called an

非直谓定义

通过涉及一对象所属的总体来给该对象所下的定义。这一术语归功于罗素和彭加勒。他们认为，必须从数学的概念基础中驱逐这种类型的定义。没有任何总体能够包含根据这个总体本身才能定义的某些成员，因为这意味着恶性循环并且导致逻辑悖论。举例来说，如果我们把集合 A 定义为“由所有不是自身元素的集合所构成的集合”，这就是一个非直谓定义。然后如果问 A 是不是它自身的一个元素，回答就是悖论性的，即是说，A 是自身的元素当且仅当 A 不是自身的元素。这就是著名的罗素悖论。

“情况似乎是：如果人们严格地排除所有非直谓定义（即通过一总体给一对象所下的定义，而此总体包括它自身或仅根据它自身才能定义的对象），人们将不仅必须牺牲大量已公认的数学，而且也会危及那从逻辑推导出数学的整个纲领。”——艾耶尔：《罗素和摩尔》，1971年，第26页。

印象（休谟）

见“观念（休谟）”条。

自在自为

见“自在”条

自在

[德语词: *an sich*, 也译为独自地, 如此] 黑格尔把自在与自为 [德语词: *für sich*] 相对比。自在是本质上或内在地潜在, 未反思的和未展开的, 而自为是现实的、反思的和展开的。自在是潜在的和自我统一的, 而自为是展现自身和外化自身的。一个婴儿的理性是自在的, 但不是自为的, 除非它的理性得到实现。自在自为 [德语词: *an und für sich*] 是完全的发展状态, 自在和自为在其中得到统一, 事物达到完满状态。事物从自在存在发展为自为存在, 并告终于自在自为的存在。这种发展按照黑格尔的正题-反题-合题的模式。在这个意义上, 自在是潜在, 并不意味着与别物的关系的发展。

一般而言, 自在与自为或与自在自为并无区别, 而是与为我们或为他人相对比。说某物是自在的, 意思是, 它至少主要地独立于其他事物, 有着不与他物相关的自身本质。自在相应于希腊词: *kath'hauto* 或 *to auto*, 柏拉图用来指他的形相或形式。在这个意义上, 如果我们把一事物作为是自在的, 那么我们就把它看做与我们的意识无关。康德把超越我们可能的经验, 但仍可思维的对象称为自在之物 [德语词: *Ding an sich*]

object which is beyond our possible experience, but can still be thought a thing-in-itself [German; *Ding-an-sich*].

"The Notion itself is for us, in the first instance, like the universal that is in itself, and the negative that is for itself, and also the third, that which is both in and for itself, the universal that runs through all the moments of the syllogism; but the third is also the conclusion." —Hegel, *Science of Logic*, II, iii, 3.

In obliquo

A mode of thinking (also called *modus oblique*) in contrast to *in recto* (also called *modus rectus*). According to this account, when a mental activity is about a subject in relation to an object, a person is thinking of a subject and an object at the same time. One thinks of the subject *in recto* and thinks of the object *in obliquo*. For example, if I am thinking of X who loves flowers, then X is thought *in recto* and flowers are thought *in obliquo*.

"It is plain that a clarification of the presentation can come about through an analysis of its object both in *recto* and in *obliquo*." —Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (tr. McAlister), 1973, p. 282.

In recto, see *in obliquo*

In vitro fertilisation

[Latin; *in vitro*, in glass, in contrast to *in vivo*, in a living organism, normally abbreviated IVF, also called extra human fertilisation] A technique for fertilising an egg outside the body and then implanting it in the womb of the woman providing it or in the womb of another woman to develop into a foetus and a baby. The procedure was first carried out successfully for a human mother by the British scientists R. Edwards and P. Steptoe in 1978 and has now become a standard treatment for some forms of human infertility. Babies produced by this method are sometimes called test-tube babies, but the progress of the pregnancies and the children that are born are perfectly normal. Much ethical controversy has arisen because IVF has extended the range of human reproduction and has opened the way to surrogate motherhood and more recently to the possible genetic manipulation of embryos. Many theorists would welcome the correction of serious genetically-based illnesses, but they would reject manipulation concerning gender, intelligence, strength or appearance. The justification for these intuitive choices is difficult to determine. Some feminists view IVF as a means of liberating women from biological inequality, while others consider that it reinforces the male domination of female bodies. The debate is still going on about the conditions under which fertilisation in vitro should be

“概念自身首先只是为我们的存在,如同自在存在的共相一样,其否定是自为存在,因而第三者是自在和自为的存在,即经历了推论的一切环节的共相;但第三者也是结论。”——黑格尔:《逻辑学》,Ⅱ,iii,3。

间接地〔或译“间断的”〕

与 *in recto* (直接地,也被称为“直接方式”)相对而言的一种思维方式(也被称为“间接方式”)。按照这种说法,当一个心智行为涉及到一个与某个客体相关的主体时,当事人就同时想到了一个主体与一个客体。此人就直接地(*in recto*, 垂直地)想到这主体,间接地(*in obliquo*, 倾斜地)想到那个客体。例如,如果我正在想一位爱花的人“X”,那么这位“X”就被直接地想到,而花则被间接地想到。

“很明显,对于表象的说明能够通过对于其对象的直接的和间接的分析而达到。”——布伦塔诺:《从经验立场看的心理学》(麦克阿里斯特英译),1973年,第282页。

直接地〔或译“直接的”〕

见“间接地”条。

试管婴儿

[拉丁文; *in vitro*, 意即在试管中,与拉丁文 *in vivo*, 意即在活的有机体中形成对照,通常缩写为 IVF,也被称为人体外受精] 一种使卵子在体外受精然后再移植到产生它的那个妇女的子宫中,或另一个妇女的子宫中,使其发育为胎儿和婴儿的技术。这一过程于1978年由英国科学家 R. 爱德华兹和 P. 斯蒂普托首次为一位母亲成功实施,现已成为人类某些不育症的公认的治疗方法。通过这种方法出生的婴儿有时被称为试管婴儿,但怀孕的过程和出生的孩子完全正常。由于 IVF 扩展了人类生殖的范围,打开了替代母亲之路,而且近来还开创了对胎儿进行遗传基因控制的可能,从而引起了很多伦理学上的争议。许多理论家赞同对严重的基于遗传的疾病的治疗,但反对对性别、智力、体力或外貌的人为控制。这些直觉的选择是否是正当的很难判定。一些女性主义者把 IVF 视为把妇女从生物学上的不平等中解放出来的手段,而另一些女性主义者则认为它加强了对女性身体的控制。关于在何种情况下试管受精应得到允许的争论仍在继续进行。

“‘In vitro’ 是拉丁文,意即‘在试管中’,因而‘in vitro fertilization’ 简单地说就是试管中的受精。”——辛格和韦尔斯:《生殖革命》,

permitted.

"'In vitro' is Latin for 'in glass'; so 'in vitro fertilization' simply means that the fertilization takes place in glass." Singer and Wells, *The Reproduction Revolution*, 1984, p. 17.

Inauthenticity, see authenticity

Incentive

In Kant's ethics, the subjective ground of desire which provides a subjective end for the will. In contrast, a motive is the objective ground of volition. An incentive is material and sensuous and is related to a particular subject. It does not always conform to the objective conditions of morality and can only supply grounds for hypothetical imperatives. On the other hand, a categorical imperative abstracts from incentives and is applicable to all rational subjects.

"From what has gone before it is clear that the purposes which we may have in our actions, as well as their effects regarded as ends and incentives of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditioned and moral worth." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 436.

Inclination

[from Latin *in* + *clinare*, bend, lean] A kind of incentive, disposition or tendency which will cause certain action. It is rooted in the world of sense and is material and subjective. In Kant's ethics, inclination is the source of the heteronomy of the will. A will dominated by inclination does not give itself a law and only passively reacts to external stimuli. This is a state of slavery. Inclination cannot be universalised and can only be the basis of a hypothetical imperative. It also contrasts with duty and reason. For Kant, it is crucial to distinguish whether an action stems from duty or from inclination in deciding whether an action has a genuine moral worth, although critics claim that his grounds for moral worth are too austere.

"The dependence of the faculty of desire on sensations is called inclination, which accordingly always indicates a need." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 413n.

Incommensurability

Two theories are commensurable if there is common ground to assess or measure their merits and demerits. Some philosophers, such as Popper, have held that science develops through the successive replacement of commensurable theories, that is old and relatively unsuccessful theories are superseded by new and relatively successful theories. However, in his account of paradigm shifts of scientific revolutions, Kuhn argued that any new

1984年,第17页。

不真正切己状态

见“真正切己状态”条。

刺激

在康德伦理学中,它是欲望的主观根据,为意志提供主观的目的。它相对于动机,即意志力的客观根据。刺激是物质的、感官的,相联于一个特殊的主体。它并非总是遵守道德的客观条件,只能为假言命令提供根据。另一方面,绝对命令抽象掉了刺激,并应用于一切理性主体。

“由此看来,很清楚,我们的行动所可能有的目的,以及它们被作为意志的刺激和目的的效果,不能给予行动以无条件的道德价值。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第400页。

爱好

[源自拉丁文 *in* 和 *clinare* (弯曲,倾向)]一种会引起某种行为的刺激、习性或倾向。它根源于感觉世界,是物质的和主观的。在康德的伦理学中,它是意志他律的源泉。如果意志受爱好支配,那么它就不为自身立法,只是对外部刺激物作被动的反应。这是一种奴性状态。爱好不能作为普遍规律,只能作为假言命令的基础。它也相对于职责和理性。对于康德来说,在决定一种行为是否有真正的道德价值时,关键是要区分这种行为是出于职责还是出于爱好。虽然批评家们认为,他的道德价值的根据太严格了。

“欲望官能对感觉的依赖叫做爱好,而后者据此总是表明一种需要。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,413注。

不可通约性

两个理论是可通约的,如果有共同的基础以估价或量度它们的优点和缺点的话。某些哲学家(例如波普)主张科学是通过可通约理论的相继取代而发展的,即旧的较不成功的理论为新的较成功的理论所取代。然而,库恩在他的科学革命的范式转换理论中论证说,任何新范式将完全替换和摧毁旧范式,它们是不可通约的。竞争范式间的构成陈述是不可互译的。它们含

paradigm will completely replace and destroy the old one and that they are incommensurable. The component statements of the rival paradigms are mutually untranslatable. They involve different conceptual schemes, different problems, and even alternative logics. The claims of one theory cannot be framed in the language of the other, and the whole network of thought and practice has to be reconstructed. The transition between paradigms involves a breakdown of communication. After a paradigm shift, scientists live in a totally different world. Science does not accumulate truth as time passes, and when a new paradigm replaces an older one, it dismisses all the results obtained within the old paradigm. We do not have common ground for resolving the disputes between different paradigms. This view was further developed by Feyerabend, but faces difficulty in explaining examples of evident continuity in the growth of scientific knowledge.

"We have already seen several reasons why the proponents of competing paradigms must fail to make complete contact with each other's viewpoints. Collectively these reasons have been described as the incommensurability of the pre and postrevolutionary normal-scientific traditions."—Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, p. 147.

Incompatibilism, see compatibilism

Incomplete symbol

Russell's term for an expression that has no significance on its own, but which acquires meaning in a context provided by other symbols. An incomplete symbol does not refer to actual objects directly. According to Russell, definite descriptions, class-symbols and logical fictions are all incomplete symbols. Because appeal to this device removes the necessity to admit a domain of unreal entities, it is an important component of Russell's theory of descriptions. A full discussion of this term is provided by Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, I, 3.

"Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word 'the' (in the singular) are incomplete symbols. They have a meaning in use, but not in isolation."—Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, I, p. 66.

Incompleteness, see completeness

Incompleteness theorem, see Gödel's theorem

Incongruent counterpart

A counterpart of an object is something which

有不同的概念框架,不同的问题,甚至不同的逻辑。一种理论的主张不能用另一种理论的语言来表述,整个思想和实践的网络必须重建。范式的过渡含有一种交往的断裂。在范式变换之后,科学家生活在一个全然不同的世界里。科学并不随着时间的流逝积累真理,当新范式替换旧范式时,它遣散了所有旧范式获得的成果。我们没有共同的依据以解决不同范式间的争论。这一观点为费耶阿本德所发展,但面临着如何说明科学知识生长中明显的连续性的困难。

"我们已经认识到为什么竞争着的范式的支持者无法使彼此的观点完全联系起来的若干理由。这些理由的汇集被表述为革命前后的常规科学传统的不可通约性。"—库恩,《科学革命的结构》,1962年,第147页。

不相容论

见“相容论”条。

不完全符号

罗素表示下述表达式的术语:它自身没有任何意义而从其他符号所提供的语境中获得意义。不完全符号并不直接指称现实的对象。根据罗素的观点,限定摹状词、类符号和逻辑虚构全都是不完全符号。因为若诉诸此类手段,就没有必要承认一个非实在的实体域,这是罗素的摹状词理论的重要构成要素。关于这一术语的详细讨论,参见怀特海和罗素:《数学原理》第1卷第3章。

"于是(除命题之外)所有包含定冠词'the'的短语(单称形式)都是不完全符号。它们在使用中有意义,孤立来看没有意义。"—怀特海和罗素:《数学原理》,第1卷,第66页。

不完全性

见“完全性”条。

不完全定理

见“哥德尔定理”条。

不一致的对等物

一个对象的对等物是某种完全类似于它的

completely resembles it. For example, a left hand is a counterpart of the right hand. Kant set out the argument from incongruent counterparts, which states that counterparts cannot be congruent if, though formally identical, they differ in their relation to absolute space. Even if identical in shape, they cannot change their spatial orientation in a way which would allow one to fit into the limits of the other. Hence, they are incongruent. For example, in three dimensions a right hand cannot occupy the same spatial location as a left hand. This argument depends upon the claim that the properties of space are prior to the relations of bodies. Counterparts have spatial properties not susceptible to any relational analysis. This argument presupposes the Newtonian conception of absolute space and is at odds with the Leibnizian relativist view of space because his relational theory cannot capture the difference of spatial orientation of right and left hands. The problem is taken by some philosophers as proof that space is absolute, while others argue that in different spatial systems incongruent counterparts would be congruent. Incongruent counterparts are also called enantiomorphs [from Greek: *enantion*, opposite + *morphe*, form].

"I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as that other, its incongruent counterpart."—Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy* (eds. Walford and Meerbote), 1992, p. 370.

Inconsistent triad, another term for antilogism

Incontinence

[Greek: *akrasia*, from *a*, not + *kratein*, control or mastery] A lack of control over oneself, especially over one's irrational desires. An incontinent man or *akrastic* does what he knows he ought not to do, or fails to do what he knows he should do. Socrates claimed that virtue is knowledge and that no man voluntarily does evil. He therefore denied the existence of incontinence and took what appeared as incontinence to be a kind of ignorance. Both Plato and Aristotle believed that incontinence exists and considered it to be a matter of great importance to understand how it is possible. Plato's account emphasised the clash between the different elements in the soul, with incontinence occurring when a person's emotion or appetite overcomes his reason. Aristotle offered two different interpretations. Along with Plato, he sought to explain incontinence in terms of a psychological conflict, but in a revision of Socrates' argument he also argued that an incontinent person does not properly know that what he is doing is bad. He knows some of the premises relating to his action only potentially, in the way that men who are asleep, mad or drunk have knowledge. Aristotle's complex discussion has been the

东西,如左手是右手的对等物。康德提出了关于不一致的对等物的论证。该论证说,两个对等物不可能是一致的,因为虽然它们表面上相同,但却具有与绝对空间相关的内在差别。不管它们在形状上多么相同,它们也不能改变它们的空间方位,以某种方式使一物的大小和形状吻合于另一物的界限,因此,它们是不对等的。例如,在三维空间中右手不能占据左手所在的同一个空间位置。这个论证依赖于这种主张:空间的属性先于物体间的关系。对等物具有不能归属于任何关系分析的空间性质。这个论证预定了牛顿的绝对空间概念。它与莱布尼茨的相对主义空间论是不一致的,因为莱布尼茨的关系理论不能说明两只手的空间方位差异。这个问题被某些哲学家作为空间的绝对性的证据。然而其他人则证明:在不同的空间系统中,不一致的对等物恰是一致的。不一致的对等物也称为“形式对立体”[源自希腊文: *enantion* (对立) 和 *morphe* (形式)]。

“如果一物体准确地相等于和相同于另一物体,但不能圈在那另一物体的同样界限中,我称之为后一物体的不一致的对等物。”——康德:《理论哲学》(瓦尔福德和米尔波特编),1992年,第370页。

不相容三元组

“前后矛盾”的另一个术语。

意志薄弱

[源自希腊文 *akrasia*, 是由 *a* (不) 和 *kratein* (控制, 掌握) 构成的] 它是指未能控制自身, 尤其是未能控制自己的非理性欲望的状态。一个意志薄弱的人是一个做他知道他不应做的事的人, 或一个未能做他知道他应当做的事的人。在苏格拉底看来, 德性是知识, 并且无人有意作恶。他因而否认有意志薄弱这一现象存在, 仅将其当做一类无知。柏拉图和亚里士多德都认为这一现象是存在的, 并相信理解它如何可能是一件很重要的事。柏拉图强调的是灵魂中不同部分的冲突。根据他的看法, 当一个人的激情或欲望征服了其理性时, 意志薄弱就出现了。亚里士多德提供了两种不同的解释。一方面, 与柏拉图一样, 他从心理冲突的角度来解释意志薄弱; 另一方面, 他又根据苏格拉底的论证认为, 一个意志薄弱的人并不真正知道他在做的事是错的。他对于其行为只是潜在具有相关的某些前提的知识, 就如同睡觉的人、疯子或醉鬼所具有的知识一样。亚里士多德的晦涩讨论一直是引起许多解释和争论的话题。

意志薄弱涉及到人性概念的一个重要方

subject of much interpretation and debate.

Incontinence involves an important aspect of the conception of human nature. Its existence shows that sometimes belief is powerless before passion, and that intellect does not always determine will. Philosophers have taken great pains to explain this phenomenon which separates moral beliefs and moral commitment.

"For incontinence makes someone act contrary to what he supposes." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1146a29.

Incorrigible

A statement or proposition is incorrigible in a strong sense if it is impossible to be mistaken or uncertain about its truth and is incorrigible in a weak sense if it cannot be corrected even if it may be mistaken. An example of the strong sense is given by the so-called basic propositions, which are meant merely to record one's present experience without relating it to anything else. I cannot doubt propositions, such as "I have a headache", although this statement might be doubted by other persons or by myself at other times. An example for the weak sense is given by our reports of our dreams, which we are not in a position to correct even if they are mistaken. A search for an absolute ground in metaphysics and epistemology is a search for a starting-point which is incorrigible, but it is disputable whether there can be such a point.

"I should now agree with those who say that propositions of this kind are 'incorrigible', assuming that what is meant by their being incorrigible is that it is impossible to be mistaken about them except in a verbal sense." —Ayer, *Language, Logic and Truth*, 1946, p. 10.

Independence, logical

If neither a sentence S nor its negation not-S is deducible from a set of sentences T, then S is logically independent of T. That is, there is no logical relationship between S and T, and T does not determine the truth-value of either S or not-S. In an axiomatic system, an axiom is generally regarded to be independent of other axioms in the system. Hence independence amounts to non-deducibility. The axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are regarded as typical independent sentences.

"Axiomatists are naturally concerned that their axioms be independent: that none be derivable as a theorem from the rest, and hence dispensable." —Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1952, 2nd ed., pp. 73-4.

Indeterminacy in law

Also called the no right answer thesis. Lawyers debate about problems of indeterminacy in which the criteria for the application of legal rules are vague or in which a case falls under two or more conflicting rules. Many legal philosophers

面。它的存在表明信仰有时在激情面前是无力的,也表明理智并不总是决定意志。哲学家们一直在努力解释这一道德信仰与道德承诺相分离的现象。

"意志薄弱使一个人做与其信仰相反的事。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1146a29。

不可矫正的

如果一个陈述或命题的真实性不可能出错或不可能不确定,则它是在强意义上不可矫正的;如果它在即使有错时也不可更正,则它是在弱意义上不可矫正的。强意义的例子由所谓的基本命题给出,它们只是意在记录人的当下经验,而不将其与任何别的东西相联系。我不能怀疑例如"我头痛"这样的命题,虽然这个陈述可能被其他人或我自己在其他时间怀疑。弱意义的例子由我们报告自己的梦境给出,即令这些报告错了,我们也不处在更正的位置上。在形而上学和认识论中寻求绝对的基础就是寻求不可矫正的出发点,但是否能有这样的出发点是有争议的。

"我现在要同意这些人的观点,他们说这种命题是'不可矫正的',假如它们之不可矫正指的是关于它们不可能发生错误,除字面意义上的错误外。"——艾耶尔:《语言、逻辑和真理》,1946年,第10页。

逻辑独立性

如果语句S及其否定非S都不能从语句集T演绎出来,则S在逻辑上独立于T。这就是说,S和T之间不存在任何逻辑关系。T并不能确定S和非S中任意一个的真值。在公理系统中,一公理通常被认为是独立于该系统内的其他公理的。所以独立性大致相当于不可演绎性。选择公理和连续统假设被看作是典型的独立语句。

"公理学家自然关心他们的公理是独立的,即没有一个公理能作为定理从其他公理演绎出来,因此所有公理都是不可缺少的。"——奎因:《逻辑方法》,1952年,第2版,第73—74页。

法律中的不确定问题

也被称作"无正确答复命题"。律师辩论的是一些不明确的疑难问题,对这些问题,运用法规的准则是含混的,或一个案件受到两个或更多的相互冲突的法规的影响。很多法哲学家认

believe that in these cases it is uncertain which side of a legal dispute is stronger. They claim that legal rules in such hard cases provide no right answer and that informed people can reasonably disagree about them. For natural law theorists, hard cases arise because law is derived from moral principles, but moral principles themselves are sometimes in conflict. For legal positivists, there is indeterminacy because law is derived from the body of past legislation and conventions which cannot be expected always to apply in solving present issues. It is unlikely that a system contains in itself appropriate conflict-resolving rules for all cases. Accordingly, they argue that for hard cases lawyers and judges should develop the law on the basis of moral, social or other extra-legal arguments.

"Where the facts which are legal reasons are indeterminate, through vagueness, open texture, or some other factors, certain legal statements are neither true nor false." — J. Raz, *The Authority of Law*, p. 72.

Indeterminacy of translation

Different translators render an alien language into our own language in terms of different translation manuals. These manuals may all fit the totality of known speech dispositions, but are not compatible with each other. It is a natural assumption that in translating the translator discovers as an objective fact that an alien word is synonymous to some word in our language, and that we can decide which manual is correct or better. But Quine challenges this assumption by arguing that there is no matter of fact according to which we may determine which manual is correct. Our choice of the manual is not based on the belief that it alone assigns the true meanings to the expressions of the alien language, but is determined by the utility of the manual in facilitating conversation, that is by subjective, pragmatic considerations. Any individual linguistic utterance may be given different interpretations. Any manual may fit the facts so long as it conforms to the stimulus meaning, but the stimulus meaning varies according to the context. Physical facts do not determine our talk about synonymy. This indeterminacy of translation leads to the indeterminacy of reference, of truth, and of ontological commitment. The thesis is consistent with Quine's denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions because this distinction means little if there is no fact of the matter determining whether a sentence in another language should be translated into an analytical or synthetic claim. It is also consistent with Quine's extensionalism, for it shows that there is no basis for assigning determinate intensional contents to propositions. Because this thesis leads toward a general mistrust of determinate meaning and undermines many of the traditional aspirations of philosophy, it has been the subject of important disputes. On the other hand,

为,在这些案件中,辩论中的哪一方更有理是不确定的。他们声称,在这样的疑难案件中法规不能提供正确的回答,了解案情的人能够对它们合理地持有不同的意见。对自然法理论家来讲,疑难案件的出现是因为法律起源于道德原则,而道德原则本身有时就是相互抵触的。在实证主义法学家看来,不明确问题的存在是因为法律起源于过去的法规和不成文法的体系,不可能指望后者总能用来解决当前的问题。一个法律体系在自身中包含对所有案件都适当的解决冲突的规则是不可能的。因此,他们争论道,对于疑难案件,律师和法官应以道德的、社会的或其他非法理的论证来发展这一法律。

“由于含混不清、开放性或某些其他原因,在事实上法律理由是不确定的地方,一些法律陈述就既不能说是对的,也不能说是错的。”——拉兹:《法律的权威》,第72页。

翻译的不确定性

不同的译者根据不同的翻译手册把另一种语言译为我们自己的语言。这些手册可能适合所有已知的言语倾向,但它们相互之间却是不可比较的。人们很自然地假定,译者在翻译中把这样一个事实看作是客观的,即外文词与我们语言中的某些词是同义的,而且我们可以确定哪一个手册是正确的或更好的。但奎因则向这种假定发起了挑战,他认为,并不存在我们可以由此决定哪一个手册是正确的这样的事实。我们对手册的选择,并不是由于相信只有它才赋予了另一种语言表达式真正的意义,而是由手册在推进交流中的效用决定的,就是说,是由主观的、实用的考虑决定的。任何单个的一句话都可以得到不同的解释。只要符合刺激意义,任何手册都可以是合适的,但这种刺激意义是根据语境变化的。物理事实并不决定我们谈论同义词问题。这种翻译的不确定性导致了指称的不确定性、真理的不确定性和本体论承诺的不确定性。这个论题与奎因否定分析命题和综合命题的区分是一致的,因为,如果并不存在另一种语言中的句子是否应该翻译成分析陈述或综合陈述这样的问题,那么这种区分就没有什么意义了。它与奎因的外延论也是一致的,因为它表明,把确定的内涵内容赋予命题是毫无根据的。因为这个论题导致了对确定意义的普遍怀疑,削弱了大多数传统的哲学抱负,因而它一直是重要争论的焦点。但另一方面,乔姆斯基认为,它对这样一种公认的观点并没有增加任何新的东西,这种观点认为,物理理论本身对所有可能的经验证据来说都是不确定的。

“在我论证翻译的不确定性时关键的考虑是,有关词的陈述并不总是或通常是具有它自

Chomsky holds that it adds nothing essential to the accepted view that physical theory is itself indeterminate with regard to all possible empirical evidence.

"The crucial consideration behind my argument for the indeterminacy of translation was that a statement about the word does not always or usually have a separable fund of empirical consequences that it can call its own." — Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 82.

Indeterminism

A theory which claims, in opposition to determinism, that some events just happen without determining causes and that no prior conditions account for them. Such events can be characterised in terms of chance, randomness or uncertainty. According to quantum mechanics, quantum events at the most fundamental level of reality are of this kind. The indeterminism of modern physics erodes any sharp demarcation between the laws of nature and the special facts of nature. This distinction can be understood only by placing it within the context of statistical laws. The contrast between indeterminism and determinism reflects a difference in the world-views held by quantum mechanics and Newtonian physics.

Some philosophers apply indeterminism to ethics and suggest that human beings have uncaused free actions, with no antecedent events explaining their choices. It is difficult on this view to explain in what sense we can ascribe an uncaused action to an agent. Answers to this question will help to decide whether freedom is more compatible with random or chance actions or with causally determined ones.

"Quantum theory is fundamentally indeterministic in that it does not supply definite predications for the result of measurements." — Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, p. 286.

Indicative word

An indicative word signifies a sensible object and its properties. Such words include names, words denoting qualities and words denoting perceptible relations. The meaning of indicative words can be given directly by ostensive definitions.

"Words that mean objects may be called 'indicative' words." — Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 121.

Indicator terms, another term for egocentric particulars

Indifference/spontaneity, see spontaneity/indifference

Indirect perception, see immediate perception

以为是的可分的经验后果。”——奎因：《本体论的相对性及其他论文》，1969年，第82页。

非决定论

一种与决定论相反的理论，主张有些事件没有决定的原因就会发生，也没有在先的条件来说明它们。这些事件可以用机遇、偶然性和不确定性来表征。根据量子力学，在实在的最低层次的量子事件就属于这一类。现代物理学的非决定论使自然定律和自然的特殊事实之间的任何清晰界限模糊起来。这种区别只能放在统计定律的语境中才能理解。非决定论和决定论之间的区别反映了量子力学和牛顿物理学所持的世界观之间的差别。

有的哲学家把非决定论用于伦理学，主张人类有非因果的自由行动，没有先行事件解释他们的选择。按照这种观点，难于说明在何种含义上我们可以将非因果行动赋予行动者。对这一问题的回答将有助于决定自由与偶然的、随机的行动还是与因果决定的行动更为相容。

“量子理论从根本上说在下述意义上是非决定的：它对测量结果不提供确定的预言。”——卡尔纳普：《物理学的哲学基础》，第286页。

指示语词

指示语词意指可感知对象及其性质。这些语词包括名称和指示性质与可知觉关系的语词。指示语词的意义可以由实指定义直接给出。

“意指对象的语词可称为‘指示的’语词。”——罗素：《人类的知识》，1948年，第121页。

指示词

“自我中心特称词”的另一说法。

无差别和自发性

见“自发性和无差别性”条。

间接知觉

见“直接知觉”条。

Indirect realism

There are two types of perceptual realism, direct and indirect realism. Both claim that the physical world exists independently of perceivers and that the world is as science says it is. While direct realism believes that what we perceive is the physical world itself, indirect realism argues that what we immediately or directly perceive are sense-data, rather than the physical world itself, which can only be perceived indirectly. Thus, indirect realism sets up a field of sense-data between our perception and the physical world. But it contrasts with phenomenalism, for it denies that physical existents are composed out of sense-data. There are two main versions of indirect realism. One, called naive indirect realism, claims that sense-data have all the types of properties that physical objects have. The other, called scientific indirect realism, suggests that physical objects have primary properties, while secondary properties, such as colour, smell, and taste, belong only to sense-data.

"The dispute between the direct realist and the indirect realist concerns the question of whether we are ever directly aware of the existence and nature of physical objects."

Dancy, *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, 1985, p. 145.

Indiscernability of identicals

This principle, also called Leibniz's law, or the principle of substitutivity, states that for any two objects X and Y, if they are identical, all the properties that belong to X belong also to Y, and vice versa. Everything true of one will be true of the other. Leibniz's formulation is: "To suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names" Leibniz himself argues that there are not in nature two real beings that are indiscernible from one another. Two leaves in a garden can never be found perfectly alike. This principle plays a great role in the contemporary discussion of intentionality. A contrary form may say that if a property is true of one thing but not of the other, they are not identical. But this is not always true in belief contexts or in other referentially opaque contexts.

A correlated principle called the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, is sometimes also included as part of Leibniz's law. It states that if X and Y have all their properties in common, they are identical.

If we shift our focus to language, these principles are related to the principle of extensionality, which states that the names and descriptions of the same object can be substituted for one another in all contexts *salva veritate* (without changing the truth value of the statements in which they appear). These principles apply within limits rather than universally, but it is difficult to explain what we should say outside these limits, for example, about intentional contexts, in which substitutivity *salva veritate* does not hold.

间接实在论

有两种类型的感性实在论,直接的和间接的实在论。两者都主张,物质世界独立于感觉者而存在,世界的本来面目就如科学所说的那样。直接实在论相信我们所感觉到的是物质世界本身,间接实在论则认为,我们所直接感觉到的是感觉材料而不是物质世界本身,物质世界只能间接地感觉到。因此,间接实在论在我们的感觉与物质世界之间确立了一个感觉材料的领域。但与现象主义相对照的是,它否定物质的存在是由感觉材料所组成。间接实在论主要有两种学说,一种被称为朴素的间接实在论,它宣称感觉材料有物质对象所拥有的所有类型的属性。另一种是科学的间接实在论,它认为,物质对象有第一性的性质,而第二性的性质,诸如颜色、气味、味觉等,仅是感觉材料。

"直接实在论者和间接实在论者的争论,是关于这一问题的,即我们是否直接意识到了物质对象的存在和性质。"——丹西:《当代认识论导论》,1985年,第145页。

等同物的不可分辨性

这个原理也称作莱布尼茨定律,或称作置换性原理,表述为:对于任何两个对象X和Y,如果它们等同,那么,属于X的一切性质也属于Y,反之亦然。凡适合于一个对象的任何一件事,也适合于另一个对象。莱布尼茨的表述是:"要假定两个东西不可分辨,就是假定同一东西用了两个名称。"莱布尼茨本人论证说,在本性上没有两个实际存在物是不能互相分辨的。我们不可能在园中找到完全相同的两片叶子。这个原理在当代关于意向性的讨论中有重要作用。该原理的相反形式可以说:如果适合于一个东西的一个性质不适合于另一个东西,那么,这两个东西是不相同的。但这种情况在信念情境或在其他指称含糊的语境中不总是对的。

与这个原理互相关联的另一个原理被称作不可分辨者的同一性原理,有时也被当做莱布尼茨定律的组成部分。它陈述为:如果X和Y所具有的一切性质都是共同的,那么,X和Y是等同的。

如果我们将注意的焦点转到语言上,那么,这些原理与外延性原理相联系。外延性原理是说,同一个对象的各种名称和描述可以在一切真值保存(*salva veritate*)语境(各种陈述出现在该语境中,其真值不发生改变)中互相替换。虽然这些原理的应用范围是有限的,而非普遍的,但它很难说明在这些范围之外我们应说些什么;例如,在意向性语境方面就是如此,在意

"One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of *substitutivity* or, as it might well be called, that of *indiscernibility of identicals*. It provides that, *given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be the same.*" — Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 139.

Individual

[from Latin: *individuus*, indivisible, employed by Boethius to translate Greek: *atom*, uncuttable or undividable; a single distinct entity or unit which is incapable of being divided actually or conceptually while preserving its identity] In a standard sense, an individual is something which can be individuated, that is counted or picked out in language and thus be distinguished from other things. In logic, individuals are things which can be subjects of sentences in the first-order predicate calculus, in contrast to predicates or functions. Individuals are often taken to be identical with particulars, but there is a significant difference. All particulars are individuals, but not all individuals are particulars. What we pick out in language are not merely various kinds of particular things, but also general things such as justice, wisdom, beauty. In moral, political and social thought, an individual is a person, in contrast to a group or society.

"So anything whatever can appear as a logical subject, an individual." — Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 227.

Individual essence

An essence is usually thought to be a property common to a kind of thing, to belong to a species and therefore to be universal. But there is also a tradition, starting from Aristotle's notion of *tode ti* (thisness), which suggests that each individual member of a given species has its own unique essential property. For instance, Plato is a man. Man is a universal essence which Plato shares with other human beings. However, there might be a property of being Plato which distinguishes Plato from Socrates and Aristotle and from all other human beings. Such an essence is a distinct property that is unique to an object and possessed by nothing else. Duns Scotus called an individual essence *haecceity*. The idea of individual essence is controversial, but it has been revived in contemporary essentialist discussions of modal logic as the property by which a proper name has a referent. In possible world accounts of modality, an individual essence is the property of X such that in every possible world in which X exists, X has this property and in no possible world is there is an object distinct from X that has it.

"We can even imagine that there is an essential property of being a particular individual Fred, for example, property

向性语境中真值不变的替换性是不适用的。

"支配同一性的基本原理之一是替换性原理,或也可以称作等同物的不可分辨性原理。这个原理规定:给定一个同一性的真陈述,它的〔被认定为同一的〕两个词项之一可以替换在任何一个真陈述中的另一个词项,其结果不变。"——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第139页。

个别

[源自拉丁文 *individuus*, "不可分割的"。该词是波埃修斯用来翻译希腊词 *atom*, "不可切割的"或"不可分割的";其意为一个单一的、特定的存在物或单位;它不可能再现实地或从概念上加以划分,除非其认同得到改变]在其标准意义上,一个个别是指那能够个体化,即在语言中得到指认或辨明,并因而与其他事物相区别的东西。在逻辑中,个别是指可在一阶谓词演算中作句子主词的事物,与谓词或函项相对照。个别经常被认为与"特殊"相等同,但它们其实有很大不同。一切特殊都是个别,但并非一切个别都是特殊。我们在语言中指认的,不只是各类特殊事物,也包括一般性的事物,如正义、智慧、美。在道德、政治和社会思想中,一个个别是一个人,相比较于群体或社会。

"凡是能作为逻辑主词出现的,都是个别。"——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第227页。

个体实质

实质通常被认为是指一个为一种事物所共有的特征。它属于一个种类,因此是普遍的。但是还有一个始于亚里士多德的 *tode ti* (这一个)概念的传统,认为一个给定种类的每一个体成员都有它自己的独特的实质特性。例如,柏拉图是一个男人。"男人"是柏拉图与其他男人共有的普遍实质。然而,可能有一个"柏拉图性"使得他与苏格拉底、亚里士多德以及所有其他男人相区分。这样一个实质是为那个对象所独有的独特特性,是任何其他的东西所没有的。D. 司各脱将个体实质称为"此性"。个体实质的思想是有争议的,但它在有关"模态逻辑"的讨论中为当代实质论者所复活。它被认为是使一个专名具有一个指称的特性。在关于模态的"可能世界"理论中,一个个体实质是 X 的这样一个性质,以至于在 X 存在的每一可能世界中, X 都具有这一性质,而在任意可能世界里都没有一个对象能够具有这一性质而又不同于 X。

"我们甚至可以想像,一个特定个体弗莱德具有一个实质特性,例如,特性 F,以至于如果任何事物具有特性 F,则它一定在量上等同于

F, such that it is necessary that, if anything has that property, it is quantitatively identical with Fred. This sort of property is called an individual essence." Martin, *The Meaning of Language*, 1987, p. 201.

Individual property, see abstract particulars

Individual term, another expression for singular term

Individualism

Any theory or attitude which holds that individuals rather than wholes composed out of individuals are of central value and have fundamental existence. It claims that an individual can be understood apart from the physical environment, social relations and historical traditions in which the individual is embedded. The notion of individualism has had different connotations in different stages of history and in different cultures, corresponding respectively to concerns for egoism and self-interest, anarchy, self-assertion, and freedom. In metaphysics, both ancient atomism and logical atomism are individualistic by holding that the world is constructed out of atoms, although their contents are distinct. In epistemology, classical empiricism is individualistic, for it believes that the private experience of individuals is the ultimate source of knowledge. In the philosophy of social science, methodological individualism is the view that inquiry into society should be based on the characteristics of individual persons. In the philosophy of mind, individualism proposes that mental semantic meaning is determined by the intrinsic properties of mental representations and does not depend upon their social and historical settings. This psychological individualism has been challenged by claims that the individuation of mental states involves the world and the linguistic-community.

Generally, the central areas of the application of individualism have been in ethics and political philosophy. In these areas, individualism is related to the ideas of autonomy and self-development. Ethical individualism claims that only the individual person is the subject of moral predicates and values and the central focus of moral consideration. Hence it contrasts with moral holism. In political philosophy, as an essential feature of political liberalism, individualism claims that the individual is viewed as the bearer of rights, that a government can be legitimately formed only on the basis of the consent of individuals and that political representation is the representation of individual interests. Society is a logical construction whose aim is to enable its individual members to pursue their respective interests without interference.

In opposition to individualism are various versions of holism, such as totalitarianism, collectivism, socialism, and

弗莱德。这种特性就叫作个体实质。”——马丁：《语言的意义》，1987年，第201页。

个别属性

见“抽象殊相”条。

个体词

“单称词”的另一种说法。

个人主义

任何认为个人而不是由个人组成的整体具有中心价值和基本存在的理论和态度。它认为，个人能够与他所存在的物质环境、社会关系和历史传统分离开来理解。个人主义的概念在不同的历史阶段和文化中有不同的涵义，分别相应于利己主义（即对个人利益的追求）、无政府、自以为是和自由。在形而上学意义上，古代原子主义的和逻辑原子主义在如下的意义上是个人主义的：即他们认为世界是由原子所构成的，虽然他们的内容是不同的。在认识论上，古典的经验主义是个人主义的，因为它相信，个人的私人经验是知识的终极源泉。在社会科学哲学里，方法论的个人主义持有这样的观点：对社会的研究应当以对个人描述为基础。在心的哲学中，个人主义提出，心的语义学意义是为心理反映的内在性质所决定的，而并不依赖于它们的历史和社会环境。这种心理个人主义已经受到挑战，因为个人的心理状态已被证明涉及到世界和语言共同体。

一般而言，个人主义主要应用于伦理学和政治哲学。在这些领域，个人主义是与自主和自我发展观念相关的，“伦理个人主义”主张，惟有个人才是道德谓项的主语、价值的主体以及道德考虑的中心点，因此它是与道德整体主义相对立的。在政治哲学里，作为政治自由主义的一个本质特征，个人主义宣称，个人被看作是权利的负荷者，一个政府只有在个人同意的基础上形成才具有合法性，而政治代表是个人利益的代表。社会是一种这样的逻辑结构：它的目的在于能够使这个社会中的个人不受干涉地各自追求他们自己的利益。

与个人主义相对立的是整体主义的多种学说，诸如集权主义、集体主义、社会主义、共同体主义等。所有这些都被看作是反个人主义的例证。

“自由和平等是个人主义的核心概念。”——鲁克斯：《个人主义》，1973年，第158页。

communitarianism. All of these can be viewed as examples of anti individualism.

"It is liberty and equality which are the cardinal ideals of individualism." —Lukes, *Individualism*, 1973, p. 158.

Individuality

[from Latin; *individuum*, a translation of Greek; *atom*, indivisible] The characteristic or property which makes something or someone the individual that it is. Different views result in different application of the concept of an individual and different accounts of the relationship between individuals and universals. One popular view derived from the etymology of this term explains individuality in terms of indivisibility. Yet there are difficulties in determining what counts as a thing which cannot be divided. Logically a species cannot be divided into its single members. Physically a particular thing cannot be divided into its components without losing its nature. Metaphysically, simple entities cannot be divided into parts. The logical sense of indivisibility is compatible with universality and must be distinguished from particularity. Other approaches to the nature of individuality include the view that a thing is individual if it is distinct from other things, that an individual has a particular 'thisness', that an individual has a spatio-temporal identity, that an individual is something which cannot be predicated of anything else, and that an individual is a thing which cannot be instantiated by anything else. In these senses individuality amounts to particularity. The discussion of individuality is related to issues such as the principle of individuation and the discernibility of individuals.

"The third is individuality, meaning the reflection-into-itself of the specific characters of universality and particularity; which negative self-unity has complete and original determinateness, without any loss to its self-identity or universality." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 163.

Individuative term, another expression for sortal

Indoctrination

One of the major aims of the philosophy of education is to distinguish between the superficially similar notions of teaching and indoctrination. While teaching encourages students and learners to develop their rational capacities and to have their own views on various disputed issues, indoctrination is regarded as the activity of conveying dogma to pupils who are expected to accept it without question. The beliefs that are taught are not open to rational criticism from the pupil. They are intended to be implanted in the minds of the students so that their subsequent experience will not change their beliefs. Indoctrination is typically represented in the preaching of religious doctrine or political opinion. It

个体性

[源自拉丁文; *individuum*, 是希腊文 *atom* (不可分) 一词的翻译] 指使某物或某人成为个体的特性或性质。不同的观点导致了“个体性”概念的不同应用, 和关于个别与普遍之间关系的不同见解。其中最流行的见解之一来源于这一术语的词源学含义, 这种见解用不可分性来解释个体性。而困难在于决定什么样的物体能算作不可分的。在逻辑上, 一个种不能再进一步划分为其单个成员。在物理上, 一特定物体不能被分割为其组成而不失其性质。在形而上学上, 简单物不能划分成部分。逻辑意义上的不可分性是与普遍性一致的, 并且必须区别于特殊性。其他有关个体性本性的观点包括: 如果一事物有别于它事物, 它就是个别的; 个别的事物具有一种独特的“此一性”; 个别的事物具有时空同一性; 个别的事物不能用任何它物作谓项; 以及个别的事物不能为任何它物个例化等等。在这些意义上, 个体性就等于特殊性。关于个体性的讨论与诸如“个体化原则”和“个体的不可区分性”等问题有关。

“第三是个体性, 意为普遍性和特殊性的特别性质的自身反思; 否定的自我统一具有完全的和原初的确定性, 而不失其自我同一性或普遍性。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》, 第163节。

个体化的词

“类”的另一种说法。

灌输

教育哲学的一个主要目的是区分教学与灌输这两个表面相似的概念。教学鼓励学生和学习者发展他们理解的能力和对各种争论的问题有自己的见解, 而灌输则被认为是向学生传授教条并期望他们毫无疑问地接受的活动。所教的那些信条不可受到学生的合理的批判, 并被有意地植入学生心中, 以使他们以后的经历不会改变他们持有的这些信条。灌输典型地体现在对宗教信仰或政治观点的说教上。它典型地包含有独裁主义的方法, 并容易受到怀有偏见的政党的操纵。

“也许最少争议的说明会是这样: 灌输是一

typically involves authoritarian methods and is open to manipulation by interested parties.

"Perhaps the least contentious account would be that indoctrination is a form of teaching in which it is intended that certain belief should be accepted without question, either because it is thought that they are not only important but unquestionably true, or because, for various reasons, it is thought important that, true or not, they should not be questioned."—Moore, *Philosophy of Education*, 1982, p. 6.

Induction

[from Latin: *inducere*, in, into — *ducere*, lead, a translation of Aristotle's *epagoge*, leading to] For Aristotle, first, a form of reasoning in which we establish a generalisation by showing that the reasoning holds for certain instances that are said to fall under it and, secondly, the process by which we apprehend a particular instance as exemplifying an abstract generalisation. Nowadays, we call the first kind of reasoning simple or enumerative induction and the second kind intuitive induction. In addition, there is also eliminative induction, which reaches a generalisation by eliminating competing generalisations. In enumerative induction, the fundamental form of induction, the basic process of inference is that, if A_1 is P , A_2 is P , A_3 is P , then all A 's are P . An enumeration covers all the instances falling under the generalisation is called a complete enumerative induction.

Induction is contrasted with deduction in which a particular conclusion is deduced from a universal premise as a matter of logical necessity. In induction, a universal is derived from what is particular and goes beyond the content of its premises. For this reason induction was called by Peirce ampliative argument. For this reason, the conclusion of an inductive argument is generally probable rather than necessary. The discussion of induction is closely associated with that of probability and confirmation. Francis Bacon, who called his theory of induction a new organon in contrast to Aristotle's syllogism, held that all new knowledge must come from some form of induction. J. S. Mill established five canons of induction.

Hume proposed the deeply important problem of induction, which claims that we lack adequate grounds to infer from observed regularities to the probable continuance of those regularities. Inductive reasoning is based on the principle of uniformity of nature, according to which events that I have not observed are similar to events that I have observed, but this principle is itself a conclusion based on induction. The rational foundations of inductive reasoning have been a major topic in subsequent philosophy, especially in the empiricist tradition. Anti-inductivism emerged to deny that induction is a rational process. The hypothetico-

种教学方式,其目的是某些信条应被毫无疑问地接受,这或者是因为它们被认为不仅是重要的而且毫无疑问是正确的,或者是因为,出于各种原因,它们被认为是重要的,不管对不对,对它们都不应有疑问。"—摩尔:《教育哲学》,1982年,第6页。

归纳

[源自拉丁词, *inducere*(进入)和 *ducere*(引导),对亚里士多德的 *epagoge*(导向)的翻译]在亚里士多德看来,这首先是指通过把若干确定事例归入类属而得出一般结论的推理形式,其次是指我们把特殊事例当做对抽象的一般结论的例化而加以把握的过程。现在,我们把第一种推理称为简单枚举归纳法,把第二种推理称为直观归纳法。此外,还存在一种淘汰归纳法,它通过淘汰不相容的一般结论而得出一般结论。在枚举归纳法这种归纳的基本形式中,推论的基本过程是,如果 A_1 是 P , A_2 是 P , A_3 是 P , 那么所有的 A 's 是 P 。涵盖归入一般结论的所有事物的枚举法称为完全枚举归纳法。

归纳相对于演绎,在演绎中特殊的结论是从普遍的前提推断出来的,这种推论具有逻辑的必然性。在归纳中,普遍是从特殊的东西推导出来的,结论超出了它的前提的内容。据此,归纳被皮尔士称为扩充论证。因此,归纳论证的结论一般地是可能的而不是必然的。归纳的讨论与概率和确证的讨论密切相关。弗兰西斯·培根把他的归纳理论称为新工具以相对于亚里士多德的三段论法,他主张,一切新知识都必须来自某种形式的归纳。J. S. 密尔建立了归纳的五个法规。

休谟深入地提出了归纳的重要问题。他主张,从所观察到的规律性推论出那种规律性的可能的连续性是缺乏适当根据的。归纳推理以自然的齐一性原理为基础,按照这种原理,我还未观察到事件相似于我已观察到的事件,但这种原理自身就是一种以归纳为基础的结论。归纳推理的理性基础一直是后继哲学的主要论题,特别在经验主义的传统中尤为如此。反归纳主义起来否认归纳是一个理性的过程。提出假设—演绎的方法以和归纳的方法相抗争,波普主张,科学的进步是通过对猜想假设的证伪,而不是通过归纳的确证来实现。古德曼提出了他的新归纳之谜:归纳如何能描述关于先前所观察的相似性的连续进行的推理。他的“绿色—绿蓝”的例子表明,同样的归纳过程能肯定两个对立的一般化结论。有关归纳的合理性和本性的

deductive method was proposed as a rival to inductive method, with Popper claiming that science proceeds by tests of falsification of imaginative hypotheses rather than by inductive confirmation. Goodman put forward his new riddle of induction concerning how an induction could be characterised in terms of an inference to the continuation of previously observed similarities. His "green-grue" example showed that the same inductive process can confirm two opposite generalisations. The debate about the nature and rationality of induction continues.

"The so called method of inductive inference is usually presented as proceeding from specific case to a general hypothesis of which each of the special cases is an 'instance' in the sense that it conforms to the general hypothesis in question, and thus constitutes confirming evidence for it."—Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, 1965, p. 5.

Induction, the problem of

A problem originally formulated by Hume concerning the legitimacy of inductive inference. Typically, induction infers from limited observation that some As are B to the conclusion that all As are B. But how can we rationally accept that such an inference is valid? On what grounds can we claim that the conclusion thus reached is acceptable? The classic response to this problem is that the validity of inductive reasoning is based on the uniformity of nature. This principle of induction claims that the future will resemble the past, and hence a generalisation from observed cases is applicable to unobserved cases. But Hume argued that this principle can be justified only by induction and that the justification of induction in terms of the principle thus involves vicious circularity. The answer that Hume provided to the problem is that induction is not a rational inference, but arises from custom and habit. A sceptical interpretation of his account argues that induction needs rational support which custom and habit cannot provide. A naturalistic interpretation of his account claims that our inductive practice does not need any justification outside itself or that custom and habit is all the justification that we need.

Recent generations of philosophers have also considered the problem of induction. Reichenbach claimed that induction is a method of reaching posits or conjectures, rather than an inference. Popper held a similar view. Some philosophers try to deny that justification in terms of the uniformity of nature involves circularity, by distinguishing different levels of induction. Goodman has proposed a new riddle of induction, suggesting that an appeal to the uniformity of nature is empty without grounds for preferring some uniformities to others. Some philosophers, including Russell, have held on the grounds of the possibility of knowledge that the justification of induction is *a priori*. An influential response, initiated by Strawson, suggests that the problem of induction

争论仍在继续。

“所谓归纳推理方法通常呈现为从特殊情况进展到一般假定,它的每一种特殊情况都是这种意义上的‘事例’,这个事例遵从所说的一般假定,因此构成了对它的确证根据。”——亨佩尔:《科学说明的诸方面》,1965年,第5页。

归纳问题

一个由休谟最初提出的、关于归纳推理的合法性的问题。归纳的典型,是从有限的观察即有些A是B,推出结论即所有的A都是B。但是我们如何能理性地承认这种推理是有效的呢?我们根据什么能宣称如此得出的结论是可接受的呢?对这一问题的经典回答,是归纳推理的有效性立足于“自然的齐一性”。这种归纳原理宣称未来将类似于过去,因此由已观察到的事例中得出的概括适用于未观察到的情形。但是休谟论证说这个原理自身也仅能由归纳辩护,因此归纳以这一原理辩护包含有循环论证。休谟本人对这问题的回答是,归纳不是一种理性的推理,而是习惯或惯例的结果。对他的说明的怀疑性解释是,归纳需要理性支持,而习惯和惯例并不能提供这样的支持。而对其说明的一种自然主义的解释是,我们的归纳实践并不需要外在于它自身的任何辩护,或者说,那种习惯和惯例正是我们所需要的辩护。

近代哲学家也致力于这个归纳问题。赖兴巴赫认为归纳是一种达到假定或猜想的方法,而不是推论的方法。波普持相似的看法。有些哲学家试图通过区别不同的归纳层次来否认依据自然的齐一性的辩护中包含的循环论证。古德曼提出了“新归纳之谜”,认为求助于自然的齐一性如果不依据其他某些齐一性将是徒劳的。包括罗素在内的一些哲学家相信,依据知识的可能性,归纳的辩护是先验的。一种起始于斯特劳森的有影响的回答,认为归纳问题的产生是由于我们用演绎推理的标准来评价归纳推理,而事实上它们各有自己的标准。归纳推理是可错的推理,即其所达致的结论可为未来的证据所推翻的推理。

“然而无论我们对归纳问题持何见解,这点都是正确的,即能够从一些已接受的因果定律

is generated because we assess inductive reasoning by the standards of deductive reasoning, when in fact each of them has its own standard. Inductive reasoning is defeasible reasoning, that is reasoning which reaches conclusions that can be overturned by further evidence.

"But whatever view we take of the problem of induction, it remains true that being able to derive it from some accepted causal law is the strongest justification for believing in the existence of any unobserved event." Ayer, *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays*, 1963, p. 206.

Induction by elimination

Also called eliminative induction or the method of elimination, a type of inductive reasoning which initially assumes several possible hypotheses for explaining the same phenomenon, and then eliminates those which are countered by new evidence through the progress of observation and experiment. The remaining hypothesis is then taken to be correct. By this procedure we establish an affirmative conclusion by rejecting all the rival hypotheses. The problem with this type of induction is that the number of competing hypotheses might be indefinite and potentially infinite, and hence elimination does not guarantee that the hypothesis surviving from those considered is correct. Neither does it ensure that only one of a finite set of alternatives is correct. Induction by elimination contrasts with induction by enumeration which infers a general conclusion by enumerating the particular instances of that generalisation.

"That type of inference in which one of the premises is a disjunction of several general statements, the other premises are singular statements which refute all the members of that disjunction except one, and the conclusion is that only member of the disjunction which is not refuted by the singular premises, is termed induction by elimination." Ajdukiewicz, *Pragmatic Logic*, 1965, p. 162.

Induction by enumeration

The inference to a generalisation by the simple enumeration of the particular instances of the generalisation. When we observe that $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_n$, all have a property B, and that no As have been found not to have B, we infer that all As have the property of B. Induction by enumeration, also called enumerative induction is thought to be the fundamental form of inductive reasoning. It is non-demonstrative, and the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed. Different causal factors and different circumstances may lead other As to lack the property B, and hence there is always the possibility of counter examples. Furthermore, scientists generally have a hypothesis before enumerating its instances, and their active programmes of experimental testing go beyond mere enumeration. Induction by enumeration is in contrast with induction by elimination.

中推导出它,是对相信那些未观察到的事件的存在的最有力辩护。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念及其他论文集》,1963年,第206页。

淘汰归纳法

也称作“淘汰式归纳”或“淘汰法”,是归纳推理的一种类型。首先设想几种用于说明同一现象的可能假说,然后随着观察和实验的过程淘汰那些为新的证据所反对的假说,保留下来的假说则被认为是正确的。由这种程序,我们通过剔除所有相反的假说以确立一个肯定性结论。这一类归纳的问题是,竞争中的假说数目可能是不确定的和潜在无穷的,因此淘汰不能保证从那些被考察的假说中生存下来的就是正确的。同时它也不能保证一组有限数目的假说中只有一个是正确的。淘汰归纳法与枚举归纳法形成对照,后者通过列举一些概括的特殊例证来推导出这个一般结论。

“这一类推理被称作淘汰归纳法,其中的前提之一为几个一般陈述的析取式,其他前提为反驳这析取式中除一个外的所有其他成员的单称陈述句,结论是析取式中不为单称前提所反驳的仅有成员。”——阿吉图库威茨:《实用逻辑》,1965年,第162页。

枚举归纳法

通过简单列举一个概括的特殊实例以达到概括的推理。当我们观察到 $A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots, A_n$ 都有性质 B, 并且没有发现有的 A 没有 B, 我们就推出: 所有的 A 都有性质 B。枚举归纳法也称作“枚举式归纳”, 被认为是归纳推理最基本的形式。它是非论证的, 其结论的真没有保证, 不同的因果因素和环境可能导致其他的 A 没有 B, 因而总是存在反例的可能。而且科学家们在列举其实例之前一般已有一个假说。他们的实际的实验测试项目也远远不只是枚举。枚举归纳法与淘汰归纳法形成对照。

“枚举归纳法是这样一种推理, 其中把一般规则性陈述认可为结论, 是由于接受这一规则性的特例陈述。”——阿吉图库威茨:《实用逻辑》, 1965年, 第48页。

"Induction by enumeration is any such inference in which a statement of a general regularity is accepted as the conclusion on the strength of accepting statements of particular cases of the regularity."—Ajdukiewicz, *Pragmatic Logic*, 1965, p. 48.

Induction by intuition

Also called intuitive induction, induction which moves from the observation of a single fact or a few facts to general statements. The implicit universal is exhibited in the clearly known particulars. This is the method of establishing propositions of restricted universality in philosophy, especially in metaphysics. In science, the result of this intuition is tested by further observation. Induction by intuition is an important means of forming hypotheses prior to testing them more systematically.

"'Induction by intuition', or 'imagination', the discovery of law by the construction of new concepts on the basis of relatively few observations and the confirming of the law by a great number of observations."—Frank, *Philosophy of Science*, 1957, p. 317.

Inductive definition, see recursive definition

Inductivism

A theory of science which holds that scientific knowledge consists of the laws or principles derived by inductive canons from accumulated facts. The knowledge grows if more facts are accumulated. The plausibility of a law increases with the observed numbers of instances of the phenomenon explained by that law. Accordingly what scientists do is to pile up relevant facts and generalise laws and principles from them. Critics of this theory of science claim that it ignores the function of theory and that its account of intellectual discovery and creation is oversimplified. Some philosophers accept Popper's criticism of inductivism even if they also criticise his own falsificationist theory of science.

"The real reason why inductivism is so wrong is that it is so unrealistic. It is an attempt to codify a more or less mythical conception of science."—Harré, *The Philosophies of Science*, 1972, p. 47.

Ineffability

[from Latin: *ineffabilis*: not expressible in words] Many theologians and philosophers believe that God is beyond our description and conceptualisation, because human experience is finite, and language has its limits. Some metaphysicians claim that the first principle of existence or ultimate reality also resists any linguistic specification, such as Plato's Form of the Good, and Plotinus' One.

直观归纳法

也称为“直观式归纳”。它从单个或少量事实的观察导向一般性结论。隐含的普遍表现在明显已知的特殊之中。这是在哲学中、尤其是在形而上学中确立受限制的普遍性命题的方法。在科学中,这种直观的结果通过与进一步的观察相比较而得以检验。直观归纳是在系统测验假说之前构成假说的一种重要途径。

“‘直观归纳法’或‘想像’,通过基于相对少的观察构造的新概念来发现定律,并通过大量的观察来确证这定律。”——弗朗克,《科学哲学》,1957年,第317页。

归纳定义

见“递归定义”条。

归纳主义

一种关于科学的理论,认为科学知识由按照归纳准则从累积事实中推导出的定律或原理组成。知识随着更多知识的累积而成长,定律的似真性随着观察到的为这定律所说明的现象的实例数目而增加。相应地,科学家的工作是积累相关事实并从中概括出定律和原理。这一有关科学的理论所面临的批评,是它忽视了理论的作用,并且它描述智力发现和创造的基本原理过于简单化。有些哲学家接受波普对归纳主义的批评,虽然他们也批评他自己关于科学的可证伪理论。

“归纳主义为什么如此错误的真实理由,在于它是如此不现实的。它试图编撰一个多少有些神秘的科学概念。”——哈雷,《科学哲学》,1972年,第47页。

不可名状

[源自拉丁语 *ineffabilis*,意为“不可用语词表述的”]许多神学家和哲学家相信,上帝不在我们的描述和概念范围内,因为人的经验是有限的,语言也有它的限界。有些形而上学家主张,存在的第一原理或终极实在也抗拒任何语言详述,如柏拉图善的理念,普罗提诺的太一。因此,这类东西是不可名状的,只能由神秘的直

Consequently, some things are ineffable and can only be grasped through mystical intuition or revelation. There are also claims that works of art can convey what is ineffable by showing what cannot be said, but critics argue that what cannot be said cannot be expressed in any other way.

"Perhaps those who call the experience of what is beyond existence and non-existence ineffable merely mean that they cannot adequately describe it to those who have not had it." Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 155.

Inegalitarianism, see egalitarianism

Inequality

Different holdings of what is advantageous or desirable by different individuals or groups in political, legal, social and economic areas. The main aim of egalitarianism is to reject any enforced policies leading to inequality, and to maintain that each individual or group has the equal rights to political participation and legal protection. Egalitarianism also tries to narrow the wealth gap between different individuals through welfare and taxation policies. However, because we have natural differences in talent and merit, and because the society and its economic system require a hierarchic organisation, it is unlikely that all sorts of inequalities can be eliminated. Accordingly, it becomes a matter of debate whether and to what degree a society is justified in narrowing inequalities. These debates focus on the relations between inequalities and liberty, efficiency, and justice. Some theorists reject the broad egalitarian consensus and argue that in many respects inequality is preferable to equality.

"It can be of little practical consequence that one regards inequality as bad—as many do—unless one is generally able to determine if one situation's inequality is worse than another's."—Temkin, *Inequality*, 1993, p. 3.

Inertia

[from Latin: *inertia*, idle, not having its own active powers, or unable to move itself] For Aristotle, it is part of the nature of motion that it will come to an end. Scholastics developed this idea by claiming that it is the inherent tendency of terrestrial matter to be inert or sluggish. Descartes transformed the notion of inertia to mean the persistence of motion or rest. Other things being equal, matter will continue in a state of uniform motion or rest and change only if externally affected. This is viewed as an early formulation of the Newtonian principle of inertia (the first law of motion): every body maintains its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces imposed upon it.

觉或启示把握。也有些人论证说,艺术品能够通过表明那不能被说的东西,传达出那不可名状的,但批评者们则说,不能被说的东西就不能以任何其他方式表示。

“或许,那些把体验处于存在和非存在之外的东西称作不可名状的人,他们的意思仅仅是,他们不能对无此体验的人作恰当描述。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第155页。

不平等主义

见“平等主义”条。

不平等

不同的个人或集团在政治、法律、社会和政治领域中对有利的或合乎需要的东西的不同占有。平等主义的主要目的是反对任何导致不平等的强权政治,维护每一个人或集团在政治参与和法律保护方面拥有平等的权利。平等主义还试图通过福利和税收政策缩小不同个人在财富上的差距。可是,由于我们在才能方面有着天赋的差别,由于社会及其经济制度要求一个等级制的组织,因而消除所有的不平等是不可能的。由此,一个社会是否要缩小不平等,以及在何等程度上缩小不平等是公正的,就成了有争议的问题。这些争议的焦点是不平等与自由、效率和公平的关系。一些理论家否认广泛平等的舆论,认为在很多方面不平等比平等更可取。

“许多人把不平等视为坏事,这种做法几乎不可能有实践意义,除非人们通常能够确定是否一种处境的不平等比另一种更差。”——坦金:《不平等》,1993年,第3页。

惯性(也译“惰性”)

[源自拉丁文 *inertia*, 字面上讲为“懒散的”,“没有它自己活动能力的”或者“不能移动自身的”]在亚里士多德看来,它是将趋向一个目的的运动本性的一部分。经院哲学家发展了这一观念,宣称这是由于地面物质惰性或懒惰的固有趋向。笛卡尔把惯性概念改变为意指运动或静止的持续。其他情况不变,物体将继续其静止状态或匀速运动状态,仅当受外界影响时才改变。这被看作是牛顿惯性原理(第一运动定律)的早期形式,这一原理表述为:每一物体保持其静止状态,或直线匀速运动状态,除非它作为作用于它的力强迫改变这一状态。

“惯性是一物体抵抗其运动或静止状态的

"Inertia is a disposition to resist changes to a body's state of motion or rest." —Harré, *Laws of Nature*, 1993, p. 44.

Infallibility

The impossibility of being mistaken. Some philosophers claim that certain perceptual beliefs such as "I am in pain" are infallible and therefore may serve as the basis for justifying other beliefs. But others argue that even in such cases mistakes are possible through applying the wrong concept to a given item. Questions of infallibility have been discussed with the related notion of incorrigibility. An infallible claim cannot be mistaken, while an incorrigible claim cannot be corrected and hence cannot be mistaken. Infallibility is also used for the view that it is impossible for knowledge to be wrong. A requirement that knowledge must be infallible would have the effect of excluding many legitimate questions from debate. Many philosophers do not think that this is acceptable, for it would reject all procedures liable to error and would radically narrow the scope of knowledge. The possibility of knowledge might vanish altogether because if fallibilism is correct, even propositions that we take to be necessary truths are in principle open to error. The notion of the infallibility of knowledge can be traced to Plato's philosophy and is one type of rationalist ideal. The idea that scientific knowledge should be infallible has been challenged by Popper's claim that only when a theory can be falsified is it a real scientific theory.

"The one feature which is common to all versions of the doctrine that knowledge implies infallibility is that, in order for the concept of knowledge to be applicable, there must not be the possibility of error." —Evans, *Knowledge and Infallibility*, 1978, p. 32.

Inference

The procedure of drawing one statement (as a conclusion) from another statement or statements which have been established to be true or false. Inference is generally divided into deductive inference (from a general rule to a particular instance), and inductive inference (from particular data to a general rule). Abductive inference is sometimes listed as a third type of inference, but is more often regarded as a special case of inductive inference. The conclusion of deductive inference is necessary, while the conclusion of inductive inference is probable. An argument consists of at least one inference. Logic seeks to establish the rules of inference. An inference is valid if it conforms to the given rules, and is invalid if it fails so to conform. "To infer" should be distinguished from "to imply", for implication can be a relation between propositions themselves, while inference must involve the belief states of an epistemic agent.

变化的倾向。”——哈雷：《自然规律》，1993年，第44页。

不可错性〔或译“绝对可靠性”〕

犯错误的不可能性。有些哲学家认为某些知觉信念，例如“我现在疼痛”，是不会错的，因此可以用作证明其他信念的基础。但是其他哲学家论证说，即使在这种知觉信念的情形中，由于把错误的概念应用于特定的事项，错误也是可能的。不可错性问题与相关的“不可纠正性”概念一起讨论。一个不可错的观点是不可能出错的，而一个不可纠正的观点是不可纠正的，因而是不可能出错的。“不可错性”也用以指那种认为知识是不可能错的观点。要求知识必须是不可错的，会导致把许多合法问题从争论中排除出去的后果。许多哲学家认为这是不可接受的，因为它会拒斥一切可错程序，并会根本性地改变知识的范围。知识的可能性就会完全消失，因为如果可错论是对的，则即使是我们认为是必然真理的命题，在原则上也是会出错的。知识的不可错性概念可以追溯到柏拉图的哲学，是理性主义理想的一个典型。科学知识应当是不可错的这一观念受到了波普的挑战，他主张一个理论只有能够被否定，才是一个真正科学的理论。

“主张知识蕴涵着不可错性这一学说有种种形式，其共同特征是，为了使知识的概念成为适用的，就一定不存在错误的可能性。”——埃文斯：《知识与不可否定性》，1978年，第32页。

推理

从已经确定为真或为假的另一个或一些陈述中引出一个陈述(作为结论)的程序。推理一般分为演绎推理和归纳推理，前者是从普遍规则到特殊例证的推理，后者是从特殊证据到普遍规则的推理。溯因推理有时被列为第三类推理，但更为经常地是把它看作归纳推理的特例。演绎推理的结论是必然的，而归纳推理的结论是或然的。一论证由至少一个推理组成。逻辑寻求确立推理规则。如果一个推理遵守了给定的规则，则它是有效的，如果它未能遵守这些规则，则它是无效的。应该把“推出”与“蕴涵”区别开来，因为蕴涵可以是命题本身之间的关系，而推理必定涉及到认知主体的信念状态。

“推理是我们达到新知识的一种方法，关于推理的非心理成分就是那种使我们能正确推理的关系。”——罗素：《数理哲学导论》，1919年，第149页。

"Inference is a method by which we arrive at new knowledge, and what is not psychological about it is the relation which allows us to infer correctively."—Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 149.

Inference to the best explanation

A kind of reasoning that is common in both daily life and science. If we observe that a, b, c, \dots are true, and if there is a hypothesis H which can best explain all these cases, then it is probable that H is true. This is a non-demonstrative deduction, sometimes called a hypothetical deduction. The confirmation of a scientific theory is essentially an inference to the best explanation. This method of reasoning resembles the process that Peirce calls abduction. There are many discussions surrounding this method of reasoning such as how to make it precise, whether it is really different from inductive reasoning and what is the criterion for determining which of several competing hypotheses is the best.

"The standard presentation of the link between the empirical adequacy and truth of a theory is known as the inference to the best explanation. Since it aims to exploit the truth conducive virtues of explanation it is most effectively applied to causal explanation."—Kosso, *Reading the Book of Nature*, 1992, p. 98.

Inferred entity, another term for metaphysical entity

Infima species

A determinate form of the lowest generality which does not admit of any further differentiation. The things below *infima species* are particular instances which are identical in specific nature. An *infima species* is the common and stable nature of a kind of thing and is therefore the object of definition and knowledge. In Aristotle's *Categories*, an *infima species* is a secondary substance. In his *Metaphysics*, its ontological status is ambiguous, depending on whether one understands it to be identical with form and also on whether one understands primary substance to be universal form or particular form. But Aristotle claimed that an *infima species* cannot mark off one individual from another and that matter should be the principle of individuation.

"An *infima species*, or lowest species, if there can be such a thing, would be a sort without any distinct sub-sort instantiating it."—Lowe, *Kinds of Being*, 1989, p. 40.

Infinite and finite

[from Latin: *in*, not — *finire*, to limit, to stop, literally, not to have a limit or end, that is, unlimited, boundless or indeterminate; *finire*, literally, to have a limit or end. Greek counterparts: *apeiron*, unlimited or undetermined; *peras*, limit] A pair of concepts that is widely

最佳说明推理

一种在日常生活和科学中都通用的推理。如果我们观察到 a, b, c, \dots 是真的, 并且有一个假说 H 能最好地说明所有这些事例, 则 H 有可能是真的。这是一种非证明性演绎, 有时称作“假说演绎”。科学理论的确证本质上是一种最佳说明推理。这种推理方法类似于皮尔士称作的假说推理的过程。围绕着这种推理方法展开了许多讨论, 包括如何使其精确, 它是否确实不同于归纳推理, 在几个竞争假说中确定最佳的标准是什么。

“理论的经验适当性和真实性之间联系的标准表述以最佳说明推理为著名。由于它意在利用说明的有利于真值的优点, 它最为有效地应用于因果说明。”——科索:《阅读自然之书》, 1992年, 第98页。

推论出的实体

“形而上学实体”的另一说法。

最低层的种

不能再作任何划分的那种最低层次一般的确定形式。处于最低层的种之下的事物是具有同一特定本性的特殊事例。最低层的种是一类事物共同的和稳定的本性, 所以, 它是定义和知识的对象。在亚里士多德的《范畴》中, 最低层的种是第二实体。在《形而上学》中, 它的本体论地位是不明确的, 依据人们是否把它理解成与“形式”同一而定, 也依据人们把第一实体理解为普遍形式还是特殊形式而定。但是, 亚里士多德断言, 最低层的种不能把一个体从另一个体中区分出来, 所以, 质料应是个体化的原则。

“如果能有这种事物的话, 最低层的种或最低层次的种就是无任何不同的下属类作为其例证的那样的类。”——罗威:《存在的种类》, 1989年, 第40页。

无限和有限

[源自拉丁语: *in* (不) 和 *finire* (限制, 停止), 字面的意思是, 并无界限或终点, 即无限制、无界限或无规定的; *finire*, 字面的意思是, 有界限或终点。希腊语的对应词为: *apeiron*, 无限制的或无规定的; *peras*, 限制] 广泛地用于讨

used in discussing the world, God, mathematics and space and time. The concepts are used in metaphysical, theological, mathematical and logical discussions.

The question whether the world is infinite or finite is one of the oldest questions of philosophy. The logical nature of infinity and finitude can be traced to Zeno of Elea's paradoxes of motion. Attempts to solve these paradoxes have stimulated inquiry into the nature of these terms. In general, the Greeks believed that the infinite is incomplete, imperfect, indeterminate, and should therefore be put into the category of the bad, while the finite is complete, perfect and determinate and belongs to the category of the good. Aristotle discussed these conceptions in detail in his *Physics*. For him, the world must be finite, and the infinite can only be potential. The distinction between actual and potential infinity was revived in Cantor's mathematics.

In Christian philosophy, the omnipotent God cannot be finite, but is an infinite and eternal being upon whom finite beings are dependent. Hence, contrary to the Greek notion, the infinite is seen as complete and perfect. The world is still finite, but it is conceived to be an imperfect creation of the infinite God.

Hegel distinguished between bad infinity and true infinity. Bad infinity is an endless series, like a straight line with no end in either direction. It is simply negative and is distinct from the finite. True infinity is closely associated with the finite. Like a circle, it is finite but unbounded. A thing can be infinite from one perspective, but finite from another. Hegel believed that the finite involves negation or limitation and claimed that the infinite is associated with the negation of a negation. Finite things have to depend on other things for their being, and their negation leads to another negation, producing an affirmation. The development of finite things is also the self-development of the absolute idea. In Hegel's sense of being self-contained and autonomous, the absolute idea is the only real true infinity.

"Dualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between finite and infinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is thereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the finite forms the other particular." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 95.

Infinite regress argument

An argument that occurs in many different branches of philosophy. An example from metaphysics may be found in Plato who recognised that if there is one idea for many similar things, then when we consider the idea together with these other things, we may require a further idea, and so on *ad infinitum*. Plato's famous Third Man argument is one version of this argument. Aristotle made use of an infinite regress argument in proving the existence of the unmoved mover. He claimed that if everything in motion is moved by a

论世界、上帝、数学与空间和时间的一对概念。这对概念具有形而上学的、神学的、数学的和逻辑的等多种用法。

世界是有限还是无限的问题是一个最古老的哲学问题。无限和有限的逻辑本性可追溯到埃利亚的芝诺提出的运动的悖论。企图解决这些悖论推动着研究深入到这些词语的本性。一般说来,希腊人认为,无限是不圆满的、不完善的、无限定的,因此应把它归入恶的范畴中。而有限是圆满的、完善的和限定的,属于善的范畴。亚里士多德在他的《物理学》中详细讨论了这些概念。在他看来,世界必须是有限的,无限只能是潜能。现实无限和潜在无限的区别在康托尔的数学中又重新加以讨论。

在基督教哲学中,全能的上帝不能是有限的,而只能是无限的和永恒的存在。有限事物依赖于他而存在。因此,与古希腊的观念相对应,无限被看作是圆满的和完善的。世界仍然是有限的,它被设想为无限上帝的不完善的造物。

黑格尔区分了坏无限和真无限。坏无限是一种无穷系列,像一条在两个方向上没有终端的直线,它是单纯地否定的和不同于有限的。真无限与有限密切相关,像一个圆圈,有限而无终。一个事物从一个角度来看是无限的,从另一角度来看是有限的。黑格尔认为,有限涉及否定或界限,并主张无限与否定之否定有关。有限事物必须依赖于他物而存在,而它们的否定导致另一否定,产生了肯定。有限事物的发展也是绝对理念的自我发展。在黑格尔的自我限制和自发的意义上,绝对理念是惟一实在的真无限。

"认为有限和无限有不可克服的对立的二元论,并没有明了这个简单的道理:无限只是对立双方的一方,因而被降低为特殊之物,而有限便成为与之相对的另一特殊之物。"——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第95节。

无穷后退证明

这个证明出现在许多不同的哲学分支中。在柏拉图那里可以找到一个形而上学的例子。柏拉图意识到,如果一个形相用于许多相似物,那么,当我们把这一形相与这些相似物放在一起看时,我们可以得到另一个形相,如此等等以至无穷。柏拉图的著名的“第三人”证明是这个证明的一种形式。亚里士多德在证明不动的推动者存在时,利用了无穷后退证明。他声称,如果每个运动的东西都是由运动者推动的,那么,

mover, there would be an infinite series of movers. Since this is impossible, there must be a unmoved mover. Aristotle also used the argument in ethics in seeking to show that if every rational action has a goal, there must be a final goal. An infinite regress argument is also used in epistemology. If we are to know a conclusion, we must know its premises, and to know the premises, we must seemingly know the premises of the premises *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress, it is claimed that there must be basic and non-demonstrable first principles or foundations which ground the rest of our knowledge.

"For it is impossible that there should be an infinite series of movements, each of which is itself moved by something else, since in an infinite series there is no first term." -Aristotle, *Physics*, 256a18.

Infinite-valued logic, see many-valued logic

Informal fallacy

The kind of fallacy which does not occur in the logical form or structure of an argument, but is committed in various other ways and can be identified through analysis of its content and its context. Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* was the first systematic study of informal fallacies, although many other forms were added by later authors. Aristotle divided all fallacies into those dependent on language (Latin: *in dictione*) and those outside of language (Latin: *extra dictionem*). Modern logic textbooks accordingly generally divide informal fallacies into fallacies of ambiguity and material fallacies. Fallacies of ambiguity arise from the ambiguity of words or sentences in which ambiguous words occur, such as the fallacies of accent, amphiboly, equivocation, composition, division and *secundum quid*. Material fallacies are due to reasons other than the ambiguity of language and are further divided into the fallacies of relevance and insufficient evidence. The fallacy of relevance occurs in those arguments whose premises are logically irrelevant to the truth of the conclusion and are hence incapable of establishing it. Many informal fallacies of this kind have a Latin name of the form "*argumentum ad* ...", such as *argumentum ad baculum*, *argumentum ad hominem*, *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, *argumentum ad misericordiam*, *argumentum ad populum* and *argumentum ad verecundiam*. Other forms include the fallacy of the complex question, the genetic fallacy, *ignoratio elenchi*, *petitio principii* (begging the question), the slippery slope argument and the straw man fallacy. The fallacy of insufficient evidence occurs in those arguments whose premises are relevant to the conclusions but are not strong or good enough to establishing the truth of the conclusions, such as the false cause or *post hoc* fallacy and hasty

would be an infinite series of movers. Since this is impossible, there must be a unmoved mover. Aristotle also used the argument in ethics in seeking to show that if every rational action has a goal, there must be a final goal. An infinite regress argument is also used in epistemology. If we are to know a conclusion, we must know its premises, and to know the premises, we must seemingly know the premises of the premises *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress, it is claimed that there must be basic and non-demonstrable first principles or foundations which ground the rest of our knowledge.

"有一个各种运动的无穷系列,每一运动本身都由其他东西推动,而这种情况是不可能的,因为在一个无限系列中没有第一项。"——亚里士多德:《物理学》,256a18。

无穷值逻辑

见“多值逻辑”条。

非形式谬误

指下述类型的谬误:它并不出现在论证的逻辑形式或结构中,而是通过各种其他途径所犯的谬误,通过分析它的内容及其语境可以将其识别出来。亚里士多德的《辩谬篇》是第一部对非形式谬误进行系统性研究的著作,不过后来的作者们补充了许多其他形式的谬误。亚里士多德把所有谬误区分为依赖于语言(拉丁文: *in dictione*)的谬误和非语言(拉丁文: *extra dictionem*)的谬误。相应地,现代逻辑教科书通常把非形式谬误分为歧义谬误和实质谬误。歧义谬误产生于词汇歧义或者含有歧义词语的语句歧义,例如错置重音的谬误,意义模糊的谬误,一语多义的谬误,合举谬误,分举谬误和无视限制的谬误。实质谬误是由于语言歧义之外的理由而产生的,进一步划分为相干谬误和不充足理由谬误。相干谬误出现在这样的论证中:其前提在逻辑上是与结论的真不相干的,它们不足以确立结论之真。许多这种类型的非形式谬误有一个形如 *argumentum ad*... 的拉丁文名称,如 *argumentum ad baculum*(诉诸强力的论证), *argumentum ad hominem*(人身攻击的论证), *argumentum ad ignorantiam*(诉诸无知的论证), *argumentum ad misericordiam*(诉诸怜悯的论证), *argumentum ad populum*(诉诸公众的论证)以及 *argumentum ad verecundiam*(诉诸权威的论证)。其他形式包括复杂问语谬误,发生谬误,无视限制谬误,窃取论题谬误,滑坡论证,稻草人谬误等等。不充足理由谬误出现在这样的论证中:其前提与所要达到的结论是相干的,但并不足够强或足够好以致可以确立结论的真,如错为因果谬误[亦称 *post hoc*(在这之后)谬误]、轻率概括等等。本辞典对上面提到的

generalisation. This dictionary has a single entry for each of the above fallacies.

"Informal fallacies are frequently backed by some motive on the part of the arguer to deceive the reader or listener."—Hurley, *A Concise Introduction to Logic*, 1982, p. 71.

Informal logic

Also called logical pragmatics. Informal logic investigates the relations of implication arising from subject-matter words and the contents of a discourse. It concerns the nature and function of arguments or assertions in natural language whose richness cannot be exhausted in formal logic. Informal logic is not as precise as formal logic and its findings are relative to given contexts. Its major topics include matters such as incomplete patterns of arguments, conversational implicature, informal fallacies and rhetorical techniques for persuasion. In contrast, formal logic deals with semantic rather than pragmatic relationships, especially with the entailments arising from the formal or structural words of propositions. While formal logic regards argument as a set of propositions and examines their truth-value, informal logic deals with the use of propositions to carry out the various aims of dialogue in everyday reasoning. Informal logic takes account of the wider context of dialogue and seeks to understand how we legitimately convince or persuade in reasonable discourse.

"Generally the theory of informal logic must be based on the concept of question-reply dialogue as a form of interaction between two participants, each representing one side of an argument, on a disputed question."—Walton, *Informal Logic*, x.

Informed consent

Informed consent is a moral requirement in medical ethics. In the process of medical treatment, competent patients are entitled to be informed in understandable language of the benefits of the treatment, its possible risks, and the alternative methods of treatment. No treatment should be given without the patient's voluntary consent on the basis of the information provided. The argument in support of this requirement is that a patient is in principle autonomous and self-determining. Patients have the right to refuse to allow their body to be touched. It is in the interest of the patients to participate in the process of making significant decisions affecting their lives. The problem is that knowing a diagnosis that patients prefer not to know does not necessarily serve their best interests.

"The idea of 'informed consent' is based on the notion of autonomy... Autonomy rests on rationality. It is difficult to act rationally in the absence of relevant information. It is on the basis of benefits, risks and alternatives that we formulate reasons for a course of action."—Lee, *Law and Morals*,

每一种谬误都列有专门条目。

“论证者一方出于某种动机要蒙骗他的读者或听众时,常常犯非形式谬误。”——赫尔利:《简明逻辑导论》,1982年,第71页。

非形式逻辑

也称为逻辑语用学。非形式逻辑研究由主题词和论说的内容所产生的蕴涵关系。它涉及自然语言中的论断或论证的功能和本性。自然语言的丰富性在形式逻辑中是不可能穷尽地研究的。非形式逻辑不像形式逻辑那样精确,它的判决是相对于给定的语境。它的主要论题包括诸如论证的不完全模式,谈话中的言外之意,非形式谬误和说服的修辞技巧。与此相对照,形式逻辑研究语义学而不是语用关系,特别具有从命题的形式语词或结构词语所引出的推演。形式逻辑把论证作为一组命题并考察它们的真值,而非形式逻辑研究运用命题来实现日常推理中对话的各种目的。非形式逻辑考虑对话的更广阔的语境,努力理解我们如何在合理的论说中合理地确信或去说服他人。

“一般说来非形式逻辑理论必须以问答对话的概念为基础,作为两个参与者之间的互动形式,每一方代表所争论问题的论证的一个方面。”——沃尔顿:《非形式逻辑》,第x页。

知情同意

知情同意是医学伦理学的一个道德要求。在医疗过程中,病人有权以可理解的语言知道治疗的益处,它的可能危险和其他治疗方法。任何治疗都不应在病人未知情况而自愿同意的条件下进行。支持这个要求的论证是,病人在原则上是自主的和自决的。病人有权利拒绝允许自己的身体被接触。让病人参与做出影响到他们生命的重大决定过程,是合乎病人利益的。问题是知晓了病人最好不要知道的病情诊断,并不必然对他们最为有利。

“知情同意的观念依据的是自主的观念……自主则是建立在理性基础上的。而缺乏相关信息就难以合理行动。正是在有益、危险和其他方法的基础上,我们形成了采取某种行为的理由。”——李:《法律与道德》,1986年,第64页。

1986, p. 64.

Innate ideas

There are several views regarding the conception of innate ideas. One takes them to be the ideas which are not derived from experience but which originate in the mind itself. Another holds that they are ideas which are potentially inherent in the mind at birth and are brought out by experience which renders them manifest in some way. Still another regards them as ideas which we have an innate disposition to form. The concept has a long history. It can be traced to Plato's theory of recollection, and becomes a pivotal issue in the debate between rationalism and empiricism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with Descartes and Leibniz defending innate ideas and Locke and Hume attacking them. The debate led to Kant's view that our understanding has *a priori* categories which are prerequisites for the organisation of experience. The notion was revitalised in this century by Chomsky who claims in his analysis of the human linguistic capacity that human beings have an innate universal grammar within them which is the precondition of language acquisition.

"I did ... observe that there are certain thoughts within me which neither came to me from external objects nor were determined by my will, but which came solely from the power of thinking within me; so I applied the term 'innate' to the ideas or notions which are the forms of these thoughts in order to distinguish them from others, which I called 'adventitious' or 'made up'."—Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (trans. Cottingham, et al), 1985, I, p. 303.

Inner observation, see inner perception

Inner perception

Franz Brentano claimed that there are two kinds of human perception, external perception through the sense organs and inner or internal perception that is the awareness of mental activity present in us. While the object of external perception is a physical phenomenon, in particular sensible qualities, the object of internal perception is a mental phenomenon, including presentations, judgements and acts of will. According to Brentano, internal perception is the basis of psychology. Internal perception is further characterised as being immediate, infallible and self evident. "Perception" here translates the German word *Wahrnehmung*, which literally means to take something to be true. Brentano claims that internal perception is perception in this real sense of the word. Internal perception differs from internal observation or introspection. While introspection directs full attention toward a phenomenon to gain a firm grasp of it, inner perception does not observe and

天赋观念

关于天赋观念的概念有几种观点。一种观点把它们当做不是来自于经验而是发源于心灵本身的观念。另一种观点认为,它们是出生时潜在于心灵之中的观念,经验以某种方式使它们变得明白,从而将它们显示出来。还有一种观点认为它们是由我们天生具有的倾向形成的观念。这个概念有一段很长的历史,它可以被追溯到柏拉图的回忆说;在17、18世纪理性主义和经验主义的争论中,它成为一个关键问题,笛卡尔和莱布尼茨捍卫它,洛克和休谟抨击它。这个争论引出了康德的观点:我们的知性有一些先天的范畴,它们对于经验的组织是先决条件。这个概念在本世纪被乔姆斯基重新复活。他在对人类语言能力的分析中声称:人类有天生的普遍语法,它是获得语言的先决条件。

“我的确……看到在我心内的某些思想既不是从外部对象来的,也不是由我的意志所决定的,而完全是从我心中的思维能力来的;所以我将‘天赋的’一词用于作为这些思想之形式的观念或概念上,以便将它们同其他我称之为‘外来的’或‘构成的’观念和概念区分开来。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第303页。

内在观察

见“内知觉”条。

内知觉

F. 布伦塔诺声称有两种人类知觉:凭借感官的外知觉和对我们内部心智行为具有意识的内知觉。外知觉的对象是物理现象,特别是可感觉的性质;而内知觉的对象则是心智现象,包括表象、判断和意愿行为。按照布伦塔诺,内知觉是心理学的基础,被进一步刻画为直接的、不会错的和自明的。“知觉”在这里是对德文词 *Wahrnehmung* 的翻译,它的字面意思是将某物当做是真的。布伦塔诺声称内知觉就是在这个词的真正意义上的知觉。内知觉不同于内在观察或内省。内省将全部注意力指向一个现象,以便牢牢地把握住它;内知觉却不观察,并不将一个人自己的心智行为当做对象,例如,生气是一种内知觉,而一旦一个生气的人观察他自己的生气状况时,它就减弱了。

“然而,请注意,我们说的是:内知觉 [*Wahrnehmung*] 而不是内省或内部观察

does not take one's own mental activity as its object. For example, anger is a kind of internal perception, but when an angry person observes his own anger, it will diminish.

"Note, however, that we said that inner perception [*Wahrnehmung*] and not introspection, i. e. inner observation [*Beobachtung*], constitutes this primary and essential source of psychology."—Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (tr. McAlister), 1973, p. 29.

Inner process

Mental phenomena such as meaning, understanding, remembering, thinking and knowing are widely considered to be inner processes. They are within the mind, private, incorporeal, invisible, although they have a place in time and some have a temporal extent. In Cartesian dualism, which contrasts the public physical world with the private mental world, these mental phenomena are ascribed to the mental realm and at best have parallel phenomena in the physical world. Wittgenstein characterizes this traditional dualism in terms of "inner/outer", but believes that this dichotomy itself is problematic. By taking the mind as a world of mental entities, states, processes or events, it has already considered the mind as something similar to the physical world. According to Wittgenstein, mental phenomena such as inner processes are actually not a realm at all. They should be explained in terms of the grammar of expressions for mental phenomena, a basic feature of which is that "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria". Hence, 'inner process', traditionally understood, is not a suitable term to describe the mental phenomena it was employed to describe, for these "phenomena" are actually not processes.

"What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word 'to remember'."—Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 305.

Inner sense

A distinction between outer and inner sense depends upon the scholastic distinction between external senses, such as touch and vision, and internal senses, which are directed toward the states of the mind itself. Kant considered these to be two distinct types of sensibility. We use outer sense to represent to ourselves objects outside us and inner sense to make our own representations the objects of our thought. Kant further distinguished form and matter in both outer and inner sense. The form of outer sense is space, through which external objects are organised in terms of shape, magnitude and mutual relations. The form of inner sense is time, through which representations of our inner state and the immediate condition of inner appearances are determined. Kant emphasised that inner sense is not the pure apperception of the *cogito*, for the former is psychological and receptive, while the latter is transcendental and the

[*Beobachtung*]构成了心理学的首要和本质的源头。"——布伦塔诺:《从经验立场看的心理学》(麦克阿里斯特英译),1973年,第29页。

内在过程

像意味、理解、记忆、思维和知道等这些精神现象被广泛地认为是内在过程。它们发生在心灵之内,是私人性的、非物质的、不可见的,虽然它们有时间中的定位,有的占据了一个时段。笛卡尔的二元论将公共物理世界与私人精神世界相对立,这些精神现象被划归为精神领域,至多在物理世界有平行的现象。维特根斯坦用“内在/外在”来刻画这种传统的二元论,但认为这个二分法本身是成问题的。在把心灵当做精神实体、状态、过程或事件的世界时,这就已经把心灵当做与物理世界相似的某种东西。在维特根斯坦看来,像内在过程这样的精神现象实际上根本不是一个领域。它们应当用表达精神现象的语法来解释,这语法的基本特征是:“……‘内部过程’需要外部的标准。”因此,根据传统的理解,“内部过程”对于描述它被用来描述的精神现象,并不是恰当的语词,因为这些“现象”其实并不是过程。

“我们要否认的是,内在过程的图画给了我们关于使用语词‘记得’的正确观念。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第305节。

内感

内感觉与外感觉的区分是依据经院学者作出的外部感觉如触觉、视觉,和直接指向心灵自身状态的内部感觉之间的区分。康德把这两种感觉作为两种不同类型的感性能力。我们用外感来向我们自身表现外在于我们的对象,而用内感使我们的表象成为我们思想的对象。但康德进一步在外感和内感中都区分了形式和质料。外感的形式是空间,通过它外部对象依照形状、大小和相互关系得到组织。内感的形式是时间,通过它我们内部状态的表象和内部现象的直接条件都得到规定。康德强调,内感不是“我思”的纯粹统觉,因为前者是心理的,并依然是接受性的,而后者是先验的,是综合的自发性根源。

虽然外感和内感都是不可缺少的,但后者是更为基本的。因为一切表象,不论它们的对象

spontaneous source of synthesis.

Although outer sense and inner sense are indispensable, the latter is more fundamental because all representations, whether their objects are internal or external, belong to inner sense. All sensory states are mediated by it. Thus the real contrast is not between outer and inner sense, but between outer and inner sense taken together and inner sense alone.

"Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A23.

Innocence, see guilt

Inscrutability of reference

Also referential inscrutability, a collateral thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Traditionally, meaning and reference are closely associated and even inseparable. In attacking this assumption, Quine claims that in a hypothetical native language the reference of general terms is objectively and behaviourally inscrutable. For example, we have no objective reason for deciding that "gavagai" refers to rabbits instead of undetached rabbit parts. This relation between us and a remote native language can also be applied to my understanding of my neighbour's linguistic behaviour. Quine concludes that the referents of terms and the range of quantifiers are not determined by physical or behavioural facts. Absolute questions of reference are meaningless, and reference can only be relative to a co-ordinate system.

"The conclusion I draw is the inscrutability of reference. To say what objects someone is talking about is to say no more than how we propose to translate his terms into ours; we are free to vary the decision with a proxy function."—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 20.

Insolubilia, the term used by medieval logicians for paradoxes

Institutional theory

A theory of art developed by the American philosopher George Dickie, based on Danto's notion of an artworld. The theory claims that an artwork is an artefact which possesses the status of a candidate for appreciation. This status is conferred by a suitable representative of a formal social institution, that is, the artworld. Accordingly, any artefact can be a work of art so long as it is admitted by the artworld. In other words, art is the consequence of social agreement

是内部的还是外部的,都无例外地属于内感。一切知觉状态都以它为中介。因此,真正的对比不是在外感和内感之间,而是存在于以外感与内感共同为一方和以内感单独为另一方之间。

“心灵所据以直观自身或其内部状态的内感,确实决不能产生作为对象的灵魂自身的直观;但有一种规定形式[即时间]存在,惟在它之中内部状态的直观才有可能。属于内部规定的一切事物因而都联系到时间而得到表现。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A23。

无辜

见“负罪”条。

指称的不可理解性

也称“指称不可理解性”,是翻译不确定性的附属论题。在传统上,意义和指称密切相关,甚至不可分离。奎因反对这种假设,认为在一种假定的土著语言中,普遍词的指称无论是在客观上还是在行为上都是不可理解的。例如,我们没有任何客观的理由确定“gavagai”是指兔子而不是指兔子身体的某个部分。我们与这种遥远的土著语言之间的关系,同样可以用于我对邻居的语言活动的理解。奎因由此得出结论,词的指称和量词范围并不是由物理事实或行为事实决定的。绝对的指称问题是无意义的,指称只能相对于对应的体系。

“我得出的结论就是指称的不可理解性。说某人正在谈论某个对象,只是说我们如何提出建议,把他的词翻译成我们的词;我们可以用一个替代函数任意地改变决定。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第20页。

不可解问题

中世纪逻辑学家用于“悖论”的名称。

机构说

由美国哲学家 G. 迪基提出的一种建立在丹托的“艺术世界”观念上的艺术学说。该学说认为艺术作品是一件包含欣赏对象之地位的人工制品。这种地位是由代表一家正式社会机构的合适人士授予的,也就是说,是由艺术世界授予的。因此,任何一件被艺术世界认可的人工制品就会成为一件艺术作品。换言之,艺术与其说是内在审美特征的结果,不如说是社会认同的

rather than having intrinsic aesthetic features. In a later version, Dickie claims that a work of art is an artefact created for presentation to a group of persons (the artworld public) who are prepared to some extent to understand artworks. In contrast to the imitation theory, which emphasises the relation between art and its subject matter, and the expression theory, which stresses the relation of an artwork to its creator, the institutional theory focuses on the established practice of art and its appreciation. The theory has the advantage of highlighting the social context through which art is generated and provided with properties that are not directly exhibited to the senses. Critics of the theory point out that its definition of art is circular, for it explains art in terms of an artworld and explains the artworld in terms of the artefacts it recognises as art. In addition, critics claim that the theory cannot properly establish the criteria by which the artworld confers upon artefacts the status of candidate for appreciation.

"The institutional theory of art concentrates attention on the nonexhibited characteristics that works of art have in virtue of being embedded in an institutional matrix which may be called 'the artworld' and argues that these characteristics are essential and defining."—Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic*, 1974, p. 12.

Institutional violence, see structural violence

Instrumentalism

An account of the nature of scientific theory, holding that scientific theory does not establish the existence of things and so can be neither true or false. We judge a theory not in terms of its truth or falsity, but in terms of its usefulness. Scientific theory is nothing more than a useful tool or instrument for research. The position was first expressed in the preface to Copernicus' book *De Revolutionibus* with the aim of avoiding conflict with religious orthodoxy by claiming that his heliocentric theory was not to be regarded as true, but merely as a tool. Instrumentalism was developed by Berkeley and Mach and became a major formulation of anti-realism. Pragmatism in general is instrumentalist through its claim that all ideas are teleological or instrumental and its emphasis on the continuity between action and judgement. One version of instrumentalism, associated with John Dewey's pragmatism, is based on the theory of evolution. Dewey argued that ideas, concepts and propositions are all tools or instruments for organising human experience and predicting future consequences. The existence of ideas is bound up with the practical needs of life. He preferred to call this theory experimentalism. Criticism of instrumentalism is that it fails to distinguish real belief from acceptance in an

产物。在后来的论说中,迪基宣称艺术作品是为展现给一群在某种程度上有意理解艺术作品的人们(意指“艺术世界的公众”)而创造的人工制品。同侧重艺术与其题材之关系的“模仿说”和侧重艺术作品与其创作者之关系的“表现说”相比,机构说强调的重点是既定的艺术实践与鉴赏。这一学说的长处在于彰显社会语境,艺术通过这种语境得以生成并且获得不直接呈现于感官的种种特性。批评机构说的人们认为,这种学说对艺术的界定采用了循环论证的方法,即用艺术世界来解释艺术,反过来又用被其视为艺术的人工制品来解释艺术世界。此外,批评家还认为,机构说难以确立艺术世界授予人工制品以鉴赏对象之地位时所依据的标准。

“艺术的机构说十分关注的是艺术作品的非展现性特征,因为艺术作品藉此方能进入可以被称为‘艺术世界’的机构矩阵,另外,机构说认为这些特征具有本质意义和规定意义。”——迪基:《艺术与美学》,1974年,第12页。

制度性暴力

见“结构性暴力”条。

工具主义

一种有关科学理论性质的观点,主张科学理论并没有确立事物的存在,因而既不可能是真的也不可能是假的。我们评价一个理论不是根据它的真假,而是根据它的有用性。科学理论不过是一种有用的工具或研究的手段。这种立场首次表述于哥白尼《天体运行论》的序言中,为避免与宗教正统观念相冲突,哥白尼宣称他并不认为日心说是真的,而是作为一种工具。工具主义为巴克莱和马赫所发展,成为反实在论理论的一种主要形式。一般而言,实用主义是工具主义的,因为它声称所有观念都是目的论的或用作工具的,并且强调行动与评价之间的连续性。工具主义的一种形式与J. 杜威的实用主义相联系,建立在进化论的基础上。杜威认为,观念、概念和命题都是为了组织人类经验和预言未来结果的工具或手段。观念的存在是与实际生活需要密切相关的。他本人喜欢称这理论为“实验主义”。对于工具主义的批评是,它没能区分真实的信念与用工具主义精神接受这种信念,没能区分对拥有知识的认识论表述与对应用知识的表述。

“工具主义意味着一种关于思维和认知的行为主义理论。它意味着,从字义上讲,认知就

instrumentalist spirit and fails to distinguish an epistemological account of the possession of knowledge from an account of the application of knowledge.

"Instrumentalism means a behaviouristic theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; and meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification."—Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 1916, p. 331.

Integrity

In an ordinary sense, honesty or being upright. In contemporary ethics it is emphasised by Bernard Williams as a fundamental value underlying ethical behaviour. It means wholeness or harmony of oneself, that is a virtue which integrates various parts of life under the guidance of the central value or principle which one has chosen and to which one's life is committed. It is consistency and continuity across the various dimensions of one's life and hence amounts to moral identity. Integrity involves the relation between the agent's sense of self and action. Persons of integrity are loyal to their chosen moral principles, which are in turn central to their self-understanding. Their actions and decisions flow from these internal attitudes, principles and convictions. They are unwilling to yield them even in the face of great pressure. Opposed to integrity is the state of self-dividedness or disintegration. Plato in his *Republic* argued that justice is the harmony of soul, and this harmonious state is precisely the state of integrity. One of Williams' major criticisms of utilitarianism is that it cannot account for human integrity, for in some situations an action may have the best consequences but may violate a moral principle that the agent endorses. If we should act in accordance with the requirements of utilitarian calculation, we might have to abandon the principles to which we are committed, and thus alienate our actions from our beliefs.

"... we are partially at least not utilitarians, and cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value ... [T]o come to refer to those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as happenings outside one's moral self, is to lose sense of one's moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one's integrity."—Williams, in *Utilitarianism For and Against*, 1973, p. 103.

Intellectual love

In Spinoza's philosophy, the only love with a privileged status. In contrast to ordinary, non-intellectual love for visible and tangible things, intellectual love arises from the intuitive knowledge that God is the cause of all things, a knowledge which involves peace of mind. Intellectual love is

是我们做的某事;分析最终是身体的和活动的:意义就其逻辑特性而言,就是对于事实的观点、态度和行为方法,而主动的实验对于证实是必不可少的。"—杜威:《实验逻辑论文》,1916年,第331页。

正直

在一般意义上,这一术语是指忠诚或正直的状态。在当代伦理学中,B. 威廉姆斯强调它是决定伦理行为的一种根本价值。它意味着自我的完整或自我和谐,即人们在所择定的以及维系他们生命的中心价值或原则的指导下,把生活的不同部分整合起来的一种德性。它是贯穿在人们一生不同方面中的一致性和持续性,因此,等于是道德认同。正直涉及到行为者的自我感与行为的关系。一个正直的人是忠于他所选择的道德原则的,而道德原则反过来则成为他的自我理解的中心。他的行为和决定来自于这些内心的态度、原则和信念。即使是面对巨大的压力,他也不会放弃它们。与正直相对的是自我分裂的状态。柏拉图在他的《国家篇》中主张,正义是灵魂的和谐,这种和谐的状态恰恰就是正直的状态。威廉姆斯对于功利主义的主要批评之一就是,功利主义不能说明人的正直,因为在某些情况下,一种行为有最好的后果但也许它违反了当事人所信誓的道德原则。如果一个人根据功利主义的计算来行动,他可能就不放弃他所承诺的原则,而这就使他的行为与他的信念相疏离。

"……我们至少部分地不是功利主义的,并且不把我们的道德情感仅仅看作是功利价值的目标……以一种纯粹的功利主义的观点来看待这些情感,也就是说,把它看作是一个人的道德自我的外在的东西,就失去了一个人的道德认同,就最实在的意义而言,就是失去了一个人的正直。"—威廉姆斯,见《功利主义:赞成与反对》,1973年,第103页。

理智的爱

在斯宾诺莎的哲学中,这是惟一充满殊荣的爱。对可见、可触的东西的爱是普通的、非理智的爱,与此相对照,理智的爱是从有关上帝是万物之因的直观知识中产生的;这种知识带来心灵的平静。理智的爱直接指向一个永恒无限

directed towards an eternal and infinite thing, and is itself unmingled with any sadness. The human mind should seek for it with all its strength. In a sense, intellectual love is simply an expression of the love of wisdom, that is philosophy. Spinoza also ascribes it to God himself. God has a kind of self-love which is identical with God's love for man and man's love for God. It is a state of joyful self-knowledge.

"The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal."—Spinoza, *Ethics*, V, Proposition 33.

Intellectual synthesis, see synthesis (Kant)

Intellectual virtue

According to Aristotle, virtue is related to soul rather than body, and the human soul includes a part which has reason in itself and another part which is non-rational but obeys the rational part. He divided virtue into two kinds: the excellence of the exercise of the rational part is intellectual virtue, and the excellence of the exercise of the non-rational part is ethical virtue, also called excellence of character or moral virtue. Ethical virtue has another dimension, because it is cultivated out of social custom and habit. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, book vi, Aristotle discussed various forms of intellectual virtue, including technical wisdom (craft, *techné*), theoretical wisdom (science, *epistémē*), wisdom (*sophia*), understanding (*nóus*), and practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Aristotle claimed that contemplation, as the activity that expresses theoretical wisdom, is the route to greatest happiness, but he also suggested that a happy life should promote all virtues. How to reconcile these two inconsistent notions of happiness (*eudaimonia*) has been a matter of continuing controversy. Practical wisdom as a type of intellectual virtue is concerned with good and bad and is intrinsic also to ethical virtue.

"Intellectual virtue arises and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs experience and time."—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a15.

Intellectus

[Latin: intellect, mind, from the verb *interlegere*, *inter*, between + *legere*, collect, choose] Any power or act of the mind, including the capacity for understanding and the activity of current conscious thought. The exercise of intellect, which differentiates humans from animals, is expressed especially in the use of language. Intellect also specifically includes acts of intuition. As a power of apprehension, judging and reasoning, it is a part of the mind which contrasts with the will, our capacity for appetite, desire, choice and action. Echoing Aristotle's distinction

的东西,它本身不掺有任何悲哀。人类心灵应当全力追求这个爱。在某种意义上,理智的爱完全表达了对智慧的爱,那就是哲学。斯宾诺莎还将理智的爱归于上帝本身。上帝有一种自爱,这种爱与上帝对人的爱和人上帝的爱是等闲的。它是快乐的自我认识状态。

"从第三种知识中产生的对上帝的理智的爱是永恒的。"—斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第五部分,命题 33。

理智的综合

见“综合(康德)”条。

理智德性

根据亚里士多德,德性是与人的灵魂而不是与人的身体相关,人的灵魂包括一个自身有理性的部分和一个没有理性可是能服从理性的部分。他进一步把德性分成两类:优秀地运用有理性部分是理智德性,而优秀地运用无理性部分则是伦理德性,也叫优秀品格或道德德性。伦理德性当然还有另一方面,因为它是从社会风俗与习惯中培养出来的。在《尼各马可伦理学》第六卷中,亚里士多德讨论了各种形式的理智德性,包括技术智慧(技艺, *techné*)、理论智慧(科学, *epistémē*)、智慧(*sophia*)、理解(*nóus*)和实践智慧(*phronesis*)。亚里士多德一方面认为表示理论智慧的活动,即沉思,是通往最高幸福之路;但另一方面,他又认为,幸福生活必须促进所有德性。如何调和这两种不一致的幸福(*eudaimonia*)观念一直广为争论。实践智慧作为一类理智德性,关心的是善和恶,也是内在于伦理德性的。

"理智德性主要是从教育中产生和生成的,所以需要经验和时间。"—亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1103a15。

智能

[拉丁语,意为智能、心智,源自动词 *interlegere*,即 *inter*(在……之间)和 *legere*(汇集,选择)]它指心灵的某种力量或活动,包括理解能力和现时的自觉思想活动。智能的运用把人和动物区分出来,尤其表现在语言的使用上。它也特指直觉活动。作为一种理解能力,即判断和推理,它是心灵的一部分,与意志、欲望能力、愿望、选择和行为相对应。作为对亚里士多德区分主动理性和被动理性的响应,阿奎那也区分了 *intellectus possibilis*(可能的或接受的心智)

between active reason and passive reason. Aquinas distinguished between *intellectus possibilis* (possible or receptive mind) and *intellectus agens* (active mind). Active mind directly knows material things which exist outside the mind. These things are only potentially known, but active mind is the power to make them actually intelligible and provides an object of thinking for itself. Receptive mind is, on the other hand, a capacity for attending to what we have acquired through active mind.

"The human intellect (*intellectus*) does not immediately, in first, apprehending a thing, have complete knowledge; rather, it first apprehends only one aspect of the thing—namely, its whatness, which is the primary and proper object of the intellect—and only then can it understand the properties, accidents and relationships incidental to the things' essence."—Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 85, 5.

Intelligible object, see intelligible world

Intelligible world

[Latin: *mundus intelligibilis*, in contrast to *mundus sensibilis*, sensible world] For Kant, the sum total of *noumena* or things-in-themselves, which are, as members of this world, also called intelligible objects. The intelligible world is conceived to be an essentially rational world which we can think through pure reason. Although this world is thinkable, we do not know it and cannot even prove whether such a world exists. But as a moral world, a kingdom of ends, it is an area where the moral law is applicable, and its main object is freedom. As space and time are the forms of the sensible world, freedom is held to be the form of the intelligible world. There is much controversy over the meaning and justification of all of these Kantian claims.

"The *mundus intelligibilis* [intelligible world] is nothing but the general concept of a world in general, in which abstraction is made from all conditions of its intuition, and inference to which, therefore, no synthetic proposition, either affirmative or negative, can possibly be asserted." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A433/B462.

Intension

What a term means, or the sum of properties comprehended in a term. It is a synonym of connotation and Frege's sense, in contrast to extension which is a synonym of denotation or reference. In 1662 the *Port Royal Logic* introduced the distinction between extension and comprehension; and later Sir William Hamilton replaced comprehension by intension. J. S. Mill replaced this distinction with one between denotation and connotation. Intension is the characteristic which determines the applicability of a term, while extension is the set of objects to

and *intellectus agens* (施动的心智)。施动的心智直接知晓在心智之外存在的物质事物。这些事物仅仅潜能地被知晓,但施动的心智是使它们成为现实可理喻的力量,并为自己提供思维的对象。另一方面,接受的心智是照管我们通过施动的心智已经获得的东西的能力。

“为了领悟一个事物,人类的智能并不是立即地一开始就具有完全的知识;勿宁说,它最初领悟的只是该事物的一个方面——即它的什么,这是智能首先的和特有的对象——然后,它才能理解该物的本质所附随的特性、偶性和关系。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》, Ia, 85, 5。

理智对象

见“理智世界”条。

理智世界

[拉丁文 *mundus intelligibilis*, 相对于“感性世界”(*mundus sensibilis*)] 在康德哲学中,它是指本体或物自体之全部总和;物自体作为这个世界的成员,也称为“理智对象”。理智世界是一个被设想为本质上是理性的、我们可以通过纯粹理性而认识的世界。然而,尽管这个世界是可思维的,但我们对它并没有肯定的知识,我们甚至不能证明这样一个世界是否存在。但它是一个道德世界,一个目的王国,道德法则可应用的领域。它的主要对象是自由。正如空间和时间是感性世界的形式,自由则是理智世界的形式。对康德所有这些观点的意义和证明,都引起不少争议。

“理智世界无非就是世界一般的普遍概念,其中已经抽象掉其直观及论证的一切条件;因此,没有任何综合命题,不论是肯定的还是否定的,能够被断定。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》, A433/B462。

内涵

语词所意味的东西,或语词所包含的性质的总和。它是 connotation 和弗雷格的 sense 的同义词,与外延相对,后者是指示或指称的同义词。在 1662 年,《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑》提出外延与内包的区别;后来, W. 汉密尔顿爵士用内涵代替了内包。J. S. 密尔用 denotation 与 connotation 的区别代替了这种区别。内涵是这样的特性,它决定了语词的可应用性,而外延是语词可应用的若干对象。具有不同内涵的不同语词,例如“独角兽”和“半人半马怪”可能有

which a term is applicable. Different terms with different intensions, such as "unicorn" and "centaur", can have the same extension, in this case because there are no unicorns and there are no centaurs. Take care to distinguish "intension" from "intention".

The distinction between intension and extension has been applied to predicates, singular terms, sentences and contexts. Following Frege, the extension of a sentence is its truth value, while its intension is the thought or proposition that it expresses. An extensional context allows an expression to be replaced by any expression with the same extension without changing the truth value of the sentence in which it occurs. Replacing an expression in an intensional context by an expression with the same extension risks changing the truth value of the sentence in which it occurs. Many philosophers try to understand the use of intensional contexts, while others try to eliminate their use.

"In logic, the totality of the characteristics of a concept is called its 'intension'." —Schlick, *General Theory of Knowledge*, p. 20.

Intensional logic

Formal logic is generally concerned with inference on the basis of the extensions of the concepts, predicate expressions and propositions employed and is hence sometimes called extensional logic. It proposes that if two expressions have the same extension and denotation, then they are interchangeable without changing the truth-value of the propositions in which the expressions occur. But this is not true of propositions containing propositional attitudes (expressed in forms such as "a believes that p", "a supposes that p" and "a asserts that p") and propositions containing modal terms such as necessarily or possibly. In such contexts these expressions are referentially opaque. Intensional logic has been developed to deal with inference strictly upon the meaning or intension of the concepts, predicate expressions and propositions. It is based on Frege's distinction of sense and reference, and its major practitioners include Frege, Russell, Church and Anderson.

"In the formal semantics of intensional logic, suppose we take a definite description to designate, in each world, the object which satisfies the description." —Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 1980, p. 346.

Intensionalism

In philosophy of language, the claim that in natural languages there are relationships at an independent level of semantic structure that determine the denotations and truth-conditions of expressions and that they cannot be reduced to the relationships at any other level of semantic structure. This position, which is proposed by Frege and Church, suggests that sense determines reference, but it is challenged

相同的外延,在这种情况下是因为根本没有独角兽和半人半马怪。要注意区分“内涵”和“意向”。

人们把内涵和外延的区别应用于谓词、特称词、语句和语境。按照弗雷格的看法,语句的外延为其真值,而其内涵是它所表达的和命题。外延语境允许一表达式被具有相同外延的表达式替换,而不改变包含它的语句的真值。在内涵语境中,一个表达式被具有相同外延的表达式替换要冒改变包含它的语句真值的风险。许多哲学家试图理解内涵语境的用法,而另一些人试图消除其用法。

“在逻辑中,概念的总体特性被称为其‘内涵’。”——石里克;《普通认识论》,第20页。

内涵逻辑

形式逻辑通常根据所使用的概念、谓词表达式和命题的外延来研究推理,因此它有时被叫做“外延逻辑”。它提出:如果两个表达式有同样的外延和所指,那么它们可以相互替换而不影响它们在其中出现的那个命题的真值。但这一点对含有命题态度(由“相信”、“假设”,“断定”之类的动词所表达)和含有像“必然”或“可能”这样的模态词的命题并不成立。在这样的语境中,这些表达式在指称上是晦暗的。于是人们发展了内涵逻辑以处理严格依赖于概念、谓词表达式和命题的意义或内涵的推理。内涵逻辑以弗雷格关于涵义和指称的区分为基础,其主要倡导者包括弗雷格、罗素、丘奇、安德森等人。

“在内涵逻辑的形式语义学中,假定了我们把限定摹状词看作是在每一个世界中都指谓那个满足该摹状词的对象。”——克里普克;《命名与必然性》,1980年,第346页。

内涵论

语言哲学中的一种主张,认为在自然语言中具有语义结构的独立层次的种种关系,它们决定表达式的指谓和真值条件,它们不能还原为语义结构的任何其他层次的关系。这种立场是由弗雷格和丘奇提出的,表明意义决定指称,但它受到奎因对分析与综合区分的抨击的挑战。内涵论对立外延论,后者反对内涵逻辑,

by Quine's attack on the analytic / synthetic distinction. Intensionalism is opposed by extensionalism, which rejects intensional logic and proposes that we should translate all statements containing intensional notions into statements containing only extensional terms. Recently, a weaker version of intensionalism has been developed. It distinguishes between type-reference (referring expressions as the words and phrases of a language) and token-reference (referring expressions as utterances or inscriptions of the words and phrases that are produced in the use of language). The weaker version then claims that sense determines type-reference, but not token-reference.

"Intensionalism claims that there is a sense as well as reference, that sense can be complex, and that as a consequence of sense inclusion, there is a special form of necessity, truth, analyticity, and a special form of valid inference, analytic entailment." —Katz, *Cogitations*, 1986, p. 32.

Intensive magnitude, see extensive magnitude

Intention

A state of mind directed towards action. An action characterised as intentional is done with a certain intention. Anscombe's *Intention* (1957) led to important debates by asking what the relation is between intention as a state of mind and as a characterisation of action. Intention is not desire, for what one intends is what one can achieve, while one may desire anything. Nor is intention belief because, unlike belief, intention cannot be judged to be true or false. A traditional approach reduces intention to desire and belief. One intends to do something because one desires this thing and believes that one can achieve it. This reductionist approach has been much criticised recently. Alternatively, some characterise intention as a distinct psychological attitude over and above desire and belief, but what this attitude is has not been explicated. Davidson developed an evaluative notion of intention according to which to intend to do something is to evaluate this conduct as the best. M. Bratman offers a plan notion of intention according to which intention is the crucial ingredient in the notion of plan. A distinction between direct intention (what one intends to do directly) and oblique intention (the foreseen consequence of the directly intended action) can be traced back to Bentham. If an intention is directed at a present action, it is called action-related, and if it is directed at a future action, it is called future directed. Another dispute concerns how these two kinds of intention are related. The problem of intention is intertwined with many important issues such as practical reasoning, deliberation, volition, weakness of the will and action and is a major theme in the philosophy of mind.

并提出, 我们应该把一切含有内涵概念的陈述翻译为仅含有外延语词的陈述。近来有人提出了内涵论的弱的形式。它区分了类相指称(把表达式作为语言的词语和词组)和殊相指称(把表达式作为在语言的使用中所产生的词和词组的话语和标题)。因此, 这一较弱形式主张: 意义决定的是类相指称, 而不是殊相指称。

“内涵论主张: 存在着意义和指称, 意义可以是复杂的, 并且作为意义内含物的必然结果, 存在着必然性、真值, 分析性的特定形式, 正确推理和分析推衍的特定形式。”——卡兹: 《认识》, 1986年, 第32页。

内涵量

见“外延量”条。

意向

一种指向活动的心的状态。一个具有“意向性的”活动是由某种意向来完成的。安斯康的《意向》一书问道: 作为一个心的状态的意向和作为一个对活动的描述的意向之间究竟有什么样的关系? 这引发了十分重要的争论。意向不是欲求, 因为一个人所意向的是其所能达到的, 而所欲求的却可以是任何东西。意向也不是信念, 因为与信念不同, 意向不能被判定为真或伪。一个传统的方法是将意向还原为欲求和信念。一个人意向做某事是因为这个人欲求此事并相信自己可以做到此事。这一还原论的方法近来受到很多批评。另外的一种选择是, 有人将意向描述为超越欲求与信念之上的独特的心理态度, 但并没有阐明这个态度究竟是什么。戴维森提出了意向的评价概念, 认为意向做某事就是将这一行为评价为最佳。M. 布莱特曼提出了意向的“计划”概念, 认为意向是计划概念的关键组成部分。直接意向(一个人所直接意向的东西)与间接意向(直接意向活动的预期后果)的区分可追溯于边沁。如果一个意向指向一个当前的活动, 它就被称为是与活动有关的, 而如果它是指向一个将来的活动, 它就被称为是“指向将来的”。这两种意向之间的关系是争议的又一主题。意向问题与像实践理性、沉思、意志、意志的薄弱、活动等等许多重要论题相互交织, 因此是心的哲学中的一个重要课题。

“我们可能倾向于说, 当我们在绝对的意义上来说一个人的意向——亦即他想要做的事——和他做或计划某事的意向——他此中的目

"And we may be inclined to say that 'intention' has a different sense when we speak of a man's intentions simpliciter—i. e. what he intends to do— and of his intention in doing or proposing something—what he aims at in it. But in fact it is implausible to say that the word is equivocal as it occurs in these different cases." —Anscombe, *Intention*, 1957, p. 1.

Intentional fallacy

A term introduced by W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley in 1946, referring to the view that in interpreting and evaluating a work of art, particularly a literary work, we should mainly appeal to the author's intention in creating the work, that is the plan or design in the author's mind. Wimsatt and Beardsley regarded this view as a fallacy because the author's intention and the work of art are two distinct entities. The author's private intention can be reliably grasped only through the statement of the author, but this kind of statement is another text open for interpretation. The work of art is public and has properties open to interpretation and assessment whatever the author's intention. The critics of art should be concerned with the artwork itself, rather than the author's mind, which is irrelevant to the critical assessment of the work. Hence, the intentional fallacy can be classified as a fallacy of irrelevance. Opponents of the notion of the intentional fallacy argue that the sharp distinction between private minds and public artworks depend on an outmoded conception of mind. Some argue that every artwork is open to multiple interpretations. Either we must use the author's intention to help choose among interpretations or we must accept that there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of a work of art.

"Intentional fallacy... occurs when the artist's intentions are given decisive say over the nature of the artwork." —Sorenson, *Thought Experiment*, 1992, p. 133.

Intentional inexistence, see intentionality; mental phenomenon

Intentional stance

A term introduced by Daniel Dennett. In explaining an entity, we appeal either to its actual state determined by its law of nature, or to its designed programme. To opt for the first is to adopt the physical stance and to choose the second is to adopt the design stance. But if the entity is too complex to be analysed properly by these stances, such as a person or a chess-playing computer, we need to adopt an intentional stance, which presupposes that the entity is a rational and conscious agent (whether or not it actually is so), and then predict what it will do given the beliefs and information we ascribed to it. Dennett claims that in terms of this stance we may be able to reconcile the views of a system as a

的时, '意向' 具有不同的涵义。但是说这个词在出现于这些不同情境时是意义含混的, 也是没有道理的。" —— 安斯康: 《意向》, 1957 年, 第 1 页。

意向谬误

这是由 W. K. 韦姆萨特和 M. C. 比尔斯利于 1946 年提出的一个术语。该术语涉及下述观点: 在解释和评价一件艺术作品(尤其是文学作品)时, 应当把重点放在作者从事创作的意向之上, 也就是作者头脑中的创作计划或设计上。韦姆萨特与比尔斯利认为这种观点属于谬误, 因为作者的意向与艺术作品是两种不同的东西。作者的私人意向只有通过作者的陈述才能可靠地把握住, 但是这种陈述则是会导致各种解释的另一个文本。艺术作品是公共的, 具有抛开作者意向予以解释和评价的特性。艺术评论家应当关注艺术作品本身, 而不是作者的心理, 因为这种心理与对作品的评价毫无关系。因此, 意向谬误可被当做一种没有相关性的谬误。意向谬误观念的反对者论辩说, 个人心理与公共艺术作品之间的鲜明差别取决于一种有关心智的陈旧观念。有人认为每一件艺术作品都会有多种的解释, 无论是用作者的意向来帮助我们选择解释, 还是肯定本来就不存在对艺术作品的正确解释。

"意向谬误, ……发生的原因在于人们把艺术家的意向当做有关艺术作品本质的定论。" — 索伦森: 《思想实验》, 1992 年, 第 133 页。

意向性的内存在

见“意向性”和“心的现象”条。

意向姿态

由 D. 丹奈特所引进的术语。在解释一个存在物时, 我们或者诉诸其由自然定律所决定的实际状态, 或者诉诸其被设计的程序。选择前者就是采取“物理姿态”, 而后者则是“设计姿态”。但是如果像一个人或一个下棋的计算机这样的存在物过于复杂而不能用这些姿态来加以适当的分析, 我们就需要采取一个“意向姿态”, 假设那个存在物是一个理性的或有意识的东西(不管它是否真的是), 然后根据所归结于它的信念和信息预测它将做什么。丹奈特声称, 借助于这一姿态, 我们或许可以调和将一个系统视为一个负责的、自由的主体, 和将之视为物理部

responsible and free agent, and as a complex of physical parts. An entity that is a proper object of the intentional stance might be called an intentional system.

"There is a third stance one can adopt toward a system, and that is the intentional stance... In the case of a chess playing computer one adopts this stance when one tries to predict its response to one's move by figuring out what a good or reasonable response would be, given the information the computer has about the situation." —Dennett, *Brainstorms*, 1978, p. 238.

Intentional system, see intentional stance

Intentionality

A characteristic feature of mental and linguistic states according to which they have an object or content and are thus about something. The problem of intentionality is explicitly formulated in Plato's *Theaetetus* with the question how we can think about things which are not. The term was introduced in modern philosophy by Brentano, as the fundamental characteristic of a mental act or consciousness, that is its directedness towards objects and its reference to a content. Brentano characterised this feature in terms of intentional inexistence (existence-in-mind or immanent objectivity) because the objects of consciousness need not exist and some, like the round square, cannot exist. Intentionality is conceived as a relation between a mental act and an object or content, which is posited as the terminus of a mental act. However, although intentionality is directed towards some object or content, that object need not exist and that content need not be true. Accounting for this feature of intentionality has become a deeply perplexing philosophical issue. Brentano's student Meinong posited an elaborate array of unusual entities as objects of intentionality as a result of his distinction between the character of an object and its being. Russell's theory of descriptions attempted to eliminate this ontological proliferation.

Husserl took the notion of intentionality from Brentano and turned it into an essential notion of phenomenology. For him, the intentionality of mental acts does not entail that they must have objects. The directedness of an experience is an intrinsic feature, which does not require us to posit an entity to be an object towards which it is directed. For Husserl, *noemata* give a mental act its directedness and meaning. Husserl's study of intentionality has had great influence upon philosophy of language and of mind.

Contemporary logic distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional verbs. As a matter of logic, intentional verbs, like "to desire" or "to believe", do not require the existence of their objects or the truth of their content whereas non-intentional verbs, including mental verbs like

分的综合体的观点。如果一个存在物是意向姿态的适当客体,它就可以被称为一个“意向系统”。

“一个人可以对一个系统采取第三种姿态,那就是意向姿态……对于一个下棋的计算机,当一个人试图通过根据计算机所具有的关于情境的信息来断定一个好的或合理的反应是什么来预测它对其棋步的反应时,他所采取的就是这一姿态。”——丹奈特:《奇思妙想》,1978年,第238页。

意向系统

见“意向姿态”条。

意向性

这是心的状态和语言状态的一个根本特点,即这些状态具有一个对象或内容,并因此而是关于某个东西的。在柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》中,通过探询我们如何能思考非存在的事物,意向性问题被清楚地提了出来。这个词在当代哲学中由布伦塔诺引入,被用来表示一个心的行为或意识的基本特征,即它指向对象并涉及一个内容。布伦塔诺用意向性的内存在(在心灵中存在或内在对象性)来表示这种特征,因为意识的对象不必要存在,而且其中的某些对象,比如“圆的方”,不可能存在。意向性被认为是心的行为与对象或内容之间的一种关系,这种对象或内容被当做心的行为的终端。然而,尽管意向性朝向某种对象或内容,这对象并不需要存在,这内容不必要是真的。去说明意向性的特点已成为一个极为错综复杂的哲学问题。布伦塔诺的学生迈农提出一批精心构想的不寻常的存在物作为意向性的对象:这是他区别对象特征与其存在(being)的结果。罗素的摹状词理论则试图消除掉这种存在论的扩展。

胡塞尔从布伦塔诺那里得到意向性观念,将它变为现象学的一个基本观念。对于他说来,心的行为的意向性并不一定必须有〔实体意义上的〕对象。一个体验的指向是一种内在特点,它并不要求我们设置一个存在物来作为被指向的对象。在胡塞尔看来,意向对象(*noemata*)给予一个心的行为以其指向性和意义。胡塞尔对于意向性的研究已经对于语言和心灵哲学产生了重大影响。

现代逻辑区别了意向性的和非意向性的动词。从逻辑角度看来,意向性的动词,比如“想要”或“相信”,并不要求其对象的存在或其内容的真实;另一方面,非意向性的动词,包括像“知觉”或“知道”这样的涉及心的行为的动词,就要求其对象的存在或其内容的真实。某些哲学家追随奎因,试图将意向性从我们对世界的说明中还原掉或取消掉。

“to perceive” or “to know”, do require the existence of their objects or the truth of their content. Some philosophers follow Quine in seeking to reduce or eliminate intentionality from our account of the world.

“We understand under intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences ‘to be the consciousness of something’.” Husserl, *Ideas* (tr. Kersten), 1982, p. 223.

Interactionism

A dualist position claiming that although mind and body are two separate substances, they causally affect one another. The mind and the body are two independent things, but throughout life they interact with each other. Interactionism contrasts with another dualist position, parallelism, which denies any causal relationship between mind and body. Descartes appealed to the pineal gland as the locus of mind-body interaction. The difficulties with his account led many of his followers to parallelism. Interactionism is compatible with common sense. However, if mind affects body, it must be through the brain, yet many scientists argue that physiology has not found any non-physical causation in the activity of the brain. Others claim that we cannot understand the workings of the brain without introducing mental states within our theoretical framework.

“Interactionism, in the mild sense, is the proposition that some material events occasion mental events and vice versa.” —John Wisdom, *Problems of Mind and Matter*, 1934, p. 103.

Internal point of view

For Hart, law is a union of primary rules and secondary rules. As in other rule-governed games, there can be two attitudes toward rules. First, one can take the rules merely as objects of observation and judgement, without accepting them. This is called the external point of view. In contrast, the second attitude is to treat oneself as a participant in the legal system and to appeal to these rules for guidance in one's own life, taking them as standards for making criticisms, demands and acknowledgements. From the external point of view, one will make statements such as “In Country X they recognise as law ... whatever the legislature enacts...”. This is an external statement. From the internal point of view, one will make statements such as “It is the law that...”. This is an internal statement.

“For it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points of view’.” —Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 1961, p. 86.

“我们用‘意向性’来说明体验的独特性,即‘成为对于某物的意识’。”——胡塞尔:《观念》(克尔斯滕英译),1982年,第223页。

交互作用论

一种二元论观点,认为尽管心与身是两个分离的实体,但它们之间却具有因果作用。心与身是两个独立的东西,但它们终生都在相互作用。交互作用论与另一种二元论立场“平行论”相反,后者否认心与身之间的任何因果关系。笛卡尔以松果腺作为身心相互作用的处所。这一理论所面临的困难使得他的许多追随者转向平行论。交互作用论符合常识。然而,如果心影响身,那就一定要通过脑。但是许多科学家认为,生理学还没有在脑的活动中发现任何这样的非物理的因果关系。另外的人则认为,如果不在我们的理论构架中引入心的状态,我们便不能理解脑的工作。

“在温和的意义上,交互作用论认为,某些物质事件引起心的事件,反之亦然。”——威斯顿:《心与物的问题》,1934年,第103页。

内在观点

在哈特看来,法律是主要规则和次要规则的结合。如同在其他由规则支配的游戏中一样,对于规则可以有两种态度。第一种是把规则仅仅视为观察和判断的对象,但不接受它们。这被称为外在观点。与此相对,第二种态度是将自身作为法律体系的参与者,并要求把这些规则作为自己生活的指南,把它们视为进行批评、提出要求 and 表示承认的准则。根据外在观点,人们会做出类似这样的陈述:“在某国,只要是立法机关制定的,……人们就会承认它们是法律,……”这是一种外在陈述。根据内在观点,人们则会做出类似“这就是法,……”这样的陈述。这是一种内在陈述。

“在涉及法律规则时,人们或者可能仅仅作为一个本人并不接受它们的观察者,或者可能作为接受它们并把它作为行动的指南的群体的一个成员。我们可以把它们分别称为‘外在观点’和‘内在观点’。”——哈特:《法的概念》,1961年,第86页。

Internal property, see right (Kant)

Internal questions

According to Carnap, philosophical problems concerning the existence of entities can be treated as either internal or external. Internal questions arise within a given conceptual framework and are settled by applying the criteria which the framework system supplies. Within the language of that framework, internal questions have the form "Are there E's?", "E" being the term for the relevant kind of entity. Such questions can receive an analytical answer, whilst questions of the form "Are there E's conforming to such and such conditions?" can be settled either factually or analytically. External questions cannot be settled within a framework, but rather concern the status and legitimacy of the framework itself.

The problems of existence raising internal questions should not be subject to dispute, for it is obvious that there are such things as physical objects, numbers or fictional characters. The reason that they are so debated is that they have been treated as external questions. Carnap suggests that such ontological questions should be interpreted as questions about a decision whether or not to accept a language containing expressions for these particular kinds of entity. The distinction between internal and external questions is challenged as arbitrary, but is defended by Ayer.

"Questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework, we call them internal questions; ... questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, [are] called external questions."—Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, p. 206.

Internal relation

An internal relation affects the nature of the related terms, for the relation is itself a constitutive part of the essence of the objects related. A thing which fails to possess this relation could not be what it is, just as it cannot fail to possess any of its essential properties. An internal relation is contrasted to an external relation, which belongs to individuals accidentally. An individual may have or lack an external relation depending upon contingent circumstances, but neither state will affect its nature because the external relation is not a constituent of its related terms. Bradley is usually taken to hold a doctrine of internal relations according to which every object is internally related to all other objects and none is independent. As a result, reality is a connected totality, and everything can be deduced from the others. Since the relation of knowing and being known is also internal, the nature of reality can be inferred from the nature of knowledge. This becomes the main target of Moore and

内在所有权

见“权利(康德)”条。

内部问题

根据卡尔纳普的观点,关于实体存在的哲学问题可以当做内部问题或外部问题来研究。内部问题出现于一已知概念框架之内,并靠应用框架系统提供的标准来解决。在那个框架的语言之内,内部问题具有“有E吗?”这种形式,这里的E是代表相关类实体的语词。这些问题可以得到分析性的回答,而形如“是否有符合如此这般条件的E?”的问题可以靠诉诸事实或分析的方式解决。外部问题不能在框架内部解决,而是关系到框架本身的地位与合法性。

引起内部问题的存在问题不应受到诘驳,因为显而易见的是,有物理对象、数或虚构人物这样的东西。它们被如此争论的原因是被当成了外部问题。卡尔纳普提议,这种本体论问题应解释为关于决定是否接受一种语言的问题,它包括对于这些特殊类实体的表达。内部和外部问题的区别被批评为是任意的,但艾耶尔捍卫这种区别。

“在框架内某种新的实体的存在问题,我们称之为内部问题;……有关作为整体的实体系统的存在或实在性问题称为外部问题。”——卡尔纳普:《意义与必然性》,第206页。

内在关系

内在关系影响相关词项的性质,因为关系本身就是有关对象本质的构成部分。一事物若未能具有这种关系,就不能是其所是,正如它不能不具有其根本性质一样。内在关系与外在关系恰成对比,后者偶然地属于个体。一个体可以有,也可以没有外在关系,这要视偶然情况而定,但没有任何一种情况会影响其本性,因为外部关系不是其相关词项的组成部分。布拉德雷通常被认为提倡内在关系论。据此理论,每一对象与所有其他对象都是内在地相关的,无一是一是独立的。结果,实在就是一个相互联系的整体,每一物都可以从其他物中推导出来。因为知与被知的关系也是内在的,因此实在的本性也可以从知识的本性中推导出来。这个看法成了摩尔和罗素在批判绝对唯心主义和新实在论对罗伊斯的批判中的主要目标。罗素把内在关系学说等同于一元论,与之相反,他把自己那种只允

Russell in their criticism of Absolute Idealism and in Neo-realism's criticism of Royce. Russell identifies the doctrine of internal relations with monism. In contrast, he identifies his own logical atomism, which allows only external relations, with pluralism. For Wittgenstein, internal relations are logical relations.

"An internal relation is a relation which forms part of the description of a particular, such that the particular would, as it were, lose its identity if it ceased to stand in this relation to some other particular." Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 208.

Internalism

A theory of epistemic justification which claims that the justification of one's belief is determined by one's actual or potential awareness of the correct cognitive process which generates and sustains the given belief. Accordingly, justification is a function of one's internal states: one's perceptual states, memory states and so on. This has been a major trend since Descartes, who identifies justification with having a reason for thinking that the belief is true. According to this theory the justification of a belief is determined entirely by subjective characteristics, ignoring external factors, and is therefore opposed to externalism. In the philosophy of language, internalism refers to the position which denies that to understand a sentence is to understand its truth condition, holding instead that the meaning of a sentence is its use.

"[A] justification must always take the form of a convincing series of reasons available to the knower. In contemporary epistemology, this is called 'internalism'. The externalist, by contrast, insists that a belief can be justified even though the knower is ignorant of that justification." Maddy, *Realism In Mathematics*, 1990, p. 73.

Internalism (ethics)

Ethical internalism is a theory concerned with moral motivation. Internalism claims that motivation is internal for the justification of a moral action. Something can be a reason for action only if it is desired by the agent in question. Only if the agent believes that he ought to do something, can this obligation be a reason for his action. Internalism hence objects to what is considered to be any psychologically unrealisable moral theory. It has two different versions. One was proposed by Plato, Kant and their followers, and claims that rational consideration generates motivation, that is knowing that something is right entails a motive for doing it. This version is also called cognitive or rational internalism. The other version, proposed by Hume, claims that the agent's desires produces motivation, while his rational beliefs motivate only in a contingent way. However, Hume believed that a combination of desire and belief forms a complete

许外在关系存在的逻辑原子论等同于多元论。对维特根斯坦而言,内在关系是逻辑关系。

“内在关系是这样的关系,它构成描述一殊相的部分,使得该殊相如果不再处于与某些其他殊相的关系中,就像会失去自己的同一性。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第208页。

内在论

一种认知辨明理论,它认为,对某人信念的辨明是由某人产生或持有某个特定信念的实际或潜在的对正确认识过程的意识所确定的。因而,辨明就是某人内在状态的一种功能:即某人的知觉状态,记忆状态等等。这一直是自笛卡尔以来的主流倾向,他把辨明等同于有理由认为这个信念是真的。根据这种理论,对信念的辨明完全是由主观特征所确定的,与外在的因素无关,因而它与“外在论”相对。在语言哲学中,内在论是指这样一种立场,它否定理解一个句子就是理解它的真值条件,而是认为句子的意义就是它的用法。

“[一个]辨明往往必须采取适用于知者的令人信服的推理形式。在当代认识论中,这被称作‘内在论’。相反,外在论者则坚持认为,即使知者对这种辨明一无所知,这个信念同样可以得到证明。”——曼蒂:《数学中的实在论》,1990年,第73页。

内在论(伦理学的)

伦理学的内在论是一种关于道德动机的理论。内在论宣称,就道德行为的辨明而言,动机是内在的。某种东西能够是行为的理由权且仅当它为当事人所欲求,只有当行为者相信,他应当做某事,这个义务才能成为他行动的理由。因此内在论反对任何心理学上不可实现的道德理论。它有两种不同的形式。一种是为柏拉图、康德和他们的追随者所提出,认为理性考虑产生动机,即知道某种事情是对的,就有一个完成它的动机。这也称作为认知的或理性的内在论。另一种为休谟所提出,认为行为者的欲望产生动机,而他的理性信念仅是以一种偶然的方式起作用。不过,休谟相信,欲望和信念的结合形成了一种完整的动机状态。这就是他的“信念/欲求论”。内因论也称作为“动机内在论”,而与“伦理外在论”(也称“动机外在论”)相对立,伦理外

motivating state. This is his belief/desire thesis. Internalism is also called motivational internalism, and is opposed to ethical externalism (also called motivational externalism), which is the view that the justification of an action is separate from its motivation.

"Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions themselves."—Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism*, 1970, p. 7.

Interpretation (Heidegger)

Heidegger distinguished *Interpretieren* (Interpretation) from *Auslegung* (interpretation, literally laid out). For him, Interpretation corresponds to understanding as a primordial mode of *Dasein*'s being and seizes the possibilities opened by understanding. In contrast, interpretation corresponds to cognitive understanding and provides our day-to-day *existentiell* interpretations. The former grasps the being of all entities, while the latter provides our ordinary accounts of entities. According to Heidegger, Interpretation, as the discovery of the transhistorical and transcultural structures of *Dasein*, determines interpretation and makes it possible. Philosophical understanding is associated with Interpretation.

"Thus by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up." Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1963, p. 168.

Intersubjectivity

Something is intersubjective if its existence is neither independent of human minds (purely objective) nor dependent

upon single minds or subjects (purely subjective), but dependent upon the common features of different minds. Aesthetic properties and Lockean ideas of secondary qualities belong to this category. The intersubjective, which contrasts mainly to the purely subjective, implies a sort of objectivity which derives from the common nature of different minds rather than from the nature of the object itself. Their common and shared nature implies an interaction and communication among different minds or subjects, and this is their intersubjectivity. On this view, a mind not only experiences the existence of other minds, but also carries within it an intention to communicate with these other minds.

For Husserl, these features of intersubjectivity indicate

在论的观点是,一个行为的合理性是与它的动机分开的。

“内在论是这样一种观点,它认为道德行为的动机显现是由伦理命题本身所保证的。”——内格尔:《利他主义的可能性》,1970年,第7页。

阐释(海德格尔)

海德格尔将 *Interpretieren* (阐释)与 *Auslegung* (解释,其字面意义为“摆开”、“陈列”)区别开。在他看来,阐释相应于作为缘在(*Dasein*)之存在的原初样式的领会;它抓住了由领会开启的可能性。与此相对,解释相应于认知式的领会,并且提供给我们以日常的生存状况的(*existentiell*)解释。前者捕捉住所有存在者之存在,而后者为我们提供出对于存在者们的通常说明。按照海德格尔的观点,阐释乃是对缘在之超历史和超文化结构的发现,决定着解释并使之可能。哲学的领会与阐释相连。

“因此,通过展示最切近的日常存在于世界之中的肯定现象,就使得这样一种洞察成为可能,即看出对于存在状态的存在论阐释之所以丧失掉的原因。这种存在状况本身在其日常存在中正是首先丧失自身和遮蔽自身者。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1963年,第168页。

主体间性

如果某物的存在既非独立于人类心灵(纯客观的),也非取决于单个心灵或主体(纯主观

的),而是有赖于不同心灵的共同特征,那么它就是主体间的。审美特性与洛克的第二性质思想属于这一范畴。主体间的东西主要与纯粹主体性的东西形成对照,它意味着某种源自不同心灵之共同特征而非对象自身本质的客观性。心灵的共同性与共享性隐含着不同心灵或主体之间的互动作用和传播沟通,这便是它们的主体间性。由此看来,一个心灵不仅体验到其他心灵的存在,而且其中包含着与其他心灵沟通的意向。

在胡塞尔看来,主体间的这些特征表明:人们与其说是建构了一个唯我论的世界,毋宁说是建构了一个共享的世界(*Lebenswelt*)。这一观点继而得到梅洛-庞蒂的发展。后者摒弃了传统

that we constitute the world as a shared world (*Lebenswelt*) rather than a solipsistic one. This view is further developed by Merleau-Ponty, who rejects the traditional dichotomy of subject and object and conceives intersubjectivity as intercorporeity. For analytical philosophy, intersubjectivity is the mutual accessibility between two or more minds. Each of them is aware not only the existence of the other, but also of its intention to convey information to the other. Intersubjectivity is fundamental to rejecting solipsism and proving the existence of other minds. The problem of other minds was at the centre of philosophy of mind in mid-century, but no longer has a dominant role.

"The principle of 'radical' idealism, namely of always going back to the constitutive acts of transcendental subjectivity, must obviously illuminate the universal horizon consciousness that is the 'world' and, above all, the intersubjectivity of this world - although what is constituted in this way, the world as what is common to many individuals, itself includes subjectivity."—Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Second part, 3. b. (tr. by Glen-Doepel), 1975, p. 219.

Intrinsic description

Ayer's term for a description that is peculiar to a particular event at a particular time. If two events are distinct, their intrinsic descriptions are different. One cannot infer from the description of one event the features and character of the other. Such a description is atomistic, for it does not carry any causal implication and it isolates an event from its actual and potential relations to other objects or events. Intrinsic descriptions are not common in ordinary language, since they are not very informative. Sometimes, this sort of description is thought to be possible only for private and fleeting sense-impressions. Ayer, however, claims that such descriptions are accepted by the empiricist tradition and should be sufficient to give an account of everything that happens. They are confined to the domain of actual facts and underlie Hume's principle that inference concerning matters of fact is not demonstrative.

"I shall introduce the concept of an intrinsic description. I shall say that such a description of the state of a subject S at a particular time *t* is intrinsic to S at *t* if and only if nothing follows from it with regard to the state of S at any time other than *t*, or with regard to the existence of any subject S' which is distinct from S, in the sense that S and S' have no common part."—Ayer, *Probability and Evidence*, 1972, p. 6.

Introspection

[from Latin: *intro*, inward, into + *specere*: look, to look into one's own mind] Direct awareness of or attending to one's mental states and activities. Traditionally,

的主客体二分法,并且把主体间性当做形体存在间性。对分析哲学来讲,主体间性是两个或两个以上的心灵之间的彼此可进入性。两者不仅均可意识到彼此的存在,而且均可意识到彼此传达信息的意向。主体间性的根本在于摒弃唯我论,在于证实他人心灵的存在。他心问题是本世纪中叶心的哲学的中心问题,但现在不再占有主导地位。

“‘极端’唯心主义的原理,也就是一贯返回超验主体性之构成行为的原理,必然会照亮普遍的视界意识即这个‘世界’,尤其是这个世界的主体间性。尽管是以此方式构成,但这个世界对许多个体来说是共有的,因此其本身就包含着主体性。”——伽达默尔,《真理与方法》,第二部分,3,b(格兰·多培尔译)1975年,第219页。

内在描述

艾耶尔用来表示这种描述的术语,它对特定时刻的特定事件是特殊的。如果两个事件有区别,它们的内在描述就不同。人们不能从一个事件的描述推论出另一个事件的特性 and 特征。这样的描述是原子式的,因为它并不具有因果性含义,它把一个事件与其对于其他对象或事件的现实的和潜在的关系相区别。内在描述在日常语言中并不普遍,因为它们并不具有很多信息。有时,人们认为这类描述只对私人的和飘浮不定的感觉印象才有可能。但艾耶尔认为,这样的描述为经验主义传统接受,应足以对所发生的每一件事作出说明。它们局限于实际事实的领域,并包含于休谟的以下原理中:关于事实问题的推理不是证明性的。

“我将提出内在描述这个概念。我要说,对主体 S 在一特定时刻 *t* 的状态的描述,对 *t* 时的 S 是内在的,当且仅当对于除 *t* 之外任何时间 S 的状态,或对于不同于 S 的任何主体 S' (就 S 和 S' 无共同部分而言)的存在推导不出任何东西。”——艾耶尔,《或然性和证据》,1972年,第6页。

内省

[源自拉丁文 *intro*(向内,进入)和 *specere*(看),看进自己的内心]直接意识或注意自己的心的状态和活动。在传统上,是以感官知觉为模

introspection is conceived on the model of sense-perception, invoking a faculty of inner sense. While sense-perception enables us to be aware of current happenings in our environment and our body, introspection enables us to be aware of current happenings in our own mind. However, this analogy to sense-perception is questioned in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some philosophers take introspection to be no more than a capacity for making true statements about one's mental happenings. The Cartesian tradition holds that introspection is a major source of evidence for the existence of a substantial mind. However, Ryle and others have tried to replace introspection with retrospection by claiming that if introspection is a mental activity, and if each mental activity is introspectible, then introspection will involve an infinite regress. The Cartesian tradition also holds that we logically cannot be mistaken about our current mental states, but this view is attacked by many philosophers and psychologists. Introspection is the same as Locke's reflection.

"The technical term 'introspection' has been used to denote a supposed species of perception. It was supposed that much as a person may at a particular moment be listening to a flute, savouring a wine, or regarding a waterfall, so he may be 'regarding', in a non-optical sense, some current mental states or process of his own."—Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 163.

Introspective awareness, another term for introspection

Intuition

[from Latin, *intueri*, look at, look upon or inspect] The innate power of the mind to see or directly apprehend truths, without the aid of sensory stimuli, and without prior inference or discussion. It is knowing a particular in a universal in a single flash of insight. Intuitive knowledge is thus distinguished from inferential knowledge. Intuition can be empirical (a direct presentation of sensible objects in the mind), practical (a direct awareness of whether a particular circumstance fits with a general rule) or intellectual (an apprehension of universals, concepts, self-evident truths or ineffable objects such as God). Practical intuition is a part of practical reason and was discussed by Aristotle in his ethics. Intellectual intuition, or reason's insight, is a crucial faculty for the rationalist tradition. For Descartes, it is the recognition of the starting-point of deduction. For Spinoza, it is scientific intuition and is the highest of the three modes of knowing. For Kant, it is a type of experience in which the normal antitheses of sense and thought, particular and universal, have been overcome.

Intuition plays an important role in mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and logic, especially with regard to the fundamental concepts and principles of these areas.

型,把内省设想成是牵涉到一种内感觉的官能。感知使得我们意识到环境与身体在目前所发生的一切,而内省则使得我们意识到自己内心在目前所发生的一切。然而这种与感官知觉的类比在当代心的哲学中受到质疑。有的哲学家认为,内省只不过是作出关于心的事件的真陈述的能力。笛卡尔主义的传统认为,内省是心灵实体存在的主要证据来源。然而,赖尔和其他人则试图以反省取而代之,他们声称,如果内省是一个心的活动,且每一心的活动都是可以被内省的,那么内省就会陷入无限后推。笛卡尔主义的传统还认为,在逻辑上,我们对自己当前心的状态不可能出错。这一观点遭到许多哲学家和心理学家的攻击。内省就是洛克所说的反省。

“‘内省’这一专门术语被用来指一种被认为是知觉的东西。据说,就像一个人可能在一特定时刻听一曲长笛、尝一口酒或注视一个瀑布一样,他也可以在非视觉的意义上注视他自己当前的心的状态或过程。”——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949年,第163页。

内省意识

“内省”的别名。

直觉

[源自拉丁文 *intueri*, “看”、“注视”、“观察”]一般指心灵无需感觉刺激之助,无需先行推理或讨论,就能看见或直接领悟真理的天生能力。它是通过瞬间的洞察对普遍中的特殊事物的认知。直觉知识因此同推理的知识区分开来。直觉可以是经验的(可感对象在心灵中的直接呈现);或者是实践的(对一个特殊情况是否符合普遍规则的直接意识);或者是理智的(对共相、概念、自明真理和诸如上帝那类无法言表的对象的把握)。实践的直觉是实践理性的一部分。亚里士多德在他的伦理学中讨论了这一问题。理智的直觉即“理性的洞见”,是理性主义传统所主张的一个重要官能。笛卡尔认为它是对演绎的起点的认识。斯宾诺莎认为它是“科学的直观”,是认识三样式中的最高级的样式。康德认为它是一类经验,在这类经验中,感觉和思想、个别和普遍的通常对立被克服了。

在数学、形而上学、伦理学、逻辑学中,尤其在有关这些领域的基本概念和原则上,直觉发挥了重要作用。但是作为一个官能,直觉不可能被检验。它被某些人看做非理性的或非认知的,而把它作为知识之源的主张总是令人怀疑的。

However, intuition as a faculty is impossible to check. It is viewed by some as non-rational or non-cognitive, and its claim to be a source of knowledge always faces suspicion. Empiricism in general rejects the existence of any faculty of intuition.

"In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A19.

Intuitionism, ethical, see ethics, intuitionistic

Intuitionism, mathematical

A philosophy of mathematics founded by L. E. J. Brouwer. Influenced by Kantian philosophy, Brouwer claimed that mathematical objects are not mind-independent, but are products of mental construction. Mathematical knowledge lies in our capacity to construct proofs. A mathematical statement is true if and only if a proof can be constructed for it, and it is false if and only if it is shown that a proof cannot be constructed. Because there is a gap between proof and the denial that a proof can be constructed, intuitionism denies the law of the excluded middle and the law of double negation. Mathematical intuitionism is a species of mathematical constructivism and is opposed to the Platonist claim that the existence of mathematical objects is mind-independent. The reasoning of mathematical intuitionism was formalised by Brouwer's disciple Arend Heyting as intuitionistic logic. Its metaphysical and epistemological ideas have been developed and extended to areas outside mathematics by M. Dummett as antirealism and the warranted assertibility theory of meaning.

"The conceptualist position in the foundations of mathematics is sometimes called intuitionism, in a broad sense of the term. Under stricter usage 'intuitionism' refers only to Brouwer and Heyting's special brand of conceptualism, which suspends the law of the excluded middle."—Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 125.

Intuitionist logic

A system of principles to formalise the types of reasoning allowed by mathematical intuitionism, after which this logic is named. It denies the principles of classical logic which are not countenanced by mathematical intuitionism. In its most important formulation, it is a calculus developed by Arend Heyting in 1930, inspired by his teacher Brouwer. It supposes that mathematical objects are products of mental operations and that the truth of a mathematical statement is its provability, that is the mental construction that would

经验论一般否认任何直觉官能的存在。

“一种知识形式不论能以何种方式何种方法与对象相关,它借以与对象直接相关,而且一切思想作为工具指向它的,是直觉。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A19。

伦理学的直觉主义

见“直觉主义伦理学”条。

数学的直觉主义

由 L. E. J. 布劳威尔所创立的一种数学哲学。受康德哲学的影响,布劳威尔认为数学对象并不是独立于心灵的,而是心智构造的产物。数学知识就在于我们构造证明的能力。数学陈述为真当且仅当能够为它构造一个证明,它为假当且仅当表明无法构造一个证明。由于在一个证明和否定可构造一个证明之间存在空隙,于是直觉主义否认排中律和双重否定律。数学直觉主义是数学构造主义的一种,它反对柏拉图主义的下述断言:数学对象是独立于心灵而存在的。布劳威尔的弟子 A. 海丁把数学直觉主义的推理形式化为直觉主义逻辑。M. 达米特把它的形而上学和认识论理念推广到数学之外的领域,并把它们发展成为反实在论和意义的有根据的可断定性理论。

“数学基础中的概念论立场有时叫做‘直觉主义’,这是取其广义。按较严格的用法,‘直觉主义’只是指布劳威尔和海丁的特殊分支的概念论,它暂停使用排中律。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第125页。

直觉主义逻辑

把数学直觉主义所允许的推理类型形式化的原理系统,这一逻辑因此得名。它否认数学直觉主义所不赞成的那些经典逻辑原理。A. 海丁受他的老师布劳威尔启发,于1930年发展了最重要的直觉主义逻辑演算。直觉主义逻辑假定:数学对象是心智运算的产物,数学陈述的真就在于它的可证性,即给出其证明的心智构造。一数学陈述为真当且仅当我们有关于它的证明。相应地,对直觉主义逻辑的联结词不能给出任

represent a proof of it. A mathematical statement is true if and only if we have a proof of it. Accordingly, no definite truth table can be given for its connectives because a truth-table is based on the law of the excluded middle (or the principle of bivalence), which holds that a statement must be either true or false, whether or not we know it to be true or false. But intuitionist logic claims that if we do not have a proof of a statement or a denial that it can be proved, then we cannot say that it is true or false. Hence it rejects the law of excluded middle as a theorem. It diverges from classical logic also by denying other laws of negation. Intuitionist logic is closely related to anti-realism which does not admit any mind independent truth.

"Arend Heyting succeeded in 1930 in codifying Brouwer's so called intuitionistic logic in a formal calculus with detachment and substitution as the rules of inferences."—R. L. Goodstein, *Development of Mathematical Logic*, 1971, p. 26.

Intuitive induction, another expression for induction by intuition

Inversion

In traditional logic a form of immediate inference from a single premise in which the subject of the inferred proposition is the contradictory of the subject of the premise. The original proposition is called the inverted, and the inferred proposition is called the inverse.

"Inversion may be defined as a process of immediate inference in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred having for its subject the contradictory of the original subject."—Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 139.

I-proposition, see A-proposition

Irony, Socratic

[from Greek: *eironeia*, dissembling] In simple cases, irony is the use of an expression to imply the opposite of its literal meaning, for example by calling a stupid answer a smart reply. In some cases, not all auditors are intended to grasp the irony. Irony can also involve distancing oneself from what one is saying. In dramatic irony, some characters do not understand what the audience or other characters understand. In historical irony, events reverse expectations, sometimes in a way which seems morally appropriate. Socratic irony also involves a tension or contrast, based on the affected ignorance of Socrates in the early dialogues of Plato. Socrates found flaws in the arguments of his interlocutors and pushed the argument forward, but he claimed that he himself did not know or did not have an

何确定的真值表,因为真值表都是基于排中律(或二值原则)之上的,后者是说:一陈述必定或者真或者假,无论我们是否知道它的真或假。但直觉主义逻辑断言:如果我们没有关于一陈述的证明或者尚未否定它的可证性,我们就不能说它是真的还是假的,所以它拒绝把排中律作为定理。它与经典逻辑的不同还在于它否认有关否定的其他规律。直觉主义逻辑是与反实在论密切相关的,后者不承认任何不依赖于心智的真理。

"1930年,A.海丁成功地把布劳威尔所谓的直觉主义逻辑编制为一个形式演算,它以分离规则和代入规则作为推理规则。"——古德斯坦,《数理逻辑的发展》,1971年,第26页。

直观式归纳

“直观归纳法”的另一种表述。

戾换

传统逻辑中的一种直接推理形式,它从单一前提出发,所推出命题的主词是前提主词的矛盾词项。原命题叫做被戾换命题,推出的命题叫做戾换命题。

“戾换可以定义为这样一个直接推理过程,从一给定命题推出了另一命题,后者以前者主词的矛盾词项作它的主词。”——凯恩斯,《形式逻辑》1928年,第139页。

I命题

见“A命题”条。

苏格拉底的讥讽

[源自希腊词 *eironeia*,掩饰真情]在一般情况中,讥讽是指使用某些表述来传达与该表述的字面意义相反的意义,例如,对一个很蠢的答案说,“精明的回答”。在某些情况中,并非一切听众都被认为是可以把握讥讽的。它也意为在自己与自己的话之间保持距离。在戏剧讥讽中,有些角色并不懂观众或其他角色能懂的内容。在历史性的讥讽中,事件的出现与愿望相反,有时以一种看来与道德相符的方式出现。苏格拉底的讥讽还指在柏拉图早期对话中所描绘的苏格拉底佯为无知的一种状态或对比。苏格拉底在其对话者的论证中找寻错误,推动论证发展,可他自己则声称他一无所知,对所讨论中的问题不能提供答案。在希腊文化中,这类讥讽一般

answer for the question under discussion. In Greek culture, this sort of irony was regarded as negative. In modern philosophy, various kinds of irony have been important in the works of Hegel, the romantics and Kierkegaard. Irony has also been discussed in the philosophy of language.

"Here we have the well known Socratic irony, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you."—Plato, *Republic*, 337a.

Irrationalism

[Latin: *ir*, not] Irrationalism in philosophy does not reject the role of reason entirely, but it rejects the claim that the function of reason is unlimited or supreme. In many areas, such as the first principles of an study, the ultimate ground of human existence and the profoundest religious truths, reason cannot grasp the truth. Hence, according to different versions of irrationalism, we must appeal to non-logical and unmediated modes of cognition such as intuition, immediate experience and faith to gain the truth and must also take culture and tradition into account. Many philosophers who are the chief proponents of reason, such as Plato, Aquinas and Kant, realised the limits of rational activity. Much religious philosophy, especially fideism, claims that reason plays at most a subordinate role in understanding. Nietzsche and the existentialists criticised the Enlightenment claim of the superiority of reason, a view taken up in a different context by contemporary postmodernists.

"The issue about irrationalism can be sharpened by noting that when the pragmatists says: 'All that can be done to explicate "truth", "knowledge", "morality", "virtue" is to refer us back to the concrete details of the culture in which these terms grew up and developed', the defender of the Enlightenment takes him to be saying 'truth and virtue are simply what a community agrees that they are'."—Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 53 (1980), p. 737.

Irrationality

The incorrect use of information for attaining truth or achieving practical goals. An irrational action violates normal and standard processes of deliberation without any justification in terms of reason. The discussion of how practical or theoretical irrationality is possible is often focused on the issues of self-deception and weakness of will. In addition to philosophical discussion of how irrationality it possible, there are psychological or sociological attempts to characterise and explain the processes of irrationality. Irrational thought and action may be overtly deranged and

被认为是否定性的。在近代哲学中,讥讽的各种含义在黑格尔、浪漫派及克尔凯郭尔的著作中都很重要。讥讽也在语言哲学中得到讨论。

"这里我们可以看到著名的苏格拉底的讥讽;我知道它,并能够预言,当你被要求回答时,你会千方百计地婉拒、躲闪,就是不肯回答人们向你提出的问题。"——柏拉图:《国家篇》, 337a。

非理性主义

[拉丁语: *ir*, 非] 哲学中的非理性主义并不完全否认理性的作用,但它反对认为理性的功能是无限制的或最高的这种主张。在许多领域中,如研究的第一原理,人类存在的最终根据和最深奥的宗教真理,理性都无法把握真理。因此,按照非理性主义的各种说法,我们必须诉诸于非逻辑的和无中介的认识方式,如直觉、直接经验和获得真理的信仰,也必须对文化和传统加以考虑。许多为理性辩护的主要哲学家,如柏拉图、阿奎那和康德,都认识到理性活动的界限。很多宗教哲学,特别是信仰主义,主张理性在理解中至多起着从属的作用。尼采和存在主义者批判了理性至高无上的启蒙运动主张。这个主张被当代后现代主义在不同的场合中所承继。

"关于非理性主义的争端由于注意到这种情况而变得鲜明起来:当实用主义者说:'一切可以用于解释"真理、知识、道德、德性"的事就是要让我们回过头来求助于文化的具体细节,而那些术语就是在这个文化中生长和发展起来的时候,启蒙运动的维护者就以为他正在说:'真理和德性即是公众所赞同的现存的东西。'"——R. 罗蒂:《实用主义,相对主义,非理性主义》,《美国哲学学会会报和演讲录》,第53期(1980),第737页。

非理性

不正确运用信息去获得真理或实现其他实践目标。非理性的行为是违反正常的、标准的思考过程的行为,没有依据理性的任何辩护。关于实践或理论方面的非理性是如何可能的讨论,经常集中在"自欺"和"意志薄弱"的争论上。除了哲学上关于非理性是如何可能的讨论外,亦有心理学的与社会学的尝试来刻画和解释非理性的过程。非理性的思想与行为可能明显地是狂乱的、困扰的,但不一定是这样的。我们对自己的非理性有着各种洞见。非理性可被正面地

obsessive, but need not be so, and we have varying insight into our own irrationality. Irrationality has been seen positively as a source of creativity as well as negatively as a danger to reason.

"Irrationality is a failure to make proper use of material already in the mind."—Pears, *Motivated Irrationality*, 1984, p. 6.

Irrealism

A word coined in the 1980s in both metaphysics and moral theory, but the idea can be traced to Hume's scepticism which denies the possibility of knowledge of a physical reality beyond our senses. Irrealism declares that there is no objective reality and hence realism is not right. But in the meantime irrealism does not commit itself to any existing forms of anti-realism. It holds that it is impossible for us even to form the idea of a body that has a continued existence independent of our minds, let alone any idea of the inner structure and invisible constitution of such a body. It does not accept that realism and anti-realism exhaust all the possible views. It questions whether we can establish a discourse which conforms to the somewhat minimal constraints of syntax and the discipline called for by the applicability of truth predicates.

"Irrealism does not hold that everything or even anything is unreal, but sees the world melting into versions making worlds, finds ontology evanescent, and inquires into what makes a version right and a world well-built."—Nelson Goodman, *Of Mind and Other Matters*, 1984, p. 29.

Irreflexive, see reflexive

Is

The third person singular form of the verb "to be", generally held to have three distinct senses: (1) the copulative sense with the syntactical function of joining subjects to predicates in sentences, for example, "This house *is* white"; (2) the sense expressing identity, for example, "The Morning Star *is* the Evening Star"; and (3) the existential sense, for example, "There *is* a house". There are also other attempts to classify the meaning of "is". There have been disputes over whether these senses are connected, whether some of them can be reduced to others or are really irreducibly different. Many contemporary analytical philosophers, especially Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, argue that traditional metaphysics is wrong to take being (the participle of to be) as a subject-matter, because doing so confuses the copulative sense and the existential sense of "is".

"Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence."—

看做是创造性之源,也可负面地看做是对理性的危险。

"非理性是没有恰当地使用已经存于心中的材料。"—皮尔斯:《促动的非理性》,1984年,第6页。

非实在论

20世纪80年代在形而上学和道德理论中创造的一个词,不过其思想可以追溯到休谟的怀疑论;该怀疑论否认认识我们感觉之外的物理实在的可能性。非实在论宣称,客观实在是不存在的,因此实在论是不正确的。但同时非实在论也不接受任何现存的反实在论形式。它认为,我们甚至不能形成一个不依赖于我们的心灵而持续存在的物体的观念,更不用说任何关于这样一个物体的内部结构和不可见组织的观念了。它不承认实在论和反实在论穷尽了所有可能的观点。它对我们是否能确立如下一种话语表示怀疑,这种话语遵守真值谓词的适用性所要求的最起码的句法和规则约束。

"非实在论并不认为每一事物或甚至任何事物都是不实在的,而是认为世界融入了构成世界的各种形式中,它发现本体论是转瞬即逝的,它探讨使一个构成世界的形式成为正确的并使世界很好建立起来的东西。"—占德曼:《论心及其他问题》,1984年,第28页。

反自返的

见“自返的”条。

是

动词“是”的第三人称单数形式,一般认为具有三种不同意义:(1)系词,其句法功能是联接句子中的主词与谓词;如“这间屋子是白的”; (2)表示等同;如“晨星即是暮星”; (3)表示存在;如“这是一间屋子”。此外,还有其他种种试图划分“是”的意义的努力。学者们一直在争论这些意义是否相联,有些意义能否归结为另一些,或者它们确实是互不相同的。许多当代分析哲学家,尤其是维特根斯坦和逻辑实证主义者认为,传统形而上学以“是”(being,即动词“to be”的分词)为主题是错误的,因为这样做混淆了“是”的系词意义与其存在意义。

“‘是’这一词既可作为系词,也可作为一种等同的符号,又可表达存在。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,3.323。

Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.323.

Is/ought gap

Also called the fact / value gap or Hume's law, initially drawn by David Hume as a logical distinction between factual statements which describe how the world *is*, and value judgements which prescribe how the world *ought* to be. Factual statements are seen as value-free, and value judgements are seen as evaluative or normative. Description and evaluation are thought to be different activities. Hence we cannot deduce a moral judgement from a non-moral one. *Ought* cannot be inferred from *is*. There is no logical bridge between fact and value. It is further inferred that ethical terms or properties cannot be defined by non-ethical or natural terms or properties. Otherwise, to use Moore's terminology, we commit a naturalistic fallacy. This dichotomy has been held by many moral philosophers, including Mill, Kant, Moore, and Hare, to be a datum, but its validity has been challenged by others who claim that the recognition of fact is itself a value-laden activity, and that a moral judgement also has descriptive meaning. The soundness of this distinction has been the focus of the debates between naturalism and anti-naturalism and between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. John Searle and others have tried to show how we can derive an ought statement from is statements.

"I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*."—Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, III, I, I.

Isomorphism

[from Greek *isos*, equal – *morph*, form or shape] The structural identity or one to-one correspondence of properties between two propositions or two systems. In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, a proposition is a picture which is isomorphic with a corresponding possible state of affairs. This is the core point in his picture theory. In its stronger version, it suggests that not only the names but also the significant relations between the names will stand in a relation of reference to the world. In its weaker version, it suggests that only relational facts will be symbolised by relational sentences, with no requirement that the significant relation in such a sentence will have reference to a relation in the world. It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's thought develops from the stronger version to a weaker one. Carnap claims that if two sentences are logically equivalent, and have the same number of corresponding components, they are

“是”和“应该”之分

亦称“‘事实’和‘价值’之分”，或“休谟的法则”。作为对事实陈述和价值判断的逻辑区分，最初由休谟提出。事实陈述描述世界“是”怎样的，价值判断规定世界“应该”是怎样的。前者被认为与价值无关，后者被认为是评价性的或规范性的。描述和评价被认为是不同的活动。因此，我们不能从非道德判断中推演出道德判断。从“是”中不能推出“应该”。在事实和价值之间没有逻辑的桥梁。人们进而推断，伦理术语或性质不能用非伦理的或自然的术语或性质来规定。否则，用摩尔的话说，我们就犯下了“自然主义的谬误”。事实和价值的这种两分法，已被包括密尔、康德、摩尔和黑尔在内的许多道德哲学家当做论据，但是，它的有效性已受到其他一些哲学家的挑战。他们声称，对事实的认识本身就是一个有价值倾向的活动，而且，道德判断也有描述意义。这一区分的可靠性已经成为自然主义和反自然主义、认知主义和反认知主义的争论焦点。J. 塞尔等人试图说明我们如何能从“是”陈述中引出“应该”陈述。

“我一向注意到，本作者有时一直是照平常的方式进行推理，确定上帝的存在，或是对人类事务作出论述，可是突然之间，我却大吃一惊地发现，我所遇到的不再是命题中通常的‘是’与‘不是’联系词，而是没有一个命题不是由一个‘应该’或一个‘不应该’联系起来的。”——休谟：《人性论》，第三卷，第一章，第3节。

同构性

[源自希腊语 *isos*(相同)和 *morphy*(形式或形状)]这是指两命题或两系统之间结构相同或性质的一一对应。在维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》中，一个命题就是一个图像，它与相应的可能事态同构。这是他的图像论的核心论点。在其较强的说法中，它主张，不仅是名称，而且还有名称之间的表意关系，都处在与世界的指称关系之中。在其较弱的说法中，它主张，只有关系事实才会由关系语句表示，而不要求这种语句的表意关系会关涉世界中的某个关系。有时人们认为，维特根斯坦的思想是从较强的说法发展为较弱的说法。卡尔纳普主张，如果两个语句在逻辑上等同，并有相同数目的对应成分，那么它们在内涵上就是同构的。它们不仅有相同的内涵，而且在分析的意义上也是等同的。

“同构，或结构上的等同，是一种在经过解

intensionally isomorphic. They not only have the same intension, but also are equivalent in analytical meaning.

"Isomorphism, or that structural identity, is a relation between interpreted languages,... To say of two systems that they are isomorphic is to say that they have the same structure (logical form)."——Pap, *Elements of Analytic philosophy*, 1949, p. 103.

Isotheneia

[Greek: equipollence] Greek sceptics use it to refer to the phenomenon where two arguments which express opposite views about the same problem possess the same strength and credibility. It thus results in a state of mental suspense existing in order not to disturb the balance between pro or contra arguments. Sceptics set up many incompatible but equally valid arguments in order to show that dogmatism is not adequate. There is no sufficient ground for holding that either the pro or contra argument justifies a decision about what is true, or even about what is more probable. In terms of *isotheneia*, a sceptic retains his general suspension of mind and attains peace of mind.

"The sceptic is inclined to try to preserve isotheneia, that is, to look for counterarguments and counter counterarguments."——Naess, *Scepticism*, 1968, p. 6.

I-Thou

For Martin Buber, one of the two main relationships exists between oneself and another person or thing. I-Thou (or I-You) stands in contrast to I-It. Thou may be either human or not human. I-Thou is a mutual and reciprocal relation, involving personal engagement and dialogue. I is for Thou, and Thou is for I. In this relationship, Thou is not an object to be manipulated, but something responding to the I in its individuality, something which the I must address with all that is most intimate and personal in oneself. The I becomes I by virtue of having a relationship to a Thou. Different I-Thou relationships generate different I's. An I-Thou relationship is always present.

"The basic word I-You can be spoken only with one's whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become, becoming I, I say You."——Buber, *I and Thou* (tr. by Kaufman), 1970, p. 62.

释的语言之间的关系,……说两个系统同构就是说它们有相同的结构(逻辑形式)。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第103页。

同位

[希腊文,意指“均等”]古希腊的怀疑论者用它指这样一种现象,即对同一个问题表达了相反观点的两个论证,同样有力可信。因而,结果就是在精神上存在一种悬置状态,而不是去打破正反两方面论证之间的平衡。怀疑论者提出了许多不可比较的但同样可靠的论证,以表明独断论是不恰当的。没有足够的理由认为,正反两方面的某一方面论证证明了什么是真的或什么是最有可能的。怀疑论者就用 *isotheneia* 这个词表明了他对心灵的普遍悬置状态,保持心灵的安宁。

“怀疑论倾向于试图保持同位,就是说寻求反证和反反证。”——纳斯:《怀疑论》,1968年,第6页。

我与你

对于 M. 布伯而言,这是两种主要关系之一,存在于一个人和另一个人或物之间。“我与你”(I-Thou, I-You)与“我与它”(I-It)相对而言。这个“你”可以是人,也可以是非人的存在者。我与你是一种相互的和互补的关系,涉及人格的投入和对话。我是为了你,而你则是为了我。在这种关系中,“你”不是一个被操纵的对象,而是那在其个体性中与我呼应者,一个我必须以自身中最内在和个人化的一切来对其发话者。这个“我”之所以能成为我,就是因为有了一个与“你”的关系。不同的我与你的关系产生出不同的“我”。一个我与你的关系总是当下在场的。

“‘我与你’这个原初词只能以一个人的全部存在而说出。专注于和融入整体的存在绝不会由我完成,但也绝不会没有我而完成。我要求一个你来成为我;成为着我,我说着你。”——布伯:《我与你》(考夫曼英译),1970年,第62页。

J

James-Lange view

The view that emotions are feelings generated by characteristic bodily changes in response to external stimuli. Hence emotion follows bodily changes rather than, as the traditional position holds, causes them. We are afraid because we tremble, and we feel sorry because we cry, rather than the contrary. This view was proposed independently by the American philosopher William James in 1884 and the Danish anatomist Carl G. Lange in 1895. Psychologically, this claim helped to put the study of emotion on the basis of a naturalist inquiry rather than on the traditional basis of introspection. Philosophically, this thesis opened a new era for the discussion of the relationship between reason and emotion.

"The famous James Lange theory—developed by the American psychologist William James and the Danish physician C. G. Lange—asserted, that one did not feel the inner cause of emotion, but simply some part of the emotional behaviour itself." —Skinner, *Science and Human Behaviour*, 1953, p. 160.

Jansenism

A philosophical and religious movement named after the Dutch Theologian Cornelius Otto Jansen (1585-1638). The movement was inspired by Augustine's anti-pelagian teachings and theology of grace. Its other major defenders included Antoine Arnauld and Abbé de Saint-Cyran. The movement had its centre in the Convent of Port-Royal. Jansenism flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, especially in France. Characteristic features included extreme predestinarianism and moral austerity. Jansenist determinism held that we cannot fulfil God's commands without divine grace, but cannot resist grace if it is offered. Sin is possible even for the righteous without interior freedom of choice through insufficient grace. The virtues of pagans are only vices. The Jansenist doctrine was condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X, and the Jansenist community was dissolved in 1709. The influence of the movement, which was influenced by the thinking of Pascal, continued into the nineteenth century. Jansenism is also remembered because of the *Port-Royal Logic* that was developed by its followers.

"Jansenism ... was an authentic catholic belief; it based itself on St. Augustine and would not quit the City of God,

詹姆斯—朗格观点

这个观点是，情感是为了回应外部刺激而发生的特征性的身体变化。因此情感是在身体变化后出现的，而不是像传统的观点所认为的那样，情感引起身体的变化。我们害怕是因为我们发抖，我们感到难过，是因为我们哭，而不是相反。这个观点是为美国哲学家 W. 詹姆斯在 1884 年和丹麦解剖学家 C. G. 朗格在 1895 年分别提出的。在心理学上，这个观点有助于把对情感的研究放在一种自然研究的基础上，而不是像传统的研究那样，放在内省的基础上。在哲学上，这个论点对于讨论理性与情感的关系，开辟了一个新领域。

“著名的詹姆斯—朗格观点——为美国的心理学家 W. 詹姆斯和丹麦的内科医生 C. G. 朗格所提出——断言，一个人感觉不到情感的内在原因，而只感觉到情感行为本身的某些部分。”——斯金纳：《科学与人类行为》，1953 年，第 160 页。

詹森主义

以荷兰神学家 C. O. 詹森 (1585—1638) 命名的一场哲学和宗教运动。这场运动受到了奥古斯丁的反裴拉鸠教旨和恩典神学的启发。它的另一些主要辩护者包括 A. 阿尔诺和 A. 德·圣克兰。该运动的中心在皇港女修道院。詹森主义的鼎盛时期在 17 至 18 世纪的西欧，尤其在法国。它的显著特征是极端宿命论和道德严谨。詹森主义的宿命论主张，如无神圣的恩典，我们不能执行上帝的命令，但如果赐给我们恩典，则不能抗拒。由于没有选择的内在自由，即使正直的人，也可能由于恩典不足而有罪恶。异教徒的德性只是邪恶。詹森主义学说被教皇英诺森十世定为异端，詹森主义团体于 1709 年被解散。该运动的影响继续到 19 世纪，也受到了帕斯卡尔的思想的影响。詹森主义也因其追随者们发展的《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑》而留下记忆。

“詹森主义……是真正的天主教信仰；它本身以圣奥古斯丁为基础，不放弃上帝之城、普世教会。它依然是一种主观宗教，强调‘恩典’在‘作品’之上。”——布莱尔斯福德：《伏尔泰》，1935 年，第 10 页。

the universal Church. None the less it was a subjective religion, which stresses 'grace' above 'works'”—Brailsford, *Voltaire*, 1935, p. 13.

Joint method of agreement and difference

The third of Mill's five inductive methods, after the method of agreement and the method of difference. A phenomenon, P, occurs both in circumstances A and B. These two circumstances differ in every aspect except the factor E. Furthermore, P does not occur in the circumstances C and D, and C and D differ in every aspect except that they both do not have E. Thus, we may conclude that E stands in a causal relationship with the phenomenon P. The method proceeds by ascertaining the difference between the cases in which the phenomenon is present and those in which it is absent. What we uncover through this method is both a sufficient and a necessary condition for the phenomenon under investigation.

"This method may be called the indirect method of difference, or the joint method of agreement and difference, and consists in a double employment of the method of agreement, each proof being independent of the other, and corroborating it." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 396.

Judgeable content

Frege's term for what is thought and asserted when we make an assertion. It is prefixed by the content-stroke $\hat{}$. The judgeable content merges the thought expressed and its truth-value. It contrasts to the unjudgeable content which is its constituent. Together they form the conceptual content. For Frege, judgeable content is a state of affairs, an entity rather than an act of making a judgement or assertion. It is an abstract entity existing independently of our judging it and is the object of judgement. If different sentences have the same assertions, they express the same judgeable content and conceptual content. Logic is the science of the relations among conceptual contents.

"... the content of what follows the content-stroke must always be a possible content of judgement." — Frege, in *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Geach and Black eds), 1960, p. 2.

Judgement

A sentence by which something is affirmed or denied. Different sentences can express the same judgement, and the same sentence can also express different judgements. Certainly, not all sentences are judgements. A judgement like a proposition is characteristically used to make a true or false claim, and judgements are verbally expressed in propositions. Judgements and propositions are often used interchangeably, although judgement has a psychological or

契合差异并用法

密尔的归纳五法中排在“契合法”和“差异法”之后的第三种方法。一现象P发生在A和B两种情形下。这两种情形除了因素E外各方面都不同。而且，P在C和D两种情形下不发生，而C和D两者除了都没有E外各方面都不同。于是，我们可以得出结论：E与现象P有因果关系。该方法是通过确定现象发生时的情形和现象未发生时的情形之间的不同来进行的。我们通过这个方法所揭示的是被考察的现象的充要条件。

“这个方法可以被称作间接差异法或契合差异并用法，该方法就在于双重使用契合法，每一证据都独立于另一证据，并确证另一证据。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第七卷，第396页。

可判断内容

弗雷格的术语，是指当我们做出断定时所想的或所断定的东西。用“内容标记”作为前缀，即 $\hat{}$ 。可判断内容构成了被表达的思想及其真值。与之相对的是作为可判断内容之组成部分的不可判断的内容，两者共同构成了概念内容。在弗雷格看来，可判断内容是一种事态，一种实体，而不是一种做出判断或断定的行为。这是一种独立于我们对它的判断而存在的抽象实体，是判断的对象。如果不同的句子有着相同的断定，那么它们就表达着相同的可判断内容和“概念内容”。逻辑就是概念内容之间关系的科学。

“……在内容标记之后的内容往往只可能是判断内容。”——弗雷格，载《G. 弗雷格哲学文集》（吉奇和布莱克编），1960年，第2页。

判断

通过它肯定或否定某种东西的语句。不同的语句能够表达同一个判断，同一语句也能表达不同的判断。当然，并非所有语句都是判断。判断与命题相同，其特征在于它作出了真的或假的断言，在字面上判断被表达在命题中。判断和命题常常可以交替使用，尽管判断有心理学的或形而上学的意味，而命题则有象征的或实质的意味。“作判断”就是有一种心智状态，叫

metaphysical tone, while proposition has a symbolic and material tone. To judge is to have a mental state which is a propositional attitude. It has been a matter of debate how to understand the capacity of the mind to form judgements. For Frege, to judge is to acknowledge a thought as true. Judgement is made manifest by a sentence uttered with assertive force, but one can grasp and express a thought without acknowledging it as true, that is without judging it.

"A judgement expressed in language is precisely what is meant by a proposition." — Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 66.

Judgement of obligation

A judgement that tells us what is right to do or what we ought to do, such as "it is not right to cheat" or "you ought to follow your teacher's advice". These judgements are directly related to our conduct and they are also called deontic judgements. Judgements of obligation contrast to judgements of value, which are not directly relevant to our behaviour or action but concern persons and motives. Judgements of value tell us what is good or what has value, for example, "freedom is a valuable thing". They also tell us who is responsible or blameworthy. They are also called "aretaic judgements". In teleological ethics such as utilitarianism, since the right thing to do is the action which has the best consequences, a judgement of obligation depends upon a judgement of value. But in non-teleological ethics, which is not concerned with the consequences of actions, there is no such connection.

"In some of our moral judgements, we say that a certain action or kind of action is morally right, wrong, obligatory or a duty, or ought or ought not to be done. In others we talk ... about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like ... I shall call the former judgements of moral obligation or deontic judgements, and the latter judgements of moral value or aretaic judgements." — Frankena, *Ethics*, 1973, p. 9.

Judgement of taste, see aesthetic judgement

Judgement of value, see judgement of obligation

Judgement stroke, see assertion-sign

Jurisprudence, see philosophy of law

Jus talionis, see *lex talionis*

做命题态度。如何理解心智形成判断的能力,这一直是一个有争议的问题。对弗雷格来说,作判断就是承认某种思想为真。通过用直陈语气说出一个句子可以明确表达一个判断。但人们能够把握和表达一个思想而不必承认它是真的,也就是说,没有对它作出判断。

“在语言中所表达的判断恰好就是一命题所意谓的东西。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第66页。

义务判断

一个告诉我们做什么是对的或我们应该做什么的判断,例如,“骗人是不对的”或“你应当听从教师的教导”。这些判断是与我们的行为直接相关的,它们也称作道义判断。义务判断是与价值判断相对立的。价值判断不是直接与我们的行为或行动相关的,而是涉及到人和动机。价值判断告诉我们,什么是善的和什么是有价值的,例如,“自由是有价值的”。它们也告诉我们谁应负责或应受指责。义务判断也称为“德性判断”。在诸如功利主义这样的目的论伦理学中,既然做正当的行为是带来最好后果的行为,义务判断就是依赖于价值判断的。但在非目的论的伦理学中,它并不关心行为的后果,因而不存在这样一种联系。

“在我们的某些道德判断中,我们说一定的行为或某种行为在道德上是正当的、错的、是一种义务或职责、应当做的或不应当做的。在其他情况下,我们谈论……人、动机、意图、品格以及类似的事情……我将把前面的判断称为道德义务判断或道义判断,而后面的判断称为道德价值判断或德性判断。”——法兰克纳:《伦理学》,1973年,第9页。

鉴赏力判断

见“审美判断”条。

价值判断

见“义务判断”条。

判断号

见“断定记号”条。

法理学

见“法哲学”条。

报复权利

见“同态复仇法”条。

Just war

Originally, a Catholic notion involving the claim that the use of force is legitimate for punishing external evil-doers, and now a major topic in political philosophy regarding the morality of the use of force for political purposes. Traditionally, a theory of just war involved two conditions: a just cause for a war (Latin: *jus ad bellum*) and a just means of war (Latin: *jus in bello*). With respect to the first condition, contemporary theorists claim that a war can only be justified

if it is a response to aggression, either to defend the borders of one's own country or to rescue another country from aggression. The use of force must be the last resort, and the war must be undertaken with the goal of establishing peace. The right of national self-defence is derived analogically from an individual's right of self-defence. But the extent to which this analogy may be sustained is a matter of controversy. It is not clear whether it is permissible to take thousands of lives for the sake of defending a piece of land. With regard to the second condition, the main requirement is that war should be proportionate to the wrong suffered. All the means which cause gratuitous or otherwise unnecessary destruction should be avoided. More important, non-combatants, especially innocent civilians, must be immune from attack. They should be protected as far as possible from the ravages of war and should enjoy protection from direct and intentional harm. The problem is that in the practice of modern war it is difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Furthermore, many combatants are also innocent. The theory of what makes a war just changes and adapts to the particular needs of time and place and the changing character of war. New technologies of mass destruction, such as atomic, biological and chemical weapons, would inevitably kill a great many innocent civilians if used in a war. For this reason, they are widely regarded as morally unacceptable in a just war. Similarly, genocide is universally condemned as an aim or consequence of war.

"The traditional theory of just war contains *inter alia* certain doctrines as to who may and who may not bear arms in war; otherwise its three main theses are as follows: a war to be just must be initiated and led by the proper authority, must be fought for a just cause with right intentions, and must not use illicit means." - Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 1986, p. 16.

Justice

[Greek: *dikaion*, from *dike*, a suit in law; the Latin equivalent: *justum*, from *jussum*, that which has been ordered. Etymologically, justice is the prescribed manner of

正义战争

最初是天主教的一个看法,认为使用武力惩罚外来的坏人是合法的,现在是政治哲学中为了政治目的而使用武力是否道德这一问题的主要论题。从传统上讲,正义战争的理论包括两个条件:战争的理由是正义的(拉丁文 *jus ad bellum*);战争的手段是正义的(拉丁文 *jus in bello*)。就第一个条件来看,当代理论家认为,战争只有在它是对侵略做出的反应时才是正当的,不管这种反应是为了保卫自己国家的边境,还是为了把别国从侵略中解放出来。使用武力必须是最后的手段,并且战争的进行必须以确立和平为目的。国家的自卫权利来自个人的自卫权利这一类推。但对这种类推可被认可的范围人们存在争议。是否容许以成千上万人的生命去保卫一块土地,这一问题并不明确。就第二个条件来看,主要的要求是战争应与无辜受害者成比例。所有引起无道理的或不必要的毁灭的手段都应避免。更重要的是,非战斗人员,特别是无辜平民,必须受到保护。他们应尽可能地受到免受战争创伤的保护,并应享有不受直接和故意伤害的保护。问题在于,在实际的现代战争中,很难区分战斗人员和非战斗人员。而且很多战斗人员也是无辜的。关于是什么使战争成为正义战争的理论是变化的,并适应时间、地点的特定需要和发生变化的战争性质。新的大规模杀伤技术,如原子、生物和化学武器,如用于战争会不可避免地杀害大量无辜的平民。为此,在正义战争中,它们被广泛认为在道义上是不能接受的。同样,种族灭绝作为战争的目的或后果普遍遭到谴责。

“传统的正义战争理论特别包含了某些关于谁可以 and 谁不可以在战争中拿起武器来的论述;此外,它还有如下三个主要论点:正义的战争必须由合适的权威发动和领导,必须是为具有正确意图的正义事业而战,不能使用不正当的手段。”——泰西曼:《和平主义和正义战争》,1986年,第46页。

正义

[希腊文: *dikaion*, 由 *dike* 而来,含义是诉讼法律;拉丁文的对应词是 *justum*, 由 *jussum* 而来,含义是已被命令的。从词源学上看,正义

doing things which should be enforced by authority] From its origin, justice has concerned both fair dealing and righteousness. In law, justice is the sum of principles and rules that ought to be followed. Hence, a system of law is also called a system of justice. In moral and political philosophy, justice is roughly equivalent to fairness or equity. It is just to treat people in proportion to their relevant differences, and justice is a virtue concerning relationships among individuals and between individuals and societies. As a principle of social order giving individuals their due, justice demands that the rights of individuals are not violated by others members of society or by the state. Plato in his *Republic* defined justice as the harmonious order between different elements of the soul, or between different classes of society. Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice (the correct allocation of scarce resources) and rectificatory justice (the rectification of injustice by punishing offences) is still of fundamental importance. Since seeking justice involves seeking social order and stability, justice has been a central topic in moral and political philosophy. Hume's conventionalism, social contract theory, utilitarianism and Rawls' rational choice of principles in an original position are some of the significant attempts to justify the principles of justice. When the established pattern of social norms is basically fair, justice serves as a principle to protect this order. When the existing order is not fair, justice becomes a principle of reform calling for social revision.

Contemporary discussions of justice surround Rawls' theory of justice.¹ On this account, the essence of justice is fairness. Inequality in the distribution of primary goods or social values can be accepted only if it improves the situation of everyone, especially of the least advantaged. Otherwise inequality is simply unjust. This general conception of justice leads to Rawls' fully articulated conception, which comprises two principles of justice. The first principle gives priority to equal liberty and the second principle deals with equality of opportunity and the just distribution of goods. The general notion summarises the common point in the two principles and shares their orientation. Since Rawls focuses on the two principles rather than on this general notion, there has been a dispute about whether this general notion is a substantive notion of justice or merely is a pattern of reasoning leading to a determinate concept. Many aspects of this account of justice have led to important methodological and substantive discussion and the development of rival positions.

"It will be recalled that the general conception of justice as fairness requires that all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone's advantage."—Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 150.

是应由权威强制的、规定的做事情的方式]从它的起源来看,正义与公平交易和正当的行为相关。在法律上,正义是应当遵循的原则和法规的总和。因此,法律体系也被称为正义的体系。在道德和政治哲学中,正义大体上相当于公平或平等。公正就是依据人们相应的差异来分别对待他们,正义是涉及个人之间及个人和社会之间关系的一种美德。作为给予个人以应得权益的一条社会秩序的原则,正义要求个人的权利不被社会其他成员或国家所侵犯。柏拉图在他的《国家篇》中,把正义定义为灵魂的不同组成部分之间,或者说社会不同阶级之间的和谐秩序。亚里士多德对分配的正义(对珍稀资源的恰当分配)和矫正的正义(通过惩罚犯罪行为对非正义的矫正)所做的区分至今仍非常重要。由于对正义的探索包括对社会秩序和稳定的探索,正义一直是道德哲学和政治哲学的中心论题。休谟的因袭主义、社会契约说、功利主义和罗尔斯的原初状态中原则的合理选择理论是一些证明正义原则的重要尝试。当所确立的社会规范模式基本上是公平的时候,正义作为一个原则起保护这一秩序的作用。当现存的秩序是不公平的时候,正义就成为一个要求社会变更的改革原则。

当代对正义的讨论是围绕罗尔斯的正义论进行的。按照他的论述,正义的本质是公平。在基本利益或社会财富分配上的不平等只有在它改善了每个人,特别是最少受惠人的境况的情况下,才可以被接受。否则,不平等就是非正义。这一正义的一般观念引出了罗尔斯对这一观念充分而明确的论述,这一观念由两条正义原则构成。第一条原则给平等的自由以优先性,第二条原则涉及的是机会的平等和利益分配上的公正。正义的一般观念概括了这两条原则中的共同点,并共有它们的倾向性。由于罗尔斯的论述集中在两条原则而不是一般观念上,因而对这一一般观念是否是一个独立的正义观念,或者说是否只是一种导出一个确定概念的推理方式,一直存在着争论。对正义的这一论述在许多方面引发了重要的方法论及实质问题的讨论,并导致了各种对立观点的发展。

"可以记得,作为公平的一般正义观念要求平等地分配所有基本的社会利益,除非一种不平等的分配将有利于每一个人。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第150页。

Justification

Whatever is provided as grounds to prove or defend one's claim or conduct. If a principle or a position is deduced from relevant premises, it is said to be justifiably inferred. To seek justification for a statement or action is the fundamental characteristic of a rational being, although there is controversy over what counts as reliable justification. Justification is especially required in epistemology and science in order to meet the challenge of scepticism. Epistemological justification has two senses. One is called objective justification and is concerned with what we should believe given what is in fact true, and it thus identified with truth. The other is the subjective sense, which is to determine what we should or should not believe given what we actually do believe, regardless of whether or not it is objectively correct. The latter is the ordinary sense of the term. It requires that we specify the norms under which we may hold a belief. To determine what to believe is a fundamental problem for epistemology, and justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. For a long time, historically, philosophers agreed that knowledge is justified true belief. But this analysis was been challenged by E. Gettier in his famous Gettier paradox.

"Justification, on most views, aims at producing something else: rational or justified belief." —Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 240.

Justificationism

Popper divided philosophy into two main groups. One proposes justificationism, which holds that science is the quest for justification, certainty or probability. These philosophers also support verificationism, which identifies knowledge with verified or proven knowledge. A belief is acceptable only if it can be confirmed or verified by positive observation and experience and past evidence renders future happenings probable. Popper criticised this position as unscientific and proposed a rival programme of falsificationism, which claims that the rationality of science does not seek justification or verification, but seeks to test theories through attempted refutation. We can never establish certainty for a theory, and only theories which are falsifiable are scientific.

"The members of the first group—the verificationists or justificationists—hold, roughly speaking, that whatever cannot be supported by positive reasons is unworthy of being believed, or even of being taken into consideration." —Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1972, p. 228.

辩明

用来作为基础以证明或捍卫某人的主张或行为的东西。如果一个原理或一种立场是从相关的前提推演出来的,那么就可以说它是有充分的理由得到推论的。寻求对陈述或行为的辩明,是理性存在物的基本特征,尽管对什么可以作为可靠的辩明还是一个引起争议的问题。认识论和科学特别需要辩明,以迎接怀疑论的挑战。认识论的辩明有两种意义。一种被称做客观的辩明,它关心的是我们应该相信所得到的东西事实上为真,因而这就被等同于真理。另一种是主观的意义,它要确定的是我们是否应该相信我们实际上所相信的东西,无论它在客观上是否正确。后者就是这个词的通常意义。它要求我们阐明我们可以持有信念的那些准则。要确定相信什么,这是认识论的基本问题,而辩明则是知识的必要条件。长时间以来,在历史上,哲学家们认为,知识就是得到辩明的真信念。但这种分析已经受到了盖梯尔在他著名的“盖梯尔悖论”中提出的挑战。

“根据大多数人的观点,辩明的目的在于提供其他的东西:合理的或得到辩明的信念。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第240页。

证明主义

波普把哲学划分为两个主要阵营。一个叫做证明主义,认为科学就是寻求证明、确实性或或然性。这一阵营也支持“证实主义”,它把知识等同于已被证实或证明了的知识。一个信念仅当它能为确定的观察和经验所确证或证实才是可接受的;过去的证据使得未来的事件变为可能。波普把这种立场批评为不科学的,并提出了一个与之相对的否定主义纲领,主张科学的合理性并不寻求证明或证实,而是寻求反驳以检验理论。我们绝不能确立一个理论的确定性,只有可否证的理论才是科学的。

“第一阵营的成员——证实主义者或证明主义者坚信,粗略地说,凡不能得到确实的理由支持的东西都不值得相信,甚或不值得考虑。”——波普:《猜想与反驳》,1972年,第228页。

K

Kalon, the Greek word for beauty

Kantian ethics

Kant's ethics and other ethical systems which follow it in at least some fundamental aspects. Contemporary Kantian moral philosophers include John Rawls, Alan Donagan, Alan Gewirth and to some degree, R. M. Hare. The general characteristics of a Kantian ethics are as follows: (1) Universalism and formalism. The search for a single or a few supreme moral principles or laws which are abstract and universal to govern all rational beings regardless of their particular and historical circumstances. (2) Rationalism. These principles and laws are formed from reason alone, independent of our desires and emotions. (3) Autonomy. These principles express the rational agency or freedom of human beings. (4) The emphasis on obligation or duty. The moral value of our behaviour is determined in terms of its conformity with the universal moral principles. (5) A realm of ends. Human beings must be respected as ends rather than as mere means, and the creation of a kingdom of ends is the priority of human activity. Kantian ethics is a target of the contemporary anti-theory movement and is criticised for ignoring differences in social and historical situation, for excluding human emotion and desire, for its ignorance of moral luck, its underestimation of the value of virtue, and its rejection of practical intuition.

"Whatever may be true of Kant, it would seem that, at least among the present-day linguistic analysts who have tried to adapt certain features of Kantian ethics to their purposes, the effort has been made to recognise the purely formal features of moral laws, without attempting to explain and account for such features in terms of the peculiar nature and constitution of rational, moral beings." - Veatch, *For an Ontology of Morals*, 1971, p. 151.

Kantianism

All philosophical thought that developed out of the spirit and themes of Kant's critical philosophy. Although such developments moved in different directions, they all originated from aspects of Kant's philosophy or dealt with the same topics in different interpretations. Some followers demanded that we go back to Kant, but many others tried to go beyond Kant. Fichte elaborated the Kantian notion of the transcendental subject and led German idealism toward Schelling and Hegel, on the one hand, and Schopenhauer, on the other. The neo-Kantian movement dominated German philosophy for several decades from the late nineteenth to the

美

“美 (beauty)” 的希腊词。

康德主义伦理学

指康德的伦理学和其他至少在某些基本方面追随康德的伦理学体系。当代的康德主义道德哲学家包括罗尔斯、A. 唐那根、A. 杰沃斯, 在某种意义上, 也包括黑尔。一种康德主义伦理学的一般特征如下: (1) 普遍主义和形式主义。寻求单一的或几条至上的道德原则或法则, 它们是抽象的和普遍的, 支配着所有的理性存在者, 而无需考虑他们特殊的历史环境。(2) 理性主义。这些原则和法则是由理性自身建构的, 与我们的欲望和情感不相干。(3) 自主性。这些原则表达着的是有理性的行为者或人的自由。(4) 对于义务或职责的强调。我们行为的道德价值在于它与普遍的道德原则的一致。(5) 一个目的领域。人类必须作为目的而得到尊重而不仅仅是工具。目的王国的创造是人类行为所应优先考虑的。康德主义伦理学是当代反理论运动的攻击目标, 人们批评它忽略了社会和历史环境的差别, 排除了人类的情感和欲望, 忽略了道德运气, 低估了德性的价值以及对实践直觉的拒斥。

“不管对康德来说什么是真的, 至少在现在那些力图把康德伦理学的某些特征用来服务他们的目的的语言分析学家之间, 已经普遍承认道德法则的纯粹形式的特征, 而不仅依据有理性的道德存在者的特殊性质和结构, 来力图解释和说明这些特征。”——维奇:《为道德本体论辩护》, 1971年, 第151页。

康德主义

由康德批判哲学的主题和精神所发展出来的一切哲学思想。虽然这样的发展朝着不同的方向, 但它们都发源于康德哲学的各方面, 或以不同的解释来论究同样的论题。某些追随者呼吁回到康德那里, 但另外的许多人企图超越康德。费希特详细阐发了康德的先验主体的概念, 把德国唯心主义一方面引向谢林和黑格尔, 另一方面引向叔本华。新康德主义运动从19世纪晚期到20世纪早期支配了德国哲学数十年。康德对自我的论述, 包括统觉的先验统一的核心概念, 不仅启发了胡塞尔和海德格尔的现象学,

early twentieth centuries. Kant's account of the self, including the central notion of the transcendental unity of apperception, not only inspired the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, but also figured prominently in discussions of personal identity and consciousness in analytical philosophy. Kantian ethics and utilitarianism have been the two major trends of moral thinking. Kant's theory of experience, the limitations he placed on reason, his account of space, time and mathematics, his notion things-in-themselves, his account of synthetic *a priori* judgements, his theory of categories, his conception of the categorical imperative, his distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning and his account of judgement were significantly discussed by major successors in diverse schools. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is essentially a Kantian project. There has been much recent sympathetic interpretation of Kantian moral theory. In other ways as well, Kant's philosophy has been a principal source of modern and contemporary philosophy. The neo-Kantian Liebmann described the situation in this way: "You can philosophize with Kant, or you can philosophize against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without Kant".

"Kantianism would still maintain that in the long run observed variations are to be conceived of as modifications in something absolutely constant, and that science advances precisely by seeking out this enduring or constant something." —Schlick, *General Theory of Knowledge*, 1974, p. 346.

Katalepsis, Greek term for apprehension

Killing

Action which ends a life. Killing a human being has always been regarded the greatest moral evil, and the right to life has been regarded as the most fundamental human right. The injunction not to kill an innocent person is the oldest and most universal moral maxim. In ancient societies, this maxim applied only to one's own community. Under Christianity, it was extended to all human beings, because all humans were regarded as having an immortal soul. Modern moral theory justifies the inviolability of human life in terms of our human dignity as rational beings. Traditionally, killing has been justified only in a just war and as capital punishment, although both of these grounds have been challenged. The principle which forbids killing provides fundamental support for the anti-abortion and anti-euthanasia movements. Disputes in this area have led to controversies about the scope and limits of this principle. Contemporary animal rights campaigners attempt to extend the principle to protect sentient non-human animals and claim, controversially, that killing animals is morally wrong.

"Killing in self-defence is an exception to a general rule making killing punishable." —Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, 1968, p. 57.

而且也突出地展现于分析哲学对个人同一性和意识的讨论中。康德的伦理学和功利主义一直是道德思想的两种主要趋向。康德的经验理论,他对理性设置的界限,他对空间、时间和数学的论述,他的物自身概念,他的先天综合判断的论述,他的范畴理论,他的绝对命令概念,他对理论理性和实践理性的区分和他对判断的论述,由主要的后继者以各种学派进行富有意义的讨论。斯特劳森的描述的形而上学本质上是康德的事业。最近一直有很多对康德道德理论的赞同的解释。同样在其他方面,康德哲学一直是现代和当代哲学的主要源泉。新康德主义者李普曼这样描写这种状况:“你可以赞成康德来搞哲学,你也可以反对康德来搞哲学,但你不能抛开康德搞哲学。”

“康德主义仍然坚持:从长远来看,所注意到的变化必须要被设想为对某种绝对恒久的东西的改进,科学正是通过不断寻求这种持久的或恒久的东西而前进。”——石里克:《普通认识论》,1974年,第346页。

理解

表示“领悟”的希腊词。

杀害

消灭生命的行为。杀人一直被认为是道德上最大的恶,而生存权一直被认为是最基本的人权。不许杀害无辜的人的禁令是最古老、最普遍的道德准则。在古代社会,这条准则只适用于人们自己的共同体。在基督教统治时期,这一准则扩展到所有的人,因为所有的人都被视为具有不道德的灵魂。现代道德理论从我们作为理性存在者的人类尊严方面来论证人的生命不可侵犯。从传统来看,只有在正义的战争中或作为死刑的执行,杀害才被视为正当的,尽管这两者的根据都已受到挑战。禁止杀害的原则为反对堕胎和反对安乐死的运动提供了重要的支持。在这一领域的争论引发了有关这一原则的范围和限度的论战。当代倡导动物权利的人试图把这一原则扩展到保护有感觉的非人类的动物,并且争论说杀害动物在道德上是错误的。

“在自卫中的杀害是排除在使杀害受到惩罚的一般法规之外的。”——哈特:《惩罚与责任》,1968年,第57页。

Kinesis

[Greek: change, movement or motion] Aristotle sometimes restricted *kinesis* to non-substantial changes in a continuing thing, including change of place, qualitative change or quantitative change, while using *gignesthai* for substantial change and *metabole* for change which includes both *kinesis* and *gignesthai*. But these distinction were not always observed, and on many occasions the words were used interchangeably. Aristotle also contrasted *kinesis* with *energeia* (activity). According to this distinction, *kinesis* is movement having an end outside itself and incomplete until its end is achieved. In contrast, *energeia* is movement containing its end within itself and complete throughout the movement. Writing a book is *kinesis* because it is not complete until the end it achieved, while writing is *energeia* because without a definite endpoint it is complete throughout. For this reason, as soon as I can say that I am writing I can also say that I have written, but I cannot say that I have written the book as soon as I can say that I am writing the book. However, Aristotle sometimes treated *kinesis* as a species of *energeia*.

"For every *kinesis* (motion) is incomplete--making thin, learning, walking, building; these are *kineses*, and incomplete at that." -- Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048b29-30.

Kingdom of darkness

In the *New Testament*, the kingdom of darkness was believed to be led by Satan, and is also called the kingdom of Satan. In Hobbes' philosophy, it refers to all errors or obstacles which interfere with a person's salvation. In *Leviathan*, IV, Hobbes lists the following categories of errors: misinterpreting the Bible (in particular the doctrines of Catholic Papists and Presbyterians); the influence of pagan mythology (demonology, the belief in demons) upon Christianity (such as the imported ideas of Greek philosophy in Christianity); and misinterpreting the history and traditions of Christianity. The kingdom of darkness stands in contrast to the kingdom of God, which includes a natural kingdom in which the laws are promulgated by human reason, although commanded by God, and a prophetic kingdom in which the laws are promulgated through prophets.

"The kingdom of darkness... is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in his present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature, and of the Gospel; and so to dis-prepare them for the kingdom of God to come." -- Hobbes, *Leviathan*, IV, 44. 1.

Kingdom of ends

For Kant, a kingdom is a systematic conjunction of rational beings under common laws, and the kingdom of ends is an ideal union or world in which each rational being is treated as an end rather than merely as a means to an end, and each pursues his ends in conformity to the requirements of the universal law which he has freely made. According to one version of Kant's categorical imperative, a rational being

运动

[源自希腊词,“变化”或“运动”]有时亚里士多德用 *kinesis* 只是指一个连续事物中的非本体运动(包括位置的变化、质的变化和量的变化),而用 *gignesthai* 指本体变化,用 *metabole* 指包括 *kinesis* 和 *gignesthai* 的全部变化。可这种区别并不总是被严格遵守的。在许多场合这些词被不加区分地使用。亚里士多德也把 *kinesis* 与活动 (*energeia*) 相对比,根据这种区分, *kinesis* 是有着外在目的的运动,在达到这个目的之前是未完成的;相反, *energeia* 则是包含自身目的在内的运动,它是通过整个运动完成的。写一本书是 *kinesis*,因为它在没有达到目的之前是没有完成的,而写作本身是 *energeia*,因为在整个过程中它并没有一个确定的终结点。由于这一原因,我可以说我正在写,我也可说我已经写完了;但当我能说我正在写这本书时,我不能说我已经写完了。然而,亚里士多德有时又把 *kinesis* 当做 *energeia* 的一个属。

“每一 *kinesis* (运动) 都是未完成的一 减肥,学习,散步,建筑等都是运动,可都是未完成的。” -- 亚里士多德: 《形而上学》, 1048b29-30。

黑暗之国

在《新约》中,黑暗之国被认为是由撒旦领导的,亦称为“撒旦之国”。在霍布斯的哲学中,它指妨碍人类获救的一切错误和障碍。在《利维坦》第四章中,霍布斯列举了下列几类错误:曲解《圣经》(特别是有关天主教徒和长老会教徒的学说);异教神话(魔鬼学,对魔鬼的信仰)对基督教的影响(诸如基督教中引入的希腊哲学思想);曲解基督教的历史和传统。黑暗之国与“上帝之国”相对立,后者包括自然之国和先知之国。在自然之国,法律虽然由上帝命定,却是根据人的理性颁布的,在先知之国,法律由先知颁布。

“黑暗之国……无非是骗子的集团,为了达到对现世人的统治,它极力用黑暗荒谬的学说熄灭人们心中的自然之光和神圣之光,从而使他们对将要到来的上帝之国无所准备。” -- 霍布斯:《利维坦》,第四部分,第44章,第1节。

目的王国

康德的术语。“王国”一词意为理性存在者在共同的法则之下的一个系统联合体。目的王国是这样一种理想的联合体或世界,其中每个理性存在者都被视为目的而不是仅仅作为实现目的的手段,每个人都使他的追求符合于由他自由地制定的普遍法则的要求。按康德的绝对命令的一种表述,每个理性存在者必须总是把

must always regard himself as a legislator in a kingdom of ends. Such a kingdom abstracts from the personal differences between rational beings and also from the content of their private ends, for in this world each pursues his own interests in ways that not only do not conflict with the purposes of others, but also assists their purposes. It is actually nothing other than the highest good (*summum bonum*) and is therefore an ideal or intelligible world (*mundus intelligibilis*), which serves as a regulation for testing practical maxims. This notion also enabled Kant to take God as the sovereign head legislating in this moral kingdom of ends. It thus provided the basis for a moral proof of the existence of God, in the sense that the concept of God is alleged to be necessary to make our moral life intelligible.

"For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i. e., a kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends (certainly only as an ideal)." Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 433.

Kingdom of God, see Kingdom of darkness

KK-thesis

The thesis that knowing something, *p*, entails that the subject knows that he knows *p*. Taking *K* to represent knowing, the thesis can be symbolised as " $Kp \rightarrow KKp$ ". The thesis is internalist and can be traced to Plato and Aristotle. Schopenhauer explicitly emphasised that my knowing and my knowing that I know are inseparable. Jaakko Hintikka introduced this claim into contemporary epistemology and argues for its truth. The thesis holds that knowledge cannot be implicit. What counts as proper knowledge must be evident to the subject itself. Accordingly, if an agent does not know the process that gives rise to a belief, the belief is unjustified. But some philosophers deny the validity of this thesis on the grounds that it leads to regress. For if I know only when I know that I know, then I know that I know only when I know that I know that I know, and so forth. It is also claimed that knowing is first-order knowledge, while knowing that one knows is second-order knowledge. These are different things. If the KK-thesis is false, a proposition may be known without it being known that it is known.

"... What is sometimes called 'the KK thesis', ... holds that in order to know something, you must at the same time know that you know it." —Carruthers, *Human Knowledge and Human Nature*, 1992, p. 74.

Knower paradox

A self-referential paradox, first formulated by Kaplan and Montague, similar to the liar paradox. There is a sentence *S* which says that "the negation of this sentence is known to be true". If *S* is true, its negation should be true, but if its negation is true, *S* cannot be true and must be false. On the other hand, if its negation is true, since this is

自己作为目的王国中的立法者。这样一个王国抽象掉了理性存在者之间的个人差别，也抽象掉了他们私人目的的内容，因为在这个世界中，每个人都以这种方式来追求他自己的利益：他们不仅与他人的目的没有冲突，而且还帮助去实现他人的目的。它实际上恰恰就是至善 (*summum bonum*)，因而是“理想的”，或“理智的世界” (*mundus intelligibilis*)，它用来作为检验实践准则的规则。这个概念也使康德把上帝作为在这个道德的目的王国中立法的至高无上的领导者。因此，在上帝概念被宣称为使我们的道德生活成为可理解而必需的意义上，它就为上帝存在的道德证明提供了基础。

“一切理性存在者都须服从这样的规律：每个人都不应把自己和别人仅仅看作工具，而应该永远同时看作是目的自身。这样就产生了一个依照共同的客观法则而建立起来的有理性存在者的系统联合体，即可以称为目的王国的王国（当然只作为一种理想）。” 康德：《道德形而上学基础》，第433页。

上帝之国

见“黑暗之国”条。

KK 论题

这个论题是指，知道某物 *p*，就意味着这个主体知道他知道 *p*。用 *K* 代表知道，这个论题就可以用符号表示为 " $Kp \rightarrow KKp$ "。这是一个内在论的论题，可以追溯到柏拉图和亚里士多德。叔本华明确强调，我知道和我知道我知道是不可分的。J. 辛提卡把它引入当代认识论，认为它是真的。这个论题主张，知识不可能是隐含的。被作为专门知识的东西必须是对主体自身显而易见的。因而，如果某个人并不知道产生信念的过程，那么这个信念就没有得到辨明。但某些哲学家否认这个论题的可靠性，认为它导致了循环论证。因为如果我知道只有当我知道时我知道，那么我就知道我知道只有当我知道时我知道，如此类推。人们还认为，知道是一阶知识，而知道某人知道则是二阶知识。它们是完全不同的东西。如果 KK 论题是假的，能够知道一个命题就并不需要知道它被知道。

“……有时称作的‘KK 论题’，……认为，为了知道某个东西，你必须同时知道你知知道它。”——卡鲁塞：《人类知识和人类本性》，1992年，第74页。

知者悖论

一种自我指涉的悖论，由卡普兰和蒙塔古首先提出，类似于说谎者悖论。有一个句子 *S* 说，“对这个句子的否定被认为是真的”。如果 *S* 是真的，那么它的否定也应该是真的；但如果它的否定是真的，那么 *S* 就不可能是真的，而必定是假的。另一方面，如果它的否定是真的，因

what S says, S must be true. Hence S is both true and false. There are various solutions to this paradox, although none is free from difficulty. Among the solutions the most influential one appeals to a distinction between different classes of knowing, that is, between knowing in the metalanguage and knowing in the object language. Another influential proposal is that sentences of this kind do not have truth-values. The existence of this paradox sets certain constraints upon any formalised theory of language.

"In view of certain obvious analogies with the well-known paradox of the liar, we call the paradox ... [the paradox of] the knower." —Montague, *Formal Philosophy*, 1974, p. 84.

Knowing how

Ryle distinguishes between knowing how and knowing that, with the aim of demolishing the Cartesian account of intelligence. Knowing how is to know how to do something correctly and concerns the ability to organise and exploit truths when discovered. It is basically a way of behaving or performing, a disposition to do something efficiently. Knowing that, on the other hand, is knowledge that such and such is the case, knowledge of this or that truth, the state of being in possession of information. Knowing that is factual knowledge that comprises the stock of truths that the mind can acquire and retain. In the Cartesian tradition, intellectual operations are thought to be the core of mental conduct, and they are thought to be mainly the acts of cognition, that is of knowing that. The tradition assimilates knowing how to knowing that by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules and the application of these rules. Ryle argues in contrast that intellectual activities are chiefly cases of knowing how, and that knowing how is logically prior to knowing that. In many intelligent performances the rules or criteria are unformulated. Furthermore, if intellectual operations must refer to a rule and if the formulation of the rule itself involves intellectual operations, an infinite regress will arise. Thus, factual knowledge and theorising on the basis of such knowledge is not the core of intelligence and not the fundamental form of mental life. To say that people have minds is to say that they are able and prone to do certain things. Thus Ryle substitutes for the Cartesian concept of intelligence, a dispositional analysis of intellectual activities.

"'Intelligent' cannot be defined in terms of 'intellectual'; or 'knowing how' in terms of 'knowing that'; 'thinking what I am doing' does not connote 'both thinking what to do and doing it'." —Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 32.

Knowing that, see knowing how

Knowledge

Epistemology is the systematic inquiry into knowledge, its nature, possibility, kinds and scope. Knowledge has been distinguished into various species on different grounds, such

as of this being S's saying, then S must be true. Hence S is both true and false. There are various solutions to this paradox, although none is free from difficulty. Among the solutions the most influential one appeals to a distinction between different classes of knowing, that is, between knowing in the metalanguage and knowing in the object language. Another influential proposal is that sentences of this kind do not have truth-values. The existence of this paradox sets certain constraints upon any formalised theory of language.

"由于明显地类似于著名的说谎者悖论,我们就把这个悖论称作……知者悖论。"——蒙塔古:《形式哲学》,1974年,第84页。

知道如何

为了推翻笛卡尔关于智能的描述,赖尔区分了“知道如何”和“知道如此”。知道如何是知道如何正确地做某事,这与在发现真以后组织和使用真的能力有关。它基本上是一种行为或操作的方式,一个有效地做某事的倾向。而“知道如此”则是关于情形是如此这般的知识,是关于真的知识,是一种占有信息的状态。知道如此是真实知识,包涵着心可以获得和保持的真。在笛卡尔传统中,智力操作被认为是心的行为的核心,并且它们被认为主要是认知的活动,亦即知道如此。因此,这一传统将知道如何理解为知道如此。它论辩说,智能操作包含着遵守规则和对于这些规则的运用。而赖尔则论辩说,智力活动主要是知道如何,而且知道如何在逻辑上优先于知道如此。在许多智能操作中,规则或标准并没有被系统地阐述。而且,如果智力操作必须借助于规则,且规则的系统阐述本身必须包含智力操作,那就会导致一个无限后推。因此,事实知识与在此基础之上的理论化不是智能的核心,也不是心的生活的基本形式。说人们拥有心灵,是说他们能够或倾向于做某些事情。这样赖尔以对于智力活动的倾向性分析取代笛卡尔的智能概念。

“‘智能’不能用‘智力’来定义;‘知道如何’也不能用‘知道如此’来定义;‘想我在做什么’并不意味着‘既想要做什么又正在做此事’。”——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949年,第32页。

知道如此

见“知道如何”条。

知识

认识论就是对知识及其性质、可能性、种类和范围的系统探究。知识根据不同的基础一直被分为各种不同的类型,诸如命题知识、非命题

as propositional and non-propositional knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance and by description, *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, knowing how and knowing that, among others. What is the common definition for all these kinds of knowledge? Starting from Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*, knowledge has been thought to consist in three necessary conditions: belief, truth and justification. Traditionally, the focus is on the nature of justification. Epistemologists are divided into advocates of foundationalism, coherentism and contextualism, each of which has various versions. In 1963 Gettier showed that these three conditions do not really explain what knowledge is. For I may hold a justified belief which is true but which I believe to be true only as a matter of luck. Such a belief cannot count as knowledge. Epistemology since then has been debating whether the original conditions need to be modified, or whether further conditions must be introduced. The causal theory of knowledge claims that knowledge should be analysed as true belief where there is a causal connection between that belief and the state or event represented by that belief. Reliabilism suggests that knowledge should be analysed as true belief acquired by a reliable method or procedure. The position which proposes that the conditions which distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge must be available to the subject is internalism, while the position which does not insist such an awareness is externalism.

"To know is to have a belief that tracks the truth. Knowledge is a particular way of being connected to the world, having a specific real factual connection to the world; tracking it." — R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 178.

Knowledge argument

An argument introduced by the Australian philosopher Frank Jackson against the thesis of physicalism. Physicalism states that to know a mental state and event is to know the information about the relevant nervous system. A colour-blind person, however, does not know what it is like to see a red thing until he is cured and can see the thing himself. The information about his brain remains unchanged, yet his qualia become different when he gains colour vision. The same point can extend to other senses, such as tasting or hearing and can apply to the sensations and experiences of a physically normal person in varying circumstances. This indicates that physicalism leaves something out. Certain sensations and perceptual experiences cannot be reduced to states of the brain because complete physical knowledge does not provide knowledge of qualia.

"The polemical strength of the knowledge argument is that it is so hard to deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have." — Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32 (1982), p. 130.

Knowledge by acquaintance, see knowledge by description

知识、亲知的知识、摹状的知识、“先天”与“后天”的知识、知道如何、知道如此以及其他。那么,所有这些知识的共同定义究竟是什么呢?从柏拉图的对话《泰阿泰德篇》开始,知识就一直被认为是由三种必要条件构成的:信念、真和辨明。在传统上,人们关注的焦点在于辨明的性质。认识论家被分为“基础主义”、“融贯主义”和“语境主义”的拥护者,而每个阵营又都具有各自不同的看法。盖梯尔在1963年表明,这三个条件实际上并没有解释知识是什么。因为我可以持有一个得到辨明的真信念,但我相信这个信念为真只是凭借运气。这种信念是不能作为知识的。从此,认识论就一直在争论,是否需要修正最初的条件,或是否需要引入其他条件。“知识的因果理论”认为,知识应该被分析为真的信念,因为在这个信念与它所表达的状态或事件之间存在一种因果联系。“可靠论”则提出,知识应该被分析为某种可靠的方法或步骤所需要的真信念。认为区分知识与非知识的条件必须适用于主体,这个立场被称作“内在论”,而并不同意这种意识存在的立场则是“外在论”。

“知道就是拥有追踪真理的信念。知识是与世界联系的一种特殊方法,拥有与世界的专门的真正现实的联系:追踪它。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1984年,第178页。

知识论证

澳大利亚哲学家F. 杰克逊针对物理主义论题而引入的一个论证。物理主义指出,知道一个心智状态和事件就是知道关于相应的神经网络的信息。不过,一个患色盲的人并不知道看见一红色的东西是怎么回事,直到他被治愈并亲自看见那个东西为止。当他获得颜色视觉时,有关他的大脑的信息没有变,但他的可感受特性(qualia)变得不同了。同一说法可以延伸至其他感官如味觉、听觉等,并能应用于处在不同情境下的生理正常的人的感觉和经验。这表明物理主义遗漏了某些东西。有些感觉和知觉经验不能归结为大脑的状态,因为纯粹的生理知识并未提供有关可感受特性的知识。

“知识论证的论辩力量在于,否定下述中心主张是特别困难的:人们能够获得所有的物理信息而仍未获得那里究竟有什么的全部信息。”——杰克逊:《附随现象特征》,《哲学季刊》,32 (1982),第130页。

亲知的知识

见“摹状的知识”条。

Knowledge by description

Russell distinguished between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. The latter, sometimes simply called acquaintance, is a dyadic relation between a knowing subject and an object of direct awareness (that is awareness without the mediation of any process of inference or any knowledge of truth). The objects of acquaintance include particulars like sense-data, memories and our own awareness of objects. They also include universals like redness and roundness, the awareness of which Russell called conceiving. Physical objects and other minds, on the contrary, are known by description. Description is of two kinds: ambiguous description, which is conveyed by any phrase of the form "a so-and-so", and definite description, which is conveyed by any phrase of the form "the so-and-so". Acquaintance is knowledge of things, while description is knowledge of truths. Russell's theory of definite descriptions analyses such descriptions to avoid the apparent need to posit special entities as their objects when they do not succeed in picking out actual objects.

"We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds ... Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only knowledge by description." Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 1917, p. 231.

Knowledge *de dicto*, see knowledge *de re*

Knowledge *de re*

Of a specific object, knowledge that it has a certain property or stands in certain relation, such as "Beijing is the capital city of China". If this object is oneself, and the subject knows it, then the knowledge is knowledge *de se*, which is usually expressed in the form of "I am..." or "I have...". In contrast is knowledge *de dicto* which is about a fact or proposition rather than about a specific object. For example, "There is a capital city in China". A person who knows this fact does not necessarily know that this capital is Beijing.

"The definition of the concept of *de re* knowledge is comparatively simple: X is known by S to be F = def. There is a proposition which is known by S and which implies X to be F." — Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 183.

Knowledge *de se*, see knowledge *de re*

Knowledge of matters of fact, see knowledge of relations of ideas

Knowledge of relations of ideas

Hume distinguished between knowledge of matters of fact and knowledge of the relations of ideas. Some knowledge depends upon the relations of ideas, and a statement which expresses such knowledge will not fall into contradiction. Knowledge of relations of ideas can be discovered either by

摹状的知识

罗素区分了摹状的和亲知的知识。后者有时简单叫做亲知，它是知的主体和直接意识的对象之间的一种二元关系（直接意识是没有任何推理过程或任何真理知识作中介的意识）。亲知的对象包括殊相如感觉材料、记忆和我们自己的对象意识，也包括共相如红性、圆性，罗素称之为“构想”（conceiving）的意识。与此相反，物理对象和他人的心灵是通过摹状词知道的。摹状词有两种类型：歧义摹状词，由形如“一个如此这般的东西”（a so-and-so）的任何短语来表达；和限定摹状词，由形如“那个如此这般的东西”（the so-and-so）的任何短语来表达。亲知是关于事物的知识，而摹状是关于真理的知识。罗素的限定摹状词理论分析了这些摹状词，以避免当它们不能成功地识别出现实对象时设定特殊的实体作为它们的对象这一明显需要。

“我们有对感觉材料的亲知，有对许多共相的亲知，可能还有对我们自身的亲知，但没有对物理对象或他人心灵的亲知。……我们关于物理对象和他人心灵的知识只是摹状的知识。”——罗素：《神秘主义和逻辑》，1917年，第231页。

关于命题的知识

见“关于对象的知识”条。

关于对象的知识

关于一种专门对象，知道它具有一定的特性或处于某种关系之中，诸如“北京是中国的首都”。如果这个对象是它自身，而且主体知道它，那么这个知识就被称作“关于自身的知识”，通常表达为这样的形式“我是……”或“我有……”。与此相反的是关于命题的知识，这是关于事实或命题，而不是关于专门的对象。例如“中国有一个首都”。知道这个事实的人并不必须知道这个首都是北京。

“关于对象的知识这个概念的定义相对来说比较简单：X被S得知为F=DF。存在一个由S得知的命题，它意味着X是F。”——齐硕姆：《人与物》，1976年，第183页。

关于自身的知识

见“关于对象的知识”条。

有关事实问题的知识

见“有关观念关系的知识”条。

有关观念关系的知识

休谟区分了有关事实问题的知识和有关观念关系的知识。有的知识依赖于观念的联系，而且表达这种知识的陈述不会陷入矛盾。有关观念关系的知识可以通过直觉或演绎发现出来。与此相反，对于表达有关事实问题的知识的陈

intuition or through deduction. On the other hand, for statements expressing knowledge of matters of fact, the contraries are possible, and this kind of knowledge is based on experience and the relation of cause and effect. Hume sometimes also characterised the difference between these two kinds of knowledge as a distinction between knowledge and probability. Hume's distinction was foreshadowed by Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact, or between necessary and contingent truths. Hume, in turn, provided the precursor of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. Because Kant held that some synthetic judgements can be known *a priori*, Hume's distinction is more directly comparable to the logical positivists' distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements.

"All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to relations of ideas, and matter of fact." —Hume, *Enquiries*, IV, part I.

Kosmos

[Greek: *cosmos*] Etymologically *kosmos* means good order, but its meaning is extended to refer to the ordered universe, for the Greeks observed that the major cosmic events are marked by their regular order. For them, order meant arrangement, structural perfection and beauty. In contrast to *aperion* (unbounded), *kosmos* is finite both in space and in time, having an origin and an end; a limited *kosmos* must have *telos* (end) and be *teleion* (complete) and living. Greek philosophy started by thinking about how a *kosmos* is generated and how all the changes maintain their orders.

"We must say that this *kosmos* is a living, intelligent animal." —Plato, *Timaeus*, 30b.

述,其反面是可能的,这类知识建立在经验和因果关系的基础上。休谟有时在特征上也将这两类知识的区分描述成知识和或然性的区分。这一区分是以莱布尼茨关于理性真理和事实真理的区分,或必然真理和事实真理的区分为先驱的。而反过来休谟又成为康德的分析判断和综合判断之区分的先驱。由于康德认为某些综合判断可以先天得知,所以休谟的区分更直接相似于逻辑实证主义者关于分析判断和综合判断的区分。

“人类理性或探究的全部对象可以自然而然地分为两类:观念的联系和事实问题。”——休谟:《人类理智研究》,第四章,第1部分。

宇宙

[希腊文,音译成英语为 *cosmos*] 在词源学里指“良好秩序”,其意扩展后则指“有秩序的宇宙”,因为在古希腊人看来,主要的宇宙事件是以规则的秩序为标志的。另外,希腊人认为秩序意味着安排、结构的完善与美。与无限相比,宇宙在时空上是有限的,是有起源和目的的;有限的宇宙必然具有目的 (*telos*),必然是完整的和活生生的。希腊哲学发轫于对宇宙如何生成与万变如何维系秩序的思索。

“我们应当说,这个宇宙是一只活生生的理智动物。”——柏拉图:《蒂迈欧篇》,30b。

L

Laissez-faire

[French; *laissez*, to allow or to let + *faire*, to do, hence to leave things alone and let them go their own way] A social and economic theory fashioned in nineteenth century France. The theory advocates economic liberalism, claiming that free exchanges between individuals and the operation of market forces without intervention will produce a more efficient economic order. It also claims that society has its own order as well and that it should be governed by nature instead of the intervention of policy. Individual actions will naturally lead to an optimal state, and the government should be strictly limited to those activities which cannot be accomplished by individual actions. With its individualistic methodology, *laissez-faire* is the basis of libertarianism, and the term has become a motto for those opposed to government intervention in economic activity. Those who see flaws or gaps in the market question the adequacy of *laissez-faire* as an approach to the economy and society.

"*Laissez-faire* is the theory that everyone will gain relatively to any other economic policy if everyone pursues his own interests within a certain framework of laws." — Barry, *Political Arguments*, 1965, p. 206.

Land ethic

An approach to environmental ethics initiated by Aldo Leopold and elaborated by J. Baird Callicott and others. Informed by ecology which reveals that all individuals, including human beings, are internally related to one another and are in an ecological web of interdependence, it claims that the land should be included in the community of moral consideration and that we have obligations towards the land in itself for it has the right to exist. Distinct from animal-centred ethics and life-centred ethics, it proposes that the central concern of environmental ethics should be the ecological system or the biotic community itself and its sub-systems, rather than the individual members it contains. It is therefore also called ecocentrism. As an holistic or totalitarian approach, land ethic is in contrast to traditional individualistic ethics. Its moral slogan is described by Leopold as "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise". The strength of land ethics is its concern for the environment as a whole and its ability to deal with many environmental crises with which other

自由放任主义

[法语: *laissez* (容许或让) 和 *faire* (去做), 因而不去干预事物, 让它们独自行动] 自由放任主义是 19 世纪法国流行的一种社会经济理论。这一理论提倡经济上的自由主义, 认为个人之间的自由交换和不加干预的市场力量的作用会产生一个更有效的经济秩序。它还主张, 社会本身也有它自己的秩序, 它应受自然的统治而不受政策的干预。个人的行为会自然导致一个最理性的状态, 政府应严格限于那些无法由个人行为完成的活动。自由放任主义以及它的个人主义的方法论是自治论自由主义的基础。这一术语已成为那些反对政府干预经济活动的人的箴言。那些看到市场的缺陷或缺点的人对自由放任主义是否适于作为解决经济和社会问题的方法表示怀疑。

“自由放任主义是这样一种理论, 它主张, 如果每个人都在一个特定的法律框架内追求他本人的利益, 那每个人都将相对地获得比任何其他经济政策更多的利益。”——培里:《政治上的论证》, 1965 年, 第 206 页。

土地伦理学

为 A. 利奥波德所创造的、后为卡利科特和其他人所阐发的一种环境伦理学学说。生态学揭示了, 所有个体, 包括人类在内, 是内在相互关联的, 是在一个相互作用的生态系统里。以此为基础, 土地伦理学宣称, 土地应当包括在道德考虑的共同体内, 我们对于土地负有责任, 因为它有权利存在。与动物中心伦理学和生物中心伦理学相区别的是, 它主张环境伦理学关注的中心应当是生态系统或生物共同体本身, 以及它的亚系统, 而不是它所包括的个别成员。因此, 它也称为“生态中心主义”。作为一种整体主义或总体主义学说, 土地伦理学是与传统的个人主义伦理学相对立的。它的道德口号是为利奥波德所提出的: “当一件事情倾向于保持生物共同体的完整性、稳定性和优美性时, 它就是对; 要不然, 就是错的。”土地伦理学的力量在于, 它把环境作为一个整体, 因此能够解决许多环境危机, 而这是其他学说所做不到的。它的批评者宣称, 由于土地不是经验主体, 它就不能被包括在道德共同体内。它的整体主义特征也

approaches fail to cope. Its critics claim that since land is not the subject of experience, it cannot be included in the moral community. It is also criticised as being environmental fascism because of its holistic characteristics.

"The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land." -Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac*, 1949, p. 239.

Language of thought

A term from the title of a book (1975) by the American philosopher Jerry Fodor, also called *mentalese*. Inspired by the notion of a Turing machine, Fodor believes that just as a computer employs a machine language as a medium of computation, so might human thinking employ a human machine language, that is a language-like system of contentful representations. His hypothesis is plausible because there are parallels between the structures of thought and language and because the sounds and marks in natural languages are meaningless in themselves but can be used to express meaning. If thinking can be understood as talking to oneself, a thought as a mental representation can be seen as a linguistic expression within a language of thought. The language of thought is the hypothetical formalised-language analogue in the brain, which has, like a computational system of symbols, its own representational elements and combinatorial rules. Such a structure is realised in the neural structure of the brain and determines the significance of spoken words. The central tenet of the language of thought hypothesis is to explain the origin of mental representation and the source of linguistic meaning. It seeks to reverse Frege's priority of language over thought. For Fodor, this hypothesis is a precondition for any sort of serious theory construction in cognitive psychology. But his critics point out that this hypothesis is regressive, for if spoken words derive their meanings from meaningful interior speech, then what is the source of meaning of the language of thought? The language of thought is close to what Dennett calls brain writing.

"It will have occurred to the reader that what I am proposing to do is resurrect the traditional notion that there is a 'language of thought' and that characterizing that language is a good part of what a theory of the mind needs to do." Fodor, *The Language of Thought*, 1976, p. 33.

Language / speech, see *langue / parole*

Language-games

[German: *Sprachspiel*] A response developed by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy to claims about the essence of language. The formalists once compared

使得它被指责为是“环境法西斯主义”。

“土地伦理学只是扩大了这个共同体的范围，把土壤、水源、植物、动物、或作为整体的土地包括进来。”——利奥波德：《沙乡日记》，1949年，第239页。

思维语言

这一术语来自美国哲学家J. 福多的一本书(1975)的书名，又称“心的语言”。受到“图灵机”概念的启发，福多相信，正像一个计算机使用机器语言作为计算的中介一样，人类思维或许也使用一个“人类机器语言”，亦即一种类似于语言的、具有内容的表征系统。这样一个假设似乎是有道理的，因为思维结构与语言之间的确存在可比性，而且自然语言的声音与标记本身是没有意义的，但它们却可以用来表达意义。如果思维可以被看作是对自己谈话，那么作为一个心的表征的一个思想就可以被看作是思维语言中的一个言语表达。思维语言是一个假设大脑中由语言系统表达的类比，像一个符号的计算系统一样，它也有它自己的表征元素和组合规则。这样一个结构实现于大脑的神经结构并且决定口头语汇的意义。思维语言假设的要旨是要解释心的表征的起因以及言语意义的来源。它旨在逆转弗雷格的语言对思维的先在性。对于福多而言，这一假设是认知心理学中任何一种严肃的理论建构的前提。但有批评指出这一假设是无穷后退的。因为如果口头语汇的意义派生于有意义的内部言语，那么思维语言本身的意义又源何而来呢？思维语言近似于丹奈特所说的“大脑文字”。

“读者将会发现，我所要做的是复兴这样的传统看法：存在一个‘思维语言’，并且描述这个语言是一个关于心的理论所需做的重要部分。”——福多：《思维语言》，1976年，第33页。

语言/言语

见“语言/言语 (*langue/parole*)”条。

语言游戏

[源自德文 *Sprachspiel*] 维特根斯坦在其后期哲学中发挥的对于有关语言本质主张的反应。形式主义者曾经把算术比喻为用数学符号

arithmetic as a game played with mathematical symbols. Wittgenstein extends this game analogy to language as a whole. Like a game, language is an indefinite set of ruled-governed operations carried out by different groups of people for different purposes. The rules constitute grammars. Just as there is no common feature in all games but a family-likeness, there are various overlaps, but no common feature, in the wide variety of ways in which words and sentences are employed. Using language is like playing a game. Language is an autonomous activity and needs no external goal. The meaning of a word does not lie in what it stands for, but is determined by its employment in grammar. To learn the meaning of a word is to learn how to use it. Hence the idea of language as game is closely connected with the theory of meaning as use. Wittgenstein claims that many persisting philosophical problems result from confusing different rules or conventions, so the clarification of rules of language-games should be the main business of philosophy. The account of language games opposes Wittgenstein's earlier view of language in the *Tractatus* and sees the correlation between names and the named objects as only one feature of language.

"We can also think of the whole process of using words... as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games 'language-games'." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 7.

Langue / parole

A distinction drawn by Saussure in his linguistics and translated as the language / speech distinction. According to Saussure, language as a whole can be divided into institutional and innovational elements. The institutional element is called *langue*, and the innovational element is called *parole*. *Langue* comprises language rules, which exist as social conventions. It contains the traditional stock of knowledge held by members of a society and makes communication possible. *Langue* is a social phenomenon and cannot be created or modified by the individual. *Parole*, in contrast, is language in use whereby new definitions of situations are created day by day. It is individual, and the source of linguistic change. The *langue / parole* distinction has had great influence in linguistics, philosophy and other social scientific and humane disciplines. It is the precursor of Chomsky's competence / performance distinction.

"For language itself can be analysed into things which are at the same time similar and yet different. This is precisely what is expressed in Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*, one being the structural side of language, and the other the statistical aspect of it, *langue* belonging to a reversible time, *parole* being non-reversible." —Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, 1968, p. 209.

来玩的游戏。维特根斯坦把这游戏的类比扩展到作为整体的语言。像游戏一样,语言是由不同人群,为不同目的而从事的一系列不确定的、由规则支配的运作。规则构成了语法。正像在所有的游戏中根本没有共同特征而只有家族相似一样,在使用语词和语句的极其多样的方式中,也只有各式各样的交叠重复而没有共同的特征。使用语言就像是玩游戏。语言是一种自主的活动,不需要外在目标。语词的意义不在于它所代表的东西,而是由它在语法中的使用决定的。学习一个词的意义就是学习如何使用它。因此,语言是游戏的看法与意义即用法理论是密切相关的。维特根斯坦主张,许多一直存在的哲学问题导源于混淆了不同的规则或习俗,所以对语言游戏规则澄清应当是哲学的主要工作。对语言游戏的说明与早期维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中的语言观相反,它把名称和被命名对象之间的关系只看作语言的特征之一。

"我们也可以把使用语词的整个过程看成是儿童学习其母语的游戏中的一种。我将把这些游戏称为‘语言游戏’。"——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第7节。

语言/言语

这是由索绪尔在其语言学中做的一个区别,被译为语言/言语(*language/speech*)区别。按照索绪尔的观点,语言作为一个整体可以被分为体制性的和革新性的因素。体制性因素被称为“语言”,而革新性的因素则被称为“言语”。这里讲的语言由语言规则组成,并作为社会约定而存在。它包含一个社会成员所具有的知识传统贮存;它使得交流可能。语言是一种社会现象,不能被个人创造或修改。与此相对,言语是使用中的语言;凭借它,对于形势的新定义被不断地创造出来。它是个人的,并且是语言变化的源泉。这种语言/言语区别在语言学、哲学及其他的社会科学和人文学科中产生了重大影响。它是乔姆斯基的能力/运用(*competence/performance*)区别的先导。

"语言本身可以被分析为同时既相似又有区别的(两种)东西。这正是索绪尔对于语言和言语的区别所表达的内容;一边是语言的结构方面,另一边则是其统计性的方面。语言属于一种可逆的时间,而言语则是不可逆的。"——列维-斯特劳斯:《结构人类学》,1968年,第209页。

Laughter, see humour

Law of contradiction

Also called the law of non-contradiction. The law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle and the law of identity form the basic laws of thought in classical logic. The law of contradiction states that for any proposition p , p and not p cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect. The law forbids the joint affirmation of a proposition and its negation or contradictory. According to this law, we judge that any proposition involving a contradiction is false, and that any proposition negating a contradiction is true. Aristotle in *Metaphysics*, 1006a2-3 defined it as the view that "it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be", and claimed that "this is the most indisputable of all principles". A strong motive for maintaining the law is that in classical logic the possibility of any meaningful discourse is undermined by accepting contradictions because every proposition is implied by a contradiction. In recent times, logical systems have been developed in which some contradictions are tolerated.

"By means of these propositional variables we can state the general logical law, 'Not both p and not- p '. this is called the Law of Non-Contradiction and is one of three so called Laws of Thought which traditionally were regarded as, in some special but ill-defined way, basic." — D. Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 19.

Law of identity, see identity, law of

Law of nature

[Latin; *lex natural*] Also called natural law. In a moral and political sense, it means that the natural rules of conduct or the general commands of morality, such as "do harm to no man", "seek peace", "do not steal", or "use self-defence". These laws are claimed to be universal, eternal and independent of the will of any human legislator. They are discovered by reason and are the basis of natural rights and duties. As dictates of reason, they contrast with human law, which is legislated by the will of the holder of state sovereignty. In Hobbes' political philosophy, there are two fundamental laws of nature for men in the natural state. One is to seek peace and the other is to do all one possibly can to defend oneself. According to natural law theory, human law or positive law gains its binding force only from natural law. Christian authority maintains that the existence of natural law authored by God is the basis of the universal moral order. Other theories ground natural law in some aspect of human nature or universal human interests. A critical

发笑

见“幽默”条。

矛盾律

亦称不矛盾律。这一规律与排中律和同一律构成古典逻辑的基本思维规律。矛盾律说,对任意命题 p , p 和非 p 不能在同一时间和同一方面为真。这个规律禁止同时断定一个命题和它的否定或矛盾命题。根据这一规律,我们判定任何包含矛盾的命题是假的,任何否定一个矛盾的命题是真的。亚里士多德在《形而上学》一书中把矛盾律定义为这样一种观点:“任何东西在同一时间不可能既存在又不存在”,并宣称“它是所有原则中最无可争辩的原则”。(1006a2-3)坚持这一规律的强烈动机在于:在古典逻辑中,接受矛盾就毁掉了任何有意义言谈的可能性,因为每一命题都被矛盾所蕴涵。近来有人已经发展了容许某些矛盾的逻辑系统。

“凭借这些命题变元,我们能够陈述那个普遍的逻辑规律:‘并非 p 并且非 p ’。这叫做不矛盾律,它是三个所谓的思维规律之一,传统上把这三个规律看作在某种特殊的但从未很好说明的意义上是基本的。”——米切尔:《逻辑导论》,1962年,第19页。

同一律

见“同一律 (identity, law of)”条。

自然法

[拉丁文, *lex natural*] 也被称为“自然法”。从道德和政治意义上讲,自然法是指行为的自然规则或道德的一般要求,例如,“不要伤害人”,“寻求和平”,“莫偷盗”,“行使自卫”。这些法被说成是普遍的、永恒的和以任何人类立法者的意志为转移的。它们是由理性发现的,是自然权利和责任的基础。作为理性的命令,它们与人定法形成对照,后者是通过掌握着国家主权的人的意志而制定的。在霍布斯的政治哲学中,对处于自然状态下的人来讲存在两条基本的自然法。一条是寻求和平,另一条是尽一切可能才能保护自己。依据自然法理论,人定法或实在法只有从自然法中才能获得其约束的力量。正统基督教坚持认为,由上帝创造的自然法的存在,是普遍道德秩序的基础。其他理论则把自然法基于人性的某一方面或普遍的人类利益的某一方面。对此,法律实证主义提出了批评,其创立者边沁认为不可能存在自然法。

response is given by legal positivism, whose founder Jeremy Bentham rejected the possibility of natural law.

In science, natural laws are objective orders or regularities in the natural world which are independent of human minds and discovered by scientific investigation. They are the basis for sound human prediction. The existence and character of natural law in this sense has been a major focus of debate in the philosophy of science. Until the eighteenth century, natural laws were sometimes backed metaphysically and theologically by appeal to God as their author, but more recently their justification has been sought within the enterprise of science itself.

"We ought to distinguish between a two-fold signification of the term of law of nature; which words do wither denote a rule or precept for the direction of the voluntary actions of reasonable agents, and in that sense they imply a duty; or else they are used to signify any general rule which we observe to obtain in the works of nature, independently of the wills of men, in which sense no duty is implied." - Berkeley, *Passive Obedience*.

Law of non-contradiction, another term for the law of contradiction

Law of the excluded middle

One of the basic laws of thought which underlie all demonstrations in classical logic. The law says that a thing is either P or not- P and that it is not possible for it to be neither P nor not- P at the same time and in the same respect. Semantically it can be expressed that for any predicate P and any object x , either P or its negation is true of x . Aristotle defined the law in *Metaphysics* 1011b23; "there cannot be an intermediate between contradictions, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate". When we say that a proposition or statement must be either true or false, the law of the excluded middle becomes the principle of bivalence. It serves as the basis for the truth-table method, but is rejected in many valued logic and intuitionistic logic. The question of whether to adhere to this law or the principle of bivalence has been a watershed which distinguishes realism and anti realism in contemporary logic and philosophy.

" $(\varphi \vee \sim \varphi)$ illustrates the law of the excluded middle, which is commonly phrased as saying that every statement is true or false." —Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, 1951, p. 51.

Laws of thought

Sometimes any truth of logic is called a law of thought, but generally the term is confined to three laws which have long been regarded as the most fundamental rules of reasoning, that is the law of identity ($P = P$), the law of contradiction or non-contradiction (not both P and not- P) and the law of excluded middle (either P or not- P). In

科学意义上的自然法指的是自然界中的客观秩序或规律性，它们是不以人的意志为转移的，是靠科学探究发现的。它们是合理的人类预见的基础。这种意义上的自然法的存在和本质一直是科学哲学争论的一个主要焦点。直到18世纪，自然法还不时受到要求把上帝作为其创造者的形而上学的和神学的支持，但后来对其合理性的探索则是在科学活动本身中进行的。

“我们应当在自然法这一术语的两重意义之间做出区分：这些确已消亡的言词指的是为有理性的人的自愿行动指明方向的一种规则或戒律，从这种意义上讲，它们暗示一种责任；否则，它们就用于意指我们在对自然活动的观察中得到的不以人们的意志为转移的一般规则，从这种意义上讲不包含责任。”——巴克莱：《消极的服从》。

不矛盾律

“矛盾律”的另一个名称。

排中律

思维的基本规律之一，它构成古典逻辑中所有证明的基础。这个规律说：一事物或者是 P 或者是非 P ，不能在同一时间和同一方面既不是 P 又不是非 P 。在语义上它可以表述为：对任意谓词 P 和任意对象 x ，或者 P 或者 P 的否定对于 x 为真。亚里士多德在《形而上学》一书中把排中律定义为下述观点：“在矛盾中不可能有居间者，对于一主词我们必须或者肯定或者否定任意谓词。”(1011b23)当我们说一命题或陈述必定是或者真或者假时，排中律就变成为二值原则。它成为真值表方法的基础，但在多值逻辑和直觉主义逻辑中受到拒斥。是否坚持排中律或二值原则的问题，在当代逻辑和哲学中已经成为区分实在论和反实在论的分水岭。

" $(\varphi \vee \sim \varphi)$ 是排中律的一个例证，排中律通常被释义为：每一陈述是真的或者是假的。”——奎因：《数理逻辑》，1951年，第51页。

思维规律

有时任何逻辑真理都被称作“思维规律”，但通常这个词限于指三个长期以来被认为是最基本的推理规则，即同一律($P=P$)，矛盾律或不矛盾律(并非既 P 又非 P)和排中律(或者 P 或者非 P)。在传统逻辑中，这些规律被看作是确实为真和毋庸置疑的。它们被认为构成所有

traditional logic, these laws are viewed as true and irrefutable. They are held to underlie all forms of reasoning and to be the fundamental principles that guide reasoning and justify valid inference. Contemporary logic usually contends that there is no reason to think that these laws are more fundamental than other truths of logic, and logical systems have been developed which reject one or more of their claims.

"Theorem ... ('If p then p'), forms part of the 'law of identity', which is one of the three traditional 'law of thought', the other being the law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction." - Prior, *Formal Logic*, 1962, p. 29.

Legal gap

The situation in which existing legal rules lack sufficient grounds for providing a conclusive answer in a legal case, for example when there is no legal reason determining that a defendant is guilty or innocent. No available correct answer guides the decision. A gap can occur because the law is open-textured or because there are conflicting rules. A situation in which rules conflict creates a legal gap because conflicting legal rules block the capacity of one another to apply throughout an appropriate domain. Rules do not have truth values, but legal gaps can be compared to truth-value gaps. It is generally held that legal gaps should be filled by discretionary decisions, but this is rejected in Dworkin's rights thesis which rejects discretion in favour of the claim that individuals must be accorded basic rights that cannot be easily overridden by considerations of community welfare.

"When an action is neither legally prohibited nor legally permitted there is a legal gap." - J. Raz, *The Authority of Law*, 1979, p. 58.

Legal philosophy, another expression for philosophy of law

Legal positivism

A tradition in legal philosophy, opposed to the natural law theory, founded by Jeremy Bentham. Although there are different versions, the basic position can be summarised by the following two claims. First, there is no internal and necessary relation between law and morality; the definition of law does not contain a moral element, and is hence morally neutral. Secondly, the validity of law is determined exclusively by reference to factual sources such as legislation, judicial precedents and custom, without regard to whether it is just or reasonable. The existence of law is a fact, that which is, rather than an ideal, that which ought to be. Accordingly, the law must be positive, and so-called natural law does not exist. For Austin, "The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another". Most legal

推理形式的基础,是指导推理和证明有效推理的基本原则。当代逻辑通常抗议说,没有理由认为这些规律比其他逻辑真理更为基本,拒斥它们中一个或多个的逻辑系统已经发展出来。

"定理……(如果 P 则 P) 构成了 '同一律' 的一部分,后者是三个传统的 '思维规律' 之一,另外两个是排中律和矛盾律。"——普赖尔:《形式逻辑》,1962 年,第 29 页。

法律空缺

它指的是在一法律案件中现存的法规缺少足够的依据以提供最后答复这样一种情况,例如,当缺少法律理由确定一个被告是有罪还是无罪的时候。用以指导判决的正确答复是得不到的。空缺之所以能出现是因为法律是开放性的,或是因为存在相互冲突的法规。法规冲突的情况造成了法律空缺,因为相互冲突的法规不能彼此都应用于一定的合适范围。法规不具有真理的价值,但法律空缺可以比作真值的空缺。一般认为,法律空缺应被自行决定的判决所弥补,但这在德沃金的 "权利论" 中是被拒绝的,后者反对自行决定,而赞同这样一种主张,即个人必须被赋予基本权利,这些权利不能轻易地被对共同体利益的考虑所践踏。

"当一种行为既不为法律所禁止又不为法律所允许时,就会存在法律空缺。"——拉兹:《法律的权威》,1979 年,第 58 页。

法哲学

"法哲学 (philosophy of law)" 的另一表述。

法律实证主义

法哲学中由 J. 边沁创立的与自然法理论相对立的一种传统。尽管法律实证主义中存在种种不同看法,其基本立场可以概括为以下两个主张。第一,在法律和道德之间没有内在的和必然的联系;法律的定义不包括道德的成分,因此在道德上是中立的。第二,法律的效力只是参照事实上的依据,如法规、判例、惯例来确定的,而不管它是否是正义的或合理的。法律的存在是一个事实,即它实际是这样,而不是一个理想,即它应当是这样。因此,法律必定是实证的,而所谓的自然法是不存在的。在奥斯汀看来, "法律的存在是一回事,它的优点和缺点则是另一回事"。绝大多数法律实证主义者否认对道德上的正确与错误有客观认识的可能。法律实证

positivists deny the possibility of an objective knowledge of moral right or wrong. Other major proponents of legal positivism include John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart. They differ from each other by invoking different factual sources for legal validity, and by holding different views about the normative character of law.

"Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so." —Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 1961, pp. 181-2.

Legal realism

Also called rule scepticism, a school of legal philosophy that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century. It maintains that the traditional theories of law are mythological in that they take legal rules to be abstract entities and legal concepts to have metaphysical essences. In contrast to legal formalism, legal realism is sceptical of the notion of legal rules. Rules by their nature cannot control decisions in court, and the function of law is to solve actual disputes. Law must be understood by reference to the reality of actual legal systems. Legal realism has two traditions. American legal realism, represented by O. W. Holmes, Jr. and Karl Llewellyn, was influenced by pragmatism. It claims that the law is constituted by how legislation is enacted and by what courts actually decide. Scandinavian legal realism, represented by Axel Hagerstrom, Karl Olivecrona and Alf Ross, was influenced by Comte's positivism. It claims that the normativity of law must be explained in terms of the psychological reactions of judges, citizens, or both. Legal realism is an attempt to understand laws in terms of what they are and how they operate. Its strength is that it is deeply rooted in the practices, insights and practical arts of lawyers, but its weakness is that it can neither account for the legal reasoning of judges nor explain the necessity of legal reform.

"Legal realism is, in large measure, the lawyer's perspective, and though it is unlikely that this perspective is the whole story, it is almost certain that it is such an important part of the story that any legal theory that leaves it out will be essentially flawed." —Murphy and Colman, *The Philosophy of Law*, 1984, p. 40.

Legal reasoning

The rationality manifested in matters of law, especially in the public process of litigation and adjudication. It is used to seek legal justification for conduct and decisions, that is to show that they have a sufficient legal warrant and in consequence to persuade the court to reach a favourable conclusion. Legal reasoning is also employed by lawyers to predict what the other side is likely to do or what a judge is

likely to do. The other main advocates of legal realism include J. Austin, H. L. A. Hart. Their mutual disagreements are reflected in their different views on the factual basis for the validity of law, and their different views on the normative character of law.

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likely to decide within the limits of the law. Like other justificatory argumentation, it can be either inductive or deductive, but its chief characteristics include appeal to the plain meaning of terms in legal rules and the conceivable consequences of a decision. Legal philosophers vary in their opinions about the suitable criteria of legal reasoning.

"Any study of legal reasoning is therefore an attempt to explicate and explain the criteria as to what constitutes a good or a bad, an acceptable or unacceptable type of argument in law." —N. MacCormick, *Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory*, 1978, pp. 12-3.

Legitimacy

A basic question in political philosophy concerns the grounds of legitimacy for a government or authority. The question can also be asked in terms of political obligation, that is the basis of one's obligation to obey the coercive power of a government or authority. Answering these questions requires a rationale for the right of an authority to make decisions and its justification for having them obeyed. A major attempt to justify authority, initiated by Hobbes, is provided by a variety of social contract theories. The ruled consent to the transformation of political power into political authority in exchange for benefits such as justice, security, happiness and liberty. In contemporary political theory, the test for this ground for legitimacy is whether a government upholds certain basic human rights. Max Weber suggested three sources of legitimacy: traditions or customs, rational-legal procedures, and individual charisma.

"A state is legitimate if its constitutional structure and practices are such that its citizens have a general obligation to obey political decisions that purport to impose duties on them. An argument for legitimacy need only provide reasons for that general situation" —R. Dworkin, *Laso's Empire*, 1986, p. 191.

Leibniz's law, see indiscernability of identicals

Lemma

[Greek: something assumed or premise; plural, lemmata or lemmas] A proposition which is assumed or proved as a theorem in the course of argument in order to proceed to a different main conclusion. If an assumed lemma is false, the conclusion is unreliable. In ancient commentaries on Plato, lemmata were portions of text selected to be commented on.

"I think in this connection of the characterisation of the lemma Y which can be 'interpolated' in an attempt to derive a certain conclusion Z from a certain premise set K." —Beth, *Aspects of Modern Logic*, 1967, p. 73.

归纳的,也可以是演绎的,但其主要特征包括诉诸法规中术语的清晰含义和可想像得出的判决的结果。法哲学家对适宜的法律推理准则持有不同的看法。

"因此,任何有关法律推理的研究都是试图说明和解释构成法律中的好的或不好的、可接受的或不可接受的论证类型的标准。"——麦考密克:《法律推理和法学理论》,1978年,第12-13页。

合法性

政治哲学中涉及政府或权威的合法性根据的一个基本问题。这一问题也可以从政治义务方面提出,即一个人有义务服从政府或权威的强制性权力的根据是什么。回答这些问题要求对权威做决定的权利及要人们服从这些决定的正当性予以理论的说明。论证权威正当性的一种主要尝试是由各种社会契约论提供的,这始于霍布斯。被统治者同意把政治权力转变为政治权威以换取诸如正义、安全、幸福和自由这些利益。在当代政治理论中,对合法性根据的检验就在于一个政府是否维护某些基本的人权。M. 韦伯提出了合法性的三个来源:传统或习惯、合理的法律程序 and 个人的魅力。

"如果一个国家其宪法结构和实践是这样的,即它的公民有普遍的义务服从意在强加责任给他们的政治决定,它就是合法的。对合法性的论证只须提供那种普遍情况的理由。"——德沃金:《法的帝国》,1986年,第191页。

莱布尼茨定律

见“等同物的不可分辨性”条。

引理

[希腊语,意指“被假定的某种东西”或“前提”;复数形式为 lemmata 或 lemmas。]引理是在论证过程中为推出不同的主要结论而被假定或证明为定理的命题。如果一假定的引理为假,则结论就是不可靠的。在古代关于柏拉图的评注中, lemmata 一词是指选择出来加以评论的那部分原文。

"在这种联系中,我想到了对引理 Y 的刻画:当试图从某个前提集 K 导出某个结论 Z 时,可以‘插入’ Y。"——贝思:《现代逻辑概观》,1967年,第73页。

Lesbian ethics

A lesbian is a woman who loves and has sexual relations with another woman. Lesbian ethics tends to address the lesbian experience and the nature of lesbian identity with the purpose of seeking the well-being of lesbians. It joins feminist ethics in charging traditional Western ethics with promoting male dominance and female subordination through social control. Sometimes it is considered as a branch of feminist ethics. Lesbian ethics claims that while both heterosexuality and male homosexuality imply the superiority of men over women, lesbians, traditionally viewed as man-haters, suffer the worst oppression. Hence, lesbian love forms a special challenge to sexism, and is a revolutionary act against the dominant political and social system. The ethics rejects the values of dominance and subordination, and promotes the value of choice and self-understanding. It encourages intimacy, engaging and co operation and develops lesbian integrity and moral agency. Although it functions only for those who choose its values, lesbian ethics claims to be applicable also for heterosexual women. The term "lesbian ethics" was coined by S. Hoagland in 1978. Currently there are two professional journals in this field: *Lesbian Ethics*, and *Gossip: A Journal Of Lesbian Feminist Ethics*.

"This book is my attempt, with much stimulation and input from a number of lesbian communities, to describe at least one way we might continue to move toward lesbian connection and create a means by which we spin out of oppressions. I call this attempt Lesbian Ethics." — Hoagland, *Lesbian Ethics*, 1988, p. 3.

Leviathan

Leviathan is a mythical sea monster with terrifying power which is described in several places in the *Old Testament*. Many authors associate it with evil, but Shakespeare took it to symbolise strength. The British philosopher Hobbes took this name, with a reference to Job 41, for the title of his most important book and used it as a metaphor for the state and its sovereign. He argued that such an artificial Leviathan should have absolute and undivided power. Leviathan is the authority in civil government which keeps human society in order and enables people to live in peace. The book's full title is *Leviathan or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, published in English in 1651, and in a revised Latin version in 1668. It is divided into four parts: Of Man, Of Commonwealth, Of a Christian Commonwealth and Of the Kingdom of Darkness. It is the main *locus* of Hobbes' moral and political philosophy.

"Leviathan [is] ... that mortal God, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence." — Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17: 13.

(女性) 同性恋伦理学

一个(女性)同性恋者是一个与另一女子相爱并有性关系的女人。这一伦理学旨在研究同性恋经验以及女同性恋者认同的本性,目的在于追求同性恋者的幸福。它和女性主义伦理学一道,指责传统西方伦理学提倡通过社会控制而达到男性支配和女性从属。有时它被看作是女性主义伦理学的一个分支。同性恋伦理学主张,异性恋和男性同性恋隐含着男人对女人的优越性。传统的观点把女性同性恋看作是男人的仇视者而受到最坏的压制。因此,女性同性恋对于性歧视形成了一种特别的挑战,乃是对于占支配地位的政治和社会制度的一种革命行动。这种伦理学拒斥支配和从属的价值,提倡选择和自我理解的价值。它鼓励亲密、投入、合作性,发展女性同性恋的整合性和道德主体性。虽然它只对那些选择了它的价值的人产生影响,女性同性恋主张对其他的异性恋的女人也有可应用性。“(女性)同性恋伦理学”这个词为霍格兰在1978年所造。在这个领域现在有两个专业杂志:《同性恋伦理学》和《喋喋不休:同性恋的女性主义伦理学》。

“在一些女性同性恋团体的相当大的鼓励下,我的这本书努力论证,至少有一种方法可使我们能够继续推进同性恋的连接,创造一种把压迫甩掉的工具。我称这个努力是(女性)同性恋伦理学。” — 霍格兰:《同性恋伦理学》,1988年,第3页。

利维坦

利维坦是神话中的一个具有可怕力量的海怪,在《旧约》的几处地方描述过。虽然许多作家把它同邪恶联系在一起,但莎士比亚把它当做力量的象征。英国哲学家霍布斯以《旧约》“约伯记”第41章为该名出处,将这个名称作为他的最重要著作的标题,用来比喻国家及其君主。他论证说,这样一个人为的利维坦应当具有绝对的、完整的权力。利维坦是一个保持人类社会秩序,使人民过和平生活的公民政府权力。这本书的全名是《利维坦,或教会与公民国家的内容、形式和权力》,1651年用英文发表,1688年出版拉丁文修订本。它分为四个部分:“论人”,“论国家”,“论基督教国家”,“论黑暗之国”。它是霍布斯的不朽的道德和政治哲学论著。

“利维坦[是]……世间的上帝,我们在不朽的上帝的主宰下,将我们的和平和防御托付给它。” — 霍布斯:《利维坦》,17: 13.

Lex talionis

[Latin; law of retaliation] A law of retaliation which proposes to maintain a correspondence or equivalence between crime and punishment. It is stated in Exodus (21: 22-5): "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, ... wound for wound". It is also called *jus talionis* (the right of retaliation). In contemporary theory of punishment, this law is quoted to justify the view that a man must be punished if his action has violated some rule for which he deserves a penalty. Furthermore, the penalty he receives must be proportionate with the wrong he committed.

"We are to observe (as we are elsewhere told explicitly) the *lex talionis*: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." — Honderich, *Punishment*, 1989, p. 24.

Lexeme

A word may have different inflections and may be presented in different forms depending on its position in a sentence. But there must be a basic core which determines that all the various forms are the forms of the same word. This basic core is called a lexeme. For instance, "builds", "building", "built" are all particular inflectional variants of the verb "to build". "To build" is the lexeme. Precisely speaking, meaning is ascribed to a lexeme rather than to a word. Hence, it is more proper to speak of lexical meaning than of word meaning.

"Within semantics, the notion of word that is most useful is that of the lexeme which is an abstract grammatical construct that underlies a set of word forms which are recognised as representatives of 'the same word' in different syntactic environments." — Carn, *Formal Semantics*, 1993, p. 94.

Lexical ambiguity, an alternative expression for semantic ambiguity

Lexical order, see two principles of justice

Liar paradox

A semantic paradox, dealing with matters of reference and truth. There are many versions, but it was initially proposed by the Megarian Eubulides in ancient Greece, although another tradition takes Epimenides as the author. The original version is "A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?". If he is speaking truly, then he is not lying, so what he says is not true; if what he says is not true, then he is indeed lying, and what he says is true. In another version, ascribed to Epimenides, a Cretan says that all Cretans are always liars. If what he says is true, then it is false. The paradox arises because the statement says

同态复仇法

[拉丁语:报复的法律]一种报复性的法律,它提出在所犯罪行和惩罚之间要保持一致或相等。基督教《圣经》“出埃及记”(21: 22-25)对此做了描述:“以命抵命,以眼还眼,以牙还牙,……以伤抵伤。”它也被称为 *jus talionis* (报复权利)。在当代惩罚理论中,这种法律被引用来为这样一种观点辩护:一个人,如果其行为违犯了某一法规并应为此受到惩罚,那他必须受到惩罚。此外,他受到的惩罚必须同他所做的错事相称。

“我们应遵守(像我们在其他地方被明确地告知的那样)同态复仇法:以眼还眼,以牙还牙。”——洪德里奇:《惩罚》,1989年,第24页。

词根

一个词可以有不同的变位,根据它在句子中的位置而表现为不同的形式。但必定有一个基本内核,决定了所有不同形式都是同一个词的形式。这个基本内核就称为“词根”。譬如,“builds”、“building”、“built”都是“to build”(建造)这个动词的所有具体变位形式。“to build”就是一个词根。严格地说,意义是被赋予词根的,而不是被赋予一个词的。因而,应该更恰当地说“词根的意义”,而不是说“词的意义”。

“在语义学中,通常使用的词这个概念,其实是指词根,它存在于词的各种形式背后的抽象的语法结构之中,而词的这些形式则被看作在不同的句法环境中代表了‘同一个词’。”——凯恩:《形式语义学》,1993年,第94页。

词根的模糊性

“语义的模糊性”的另一种说法。

词典式次序

见“正义的两条原则”条。

说谎者悖论

一个语义悖论,处理指称和真理问题。它有许多形式。最初是由古希腊麦加拉学派的欧布里德提出来的,尽管另一种传说把爱披门尼特当做它的作者。这个悖论原本的形式是:“一个人说他正在说谎。他说的是真话还是假话?”如果他说的是真话,那么他不在说谎,所以他说的不是真话;如果他说的不是真话,那么他确实在说谎,所以他说的是真话。据说爱披门尼特提出了另一种表述,即“克里特岛人说所有的克里特岛人都说谎。如果他所说的是真的,那么它是假的。该悖论产生是因为该陈述以自我指称的

something self-referentially about its own truth or falsity. The need to avoid the liar paradox was partly responsible for the development of Tarski's semantic theory of truth, and more generally the paradox is a key constraint on attempts to devise consistent semantic theories.

"Any version of the [liar] paradox involves the assertion that all propositions satisfying a certain condition are false, where the assertion itself is a proposition which satisfies that condition." — Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, 1967, 3rd ed., p. 350.

Liberalism

A political and social theory fundamentally emphasising the priority of the liberty and equality of individuals. It begins with the priority of the individual rather than the community. According to liberalism, individuals have innate human rights regardless of any particular political system. They have interests that they seek to advance both public and in private life. Society and government should protect and promote individual freedom rather than imposing constraints. It is the mandate of government to respect individual rights. The plurality and diversity of society should be encouraged, and a society should be equal and just in the distribution of opportunities and resources. The political process should provide a fair procedure for resolving disputes when the interests of individuals clash.

Because liberty and equality come into conflict, various kinds of liberalism have been formulated, depending on whether the theory emphasises liberty or equality, or on how one seeks to reconcile them. Classical market liberalism tends to insist that civil rights are fundamental to human beings, while contemporary egalitarian liberalism focuses more on equality and argues that government or society should increase its scope of intervention in areas such as health care, education, social welfare and discrimination. On this version, civil rights can legitimately be qualified in such areas to secure justice.

Liberalism provided justification for capitalism, although it was also associated with the appeal for religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some notable liberal theorists in England include John Locke, John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green, Isaiah Berlin, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin; in France include Montesquieu, Voltaire and Benjamin Constant; in Germany include Kant and W. H. von Humboldt; and in America include John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Persons who believe in liberalism are called liberals. Liberalism is the theoretical basis of the democratic system and has dominated political and social thought in the modern western world. Critics of liberalism are suspicious of its association with the free market. Communitarians argue that liberalism overemphasises the autonomy of the individual and ignores the ways in which individuals are embedded in social customs and traditions. The latter is also a long-

方式说了有关它自身的真或假的某些话。避免说谎者悖论的需要,是促使塔斯基发展他的语义真理论的部分原因;并且更一般地说,对设计那些一致的语义理论的尝试来讲,该悖论是一个关键性的制约因素。

“[说谎者]悖论的任何形式都包含下述断言:满足某种条件的所有命题都是假的,这里该断言本身就是一个满足该条件的命题。”——柯比:《符号逻辑》,1967年,第3版,第350页。

自由主义

一种十分强调个人自由和平等的首要性的政治社会理论。它的出发点是个人的首要性而不是公众的首要性。按照自由主义的观点,不管在何种特殊的政治体制中,个人都拥有生而具有的人权。无论是在公共生活中还是在私人生活中,他们都拥有追求发展的权利,社会和政府应保护和促进,而不应强行压制个人的自由。尊重个人的权利是政府的使命。社会的多数人和多样化应受到鼓励,一个社会在机会和资源的分配上应当平等和公正。当个人间的利益出现冲突时,政治的作用应是为解决争端提供一种公平的程序。

由于自由和平等之间发生冲突,各种各样的自由主义理论于是便得到了发展,其差异在于一种理论是强调自由还是强调平等,或一种理论是如何尽量使这二者一致起来。古典市场自由主义倾向于坚持,对人类而言,公民权是基础;当代平等的自由主义则更强调平等,并论证说政府或社会应当对医疗卫生、教育、社会福利和社会歧视等领域扩大其干预的范围。按照这一看法,公民权在这些领域应加以合法地限定以保证公正。

自由主义提供了为资本主义的辩护,尽管它也同16世纪和17世纪的争取宗教宽容有关。著名的自由主义理论家包括:英国的J. 洛克, J. S. 密尔, T. H. 格林, I. 柏林, H. L. A. 哈特和 R. 德沃金;法国的孟德斯鸠、伏尔泰, B. 科斯坦特;德国的康德和 W. H. 洪堡;美国的 J. 罗尔斯和 R. 诺齐克。信奉自由主义的人被称为自由主义者。自由主义是民主制度的理论基础,并且是现代西方世界占统治地位的政治社会思想。自由主义的批评家对它与自由市场经济的联系持怀疑态度。共同体主义者争论说,自由主义过于强调个人的自主性,忽视了个人是生活于社会习惯和社会传统之中这一情况。后者也是保守主义者反对自由主义的长期存在的主题。

“不久以前,自由主义在英国和美国,至少是在政治哲学家和法哲学家中,几乎曾是一种被一致认同的政治理论。他们对它持有很多不同看法,但却似乎都近似不言自明地接受一种

standing theme of conservative opposition to liberalism.

"Liberalism was once, not very long ago, almost a consensus political theory in Britain and the United States, at least among political and legal philosophers. They disagree about it a great deal, but they all seem to accept, as close to axiomatic, a kind of egalitarian individualism." —R. Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 4.

Libertarianism

A twentieth century political and moral movement. It is a radical form of liberalism and argues that no intervention from state and government is necessary or justified. Free choice is supreme and all conflicts can be settled through the mechanism of the market. Its strong anarchist form insists that all government is illegitimate, and that all coercive political universalism is unacceptable. Its moderate anarchist form concedes that government may appropriately engage in police protection, enforcement of contracts and national defence, but no more than that. Libertarianism emphasises in particular the rights of individuals to acquire and hold property and questions the legitimacy of the tax system. It proposes to develop rational egoism or Aristotelian eudaimonism. The most influential advocate of libertarianism is Robert Nozick in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia*.

Libertarianism is also a metaphysical term. In this sense, it is opposed to determinism and holds that the past does not determine a single future. We can act, on the basis of rationality or the self we possess, independent of necessitating causal laws, no matter what happened in the past. This theory is now often supported by appealing to quantum mechanics which asserts that there are uncaused events in the universe, but it is not clear that quantum indeterminism is the right way to allow for rationality and choice.

"Libertarians are against what they describe as an 'interventionist' policy in which the state engages in 'interference'." —Cohen, *Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality*, 1995, p. 57.

Libertinism

A movement that flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which demands freedom of consciousness in religious affairs and moral issues. It is regarded as an anti-theoretical position and a form of antinomianism. Theories which are based not on reason but on divine revelation, such as immortality of the soul and punishment in the afterlife, should be rejected. Libertinism is associated with deism, materialism and Epicureanism. Its major proponents were P. Charron, Montaigne, P. Gassendi, Pietro Pomponazzi and Campanella.

"[L]ibertinism — the belief that by grace, by the new life in Christ and salvation by faith, law or rules no longer

平等的个人主义。”——德沃金：《原则问题》，1986年，第4页。

自治论自由主义

20 世纪的一场政治和道德运动。它是自由主义的一种激进形式，认为来自国家和政府的干预是不必要的或无道理的。自由选择是至高无上的，所有的冲突都可以通过市场机制来解决。其强烈的无政府主义形式坚持认为，所有的政府都是不合理的，所有强制的政治上的普遍性都是不可接受的。其温和的无政府主义形式承认政府可以适当地从治安保卫、合同的执行及国家的防卫，但不能再超出这些。自治论自由主义特别强调个人获取和拥有财产的权利，并对税收制度的合法性表示怀疑。它提出要发展合理的利己主义或亚里士多德的幸福论。自治论自由主义的最有影响的鼓吹者是《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》一书的作者 R. 诺齐克。

自治论自由主义也是一个形而上学的术语。从这种意义上讲，它是与决定论相对的，认为过去并不决定一个单一的未来。不管过去发生了什么，我们都可以具有我们的理性或自我的基础上行事，而不受强制的因果规律的约束。这一理论常常求助于量子力学的支持，后者断言宇宙中存在的是无前因的事件，不过，在考虑到合理性和选择时，量子非决定论是否是正确的方向，则是不清楚的。

“自治论自由主义者反对他们所描述的国家进行‘干预’的‘干预的’政策。”——柯亨：《自我所有制、自由和平等》，1995年，第57页。

自由思想

兴盛于 16 世纪和 17 世纪的一场运动，它要求在宗教事务和道德问题中的意识自由。它被视为一种反对理论的主张，一种形式的反律法论。那些不是基于理性而是基于神的启示的理论，例如灵魂不朽和来世惩罚，都应被拒绝。自由思想同自然神论、唯物主义和伊壁鸠鲁的学说有关。它的主要倡导者有 P. 沙朗、蒙田、P. 伽桑狄、P. 彭波那齐和康帕内拉。

“自由思想是这样一种信念，即认为通过神的感化，通过基督的新生和对信仰的拯救，法律或法规就不再适用于基督徒了。”——弗莱彻：《情境伦理学》，1966年，第22页。

applied to Christians.” Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, 1966, p. 22.

Liberty, a synonym for freedom

Libido

Freud's term for the psycho-physical energy or motive force produced by sexual instinct. It is the energy of the id, and can be directed either towards the self or an object. The direction of the libido towards the self produces narcissism. Freud viewed the libido as a motive force for progress, with the intellectual evolution of society explicable in terms of a theory of the libidinous development. The libido is not anatomically located, but its existence is assumed in the development of biology. Freud later replaced the concept of the libido with the concept of eros.

“Libido is a term used in the theory of the instincts for describing the dynamic manifestation of sexuality.” Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 255.

Life instinct, another term for *eros* (Freud)

Lifeboat case

Tom Regan's hypothetical case against his claim that animals have rights and hence are entitled to the same moral consideration as humans. There are five survivors on a lifeboat, each with approximately the same weight. Four of the five are human beings and the fifth is a dog. Because the boat can only support four of the survivors without being overturned, one survivor must be thrown overboard or else all will die. Which one should go? Common-sense suggests that the dog should be sacrificed, but if the dog has an equal right to be respected or not to be harmed, as advocates of animal rights claim, what should the survivors do? Regan argues that this objection does not undermine the claim that animals have equal rights, because animal-rights theorists can safely answer that the dog should be cast overboard. For the rights are *prima facie* and can be overridden in such circumstances depending on the loss of whose life will cause more harm. Since the loss of a human life will bring about greater harm than that of a dog's life, it is justifiable to override the dog's right to life in this case. Only some moral philosophers would allow the same considerations to determine which human life should be lost if all the survivors were human.

“The lifeboat case would not be morally any different if we supposed that the choice had to be made, not between a single dog and the four humans, but between humans and any numbers of dogs.” Regan, *The Case for Animal*

自由

“自由 (freedom)” 的同义词

里比多

弗洛伊德为心理—身体的能量或由性本能产生出的动力所取的名字。它是伊底(本我)的能量,可被导向自我或对象。朝向自我的里比多产生出自恋。弗洛伊德将里比多视为进步的动力;并通过一种里比多的发展理论而表达出一种社会的理智进化过程。里比多在解剖学上无法定位,但是在〔关于人的〕生物学的发展观中假定了它的存在。弗洛伊德后来用“爱”或“厄罗斯”(eros)的概念替换掉了里比多这个概念。

“里比多是在描述性 (sexuality) 的动态表现的本能理论中使用的 一个词。”——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第18卷,第255页。

生命本能

表达“厄罗斯(弗洛伊德)”的另一个词。

救生艇案例

T. 里根以他的主张,即动物也有权利因而也有资格像人一样受到同样的道德考虑为背景而假设的案例。一条救生艇上有五个幸存者,每个体重大体相近。五个幸存者中四个是人,第五个是一条狗。由于这条救生艇只能承载四位幸存者,否则就会翻船,因而一个幸存者必须被抛出船外,要不谁也活不成。哪一个应当离船?我们的常识会提出狗应被牺牲,但如果像动物权利倡导者所主张的那样,这条狗也有同样的权利得到尊重和不被伤害,这些幸存者又应该如何做呢?里根争论说,这一异议并没有削弱动物拥有同样权利这一主张的基础,因为动物权利理论家可以安然地说狗应被抛出船外。因为这种权利是不言自明的,它在这种情况下可被搁置在一边依据的是谁失去生命会造成更大的损害。由于失去一个人的生命所带来的损害比失去一条狗的生命大,因此,在这一案例中把狗的生命权搁置在一边是无可非议的。如果所有的幸存者都是人,那只有某些道德哲学家才会允许对确定哪一个人的生命应当丧失予以同样的考虑。

“如果我们假设不是在一条狗与四个人之间,而是在人和任何数目的狗之间不得不出抉择,那救生艇案例在道义上也不会有什么不同。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第325页。

Rights, 1983, p. 325.

Life-world

[from German: *Lebenswelt*] Husserl's term for the historical world in which we live as historical beings and the culturally and historically determined horizon. The life-world forms the framework of processes of reaching understanding in which participants agree or discuss something in their communal social world. The life-world is given to us prior to all acts of consciousness and is not consciously intended. Our objective knowledge of the natural sciences springs from the life-world. This knowledge reflects the concerns of specific communities and serves as one means of accomplishing their needs. Hence, the scientific world is rooted in the life-world, and the sciences are characteristic of being historically and culturally situated. The conception of the life-world is further developed in Heidegger's account of "Being-in-the-world", in Gadamer's notion of historical understanding and in Habermas's theory of communicative action. However, Husserl believed that various cultural life-worlds are themselves derived from an *eidos* or formal non-historical life-world which is the product of transcendental subjectivity. In his view, one of the main tasks of phenomenology is to describe the structure of this *eidos* life-world.

"The life-world, for us who wakenly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the ground of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical." — Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences* (tr. Carr), 1970, p. 142.

Light of reason, an alternative expression for natural light

Like to like

The principle of the mutual attraction of similars in the philosophy of the Greek philosopher Empedocles, independent of his two cosmic agents of Strife and Love. While Love is the principle of unifying different elements, and Strife of separating different elements, the principle of like to like means that any portion of any element has a natural tendency to seek out and gather with other portions of the same element. It is the basis of Strife. Empedocles also employed this principle to explain sensation, which arises because one element in the body of the subject meets with the same element outside. All generating things are incessantly giving off effluences, and when these effluences are of the right size to fit into the pores of the sense organ, the meeting happens and we have sensation.

"For by earth, Empedocles says, we see earth, by water, water by air bright air, by fire consuming fire, Love by love, and Strife by gloomy strife." — Aristotle,

生活世界

[源自德文: *Lebenswelt*] 胡塞尔使用的一个词, 意指我们作为历史存在者生活于其中的历史世界; 它 是被文化和历史塑成的视域 (horizon)。这生活世界形成了达到理解之过程的构架, 其中的参与者在关于他们的共同社会世界中的某些事情上取得一致, 或讨论它们。生活世界在任何意识行为之先就被给予我们, 人的意识并不以它作为意向的对象。自然科学的客观知识以这个生活世界为源头。这种知识反映了特殊社团的关切, 并且作为一种完成他们需要的手段而起作用。因此, 科学的世界植根于生活世界, 众科学都处于历史和文化的形势之中。生活世界的概念在海德格尔关于“在此世界之中存在”的说明中, 伽达默尔历史理解的观念中及哈贝马斯的交往行为的理论中得到进一步的发展。然而, 胡塞尔相信不同文化的生活世界本身是从一个观念 (*eidos*, 理念) 或一个形式的非历史的生活世界而来; 这种观念的或非历史的生活世界是先验主体性的产物。在他看来, 现象学的一项主要任务就是去描述这个观念的生活世界的结构。

“这个我们在清醒时生活于其中的生活世界总已经在那儿了, 先于我们而存在, 而且是所有实践的基础; 不管这些实践是理论的或是超理论的。”——胡塞尔: 《欧洲科学的危机》(卡尔英译), 1970 年, 第 142 页。

理性之光

“自然之光”的另一表述。

同类相吸

古希腊哲学家恩培多克勒哲学中的相似物相互吸引原理, 有别于他的另外两个宇宙动因——爱与恨。爱是统一不同因素的原理, 恨则是分别不同因素的原理, 而同类相吸原理是指任何因素中的任何部分, 都具有一种寻求相同因素中的其他部分并与其结合的自然倾向。这便是恨的基础。恩培多克勒也曾利用这一原理来解释感觉, 认为感觉的缘起是因为主体身体中的某一因素与外在同类因素相遇的结果。所有生成物不停地散发流出物, 当这些流出物达到一定体积时便进入到感官的毛孔中, 这种相遇发生时我们便有了感觉。

“所以, 恩培多克勒说, 我们凭借地球认识地球, 凭借水认识水, 凭借空气认识明亮的空气, 凭借火认识使用的火, 凭借爱认识爱, 凭借恨认识恼人的恨。”——亚里士多德: 《形而上学》, 1000b6—8。

Metaphysics, 1000b6-8.

Limited variety, principle of

A principle in the theory of probability introduced by J. M. Keynes in *A Treatise on Probability*. It proposes that the domain from which a generalisation is inferred and to which it can be applied should contain a limited or finite number of independent characteristics. This principle is held to increase the reliability of the conclusions derived in terms of Mill's methods and of eliminative induction. If the extent of possible independent variation is infinite in the objects of our generalisation, induction cannot be meaningful. The principle is close to the principle of the uniformity of nature. Both are regarded as basic assumptions for the validity of induction.

"As a logical foundation for Analogy, therefore, we seem to need some such assumption as that the amount of variety in the universe is limited in such a way that there is no one object so complex that its qualities fall into an infinite number of independent groups." —Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 1929, p. 258.

Line, simile of the

A simile employed by Plato in the *Republic* to help in explicating the difference between the perceptible world and the intelligible world. Take a line AB, and divide it into two unequal parts, AC and CB, with AC representing the perceptible world and CB representing the intelligible world. Then divide each of these two parts in the same ratio. Thus we have; A.....D.....C.....E.....B, with $AD : DC = AC : CB = CE : EB$.

Plato distinguished the portions of the perceptible world AC, by assigning different objects and corresponding mental states to them. AD stands for images (*eikonas*) such as shadows and reflections of objects, and the corresponding mental state is illusion or imagination (*eikasia*); DC stands for the originals of these images, such as natural and artificial things, and the corresponding mental state is belief (*pistis*).

In the intelligible world CB, Plato distinguished the two sections by the different methods of inquiry the mind uses in each of them. In CE, the mind uses the sensible objects of DC as illustrations, starting from hypotheses and proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. This is the method of the mathematical sciences, and the state of mind is *dianoia* (intelligence, mind, thinking, reasoning). In EB, the mind makes no use of illustrations, conducts the inquiry solely by means of Forms and proceeds to an unhypothetical first principle. This is the method of philosophy or dialectic, and the state of mind is *noesis* (intellect or understanding). Sometimes CE is understood to be concerned with mathematical entities and EB to be concerned with moral

有限多样性原理

概率理论中的一条原理，由 J. M. 凯恩斯在其《论概率》中引入。它提出，从中推出概括并可对之使用的域应包含有限或有穷数目的独立特性。这个原理的运用被认为增加了按“密尔方法”和“排除归纳法”导出结论的可靠性。因为如果可能的独立变化的范围在我们概括的对象中是无穷的，归纳就不可能有意义。这原理与“自然齐一性原理”密切相关，二者都被看作是归纳有效性的基本假定。

“因此，作为类推的逻辑基础，我们看来需要某些这样的假定，即宇宙中的多样性是以这种方式加以限定的：没有一个对象会复杂到使它的特性落入无穷的独立群之中。”——凯恩斯：《论概率》，1929年，第258页。

线段之喻

柏拉图在《国家篇》中采用的一个比喻，以进一步说明可感世界与理智世界间的差别。取一条线 AB，将其划分成两个不等的部分，AC 与 CB；以 AC 代表可感世界，以 CB 代表理智世界；然后再按同等比例将每一部分再分作两个部分。这样我们便得到了下面这条线：

A.....D.....C.....E.....B,

也即 $AD : DC = AC : CB = CE : EB$ 。

柏拉图通过指定不同的对象及与此相应的心灵状态来区分可感世界 AC 的不同部分。AD 代表影像 (*eikonas*)，如对象的阴影和倒影；其相应的心灵状态是幻觉或想像 (*eikasia*)；DC 代表这些影像的原本，如自然的和人工的事物，其相应的心智状态是信仰 (*pistis*)。

在理智世界 CB 中，柏拉图区分两个部分的方法是通过表明心灵在每一部分中所运用的不同方法。在 CE 中，心灵使用 DC 所代表的可感对象作例证，从假设开始推理，不是进展到第一原则，而是达到结论。这是数学科学的方法。这种心态叫做 *dianoia* (理智，心灵，思维，推理)。在 EB 中，心灵不再使用例证，只是通过形式来进行研究，并进展到不是假设的第一原则。这是哲学的方法或辩证法。这种心态叫做 *noesis* (理性或理解)。有时 CE 被理解作是关涉于数学实在物的，而 EB 是关于道德形式的，可这种看法很有争议。

这四部分是对认识状态及其对象的一种分类，从 AD 到 EB，这一线段构成了清晰度和实在程度都不断增加的等级连续。线段之喻紧密

Forms, but this interpretation is disputable.

These four sections provide a classification of cognitive states and their objects, and from AD to EB the line constitutes a continuous scale of increasing degrees of clarity and reality. The Simile is closely related to the Simile of Sun, and the Simile of Cave. Plato's text is difficult, but the simile provides a basis for exploring a number of important metaphysical and epistemological issues.

"There are four such processes in the soul, corresponding to the four sections of our line: *noesis* for the highest, *dianoia* for the second; give the name of *pistis* to the third, and *eikinos* to the last." —Plato, *Republic*, 511c.

Linguistic act, see speech act

Linguistic analysis

In its broad sense linguistic analysis is the major characteristic of analytic philosophy, which regards it as the real function of philosophy. Linguistic analysis aims to clarify and reveal the proper structure of ordinary language. It tries to show how certain uses of ordinary language have provoked metaphysical problems and how language has been misused in many alleged solutions. It is claimed that this approach might eliminate or solve the traditional philosophical problems which arise because of the misuse of language. Linguistic analysis is in the tradition of British empiricism.

"Linguistic analysis distinguished it [metaphysics] sharply from science, regarding it either as a diseased intellectual condition to be cured by the therapy of the linguistic analyst, or as a group of problems that inevitably arise from the use of natural languages, and that are to be solved by linguistic elucidation." —Owens, *Christian Metaphysics*, 1985, p. 10.

Linguistic determinism, another expression for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

Linguistic framework

A chosen language or a set of analytical principles which provides the method and criterion for the formulation of any significant assertion and its solution within this framework. A body of significant knowledge can only be justified by reference to the principles or rules that make up the framework. Different frameworks reflect different ways of talking about the world. But once we adopt a framework according to the principle of tolerance we must obey all of its principles. The framework is a basis for reaching agreement about any disputed problem. It follows that any answer to a question about kinds of entities recognised by a language is relative to a framework. Carnap divided internal and external

联系于太阳之喻和洞穴之喻。柏拉图的原著颇为晦涩,可这比喻为研究许多极其重要的形而上学和知识论问题提供了基础。

"在灵魂中有四种这样的过程,相应于我们线段中的四个部分:理性相应于最高的部分,理智对第二部分;相应于第三部分的可名为信仰,对应于最后一部分的叫想像。"——柏拉图:《国家篇》,511c。

语言行为

见“言语行为”条。

语言分析

在广义上,语言分析是分析哲学的主要特征,被看作是哲学的真正作用。语言分析的目的在于澄清和揭示日常语言的专门结构,试图表明日常语言的某些用法是如何带来了形而上学问题,而语言在许多所谓的解决方案中又是如何被误用了的。据说,这种方法能够消除或解决由于误用语言而产生的传统哲学问题。语言分析属于英国经验论的传统。

"语言分析把它[形而上学]与科学严格区分开来,把它看作是可以语言分析家的治疗方法治愈的理智疾病,或者是最终产生于自然语言用法的一些问题,而这些问题是必须用语言阐明加以解决的。"——欧文斯:《基督教形而上学》,1985年,第10页。

语言决定论

“萨丕尔—沃尔夫假说”的另一表述。

语言框架

一种选定的语言或一套分析原则,它提供了在这种构架中构成有意义的断定及其解决的方法和标准。任何有意义的知识只有通过构成这个框架的原则或规则才能得到证明。不同的框架反映了谈论世界的不同方式。而一旦我们根据“容忍原则”选择了一种框架,我们就必须遵守它的所有原则。这个框架是在问题争论中达到一致的基础。这表明,对关于由语言表达的各种实体问题的回答是与某个框架有关。卡尔纳普用语言框架概念区分了内部问题和外部问题。内部问题是根据这个框架的规则提出的,而外部问题则超出了具体框架的语境,是关于整

questions in terms of the notion of a linguistic framework. Internal questions are formulated according to the rules of the framework, while external questions are outside the context of any particular framework and concern the existence of the systems of entities as a whole. These latter questions are therefore metaphysical and lack theoretical significance. This conception not only played a central role in Logical Positivism, but also greatly influenced the development of the philosophy of science.

"If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question." —Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, 1956, p. 206.

Linguistic meaning

The meaning possessed by a linguistic expression which is inseparable from the linguistic form, that is, the fixed combination of signalling-units or phonemes. It is the semantic feature of an expression (a word, a phrase or a sentence) and is the common element whenever the expression is uttered, regardless of the circumstances in which it is used. Linguistic meaning contrasts to the pragmatic meaning of an expression determined by the situation in which it is employed. When the philosophy of language talks about the nature of meaning, it is generally concerned with the linguistic meaning.

"By uttering a linguistic form, a speaker prompts his hearers to respond to a situation; this situation and the response to it are the linguistic meaning of the form." —Bloomfield, *Language*, 1933, p. 158.

Linguistic phenomenalism, see phenomenalism

Linguistic phenomenology

Austin's term characterising his own philosophical approach, which is generally called linguistic philosophy or ordinary language philosophy. He probably used the term as a methodological corrective to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and his followers. Austin claimed that discussing the functions of certain words and sentences and inventing new ways of describing phenomena are not merely linguistic, but improve our perception of reality or phenomena on the basis of a sharpened awareness of words. Hence it should be considered to be a sort of phenomenology. Austin's philosophy itself sharpens our perception of English grammar, although appreciation of its philosophical value has declined.

"When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again

个实体系统的存在问题。因而这后一种问题是形而上学的,缺乏理论的意义。这种看法不仅在逻辑实证主义中起着核心作用,而且极大地影响到科学哲学的发展。

"如果有人希望用他的语言谈论某种新的实体,他就必须引入一种新的说话方式,遵守新的规则;我们把这个过程称为这种新实体构造语言框架。"——卡尔纳普:《意义与必然性》,1956年,第206页。

语言意义

即语言表达式具有的意义,而语言表达式与语言形式即记号单位或音素的固定组合是不可分的。这是表达式(一个词、短语、句子)的语义特征,是当表达式被说出时共同具有的成分,与这个表达式使用的环境无关。语言意义对应于由使用场景决定的表达式的语用意义。当语言哲学谈论意义的性质时,它通常关心的是语言意义。

"当一个说者说出一个语言形式,他是促使他的听者对某种场景做出反应;这种场景及其对它的反应就是这个形式的语言意义。"——布龙菲尔德:《语言论》,1933年,第158页。

语言现象主义

见“现象主义”条。

语言现象学

奥斯汀用来表达他自己的哲学方法的术语,这种方法通常称作“语言哲学”或“日常语言哲学”。他可能以此术语作为对胡塞尔及其追随者的现象学哲学的方法论纠正。奥斯汀认为,讨论某些词和句子的作用,发明描述现象的一些新方法,这些并不仅仅是语言上的事,而是我们基于对词的已有认识,改进我们对实在或现象的认识。因而它应该被看作是一种现象学。尽管对其哲学价值的评价已经降低了,但奥斯汀哲学本身至少构成了我们对英语语法的认识。

"当我们考察我们应该说什么,在什么场合说什么话,我们就不仅仅是在考察语词(或‘意义’,无论它们是什么),而是在考察我们用这些语词谈论的实在……出于这种原因,我认为,就做哲学的方式而言,应该最好使用比上述那些

not merely at words (or 'meanings', whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about ... For this reason I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misunderstanding name than those given above--for instance, 'linguistic phenomenology', only that is rather a mouthful." --Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, 1970, p. 182.

Linguistic philosophy

In a narrow and technical sense linguistic philosophy is a synonym for ordinary language philosophy, an approach that seeks to illuminate and solve traditional philosophical problems through the investigation of everyday language use. It was characteristic of the Oxford-style of analytic philosophy and flourished mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, led by figures such as Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin and showing the strong influence of the later Wittgenstein.

In a broad sense it is the philosophical method which takes language as a fundamental issue in discussions of philosophy. We must first come to understand the role of language before we understand our ideas and the subjects of the ideas. Starting from Plato and Aristotle, such a linguistic approach has been important, and it became dominant in the twentieth century. The whole of analytic philosophy is linguistic philosophy in this sense, and ordinary language philosophy or linguistic philosophy in the narrow sense is one of its many schools. Linguistic philosophy, which deals with a broad range of philosophical problems in many areas of the subject, can be distinguished from the philosophy of language.

"The term 'linguistic philosophy', ... is tied to that quite special version of analytical philosophy which flourished at Oxford in the 1950s and 60s." --Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, 1981, p. 148.

Linguistic rule

The conventionally accepted rules which constitute or regulate the correct use of the constituent words and grammatical forms of sentences. These rules do not describe empirical facts, but determine necessary truths. Violations of the rules are classically said to result in meaninglessness, although we can often understand ungrammatical and even logically malformed utterances. I understand the meanings of the expressions of my language when I know the system of rules which determine the meanings of the sentences that contain its expressions. Misunderstandings follow from ignorance or misapplication of the rules. The notion of a linguistic rule was emphasised by Carnap and other logical positivists in their discussion of language. Their account opposed the referential theory of language, according to which each word must refer to something external in order to have a meaning. They had specific objections to this account

更少些误解的名称,譬如‘语言现象学’,只是它太长了一点。” --奥斯汀:《哲学论文集》,1970年,第182页。

语言哲学

在狭义上和专门的意义上,语言哲学是被用做“日常语言哲学”的同义词,这种方法寻求通过研究日常语言的用法,阐明和解决传统的哲学问题。它被看作牛津风格的分析哲学特征,主要兴起于20世纪50年代与60年代,以赖尔及奥斯汀为代表,并表现出后期维特根斯坦的强烈影响。

在广义上,它是指把语言看作哲学讨论中的基本问题这种哲学方法。在我们理解我们的观念和观念主题之前,我们必须首先理解语言的作用。从柏拉图和亚里士多德开始,这种语言方法就一直非常重要,并在20世纪逐渐占到主导地位。在这种意义上,整个分析哲学就是语言哲学,而狭义上的“日常语言哲学”或“语言哲学”只是众多流派中的一种而已。语言哲学广泛地讨论许多领域中的哲学问题,这就可以与关于语言的哲学区分开来。

“‘语言哲学’这个词,……用来指20世纪50年代和60年代在牛津兴起的那种极为特别的分析哲学形式。”——达米特:《弗雷格哲学解说》,1981年,第148页。

语言规则

惯例认可的构成或支配正确使用句子中的组成词汇及语法形式的规则。这些规则并不描述经验事实,却决定必然真理。违背这些规则传统上讲会导致无意义,尽管我们通常可以理解不合语法的乃至逻辑形式不正确的句子。当我懂得决定语句意义的规则系统时,我就理解了我的语言表达式的意蕴。误解来自于对规则的无知或误用。语言规则的概念尤为逻辑实证主义者、特别是卡尔纳普在他们关于语言的讨论中所强调。它被用于反对语言的指称理论,按照后者,每一个词都必须指称外在的某物以便具有意义。逻辑实证主义特别反对语言指称论对逻辑常项的说明,认为常项的意义可由作为语言规则的逻辑法则所构成而更好地理解。他们认为,语言指称论需要许多不必要的形而上学实体的存在,误解了逻辑和语言的性质。逻辑实

for the logical constants, whose meaning can better be understood as constituted by the laws of logic as linguistic rules. They argued that a referential theory of language requires the existence of unnecessary metaphysical entities and misconstrues the nature of logic and language. Logical positivists argued that discussing meaning in terms of linguistic rules can lead not only to a satisfactory understanding of meaning, but also to an understanding of rationality, because science, which is the model of rationality, is essentially a set of rules governing scientific language. Accordingly, philosophy should be concerned mainly with describing the rules that govern linguistic behaviour and uncovering the rule-governed relations between language and experience. Criticisms by Wittgenstein on rule-governed behaviour and Quine on analyticity have questioned this account of linguistic rules.

"In order to understand this conception of laws of logic as linguistic rules, we should reflect on the method of specifying the meanings of logical constants." —Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 1963, p. 101.

Linguistic turn

In a broad sense, a movement claiming that the analysis of thought and knowledge must be conducted through the analysis of language and, hence, that language should be the central concern of philosophy. Traditional philosophical problems can be solved by reducing them to issues in the philosophy of language. This movement was initiated by Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and characterises twentieth century analytic philosophy. More narrowly, it is a general tendency, particularly associated with Oxford, which suggests that we should deal with philosophical problems by appealing to language as it is actually used. Philosophy must find the logical form of ordinary language, and expose those natural imperfections which have given rise to so many philosophical questions. This trend was influenced by Wittgenstein, and its leaders were figures such as Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Grice.

"Once the linguistic turn had been taken, the fundamental axioms of analytical philosophy—that the only route to the analysis of thought goes through the analysis of language—naturally appeared compelling." —Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, 1993, p. 128.

Linguistic universals

Chomsky's term, also called universals of language, for the basic similarities contained in all known languages. They are further divided into substantive universals and formal universals. Substantive universals are common abstract syntactic features which can be found in the analysis of any natural language, for example nouns, verbs, words, sentences, particles, morphemes and phonemes. Formal

证主义者相信,按照语言规则来讨论意义,不仅能导致对于意义的令人满意的理解,而且能导致对于理性的理解,因为作为理性模型的科学本质上是一组支配科学语言的规则。相应地,哲学应主要关心描述支配语言行为的规则,并发现语言和经验之间的规则支配关系。但是维特根斯坦对规则支配行为的批评和奎因对可分析性的批评对这种语言规则观点提出了质疑。

"为了理解这种把逻辑法则作为语言规则的看法,我们应当反思澄清逻辑常项意义的方法。"—帕普:《科学哲学导论》,1963年,第101页。

语言的转向

在广义上,这场运动主张,对思想和知识的分析必须通过对语言的分析才能进行,因而语言应该是哲学思考的中心。传统的哲学问题可以通过把它们还原为语言哲学中的问题而加以解决。这一运动发起于弗雷格、罗素和维特根斯坦,最终形成20世纪的分析哲学。在狭义上,它是指一种普遍的倾向,特别是与牛津有着密切的关系,这种倾向认为,我们应该凭借实际使用的语言来谈论哲学问题。哲学必须发现日常语言的逻辑形式,揭露那些已经带来了许多哲学问题的天然缺陷。这一倾向受到了维特根斯坦的影响,而代表人物则是赖尔、奥斯汀,斯特劳森和格莱斯等人。

"一旦实现了语言的转向,自然就会要求接受分析哲学的基本准则,即分析思想的唯一道路是分析语言。"—达米特:《分析哲学的起源》,1993年,第128页。

语言共相

乔姆斯基的术语,也称为"语言的共相",是指在所有已知语言中包含的基本相似性。它们还进一步被分为"实质共相"和"形式共相"。实质共相是可以通过分析自然语言而得到的共同抽象的句法特征,例如,名词、动词、语词、句子、虚词、词素、音素等等。形式共相是语法结构的共同形式特性,即出现在语法中的规则和

universals are the common formal properties of grammatical structures, that is, the general characteristics of the rules that appear in grammar and the ways in which they are interconnected. Linguistic universals are closely connected with the problem of innateness. Chomsky and his followers claim that a child must possess tacit and innate knowledge of these universals and unconsciously apply them to the data of the language he is learning in order to grasp that language efficiently.

"The study of linguistic universals is the study of the properties of any generative grammar for a natural language." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 28.

Lived experience

[German: *Erlebnis*, from the verb *erleben*, to live through] Dilthey's term for what is immediately given to individual consciousness regarding one's own thought and feeling. It can also be used for the experience which orients a person's self-conception and around which an individual life organises itself. Through lived experience, the meaning of a particular life-history unfolds. We can understand society as our world on the basis of our lived experience of the forces that move society. Lived experience is distinguished from *Erfahrung* [German: scientific experience], the data of experiment and measurement which can be gathered indirectly. The distinction between lived experience and scientific experience serves as a basis for the distinction between natural sciences and human sciences in Dilthey's philosophy. He held that the human sciences are grounded in lived experience and are thus a distinct domain from the natural sciences that are based on scientific experiences.

"A more thoroughgoing grounding of the independent status of the human sciences vis-a-vis the natural sciences... will be developed step by step in this work through the analysis of our total lived experience of the human world and its incommensurability with all sensory experiences of nature." —Dilthey, *Selected Works*, I, 1989, p. 60.

Locutionary act

[from Latin: *loqui*, speak, utter] Austin's first level of analysis of speech acts. To perform a locutionary act is to perform the basic linguistic action of uttering sounds which have meaning or definite reference. In doing so, one says something in the central and basic sense of "to say". Compared with Austin's two other kinds of speech act, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts, locutionary acts are concerned mainly with meaning. Locutionary acts are further divided into three kinds: phonetic acts, which are merely the act of uttering certain noises; phatic acts, which utter a grammatical sentence; and rhetic acts, which utter

它们的相互联结方式这些一般特征。语言共相与先天性问题密切相关。乔姆斯基和他的追随者认为,孩子一定是不言而喻地先天得知这些共相,他毫无意识地把这些共相用于他正在学习的语言,以便有效地掌握这种语言。

"研究语言共相,就是研究自然语言的生成语法特性。"——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的诸方面》,1965年,第28页。

活生生的体验〔或译“生活经验”〕

[德文为 *Erlebnis*, 从动词 *erleben* 而来, 字面意义为“活着经过”]狄尔泰使用的一个词,描写那直接给予关于某人自身思想和感情的个人意识。它也用来表达这样一种经验,它引导着人的自我概念;而且,个人的生活也就围绕着这种经验而组建自身。通过活生生的体验,一个特殊的生活历史的意义展现出来。在我们对于那推动社会力量的活生生体验的基础上,我们能将社会理解为我们的世界。活生生的体验区别于科学的经验(*Erfahrung*)及那些能被间接收集的实验资料和测量资料。活生生的体验与科学的经验的区别提供了在狄尔泰哲学中区别自然科学和人文科学的基础。他认为人文科学基于活生生的体验,因此是与基于科学的经验的自然科学不同的一个独特领域。

“这本著作将一步步地去开展这样一项工作,它将更彻底地确保那与自然科学相对的人文科学的独立身份;进行这项工作的途径就是去分析人类世界的全部活生生的体验及其与所有自然的感受经验的不可公度性。”——狄尔泰:《文集》,第一卷,1989年,第60页。

以言表意的行为

[源自拉丁文 *loqui* (说,说出)] 奥斯汀对言语行为的第一层分析。完成一个以言表意的行为,就是完成一个发出声音的基本语言行为,这些声音具有意义或确定的指称。这样做,实际上就是在“说”这个词最核心和基本的意义上说出某些东西。与奥斯汀的另外两类言语行为,即以言行事的行为和以言取效的行为相比,以言表意的行为主要关心的是意义。以言表意的行为可以进一步分为三种形式:作为纯粹发声行为的语音行为、说出语法句子的交际行为,以及说出具有一定意义和一定指称的某个东西的表

something with a certain sense and with a certain reference.

"The act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense I call, i. e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, or of the full units of speech." —Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, pp. 94-5.

Logic

[from Greek: *logos*, reason, speech, measure] Logic is the study concerned with the conditions of valid reasoning or the structure and principles of correct inference. It is mainly thought to deal with the form of argument, independent of content, although the distinction between form and content is sometimes questioned. Aristotle, who made logic a special discipline, established the first logical system, which dominated Western conceptions of logic until the last century when Frege and others developed powerful modern systems of logic. Aristotle referred to his own logical works as analytic, and the technical sense of logic did not appear until the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Logic is now divided into two branches: formal or symbolic logic and philosophical logic. Within formal logic, classical modern logic is based on the development of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus, although important formal systems which supplement or rival these basic systems have been developed. In philosophical logic, philosophers examine logical terms such as proposition, meaning, truth, falsity, proof, implication, entailment, reference, predication, constant, variable, quantifier, function, necessity, possibility, and tense. Sometimes, especially in the nineteenth century, logic has meant the study of epistemology and scientific methodology, as exemplified in German idealism.

"If we use 'proposition' as a general name for what, when these forms are exemplified, we introduce or specify by such 'that-', 'whether-' or 'if-' clauses, then logic is the general theory of the propositions. It has a formal part and a philosophical part." —P. F. Strawson (ed.), *Philosophical Logic*, 1967, p. 1.

Logic (Hegel)

Hegel called his own philosophy the science of logic, but for him logic is not a static formal system of valid deduction. Rather, it concerns the process of thought according to which one category is implied by another, from which it develops as its contradictory. These categories move to unity in a higher whole, which opens the way for further stages of development. For Hegel, this is the fundamental logical process from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis. This dynamic process, which relates concepts to each other in a systematic way, is the subject-matter of Hegel's logic. Each concept is one moment, or inseparable part, in the self-

达行为。

"在十分规范意义上'说出某物'的行为,我称作,即命名为完成以言表意的行为,进一步说就是对话语的研究,在这些方面也是对言语的研究,或对整个言语单位的研究。"—奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》,1962年,第94—95页。

逻辑

[源自希腊语 *logos*, 理性, 言谈, 尺度] 逻辑是关于有效推理的条件或正确推理的结构和原则的研究。它主要被认为是处理不依赖内容的论证形式, 虽然形式和内容的区分有时受到质疑。亚里士多德使逻辑成为一个专门的学科, 他建立了第一个逻辑体系, 一直支配着西方人的逻辑观, 直至上世纪弗雷格和其他人发展了强有力的现代逻辑系统。亚里士多德把他自己的逻辑著作称之为"分析的", 在爱弗罗得西亚的亚历山大的评注中才出现"逻辑"的专门含义。逻辑现在分为两个分支: 形式逻辑或符号逻辑和哲学逻辑。在形式逻辑范围内, 经典现代逻辑基于命题演算和谓词演算的发展之上, 尽管已经有人发展出了补充这些基本系统或与之竞争的重要形式系统。在哲学逻辑中, 哲学家们考察这样一些逻辑词项, 如命题, 意义, 真、假, 证明, 蕴涵, 衍推, 指称, 谓述, 常项, 变元, 量词, 函项, 必然性, 可能性和时态。有时, 特别是在19世纪, "逻辑"还意指关于认识论和科学方法论的研究, 德国唯心主义是这方面的典型。

"如果我们把'命题'用作一个普遍名称, 表示当这些形式被例证化时我们用 'that-', 'whether-', 或 'if-' 从句所引入或刻画的东西, 那么逻辑就是关于命题的一般理论。它有形式的部分和哲学的部分。"—斯特劳森编:《哲学逻辑》, 1967年, 第1页。

逻辑(黑格尔)

黑格尔把他自己的哲学称为逻辑学, 但对他来说, 逻辑不是一个有效演绎的静止的形式体系。毋宁说, 它论究思想的过程, 按此过程, 一范畴被另一范畴所包含, 并由此发展为其对立面。这些范畴在一更高的全体中达到统一, 这个统一又为发展的下一阶段开辟了道路。在黑格尔看来, 从正题到反题, 再到合题, 是基本的逻辑过程。这个动态过程以系统的方式使概念相互联系, 这是黑格尔逻辑的主体内容。每个概念在自我反思的思想中都是一个环节, 是不可分离的部分。逻辑是对这个自我反思过程的考

reflection of thought. Logic is the examination of this process by which thinking itself works. This logic is thus contrasted to traditional formal logic in the sense that it involves the development of the thinking process rather than the abstract form of deduction. It also involves the contents rather than merely the forms of thinking. Furthermore, Hegel's logic is also intended to be true of the objective world because the thinking process is the essential structure of all that actually happens in the world. Logic in this sense is also metaphysics. Hegel also called his logic a dialectic of being and dialectic logic. It was further developed by Marx and Engels as a reflection of the ever-changing processes of things based on their immanent contradictions. Critics have asked searching questions about the programme of Hegel's logic and about its details, including the notions of dialectic and contradiction, the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula, the dynamic aspect of the logic, the relation between logic and metaphysics, the relation between logic and thought and the ability of Hegelian method to deliver truth.

"Logic is the science of the pure idea; pure, that is, because the idea is in the abstract medium of thought." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 19.

Logic of change, another name for tense logic

Logic of scientific discovery, see demarcation, criterion of

Logic of terms, another name for predicate logic

Logica docens, see *logica utens*

Logica modernorum, see *logica vetus*

Logica nova, see *logica vetus*

Logica utens

The distinction between *logica utens* and *logica docens* was drawn by medieval logicians and borrowed by Peirce. *Logica utens* is one's unreflective judgement of the validity of informal arguments. It is a general idea of what good reasoning is. In contrast, *logica docens* is the reflective and precise rules of reasoning in formal systems.

"Such a classification of arguments, antecedent to any systematic study of the subject, is called the reasoner's logic utens, in contradistinction to the result of the scientific study, which is called logic docens." — Peirce, *Collected*

Essays,思维自身以此过程而活动。这样,这种逻辑不同于传统形式逻辑之处在于:它研究思维过程的发展,而不是演绎的抽象形式。它也研究思维的内容而不仅是思维的形式。而且,黑格尔的逻辑也企图适用于客观世界,因为思维过程是世界中现实发生的一切事件的本质结构。逻辑在这种意义上也是形而上学。黑格尔也把他的逻辑称为存在的辩证法和辩证逻辑。它被马克思和恩格斯进一步发展为一种对事物基于它们的内在矛盾而永恒变化过程的反映。批评家已对黑格尔逻辑的程序和它的详细过程提出了进一步的问题,包括辩证法和矛盾的概念,正题—反题—合题的公式,逻辑的能动方面,逻辑和形而上学之间的关系,逻辑和思想之间的关系,以及黑格尔式的表达真理方法的能力。

"逻辑是纯粹理念的科学;所谓纯粹,是因为理念作为思维的抽象要素而存在。"——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,19节。

变化逻辑

“时态逻辑”的另一个名称。

科学发现的逻辑

见“分界标准”条。

词项逻辑

“谓词逻辑”的另一个名称。

形式论证

见“非形式论证”条。

当代逻辑

见“旧逻辑”条。

新逻辑

见“旧逻辑”条。

非形式论证

形式论证和非形式论证的区分是由中世纪逻辑学家作出的,并为皮尔士所借用。非形式论证是指一个人对非形式论证的有效性的非反思的判断,它是关于何谓好的推理的一般观念。相比之下,形式论证是形式系统内反思的精确的推理规则。

“在对题材进行任何系统研究之前对论证所作的这样一种分类,叫做该推理者的非形式论证,以与作为科学研究结果的所谓形式论证相区别。”——皮尔士:《文集》,第二卷,第204

Works, II, p. 204.

Logica vetus

[Latin: old logic] Medieval logicians called Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* and Boethius' commentaries on them the old logic because these were the logic texts available until the middle of the twelfth century. Aristotle's other logical books in the *Organon*, namely *Topics*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*, were then introduced into the Latin world and were called *logica nova* (new logic). Medieval logicians called their own development of logic *logica modernorum* (contemporary logic). *Logica modernorum* was mainly concerned with the analysis of linguistic fallacies and syncategoremata and its connection with more general topics in logic. This work was stimulated by Aristotle's discussion of fallacies.

"These very short and very difficult books [*Categories* and *De interpretatione*], along with a handful of associated treatises stemming from late antiquity, constituted the secular philosophical library of the early Middle Ages, and became known as the Old Logic [*Logica vetus*] by contrast with the New Logic – the rest of Aristotle's *Organon* – as it became available during the second half of the twelfth century." – Kretzmann, et. al. (eds), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 1982, p. 5.

Logical analysis

Logical analysis aims to discover the logical forms of propositions which are often concealed in philosophically crucial cases by the overt structure of language and to show the philosophical significance of providing correct accounts of different logical forms. It is concerned to show how propositions relate to one another and to provide insight into the underlying structures of language. In a broad sense, logical analysis, as the logical articulation of concepts and statements to gain philosophical understanding, has been a central feature of philosophical method throughout the history of western philosophy. In a more technical sense, however, logical analysis is a programme inspired by Frege's logic and exemplified in the writings of Russell and Wittgenstein. On the assumption that for philosophical purposes ordinary language is too vague, ambiguous and misleading in its apparent structure, one approach to analysis sought to replace ordinary discourse by propositions which can be understood in terms of their clear and perspicuous logical form, while another approach claimed that ordinary language needed clarification rather than replacement. Some analysts sought to reduce complex propositions into atomic or elementary propositions, and eventually to terminate their analysis by identifying the constituents of these elementary propositions, while others sought to clarify the logical

真。

旧逻辑

[拉丁语,意为“旧逻辑”]中世纪的逻辑学家把波菲利的《导论》、亚里士多德的《范畴》和《解释》、波埃修斯对它们的评注称为“旧逻辑”,因为这些著作直到12世纪中叶,都是有效的逻辑学教本。从那时以后,亚里士多德在“工具论”中的其他逻辑学著作,即《正位篇》、《前分析》、《后分析》、《驳诡辩》,都被引入了拉丁世界,并被称作“*logica nova*”(新逻辑)。中世纪逻辑学家则将他们自己对逻辑学的发展叫作 *logica modernorum* (当代逻辑)。*Logica modernorum* 主要关注的是语言谬误的分析,以及依附范畴的词和它与逻辑学中更为一般的论题的关系。它也是由亚里士多德对谬误的讨论所激发。

“这些很短但很艰涩的著作[《范畴》和《解释》],与古代后期出现的少量相关论著一起,构成中世纪早期的世俗哲学书库,并以旧逻辑 [*Logica vetus*] 著称,对应于所谓新逻辑,即亚里士多德“工具论”中的其余著作,因为直到12世纪下半叶,旧逻辑都是通行的。”——克里兹曼等编,《剑桥中世纪晚期哲学史》,1982年,第5页。

逻辑分析

逻辑分析的目的在于发现命题的逻辑形式,它们常常由于语言的表面结构而在哲学上至关重要的情况下被遮蔽了。语言分析的目的在于显示对不同逻辑形式提供正确说明的哲学意义。它致力于显示命题是如何彼此相关的,并对语言的深层结构作出洞察。从广义上说,逻辑分析作为对概念和陈述在逻辑上作出阐明以获得哲学理解,它在整个西方哲学史上一直是哲学方法的核心特征。但从更专门的意义上说,逻辑分析是由弗雷格的逻辑所促动,并在罗素和维特根斯坦的著作中体现出来的工作。因为人们认为,对于哲学目的而言,日常语言在其表面结构中太模糊、含混和误导人了,一种分析方法力图用命题取代日常话语,这些命题因其清晰明白的逻辑形式而能得到理解,而另一种方法认为日常语言只需澄清而无需替代。有些分析者力图把复杂的命题还原为原子命题或基本命题,其分析的最终结果是辨明这些基本命题的构成成分,而其他分析者力图通过说明来弄清命题的逻辑结构,并不认可还原论方法。许多当代分析哲学家认为逻辑分析是哲学的主要活动,把自己的工作视为受早期分析形式的激励,但对于分析应为何物的问题,他们现在有极大的分歧。

structure of propositions through paraphrase without subscribing to a reductionist programme. Many contemporary analytical philosophers consider logical analysis to be the main activity of philosophy and see their work as inspired by earlier forms of analysis, but they now have important disagreements over what analysis should be.

"Logical analysis is, indeed, linguistic in the sense that it begins with an examination of the ways certain expressions are used." Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 467.

Logical atomism

A view held by Russell in the period 1905-1918, represented by his paper "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", and by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Its basic position is that for language to have meaning it must be logically analysed or reduced into atomic elements of meaning. Other elements of meaning are constructed out of these atomic elements through rigorous logical processes. Such processes of logical analysis might reveal the hidden structure of reality which is concealed by ordinary language. The articulations of logical form would get rid of various traditional metaphysical problems.

For Russell, some logical atoms are things with which we are directly acquainted, such as "little patches of colour or sounds, momentary things", and others are "predicates or relations and so on". These logical atoms constitute atomic facts, which are expressed by propositions without logical connectives.

For Wittgenstein at this stage, the basic items of atomism are mutually independent propositions which have meaning by logically picturing possible states of affairs. The basic enterprise of logical atomism is inherited by logical positivism, although both Russell and Wittgenstein themselves depart from it.

"The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms... The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis." - Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 170.

Logical calculus

Also called formal language, or by Leibniz *calculus ratiocinator* (Latin: a calculus of reasoning). Distinguished from mathematical calculus, which is used for calculation, logical calculus is a syntax of logic or a system used to construct valid arguments. Its basic idea originated with Leibniz, but was developed as a branch of mathematics by Frege and Russell. Any logical calculus must have a list of symbols, a set of axioms and a set of rules of inference. It can determine the construction of a logical formula and

"确实,在逻辑分析始于考察某些表达式的使用方式这种意义上说,它是语言上的。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第467页。

逻辑原子主义

罗素在1905—1919年间所持有的一种观点,以其论文《逻辑原子主义的哲学》为代表,这种哲学也体现在维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》一书中。它的基本立场是,语言要有意义,就必须在逻辑上分析为或还原为意义的原子成分。意义的其他成分由这些原子成分通过严格的逻辑程序建构出来。这样的逻辑分析程序可能揭示由日常语言遮蔽的、隐藏着的现实结构。明晰说明逻辑形式将清除各式各样传统的形而上学问题。

对罗素而言,有些逻辑原子是我们直接熟知的东西,例如“颜色或声音的片段,稍纵即逝的事物”,另外一些则是“属性和关系等等”。这些逻辑原子构成原子事实,它们由不带逻辑联结词的命题表示。

对于这一阶段的维特根斯坦而言,原子主义的基本项是相互独立的命题,它们由于在逻辑上描绘了可能的事态而具有意义。逻辑原子主义的基业由逻辑实证主义继承,虽然罗素和维特根斯坦自己都脱离了此项事业。

“我把自己的学说叫做逻辑原子主义,是因为我希望得到的、作为分析的最终产物的原子是逻辑原子而不是物理的原子……要点在于,我希望达到的原子是逻辑分析的原子,而不是物理分析的原子。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第179页。

逻辑演算

亦称形式语言,莱布尼茨则称之为“理性演算”(拉丁语:推理演算)。与用于计算的数学演算不同,逻辑演算是用于构造有效论证的逻辑句法或系统。它的基本观念源自于莱布尼茨,但它作为数学的一支是由弗雷格和罗素所发展的。任何逻辑演算必定有一个符号表,一组公理和一组推理规则。它能够决定逻辑公式的构造以及一串逻辑公式是否构成一个证明。不同的演算关注不同类型的有效论证形式。现代逻辑

whether a sequence of logical formulae forms a proof. Different calculi are concerned with different kinds of valid forms of argument. The most influential logical calculi in modern logic are the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus.

"The logical calculus, therefore, is, in all other parts of mathematics, of quite fundamental importance. It supplies, together with arithmetic, the type of all possible judgements concerning manifolds as such." —Russell, *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, II, p. 191.

Logical consequence

If a statement B can be validly inferred or deduced from the premises A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , in such a way that it is impossible that all the premises A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n can be true while B is false, then B is a logical consequence of these premises. Every consequence of true propositions must be true. The deductive relation which holds between premises and the conclusion is independent of the subject-matter of the words contained in premises and conclusion. Logical consequence is generally symbolised by a double turnstile \models . That B is the logical consequence of A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , can be written " $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n \models B$ ". Logical consequence is a synonym of logical implication. It indicates that there is a necessary relationship between premises and conclusion. The inference is necessary, leading invariably to true conclusions from true premises.

"We can define the concept of logical consequence as follows: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X ." —Tarski, *Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics*, 1983, p. 117.

Logical constant

The structural components of a sentence that indicate its logical form. Their significance does not depend upon their subject matter, rather they serve as operators of inference. Any word in a formula can be a constant, but not necessarily a logical constant; for example bachelor is a constant, but not a logical constant. The choice of expressions that can count as logical constants varies among logicians. We can follow Quine by enumerating logical constants as basic particles, such as the truth functions not, and, or and implies; the identity relation, equivalence, and the quantifiers some and all. We can also include necessarily and possibly for modal logic, past, present and future for tensed logic and similarly basic terms for other kinds of logic. It is not clear whether we can go beyond enumeration to provide a principle justifying a choice of terms as logical constants. Each logical constant has a symbolic counterpart in symbolic logic. A formula which contains logical constants as its only constants is called a logical formula.

中最有影响的逻辑演算是命题演算和谓词演算。

“所以,在数学的所有其他部分中逻辑演算具有相当基本的重要性。它与算术一起,提供了有关多重性本身的所有可能的判断类型。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第二卷,第191页。

逻辑后承

如果陈述 B 能够以这样一种方式从前提 A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n 有效地推出或演绎得到,使得所有前提 A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n 为真而 B 为假,这种情形不可能,那么, B 就是这些前提的逻辑后承。真命题的每一个后承必定真。在前提和结论之间成立的演绎关系是独立于包含在前提和结论中的词语内容的。它通常被符号化为(旋转门上的)双绕杆 (\models)。 B 是 A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n 的逻辑后承,可以写成 " $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n \models B$ ". 逻辑后承是逻辑蕴涵的同义语。它表明在前提和结论之间存在必然关系。推理是必然的,从真的前提不可更易地导致真的结论。

“我们可以把逻辑后承概念定义如下:语句 X 从 K 类的语句中逻辑地推出,当且仅当 K 类的每一模型也是语句 X 的模型。”——塔斯基:《逻辑、语义学与元数学》,1983年,第117页。

逻辑常项

语句内表示其逻辑形式的结构要素。它们的意义并不取决于它们的题材,相反是用作推理的算子。一公式内的任何词都可以是一常项,但不必然是一逻辑常项。例如,单身汉是一常项,但不是一逻辑常项。哪些表达式可以用作逻辑常项,不同的逻辑学家有不同的选择。我们可以追随奎因,把逻辑常项枚举为下述基本的小品词,如真值函项“并非”、“并且”、“或者”以及蕴涵;同一关系、等价以及量词“有些”和“所有的”。对模态逻辑,我们还可以包括“必然”和“可能”;对时态逻辑,包括“过去”、“现在”和“未来”;对其他类型逻辑,包括类似的基本词项。我们是否可以不用枚举法,而提出一条证明把某些词项选为逻辑词项是合理的原则,这一点并不清楚。每一个逻辑常项在符号逻辑中都有其符号对应物。只含有逻辑常项作为其常项的公式叫做逻辑公式。

“形式逻辑学家选择一些表达式作为它们

"Expressions dignified by selection by formal logicians to figure as constants in their representative verbal patterns or formulae are sometimes called 'logical (formal) constants'." —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 47.

Logical construction

A reductive analytical procedure seeking to show that a symbol purporting to refer to an inferred entity can be replaced by a symbol whose denotation is given in sense-experience. On this view, any sentence containing a term denoting an inferred entity can be analysed or translated into some sentence which does not contain such terms, but consists only of terms for items which are available to experience. In this sense, logical constructions provide analyses of sentences containing terms such as Russellian incomplete symbols, but are not identical with the sentences that they analyse. Russell extends this method from mathematics to the physical world, and reconstructs physical objects in terms of sets of sense-data or sensations. Epistemologically he brings physical objects closer in their nature to the experiential foundations of our knowledge, and metaphysically he eliminates inferred entities such as matter, the self and other minds. Logical construction as a method has been widely adopted in many areas of analytical philosophy.

In another sense Russell also applies the term "logical construction" to symbols or entities constructed out of other entities, and thus makes logical constructions identical with incomplete symbols and logical fictions.

"The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this, wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." —Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VIII, p. 11.

Logical construction theory, Broad's term for the bundle theory of mind

Logical determinism

Since ancient Greece, some philosophers have believed that logic supports the thesis that a person's fate is predetermined and that there is nothing we can do to alter it or to avoid what will happen. Any statement about the future must be either true or false now. Correspondingly, the future event it represents may either happen or not happen. Hence a statement about the future is either true before the event takes place or false before the event fails to occur. There is nothing that anyone can do to alter the truth or falsity of the statement or the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event. Stoics and scholastics advocated this doctrine to prove fatalism or God's omniscience. The issue was first discussed by Aristotle in *De Interpretatione*, with

所置身的言语模式或公式中的常项, 这些表达式有时叫做 '逻辑 (形式) 常项'。" ——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》, 1952 年, 第 47 页。

逻辑构造

一种还原性的分析程序, 它力求表明, 意指指称被推论实体的符号可以替换为在感觉经验中被所予指示对象的符号。根据这种观点, 含有指示推论实体的语词的语句可以分析为或翻译为某个这样的语句, 它不包含这样的语词, 而仅由代表了可在经验中获得的東西的语词组成。在这种意义上, 逻辑构造提供了对包含诸如罗素的不完全符号这种语句的分析, 但并不等同于它们所分析的语句。罗素把这种方法从数学扩展到物理世界, 并用一些感觉予料或感官知觉来重构物理对象。从认识论上说, 他使物理对象在其本性上与我们知识的经验基础更接近了, 而从形而上学方面说, 他清除了诸如物质、自我和他人心灵这些被推论实体。逻辑构造作为一种方法在分析哲学的许多领域被广泛采用。

在另一种意义上, 罗素也把“逻辑构造”一词应用于从其他实体中构造出来的符号或实体, 这就使得逻辑构造等同于不完全符号和逻辑虚构。

“科学哲学活动的最高准则是: 只要可能, 就用逻辑构造来代替被推论实体。” ——罗素:《罗素文集》, 第八卷, 第 11 页。

逻辑建构理论

布劳德对“心的捆束理论”的称呼。

逻辑决定论

自从古希腊时期起, 有些哲学家就相信逻辑可以支持这一论题, 即一个人的命运是预先决定的, 我们无法改变它, 或避免其发生。任何关于未来的陈述现在必然或真或假。相应地, 它所表征的未来事件可能发生或不发生, 因此一个有关未来的陈述要么在事件实际发生之前就为真, 要么在事件将来不发生之前就为假。人们不能够做什么去改变一陈述的真假或一事件的发生与不发生。斯多亚学派和经院哲学都倡导这种学说, 以分别证明“宿命论”和“上帝全能”。这一问题首先为亚里士多德在他的《解释》中以明日海战为例加以探讨。他的隐含解答是, 我们应否认二值原理的普遍有效性。关于未

the example of the sea-battle tomorrow. Aristotle's implicit solution is that we should deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence. The future statement is neither true nor false before the event actually occurs. This is developed in contemporary logic into three-valued or many-valued logic. Others suggest that we can deal with the problem by distinguishing different modal conceptions. Only a necessary statement entails that the event will necessarily happen. The issue is still a matter of controversy.

"Logical determinism maintains that the future is already fixed as unalterably as the past." —Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970, p. 65.

Logical empiricism

Another term for the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and broadly equivalent to logical positivism. Some members of the circle, including Schlick, preferred to call their philosophy "logical empiricism". This title indicates their affinity with the British empiricist tradition and their development of that tradition through the methodology of empirical science and, more important, the logical analysis of language. This analysis sought to characterise elementary propositions and to test them against experience (according to the verification principle), as empiricism requires. For the main philosophical content of logical empiricism, see logical positivism.

"The positivist theory of meaning has found its most precise formulation in contemporary logical positivism (or 'logical empiricism') ...: it is postulated that concepts be formed in such a way that it is empirically decidable whether the concept does or does not apply in a given sense." —Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 97.

Logical equivalence

The relationship of logical equivalence between two propositions is one of mutual inference. If p is logically equivalent to q , then we can derive p from q and q from p in accordance with logical rules. The denial of such a deduction is self-contradictory. We may also define p in terms of q , or q in terms of p . If two sentences are logical equivalent, they denote the same proposition. Logical equivalence should be distinguished from material equivalence, according to which two propositions have the same truth-value (either both true or both false), without necessarily being mutually deducible.

" 'p' and 'q' ... are logically equivalent if they are mutually deducible such that it would be self-contradictory to affirm p and to deny q , or to affirm q and to deny p ." —Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 318.

Logical falsity, see logical truth

来的陈述在事件实际发生之前是既非真也非假的。这在当代逻辑中发展成为“三值逻辑”或“多值逻辑”。其他人建议我们能通过区分不同的模态观念来处理这问题。只有必然陈述蕴涵着事件将必然发生。这一问题仍然是一个争论的话题。

“逻辑决定论主张未来是已经确定的,像过去一样不可改变。”——鲁卡斯:《意志的自由》,1970年,第65页。

逻辑经验主义

维也纳小组哲学的另一说法,大致等同于逻辑实证主义。小组的某些成员,包括石里克在内,宁愿把他们的哲学叫做“逻辑经验主义”。这一名称指明他们与英国经验主义传统的亲缘关系,以及他们通过经验科学的方法论,以及更重要的是通过对语言的逻辑分析发展了那个传统。这种分析寻求对基本命题的刻画,并(按照证实原则)依经验对它们作检验,就像经验主义所要求的那样。关于逻辑经验主义的主要哲学内容,见“逻辑实证主义”条。

“实证主义的意义理论在当代逻辑实证主义(或‘逻辑经验主义’)那里找到了自己最精确的阐释……:它设定概念是以这种方式形成的,即可以在经验上决定概念是否应用于一已知经验。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第97页。

逻辑等价

两个命题之间的逻辑等价关系是相互推导关系。如果 p 在逻辑上等价于 q ,那么我们可以根据逻辑规则从 q 得到 p ,从 p 得到 q 。否定这种演绎就是自相矛盾。我们还可以用 q 定义 p 或用 p 定义 q 。如果两个语句是逻辑等价的,他们就指相同的命题。逻辑等价应区别于实质等价,后者指的是两个命题有相同的真值(或同真或同假),而并不必然是相互可推演的。

“‘p’与‘q’……逻辑等价,如果它们可相互推演,使得肯定 p 而否定 q 或肯定 q 而否定 p 会造成自相矛盾。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第318页。

逻辑假

见“逻辑真”条。

Logical fiction

Also called pseudo object. A type of logical construction according to which symbols are constructed from the characteristics of entities they do not denote. They are fictions because these symbols at first glance appear to denote some entities, but upon analysis this turns out to be false. Symbols which are logical fictions are symbolic devices only and do not denote any constituent of the world. The objects they appear to denote do not have their own being and are not constituents of reality. In logic and mathematics, Russell considered such crucial conceptions as classes, the class of classes and numbers as logical fictions. As non-referring descriptions they are all incomplete symbols, that is, they do not have meaning in themselves but have meaning only as used in the context of a proposition.

"...There may be no entity named by the eliminable symbol at all; if this is the case, the object seemingly referred to by the symbol under analysis may be called a 'logical fiction' (Russell) or a 'pseudo-object' (Carnap)." — Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 384.

Logical form

The pattern or structure of a statement or proposition which is shared with other propositions of the same type. To discover the hidden logical form from natural language is precisely the task of logic starting from Aristotle, from whom the term "formal logic" derives. Logical form is topic-neutral, for it is independent of the content of the proposition. An inference is valid or invalid in virtue of the logical form of argument. Arguments which share the same logical form have the same validity. The logical form of a proposition is determined by its constituents. A fully general proposition is a logical form closed by universal quantification. According to the doctrine of logical atomism, philosophy as logical analysis is a matter purely concerned with logical form. On this view, logical form corresponds to the basic structure of reality, for which it provides a logical picture.

Some analytical philosophers tend to distinguish logical form from grammatical form, which is the surface grammatical structure of a sentence. The fact two sentences share the same grammatical form does not entail that they share the same logical form. On the contrary, grammatical form can cover a difference of logical form and give rise to philosophical trouble. In Ayer's illustration, "Martyre exists" and "Martyre suffers" have the same grammatical form, for each sentence consists of a noun following an intransitive verb. From this people infer that "to exist" is an attributive verb like "to suffer", but the logical form of existential sentences is very different from the logical form of sentences ascribing a feature to a subject.

"What any picture, of whatever form, must have in

逻辑虚构

也叫“假对象”,是指一种逻辑构造,根据这种构造,符号是从它们并未指称的实体特征中构造出来的。它们之所以为虚构,是因为这些符号初看起来好像指称了某些东西,但在分析之下表明并不是这样。作为逻辑虚构的符号只是符号工具,并没有指示世界的任何内容。它们似乎指示的对象并无自身的存在,不是实在的构成部分。在逻辑和数学中,罗素认为诸如类、类的类、数这些至关重要的概念是逻辑虚构。作为非指称的摹状词,它们都是不完全符号,就是说,它们自身本无意义,而只有在用于命题的语境中才有意义。

“……可能根本就没有由可消除符号命名的实体;如果情况如此,此符号看上去所指称的对象在分析之后可称为‘逻辑虚构’(罗素语)或‘假对象’(卡尔纳普语)。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第384页。

逻辑形式

陈述或命题的模式或结构,与其他同类命题所共有。从自然语言中发现隐藏的逻辑形式恰恰是始于亚里士多德的逻辑的任务。“形式逻辑”这个词就是从 he 那里得来的。逻辑形式对于论题是中立的,因为它独立于命题的内容。一个推理的有效或无效在于论证的逻辑形式。具有相同逻辑形式的论证有着同样的有效性。命题的逻辑形式由它的组成部分决定。最一般的命题是冠有全称量词的逻辑形式。根据“逻辑原子主义”学说,作为“逻辑分析”的哲学仅与逻辑形式有关。按这种看法,逻辑形式对应实在的基本结构,它对实在提供了一幅逻辑图画。

有些分析哲学家倾向于区分逻辑形式和语法形式,后者是语句表面的语法结构。两个语句具有相同的语法形式,并不蕴涵着它们具有相同的逻辑形式。恰恰相反,语法形式可能掩盖逻辑形式的差别并引起哲学上的麻烦。用艾耶尔的例子,“烈士存在”和“烈士受难”有相同的语法形式,因为每个句子都是由一个名词接一个不及物动词组成的。人们由此推论出,“存在”像“受难”一样是属性动词,但是,存在语句的逻辑形式完全不同于将一特征赋予主词的语句的逻辑形式。

“任何图像,不论具有什么形式,为了能够描画实在——不论描画得正确还是错误——必须以某种方式与实在有共同的东西,这就是逻辑形式,也即实在的形式。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,2.18。

common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i. e. the form of reality.”—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.18.

Logical formula, see logical constant

Logical grammar, another term for logical syntax

Logical implication, another term for logical consequence

Logical modality, see modality

Logical necessity

The necessity of what is logically true and guaranteed by the laws of logic. The nature and standard of logically necessary propositions has been a major concern from Leibniz to Wittgenstein, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Kripke and Hintikka. Logical necessity has a set of different but connected senses. It is a property attributable to a proposition *P*, which according to Kripke's modal semantics means that *P* is true in all possible worlds. Denying such truths would conflict with the laws of logic and render all thinking chaotic. Logical necessity is equivalent to conceptual necessity or being non-contingent. It is ascribed to analytical truths, originally understood as subject-predicate sentences in which the predicate term is contained in the subject, but now understood as sentences which are true in virtue of their logical form alone. In another sense, all consequences deduced from the laws of logic are truths having logical necessity. It is a matter of debate whether logical necessity is the sole valid form of necessity and whether necessity is confined to the sphere of ideas rather than the sphere of facts. Logical truths and, according to standard account, mathematical truths are logically necessary, and there are different views whether we can specify acceptable independent notions of metaphysical, transcendental, physical, nomic or theoretical necessity. There is also debate about whether logical necessity is conventional and varies according to different logical systems. If so, there are questions about what gives the “hardness” to logical necessity and whether logical necessity is a matter of convention, discovery, construction or choice.

“A logical necessity ... is nothing but the necessity of holding-to-be-true according to logical laws of the understanding and of reason.”—Kant, *Lectures On Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 116.

逻辑公式

见“逻辑常项”条

逻辑语法

“逻辑句法”的另一说法。

逻辑蕴涵

“逻辑后承”的另一个名称。

逻辑模态

见“模态”条。

逻辑必然性

逻辑上为真的及为逻辑规律所保证的必然性。逻辑上的必然命题的性质和标准一直是从莱布尼茨到维特根斯坦、卡尔纳普、C. I. 刘易斯、克里普克和辛提卡所关注的主题。逻辑必然性有一组不同但却相关的含意。它是一种可归属于命题 *P* 的性质,按照克里普克的模态语义学,它意指 *P* 在所有可能世界中为真。否认这样的真理就会与逻辑规律相冲突,并使全部思维混乱。逻辑必然性等于“概念必然性”,或是“非偶然的”。它也被归结为分析真理,最初被看做是谓项包含在主项中的主谓语句,现在指仅就其逻辑形式即为真的语句。在另一种意义上,所有由逻辑规律演绎出的推论都是具有逻辑必然性的真理。逻辑必然性是否为必然性的唯一有效形式,以及必然性是否只限于观念的领域而不涉及事实的领域,这都是争论的话题。逻辑真理,以及按照标准的观点、数学真理、都是逻辑必然的。关于我们能否说明形而上学必然性、超验必然性、物理必然性、规范必然性及理论必然性这些相互独立的观念,人们有不同的观点。人们也争论逻辑必然性是否是约定性的,是否随不同逻辑系统而不同。如果是如此,则提出了下列问题,即是什么赋予了逻辑必然性的“坚实性”,逻辑必然性究竟是否是约定的、发现的、构造的、选择的。

“逻辑必然性不是别的,而是按照理解和推理的逻辑规律保持为真的必然性。”——康德:《逻辑学讲义》(杨编辑),1992年,第116页。

Logical oddness

Newell Smith's term, referring to the denial of contextual implications. If P contextually implies Q, then to assert P we would naturally assert Q. But if one asserts P, but denies Q, or asks whether Q, one acts in a way that is logically odd. In the former case, the person denying Q is in a self-contradiction. In the latter case, the answer to the person's question has already been implied, and no further or better answer can be expected to be given.

"I shall say that a question is 'logically odd' if there appears to be no further room for it in its context because it has already been answered." Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 83.

Logical paradox

Russell believed that his ramified set theory provides a unified solution for all paradoxes. But Ramsey claims that there are two kinds of paradoxes: logical or set-theoretical paradoxes and semantic paradoxes. Logical paradoxes occur in a logical or mathematical system and are synonymous with antinomies. They are represented by Russell's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, and Cantor's paradox. They arise because of the peculiar nature of some set-theoretical concepts or due to faulty logic and mathematics. Semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise, on the other hand, because of ambiguities with respect to certain of the terms or notions employed. The general solution to logical paradoxes is to restrict the principles governing the existence of sets.

"A number of paradoxes known variously as the Antinomies or the logical paradoxes are often said to share the common feature of self-reference."—Champlin, *Reflective Paradoxes*, 1988, p. 120.

Logical picture, another term for logical form

Logical positivism

A general philosophical position, also called logical empiricism, developed from the 1920s by members of the Vienna Circle, such as Schlick, Neurath and Carnap, on the basis of traditional empirical thought and the development of modern logic. Logical positivism confines knowledge to science. It divides all meaningful propositions into two categories: analytic propositions which are necessarily true and can be known *a priori*; and synthetic propositions, which are contingent and can be known empirically or *a posteriori*. On the one hand, logical positivism pays special attention to mathematics and logic and develops logical syntax and semantics in order to reveal the logical structure of the world. On the other hand, it insists on verificationism, that is, that the meaning of a proposition consists in its method of verification. A purportedly empirical

逻辑奇异

诺威尔·史密斯的术语,是指对情境蕴含的否定。如果P在情景意义上蕴含着Q,那么肯定P,自然就肯定了Q。但假如一个人断言P,但否定Q,或问是否Q,他的行为在逻辑上就是奇异的。在前一种情形里,否定Q的人是自我矛盾,在后一种情形里,对他的问题的回答已经被隐含了,因而没有更进一步或更好的回答能够给予。

“如果一个问题在它的情景中已经给了回答,而不再有进一步的回旋空间,那它是逻辑奇异的。”——诺威尔·史密斯:《伦理学》,1954年,第83页。

逻辑悖论

罗素相信,他的分支集合论提供了对所有悖论的统一解答。但是拉姆塞认为有两种悖论:逻辑悖论(也称“集合论悖论”)和语义学悖论。逻辑悖论出现在逻辑或数学系统中,与“二律背反”同义,其代表有罗素悖论,布拉里-福蒂悖论和康托尔悖论。它们的出现是由于某些集合论概念的特殊性质或是逻辑和数学的不完善。另一方面,语义学悖论,如说谎者悖论的出现,是由于所采用的某些词语或概念的含糊性。对逻辑悖论的一般解决是限制支配集合存在的原则。

“一些被不同地称作二律背反或逻辑悖论的悖论,经常被认为具有自我指称的共同特征。”——钱普林:《自反悖论》,1988年,第120页。

逻辑图像

“逻辑形式”的另一说法。

逻辑实证主义

一种普遍的哲学立场,亦称“逻辑经验主义”,由诸如石里克、纽拉特和卡尔纳普等维也纳小组成员基于传统的经验论思想和现代逻辑的发展,于20世纪20年代提出。逻辑实证主义把知识局限于科学。它把所有有意义的命题划分为两类:分析命题,它们必然为真,可以先天地知道;综合命题,它们是偶然的,可以从经验上或后天地知道。一方面,逻辑实证主义特别关注数学和逻辑,提出逻辑句法和语义学,以揭示世界的逻辑结构。另一方面,它坚持证实主义,即主张命题的意义在于其证实方法。一个所谓的经验命题或事实命题是没有意义的,如果它被证明为不能够在经验中得到证实。一切被证明为合理的信念最终可以还原为记录陈述,它们可能直接显示为真,而无需从其他陈述中推

or factual proposition is meaningless if it proves incapable of being verified in experience. All justified beliefs can be reduced ultimately to protocol statements, which can be shown to be true directly without inference from other statements. On this basis, logical positivism claims that traditional metaphysical problems are not false but meaningless, for they cannot be shown to be true by *a priori* analysis and cannot be verified in experience. With these two approaches exhausted, they have no truth-value and are meaningless. Logical positivism greatly promoted the development of analytical philosophy in the first half of twentieth century, but after World War II, all of its major tenets were criticised respectively by Quine and Oxford ordinary language philosophy.

“‘Logical positivism’ is a name for a method, not for a certain kind of result. A philosopher is a logical positivist if he holds that there is no special way of knowing that is peculiar to philosophy, but that questions of fact can only be decided by the empirical methods of science, while questions that can be decided without appeal to experience are either mathematical or linguistic.”—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 367.

Logical product, see logical sum

Logical proposition, see fully generalised proposition

Logical / real opposition

A dichotomy that Kant introduced in his *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy*. A logical opposition is an abstract relation between a proposition and its negation, namely logical contradiction, which can be discerned through conceptual analysis. A real opposition involves opposing forces or tendencies which exist in the qualities of external things and can be discovered through empirical methods rather than through logical analysis. The distinction undermines the claim of rationalism that reason alone is the guarantee of knowledge, because we cannot understand real oppositions through reason alone. This distinction developed into the distinction between reason and sensibility in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

“Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction.”—Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770* (Walford and Meerbote, eds), 1992, p. 211.

论。逻辑实证主义基于此宣称,传统形而上学问题不是错了,而是没有意义,因为它们不能以先天分析表明为真,又不能在经验中得到证实。因为在这两条路之外别无它径,所以它们没有真值,是无意义的。在20世纪上半叶,逻辑实证主义极大地促进了分析哲学的发展,但在第二次世界大战之后,它的主要信条分别受到了奎因和牛津日常语言哲学的批评。

“‘逻辑实证主义’是一种方法的名称,而不是某种结果的名称。如果一个哲学家认为,没有哲学所专有的特殊的认知方式,事实问题只能由科学的经验方法决定,而不诉诸于经验即可决定的问题要么是数学问题,要么是语言问题,那么他就是逻辑实证主义者。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第367页。

逻辑积

见“逻辑和”条。

逻辑命题

见“充分普遍化命题”条。

逻辑的/实在的对立

康德在他的《把否定量概念引进哲学的尝试》一文中介绍的一种二分对立。逻辑的对立是指一个命题和它的否定之间的抽象区别,即逻辑矛盾;它可通过概念分析而辨别。实在的对立是指外部事物的性质中所存在的对立的力量或趋向;它们不是通过逻辑分析,而是通过经验方法来发现。这种区别对理性主义关于只有理性才是知识的保证的根本立场提出挑战,因为理性本身不能使我们理解实在的对立。这个区分最终在《纯粹理性批判》中发展为理性和感性的区分。

“如果一个事物取消由另一事物所设定的东西,那么这两个事物是相互对立的。这种对立是双重的:它既由于矛盾而是逻辑的,又是实在的,那就是说,没有矛盾。”——康德:《理论哲学(1755—1770年)》(瓦尔福德和米尔波特编),1992年,第211页。

Logical sentence

A sentence which consists solely of logical symbols. It is either analytical and, hence, a logical truth or contradictory and, hence, a logical falsehood. Such a sentence is the same as a logical formula.

"A logical sentence is one that contains only logical signs." Bergman, *Meaning and Existence*, 1960, p. 74.

Logical space

The possible ways in which objects can combine into states of affairs. The term is used by analogy to physical space, which presents us with a set of locations, positions or places which can be occupied by objects in relation to other objects. Logical space is thus the ensemble of logical possibilities, a universe composed of all possible-and-existing states of affairs and all possible-and-non-existing states of affairs. For Russell, it is a system of proper logical relations. Wittgenstein makes use of this conception to show that facts do not compose the world as a heap and that there is a structure of logical relations amongst them. The world is the totality of facts in logical space.

"The logician is led to give the name 'space' to any system of relations having the same or similar logical properties."—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VI, p. 82.

Logical sum

A logical sum results from the disjunction of two propositions ($p \vee q$), or from the union of two sets. It is the inclusive sense of the connective "or", that is "p or q or both" (rather than the exclusive sense of "or", that is "p or q, but not both"). The logical sum is contrasted to the logical product, which results from the conjunction of two propositions ($p \wedge q$), or from the intersection of two sets. The logical product is the truth-functional compound of p and q, that is its truth value is determined by the truth value of p, the truth value of q, and the logical connective 'and'.

"Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or logical sum."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.521.

Logical syntax

Also called logical grammar. A system of rules governing the use of signs, which determines whether a combination of signs can be a proposition, that is, whether it can represent a logically possible state of affairs. Logical syntax belongs to the purely formal part of a logical system and is discovered through logical analysis. It aims to display the hidden logical forms of propositions. In contrast to the surface syntax or grammar of ordinary language, it is the syntax of logical or ideal language. Aside from avoiding the

逻辑句子

只是由逻辑符号组成的句子。它要么是分析的, 所以是逻辑真理, 要么是矛盾的, 所以是逻辑错误。这样一个句子与一个逻辑公式是一样的。

"一个逻辑句子是那只包括逻辑符号的句子。"—柏格曼:《意义与存在》, 1960年, 第74页。

逻辑空间

对象能够在其中结合为事态的可能方式。此词的用法是类比于物理空间。它向我们展现了一系列的居所、位置或地方, 它们可能被与其他对象有关的对象占据。因此, 逻辑空间是逻辑可能性的集合, 由所有可能的和现存的事态以及所有可能的与非现存事态构成的宇宙。对罗素而言, 这是一个恰当的逻辑关系的体系。维特根斯坦利用这一概念来说明, 事实并不构成积累式的世界, 在它们之中有一个逻辑关系的结构。世界是逻辑空间中事实的总体。

"逻辑学家被引导到对于具有相同或相似逻辑性质的任何关系体系给以'空间'的名称"。——罗素:《罗素文集》, 第六卷, 第82页。

逻辑和

逻辑和出自两个命题的析取($p \vee q$), 或两个集合的相并。这是联结词"或"的可兼的意义, 即是"p或q或二者"(而不是"或"的不可兼的意义, 即"p或q, 但并非二者")。逻辑和不同于逻辑积, 它出自于两个命题的合取($p \wedge q$), 或两个集合相交。逻辑积是p和q的真值函数的复合, 就是说, 它的真值由p的真值、q的真值和逻辑联结词"和"决定。

"弗雷格和罗素引入了与逻辑积或逻辑和相联系的概括性。"—维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》, 5.521。

逻辑句法

也叫逻辑语法, 支配符号使用的规则系统。它决定符号的一种结合是否可能是命题, 也就是说, 它是否能表示一种逻辑上可能的事态。逻辑句法属于逻辑系统的纯形式部分, 通过逻辑分析而被发现。它的目的是要显示隐藏着的命题逻辑形式。与日常语言的表面句法和语法不同, 它是逻辑语言或理想语言的句法。除了要避免使用同一符号表示不同的意义, 它并不关心符号的意义。它把符号的某些结合当做胡说而

use of the same sign for different significations, it is not concerned with the meaning of the signs. It excludes some combinations of signs as nonsense. To say that traditional metaphysical problems are nonsensical means that they violate logical syntax. The term was used in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, but is abandoned in his later works. Carnap attempts to establish such a system in his *Logical Syntax of Language* (1934).

"In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification; that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar -by logical syntax." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.325.

Logical truth

A logical symbol or logical formula can be a logical truth because it is true under all interpretations. A statement or proposition is logically true if it is validly deduced in a logical system. In this sense, a logical truth is generally a theorem of a logical system. More often, we say that a statement is a logical truth because it is an instance of a valid logical form. For example "A house cannot be both warm and not warm". The logical form of this sentence is "not both p and non-p", and it is thus in accord with the principle of non-contradiction. If a statement is logically true, then it is analytic and is necessarily true. On the contrary, if a statement violates a logically valid form, that is if its logical form conflicts with some logical principle, it is logically false or a logical falsity. If a statement is logically false, it is necessarily false. Accounts of the kind of logical truth that depends upon the meaning of the expressions contained in a proposition have come under pressure from Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notions of synonymy and meaning. Without reliance on meaning, a logical truth becomes any truth which can be obtained from a valid logical scheme.

"A logical schema is valid if every sentences obtainable from it by substituting sentences for simple sentence is true. A logical truth, finally, is a truth obtainable from a valid logical schema." — Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, 1970, p. 51.

Logical type

Words or expressions can be classified into a hierarchy of classes, such as individuals, classes, classes of classes, and so on. The logical type of a word or an expression is the class it is in. When two words a and b are of the same logical type, for any sentential function Fx, Fa and Fb are either both meaningful or both meaningless. In "Socrates is a philosopher" and "Aristotle is a philosopher", "Socrates"

加以排斥。说传统的形而上学问题是胡说,意思是说它们违反了逻辑句法。维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中使用了这一术语,但在后期著作中又将其抛弃。卡尔纳普在《语言的逻辑句法》(1934)中企图建立起这样的系统。

“为了避免这些错误,我们必须使用排除了这些错误的符号语言,即不对不同的记号使用相同的符号,不以表面相似的方式使用具有不同意义样式的符号:这就是说,我们必须使用由逻辑语法即逻辑句法支配的符号语言。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,3.325。

逻辑真

逻辑符号或逻辑公式能够是一逻辑真理,因为它在所有解释下都真。一陈述或命题是逻辑真的,如果它在一逻辑系统内演绎有效。在这种意义上,逻辑真理一般而言是一逻辑系统内的定理。更为经常地,我们说一陈述是逻辑真的,因为它是一有效的逻辑形式的例证。例如,“一座房子不能既是温暖的又不是温暖的”。这一句子的逻辑形式是“并非既p又非p”,因此它是与不矛盾原理相一致的。如果一陈述是逻辑真的,那么它是分析的并且是必然真的。相反,如果一个陈述违反了逻辑有效形式,即是说它的逻辑形式违背了某些逻辑原理,则它是逻辑假的,或者说它是一逻辑假。如果一陈述是逻辑假的,则它是必然假的。奎因拒斥分析—综合的区别以及拒斥同义和意义概念,这已经给依赖于包含在命题中的表达式的意义的那类逻辑真理的说明带来了压力。假如不依赖于意义,逻辑真理就成为能够从有效的逻辑模式得到的任何真理。

“一逻辑模式是有效的,如果通过用句子替换简单句由它得到的每一个句子都是真的。逻辑真理最终就是由一有效逻辑模式得到的真理。”——奎因:《逻辑哲学》,1970年,第51页。

逻辑类型

语词或词组可以分成类的等级系统,例如个体、类、类的类,等等。语词或词组的逻辑类型就是它所在的类。当两个语词a和b属于同一逻辑类型时,对于任意语句函项Fx, Fa和Fb要么同为有意义,要么同为无意义。在“苏格拉底是哲学家”和“亚里士多德是哲学家”中,“苏格拉底”和“亚里士多德”属于同一逻辑类

and "Aristotle" are of the same logical type, for both of them are individuals. Yet this does not extend to "A man is a philosopher". For "man" is a class, and hence is of a different type.

"The definition of a logical type is as follows: A and B are of the same logical type if, and only if, given any fact of which A is a constituent, there is a corresponding fact which has B as a constituent, which either results by substituting B for A, or is the negation of what so results." —Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. IX, p. 169.

Logical words

Russell divides words into two kinds: factual words which contribute to indicating facts and logical words which contribute to indicating the structures of sentences and inferences. He further divides logical words into two kinds: general words such as "all" and "some", and conjunction such as "not", "or" "and" and "if-then", by means of which we combine atomic sentences into a molecular sentences and make various inferences. Logical words are also called logical constants. Although there is broad agreement in the enumeration of the logical constants, it is much more difficult to determine why certain words have this status.

"There are logical words such as 'or', 'not', 'some', and 'all'." —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 275.

Logically impossible

A purported state of affairs or fact which violates the laws of logic, and is therefore inconsistent or self-contradictory, is logically impossible. For instance, "God is a sceptic" is logically impossible because it would be self-contradictory to ascribe scepticism to a being defined as having perfect knowledge. The logically impossible should be distinguished at least from metaphysical, epistemic and scientific impossibility, each with its own grounds. A proposition is scientifically impossible, for example, if it violates the laws of nature. Propositions are logically possible if they do not violate the laws of logic. We do not necessarily know of every proposition whether it is logically possible or logically impossible. Nor do we have a clear understanding of how different kinds of impossibility and different kinds of possibility are related.

"When we hold a proposition to be logically impossible, we are claiming that it is incompatible with some general proposition which is itself logically true." —Ayer, *Probability and Evidence*, 1972, p. 17.

Logically perfect language

Also called an artificial language or ideal language. Because they were dissatisfied with the ambiguities and bewildering syntax of ordinary language and because they believed that these difficulties formed the main obstacles to

型,因为它们都是个体。但这不能扩展到“有个人是哲学家”,因为“人”是类,因此属于另一类型。

“逻辑类型的定义如下: A 和 B 属于同一逻辑类型,当且仅当,已知任意事实(A 是其构成部分),有一相应事实(有 B 作为其构成部分),它要么是以 B 替换 A 的结果,要么是此结果的否定。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第九卷,第 169 页。

逻辑词

罗素把词分为两类:事实词(其作用是指明事实)和逻辑词(其作用是指明语句和推理的结构)。他进一步把逻辑词分为两类:像“所有”、“有些”这样的全称词,以及像“并非”、“或者”、“并且”、“如果……那么”这样的联结词,我们可借助于它们把原子语句连结为分子语句,并进行各种各样的推理。逻辑词也叫逻辑常项。虽然在列举逻辑常项时人们有广泛的一致意见,但要决定为什么某些词有这种性质则要困难得多。

“有诸如‘或’、‘并非’、‘有些’及‘所有’这样的逻辑词。”——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948 年,第 275 页。

逻辑上不可能

一种设想的事态或事实,它违反了逻辑定律,因而是不一致的,或自相矛盾的,所以在逻辑上是不可能的。例如,“上帝是怀疑论者”在逻辑上不可能,因为要把怀疑论赋予被定义为具有完美知识的存在者,是自相矛盾的。逻辑上不可能至少应区别于形而上学的、认识论的和科学上的不可能性,每一种都有自身的理由。例如,如果一个命题违反了自然定律,它就是在科学上不可能的。没有违反逻辑定律的命题是在逻辑上可能的。我们并不必然知道每个命题在逻辑上可能或不可能。不同种类的不可能性和可能性是如何相关的,对此我们没有清晰的了解。

“当我们认为一命题在逻辑上不可能时,我们是在认为它与某些自身在逻辑上为真的普遍命题不相容。”——艾耶尔:《或然性和证据》,1972 年,第 17 页。

逻辑上完善的语言

也叫“人工语言”或“理想语言”。弗雷格、罗素、维特根斯坦不满于日常语言的含混和令人困惑的句法,并认为这些困难构成了哲学进步的主要障碍,因此他们步莱布尼茨的后尘,提

progress in philosophy, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein followed Leibniz in advancing the project of an ideal or logically perfect language. Such a language would have both perfect syntax and perfect vocabulary. Perfect syntax would be provided by classical predicate calculus with identity, and the perfect vocabulary would include only unanalysable words holding of simple objects. A perfect language would immediately show the logical structure of its propositions and the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied, and in a perfect language the logical form and the grammatical form would entirely coincide, so conforming to the logical requirement that language should avoid contradiction. A sample of perfect language is the language of mathematical logic. Russell sometimes thinks that such a language will afford insight into the nature of language in general and that in this way its significance is to make graphic some metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. Because this language would be entirely free from the philosophical defects of ordinary language which Russell and Wittgenstein claim to discover, such as ambiguity, vagueness and singular terms without reference, it is also called an ideal language. A logically perfect language is supposed to represent our thought perfectly, but having a language which expresses any one thought in only one way is generally regarded as an unattainable ideal. Furthermore, many philosophers follow the later Wittgenstein in rejecting a logically perfect language as a proper ideal to guide philosophical work. Nevertheless, a narrow notion of a logically perfect language, incorporating only the logical symbolism of Frege and Russell (predicate calculus and propositional calculus) supplemented by later logical developments, is regarded as providing a reliable instrument for carrying out deductive inferences without the risk of fallacy. This goal has been achieved to a great extent, but without fulfilling earlier promises of fundamental consequences for the whole of philosophy.

"In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component." — Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, pp. 197-8.

Logically possible, see logically impossible

Logically proper name

A proper name is a simple symbol designating a particular. Russell distinguishes ordinary proper names from logically proper names. An ordinary proper name, such as "Socrates" or "The Golden Mountain" has a sense, but it has its sense because it is, in fact, a description in disguise. It is

出了理想语言或逻辑上完善的语言的计划。这样一种语言会有完善的句法和完善的词汇。完善的句法由经典的、带等同的谓词演算提供,完善的词汇只包括表示简单对象的不可分析的语词。完善的语言会直接显示其命题的逻辑结构以及所肯定或否定的事实的逻辑结构;在完善的语言中,逻辑形式和语法形式会完全重合,以符合这样一个逻辑要求,即语言应避免矛盾。完善语言的一个样本是数理逻辑语言。罗素有时认为,这种语言将为洞察一般语言的本性提供卓见。这样,它的意义就是使某些形而上学和认识论学说变得清晰明白。因为这种语言完全没有罗素和维特根斯坦声称发现的日常语言中的哲学缺陷,诸如含混、模糊、无指称的单称词等,它有时又叫作理想语言。逻辑上完善的语言被认为完善地表达了我们的思想,但拥有只用一种方式表达思想的语言一般被认为是达不到的理想。此外,许多哲学家赞同后期维特根斯坦,否认逻辑上完善的语言是恰当的指导哲学工作的理想。不过狭义的逻辑上完善的语言仅仅包括弗雷格和罗素的逻辑符号体系,即谓词演算和命题演算,并由后来的逻辑发展所补充,这通常被看作是提供了可靠的工具来进行演绎推理,而没有出现谬误的危险。这一目标已在极大的范围内达到,但未能实现先前的许诺,即对整个哲学有根本性意义。

"在逻辑上完善的语言中,对于每一简单对象都有一个并且只有一个词,而所有并非简单的东西将由语词的结合来表示,这种结合当然来自于表示构成复杂事物的简单事物的语词,一个词代表一个简单成分。"——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第197—198页。

逻辑上可能

见“逻辑上不可能”条。

逻辑专名

专名是命名殊相的简单符号。罗素区分了普通专名与逻辑专名。像“苏格拉底”或“金山”这样的普通专名有涵义,但它有涵义是因为它实际上是伪装了的摹状词。可是,能满足摹状词的承受者并不总是存在。逻辑专名是自我中

not always the case that there is a bearer which satisfies the description. Logically proper names are egocentric words or indexical words, such as "I", "this", "that" and "here". They are names for items available in current experiences, and have their meaning solely in terms of the objects they stand for. If such an object does not exist, a logically proper name is meaningless. Its meaning changes if the object it designates changes. Hence, a logically proper name refers to an object, and it refers directly without any implicit description. It denotes, but it does not connote anything. This distinction between ordinary proper names and logically proper names is crucial to Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Whether any term can function as a logically proper name is discussed within the general context of the theory of names.

"The mark of a logically proper name being that its significant use entailed the existence of the object which it was supposed to denote." —Ayer, *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, 1973, p. 36.

Logicism

An approach to philosophy of mathematics developed by Frege, Russell and Carnap, which claims that logic provides the foundations of mathematics, such that the two are continuous and even identical. According to Russell, logic has two parts: one is philosophical and deals with forms of reality and formal analysis; the other is mathematical and deals with the foundations of mathematics and the theorems deduced from these foundations. This mathematical part, which justifies the term "logicism", is also called symbolic logic, logistic or mathematical logic. In contrast to two other major forms of philosophy of mathematics, namely intuitionism and formalism, logicism believes that every mathematical truth — or at least the most significant ones — can be expressed as a true logical proposition which is a logical truth, and that all such truths can be deduced from a small number of logical axioms and rules. Logicism is thus a programme to translate the basic mathematical ideas and theorems into logic in order to ensure that mathematical truth has the same epistemological status as logical truth. The classical presentations of logicism can be found in Frege's *Foundation of Arithmetic* and Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. However, to avoid paradoxes Russell introduced set theory into his programme and extended the basis of logicism beyond the purely logical. Quine argues that logicism succeeds in reducing mathematics not to logic but to logic plus set theory. However, the current close relationship between the study of mathematics and the study of logic is inspired by logicism.

"Logicism, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Carnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known or unknown, specifiable and

心词或索引词, 例如“我”、“这”、“那”、“这里”。它们是可在当下经验中得到的东西的名称, 它们有意义仅仅是由于它们所代表的对象。如果这样的对象不存在, 那么逻辑专名就没有意义。如果它所命名的对象变了, 它的意义也就变了。因此, 逻辑专名指称一对象, 它直接指称, 没有含蓄的描述。它指称, 但无内涵。对于罗素的限定摹状词理论, 普通专名和逻辑专名的这种区分是至关重要的。某一语词是否能作逻辑专名用, 这在名称理论的一般语境中讨论。

“逻辑专名的标志是, 它的有意义的使用蕴涵着存在被视为它所指称的对象。”——艾耶尔:《形而上学和常识》, 1973年, 第36页。

逻辑主义

由弗雷格、罗素、卡尔纳普提出的研究数学哲学的方法, 认为逻辑为数学提供了基础, 以至于使两者连续甚至等同起来。根据罗素的看法, 逻辑有两个部分, 一为哲学性的, 处理实在的形式和形式分析问题; 另一为数学性的, 处理数学的基础和从这些基础中演绎出定理的问题。这一数学部分恰当地表明了“逻辑主义”一词, 也叫做“符号逻辑”、“逻辑斯蒂”或“数理逻辑”。与数学哲学的其他两种主要形式, 即直觉主义和形式主义不同, 逻辑主义认为每一数学真理——或至少大部分有意义的数学真理——可以表达为真的逻辑命题, 即逻辑真理, 而所有这些真理可以从很少的逻辑公理和规则中演绎出来。因此, 逻辑主义主张这样的计划, 它要把基本的数学观念和定理翻译成逻辑, 以保证数学真理与逻辑真理有相同的认识论地位。逻辑主义的经典代表作是弗雷格的《算术的基础》和罗素与怀特海的《数学原理》。但是, 为了避免悖论, 罗素把集合论引入他的计划之中, 把逻辑主义的基础扩大得超出了纯逻辑。奎因认为, 逻辑主义的成功之处不是将数学还原为逻辑, 而是还原为逻辑加集合论。不过, 当今在数学研究和逻辑研究之间的密切关系是得之于逻辑主义的促进。

“由弗雷格、罗素、怀特海、丘奇和卡尔纳普所代表的逻辑主义, 允许人们不加区别地使用约束变项来指称已知的或未知的、可指明的和不可指明的抽象实体。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》, 1953年, 第14页。

unspecifiable, indiscriminately.”——Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 14.

Logistic, another term for logicism

Logistic method

The method of constructing a formal deduction system. It starts with a specification of the primitive symbols. A sequence of symbols acceptable in a system is called a sentence or a well-formed formula. Certain well-formed formulae are singled out as axioms, and a set of rules of inference are laid down, according to which some well-formed formulae can be inferred from other well-formed formulae which serve as premises. The method establishes a decision procedure which determines in accordance with rules of inference whether an arbitrary formula is a theorem of the system. The aim of this method is to make deductive reasoning mathematically precise and to deal with the major features of a theory, such as implication, compatibility and interdependence, in a formal way. The formalised system of logic built by this method is called a logistic system.

“By the logistic method, the principles of logic are not antecedently presumed as rules of demonstration.”——Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, 1932, p. 118.

Logistic system, see logistic method

Logocentrism

A postmodernist characterisation of the Western metaphysical tradition as taking *logos* (reason) as the locus of truth and meaning and believing that truth can be known by the subject via the inner light of reason. This tradition takes being as subject-matter and is excessively concerned to establish a hierarchical ordering of various conceptual oppositions and to maintain the stability of meaning and the validity of reason. According to this criticism, Western metaphysics neglects the complexity of reason in the life-world and restricts it to its cognitive-instrumental dimension. The dominant concern of traditional metaphysics with the articulation of the source of order and structure of things is based on its cosmological and ontological assumption that the world has an ordered ground. Logocentrism is the target of Derrida's deconstruction. In his view, philosophy should be concerned with the condition of the possibility of *logos*, rather than viewing *logos* as the condition of the possibility of truth. For Derrida, logocentrism presents itself chiefly in history as phonologism, or the emphasis of speech over writing. “Phonologism” is always used by Derrida as a synonym for “logocentrism”.

“Logocentrism would thus support the determination of

逻辑斯蒂

“逻辑主义”的另一说法。

逻辑斯蒂方法

构造形式演绎系统的方法。它从明确给出初始符号开始。在一系统内可接受的符号串叫做语句或“合式公式”。然后它挑选出某些合式公式作为公理,并且规定一组推理规则,根据这些规则,某些合式公式可以从用作前提的另外的合式公式推演出来。这种方法确定了一“判定程序”,后者决定着是否任意公式根据推理规则都是该系统的一个定理。这一方法的目标是使演绎推理在数学上是精确的,并且以一种形式的方式处理一理论的那些主要特征,例如蕴涵、相容性和相互依赖性。用这种方法建构的形式化的逻辑系统叫做“逻辑斯蒂系统”。

“根据逻辑斯蒂方法,逻辑原理并不是预先作为论证规则而被假定的。”——刘易斯和兰根福特:《符号逻辑》,1932年,第118页。

逻辑斯蒂系统

见“逻辑斯蒂方法”条。

逻各斯中心论

对于西方形而上学传统特征的一种后现代表述;这种特征就是将逻各斯(理性)当做真理和意义的中心,并相信真理能为主体经过理性的内在之光而知晓。这个传统将存在当做主题,并且极想建立一个关于各种对立概念的等级次序,维持意义的稳定和理性的有效。按照这种批判,西方形而上学忽略了生活世界中的理性复杂性,将自己限于认知的一工具的维度。传统形而上学对于秩序之源和事物结构的首要关切基于这样一个宇宙论的和存在论的假定,即这个世界有一个有序的基础。逻各斯中心论是德里达要去解构的对象。在他看来,哲学应该关心逻各斯之所以可能的条件,而不是将逻各斯视为真理可能的条件。对于德里达而言,逻各斯中心论在历史上首先表现为语音主义,或对于言语而非书写的强调。“语音主义”在德里达那里总是被用作“逻各斯中心论”的同义词。

“因此,逻各斯中心论支持将存在者之存在确定为在场的做法。此逻各斯中心论在海德格尔的思想中也并非完全没有,或许它在存在论—神性论时代、在在场哲学或哲学自身中仍然把持着那种思想。”——德里达:《论书写学》

the being of the entity as presence. To the extent that such a logocentrism is not totally absent from Heidegger's thought, perhaps it still holds of that thought within the epoch of onto-theology, within the philosophy of presence, that is to say, within philosophy itself." — Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Spivak), 1974, p. 12.

Logos

[Greek, from the verb *legein*, to say, to speak] From its basic meaning of anything said, a term with a wide range of derivative meanings, including speech, reputation, thought, cause, reason, argument, measure, structure, proportion, ratio, relation, principle, formula and definition. Its exact meaning must be decided in context, but three meanings had greatest prominence in Greek philosophy: (1) in the philosophy of Heraclitus who first uses *logos* as a technical term, an objective universal principle which is equally true and equally accessible for all; Stoicism also took *logos* to be a cosmic force, the principle both of knowledge and of causation; (2) the rational part of the soul; (3) an account or, more precisely, an account expressing the essential nature of anything, that is a definition. The second and third meanings played a great role in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

"Listen not to me but to the Logos." — Heraclitus, in Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker*, Fr. 50.

Lottery paradox

A paradox formulated by Henry Kyburg in *Probability of the Logic of Rational Belief* (1961). I believe rationally that of a million lottery tickets there is one which will win. But I do not believe rationally that Ticket 1 will win, nor do I believe that Ticket 2 will win, and so on through all the tickets. Eventually there is no reason to believe that any single ticket will win. A paradox then arises, for I certainly believe that there is one ticket that will win. The paradox involves the relation between partial belief and full belief.

"All the lottery paradox shows in any case is that in some circumstances a claim to knowledge is not adequately supported by the reasonableness of any particular partial belief however strong." — Mellor, *The Matter of Chance*, 1971, p. 163.

Love

As commonly understood, love is closely related to sexual affection. Some philosophers, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, regard it as a natural impulse. But in the history of Western philosophy, love has been treated in various ways under different names, such as *eros*, *philia*, *agape* (universal benevolence), Romantic love, Sacred love (the love of God), comradeship, sympathy, care and concern. Plato in his *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* argued that

(斯庇瓦克英译), 1974 年, 第 12 页。

逻各斯

[希腊语, 源自动词 *legein* (言、说)] 该词的基本意思是所言之事, 由此引申出广泛的意义域, 例如言说、名声、思想、原因、理性、论证、尺度、结构、比率、比例、关系、原理、公式、定义等等。它的精确含义只能由上下文的关系来确定, 但在希腊哲学中, 有三种含义最为突出: (1) 在作为专业术语第一次使用 *logos* 的赫拉克利特哲学中, 它指对所有东西同等真实也同等可近的客观普遍原则; 斯多亚学派也把 *logos* 当做宇宙力量, 当做知识原则和因果原则。(2) 灵魂的理性部分。(3) 一种说明, 更恰当地说, 一种表述事物本质特性的说明, 即定义。在柏拉图和亚里士多德哲学中, 后两种含义起了很大作用。

“不要听从我, 而要听从逻各斯。”——赫拉克利特, 见第尔斯和克兰兹: 《前苏格拉底残篇》, 残篇 50。

抽彩悖论

由 H. 凯伯格在他的《合理信念逻辑的概率》(1961) 一书中所表述的悖论。我合理地相信在一百万张彩票中有一张将中彩。但我并不合理地相信 1 号票将中彩, 也没有理由相信 2 号票将中彩。这一过程可以继续下去, 以至最终也没有理由相信任何单独一张票将中彩。于是悖论出现了, 因为我确实相信有一张票将中彩。这一悖论涉及到部分信念和完整信念之间的关系。

“无论如何, 抽彩悖论所表明的是, 在某些场合, 任何特殊的部分信念, 无论它是多么合理, 都不足以支持关于知识的断言。”——梅洛: 《机遇问题》, 1971 年, 第 163 页。

爱

按照通常的理解, 爱与性爱密切相关。一些哲学家, 如叔本华和尼采, 认为它是一种自然的冲动。但在西方哲学史上, 爱一直是在不同的名称下以各种不同的方式加以论述的, 例如 *eros* (两性间的爱)、*philia* (对朋友和同胞的爱)、*agape* (普遍的仁慈)、浪漫的爱、神圣的爱 (对上帝的爱)、同志友谊、同情、关怀和关心。柏拉图在他的《会饮篇》和《斐多篇》中论证说,

love (*eros*) begins with a desire for personal beauty, but its spiritual ascent culminates in a desire for beauty in itself, that is the love of wisdom, which is philosophy in its original sense. Spiritual and divine love, which has been a major philosophical theme from the Neoplatonists to Augustine and Dante, still inspires many writers. Aristotle held that true love (*philia*, friendship) between virtuous people enables one look after another for the other person's sake. In the final analysis, however, he considered true love to be a form of self-love which is obedient to one's rational voice. Aristotle is highly praised in contemporary virtue ethics for taking love or personal attachment into the sphere of ethical consideration. Feminism tends to develop a related ethics of care. However, since love involves partiality in personal relationships and emotions, an issue has arisen about the possibility of reconciling love with the impartial requirements of morality.

"In spite of all the misuses to which the word love is subjected, in literature and daily life, it has not lost its emotional power. It elicits a feeling of warmth, of passion, of happiness, or fulfilment, whenever it is used." —Paul Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, 1975, p. 3.

Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, see Skolem's paradox

Loyalty

A trait of character marked by faithfulness and devotion to a person, a group, a country, a cause or a principle. Such a feeling is not easily altered either by external forces or by the discovery that the object of loyalty lacks its supposed merits. Loyalty is related to compassion and gratitude. It is classed as a virtue because it involves selfless commitment. The stability of any political society requires at least some loyalty on the part of its citizens. In contrast to measured loyalty, loyalty can be blind and unreflective, even to the extent of taking the object of loyalty to be sacred. Because loyalty is always partial and emotional, it is difficult to reconcile with the impartial requirements of morality.

"The feeling of allegiance, or loyalty... may vary in its objects... but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of state something which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be what it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, X, p. 132.

Lying

Deliberately saying what one knows or believes to be false in order to deceive one or more other persons. Liars has

爱 (*eros*) 始于对人的美貌的期望, 但其精神会最终升华到对自身中的美的期望, 这就是爱智慧, 即最初意义的哲学。从新柏拉图主义者到奥古斯丁和但丁, 宗教的和神性的爱一直是一个主要的哲学题目, 它至今仍激励着许多作家。亚里士多德认为, 道德人上之间的真正的爱 (*philia*, 友谊) 能使人们为了其他人而照顾别人。可是, 归根到底, 他又认为真正的爱是服从人的理性愿望的自爱的一种形式。由于亚里士多德把爱或人的感情纳入伦理学考虑的范围, 因而受到当代美德伦理学的高度赞扬。女权主义倾向发展一种相关的关怀伦理学。然而, 由于爱包括人际关系和感情中的偏见, 因而出现了关于能否将爱与无偏见的道德要求一致起来的争论。

“尽管爱这个词受到种种滥用, 但在文学和日常生活中, 它没有失去它的感情上的力量。无论何时用到它时, 它都会引出温暖、热望、幸福或满足的情感。” —蒂利希: 《爱、权力和正义》, 1975 年, 第 3 页。

勒文海姆 司寇伦定理

见“司寇伦悖论”条。

忠诚

以忠实和献身于一个人、一个集团、一个国家、一个事业或一个原则为标志的性格特征。无论是外部的力量, 还是发现了其忠诚的对象缺乏它假定的那些美德, 都很难改变这样一种情感。忠诚是与同情和感激相联的。它被归为一种美德是因为它包含着无私的奉献。任何政治社会的稳定都需要至少是它的公民的某种忠诚。忠诚不是加以权衡的, 而是盲目的和不顾一切的, 甚至到把忠诚的对象视为神圣不可侵犯的程度。由于忠诚总会带有偏见并具有感情色彩, 它很难与公正的道德要求协调一致。

“效忠或忠诚的情感其对象可能是不同的, ……但无论是在民主制度还是在专制制度下, 它的本质总是相同的; 这也就是说, 在国家宪法中, 存在某种固定的东西, 某种永恒的和不容质疑的东西; 某种经过普遍同意有权成为现在这种样子, 并且是不管其他情况有什么变化都神圣不可侵犯的东西。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》, 第十卷, 第 133 页。

说谎

故意说自己知道或相信是虚假的东西以欺骗他人或更多的人。说谎者自己心里想的是一

one thing in their mind and state another conflicting claim with the intention to deceive or at least with a lack of care about the possibility of deceiving. There is disagreement whether there should be a universal moral prohibition against lying. Both Aquinas and Kant denounced lying as a moral vice. For Kant, truthfulness constitutes a basic moral relationship between rational beings. Because it violates this relationship, lying is wrong in itself, whether or not it produces good consequences. J. S. Mill, on the other hand, argued that lying to avoid a greater evil could be justified. This is also the position implied by Plato's concept of the noble lie. According to the utilitarian principle that an act is morally permissible if it maximises the good, lying is not simply an evil, but must be judged according to its good or bad consequences. Accordingly, the treatment of lying is an area in which the difference between deontology and utilitarianism is clearly indicated.

"I shall define as a lie any intentionally deceptive message which is stated." Bok, *Lying*, 1978, p. 13.

回事,但却故意欺骗别人说是另一回事,或至少是没考虑欺骗人的可能而这样做。是否应当有一普遍的道德禁令反对说谎,在这一问题上存在不同的意见。阿奎那和康德谴责说谎是一种不道德的行为。在康德看来,诚实构成有理性的人之间基本的道德关系。因为说谎损害这一关系,说谎本身就是错误的,无论它是否产生好的结果。J. S. 密尔则持相反的意见,他论证说,说谎如可避免更大的灾难就可以是正当的。这也是柏拉图崇高的谎言这一观念所意指的观点。根据功利主义的原则,一个行为如果最大限度地扩大了好的结果,就是道德上所允许的,说谎并不简单地等于坏事,它是否是坏事必须根据它的好的或坏的结果来判断。因此,在对待说谎这一问题上,道义论和功利主义之间的差别是明显的。

“我把谎言定义为表述出的故意骗人的消息。”——博克:《说谎》,1978年,第13页。

M

Machine functionalism

A type of functionalism proposed by Putnam, also called Turing-machine functionalism, which understands the mind's function as the operation of the computational states of a Turing machine. It claims that each mental state is identical to a machine-table state and can be defined simply in terms of the latter. A difficulty facing this version of functionalism is that while a Turing machine can only be in one computational state at a time, a mind can have several psychological states at the same time.

"Putnam envisioned a theory of mind whose explications of individual mental state-types would take the form 'to be in a mental state M is to realize or instantiate machine program P and be in functional state S relative to P'. Let us call the view that some such set of explications is correct machine functionalism." — Lycan, *Consciousness*, 1987, p. 8.

Macrocosm

Macrocosm means large world-system, in contrast to microcosm, which means little world-system; the former refers to the universe which was, in the mind of the ancient Greeks, an organic living being, and the latter refers to man. Thus, the universe is a large creature and man is the small universe. It is said that Democritus was the first to use the term microcosm to refer to man. This analogy reflects the intimate relationship between the universe and the human body, the natural bounty and human goodness. This analogy pervades almost all Greek philosophy. In Leibniz, monads are microcosms of the world, since each in itself mirrors the entire universe.

"If it can occur in microcosm it can also occur in macrocosm." — Aristotle, *Physics*, 252b.

Magnanimity, another expression for great-soulness

Maieutic method, another term for midwifery

Major premise

In a standard categorical syllogism which consists of two premises and one conclusion, the predicate of the conclusion is called the major term, and its subject, the minor term.

机器功能主义

由普特南所提出的一种功能主义, 又称“图灵机功能主义”, 它将心的功能理解为图灵机的计算状态的操作。它声称, 每个心的状态都同一于一个机器桌面状态并可以简单地用后者来定义。这种功能主义所面临的主要困难在于, 一个图灵机在同一时刻只能处于一种计算状态, 而一个心则可以同时具有几个心理状态。

“普特南设想这样一个心的理论, 它用这样的形式来解释单个的心的状态类型: ‘处于一个心的状态 M 就是实现或例示机器程序 P 并处于与 P 相关的功能状态 S’。我们不妨称认可这些解释的观点为机器功能主义。” — 里库:《意识》, 1987 年, 第 8 页。

宏观世界

宏观世界意指“大的世界体系”, 与意指“小的世界体系”的“微观世界”形成对比。前者表示古希腊人心目中的作为有机生物体的宇宙, 后者则表示人类。因此, 宇宙是一个大的生物, 而人则是小的宇宙。据说德谟克利特首先使用“微观世界”这个词指人类。这一比喻反映出宇宙与人体之间、自然界的慷慨大度与人类的善行之间所存在的密切关系。这一比喻几乎贯穿了整个希腊哲学思想。在莱布尼茨那里, 单子是构成世界的微观世界, 因为每个单子自身反映出整个宇宙。

“假如它可以发生在微观世界里, 那也会发生在宏观世界里。” — 亚里士多德:《物理学》, 252b.

大度

“伟大的心灵”的另一种表达。

助产术

“助产术 (midwifery)”的另一称谓。

大前提

在一个包含两个前提和一个结论的标准的直言三段论中, 结论的谓项称作大项, 其主项称作小项。在前提中出现两次而在结论中不出现

The term which appears twice in the premises but not in the conclusion is called the middle term. The premise which contains the major term is called the major premise, while the premise which contains the minor term is called the minor premise.

"The major premise, by definition, is the one that contains the major term." --Hurley, *Logic*, 1982, p. 173.

Make-believe

A state of mind that is close to pretending and to the exercise of aesthetic imagination. A person knows that an object is not genuine or does not even exist, but ignores the distinction between the real and the not real and accepts being affected by the object as if it were real or had a different character. In a well-lit room a child plays that the fur rug is a bear. He knows that it is not really a bear. When the light is off, however, the child might lose a sense of safety because of the make-believe and fear that there really is a bear in the room. In some cases, make-believe carries the possibility of taking the imagined as real; in other cases, this possibility does not arise or exists only at the margins of awareness and interpretation.

"It will be noticed that in some varieties of make-believe, the pretender is deliberately simulating and dissimulating, in some varieties he may not be quite sure to what extent, if any, he is simulating or dissimulating, and in other varieties he is completely taken by his own acting." Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 244.

Malicious demon

[Latin: *malignus genius*] Descartes' fiction that there might be some omnipotent evil demon who deliberately, constantly, and systematically deceives me. Consequently, the universe and its parts may be such that they never can be clearly understood, and we can never be certain of our knowledge. The argument is introduced after Descartes' other three main arguments for subjecting our beliefs to doubt (that is unreliability, the possibility of dreaming and the possible error in the reasoning of mathematics) and pushes methodological doubt to its limit. It expresses in all its rigour the radical decision "to doubt whatever can be doubted". For Descartes, the only belief which can survive the challenge of the malicious demon argument is my awareness of my present existence, that is *cogito ergo sum*, which is therefore the starting-point for establishing the certainty of knowledge.

"I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some malicious demon not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his energies in deceiving me." Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, I.

的项称作中项,包含有大项的前提称作大前提,而含有小项的前提称作小前提。

"按照定义,大前提就是含有大项的前提。"——赫尔利:《逻辑》,1982年,第173页。

虚拟情景

近似于“假装”和“审美想像”活动的心态。某人明明知道某物不是真的或者不存在,但却不辨真假,反而受到似乎真实或者似乎具有不同特征之物的影响。譬如,在灯火辉煌的房间,一个小孩在玩一只毛皮熊。他知道那不是一只真熊。可是,当房间熄灯后,虚拟情景的心理倾向与害怕屋里真有一只熊的念头会使这位小孩失去安全感。在有些情况下,虚拟情景的心理倾向会有可能将想像的东西当做真实的东西;而在另外一些情况下,这种可能性不会出现,或者仅仅存在于意识和解释的边际处。

"人们将会注意到,在某些虚拟情景的不同心理倾向中,假扮者是在有目的地假装和掩饰;在另外某些情况下,装扮者或许不能肯定要假装和掩饰到什么程度;而在其他某些情况下,假扮者完全被自己的行为欺骗了。"——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949年,第244页。

恶意的神灵

[拉丁文 *malignus genius*] 笛卡尔的虚构,认为可能有某个全能的恶神存在,它故意地、不断地、系统地欺骗我。这样一来,宇宙及其部分就可能成为无法清楚理解的,而且我们无法确信我们的知识。这个证明是笛卡尔已经提出对我们的信念的怀疑的其他三个主要证明(即不可靠性证明,梦的可能性证明,数学推理的可能错误证明)之后提出的,它在方法论上将怀疑方法推到极端。它十分严肃地表达了一个彻底的决心:"怀疑一切能够怀疑的东西。"在笛卡尔看来,只有一个信念可以幸免于这个"恶意的神灵"证明的挑战,那就是我对我的当下存在的意识,即"我思故我在",因此,这个信念就是确立知识确定性的起点。

"于是我将假定,并非那个至善的、作为真理之源的上帝,而是某个既强大又骗人的恶意的神灵,在竭尽全力的欺骗我。"——笛卡尔:《第一哲学沉思》,1。

Manichaeism

A religion founded by the Persian Mani (c. 216-277 AD), which claimed that there is no single supreme being. Instead the world is governed by two balanced and antagonistic cosmic forces: Light and Darkness. They dwell in different realms and are co-eternal but independent. Their strife is the cosmic background of the moral conflict in human history and in every human life. Light is associated with God, goodness and spirit, and Darkness with Satan, evil and matter. Humanity is also a mixture of these two forces, with the soul representing Light, and the body representing Darkness. They are in a constant struggle, although eventually victory is assured for the Good. Manichaeism advocated the pursuit of an ascetic life in order to free the soul by releasing the Light that is trapped in the body. Augustine was briefly an adherent of this religion before he became a Christian. Manichaeism was derived from Zoroastrianism and flourished between the third and fifth centuries A. D. It was condemned by orthodox Christianity, but many philosophers such as Bayle, Hume and Voltaire, believed that it provides a better account of the origin of the evil than orthodox Christian doctrine.

"Positively, Manichaeism offered a comprehensive system of truth, a cosmology, a soteriology and an Eschatology. Its cosmology was based on the old Zoroastrian dualism of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness." —Burleigh, *The City of God*, 1944, p. 53.

Manifest image

A term introduced by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars for a conception or framework in terms of which we understand that we are in the world, with beliefs, desires and intentions. This contrasts with what he calls the scientific image, which postulates theoretical entities to explain the relations of perceptible things. Sellars held that the contrast between these two images is not between pre-scientific and scientific images, or between uncritical and critical images, for one's manifest image also employs correlational techniques to explain one's behaviour. However, he did believe that the scientific image is the only real image and that theoretical sciences determine what really is and what really is not. Traditional philosophy has tried to understand the structure of the manifest image, but Sellars claims that the aim of philosophy is the unification of these images of man-in-the-world.

"Our contrast then, is between two ideal constructs: (a) the correlational and categorical refinement of the 'original image', which refinement I am calling the manifest image; (b) the image derived from the fruits of postulational theory construction which I am calling the scientific image." — W. Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality*, 1963, p. 19.

摩尼教

由波斯人摩尼(约公元216—277年)创立的一个宗教。它主张,没有任何单一至上的存在者。相反,世界是由两种均衡而又相反的宇宙力量,即光明和黑暗统治的。它们居住在不同的领地,共享永恒但彼此独立。它们的冲突是人类历史上及每个人生活中道德冲突的宏观背景。光明与上帝、善和精神相联系,黑暗则与撒旦、邪恶和物质相联系。人性也是这两组力量的混合,灵魂方面代表光明,肉体方面代表黑暗。它们处于不停的斗争中,虽然最终的胜利属于善。摩尼教提倡追求禁欲生活,以便释放出被诱陷在肉体中的灵魂或光明。奥古斯丁在成为基督徒之前,曾短期地成为这个宗教的信徒。摩尼教源出于“祆教”,其鼎盛期在公元3至5世纪之间。它被正统基督教定罪,但许多哲学家,譬如贝尔、休谟和伏尔泰等相信,它对邪恶的起源提供了比正统基督教学说较好的说明。

“肯定地讲,摩尼教提出了广泛的真理体系、宇宙论、救世论和末世论。它的宇宙论是以善与恶、光与暗的老祆教二元论为基础的。”——布尔列:《上帝之城》,1944年,第53页。

明显的影像

由美国哲学家 W. 塞拉斯引入的术语,指一种观念或框架,人们据以理解他在世界中,并带有信念、愿望和意向。这与他称为“科学的”影像形成对比,后者假设理论实体以说明可知觉事物的关系。塞拉斯认为,这两种影像之间的对比并非前科学与科学的影像之间、或不加批判的与批判性的影像之间的对比,因为人们的明显的影像也采用了相关关系的方法来说明人们的行为。然而,他确实相信科学的影像是惟一真实的影像,理论科学决定着何为真实和何为不真实。传统哲学已试图理解明显影像的结构,但是塞拉斯主张哲学的目标,是统一这两种人在世界中的影像。

“我们对比的是两种理想构造物:(a)‘原初影像’的相关性、范畴性的精炼,这种精炼我称之为明显的影像;(b)由公设化理论构造的成果中推出的影像,我称之为科学的影像。”——塞拉斯:《科学、知觉和实在》,1963年,第19页。

Manifold

Kant's term for the material of experience acquired through sensation. Its elements are given either empirically or through pure *a priori* intuition in space and time, and it is unified or held together pre-cognitively by the synthetic activity of the imagination. The synthesis of the manifold is the first step towards knowledge. According to Kant, the manifold is indispensable, because without it the concepts of pure understanding are without content and are entirely empty.

"Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B103.

Many-valued logic

A part of logic for which truth-values other than true and false are conceivable for propositions. It thus abandons certain theorems of inferences in traditional two-valued logic, such as the law of the excluded middle (the principle of bivalence) and the law of non-contradiction. Although it may be traced to Hugh MacColl and Peirce, it was inaugurated by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz's development of three-valued logic and independently by the American philosopher Post's elaboration of an *n*-valued calculus. Three-valued logic is one of the chief forms of many-valued logic and is the model for higher-valued logics. There are various ways to designate and interpret the truth value or truth values other than true or false, usually in terms of the degrees of truth or the degrees of falsity. In three-valued logic developed by Lukasiewicz, truth is represented by "1", false by "0", and the third value, interpreted as half-true, is represented by "1/2". An infinite-valued logic means that for propositions an infinite degree ranging from completely true to completely false can be designated. Unlike modal logic, the truth value of a complex proposition in many-valued logic is still determined by the truth values of its constituents. Lukasiewicz was motivated by the problem of future contingents, and others have applied many-valued logics to deal with vagueness, logical paradoxes, and quantum mechanics.

"The mainstream of the development of many-valued logic proceeded on the basis of elaborations of Lukasiewicz's ideas—especially in their formulation in his widely read paper of 1930, where the 3-valued logic was generalised to the many-valued logic, indeed even infinite-valued logic." — Rescher, *Topics in Philosophical Logic*, 1968, p. 56.

Marxism

A term for ideas developed in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and later developments based on their thinking. The attempt to work out a coherent Marxist

杂多

康德术语,指通过感觉而获得的经验材料。它的成分或者是经验地给予,或通过空间和时间的纯粹先天直观而给予,并且它通过想像力的综合活动而先验地联结或结合。杂多之综合是达到知识的第一步。按康德的观点,杂多是必不可少的,因为没有杂多,纯粹知性概念就没有内容,就是完全空的东西。

“杂多之综合(不管它是经验地给予或是先天地给予)乃是产生知识的首要因素。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B103。

多值逻辑

这一部分逻辑认为,对命题而言除“真”和“假”之外,其他真值也是可设想的。因此它抛弃了传统二值逻辑中的某些推理定理,例如排中律(二值原则)和不矛盾律。尽管可以将其起源追溯到 H. 麦柯尔和皮尔士,它的实际奠基开始于波兰逻辑学家卢卡西维茨所创立的三值逻辑和美国哲学家波斯特所(独立)详细阐述的 *n*-值演算。三值逻辑是多值逻辑的主要形式并且是更高值逻辑的模型。有不同的方式去指涉和解释“真”、“假”之外的那个或那些真值,通常是根据真的程度或假的程度。在卢卡西维茨所发展的三值逻辑中,“真”由“1”表示,“假”由“0”表示,第三值被解释为“半真”,由 $\frac{1}{2}$ 表示。无穷值逻辑意味着:对命题而言,可以指派从完全真到完全假的无穷多个真值。与模态逻辑不同,多值逻辑中复合命题的真值仍由它的支命题的真值所决定。卢卡西维茨创立多值逻辑是由未来偶然问题所触发,其他人则把多值逻辑用于处理模糊性、逻辑悖论和量子力学。

“在卢卡西维茨 1930 年广为传诵的论文中,三值逻辑被推广为多值逻辑甚至是无穷值逻辑。在对卢卡西维茨的观念——特别是表述在那篇论文中的观念的精确阐释的基础上,形成了多值逻辑发展的主流。”——雷谢尔:《哲学逻辑论集》,1968 年,第 56 页。

马克思主义

这一术语指的是在卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯的著作中提出,后来又在他们的见解的基础上得到发展的思想。试图建立一个有内在

system starts with Engels himself. Later Marxists have different versions, and each believes his own to be orthodox and condemns the others versions as revisionist. In the communist countries, orthodox Marxism has been developed by Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union and by Mao Zedong in China. The central doctrines of Marxist philosophy are called dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

The essential claims of Marxism are that society consists of an economic base containing forces and relations of production, a political and legal superstructure determined by the economic base, and ideology which corresponds to the superstructure. The superstructure has partial autonomy, but the development of the forces of production are the ultimate ground for historical progress through stages from primitive society to slavery society, feudalism, capitalism and eventually socialism and communism. Persons are members of different classes according to their respective positions in the social economy. However it is seen by members of a society, history is a history of class-struggle. All existing institutions and agencies represent, consciously and unconsciously, the interest of one or another class. Even morality, which most theorists regard as an historical and cultural matter that allows room to criticise authority, is said to reflect the interests of the ruling class. In Marxist thought, class-divisions will not disappear until the ultimate stage of social development: communism. Engels held that Marxism is the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought. Marxism is not merely a theory, but a social project as well, as expressed in Marx's claim: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world... the point, however, is to change it". The publication of Marx's early *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* around 1930 and the end of the Second World War led Marxism to become an area of flourishing academic research in the West, especially in Europe. Various interpretations of Marxism emerged to form different schools under the general title of Western Marxism. Major schools were initiated by Gyorgy Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School's critical theory, represented by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas, existential Marxism, represented by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, and Althusser's structuralist Marxism. Analytic Marxism, which uses the methods of analytical philosophy to examine Marxist thought, is represented by G. A. Cohen, John Elster, John Roemer and Alan Wood.

"We have today a galaxy of different Marxisms, within which the place of Marx's own thought is ambiguous." - Thomas, in Carver (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*, 1991, p. 26.

联系的马克思主义体系始于恩格斯本人。后来的马克思主义者有各种不同的看法，每一看法的持有者都认为自己的看法是正统的，并把其他看法斥为修正主义的。在共产主义国家，正统的马克思主义在苏联为列宁和斯大林所发展，在中国为毛泽东所发展。马克思主义哲学的主要学说被称为辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义。

马克思主义的基本主张是：社会由包括生产力和生产关系在内的经济基础，由经济基础决定的政治、法律的上层建筑和与上层建筑相适应的意识形态构成。上层建筑有部分的独立性，但生产力的发展是历史进程的根本原因，这一进程是通过由原始社会、奴隶社会、封建社会、资本主义社会，最后到社会主义和共产主义社会这些阶段实现的。人们依据他们各自在社会经济中所处的地位而分属于不同阶级。历史是阶级斗争的历史，而不管一个社会的成员如何看待它。所有现存的制度和机构都自觉和不自觉地代表着这一阶级或那一阶级的利益。甚至被绝大多数理论家视为属于历史和文化问题，并留有批判权威余地的道德，也被说成是统治阶级利益的反映。在马克思主义理论中，到了社会发展的最后阶段共产主义，阶级划分将会消失。恩格斯认为，马克思主义是关于自然、人类社会和思维的运动和发展的一般规律的科学。马克思主义不仅是一种理论，而且也是一种社会方案，正如马克思所言：“哲学家只是解释世界，……而问题在于改造世界。”马克思早期的《1844年哲学经济学手稿》在1930年前后的出版和第二次世界大战的结束，使马克思主义在西方，特别是在欧洲，成为一个繁荣的学术研究领域。对马克思主义的各种解释的出现形成了通常称为西方马克思主义的不同流派。主要的流派有：由G. 卢卡奇创立的学派；A. 葛兰西创立的学派；以M. 霍克海默、T. 阿多尔诺、H. 马尔库塞和J. 哈贝马斯为代表的法兰克福学派的批判理论；以M. 梅洛-庞蒂和J.-P. 萨特为代表的存在主义的马克思主义；阿尔杜塞的结构主义的马克思主义。分析的马克思主义运用分析哲学的方法检验马克思主义的理论，其代表人物是G. A. 柯亨、J. 爱尔斯特、J. 罗默和A. 伍德。

“今天我們有一群光彩夺目的不同的马克思主义，在它们之中，对马克思本人思想的地位是有多种解释的。”——托马斯，载于卡弗编辑的《剑桥马克思指南》，1991年，第26页。

Masculinism

From a feminist point of view, masculinism is an attitude which ignores the existence of women and is concerned exclusively with male opinions and interests. It tries to justify the claim that only male views have value and the further claim that anything that cannot be reduced or translated into men's experience should be excluded from the subject-matter of philosophy. In another sense, masculinism advocates the elimination of all discrimination against men because they are male. The goal of this sort of masculinism is the equality between men and women, and it is a reaction against extreme feminist claims for the superiority of women over men.

"By masculinism in general I mean the assertion of masculine dominance over the feminine and also the practice of taking this first 'superiority' as a point of reference to assert other forms of supremacy which apparently have nothing to do with the duality of the sexes." —Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice*, 1989, p. 78.

Masked man fallacy

A fallacious argument of the following form: you say that you know your father, but that you do not know this masked man and conclude that this masked man is not your father; however, this masked man is indeed your father. The recognition of this fallacy can be traced to Eubulides of Megara (3rd century B. C.) and was discussed by the Stoics. However formulated, this fallacy occurs because it treats a referentially opaque context as if it were referentially transparent. It is sometimes argued that Descartes committed this fallacy when he said that he knows certain things about his mind, but does not know anything about the nature of his body, so mind and body are really distinct. Descartes argument, however, is more sophisticated than this fallacy.

"[A] fallacy recognized by Stoic logicians, which came to be known as the *larvatus* or 'masked man' fallacy; I do not know the identity of this masked man; I do know the identity of my father; therefore this masked man is not my father." —Williams, *Descartes*, 1978, p. 112.

Masochism

Generally, the practice of obtaining sexual pleasure by means of one's own pain and humiliation. In Sartre's use, a person is a masochist by becoming a mere object for a loved person in a state of complete dependence. This kind of human relation leads to frustration and to a failure of love. For Sartre, a person cannot be a mere object and must make free choices. A person cannot be lost completely in being-for-the-other.

"Masochism is thus in principle a failure. There is nothing surprising in this when we think that masochism is a

男权主义

从女性主义的观点来看,男权主义是一种忽视妇女的存在、只关心男性的主张和利益的态度。它试图为这样一种看法作论证,即认为只有男人的观点有价值,并进而认为凡不能转化或转变为男人经验的东西都应排除在哲学的主题之外。另一种意义的男权主义提倡消除所有因他们是男性而造成的对他们的不公平的对待。这种男权主义的目的是男女之间的平等,它是对极端女性主义主张的妇女比男人优越的观点所做出的反应。

"通常意义的男权主义我指的是男性统治女性的主张,也指把这首要的'优越性'作为参考的要点去断言其他优越的形式的实践,而那些形式显然是与性别的二元性无关的。"——L. 多尤夫:《喜帕恰亚的选择》,1989年,第78页。

戴面具者谬误

一种荒谬的论证,其形式如下:你说你认识你父亲,但是你不认识那个带面具的人;而那个带面具的人是你父亲;因此你不认识你父亲。这种谬误的识别可以追溯到麦加拉的欧布里德(公元前3世纪),并为斯多亚学派所讨论。这一谬误无论如何表述,其发生是由于它把一种"指称晦涩"的语境看做是指称清晰的。有时人们认为笛卡尔也陷入这种谬误,即他说他知道关于他的心的某些事,但却对他身体的性质一无所知,因此心与身体的确截然不同。不过,笛卡尔的论证远比这一谬误精致。

"一种为斯多亚学派逻辑学家所认识,被称作 *larvatus* 或'戴面具者'的谬误:我不知道这个戴面具者是谁;但我知道我父亲是谁;因此这个戴面具者不是我父亲。"——威廉姆斯:《笛卡尔》,1978年,第112页。

受虐狂

一般指通过本人自己的痛苦和羞辱而得到性快感的实践。在萨特的用法中,一个人之所以是一位受虐狂,是因为此人在彻底的依赖状态中为其所爱的人变成了一个完全的对象。这种人际关系导致挫折感和爱情的失败。对于萨特说来,一个人不可能仅仅是个对象,而是必须做出自由选择。他或她不可能完全丧失于为他人的存在(*being-for-the-other*)之中。

"因此,受虐狂从原则上说来是一种失败。毫不奇怪,我们将受虐狂视为一种'恶'

'vice' and that vice is, in principle, love of failure." — Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 447.

Mass term

In contrast to count nouns or sortals, mass terms or nouns cannot occur with a definite or indefinite article. They do not refer distributively and provide no principle of countability. While a count noun is associated with quantifiers such as many and few, a mass noun is associated with quantifiers such as much and little. Examples of mass nouns are water, gold, music, intelligence and information. Many abstract mass nouns are closely related to adjectives, for instance intelligence—intelligent or virtue—virtuous. There are various alternative terms for mass nouns. Strawson calls them characterising terms; Goodman refers them as collective predicates, and Quine calls them partitive terms or bulk terms.

"So-called mass terms like 'water', 'footwear', and 'red' have the semantical property of referring cumulatively: any sum of parts which are water is water." — Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 91.

Master argument

An argument about possibility introduced by Diodorus Cronus (c. 284 BC), a member of the Greek Megarian School. The argument turns on three propositions: (1) Everything that is past is necessary. (2) Nothing impossible follows from the possible; (3) What neither is nor will be is possible. According to Diodorus, (1) and (2) are evidently true, but (3) cannot be supported by (1) and (2) and must be wrong. On his account, therefore, the possible is what is true or will be true. This is also his response to Aristotle's discussion of future contingents. But the Stoics argued that (3) is correct, and either (1) or (2) might be wrong.

"According to Alexander, Diodorus constructed the Master Argument in order to establish his own definition of possibility, but a modern scholar has suggested that the title refers to the overmastering power of fate." — W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 1962, pp. 118-9.

Master morality

Nietzsche held that two fundamental types of morality, arising out of different traditions, have engaged in struggle throughout history. The first, master morality, is rooted in the self-affirmation by the strong man and the ruling group and calls good everything that is noble and powerful and calls bad everything that is mediocre, undistinguished, ugly and weak. According to Nietzsche, master morality is vigorous and desires to train man for heights. In contrast, slave morality is associated with the resentment of the weak man

(vice), 它从原则上说来就是失败的爱。”——萨特：《存在与虚无》（巴奈斯英译），1957年，第447页。

总量词

与“可数名词”或“类词”相反，总量词或总量名词不能使用定冠词或不定冠词。它并不指称个别的东西，也没有提供可数性原则。可数名词使用的是“许多”、“很少”等等这样的量词，而总量名词则使用“大量的”、“少量的”等等这样的量词。总量名词的例子有“水”、“金子”、“音乐”、“理智”、“信息”。许多抽象的总量名词都与形容词有着密切的关系。譬如，“理智—有理智的”、“德行—有德行的”。“总量名词”有各种不同的说法。斯特劳森把它们称作“描述词”；古德曼用“集合谓词”来指它们，而奎因则把它们称为“部分词”或“堆词”。

“所谓的总量词，像‘水’、‘鞋类’、‘红’等，都有一种累计指称的语义属性：水的总和就是水。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第91页。

主论证

由古希腊麦加拉学派的成员第欧多鲁·克罗纳（死于公元前284年）提出的一个关于可能性的论证。该论证依赖于三个命题：（1）凡是过去的事情都是必然的；（2）没有不可能的东西从可能的东西推出；（3）既不（现在）真也不（将来）真的东西是可能的。在第欧多鲁看来，（1）和（2）是明显为真的，但它们不可能支持（3），因此（3）必定是错误的。所以，按照他的说明，可能的东西就是现在真或将来真的东西。这也是他对亚里士多德所讨论的未来偶然事件的答复。但斯多亚学派争辩说，（3）是正确的，而（1）或者（2）则可能是错误的。

“在亚历山大看来，第欧多鲁构造主论证是为了确立他自己的可能性定义，但一现代学者已经指出，该名称涉及到命运支配一切的力量。”——W. 涅尔和M. 涅尔：《逻辑学的发展》，1962年，第118—119页。

主人的道德

尼采认为，有两种基本的道德类型，它们出自不同的传统，在整个历史中相互争斗。第一种是主人的道德，它存在于强人和统治者圈子中，植根于自我肯定。它将一切高贵的和强有力的东西称为好的，将一切平庸的、不杰出的、丑陋的和弱的东西称为坏的。按照尼采的主张，主人的道德是精力充沛的，渴望将人训练为高等者。相反，奴隶的道德与弱者和被统治者的怨恨相关。奴隶的道德谈论善与恶（good and evil），而

and the ruled group. Slave morality talks of good and evil rather than good and bad. It calls evil whatever is threatening and harmful and calls good whatever is benefiting and advantageous. Slave morality is shaped in direct and insidious reaction to master morality and emphasises preservation from destruction. Each morality develops into a kind of value-schema rather than into a morality of a segment of the population. Nietzsche claimed that any higher complex culture, including the bourgeois, is a mixture of these two types of morality and attempts to find a reconciliation between them. The two moralities even exist within the soul of the same person. Nietzsche himself preferred master morality, but did not accept it as a whole, for he admitted that this type of morality contains aspect of inhumanity. His master corresponds to Aristotle's great-souled man. Master morality, for Nietzsche, was also called noble morality, and slave morality was also called herd morality.

"According to slave morality, therefore, the 'evil person' arouses fear; according to master morality, it is precisely the 'good person' who arouses and wishes to arouse fear, whilst the 'bad man' is felt to be contemptible." — Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (tr. by Diethe), 1994, p. 167.

Master/slave

Hegel's metaphor to describe the evolution of moral and political consciousness. Initially, each man is a particular individual who strives to impose himself upon others and to achieve external recognition. On this basis, one man enslaves another. The master, through his command over things, orders the slave to work for the sake of satisfying the master's own desire. The slave, in order to survive and to retain his life, must repress his own instinct and his essence by negating himself. In a second stage, the slave transcends himself by working and becomes the master of nature. Because work raises him from slavery to freedom, the slave changes himself by changing the world. The future belongs to the working slave rather than the consuming master. History is simply the progressive negation of his own slavery by the slave. Eventually, consciousness reaches a third stage in which men recognise themselves as universal and respect each other as ends. This mutual recognition achieves the integrity of life and essence. The thesis of mastery and the antithesis of slavery are dialectically overcome. The opposition between master and slave becomes the motive principle of the historical process. Hegel's rich metaphor has been borrowed by a wide range of later moral and social theorists and philosophers.

"While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognised by the former as his superior. Thus arises the status of master

不是好与坏 (good and bad)。它将一切有威胁性的和有伤害性的东西称为邪恶的, 将一切有利可图的和有好处可占的东西称为善。奴隶的道德形成于对主人的道德的直接和阴险的反应中; 它强调保护而不是摧毁。这两种道德都发展成了一种价值框架, 而不是某一部分人的道德。尼采声称任何较高级的复杂文化, 包括资产阶级文化, 都是这两种道德类型的混合, 而且都力图在两者之间找到一种妥协。这两种道德甚至存在于同一个人的灵魂之中。尼采本人倾向于主人的道德, 但并不百分之百地接受它, 因为他也承认这种道德类型包含了非人性的一面。他讲的主人相应于亚里士多德讲的具有伟大灵魂的人。主人道德在尼采那里也被称为贵族的道德, 而奴隶的道德也被称为民众的道德。

"所以, 按照奴隶的道德, '恶人' 引起恐惧; 按照主人的道德, 正是 '好人' 唤起或希望去唤起恐惧, 而 '坏人' 则被视为可藐视的。" ——尼采: 《论道德的谱系》(狄特英译), 1994 年, 第 167 页。

主人/奴隶

黑格尔描述道德和政治意识进化的比喻。最初, 每个人都是特殊的个体, 他努力对他人施加作用, 并获得外界认可。在此基础上, 某个人奴役另一个人。主人通过他对物的控制, 命令奴隶为满足主人自己的欲望而劳动。奴隶为苟延残喘和保住性命, 必须通过否定自身而抑制他自己的本能和本质。在第二阶段, 奴隶通过劳动而超越自身, 并成为自然的主人。因为劳动使他从奴役上升到自由, 奴隶通过改变世界而改变自身。未来属于劳动的奴隶而不是享受的主人。历史不过就是奴隶对他自己的奴役状态的不断否定。最后, 意识达到了第三阶段, 人们认识到自身是普遍的, 并相互视为目的。共同的认识达到了生活和本质的整体。统治的正题和被奴役的反题得到了辩证的克服。主人和奴隶的对立成为历史过程的驱动原理。黑格尔富有寓意的比喻一直被一大批以后的道德和社会理论家和哲学家所引用。

"一个斗士宁可选择生命, 保住他单纯的自我意识, 但放弃他得以认可的主张, 同时, 另一斗士则坚持他的自我肯定, 并被前者承认为他的优越者。这就产生了主人和奴隶的状况。" ——黑格尔: 《精神现象学》, 第 433 节。

and slave.” —Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, Sect. 433.

Material adequacy

According to Tarski, any acceptable definition of truth should meet two conditions; materially adequacy and formal correctness. The condition of material adequacy sets limits on possible contents, requiring that any acceptable definition of truth has as consequences all instances of the (T) schema ('p' is true if and only if p). This determines what the extension of the truth-predicate should be. The condition of formal correctness sets limits on the possible structural form of a language of any acceptable definition, requiring that a definition of truth should not be semantically closed. A definition which meets these two conditions will be able to answer our pre-theoretical intuitions about what it means for a sentence to be true.

“The present article is almost wholly devoted to a single problem—the definition of truth. Its task is to construct—with reference to any given language—a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term ‘true predicate’.” —Tarski, “The concept of truth in formalised languages”, in his, *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, 1983, p. 153.

Material analysis, see analysis

Material conditional, another term for material implication

Material equivalence, see logical equivalence

Material implication

A term used by Russell and Whitehead, representing the truth-function of two propositions p and q in the form of the statement “If p then q”. The relation is symbolised by a horseshoe \supset , written as “ $p \supset q$ ”, or alternatively by an arrow \rightarrow , written as “ $p \rightarrow q$ ”. It is true that p materially implies q in each of the following three cases: (1) both p and q are true; (2) p is false, and q is true; (3) both p and q are false. It is false only if p is true and q is false. This is called material implication because what is expressed by the sign ‘ \supset ’ is different from our ordinary notion of implication. A statement such as “If Rome is in Italy, then London is beautiful.” is true by material implication, but does not seem to be an implication at all in the ordinary sense, for there is no relation between antecedent and consequent. It is due to this difference that material implication leads to many paradoxes. Some philosophers claim therefore that we should say that it is a material conditional relation instead of a relation of material implication.

“The relation in virtue of which it is possible for us

实质充分性

根据塔斯基的观点,任何可接受的真定义都应该满足两个条件:实质充分性和形式正确性。实质充分性条件设定了可能内容的限度,它要求:任何可接受的真定义都把(T)模式(‘p’是真的当且仅当p)的所有例证作为后承。这确定了真谓词应当具有的外延。形式正确性条件设定了具有任何可接受定义的那个语言可能的结构形式之限度,它要求真定义不应该是语义上封闭的。满足这两个条件的定义将能够符合我们关于一语句为真意味着什么的前理论直觉。

“本论文几乎是完全致力于一个单独的问题——对真的定义。它的任务是:相对于任意给定的语言,构造一个实质上充分和形式上正确的关于‘真谓词’这一术语的定义。”——塔斯基:《形式化语言中的真概念》,见他的《逻辑、语义学与元数学》,1983年,第153页。

实质分析

见“分析”条。

实质条件句

表示“实质蕴涵”的另一术语。

实质等价

见“逻辑等价”条。

实质蕴涵

由罗素和怀特海所使用的术语,表示在形如“如果p则q”的陈述中两个命题p和q的真值函项。此关系被符号化为马蹄号 \supset ,写作“ $p \supset q$ ”,或者另外用箭头 \rightarrow 表示,写作“ $p \rightarrow q$ ”。在下述三种情形的每一种之下,p实质蕴涵q为真:(1)p和q都真;(2)p假而q真;(3)p和q都假。仅当p真而q假时,p实质蕴涵q才为假。这称之为“实质蕴涵”,是因为记号“ \supset ”所表达的意思与我们日常的蕴涵观念不同。像“如果罗马在意大利,那么伦敦是美丽的”这样的陈述根据实质蕴涵为真,但在日常涵义上似乎根本就不是一个蕴涵,因为其前件和后件之间没有任何关系。正是由于这一差异,实质蕴涵才导致了許多悖论。某些哲学家因此断言,这是实质条件句关系,而不是实质蕴涵关系。

“我们据此可进行有效推理的那种关系就是所谓的实质蕴涵……事实上当实质蕴涵成立时,那种关系也成立,而与相关命题的真或假无关。”——罗素:《数学原则》,1903年,第33

validly to infer is what I call material implication... The relation holds, in fact, when it does hold, without any reference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition involved." —Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, p. 33.

Material implication, paradoxes of

The unpalatable consequences arising from the definition of material implication: a false proposition, merely because it is false, implies every proposition; and a true proposition, merely because it is true, is implied by every proposition. Put it in another way, whenever p is false, $p \supset q$ is true; whenever q is true, $p \supset q$ is true. The problem arises because implication is ordinarily used for a relation between two propositions, while a statement of material implication can be true even if there is no relation at all between its component propositions. Material implication does not concern the subject-matter or content of its components. To avoid these consequences, it is suggested that we speak of the material conditional instead of material implication.

"Russell's definition of ' p implies q ' as synonymous with 'either not p or q ' solicited the justified objection that according to it a true proposition is implied by any proposition and a false proposition implies any proposition (paradoxes of material implication)." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 463.

Material mode of speech

Carnap draws a distinction between the material mode of speech and the formal mode of speech. The material mode of speech uses propositions in an object language which describe facts, objects or phenomena. The formal mode of speech uses propositions in a metalanguage to talk about words or linguistic forms (syntactical sentences). An example of the material mode of speech is "Red is a quality", and an example of the formal mode of speech is " 'Red' is a quality-word". For Carnap, many traditional problems arise because we treat claims about words as claims as objects. On this basis, we then speak in the material mode, producing many pseudo-object sentences. Philosophy should translate these sentences into the formal mode, that is replacing talk about meaning by the talk about the formal relations of words.

"The true situation is revealed by the translation of the sentence of the material mode of speech, which are quasi-syntactical sentences, into the correlated syntactical sentences and thus into the formal mode." —Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, p. 288.

Material objects

Also called physical objects, the objects which possess physical characteristics such as position, size, shape and solidity. Such objects include physical entities such as rocks,

页。

实质蕴涵悖论

由实质蕴涵定义中产生的令人麻烦的结果：假命题仅仅因为它是假的，就蕴涵每一命题；真命题仅仅因为它是真的，就被每一命题所蕴涵。用另一种方式来表述，只要 p 为假， $p \supset q$ 就为真；只要 q 为真， $p \supset q$ 亦为真。上述情形发生，是因为日常语言中的“蕴涵”表示两个命题之间的关系，而一个陈述按实质蕴涵能够为真，即使在它的支命题之间根本不存在任何关系。实质蕴涵与其支命题的题材或内容无关。为了避免这些后果，有人建议我们谈论“实质条件句”而不是“实质蕴涵”。

“罗素把 ' p 蕴涵 q ' 定义为 '或者非 p 或者 q ' 的同义语，这导致了下述有根据的反对意见：根据上述定义，真命题被任意命题所蕴涵，并且假命题蕴涵任意命题(实质蕴涵悖论)。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949年，第463页。

实质的说话方式

卡尔纳普区分了实质的说话方式和形式的说话方式。实质的说话方式是在描述事实、对象或现象的对象语言中使用命题。形式的说话方式是在谈论语词和语言形式(即句法语句)的元语言中使用命题。实质说话方式之一例是“红是一种性质”，形式的说话方式之一例是“‘红’是一性质词”。在卡尔纳普看来，许多传统问题的出现是因为把关于语词的断语当成了关于对象的断语。基于此，我们因而以实质的方式说话，制造了许多假对象语句。哲学应该把这些语句翻译成形式的方式，它们用关于语词形式关系的谈论代替关于意义的谈论。

“真实情况由此得到揭示，即把实质说话方式的语句(它们是类似句法语句)翻译成相关的句法语句因而翻译为形式的方式。”——卡尔纳普：《语言的逻辑句法》，第288页。

物质对象

亦称物理对象，即具有诸如位置、大小、形状和坚实性等性质的对象。这些对象包括像岩石、树木、房屋这样的物理性的东西，也包括像

trees, houses, and living organisms such as plants, animal and human beings. The existence of material objects is independent of our perception, but they are the objects of perception. In this sense material objects stand in contrast to another kind of alleged object of perception, sense-data. The perception of material objects is public and durable, but it is indirect because it involves inference and interpretation, and it is therefore also less certain than perception of sense-data seems to be. This contrast leads to major disputes about the nature of material objects. How can we prove the existence of material objects and combat scepticism and idealism? What is the relation between material objects and sense-data?

"Nothing can be a material object except what has position in space." —Moore, *Some Main Problems in Philosophy*, p. 128.

Materialism

The doctrine that all items in the world are composed of matter and that the properties of matter determine all other things, including mental phenomena. Every explicable thing can be explained on the grounds of natural laws. Materialism has a long history starting from the Ionian natural philosophers and ancient atomists. It was developed by Gassendi and Hobbes in the seventeenth century, the French materialists in the eighteenth century, and Marx's dialectical materialism and historical materialism in the nineteenth century. There has been some dispute about the nature of matter. Physicalism, which claims that all items in the world are physical entities, is a popular contemporary version of materialism. All forms of materialism reject abstract entities and embrace the reality of particulars. Materialism claims to be an ally of common sense and it is generally deterministic. Contemporary materialism has become less ontological and is not so much concerned with the composition of things. Accordingly, the traditional contrast between materialism and idealism does not always apply. The physicalism of logical positivism was essentially epistemic and logical, claiming that all predicates can be reduced to physical predicates. Central-state materialism in the philosophy of mind proposes that all mental phenomena can be explained by appeal to neuro-physical items with which they are identical. Eliminative materialism seeks to get rid of what it claims to be scientifically inadequate folk psychological terms, like belief and desire, in favour of neuro-scientific notions.

"Materialism was taken to be a logical analysis of statements about the mind and not a very general contingent or empirical theory about the nature of mental entities." —Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, 1973, p. 332.

Materialist theory of mind

A theory developed as a result of the criticisms of dualist theory of the relationship between body and mind. While

植物、动物、人类这样的活的有机体。物质对象的存在独立于我们的知觉，但它们是知觉的对象。在这种意义上，物质对象与另一类所谓的知觉对象即感觉材料不同。对物质对象的知觉是公共的、持续的，但它是间接的，因为它涉及到推理和解释，因此它的确定性比对于感觉材料的知觉看上去要小。这个区别导致了关于物质对象性质的主要争论。我们如何能证明物质对象的存在，以及如何与怀疑论和唯心论战斗？物质对象与感觉材料的关系是什么？

“除了具有空间位置的东西，别的都不能是物质对象。”——摩尔：《哲学的一些主要问题》，第128页。

唯物论

这种学说认为，世界上的所有东西都是由物质组成的，物质的性质决定所有其他的东西，包括心的现象。所有可解释的东西都可以在自然规律的基础上加以解释。唯物论有一个漫长的历史，它起自爱奥尼亚的自然哲学家和古代原子论者，由17世纪的伽桑狄和霍布斯、18世纪的法国唯物论者和马克思的辩证唯物论和历史唯物论所发展。但关于物质的本质曾有一些争论。声称世界上所有的东西都是物理存在的“物理主义”是一种流行的当代唯物论。所有形式的唯物论都拒斥抽象的存在而支持具体现实。唯物论一向是常识的同盟者并通常是决定论的。当代唯物论变得不那么本体论了，也变得不那么关心事物的组成了。因此，唯物论与唯心论的传统对立并不总是适用的。逻辑实证主义的物理主义实质上是认识和逻辑上的。它声称所有的谓项都可以还原为物理谓项。心的哲学中的“中心状态唯物论”认为所有的心现象都可以用神经物理的东西来解释。“取消唯物论”则试图摆脱它认为是在科学上不合适的常识心理学语汇如信念、欲望，以支持神经科学的概念。

“唯物论被认为是关于心的陈述的逻辑分析，而不是关于精神存在物的本质的十分普遍的偶然的或经验的理论。”——奎因顿：《事物之本性》，1973年，第332页。

唯物主义的心的理论

唯物主义的心的理论产生于对关于心身关系的二元论的批评。二元论声称心与身是两个

dualism claims that mind and body are two independent entities, varieties of materialism claim that mental phenomena are determined by, identical with or supervenient on physical phenomena. Materialism holds that human beings are distinguished from other physical objects only because of the special complexity of their physical organisations. This theory has many different versions; Behaviourism claims that to have a mind is to have tendencies to behave physically in a certain way. Central-state materialism or identity theory claims that mental events are identical with certain physical events in the brain. Supervenience can allow a person to have mental states in virtue of having certain brain states without the mental states being reduced to the brain states.

"In sharp opposition to any form of dualism we have materialist or physicalist theory of mind. For a materialist, man is nothing but a physical object, and so he is committed to giving a purely physical theory of mind." —Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, 1967, p. 10.

Mathematical cyclist

A paradox devised by Quine to criticise the division between essence and accidents that is fundamental to essentialism. For Quine there is no absolute way to distinguish between the necessary or essential attributes and the contingent or accidental attributes of an object X, for our decisions in this regard are always related to our interests. In relation to some interests, some properties are essential; and in relation to others, they are accidental. Thus, essentialism is faced with a paradox that a given individual will be both essentially and accidentally so and so. A mathematician is necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged; a cyclist is necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational; then what of an individual who is both a mathematician and a cyclist?

"Mathematicians are conceivably said to be necessarily rational, and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling?" —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 199.

Mathematical logic

Also called symbolic logic or modern logic. The modern embodiment of formal logic, mainly consisting of propositional and predicate logic, with quantifiers, variables and functions as its central notions. It can be traced to Leibniz, Boole and Peano, but in its modern form began in 1879, with the publication of Gottlob Frege's *Begriffsschrift*. It was further developed by Russell and Whitehead in their *Principia Mathematica*. Frege, Russell and Whitehead sought to deduce mathematics from logic.

彼此独立的存在物，而各种唯物论则声称心的现象是由物理现象决定并同一于或伴随于物理现象的。唯物论主张人与其他物理对象之不同仅在于其物理组织的极其复杂。这一理论有多种不同形式。行为主义声称具有一个心就是具有以某种方式进行身体行为的倾向。中心状态唯物论或同一论则声称心的事件同一于大脑中的某些物理事件。伴随性容许一个人由于具有某些大脑状态而具有心的状态，而又不将心的状态还原为大脑状态。

“与任何形式的二元论完全对立，我们有唯物主义的或物理主义的心的理论。对于一个唯物主义者来说，人只是一个物理对象，因此他必须给出一个关于心的纯粹物理的理论。”——阿姆斯特朗：《唯物主义的心的理论》，1967年，第16页。

数学家骑车人

一个由奎因设计出的悖论，以批评本质主义对本质与偶然所作的根本区分。奎因认为，不存在绝对的方式去区分一个对象X的必然的或本质的属性和偶然的或可能的属性，因为我们关于这一点的决定总是与我们的旨趣有关的。相对于某些旨趣而言，有些性质是本质的；而在与其他旨趣的关系中，它们又可能是偶然的。这样，本质主义就面临着一个悖论，一个确定的个体将既是本质的又是偶然的，如此等等。一个数学家必然是理性的，而并不必然是有两条腿的；一个骑自行车的必然是两条腿的，但并不必然是理性的；那么当一个人既是数学家又是骑自行车的人时当如何呢？

“数学家总是被设想为必然是理性的，而并不必然是两条腿的；骑自行车的人必然是两条腿的而不必是理性的。但是当一个人的爱好中既有数学又有骑车时又当如何呢？”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第199页。

数理逻辑

亦称符号逻辑或现代逻辑。形式逻辑的现代体现，主要包括命题逻辑和谓词逻辑，以量词、变元、函项作为它的中心概念。它可以追溯到莱布尼茨、布尔和皮亚诺，但就其现代形式而言，可以说它创始于1879年，这一年弗雷格发表了《概念文字》。罗素和怀特海在其所著的《数学原理》一书中进一步发展了它。弗雷格、罗素和怀特海试图从逻辑中推演出数学。数理逻辑本身是数学研究的一支，极大地依赖于符号

Mathematical logic is a branch of mathematical study and relies heavily on symbolic techniques and mathematical methods. It is also a logical theory of mathematical analysis and is applicable to other more traditional branches of mathematics. Many philosophical problems have arisen from the development of modern logic, but advanced modern logic has become a technical field for mathematicians and the philosophy of mathematics.

"By the name 'mathematical logic', then, I will denote any logical theory whose object is the analysis and deduction of arithmetic and geometry by means of concepts which belongs evidently to logic." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VI, p. 33.

Matrix method, another name for truth-table method

Matter

[from Greek; *hule*, wood] Aristotle considered matter and form to be relative terms, with matter as the material of a thing (the basic stuff) as opposed to form as its structure. Matter is a factor within the category of substance, but is not primary substance. Matter and form together are the two major components of reality. Matter, as the subject or substratum of change, can accept contraries and so make change possible. At the beginning of change, there are remote matter-like elements, which would be prime matter in a general discussion of change. At the end of generation there is proximate matter, which is the matter appropriate to the product. A material substance is a composite of matter and form. Matter is usually, but not always, associated with potentiality. Aristotle also occasionally mentioned spatial extension as intelligible matter. The characteristics of Aristotle's notion of matter were retained in the later development of metaphysics.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, matter was thought to be something in a spatio-temporal location and to have the properties of extension and movability. Descartes called it extended substance in contrast to mind or soul as thinking substance. This led to the problems raised by matter-mind dualism. In modern science, matter is characterised in terms of mass and extension, and is distinguished from energy on the grounds that each has its own law of conservation. This distinction no longer holds in contemporary physics. Matter is now mainly a subject for the philosophy of physics.

"For my definition of matter is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result." —Aristotle, *Physics*, 192a30-31.

技巧和数学方法。它也是数学分析的逻辑理论，特别适用于其他更为传统的数学分支。从现代逻辑的发展中已经产生了许多哲学问题，不过高等现代逻辑已经成为数学家和数学哲学的专门领域。

“于是，我将用‘数理逻辑’这一名称去指称任何这样的逻辑理论，其对象是算术和几何的分析和演绎，所凭借的是明显属于逻辑的概念。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第六卷，第33页。

矩阵方法

“真值表方法”的另一个名称。

质料〔或译“物质”〕。

〔源自希腊语 *hule* (木材)〕亚里士多德把质料和形式看做相关术语，质料作为一物的原料（基础材料）而与作为其结构的形式相对。质料是实体范畴的一个要素，但不是第一实体。质料和形式共同是实在的两个主要成分，质料作为变化的主体或基质，能够接受相反物，所以，才使变化成为可能。在变化之初，有像质料的不同元素，在对变化的一般讨论中，它就是原初质料。在生成之末，有最近似的质料，即适于生产的质料。物质实体是质料和形式的合成物。质料通常但不总是与潜能相关联。亚里士多德也偶然提到作为理智质料的空间广延。亚里士多德质料学说的特征，被保持在形而上学的后来发展中。

在17至18世纪，物质〔质料〕被认为是处于时空位置中的某种东西，具有广延性和可移动性。笛卡尔称它为“广延实体”，对应于作为思维实体的心灵或灵魂。这导致了心物二元论问题。在现代科学中，质料的特性用质量和广延来形容，并与能量相区别，其根据是，每物都有它自己的守恒律。但是，在当代物理学中，不再保持这种区别。现在，质料主要是物理哲学的一个主题。

“我所谓的质料定义正是：每一事物的原始基质，事物绝对地由它产生，并且继续存在下去。”——亚里士多德：《物理学》，192a30-31。

Matter of fact, see knowledge of relation of ideas

Maxim

Generally, any simple rule or guide in our life, but in Kant's moral theory a practical proposition which connects one's subjective conditions, that is one's reason or motive, to one's decision to act. Such maxims have the form "I will do A if that will make me happy". Hence a maxim is a principle upon which one acts. For Kant, there are maxims of action, which express a determination to act in a certain way when a certain condition is met, and maxims of ends, which express a determination to form an intention when a certain condition is met. A maxim is distinguished from the practical law. For a maxim, the conditions (the reason or motives) are subjective and differ among persons because each person has different desires or purposes. For a practical law the conditions are objective, that is universally valid. Therefore, Kant called a maxim the subjective principle of volition and the practical law the objective principle of volition, that is the categorical imperative. All maxims have form or universality, matter or plurality, and totality in the complete determination. Maxims must be tested by the categorical imperative. Accordingly, a morally commendable action requires a person to act on a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law so that the subjective principle of volition coincides with the objective principle of volition.

"A maxim contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or his inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and it is the principle according to which he ought to act, i. e. an imperative." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 421 n.

Maximin rule

A strategy for choosing under uncertainty, according to which we should consider the worst possible outcome for each choice and adopt the one which has the least bad consequences. According to Rawls, because the rational agents in the original position are ignorant of their own initial positions in the society they are devising, they will reasonably employ the maximin rule for choosing principles of justice. The rationality of this strategy under conditions of ignorance is the basis for Rawls' difference principle, according to which a just society would make the situation of its worst-off group as good as possible. While the maximin rule seeks to maximise the minimum gain, a related strategy governed by the minimax rule enjoins rational agents to minimise their maximum loss. The two rules are generally

事实问题

见“有关观念关系的知识”条。

准则

通常是指我们生活中的任何简单规则或指导,但在康德的道德理论中则指一种实践的命题,它把人们的主观条件(即人们的理性或动机)与人们去行为的决定联系起来。这种准则的形式为:“如果A会使我幸福我就会做它”。因此,准则是人们按照它来行动的原则。康德把准则划分为行为准则和目的准则,前者表示当某种条件得到满足时,便以某种方式去行动的决定;后者表示当某种条件得到满足时,形成某种意图的决定。准则不同于“实践法则”,它们的区别在于,前者中的条件(理性或动机)是主观的,随着不同的个人而不同,因为每个人都有不同的欲望或意图,而在后者中的条件是客观的,即普遍有效的。因此康德把准则称为“意志的主观原则”,而把实践的法则称为“意志的客观原则”,即绝对命令。所有的准则都有形式或普遍性,质料或复多性,和完满规定的总体性。准则必须由绝对命令来检验。因此,一种道德上值得称赞的行为,要求一个人按照同时能使自身成为普遍规律的准则来行动,这样,意志的主观原则就与意志的客观原则达到协调。

“准则包含理性按照主体的条件(常常是他的无知或他的爱好)而规定的实践规则,因此是主体采取行动时所依照的原则。但法则是对每一个理性存在者都有效的客观原则,并且是他应该依照它而行动的原则,即一种命令。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,421注。

最大最小值规则

一种在不确定情况下的选择策略。按照这一策略,我们应考虑到每种选择的最坏可能,并采取那种带来最少坏的结果的选择。根据罗尔斯的见解,由于处在原初状态中理性的人不知道他们自己在他们设想的社会中的最初立场,他们将会合理地采用最大最小值规则以选择正义的原则。在无知情况下的这一策略的合理性是罗尔斯的差别原则的基础,按照差别原则,一个公正的社会将会尽可能地使它的最贫困的阶层的处境好转。当最大最小值原则试图最大限度地增加最少受惠者的利益时,受最小最大值规则支配的有关的策略就会责成理性的人使他们的最大损失减少到最少。这两条规则一般被认为是相等的。

taken to be equivalent.

"The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes; we are to adopt the alternatives the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcome of the others." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, pp. 152-3.

Mean

[Greek; *mesotes*, a noun derived from *mesos*, middle, intermediate] Aristotle claimed that virtue of character is a mean. Unlike an arithmetic mean, virtue as a mean is not a middle point between two extremes, which is one and the same for all. Instead, it is in relation to passions and actions and is a state in which passions are neither indulged without restraint (excess) nor suppressed entirely (defect). The right amount of passion is relative to us, and is different in different situations. However, that does not entail that different persons measure it in different ways. Rather, virtue is determined by practical reason.

Aristotle employs the mean to analyse not only virtue in general, but also particular virtues. The doctrine of the mean in Aristotle's ethics is famous, although it is not clear how much it tells us about virtue and vice. In addition, he uses it in his theory of perception, saying that a sense organ must be in a mean state (e.g. less hot and less cold) if it is to perceive the extreme qualities (e.g. hot or cold).

"Virtue is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a4.

Meaning

Generally, what is expressed, said or referred to in an expression. Literal meaning is what one can directly tell or draw from the words used in an expression themselves. If two or more expressions have the same meaning, they are said to be synonymous. Meaning is used in the same way as sense, connotation and intension in contrast to reference, denotation and extension. Determining the way the meaning of an expression is generated involves determining the way language relates to reality, the relation between meaning and psychological states, and the relation between meaning and other key semantic notions such as truth and reference. All these make the notion of meaning a central and difficult concept, not only in the philosophy of language, but also in the philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics. Various theories about meaning have been developed in the twentieth century. This dictionary has a single entry for each of the major influential theories. They include the behavioural theory of meaning, the ideational theory of meaning, the image theory of meaning, the picture theory of meaning, the referential theory of meaning, the truth-conditional theory of meaning, the use theory of meaning and

"最大最小值规则告诉我们,我们要按选择对象可能产生的最坏结果来排列选择对象的次序,然后我们要采用这样一个选择对象,它的最坏结果优于其他对象的最坏结果。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第152-153页。

适度

[希腊名词 *mesotes*, 源自动词 *mesos*, "中间"、"居间"] 亚里士多德认为,人格的美德在于一种适度。与算术的平均值不同,作为适度的美德并非是两极的中间点,因为后者对所有东西来说都是同样的,相反,适度与激情和行为有关,它是一种激情既不过度也不欠缺的状态。适量的激情对我们来说是相对的,在不同情景中是不同的。然而,这并非是说不同的人会以不同的方式来衡量它。相反,美德取决于实践理性。

亚里士多德不仅用适度来分析一般的美德,而且用来分析具体的美德。亚里士多德伦理学中的"中庸之道"著称于世,尽管它并未清楚地告诉我们有关美德与恶习之别。另外,亚里士多德在其感性学说中也使用它,他说,假如要感知极端性质(譬如热或冷)的话,感官务必处于适度状态(譬如不热不冷)。

"美德是介于两种恶习即过度与欠缺之间的适度。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1107a4。

意义

一般是指在一个表达式中所表达、说到或提及的东西。"字面意义"是人们能够在某一表达式所使用的那些词语本身中直接告诉或得出的东西。如果两个或多个表达式有同样的意义,则说它们是同义的。"意义"总是与"涵义"、"内包"、"内涵"以同样的方式被使用的,而与"指称"、"所指"和"外延"形成对照。确定表达式意义的生成方式,涉及到确定语言和实在之间的关联方式,意义和心理状态之间的关系,以及意义与其他关键性语义学概念如真和指称之间的关系。所有这些使意义概念不仅成为语言哲学中,而且成为心的哲学、认识论和形而上学中最关键且最难对付的概念。20世纪已经发展出各种有关意义的理论。本辞典对每一种主要的有影响的理论都列有单独的条目,它们包括意义的行为论,意义的观念论,意义的心象论,意义的图画论,意义的指称论,意义的真值条件论,意义的用法论,意义的证实论等等。

"一个单独的指称表达式要具有意义,满足下述条件就足够了:应该有可能在适当的场合用它去指称某个事物,人,位置等等。"——斯

the verificationist theory of meaning.

"For a single referring expression to have a meaning, it suffices that it should be possible in suitable circumstances to use it to refer to some one thing, person, place, etc." - P. F. Strawson, *An Introduction to Logic Theory*, 1952, p. 188.

Meaning of a sentence

In contrast to the meaning of a word, which is a potential meaning that is realised when the word is used in a sentence, the meaning of a sentence is claimed to be a certain extra-linguistic fact. Even philosophers who reject an ontology of facts can retain the priority of sentence meaning over word meaning. Philosophers who accept the notion of a propositional attitude see the meaning of a sentence as the object of propositional attitudes.

"The meaning of a sentence is something in the outside world at a given time and in relationship to given persons, qualities, and objects." - Bolinger and Sears, *Aspects of Languages*, 1981, p. 109.

Meaning of life

An ancient and central philosophical question asks what is the meaning of life. Some philosophers argue that nothing outside of life could give it meaning. For others, there is nothing but life, and it is meaningless. Another view is that an overall plan or ultimate goal, preferably chosen by us, gives life its meaning. In some versions, the plan and goal must be part of a larger project or derived from a source, where the project or source extends beyond the life and gives place to the commitments of the life. There are different views about the projects or sources which could give meaning to life, with candidates including God, immortality, tradition and rationality. There are also debates over the objectivity or subjectivity of the meaning of life. If the meaning of life is an objective matter, a life can seem to have a meaning through passionate intensity, coherence and satisfaction, without really having meaning. Accepting that there is a meaning in life leads to consideration of how one should live.

"[the] meaning of life: A person's shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life." - Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, 1974, p. 50.

Meaning postulate

A term introduced by Carnap in 1953 and originally intended to explicate but not strictly define an analytical statement which is not logically true. It was later extended to any statement or rule which specifies or clarifies the meaning of a predicate and hence determines the entailments that derive from that predicate in the nonlogical vocabulary of

特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》, 1952年, 第188页。

句子的意义

词的意义是潜在的, 只有当它被用于句子中时才会被意识到; 与此相反, 句子的意义则被认为是某个语言之外的事实。即使是拒斥事实本体论的哲学家也能接受句子的意义先于词的意义。接受命题态度概念的哲学家把句子的意义看作是命题态度的对象。

"句子的意义是外在世界中在某个时间和与某些个人、属性和对象有关的某个东西。" ——博林格和西尔斯:《语言的诸方面》, 1981年, 第109页。

生活的意义

探求生活的意义是一个古老的哲学问题, 也是一个核心的哲学问题。一些哲学家论证说, 生活之外的任何东西都不能赋予生活以意义。在另一些人看来, 除了生活别无他物, 而生活是没有意义可言的。还有一种观点认为, 那种由我们倾向于选择的总体计划或最终目标, 赋予了生活以意义。在一些看法中, 计划和目标必定是更大方案的一个部分, 或是由一个根源派生的, 在那里, 这种方案或根源伸展到生活以外, 并让位于对生活的信奉。对可以赋予生活以意义的方案或根源是什么, 是上帝、不朽、传统还是理性, 人们有不同的看法。对生活意义的主观性或客观性问题也有争论。如果生活的意义是一种客观的事物, 那生活似乎可以通过热情的程度、协调和满足而获得意义, 而不是真正具有意义。承认生活有意义, 会导致对一个人应如何生活的思考。

"生活的意义: 一个人根据某种总体计划来设计他的生活, 就是他赋予其生活的意义的方式; 只有有能力这样设计他的生活的人, 才能具有或力求有意义的人生。" ——诺齐克:《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》, 1974年, 第50页。

意义公设

由卡尔纳普于1953年引入的术语, 起初意在阐释(而不是严格意义上的定义)分析的而非逻辑上真的陈述。后来扩展到指任何陈述或规则, 它们限定或澄清谓词意义, 因而确定了派生于一种自然语言的非逻辑词汇中的谓词的蕴涵。这种意义公设的范例包括递归定义、使用定

a natural language. Examples of this kind of meaning postulate include recursive definitions and definitions in use. The advantage of this device is that it avoids a sharp distinction between the logical and nonlogical vocabulary of the object language.

"We draw an analytic-synthetic distinction formally only in connection with formalised languages whose inventors list some statements and rules as 'meaning postulates'. That is, it is stipulated that to qualify as correctly using the language one must accept those statements and rules." —Putnam, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. iii, 1963, p. 381.

Meaningless

Loosely, what is obviously false, absurd or pointless. In a stricter sense, questions and answers which are devoid of meaning or sense. In logical positivism, metaphysical statements are examined by logical analysis and claimed to be meaningless. One cannot say that metaphysical statements are true or false, because we lack any criterion to determine whether they are true or false. Only statements allowing such a criterion are meaningful. According to logical positivism, there are two kinds of meaningful statements; first, the formulae of logic and mathematics and second, empirical or factual statements. Any other statements which do not fall in these categories are rejected from serious philosophy as meaningless, metaphysical statements or pseudo-statements.

"In the strict sense, however, a sequence of word is meaningless if it does not, within a specified language, constitute a statement." —Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language", in Aye (ed.), *Logical Positivism*, 1959, p. 61.

Means/end

Some things are done to achieve a further goal or purpose and are means to ends. If a thing is done not for some purpose outside itself but for its own sake, it is an end in itself, but an end can also be a means to a higher end. In line with this reasoning, many philosophers infer that there is an ultimate or final end, which is an end in an absolute sense. Such means-end reasoning, called a teleological approach or analysis [from Greek; *telos*, end], is applied in both theology and ethics. Some philosophers hold that rationality is restricted to selecting means as instruments to achieve ends that are given non-rationally, while others hold that the selection of ends is also a matter for reason. Modern teleological ethics, represented by utilitarianism, claims that acts should be judged by their consequences, including the ends they realise. Deontology, which holds that acts should be judged according to their motive or duty rather than by their consequences, also uses the distinction between means

义等等。这种方法的长处在于避免了对象语言的逻辑词汇和非逻辑词汇之间的截然区分。

"我们仅关于那些其发明者列出了一些作为'意义公设'的陈述和规则的形式化语言,才做出形式上的分析—综合的区分。就是说,它规定了人们要正确使用这种语言,必须接受这些陈述和规则,"——普特南,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,1963年,第3卷,第381页。

无意义的

宽泛地说,指明显为假、荒谬和不得要领的东西。从较严格的意义上说,是没有意义的问题和答案。逻辑实证主义用逻辑分析来检查各种形而上学陈述并宣布它们是无意义的。人们不能说形而上学陈述是真的还是假的,因为我们缺少确定它们为真还是为假的标准。只有可用这种标准的陈述才是有意义的。根据逻辑实证主义的看法,有两类有意义的陈述:第一,逻辑或数学公式,第二,经验或事实性陈述。任何其他不在这两类之中的陈述被排除于严肃的哲学之外,说成是没有意义的、形而上学的陈述或伪陈述。

"在严格的意义上说,如果一串词在一特定的语言中不构成一陈述,就是无意义的。"——卡尔纳普:《通过语言的逻辑分析清除形而上学》,载于艾耶尔编:《逻辑实证主义》,1959年,第61页。

手段/目的

某些事之被做是为了实现进一步的目标或意图,因而它们是实现目的的手段,如果一件事之被做不是为了这件事本身之外的某一目的,而是为了其本身,那它本身就是目的,不过,一个目的也可以是一个更高目的的手段。与这一推理相一致,很多哲学家推断存在一个终极的或最终的目的,即一个绝对意义上的目的。这种手段—目的的推理被称做目的论的方法或目的论的分析[源自希腊文 *telos*, 目的],它既被用于目的论,也被用于伦理学。一些哲学家认为,合理性是被限于选择作为工具的手段去实现特定的不合理的目的。而其他哲学家则认为,对目的选择也是合理性的问题。以功利主义为代表的现代目的论伦理学认为,行为应以它们的后果来评判,这些后果包括它们实现的目的。道义论则认为,对行为的评价应根据它们的动机或责任,而不是它们的后果。它根据康德的绝对

and ends, with Kant's Categorical Imperative requiring that we treat rational beings as ends rather than merely as means. Aristotle had another conception of the means-ends relation. Rather than being merely instrumental, a means can be constitutive of an end or be a major component of the end. This later conception is important for understanding Aristotle's notion of happiness. There has been much controversy whether good ends can justify evil means.

"A means is the object of an interest which is asymmetrically dependable on an ulterior interest whose object is the end." Perry, *Realms of Value*, 1954, p. 79.

Means of production, see productive force

Mechanism

A paradigm of explanation modelled on mechanics and holding that everything can be explained by the mechanistic principles, that is by the interaction and combination of material particles. On this view, both animals and human beings are machines, and mental phenomena are nothing more than the sophisticated arrangement of different minute parts. In general, mechanism reduces all differences of quality into the differences of quantity. The world as a whole is an aggregate rather than an organic unity. All relations among particles are external relations. This paradigm was developed by Descartes and Hobbes and was supported by Newton's mechanics. It denies both action at distance and Aristotelian final cause or teleology. It therefore opposes vitalism and organicism.

"Mechanism represents the tendency opposed to teleology because its adherents think that the course of all phenomena in the world occurs as if in a mechanism and is not directed by purpose in the way that human conduct is." Ajdukiewicz, *Problem and Theories of Philosophy*, 1973, p. 138.

Mechanistic materialism

The type of materialism prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, represented by Hobbes, Gassendi and French materialists such as La Mettrie, Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius and Condillac. The theory was influenced by mechanics, which was the most highly developed natural science at that time. On this view, all phenomena, including those involving life and the mind, can be explained in terms of the interactions of forces and the simple or complex arrangement of material particles. Both universe and man are viewed as machines, with La Mettrie calling his major work *L'Homme Machine*. Things can affect one another only by direct mechanical contact. Because the mind lacks an independent status and is explained in mechanical terms, this theory has difficulty in accounting for free will. Marx and

命令即要求我们把理性的人看做目的而不仅仅是手段,也运用了对手段和目的的区分。亚里士多德对手段一目的关系有另一种看法。手段不仅仅是工具性的,它可构成目的,或是目的的一个主要组成部分。这后一个看法对理解亚里士多德的幸福概念很重要。关于善的目的能否为恶的手段辩护的问题,人们一直存有争议。

"一种手段是一种利益的对象,这种利益不对称地依赖于一个终极的利益,后者的对象乃是目的,"——佩里:《价值王国》,1954年,第79页。

生产资料

见“生产力”条。

机械论

以力学为模式的说明范式,认为一切事物都可按照机械原理,即按照物质粒子的结合和相互作用来加以说明。按此观点,动物和人类都是机器,心智现象无非就是各种不同微粒的复杂的排列。一般说来,机械论把一切千差万别的质都还原为各种各样的量。世界作为整体是一个集合体而不是有机的统一体。粒子之间的一切关系都是外在的关系。这种范式由笛卡尔和霍布斯所发展,并得到牛顿力学的支持。它既否认超距作用,也否认亚里士多德的目的因或目的论,因此,它与活力论和有机性相对立。

“机械论代表了与目的论相对立的趋向,因为它的信奉者认为,世界上一切现象的过程似乎都是按机械原理发生的,而不是像人类行为那样由目的所指导,”——阿吉图库威茨:《哲学问题和哲学理论》,1973年,第138页。

机械唯物论

流行于17世纪和18世纪的一种唯物论,以霍布斯、伽森狄和法国唯物论者如拉美特利、狄德罗、霍尔巴赫、爱尔维修和孔迪亚克为代表人物。这个理论受到机械论的影响,而机械论是那个时代最高度发达的自然科学。按照机械唯物论的观点,一切现象,包括生命和心灵,都可解释为力的相互作用和物质微粒的简单或复杂的排列。宇宙和人都被视为机器,拉美特利的主要著作就叫做《人是机器》。事物只有通过直接的机械接触才能相互作用。由于心灵缺乏独立的地位并被作出机械的解释,因而这个理论很难说明自由意志。马克思和恩格斯认为这种唯物论代表陈旧的形而上学思想,并主张它必须被辩证唯物论所超越。

Engels took this kind of materialism to represent outmoded metaphysical thought and claimed that it must be superseded by dialectical materialism.

"Mechanical materialism not only denies that spiritual substance exist, it also considers even mental phenomena (thought, feelings, etc) to be physical processes." -- Ajdukiewicz, *Problem and Theories of Philosophy*, 1973, p. 105.

Mediate inference, see immediate inference

Mediate perception, see immediate perception

Medical ethics, see bioethics

Medieval philosophy

The central theme of medieval philosophy was the attempt to join faith and reason. Philosophers sought to make Christian faith intelligible and to prove the compatibility of Christianity and reason. Historical accounts of medieval philosophy normally start with Augustine, who applied Plato's thinking to Christianity. The translation and commentary of Aristotle's logical works by Boethius shaped much Latin technical philosophical vocabulary. Anselm of Canterbury, in virtue of his ontological argument, is known as the father of Scholasticism, a tradition which debated questions such as the ontological status of universals, free will and determinism and the problem of evil. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the whole body of Aristotle's work became available to Europe through transmission from the Islamic world, together with the commentaries of Arabic scholars such as al-Farabi, Avicenna (ibn-Sina) and Averroës (ibn-Rushd). The greatest medieval thinker, Thomas Aquinas, attempted to reconcile Christianity with an Aristotelian framework. Later major thinkers included Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Francisco Suárez. The divorce of philosophy and theology and the influence of modern science in the work of later philosophers, such as F. Bacon, Hobbes and Descartes, marked the end of medieval philosophy. Many issues of medieval logic, ethics and philosophy of language still excite interest among contemporary philosophers.

"The assertion that the most important philosophical event in medieval philosophy was the discovery by the Christian West of the more or less complete works of Aristotle is an assertion which could, I think, be defended." -- Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, III, 1953, p. 3.

"机械唯物论不仅否认精神实体的存在,它甚至也把心的现象(思想,感情等)看作是物理过程。"——阿吉图库威茨:《哲学问题和哲学理论》,1973年,第105页。

间接推理

见“直接推理”条。

间接知觉

见“直接知觉”条。

医学伦理学

见“生命伦理学”条。

中世纪哲学

中世纪哲学的核心论题是企图结合信仰和理性。哲学家们力求使基督教信仰可以理喻,并证明基督教和理性的相容性。中世纪哲学的历史正规地讲是从奥古斯丁开始的,他把柏拉图的思想用于基督教。波埃修斯对亚里士多德逻辑学著作的翻译和评注,形成了许多拉丁语的专门哲学词汇。坎特伯雷的安瑟尔谟因其本体论论证而以经院哲学之父著称,他开创了经院哲学辩论诸如共相的本体论地位、自由意志与决定论、邪恶问题的传统。在12至13世纪,亚里士多德的全部著作,通过穆斯林地区的传播,与阿尔-法拉比、阿维森纳(伊本-西那)、阿维罗伊(伊本-路西德)等阿拉伯学者的评注一起,流传到欧洲,逐渐通行起来。最伟大的中世纪思想家T. 阿奎那企图使基督教与亚里士多德的框架协调一致。后期的主要思想家包括D. 司各脱、奥康的威廉和F. 苏亚雷斯。在诸如F. 培根、霍布斯和笛卡尔等后来哲学家的作品中,哲学和神学的分离以及近代科学的影响,标志着中世纪哲学的终结。中世纪逻辑学、伦理学和语言哲学的许多问题至今仍激发着当代哲学家们的兴趣。

"在中世纪哲学中,最重要的哲学事件是被西方基督徒发现的亚里士多德的几乎全部著作,这个断定我认为是能够得到辩护的。"——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》,第三卷,1953年,第3页。

Meditation

Usually used in religion as a synonym for contemplation, by which one beholds some spiritual object or obtains spiritual insight. Descartes chose this word for the title of his metaphysical masterpiece: *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1664). Meditation here is the reflection of a solitary thinker or meditator who retreats from the sensible world and frees himself from the influence of preconceived opinions. The purpose of meditation is to discover the indubitable first principles which can serve as the secure foundation of the system of knowledge. The *Meditations on First Philosophy* purports to describe the soul's solitary quest for truth and its discovery.

"I shall first of all set forth in these *Meditations* the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which persuaded me, I can also persuade others." —Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Preface.

Memory

The capacity to recall past experience and to retain in the present the knowledge acquired in the past. Although some sceptics reject belief based on memory as knowledge on the grounds that there is always a gap between the present remembering and the past, many philosophers consider memory to be a source of knowledge. In most cases memory gives us knowledge of the past. There has been some debate as to what counts as memory, how it is possible to have knowledge of that which is no longer present, and how past knowledge can be retained in the present. Because it is generally taken that there is an analogy between memory and perception, all theories of perception have their counterparts in theories of memory. While indirect realism, or the representative theory of memory developed by Aristotle and Hume, claims that what we remember is an image which represents the past, direct realism argues that our awareness of the past is direct without an intermediary image. For phenomenism the existence of the past is nothing more than the availability of memory experience.

"Memory demands (a) an image, (b) a belief in past existence. The belief may be expressed in the words 'This existed'." —Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, 1921, p. 186.

Mens rea

[Latin: guilty mind or guilty mental state] The mental state that a defendant has when he commits a crime. In order to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant has a guilty mind. The malice aforethought of such a mind and the defendant's *actus reus* (Latin: guilty activity) constitute sufficient grounds for the defendant to be liable to punishment. Accordingly, a person is punishable if and only

沉思

通常用在宗教中,作为 contemplation 的同义词,指观照某个精神对象,或获得了精神上的洞见。笛卡尔选用这个词作为他的形而上学名著《第一哲学沉思》(1664)的标题。这里的沉思是指一位躲开了可感的世界,摆脱了先人之见影响的孤独思想家(沉思者)的反思。沉思的目的是发现可以作为知识体系可靠基础的不容置疑的第一原理。《第一哲学沉思》打算描述灵魂对真理以及对真理的发现的孤独追求。

"在这些沉思中我将首先提出我的思考,这些思考使我相信我已经达到了关于真理的确实明白的知识,以便看一看根据使我信服的同样理由是否也能说服其他人。"——笛卡尔:《第一哲学沉思》,序言。

记忆

唤起过去的经验并将过去获得的知识保存至今的官能。尽管有些怀疑论者根据现在的记忆与过去之间所存在的鸿沟而反对将基于记忆之上的信念视为知识,但许多哲学家仍然将记忆视为知识的一个来源。在大多数情况下,记忆给予我们关于过去的知识。关于什么算作记忆、如何能够具有关于不再呈现的东西的知识、过去的知识如何得以保存至今等问题一直存在争论。由于通常认为记忆与知觉之间有相似之处,因此所有的知觉理论都有一个对应的记忆理论。由亚里士多德和休谟所提出的间接实在论或记忆的表征理论声称我们所记住的东西就是表征了过去的映象,而直接实在论则论辩说我们对过去的意识是直接的,并没有一个中介的映象。对于现象论来说,过去的存在只是记忆经验的可得性。

"记忆要求 (a) 一个映象, (b) 关于过去存在的信念。这个信念可以表达为 '这曾经存在过'。"——罗素:《心的分析》,1921年,第186页。

犯罪心态

[拉丁文, "犯罪心态"或"有罪的心态"]被告在犯罪时具有的那种心态。为了保证定罪准确,原告及其律师必须证明被告具有犯罪之心。这种心态的预谋和被告的 *actus reus* (拉丁文,犯罪行为),构成被告应受惩罚的充足根据。因此,只要他或她做出抉择,无论这一抉择是犯法还是不犯法,并且实现了那种导致犯法的抉择,

if he or she had a choice whether or not to break the law and exercised that choice in favour of breaking it. *Mens rea* varies from crime to crime, and the common feature is that the defendant has knowledge of the bad consequence of the action but still recklessly intends to bring it about. The *mens rea* requirement is contained in the definition of almost all crimes, with the exception of strict liability which does not depend upon mental state. If *mens rea* can be negated for example by insanity or negligence, the same act will be treated rather differently. The *mens rea* point is viewed as a restraint upon the utilitarian theory of punishment according to which a punishment is justified if it promotes generally good consequences.

"In order to prove murder, the state has the burden of proving, among other things, that the accused acted with the appropriate mental states. Such mental states requirements are usually called *mens rea* (very loosely, 'guilty mind') requirements." —Murphy and Coleman, *The Philosophy of Law*, 1984, p. 132.

Mental act

Activities or processes such as seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling pains, calculating or deliberating in one's own mind. Starting with Brentano, there has been a tradition which separates the occurrence of a mental act from its content. All mental acts are mental events, but not *vice versa*. Mental events such as suddenly noticing something are not regarded as mental acts. But how precisely to distinguish between mental acts and other mental events has been an intensively debated problem. Other philosophers such as Russell claim that is unnecessary to establish a special category of mental acts.

"To begin with, then, I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, etc. ... And because, in a wide sense, they are all of them things which I do, I propose to call them all 'mental acts'. By calling them 'acts' I do not wish to imply that I am always particularly active when I do them." —G. E. Moore, "The subjectivity of psychology", in Vesey (ed.) *Body and Mind*, 1964, p. 237.

Mental causation

A term for the phenomenon of a mental event causing another event, whether physical or mental. As causation involving mental phenomena, it contrasts with physical causation. It is, however, uncertain whether there can be an intelligible notion of non-physical causation. Some believe that mental causation can be understood in purely mental terms. Some argue that mental events have both physical and mental properties. Mental properties are not epiphenomenal and have a significant causal role. A satisfactory explanation of behaviour or mental events is implausible without referring to the mental properties of other mental events.

这个人就该受到惩罚。犯罪心态随罪行的不同而有所不同。其共同的特征是,被告明知其行为的恶果但仍不顾一切地想要去实现它。除了严格的不取决于心态的责任以外,犯罪心态要求包含于几乎所有犯罪的界定之中。如果犯罪心态能为(例如)精神病或疏忽所否定,那同样的行为将会受到相当不同的对待。犯罪心态这一条被视为对功利主义的惩罚理论的限制,根据后者,一种惩罚只要它一般说来有助于好的结果就是正当的。

“为了证明谋杀,国家有责任除了其他情况外,提供被告的行为具有相应的心态。这种心态要求通常被称为 *mens rea* (非常宽泛地,‘犯罪之心’) 要求。”——墨菲和科耳曼:《法哲学》,1984年,第132页。

心的活动

像看、听、闻、感觉疼痛、计算或盘算等等这样的心的活动或过程。自布伦塔诺以来,就有试图将心的活动的发生与其内容分离开的传统。所有心的活动都是心的事件,但反之不然。像突然注意到某事这样的心事件并不被认为是心的活动。但究竟如何严格区分心的活动与心的事件曾是一个大有争议的问题。另外一些像罗素这样的哲学家则声称,将心的活动作为一个特别的范畴是不必要的。

“那么从我看、我听、我闻、我尝等开始……由于在广义上,它们都是我所做的事情,所以我提议将它们都称作‘心的活动’。我把它叫作‘活动’并不意味着我在做这些事情时总是特别地主动积极。”——摩尔:《心理学的主观性》,见韦西(编)《身与心》,1964年,第237页。

心的因果性

这一术语指心的事件导致另一物理的或心的事件的现象。作为涉及心的现象的因果作用,它与物理的因果性相对。然而,很难说能否有一个说得清的非物理的因果性概念。有人相信心的因果性可以以纯粹的心的语汇来理解。有人论辩说心的事件既有物理特性也有心的特性。心的特性并非附随现象,它们具有重要的因果作用。不借助于其他的心事件的心特性就不可能令人满意地解释行为或心的事件。这一说法有时被叫作“心的不可替代性”。戴维森的“变异一元论”声称不存在心物定律。按照这一

Such a claim is sometimes called mental indispensability. Davidson's anomalous monism claims that there are no psycho physical laws. Following this line, many philosophers believe that mental events, if they can produce any physical effects, must be themselves physical and that mental causation is due to the physical properties of mental events. They claim that mental causation is intelligible only when mental events or states are related to physical phenomena and to physical causality by being determined by physical causality or supervenient upon it.

"The mental causation must be realized or constituted by the physical process." — Child, *Causality, Interpretation and the Mind*, 1994, p. 116.

Mental event

An event that has mental properties, such as thinking, feeling or willing. Either mental events exist independently or they have more fundamental physical properties. If a mental event causes some effect, must this causation be explained in terms of its physical properties, or is it because its mental properties themselves are causally potent? This question is related to the problem about the relationship between mental events and physical events which is one of the central issues in the current debate of philosophy of mind. Davidson's anomalous monism claims that while every mental event is a physical event, there are no strict psychophysical laws that connect the mental and physical realms.

"Mental events (by which I mean events described in the mental vocabulary, whatever exactly that may be) are like many other sorts of events, and like material objects, in that we give their locations with no more accuracy than easy individuation (within the relevant vocabulary) demands." — Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 176.

Mental indispensability, see mental causation

Mental phenomenon

Brentano's term, also called a psychical phenomenon, in contrast to a physical phenomenon. He argued that mental phenomena are characterised by their reference to something as an object, but that their objects, using the scholastic term, have intentional inexistence and need not exist. Mental phenomena have immanent contents of consciousness and intentional objects, in contrast to physical phenomena which contain external objects which transcend the mind. Brentano's distinction between mental and physical phenomena in terms of intentionality has had great influence. He classified mental phenomena into presentation (I see, I hear), judgement (I affirm, I reject) and emotional acts (I feel, I wish). Mental phenomena are not merely static, but

思路,许多哲学家认为,心的事件如果能够产生任何物理效应,那么它们本身一定是物理的,而心的因果性则源于心的事件的物理特性。他们认为,只有当心的事件或状态因由物理因果性所决定或伴随于物理因果性而与物理现象和物理因果性相关联时,心的因果性才是可以理解的。

“心的因果性一定由物理过程来实现或组成。”——恰尔德:《因果力、解释与心》,1994年,第116页。

心的事件

具有思维、感觉、意愿等等这样的心的特性的事件。心的事件或者独立存在,或者具有更为基本的物理特性。如果一个心的事件产生某种效应,这应当用其物理特性来解释呢,还是因为心的特性本身具有因果力?这一问题与心的事件与物理事件的关系问题相关联,后者是当代心的哲学中的中心议题。戴维森的变异一元论声称,每一心的事件都是一个物理事件,但并不存在严格的心物定律来连接心的领域和物的领域。

“心的事件(我是指那些用心的词汇来描述的事件,不管那到底是什么)像许多其他种类的事件一样,也像物质对象一样,我们对它们的定位并不比简单的(用相关词汇所做的)区分更为精确。”——戴维森:《关于行为与事件的论文集》,1980年,第176页。

心的不可替代性

见“心的因果性”条。

心的现象

布伦塔诺所使用的一个与物理现象相对的词,也被称作心理现象。他认为,心的现象的特点在于它们总是将某物作为一个对象来指谓;而且,这些对象具有意向性的内存在(intentional inexistence,这是取自经院主义的一个词),它们不必实际地存在(exist)。心的现象有内在的意识内容和意向对象,这完全不同于物理现象;物理现象包含超出了心的外在对象。布伦塔诺通过意向性来区分心的现象和物理现象的做法产生了重大影响。他将心的现象分为表象(我看,我听)、判断(我断定,我拒绝)和情感行为(我感到,我希望)。心的现象不是纯静态的,而是以积极主动为特征的,直接

are characteristically active and directed upon some object. A mental phenomenon is the object of inner perception and the subject-matter of psychology. The terms "mental phenomenon" and "intentional inexistence" have been closely examined by R. Chisholm and have been the subject of vigorous debate.

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity." — Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (tr. McAlister), 1973, p. 88.

Mental representation

Representation in the mind. It is commonly believed that to think about something is to have that thing represented in one's mind. Etymologically, "meaning" is associated with the "mind". To mean something is to have it in one's mind. To think about the White House is to have an image of the White House in one's mind. A word or a concept is associated with a certain image in the mind of the language-user. If two concepts are synonymous, they are associated with the same mental representation. But the problem of clarifying the nature of mental representation is a vexed issue. Some believe that to represent the world is to have a model of it in your mind; some believe that a representation is an image which represents things in virtue of resembling them; some suggest that a mental representation is a language-like symbol that does not have to be similar to what is symbolised; and still others think that mental representation is simply a neurophysiological state. According to Fodor, mental representations are linguistic expressions within the language of thought, and mental representations have syntactic and semantic properties comparable to those of a natural or an artificial language. There are various types of representation. Which kind counts precisely as a mental representation? Does mental representation constitute the content of thought? Does mental representation serve merely as an image or have a causal role in the brain? How can representations get to be about things in the world? These and other problems have been matters of dispute.

"The central question about mental representation is this: what is it for a mental state to have a semantic property? Equivalently what makes a state (or an object) in a cognitive system a representation?" — Cummins, *Meaning and Mental Representation*, 1989, p. 11.

Mental state

Mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, intentions,

作用于某个对象。心的现象是内在知觉的对象，因而是心理学的题材。齐硕姆仔细地研讨了“心的现象”和“意向性的内存在”这两个词，它们是被人们激烈争论的主题。

“每个心的现象的特征在于中世纪经院哲学家所说的某个对象的意向性的(或心的)内存在，以及我们可以不那么精确地称为对某个内容的指谓、对某个对象(这里不是指一个事物)的指向，或内在的客观性那样的东西。”——布伦塔诺：《从经验立场看的心理学》(麦克阿里斯特英译)，1973年，第88页。

心的表征

存在于心中的表征，人们通常认为，思考某事就是将此事表征于心中。在词源学上，“意义”与“心”相关联，意味某事即是心中有此事。想到白宫即是在心中有一个关于白宫的映象。一个词汇或一个概念与语言使用者心中的某个映象相联系。如果两个概念是同义的，它们就与同一个心的表征相联系。但澄清心的表征的本质这一问题十分令人烦恼。有人认为，表征世界就是在心中有一个世界的模型；有人则认为，一个表征是一个借助于相似于事物来表征事物的映象；另有人认为，一个心的表征是一个类似于语言的符号，无须相似于所代表的东西；还有人认为，心的表征只是一个神经生理状态。根据福多的观点，心的表征是在“思维语言”中的语言表达。心的表征具有可比于自然语言或人工语言的句法特征和语义特性。有各种不同的表征。究竟哪一种恰可看做是心的表征呢？心的表征构成思维的内容吗？心的表征只是一个映象，还是在大脑中具有因果作用？表征如何得以关涉世界中的事物？这一系列问题都曾引起争论。

“心的表征的中心问题是：心的状态具有语义特性是怎么回事？同样地，什么使得认知系统中的一个状态(或对象)成为表征？”——库敏斯：《意义与心的表征》，1989年，第11页。

心的状态

像信念、需求、意向和感觉这样的心的现

and sensations. The nature of these phenomena has been a central question in the philosophy of mind. Different theories of mind are distinguished largely according to their respective answers to this problem. According to Cartesian dualism, mental states are inner, non-material states of a mental substance. According to Hume, the self or mind is a succession of mental states. According to behaviourism, mental states consist simply in dispositions to behave in various ways. According to the identity theory, mental states are identical with states of the brain. According to functionalism, mental states are defined in terms of their causal relations to input stimuli, other mental states and external behaviour. All mental events are mental states, but not all mental states are mental events.

"Let's us describe a mental state as a state which can be directly observed only through introspection and cannot be directly observed by more than one individual, viz. the individual who is in that mental state." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 267.

Mentalese, another term for language of thought

Mentalism

Synonymous with idealism and panpsychism. The position that physical or bodily things can be explained in terms of mental things, and that the latter exist in a real sense. On this view, everything is mental in character. Mentalism is thus opposed to materialist claim that all mental things are explained in terms of physical things and that the latter exist in a real sense. Berkeley and other mentalists claim that physical objects are nothing but sensations or perceptions. Leibniz said that the monads which compose the world are ultimately spiritual. Hegel and other absolute idealists consider the whole material world to be mental in nature. These philosophers hold different versions of mentalism.

"Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called mentalist theories." —Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of Mind*, 1968, p. 5.

Mentalistic linguistics

Chomsky's characterisation for his own approach to linguistics. On the basis of the distinction between competence and performance, he claims that linguistics should study competence, that is the speaker's internalised transformational-generative rules of language. Introspection is one excellent source of data for the study of language. Linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology which deals with structure and process in human minds and can be connected with observed behaviour only in an indirect way.

象。这些现象的本质一直是心的哲学的中心议题。不同的心的理论在很大程度上依其对这一问题的不同回答来区分。根据笛卡尔的二元论,心的状态是心的实体的内部的、非物质的状态。根据休谟的观点,自我或心是一系列心的状态。根据行为主义的观点,心的状态只是由以各种方式进行行为的倾向所组成。根据“同一论”,心的状态同一于大脑状态。根据“功能主义”,心的状态由其与输入刺激、其他的心的状态和外部行为之间的因果关系来定义。所有的心的事件都是心的状态,但并非所有的心的状态都是心的事件。

“让我们将心的状态描述为这样一个状态:它只能通过内省而被直接观察到,而无法由某个人,亦即处于那个心的状态的那个人之外的其他人直接观察到。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第267页。

心的语言

“思维语言”的别名。

心灵主义

“观念论”和“泛心论”的同义语。这种观点认为,物理的或身体的东西可以用心的东西来解释,并且后者在真正的意义上存在。根据这种观点,所有的东西在本质上都是心的。因此它与唯物论是对立的,后者主张所有的心的东西都用物理的东西来解释并且后者在真正的意义上存在。巴克莱和其他的心灵主义者声称,物理对象只是感觉或知觉。莱布尼茨说道,构成世界的单子最终是精神的。黑格尔及其他绝对观念论者认为整个物质世界归根结蒂都是心的。所有这些哲学家主张不同形式的心灵主义。

“有些关于心与身的理论试图将身还原为心或心的某种特性。这样的理论可以叫作心灵主义理论。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯物主义的心的理论》,1968年,第5页。

心灵主义语言学

乔姆斯基对自己语言学方法的描述。根据能力和运用的区分,他认为语言学应该研究能力,即内在于说者的语言转换生成规则。内省对语言研究来说是最好的论据来源。语言学是研究人类心的结构和过程的认知心理学分支,它只能以间接的方式与观察行为相联系。这样一种心灵主义的方法是与行为主义方法相对立的。行为主义方法为了解释行为抛弃了内省、意识以及其他心灵主义术语。心灵主义与行为主

Such a mentalistic approach is opposed to behaviourist approaches which reject introspection, consciousness and other mentalistic terms for the purpose of explaining behaviour. The contrast between mentalism and behaviourism in the philosophy of language is essentially a contrast between rationalism and empiricism.

"Mentalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data (along with other data, for example the data provided by introspection) for the determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of its investigation." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 93.

Mentality

The possession of a mind. The features which enable a human being to think, feel, imagine, and act. Different philosophies have different explanations of mentality. According to Cartesian dualism, mentality consists of inner states independent of physical states. According to some versions of physicalism, all facts about mentality can be reduced to facts about the states of central nervous systems. Mentality in this sense becomes the subject-matter of brain science. Non-reductive physicalism identifies mental states with brain states, but retains the mental for discussion at an autonomous level of theory. Mentality can also refer to what is going on in an individual's mind which makes him a distinct person. In this broad sense, mentality is synonymous with style of thought or way of thinking and is formed partly as a result of one's social and cultural setting.

"[H] is own mentality, ... is his own assumptions, values, expectations, and perceptions of what is possible." — Tiles and Tiles, *An Introduction to Historical Epistemology*, 1993, p. 46.

Mercy

Also called nonmaleficence, an ethical demand that one should do one's best to relieve the pain or suffering of another person where this is possible and to the extent that the relief is in the suffering person's interest. In contemporary ethics, this moral demand is closely linked with the issue of euthanasia or mercy killing, that is whether it is morally justified to end the life of a terminally ill and gravely suffering patient who is of sound mind and wants to die. Mercy is a major reason for supporting the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia, but some consider such deaths as murder. There are also problems about patients who make choices under the influence of others, about the presentation of cases of involuntary euthanasia as voluntary cases, and about euthanasia for those who are not of sound mind or who cannot express a view. In all of these cases, considerations of mercy might support euthanasia, but respect for life and free consent might oppose it.

义在语言哲学中的对立,基本上就是理性主义与经验主义的对立。

"心灵主义语言学只是理论语言学,它把运用作为确定能力的论据(当然还有其他的论据,例如由内省提供的论据),而能力则被看作是它研究的主要对象。"——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第93页。

心性

拥有一个心,是指能使一个人去思维、感觉、想像和行为的那些特征。不同的哲学家对心性具有不同的解释。根据笛卡尔的二元论,心性由独立于物理状态的内部状态所组成。根据某些形式的物理主义,关于心性的所有事实都可以被还原为关于神经中枢系统的状态事实。心性在这个意义上是脑科学的课题。非还原的物理主义将心的状态同一于大脑状态,但仍在理论的自主水平上讨论心的东西。心性亦可指一个人的心中所发生的那些使其成为一个独特的人的东西。在这一宽泛的意义上,心性是“思维风格”或“思维方式”的同义语并且部分地由其社会文化背景所形成。

“他自己的心性……是他自己的假定、价值、期望和对可能的东西的知觉。”——泰尔斯和泰尔斯:《历史认识论引论》,1993年,第46页。

怜悯

也叫不做恶,一种道德上的要求;一个人在可能的情况下应尽其最大可能去解除另一个人的痛苦或苦难,这种解除要限于符合受苦难人利益的范围内。在当代伦理学中,这一道德要求与有关安乐死或慈杀的争论有密切关系,即在一个神智正常的身患绝症并极度痛苦的病人要求死的情况下,结束这个人的生命在道德上是否是正当的。怜悯是支持容许自愿安乐死的一个重要理由,但有些人认为这样致死是谋杀。与此相关的问题还有:病人是在他人影响下做出的选择;把不自愿的情况说成是自愿的;对那些神智不正常或不能表达自己意见的人实行安乐死。在所有这些情况中,对怜悯的考虑会支持安乐死,但对生命和自由同意的重视会反对它。

“这种怜悯原则确立了两种组合起来的义务:1. 不造成进一步痛苦或苦难的义务;2. 去结束已发生的痛苦或苦难的义务。”——巴廷:

"This principle of mercy establishes two component duties: 1. the duty not to cause further pain or suffering, and 2. the duty to act to end pain or suffering already occurring." —Battin, *The Least Worst Death*, 1994, p. 102.

Mercy killing, another term for euthanasia

Mereological essentialism

A theory developed by Roderick Chisholm which claims that if anything is ever a part of a whole, then it is a part of that whole as long as the whole exists. The whole possesses that part in every possible world in which the whole exists. The theory is mereological because it deals with the relationship between wholes and parts, and it is essentialist because it holds that the parts of an object are essential to that object. At first glance, this claim conflicts with common sense, for we usually deny that having a part is essential for an ordinary thing to persist. But Chisholm argues that we must distinguish between a proper part in a strict philosophical sense and an improper part in a looser ordinary sense. The loss of a proper part will cause an object to change its identity, whilst the identity of an object will be maintained with the loss of an improper part. Chisholm's theory deals with parts which a whole has necessarily and which are essential to that whole. This theory is useful in dealing with puzzles such as that of the ship of Theseus, in which we ask whether an object maintains its identity after each of its parts is successively replaced.

"The principle of mereological essentialism that I have advocated may be put this way: For every X and Y, if X is ever part of Y, then Y is necessarily such that X is part of Y at any time that Y exists." —Chisholm, *Person and Object*, 1976, p. 149.

Mereology

[from Greek: *meros*, part] The formal theory of logical relationships between wholes and parts, derived from Aristotle and developed in the twentieth century by figures such as Lesniewski, Tarski and Nelson Goodman. It claims that any individual whole is a mereological sum, that is the least inclusive thing that includes all of its parts. It is composed of these parts and of nothing else. Consequently, two individuals, X and Y, if identical, must have the same proper parts. David Lewis claims that a world is the mereological sum of all the possible individuals that are parts of it. Mereology was intended to provide an alternative foundation of mathematics, but its claims are controversial. Many counterexamples exist to its theorems, especially with regard to organic wholes. Nevertheless, the applications of this important formalism are still being explored. Because mereology applies to individuals, it is called the calculus of

《最佳死亡》，1994年，第102页。

慈杀

“安乐死”的另一个名称。

部分学的本质主义

齐硕姆提出的一种理论，它断言：如果任何事物是一整体的一部分，那么，只要该整体存在，它就是该整体的一部分。该整体在它存在的每一个可能世界中都具有该部分。此理论是部分学的，因为它处理整体和部分之间的关系；它是本质主义的，因为它主张一对象的部分对于该对象是本质性的。初看起来，这一断言是与常识相冲突的，因为我们通常否认有一部分对于一持续存在的普通事物是本质性的。但齐硕姆论证说，我们必须区分严格的哲学意义上的真部分和松散的日常意义的非真部分。失去真部分将使得一对象改变它的身份，若失去一非真部分，一对象的身份却仍将保持住。齐硕姆的理论处理一整体必然具有且对于该整体是本质性的部分。这一理论在处理忒修斯(Theseus)之船疑难这样的问题时是有用的，在后者中我们问：在一对象的每一部分都相继被替换后，该对象是否仍保持它的身份。

“我所提倡的部分学本质主义的原则可以这样表述：对于每一个X和Y，如果X曾是Y的部分，则Y必然使得在Y存在的任何时间内X都是Y的部分。”——齐硕姆：《人与物》，1976年，第149页。

部分论

[源自希腊文 *meros*，部分] 部分论是关于部分与整体的逻辑关系的形式理论，来自亚里士多德，20世纪由莱斯涅夫斯基、塔斯基和N. 古德曼等人所发展。它声称任何单个整体都是部分的总和，亦即包含其所有部分的范围最小的东西。它只由这些部分所组成。结果，如果两个个体X和Y是同一的，就一定具有相同的真部分。D. 刘易斯声称，世界是作为其部分的所有可能个体的部分总和。有人试图以部分论作为数学的另一基础，但这种主张颇有争议，其定理存在许多反例，特别是对有机整体而言。然而，对这种重要的形式主义的应用仍在探索之中。因为部分论应用于个体，所以被称为个体演算，与被称类别演算的集合论相对立。

“部分论是关于部分与整体的关系的理论，是关于隶属关系的概念。这些隶属关系之一就

individuals, in contrast to set theory, which is called the calculus of classes.

"Mereology is the theory of the relation of parts to wholes, and kindred notions. One of these kindred relations is that of a mereological fusion, or sum; the whole composed of some given parts." —David Lewis, *Parts of Classes*, 1991, p. 1.

Merit

Excellence or worth which deserves reward. We can distinguish between moral merits, such as virtues, and non-moral merits, such as skills and abilities. All merits are qualities that are or should be respected and admired in society. Whether or not a quality is a merit is determined in relation to the social purpose it serves. In contrast to egalitarianism and utilitarianism, a meritarian political philosophy would distribute benefits and responsibilities in proportion to the merit of those who receive them, and a society would be just if it conformed to this distribution. Since merit is not allotted equally, distribution according to merit demands that unlike cases should be treated unequally. On this view, those possessing special merit deserve special and discriminatory treatment. Merit is closely related to the idea of desert, equity, fairness and justice. A distribution based on merit is not an equal one, but it aims to promote fairness and justice. A difficulty facing this position is the ease with which power, influence and the pretence of merit can displace real merit as a basis for enhanced reward.

"I distinguish desert, which is concerned with what an agent has done, from merit, which is concerned with what he is." —Lucas, *Responsibility*, 1993, p. 3.

Meritocracy

A society in which all institutional positions are filled according to selection procedures based on relevant qualifications, skills, abilities, achievements and promise. It judges and promotes people on the grounds of the quality of their existing service. Meritocracy is a type of aristocracy, for it creates an elite group of people with special powers, but it is also democratic, for it is based on the equality of opportunities, according to which the distribution of opportunities is in accordance with capacities and achievements. However, meritocracy might lead to many types of inequalities, and it is controversial whether talent is a suitable fundamental ground for justifying these inequalities. In contrast to traditional inegalitarian meritocracy, two new forms of meritocracies have recently been proposed. In egalitarian meritocracy, inequalities would not be based on the social functions of the job but on the needs or other deserts of the job holders. In maximum meritocracy, inequalities would be allowed, but under certain conditions that are favourable to those whose abilities are

是部分融合或总和：整体由某些给定的部分所组成。”——刘易斯：《类的部分》，1991年，第1页。

才能

值得奖励的优点或价值。我们可以区分道德才能（例如美德）和非道德才能（例如技巧和能力），所有的才能都是在社会中受到或应当受到尊重和羡慕的品质。对一种品质是否是才能的确定与它所服务的社会目的有关。相对于平等主义和功利主义而言，才能主义的政治哲学要按人们具有才能的多少来分配利益与责任，如果一个社会遵从这样的分配，它就是公正的。由于才能不是平均分摊的，所以按才能分配就要求不同情况予以不同对待。根据这一观点，那些拥有特殊才能的人应受到特殊的、有差别的对待。才能与功过、平等、公平和正义等观念密切相联。以才能为基础的分配不是一种平等的分配，但它的目标是促进公平和正义。这种观点面临的困难是容易出现权力、影响和假才能取代作为增强奖励基础的真才能的情况。

“我把功过与才能加以区分，前者涉及一个人做了什么，后者涉及他是什么样的人。”——鲁卡斯：《责任》，1993年，第3页。

能人统治

指的是一个社会中所有机构的职务都是根据基于相应的资格、技能、能力、成绩和前途的选举程序来任命的。它对人们的评价和提升依据的是他们现在的办事质量。能人统治是一种贵族统治，因为它造就了一个握有特殊权力的精英集团；但它又是民主的，因为它以机会平等为基础，即机会的分配是与能力和贡献相一致的。可是，能人统治也会导致很多不平等，在天资是否是证明这些不平等的适宜的基本论据这一问题上存在争论。最近提出了两种与传统的不平等的能人统治不同的新的能人统治形式。在平等的能人统治中，不平等不是基于工作的社会功能，而是基于对工作持有者来讲是必要的东西或其他方面的美德。在最大限度的能人统治中，不平等的存在是允许的，但只是在一定的条件下，即要利于那些其能力不可能使他们得到高薪工作的人。在一个正义的社会中，能人统治中用作分配职务的基础的天资应否视为直接属于个人，罗尔斯对此提出了质疑。

unlikely to gain high-reward jobs. Rawls raises the question of whether the talents which are used in a meritocracy as a basis of assigning positions should be seen as straightforwardly belonging to the individual in a just society.

"Meritocracy; a social order built around a particular notion of merit." —Daniels, *Justice and Justification*, 1996, p. 302.

Meshing problem

According to classical utilitarianism, we should choose a society containing the maximum total good over societies containing less good. We also believe that we should choose a society with the most nearly equal distribution of good over other societies in which the good is distributed more unequally. The ideal, of course, is to combine the greatest possible total good with the most nearly equal distribution. But the world is not perfect, and we cannot necessarily realise this ideal. The meshing problem asks how we can mesh or harmonise the desire to maximise good and the desire to distribute good relatively equally. If one society possesses more good but distributes it less equally and another society possesses less good but distributes it more equally, which one should we choose? How can we assess the merits of each society, and how can we strike a balance between them? The meshing problem indicates that the principle of utility has the severe limitation of ignoring distributive justice.

"This 'meshing problem' of balancing the total amount of good at issue in a given putative distribution against the fairness of the distribution in cases where these two desiderata cut against one another is one which utilitarians (and non-utilitarians, for that matter) has never been resolved satisfactorily." —Rescher, *Distributive Justice*, 1966, p. 40.

Meta-epistemology

Meta-epistemology is the epistemology of epistemology. Normal epistemology can be called "substantive epistemology" which concerns the relation between knowledge and belief, between knowledge and truth and between knowledge and justification, and deals with inquires about the origin of knowledge, while meta-epistemology compares and evaluates all kinds of epistemology. It analyses basic epistemic concepts, determining their limits and the conditions of their application.

"Meta-epistemology is concerned with the basic concepts we employ in epistemology, concepts of knowledge, truth, belief, justification, rationality, and so on, and with the methods, procedures, and criteria to be employed in determining how to apply these concepts." —Alston, *Epistemic Justification*, 1989, p. 2.

"能人统治：一种围绕才能这一特定概念建立的社会秩序。"——丹尼尔森：《正义与辩护》，1996年，第302页。

协调上的问题

根据经典的功利主义，我们应选择包含最大的总体利益的社会，而不是包含较少利益的社会。我们还相信，我们应选择利益分配最为平等的社会，而不是利益分配更为不平等的社会。当然，理想的东西是将最大可能的总体利益与最为平等的分配结合起来。但世界是不完美的，我们必然无法实现这一理想。协调上的问题要我们回答，如何才能把要求最大利益与要求相对平等地分配利益协调或一致起来。如果一个社会拥有较多的利益而分配利益较少公平，另一个社会拥有较少的利益但分配利益更为公平，我们应选择哪一个呢？我们怎样才能确定每一社会的长处？我们怎样才能在他们之间取得平衡？这一协调上的问题表明功利原则有严重的忽视分配公正的局限性。

"争论中的‘协调上的问题’，即在两个迫切需要的东西相互排斥的情况下，在一既定的、公认是不公正的分配中平衡全部利益的问题，是功利主义者（及非功利主义者，就这一问题而言）从未做出令人满意的解决的问题。”——雷谢尔：《分配上的公正》，1966年，第40页。

元认识论

元认识论是关于认识论的认识论。规范的认识论可以称作“实质的认识论”，它关心的是知识与信念、真理、辨明的关系，研究知识的起源，而元认识论则是比较和评价所有的认识论。它分析基本的认识概念，确定它们的基本范围以及适用的条件。

"元认识论关心的是我们在认识论中运用的基本概念，如知识、真理、信念、阐明、合理性等等概念，以及用于确定如何运用这些概念的方法、步骤和标准。"——阿尔斯通：《认知辩明》，1989年，第2页。

Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics is usually said to deal with ethics itself, in contrast to normative ethics which deals with substantive ethical questions. The major components of meta-ethics include the study of the nature of ethics, the conceptual analysis of key moral terms and inquiry into the method for answering moral questions. The purpose of the study of the nature of ethics is to discuss what ethics is and does and to discuss the objectivity and validity of ethical claims themselves. The purpose of conceptual analysis is to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of major moral concepts. The purpose of the inquiry into method is to specify the ways to answer moral questions from a moral point of view. Meta-ethics is, then, a logical and epistemological inquiry concerning the nature of normative ethical statements.

The distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics appeared with the development of linguistic philosophy in this century and was deeply influenced by Moore's distinction between saying what goodness is and saying what things are good. Ayer and Stevenson explicitly drew upon this distinction. Many analytical philosophers believed that meta-ethics should be the main concern of ethics, and this claim became one of the main characteristics of the development of ethics in English-speaking countries in this century. However, this distinction itself has become more and more problematic. Recent moral philosophers view meta-ethical judgements and normative judgements as interdependent and many judgements are hard to classify according to this distinction.

"Twenty or thirty years ago, it was standard practice to distinguish 'ethical' from 'meta-ethical' theories. The first made substantive claims about what one should do, how one should live, what was worthwhile, and so on. The second concerned itself with the status of those claims; whether they could be knowledge, how they could be validated, whether they were (and in what sense) objective, and so on." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 72.

Metalanguage

Tarski drew a distinction between object language and metalanguage. The object language is that with which we talk about extra-linguistic things and objects (the language in which we speak), while the metalanguage is the language in which we talk about the object language (the language about which we speak). An example of an object language statement is "New York is a large city" and an example of the latter is " 'That New York is a large city' is true". Tarski argued that the definition of truth must be relative to a language, for the one and the same sentence may be true in

元伦理学

与研究实质性伦理问题的规范伦理学不同,元伦理学一般被认为是研究伦理学本身的。元伦理学主要成分包括对伦理学性质的研究,对于关键性的道德词汇进行概念分析,以及对于回答道德问题的方法的研究。对于伦理学性质的研究在于讨论伦理学是什么和做什么,讨论伦理主张本身的客观性和正当性。概念分析的目的在于说明运用主要的道德概念的有效性和充分条件。关于方法探求的目的在于说明以何种方式从道德观念上回答道德问题。因此,元伦理学是一种对于规范伦理学陈述性质的一种逻辑的和认识论的研究。

元伦理学和规范伦理学区分的出现是 20 世纪语言哲学发展的结果。这一区分深受摩尔对于说善是什么和说什么是善的区分的影响。艾耶尔和 C. L. 斯蒂文森明确地划分了元伦理学与规范伦理学。长期以来,许多分析哲学家相信,元伦理学应是伦理学的主要内容,这种主张成为 20 世纪英语国家伦理学发展的主要特征之一。不过,这种区分本身越来越成问题。最近以来的哲学家把元伦理的判断和规范伦理的判断看成是相互依赖的,许多判断很难以此类分。

"20 或 30 年前,将 '伦理的' 从 '元伦理理论' 中区分出来是一般的做法。伦理学对一个人应做什么,应该怎样生活,什么是值得的等提出实质性的主张;元伦理则涉及到这些主张本身的地位,即它们是否能是知识,它们何以能是有效的,它们是否是(和在什么意义上是)客观的等。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985 年,第 72 页。

元语言

塔斯基在“对象语言”和“元语言”之间作出了区分。对象语言是我们用以谈论语言之外的事物和对象的语言(我们在其中说的那个语言),而元语言则是我们在其中谈论对象语言(我们所谈说的那个语言)的语言。前者的例子是“纽约是一座大城市”,后者的例子是“‘纽约是一座大城市’是真的”。塔斯基论证说,真定义必须是相对于某个语言而言的,因为同一个句子可以在一语言内为真,但在另一语言内为假。对象语言是相对于它而定义真的语言,元

one language but false in another. The object language is the language for which truth is defined, and the metalanguage is the language in which we construct the definition of truth in the object language. Truth is in this way viewed as a semantic property of object language sentences and a predicate of a metalanguage applicable to sentences of its object language. A metalanguage contains either the object sentence itself or a translation of it. The appeal to metalanguage can avoid the danger of semantic paradoxes, for in a metalanguage the object sentences are not used but only mentioned and discussed. This distinction is significant for formal semantics.

"The names of the expressions of the first language, and of the relations between them, belong to the second language, called metalanguage." —Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, 1983, 2nd ed., p. 167.

Metalogic

Motivated by Hilbert's distinction in mathematics between meaningful inference and formalised calculus, metalogic takes the systems of formal logic as its subject matter. It is therefore the theory of logic. It is the result of the combination of Boole's formalism and Frege's theory of proof. The first system of metalogic was developed by Tarski. It differs from formal logic in that it is not concerned with meaningful inference, but only with purely formal questions arising from formal logical systems, that is formal properties of formal logic systems such as consistency, consequence, completeness, decision procedure, deduction, categorialness and satisfaction. It differs from the philosophy of logic because it deals with the conditions under which various formal theories possess these properties, rather than with the philosophical issues raised by logic systems.

"Metalogic is the study of formal properties of formal logical systems." S. Haack, *Philosophy of Logics*, 1978, p. 1.

Metaphilosophy

A term introduced by Lazerowitz for the philosophical discussion of philosophy itself, including, for example, its nature, method, goals, autonomy and objectivity. Hence it is second-order philosophy. According to the first-order branch of philosophy under discussion, such as metaphysics, epistemology or ethics, we can also divide metaphilosophy into metametaphysics (meta-ontology), meta-epistemology, and meta-ethics. The division between first-order and second-order studies has lost some of its popularity, and philosophers now find it more difficult to draw a sharp distinction between metaphilosophy and philosophy. For those who believe that philosophy comes to an end, metaphilosophy refers to the theoretical activities after the

语言则是我们在其中用对象语言构造真定义的那个语言。这样一来,真被视为对象语言句子的语义性质,并且是一个适用于其对象语言句子的元语言谓词。元语言或者包含对象句子本身,或者包含该句子的译文。诉诸元语言可以避免语义悖论的危险,因为在元语言中对象句子不被使用,仅被提及和讨论。这一区分对于形式语义学是意义重大的。

"第一语言的表达式的名称,以及这些表达式之间关系的名称,都属于第二语言,后者叫做元语言。"——塔斯基:《逻辑、语义学与元数学》,1983年,第2版,第167页。

元逻辑

受希尔伯特在数学中区分有意义的推理和形式化演算的启发,元逻辑以形式逻辑系统作为它的研究对象,所以它是关于逻辑的理论。它是布尔的形式主义和弗雷格的证明理论相结合的产物,第一个元逻辑系统是由塔斯基提出的。它区别于形式逻辑之处在于:它并不关注有意义的推理,而只关注从形式逻辑系统中产生的纯形式问题,即形式逻辑系统的形式性质,如相容性,后承,完全性,判定程序,演绎,范畴性,满足等等,它区别于逻辑哲学之处在于:它讨论各种形式理论具有上述性质的条件,而不是处理由逻辑系统所提出的哲学问题。

"元逻辑是对于形式逻辑系统的形式性质的研究。"——哈克:《逻辑哲学》,1978年,第1页。

元哲学

拉泽诺维茨引入的哲学术语,旨在对哲学自身作哲学讨论,包括(例如)哲学的性质、方法、目标、自主性和客观性。因此它是二阶哲学。根据所讨论的哲学的一阶分支,诸如形而上学、认识论或伦理学,我们也可以把元哲学划分为元形而上学(元本体论)、元认识论和元伦理学。一阶和二阶研究之间的划分已经不再流行,哲学家们现在发现要在元哲学和哲学之间作出明晰区分是更为困难了。对于那些认为哲学已告终结的人来说,元哲学指在哲学消亡之后的理论活动。

"我们必须承认在哲学和元哲学方面的区分:发挥和捍卫哲学见解的人与批判性地考察

death of philosophy.

"We must recognize the distinction between the philosophic and meta-philosophic perspectives: there is a difference between the one who develops and defends a philosophical position and the one who examines that position critically." —Yolton, *Metaphysical Analysis*, 1968, p. 19.

Metaphor

[from Greek: *metaphora*, a transfer, a change] A figure of speech or a verbal composition in which an expression is used to denote a thing to which its literal sense does not apply. For example, "a baby is a flower" is a metaphor because "flower", taken literally, does not describe a baby. If there were only literal meaning, all metaphors would be false. The best metaphors evoke a complex and productive mental response through indicating certain likenesses between what an expression literally denotes and the thing it metaphorically describes. The power of metaphors can also involve dissimilarities as well as likenesses. Starting from Aristotle, the nature and scope of metaphor has been of interest to philosophers. This interest has intensified in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Major issues concerning metaphor include: can a metaphor itself be literally paraphrased? How clear-cut is the distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning? Traditionally metaphor is regarded as a decoration of speech which does not contribute to the cognitive meaning of discourse. Others argue that metaphor contributes indispensably to the cognitive meaning of discourse, but there is no agreement over the kind of contribution it makes. Davidson claims that what is crucial to a metaphor is not a matter of meaning, but of use. In his view, a metaphor lacks meaning peculiar to itself other than literal meaning. But Nietzsche claimed that the nature of language itself is metaphorical, for it works by means of transference from one kind of reality to another. This view that has been widely adopted by continental philosophers, who regard metaphor not merely as a rhetorical device or an aspect of the expressive function of language, but as one of the essential conditions of speech. They claim that as the way in which many kinds of discourse are structured, metaphor powerfully influences how we conceive things.

"The study of metaphor is becoming important as it is being realised that language does not simply reflect reality but helps to constitute it." —Sarup, *A Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-Modernism*, 1993, p. 47.

Metaphysica generalis

General metaphysics, in contrast to *metaphysica specialis*, special or particular metaphysics. The distinction

那种见解的人之间是有区别的。”——尤尔顿：*《形而上学分析》*，1968年，第19页。

隐喻

[源自希腊词 *metaphora*，意指“转换”、“变化”] 一种修辞格或文字组合法，用于指某种与其字面意思不符的表达式。譬如，“婴儿是朵花”是个隐喻，因为“花”从字面意思上看并非是描写婴儿的。如果只有字面意思，那么所有隐喻就成为虚假的了。最上乘的隐喻是通过表明某一词汇的字面意思与其所暗示的事物之间的相似性，来唤起一种复合词意的和构成新词意的内心反应。隐喻的作用也能涉及到相异和相像。从亚里士多德开始，隐喻的本质与范围一直倍受哲学家们的关注。当代心的哲学和语言哲学强化了对隐喻的关注。关于隐喻的主要问题包括：隐喻本身能从字面上得到意释吗？字面含义与隐喻含义的区别到底会有多么明确呢？在传统意义上，隐喻被视为一种言语修饰，它对话语的认知意义并不起什么作用。其他一些人则争辩说，隐喻以不可或缺的方式有助于话语的认知意义，但是对隐喻的这种作用没有达成一致的看法。戴维森认为，对隐喻来讲，至关重要的并非是意义问题，而是使用问题。在他看来，隐喻并不具有不同于字面意义上的独特意义。可是，尼采则认为，语言自身的性质就是隐喻性的，因为语言是通过将一种现实转换为另一种现实而发挥作用的。这一观点得到欧洲大陆哲学家的广泛认同，他们把隐喻不仅看作一种修辞手段或语言表达功能的一个方面，而且将其看作言语的基本条件之一。他们还认为隐喻作为各种话语构成的一种方式，对人们如何感知或理解事物具有重大的影响。

“隐喻研究日益重要，因为人们正在认识到语言不仅反映而且有助于构成隐喻。”——萨罗波：*《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》*，1993年，第47页。

一般形而上学

一般形而上学，相比较于特殊形而上学而言。这一区分可溯至亚里士多德的形而上学。亚

can be traced back to Aristotle's metaphysics. Aristotle himself referred to metaphysics as first philosophy or *sophia* (wisdom), that is the science of ultimate causes and principles. Sometimes he said that metaphysics is the science of being *qua* being and that such an enquiry provides a starting point for all other sciences. Elsewhere he held that metaphysics is concerned with a special kind of being which is beyond the sensible substances, namely God, and that it is therefore theology. The medieval philosophers called these two accounts of metaphysics respectively *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*. Aristotle believed that these two accounts of metaphysics are reconcilable, but did not offer any convincing argument for that conclusion. The problem of dealing with these two accounts has given rise to major debate in Aristotelian scholarship and greatly affects our understanding of his metaphysics. The distinction was retained in the later development of metaphysics, but the meaning varied. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, general metaphysics was identified with ontology, which was concerned with general concepts, while special metaphysics was identified with natural theology. For Wolff, general metaphysics concerned *ens qua ens* (being *qua* being), and special metaphysics concerned substance and its attributes. Brentano distinguished between broad ontology and narrow ontology. The former amounts to general metaphysics, discussing the general nature of things, and the latter amounts to special metaphysics, with theology as its subject-matter.

"What is important... is the conception of an inquiry into being in general—general ontology, or what medieval philosophers called *metaphysica generalis*, as opposed to *metaphysica specialis*." —Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, 1984, p. 2.

Metaphysica specialis, see *metaphysica generalis*

Metaphysical deduction

Part of the transcendental analytic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, although its official title is "the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding". The metaphysical deduction is concerned with uncovering the origin of the categories and identifying them systematically, in contrast to the transcendental deduction which is concerned with establishing the legitimacy of these categories. Knowledge must be derived from what is given in sensible intuition and the judgements we make on that basis. Taken together, these two determinations indicate that our intuition of things must conform to the logical functions of judgement. The categories are or stem from these logical functions of judgement. Kant therefore derived twelve categories or pure concepts of the understanding from what he regarded as the complete classification of the kinds of

里士多德自己把形而上学称作“第一哲学”或“智慧”，即关于终极原因与原则的科学。有时他把这一形而上学称作关于“作为是的是”的科学，并认为这一研究为其他科学提供了出发点。有时他又说形而上学探讨一类超越可感本体的特殊存在（即神），所以是神学。中世纪哲学家们把这两种形而上学分别叫做“一般形而上学”和“特殊形而上学”。亚里士多德相信它们是可以调和的，可却未能对此提供令人信服的论证。这在亚里士多德研究中引起了重大争论，极大地影响了我们对他的形而上学的理解。这一区分在形而上学的后来发展中得到了保存，但意义却有了变化。在17和18世纪，一般形而上学等同于本体论，关注一般概念；而特殊形而上学却等同于自然神学。在沃尔夫哲学中，一般形而上学研究“作为是的是”，而特殊形而上学则研究本体及其属性。布伦塔诺区分了广义本体论和狭义本体论。前者相当于一般形而上学，讨论事物的一般性质，而后者相当于特殊形而上学，以神学作为其主题。

“真正重要的是对一般存在的探究这一概念，即一般本体论；也即是中世纪哲学家们所称为的与特殊形而上学相对的一般形而上学。”——哈姆林：《形而上学》，1984年，第2页。

特殊形而上学

见“一般形而上学”条。

形而上学演绎

康德《纯粹理性批判》中先验分析论中的一部分，尽管其正式题目为：“发现一切纯粹知性概念之思路。”它论及对范畴本源的揭示和对它们的系统辨明。形而上学演绎相对于论及确立这些范畴的合法性的先验演绎。知识必须来源于感性直观中所给予的东西和我们以此为基础而作出的判断。这两个规定一起表明：我们对事物的直观必须遵照判断的逻辑功能。范畴来源于或简直就是判断的这种逻辑功能。因此康德把十二个范畴或纯粹知性概念从他视为各种判断的完满分类体系中推导出来。只有将某一范畴应用于经验，我们才能作出判断。这种推导就是他对范畴的形而上学演绎。它表明，在判断中存在着思维的基本结构，它对直观杂多的综合给予统一。批评家们可以接受范畴与判断的逻

judgements. Only by applying one of these categories to experience can we make a judgement. This derivation is his metaphysical deduction of the categories. It shows that there is a fundamental structure of thought in judgement which gives unity to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Critics might accept the relation of categories to the logical functions of judgement, but seek to revise his classification of kinds of judgement in line with modern developments of logic.

"In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B159.

Metaphysical entities

Also called *inferred entities*. The term that Russell uses to refer to such items as material objects, space and time, which are initially postulated as the ultimate constituents of reality, but which cannot be directly experienced and are instead known by inference. He also calls them unknown entities or inferred entities. In Russell's logical atomism, these entities can be eliminated and replaced by logical constructions, and we therefore need not include them among the real constituents of the world. In contrast, the class of entities which comprise the logical constructions are called known entities.

"By metaphysical entities I mean those things which are supposed to be part of the ultimate constituents of the world, but not to be the kind of thing that is ever empirically given." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VIII, p. 238.

Metaphysical exposition

Part of the transcendental aesthetic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of space contains four arguments: (1) "space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences"; (2) "space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions"; (3) "space is not a discursive, ... but a pure intuition"; and (4) "space is represented as an infinite given magnitude". The first two argue claim that space is a priori, and the latter two claim that space is an intuition. The metaphysical exposition of the concept of time makes similar points about time.

"The exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B38.

Metaphysical subject

The Cartesian self and related versions of the "philosophical 'I'", classically a separate, simple thinking substance, tracing a subjective path through the world and

辑功能的联系,但力图依据现代逻辑的发展来修订他对判断的分类。

"在形而上学演绎中,通过范畴与思维的一般逻辑功能的完全一致,已证明了范畴的先天起源。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B159。

形而上学实体

也叫“推论出的实体”。罗素用这个词来指称诸如物质对象、空间和时间这样的东西,这些东西本来被规定为实在的最终组成部分,但不能被直接经验到,而是由推论而为人所知。他也将它们称为未知实体或推论出来的实体。在罗素的逻辑原子论中,这些实体可以被消除,并由逻辑构造来取代。因此我们无需将其纳入世界的真正组成部分之中。相反,由逻辑构造组成的那类实体称为“已知实体”。

"所谓形而上学实体,我指的是这样的东西,它们被认为是世界的最终成分的一部分,但不是经验中所予的东西。"——罗素:《罗素文集》,第八卷,第238页。

形而上学阐明

康德的《纯粹理性批判》中先验感性论的一部分。空间概念的形而上学阐明由四个论证组成:(1)“空间不是从外部经验得来的经验概念”; (2)“空间是作为一切外部直观根基的必然的先天表象”; (3)“空间不是论证性的,而是纯直观”; (4)“空间被表象为一种无限给予的量”。前两个论证说明这个主张:空间是先天的,后两个论证说明:空间是一种直观。时间概念的形而上学阐明与空间概念的形而上学阐明相类似。

"当阐明包含把概念展示为先天给予的东西,它就是形而上学阐明。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B38。

形而上学主体

笛卡尔的自我,与“哲学上的‘我’”相关的说法,按经典的表达就是一种分离的、简单的思维主体,它通过世界回溯到主观道路,可以在

capable of surviving bodily death. Hume's discussion of personal identity and Kant's rejection of the main aspects of the rational theory of the soul does much to undermine such positions. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, the "I think" which accompanies all of my representations, provides a more austere grounds for an account of the metaphysical subject. Contemporary philosophers have also raised questions about the metaphysical self. Heidegger's *Being and Time* is an attempt to replace the traditional notion of the self as part of his rejection of metaphysics. Wittgenstein, like Kant, rejects the view that the metaphysical subject is one object among others in the world and links his discussion of the self to his assessment of solipsism and the claim that the world is my world.

"The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world." —Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, 2 September 1916.

Metaphysics

A term originally used as the title of a compilation of Aristotle's writings, according to tradition by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century AD. The title *Ta meta ta phusika* was used because the compilation came after (*meta*) the physical writings in the classification of Aristotle's works. This position, however, had a philosophical basis in its subject-matter, because Aristotle intended it to be an inquiry into objects which are prior to or higher than physical objects, giving reasons for what we instinctively believe. Hence this title can be applied to a whole branch of philosophy. Metaphysics now generally refers to the study of the most basic items or features of reality (ontology) or to the study of the most basic concepts used in an account of reality. (On some accounts, metaphysics deals primarily with non-sensible entities or with things outside the scope of scientific method, but other metaphysical views reject these claims.

Aristotle himself referred to this kind of investigation as first philosophy or *sophia* (wisdom), that is the science of ultimate causes and principles. He sometimes said that it is the science of being *qua* being, or what it is simply to be. Sometimes, he identified it with theology because it is concerned with a special kind of being, namely God, which is beyond the sensible substances. Medieval philosophers called these aspects of metaphysics respectively *metaphysica generalis* (general metaphysics) and *metaphysica specialis* (special or particular metaphysics).

In the rationalist tradition, metaphysics was seen to be an inquiry conducted by pure reason into the nature of an underlying reality which is beyond sense-perception, although major metaphysicians, such as Plato, Descartes,

身体死亡后继续存在。休谟对个人同一性的讨论以及康德对灵魂唯理论的主要方面的否认,都极大地打击了这些见解。康德的统觉的先验统一性,即伴随着我的全部表象的“我思”,提供了更可靠的理由来对形而上学主体加以说明。当代哲学家也对形而上学的自我提出质疑。海德格尔的“此在”是一种努力,作为他拒斥形而上学的一部分,要取代传统的自我概念。维特根斯坦像康德一样,拒绝形而上学主体是世上各种对象之一一种的看法,并把他对自我的讨论与他对唯我论的评价相联系,主张世界就是我的世界。

“哲学上的我不是人类,不是人的身体或具有心理学性质的人的灵魂,而是形而上学的主体,世界的分界线(而不是一部分)。”——维特根斯坦:《笔记本 1914—1916》,1916年9月2日。

形而上学

传统认为,“形而上学”这一词最初是罗德岛的安德罗尼科在公元1世纪用来作亚里士多德一集作品的标题的。他之所以用 *ta meta ta phusika* (直译是“在物理学之后”)这一标题,是因为在他对亚里士多德作品的分类中,这集作品摆在关于物理学作品之后(*meta*)。不过,这样一个位置在其主题上有他的哲学基础,因为亚里士多德在这些作品中研究的乃是那先于或高于物理对象的事物,从而对我们在直观上相信的一切给出理由。因此,这一标题便能应用于整个哲学分支。现在,形而上学一般是指对实在的最基本的成分或特征的研究(本体论),或者对我们在叙述实在时所用的最基本概念的研究。按照某些用法,形而上学主要讨论不可感的事物,或者科学方法范围之外的事物,但其他的形而上学观点则反对这些说法。

亚里士多德自己把这类研究称作“第一哲学”或 *sophia* (智慧),即关于终极原因和原则的科学。有时他称之为“作为是的是”的科学(即什么是“是”的科学),有时他又将之等同于神学,因为它讨论一类特殊的是(存在),即超越可感本体的神。中世纪哲学家把形而上学的这些不同方面分别叫做“一般形而上学”和“特殊形而上学”(或具体形而上学)。

在理性主义传统中,形而上学被看做是由纯理性所操作的对超越感官知觉的内在实在性质的研究,虽然主要的形而上学家,如柏拉图、笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨和黑格尔,对内在实在是什么具有完全不同的见解。C. 沃尔夫把形而上学分成四部分:本体论(关于是或存在的一般理论)、理性神学(关于上帝)、理性心理学

Spinoza, Leibniz and Hegel disagreed sharply over what the underlying reality might be. Christian Wolff divided metaphysics into four parts: ontology (a general theory of being or existence), rational theology (about God), rational psychology (about the soul) and rational cosmology (about the world).

Kant labelled all attempts to use pure reason to account for a transcendent reality beyond human understanding as speculative metaphysics. Kant thought that metaphysics is a necessary propensity of the human mind towards total explanation and that its transcendent subject-matter (God, Freedom of the Will and Immortality) can be the grounds for the right way to act (metaphysics of morals), even though speculative metaphysics cannot yield knowledge. Kant's critical philosophy is a metaphysics in another sense, which deals with the conditions for the possibility of experience and the presuppositions of science.

Carnap and other logical positivists defined metaphysics as the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of empirical sciences and believed that this field should be eliminated as nonsensical. On the other hand, they considered that their own work was restricted to logic and experience and should be called scientific philosophy.

For different motives, Heidegger and Derrida also sought to exclude metaphysics from their thought although they did not satisfy themselves that they succeeded.

Strawson drew a famous distinction between revisionary metaphysics and descriptive metaphysics. He called speculative metaphysicians revisionary, in contrast to descriptive metaphysics, which is concerned with the conceptual scheme according to which we think and talk about the world. Accordingly, logical positivism and other anti-metaphysical philosophies are themselves a kind of metaphysics insofar as they deal with the conceptual structure of human language and thought.

In a special use associated with Marxism, metaphysics is considered to be a partial, stationary and isolated way of thinking opposed to Hegelian dialectics.

"Metaphysics is for us the name of a science, and has been for many centuries, because for many centuries it has been found necessary, and still is found necessary, to think in a systematic or orderly fashion about the subjects that Aristotle discussed in the group of treatises collectively known by that science." —Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, 1940, p. 4.

Metaphysics (Kant)

In a positive sense, metaphysics for Kant is the system of knowledge arising out of pure reason, that is knowledge which is attained *a priori* and involves only *a priori* concepts. It is divided into a speculative part, the

(关于灵魂) 以及理性宇宙论 (关于世界)。

康德把一切力图以纯理性来叙述超越人类理智的超验实在的努力都归作思辨的形而上学。他认为,形而上学乃是人类心灵寻求整体解释的一种必然倾向。虽然思辨的形而上学不能产生知识,它的超验主题(上帝,自由意志和灵魂不朽)可以作为正当行为的根据("道德形而上学")。康德的批判哲学是另一意义上的形而上学,它研究经验可能性及科学设定的条件。

卡尔纳普及其他逻辑实证主义者把形而上学看做是声称对超越经验科学领域的事物的本质具有知识的领域。他们认为,这一领域应作为无意义的东西而加以清除。另一方面,他们又主张他们自己的工作限制在逻辑和经验之内,应称作科学哲学。

出于不同的目的,海德格尔和德里达也试图从他们的思想中排除形而上学,尽管他们对自己的工作并不感到满意。

斯特劳森提出了"修正的形而上学"和"描述的形而上学"这一著名区分。他把思辨的形而上学称作是修正性的,而与之相对立的描述的形而上学则讨论我们据以思考和谈论世界的概念构架。据此,逻辑实证主义和其他反形而上学的哲学也都是一形而上学,因为它们讨论人类语言和思想的概念结构。

在一种与马克思主义有关的专门的意义上,形而上学被看做是一种片面的、静止的和孤立的思维方式,与黑格尔的辩证法相对立。

"形而上学对我们来说是一门科学,已经存在许多世纪了。因为许多世纪以来人们一直觉得有必要,现在仍觉得有必要,以系统的或有序的方式来思考亚里士多德在以那门科学命名的一组论著中所讨论的主题。"——柯林伍德:《论形而上学》,1940年,第4页。

形而上学 (康德)

在其正面意义中,对康德来说,形而上学是产生于纯粹理性的知识体系,即先天地获得的和只涉及先天概念的知识。它划分为思辨的部分(即自然形而上学)和实践的部分(即道德形

metaphysics of nature, and a practical part, the metaphysics of morals. In a strict sense, metaphysics is confined to the metaphysics of nature, but in a wider sense, metaphysics also includes the metaphysics of morals and criticism, that is the investigation of the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure *a priori* knowledge and is propaedeutic. Metaphysics in this wide sense is the same as the philosophy of pure reason.

The metaphysics of nature discusses the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts and employed in the theoretical knowledge of all things. It is further divided into transcendental philosophy, which deals with understanding and reason without taking into account the objects given, and the physiology of pure reason, that is the rational physiology of objects that can be given in experience. The latter is divided into transcendent and immanent parts. The metaphysics of morals, also called morals proper, deals with the *a priori* principles of morality, that is the principles that determine and make necessary all of our actions.

In both the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, there is a transcendental analytic, which concerns the legitimate application of their *a priori* principles within the limits of experience, and a transcendental dialectic, which exposes the fallacies in traditional metaphysics arising when pure reason applies these principles to things in themselves beyond experience. The *Critique of Pure Reason* reveals in detail the illusions or errors of traditional metaphysics, especially of rational cosmology, rational psychology and rational theology. This represents both sides of Kant's attitude toward metaphysics. He scorns the claim of traditional metaphysics to be the queen of the sciences, but believes that the metaphysics of his critical philosophy can inquire into the properties of things and show the limits of human reason. Hence, rather than being totally demolished, metaphysics needed redefinition or reconstruction.

"The title 'metaphysics' may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type—in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason."
— Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A841/B869.

Metaphysics of morals, see metaphysics (Kant)

Metaphysics of nature, see metaphysics (Kant)

而上学)。在其严格意义上,形而上学只是指自然形而上学。但在广义上,形而上学也包括道德形而上学和“批判”的东西,即对与一切纯粹先天知识有关的理性官能的研究,并且是预备性的研究。广义的形而上学就是关于纯粹理性哲学。

自然形而上学探究那种从纯概念推导的、并且应用于一切事物的理论知识的纯粹理性原理。它进一步划分为先验哲学和纯粹理性自然学,前者只论及知性和理性而不考虑给予的对象,后者是能在经验中给予对象的理性自然学。理性自然学又进而分为超验的和内在的部分。道德形而上学也称为“严格意义的道德”;它论及道德的先天原理,即决定我们的一切行为并使它们成为必然的原理。

在自然形而上学和道德形而上学中,有先验分析论,它涉及把这些先天的原理合法地应用到经验的界限内;还有先验辩证论,它揭示由于纯粹理性超越经验而把这些原理应用于物自身所产生的传统形而上学的谬误。《纯粹理性批判》详细地揭露了传统形而上学,特别是理性宇宙学、理性心理学和理性神学的幻象和谬误。这表现了康德对待形而上学的两方面态度。一方面,他槟斥把形而上学作为科学之王后的主张。另一方面,他相信他的批判哲学的形而上学能探究事物的性质,并能表明人类理性的界限。因此形而上学不能全部推翻,但需要重新规定或重构。

“然而,‘形而上学’之名称,也可加于纯粹哲学之全体,包括批判在内,因此也包括一切能先天认识的东西之探究,以及构成此类知识的纯粹哲学方式体系之阐明——这样与理性的一切经验的和数学的应用相区别。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A841/B869。

道德形而上学

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

自然形而上学

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

Metaphysics of presence. see presence

Metempsychosis. see transmigration of soul; reincarnation

Methexis. Greek term for participation

Method

A combination of rules, assumptions, procedures and examples determining the scope and limits of a subject and establishing acceptable ways of working within those limits to achieve truth. The question of philosophical method is itself a matter for philosophy and constitutes a major example of the reflective nature of the subject. Philosophers disagree about the appropriate philosophical method. The identifying mark of a philosophical school or movement lies mainly in the method it adopts. Ancient philosophy was developed according to various interpretations of dialectic method, and modern philosophy was initiated by Descartes' method of doubt. Analytic philosophy is characterised by linguistic method, while non-analytic European philosophy is characterised by phenomenological, historical and textual methods. Historically, philosophers have tried to model their work on the methods of successful sciences, such as mathematics, physics, biology, psychology and computer science, but the appropriate relationship between philosophical and scientific method is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers draw methodological implications from the claim that philosophy is a part of science or ancillary to science, while others derive their account of philosophical method from the claim that philosophy is prior to science and other disciplines and presupposed by them.

"By a 'method' I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one's mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly increase one's knowledge till one arrives at a true understanding of everything within one's capacity."—Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham, et al.), 1985, I, p. 16.

Method of agreement

The first of Mill's five inductive canons. Take two instances, A and B, of a given phenomenon. If we observe that the possible causes of A include c, d and e, and the possible causes for B include f, g and e, we eliminate c and d, which are peculiar to A, and f and g which are peculiar to B. There remains a common factor e for both A and B, and we may conclude that e is the cause or part of the cause of the phenomenon. The principle underlying this method is that whatever can be excluded without doing injustice to the

在场的形而上学

见“在场”条。

灵魂转生

见“灵魂轮回”、“再生”条。

分有

“分有 (participation)” 的希腊词。

方法

方法是决定一个主题的范围和界限,并确定在这些界限内可接受的获取真理的工作方式的准则、假定、程序和范例的组合。哲学方法问题本身也是一个哲学问题,并成为哲学的反思性质的一个主要特征。哲学家们对什么是合适的哲学方法并无一致意见。鉴别一个哲学学派或运动的标志,主要在于它所采用的方法。古代哲学的发展充满了对辩证法的不同解释。近代哲学始于笛卡尔的怀疑方法。分析哲学为其语言方法所表征,而非分析的欧洲哲学为其现象学方法、历史方法和本文方法所刻画。在历史上,哲学家曾尝试模仿成功科学的方法,例如数学、物理学、生物学、心理学和如今的计算机科学的方法,然而哲学方法与科学方法之间的适当关系是一个争论的话题。有些哲学家从哲学是科学的一部分或科学的辅助这一观点得出其方法论含义,而其他人则从哲学先于科学并为科学及其他学科所预设这一立场来发展其对哲学方法的叙述。

“我所说的‘方法’意思指可靠的规则,它们是易于应用的,并且如果人们严格地遵循它们,就绝不会把假的当做真的,或是无效地耗费人们的精神上的努力,而将逐步和不断地增加人们的知识,直至达到对人们能力范围内每一事物的真实理解。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等人译),1985年,第一卷,第16页。

契合法

密尔五条归纳规则的第一条。假定有一既定现象的两个事例A和B,如果观察到A的可能原因包括c、d、e,B的可能原因包括f、g、e,然后我们排除A特有的c、d,排除B特有的f、g,剩下了A和B的共同因子e,于是,我们可以得出结论:e是该现象的原因或部分原因。这个方法所根据的原理是:凡是对一现象可以并无不当加以排除的因素,就与该现象没有因果关系。我们通过这个方法所揭示的是被考

phenomenon has no causation with it. What we uncover through this method is a sufficient condition for the phenomenon under investigation.

"As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to ascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the method of agreement." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 390.

Method of concomitant variations

The fifth of Mill's five inductive canons states that if it is the case that when the phenomenon P changes, another phenomenon Q changes concomitantly, this sort of functional dependence between these two phenomena suggests that P must be a cause of Q, or Q of P, or both of them are the effect of the same cause. However, we need further methods to determine the exact relationship between P and Q.

"Method of concomitant variations... is regulated by the following canon: whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 401.

Method of difference

The second of Mill's five canons or inductive methods. Suppose a phenomenon P happens in circumstances A, but not in the circumstances B. A contains conditions c, d, e and f, and B contains conditions c, d and e. Since A and B differ only in condition f, and P occurs in A but not B, we may conclude that f is the cause of the phenomenon P. The principle underlying this method is that whatever cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon is the cause of the phenomenon. What we uncover through the method of difference is a necessary condition for a phenomenon.

"The canon which is the regulating principle of the method of difference may be expressed as follows: If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 392.

Method of elimination, another expression for induction by elimination

Method of residues

The fourth of Mill's five canons applies to cases in which a phenomenon P can be caused by any one of the conditions e, f, or g, and we wish to determine which condition is the cause. We already know through previous induction that

察现象的充足条件。

"这个方法是通过比较不同事例,确定它们在什么方面相同,所以我把它称作契合法。"——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第390页。

共变法

密尔五条归纳规则的第五条,表述为:现象P发生变化,另一现象Q伴随着变化,如果情况是这样,那么,这两个现象的这种相互作用就表明,P必定是Q的原因,或Q是P的原因,或两者都是同一个原因的结果。不过,我们需要进一步的方法来确定P和Q的确切关系。

"共变法……依据如下规则:凡是一现象以任何方式变化,这时都有另一现象以某种特定方式变化,那么,这个现象要么是另一个现象的原因,要么是另一个现象的结果,要么与另一个现象通过某个因果事实联系着。"——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第401页。

差异法

密尔的五规则或五条归纳规则的第二条。假定现象P在情形A下发生,但未在情形B下发生。A包含条件c、d、e、f, B包含条件c、d、e。因为A和B只在条件f上不同,而P发生于A而不是B,于是我们可以得出结论:f是现象P的原因。这个方法所根据的原理是,凡是不排除就不能制止现象发生的因素,就是该现象的原因。我们通过差异法所揭示的是现象的必要条件。

"作为差异法规范原理的规则,可以表述如下:如果一个被考察现象出现的事例,和一个被考察现象未出现的事例,除了只发生在前者的一个情况外,一切情况都相同,那么,两个事例惟一不一致的这个情况是该现象的结果,或原因,或原因的不可缺少的部分。"——《J.S. 密尔著作集》,第七卷,第392页。

淘汰法

"淘汰归纳法"的另一种表述。

剩余法

密尔五条归纳规则的第四条,适用于如下情况:如果一现象P可以被条件e、f、g中的任何一个所引起,而我们希望确定是哪一个。我们通过前面的归纳已知e、f都不是P的原因。那

neither *e* nor *f* is the cause of *P*. Then, the remaining condition *g*, which is the residue, might be the sufficient condition of *P*. Such a conclusion is inferred and needs to be proved by further observations.

"The canon of the method of residues is as follows; subtract from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedent." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 398.

Methodological collectivism

Also called methodological holism, a collective or holistic approach to social phenomena. In contrast to the assertion of methodological individualism that all explanations of social phenomena must be reduced to facts about individuals, methodological collectivism holds that collective phenomena are explanatorily prior to facts about individuals. Social wholes are much better known and more immediately accessible than the individuals that constitute them. Whilst we can learn much from the study of aspects of individual humans and their actions, the social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be defined by appeal to the features of its component individuals. Facts about society cannot be reduced to the decisions, attitudes and dispositions of the individuals. The social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of the description of individuals, for in most of their activities individuals behave in culturally sanctioned ways. Methodological collectivism was developed by Comte and Durkheim. Hegelians and Marxists are also generally regarded as methodological collectivists.

"[M]ethodological collectivism[is the]tendency to treat 'wholes' like 'society' or the 'economy', 'capitalism' (as a given historical 'phase') or a particular 'industry' or 'class' or 'country', as definitely given objects about which we can discover laws by observing their behaviours as wholes." —Hayek, in O' Neill, *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, 1973, p. 44.

Methodological holism, another expression for methodological collectivism

Methodological individualism

A kind of reductionism which believes that a social whole or structure is merely a logical construction out of its individual components or parts, and hence that statements about the social whole can be explained in terms of statements about the features or properties of the individuals. An explanation is sound only if it is couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals. No explanations that appeal to social structures, institutional factors and so

么剩下的条件 *g*, 即剩余者, 也许是 *P* 的充足条件。这样的结论是推断出来的, 需要进一步观察的证明。

"剩余法的规则如下: 从任何现象中去掉由以前归纳所知是某些前例的结果的部分, 该现象的剩余部分是剩下的前例的结果。" ——《J. S. 密尔著作集》, 第七卷, 第 398 页。

方法论的集体主义

也被称为方法论的整体主义, 一种研究社会现象的集体的或整体的方法。方法论的集体主义与方法论的个人主义不同, 后者断言, 所有对社会现象的解释都必须归结为关于个人的事实, 前者则认为, 社会的集体现象在解释上比有关个人的事实更重要。人们对社会整体的了解比对构成它们的个人的了解更多, 也更直接。虽然我们可以从对个人及他们行为方面的研究中了解到很多东西, 但社会整体有它自己的高级复杂的规律, 这些规律是不能通过求助其组成者的个人特征来解释的。有关社会的事实不能还原为个人的决定、态度和性情。社会整体是一个真实的整体, 是使个体的描述具有意义的基础, 因为在其绝大多数活动中, 个人是按文化上认可的方式行事的。方法论的集体主义是由孔德和杜克海姆提出的。黑格尔主义者和马克思主义者一般也被视为方法论的集体主义者。

"方法论的集体主义是这样一种倾向, 即把'社会', 或'经济', '资本主义' (作为既定的历史'阶段'), 或一特定的'工业', 或'阶级', 或'国家' 这些'整体' 作为明确的既定的对象来对待, 通过观察它们的作为整体的行为, 我们可以发现有关它们的规律。" ——海尼克, 载《个人主义的模式和集体主义的模式》(奥尼尔编辑), 1973 年, 第 44 页。

方法论的整体主义

"方法论的集体主义" 的另一种表述。

方法论的个人主义

一种还原论, 相信社会整体或社会结构仅仅是来自于它的个体成分或部分的逻辑构造, 因此关于社会整体的陈述能够依据对个体特性的陈述来解释。只有完全依据个人事实的解释才是正确的解释。那诉诸于社会结构、制度因素及诸如此类的任何解释都不具有合法性。这种观点可以追溯至霍布斯。他宣称, 在我们能够适当地理解一个组合物之前, 必须了解一个组合

on are legitimate. The position can be traced back to Hobbes who claimed that it is necessary to understand the constitutive parts out of which a compound is built before we can properly understand the compound itself. This methodology was further maintained by Comte, J. S. Mill, Max Weber and Karl Popper. All of them held that the basic elements in the explanation of historical and social progress are individual human beings. The beliefs, dispositions, and situations of the individuals are essential for understanding social phenomena. The theory is opposed to methodological holism, which holds that a social whole has its own sophisticated and complex laws that cannot be reduced to laws about its component individuals. On the contrary, a social whole is a real entity and is the basis for making sense of statements about its constituent individuals. The debate between methodological individualism and holism is prominent in sociology and the philosophy of social sciences.

"The doctrine of methodological individualism may therefore be viewed as implying the reducibility of the specific concepts and laws of the social sciences (in a broad sense, including group psychology, the theory of economic behaviour, and the like) to those of individual psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics." - Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, 1966, p. 110.

Methodological solipsism

A term introduced by Putnam in 1975 in relation to his claim that there are two types of mental state, wide and narrow. Narrow mental states, such as pain, do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. Wide mental states, such as being jealous of somebody, carry reference to the world outside the subject. Narrow mental content is intrinsic, while wide content refers to one's physical or social environment. Methodological solipsism is the doctrine that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states and that mental states should be individuated by reference to items internal to the individual whose mental states they are. We should explain the content of a propositional attitude solely by identifying it with events occurring inside the mind. There is no need to investigate the environmental causes or behavioural effects of the mental states or processes. The doctrine likens a mental process to the computing of a machine which is not fully determined by the physical elements. In a sense, both physicalism and functionalism carry the restriction of methodological solipsism forward to their physical account of the mental. Fodor takes it as a research strategy in cognitive psychology that psychological states are individuated without respect to their semantic evaluation. And he contrasts this strategy with his rendering of methodological individualism which tries to individuate psychological states by reference to

物得以构成的结构性部分。这个方法论得到孔德、J. S. 密尔、M. 韦伯和 K. 波普的进一步肯定。他们都相信,对于历史和社会进步的解释的基本要素,是个体的人类。个人的信念、气质和处境是理解社会现象的实质所在。相反的理论被称为“方法论的整体主义”。这种理论相信,社会整体有它自己成熟的和复杂的法则,这是不能还原为有关它的组成个体的法则的。相反,社会整体是一种真实的整体,是使个体的描述具有意义的基础。方法论的个人主义和整体主义的争论主要是在社会学和社会科学哲学中。

“因此,方法论个人主义的学说可以说隐含着把社会科学(更广义地说,包括群体心理学、经济行为理论以及类似的理论)的法则和专门的概念还原为个人心理学、生物学、化学和物理学的理论。” - 亨佩尔:《自然科学的哲学》,1966年,第110页。

方法论的唯我论

这一术语由普特南于1975年引进。他声称有两种心的状态:广义的和狭义的。“狭义的”心的状态,像疼痛,不预设任何具有这一心的状态的主体以外的个体的存在。“广义的”心的状态,像忌妒某人,对主体以外的世界有所指。狭义的心的内容是内在的,而广义的内容则指称一个人的物理或社会环境。方法论的唯我论是这样一学说,它认为心理学只应当关心狭义的心的状态或心理状态,而心的状态应当由具有这一心的状态的个体的内部东西来区分。我们只应当通过将命题态度同一为心的内部所发生的事件来解释命题态度的内容,无须探究这一心的状态或过程的环境原因或行为效应。这一学说将心的过程比作不完全由物理因素所决定的机器的计算。在某种意义上,物理主义和功能主义对心的东西的物理解释都受到方法论的唯我论的局限。福多把不借助于语义评价来区分心理状态作为认知心理学的一个研究策略。他将之与他对“方法论的个人主义”的反应相对立,后者试图借助于因果力来区分心理状态。但普特南反对方法论的唯我论这一限制性的纲领,其根据是,它与像信念、忌妒和后悔这样的通常的心的状态的存在不相容。

“当传统的哲学家谈论心理状态(或‘心的状态’)时,他们作了一个我们称为方法论的唯我论假定这样一个假定。这个假定认为,严格地

their causal powers. But Putnam objects to the restrictive programme of methodological solipsism on the grounds that it is incompatible with the existence of ordinary mental states such as belief, jealousy and regret.

“When traditional philosophers talked about psychological states (or ‘mental states’), they made an assumption which we may call the assumption of methodological solipsism. This assumption is the assumption that no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed.” —Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, p. 220.

Middle knowledge

[Latin: *scientia media*] A kind of knowledge that was first ascribed to God by the Spanish Theologian Luis de Molina, with the aim of reconciling the tension between God’s foreknowledge and human free will. According to this doctrine, God knows what free action a person would perform were a counterfactual condition actualised. He knows that P would freely do A were he in condition F. It is true that it is up to God to decide whether to instantiate the condition F, but before he makes his decision, the statement of what P would do in condition F has a true-value. Since this kind of knowledge falls between God’s knowledge of what is actual (*scientia visionis*, knowledge by intuition) and his knowledge of what is possible (*scientia simplicis intelligentia*, knowledge of simple understanding), it is called middle knowledge. This term was recently revived in this century by A. Plantinga in his approach to solving the problem of evil. It is also called counterfactuals of freedom.

“What they call middle knowledge is nothing but the knowledge of contingent possibles.” —Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 98.

Midwifery

In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates’ art of eliciting from others what was in their minds. In *Theaetetus*, Socrates said that his mother was a midwife, a job that was normally taken by women who were too old to conceive or bear children themselves. He then claimed that he himself virtually practised the art of midwifery in philosophy. He did not produce philosophical wisdom himself, but could elicit ideas from others and test these ideas for correctness. The characteristic of his midwifery was to be concerned with the soul rather the body, and the offspring were not real children but ideas which could be checked for truth and falsehood. The description of this method fits with Socrates’ practice in the earlier Platonic dialogues and has deeply influenced Western philosophy of education. Because the Greek term for midwifery is *maieutikos*, this method is also called the *maieutic method*.

说,任何心理状态都不预设具有该状态的主体以外的任何个体的存在。”——普特南:《心智、语言与实在》,1975年,第220页。

中间知识

[拉丁语是 *scientia media*] 这类知识首先被西班牙神学家L. 德·摩尼纳归于上帝,其目的是缓和上帝的预知和人的自由意志之间的紧张状态。按照这种学说,上帝知道如若实现一个反事实条件,人会采取什么自由行动。这就是说,他知道“P会自由地做A,如若他处于条件F中”。的确,决定是否例示条件F的权利在上帝,但在他作出决定前,“P在条件F中会做什么”的陈述就有真价值,既然这类知识处于上帝的现实东西知识(*scientia visionis*, 靠直觉的知识)和可能东西知识(*scientia simplicis intelligentia*, 单纯理解的知识)之间,就被称作“中间知识”。在本世纪,这个术语近来被A. 普兰汀格复活,用于解决恶的问题。它也被叫做“反事实自由”。

“他们所谓的中间知识,其实不过是偶然可能的知识。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第98页。

助产术

在柏拉图的对话中,苏格拉底用于把他人头脑中的想法诱导出来的技艺。在《泰阿泰德篇》中,苏格拉底说他的母亲是一个助产妇。这种工作通常是由年龄过大已不能自己生育孩子的妇女做的。他然后声称自己在哲学中也基本上在实施助产术。他自己并不产生哲学智慧,却能引导出他人的观点,并测试这些观点的正确性。他的助产术的特点是关涉灵魂而不是身体;所生出的不是真正的孩子,而是可检验其真假的观念。对这种方法的描绘与苏格拉底在早期柏拉图对话中的实践相符,对西方的教育哲学有重大影响。由于在希腊文中,助产术为 *maieutikos*, 故这方法也写作 *maieutic method*。

“上天制约我做一产妇,但又禁止我生育。”——柏拉图:《泰阿泰德篇》,150d。

"Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giving birth." —Plato, *Theaetetus*, 150d.

Mill's Canons

Also called Mill's methods, the five inductive laws formulated and generalised by Mill for discovering the causal relations among phenomena. (1) The Canon or Method of Agreement: "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances appear is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon" (2) The Canon or Method of Difference: "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon". (3) The Joint Canon or Method of Agreement and Difference: "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause". (4) The Canon or Method of Concomitant Variations: "Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation" (5) The Canon or Method of Residues: "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents".

"The classical exposition of the inductive method is as Mill's Canons." —Harré, *The Philosophy of Science*, 1972, p. 58.

Mill's methods, another expression for Mill's canons

Mimesis, Greek term for imitation

Mimetic theory, another expression for imitation theory

Mind

Descartes used the terms mind and soul interchangeably. For him, the mind is identical to self, person, the substance that thinks, believes, doubts, desires and acts. For others, like Hume, the mind is a set of

密尔规则

也称作“密尔方法”，由密尔系统提出并使之一般化的五条归纳法则，用以发现现象中的因果关系。(1) 求同规则（或契合法）：“如果所研究现象的两个或两个以上的事例只有一个共同的情况，这个所有事例仅在它中出现的情况就是给定现象的原因（或者结果）。”(2) 差异规则（或差异法）：“如果在一个事例中所研究的现象发生，而另一事例中它不发生，二者所有情况都相同，只有一点不同，这一点发生于前者中；这两个事例惟一不同之处，就是这个现象的结果或原因，或是原因中不可缺少的一部分。”(3) 同异并用规则（或契合差异并用法）：“如果两个或两个以上的事例中现象的发生仅有一个共同的情况，而在其他两个或两个以上现象不发生的事例中除缺少上述共同情况外没有共同情况，则两组事例相差异的这个惟一情况是这现象的结果或原因，或原因中不可缺少的一部分。”(4) 共变规则（或共变法）：“凡是一种现象，当别的现象发生某种特殊变化时，它也以任何方式变化，则它或者是那种现象的原因或结果，或者经由某种因果关系的事实与之相连接。”(5) 剩余规则（或剩余法）：“从任意现象中消去由先前的归纳已知为某些前项之结果的部分，现象中的剩余部分就是所余前项的结果。”

“归纳法的经典说明即如密尔规则。”——哈雷：《科学哲学》，1972年，第58页。

密尔方法

“密尔规则”的另一种表述。

模仿

“模仿 (imitation)” 的希腊词。

模仿说

“模仿说 (imitation theory)” 的另一种表述。

心

笛卡尔所使用的“灵魂”和“心”这两个术语是可以互换的。对于他来说，心同一于“自我”、“个人”以及思维、相信、怀疑、欲求和行为着的实体。对于像休谟等其他的人而言，“心”指

psychological states, and in this sense it is close to consciousness but contrasts to physical states. Different understandings of mind lead to different understandings of the mind-body problem. If one believes in a Cartesian mental substance, the mind-body problem involves the relationship between one's mind as a mental substance and one's body as a physical substance. If, on the other hand, one holds that minds are collections of psychological states, the problem is to explain the relation between one's psychological properties and one's physical properties. There has been renewed interest in the Aristotelian account of the mind that Descartes displaced. On this view, the mind or soul is the form of the body, although this position might have theoretical presuppositions that cannot be revived.

"The substance in which thought immediately resides is called mind. I use the term 'mind' rather than 'soul', since the word 'soul' is ambiguous and is often applied to something corporeal." — Descartes, *Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham, etc.), vol. II, p. 114.

Mind-body problem

Problems concerning the relationship between soul and body can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, but it is Descartes who gave the issue a central position in modern philosophy. He believed that mind has thinking as its essence and is an entity totally distinct from body or extended substance. This view is an expression of mind-body dualism. How, then, can a spatial body interact with a non-spatial mind? How can mental phenomena be both irreducibly psychological and somehow dependent on a mechanistic causal base, such as the brain or nervous system? Descartes' failure to provide a satisfactory account to the problem has led to many objections to his dualism and various alternative accounts of the relationship between mind and body or between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. This has become the central topic of the philosophy of mind. Of various theories developed, the most influential ones include: occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, psychophysical parallelism, idealism, dual aspect theory, panpsychism, behaviourism, identity-theory or central-state materialism, functionalism, and anomalous monism, all of which are discussed in separate dictionary entries. The mind-body problem continues to provoke important debate in current philosophy. Until recently, the discussion of this problem has been from the standpoint of mind, but some philosophers are taking our new scientific understanding of the workings of the brain and nervous system as a starting point for dealing with the question. If there is an adequate solution to the mind-body problem, it could lead to an integrated science of human nature. Other philosophers argue that there cannot be an adequate solution because raising the problem is a mistake based on misleading Cartesian assumptions. In some, they

一系列心理状态,在这个意义上,它与意识相近并与物理状态相对。对心的不同理解导致对“心身问题”的不同理解。如果一个人相信笛卡尔的心的实体,心身问题就包含着一个人作为心的实体的心和一个人作为物理实体的身之间的关系。另一方面,如果一个人相信心是心理状态的集合,问题就变成对一个人的心理特性和一个人的物理特性之间的关系的解释。现在人们恢复了对笛卡尔所取代的亚里士多德关于心的描述的兴趣。根据亚里士多德的观点,心或灵魂是身体的形式,尽管这种立场可能立足于一些不可能得到复兴的前提。

“思维所直接归属的实体叫做心。我使用‘心’而不是‘灵魂’这一术语是因为‘灵魂’一词意义含混且常被应用于身体的东西。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,第114页。

心身问题

关于灵魂与身体的关系问题可以追溯到柏拉图和亚里士多德,但将这一问题置于现代哲学之中心地位的是笛卡尔。他认为心的实质是思维,是与身或广延实体完全不同的存在物。这是心身二元论的一个表达。那么,一个广延的身体如何与一个非广延的心相互作用呢?心的现象如何可能既是不可还原的心理的东西又在某种意义上完全依赖于一个像大脑或神经系统这样的机械的因果基础?笛卡尔未能对这个问题给出令人满意的说明,这导致对其二元论的许多反驳以及关于心与身或心的现象与物理现象之关系的许多不同的描述。这成为心的哲学的中心议题。在所提出的各种理论中,最有影响的包括:“偶因论”、“附随现象论”、“心身平行论”、“唯心论”、“双面理论”、“泛心论”、“行为主义”、“同一论”或“中心状态唯物论”、“功能主义”、“变异一元论”,所有这些都在不同条目中分别讨论。心身问题依然在当今哲学中引起重要争论。迄今为止,对这一问题的讨论一直是从心的观点出发,而有的哲学家则以对脑及神经系统活动的新的科学理解为出发点来处理这一问题。如能彻底解决心身问题,就有可能导致关于人性的整体科学。而其他哲学家认为这一问题得不到彻底解决,因为问题的提出本身是一个错误,它建立在笛卡尔的错误假设上。有人也力图回到亚里士多德把心解释为身之形式这一观点上。

“关于心的现象世界与身的物理状态的关系问题通常被称为‘心身问题’。”——麦金:《心的特性》,1982年,第19页。

seek to return to an Aristotelian account of the mind or soul as the form of the body.

"The question as to the relation between mental phenomenal world and physical states of the body, specifically the brain, is generally referred to as 'the mind-body problem'." - McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 19.

Minimal theory of truth

One form of the deflationary theory of truth, proposed by Horwich. It holds that truth like existence is a logical property rather than a natural property. The truth predicate does not invoke meaning-like entities. Instead, it provides a device that enables us to formulate propositions that can be the objects of belief, desire and so on, in cases where the proposition of primary concern is inaccessible. The simplest way of introducing this device is to introduce a new predicate of being true.

"Because it contains no more than what is expressed by uncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema ' (E) It is true that "p" if and only if p', I shall call my theory of truth 'the minimal theory'." - Horwich, *Truth*, 1990, pp. 6-7.

Minimax rule, see maximin rule

Minimum sensible

A term introduced by Berkeley for the least number of our sense-impressions of extension required in order to reject the idea that extension is infinitely divisible. This is similar to what Locke calls the sensible point, that is the smallest particle of matter or space we can discern. Berkeley's argument is that all the objects of immediate perceptions are sense-impressions. There is nothing in a sense-impression but what is actually perceived in it, and I cannot be mistaken about my immediate sensations. The capacities of our senses are finite. Hence, sense-impressions are not infinitely divisible, but must be composed of a finite number of minimum sensibilia. There must be a minimum tangible or a minimum visible, beyond which sense cannot perceive. A minimum visible should be the same for all beings endowed with the faculty of vision. It does not include any parts and the ultimate component of any sensation is extension. Furthermore, since to be is to be perceived, the immediate objects of perceptions must also be composed of minimum sensibilia. Hence, the idea of the minimum sensible is closely related to Berkeley's immaterialism. For Berkeley, a minimum visible has no existence without the mind of the perceiver. The position encounters difficulties in meeting Zeno's paradoxes. It is also difficult to determine what we actually perceive.

真理最小理论

真理紧缩论的一种形式,由霍维奇提出。它认为,真像存在一样是逻辑性质而不是自然性质。真谓词并不引发意义之类的实体。相反,在至关重要的命题[概念]难以理喻之处,它提供了使我们能够把命题表述成为信念、意愿等等的对象的手段。引入这一手段的最简单的途径,就是引入“是真的”这一新谓词。

“因为它所包含的仅仅是由等值模式‘(E)“p”是真的当且仅当p’的无争议例证所表达的东西,我将把我的真理论称之为‘最小理论’。”——霍维奇:《真理》,1990年,第6-7页。

最小最大值规则

见“最大最小值规则”条。

最小可感体

巴克莱采用的术语,指我们最少的广延感觉印象,用来反驳广延无限可分的思想。这个术语类似于洛克所说的“可感觉的点”,即我们可察觉到的最小的物质颗粒或空间。巴克莱的论证如下:当下知觉的全部对象是感觉印象。在感觉印象中没有别的,只有在它之中实际感知到的东西,而且我对我的当下感觉不可能弄错。我们的感觉能力是有限的。因此,感觉印象不是无限可分的,必定是由有限数目的最小可感体组成的。最小的可触体或最小的可见体必定是存在的,感官无法感知超出它们之外的东西。最小的可见体对于一切具有视觉能力的存在物都是同样的。它不包含任何部分,任何感觉的最基本组成部分是广延。而且,既然存在就是被感知,知觉的当下对象必定也是由最小的可感体组成的。因此,最小可感体的思想与巴克莱的非物质论有密切关系。在巴克莱看来,最小的可见体没有感知者的心灵就不存在。这个观点在处理芝诺悖论时遇到不少困难。要确定“我们实际感知到了什么”也是困难的。

“经过彻底考察将发现,在任何情况下利用或设想有限线段的无限部分,或设想甚至比最小可感体更小的量,都是不必要的;不,显然我们决不那样做,因为那是不可能的。”——巴克

"Upon a thorough examination it will not be found, that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident that this is never done, it being impossible." —Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, I, p. 132.

Minimum vocabulary

For Russell, the words contained in a minimum vocabulary allow us to express every proposition in a given body of knowledge. No word in this vocabulary can be defined in terms of other words in it, but can only be mastered by acquaintance with the things. These words represent the hard core of experience by which our sentences are connected to the extra-linguistic world. For Russell such a vocabulary will reduce the number of entities one's language forces us to assume and so lessen the possibility of an unwarranted metaphysics of substance. The minimum vocabulary required for a given subject-matter diminishes with the development of the inquiry into that subject matter.

"I call a vocabulary a 'minimum' one if it contains no word which is capable of a verbal definition in terms of the other words of the vocabulary." —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 94.

Miracle

[from Latin: *miror*, wonder at] An extraordinary event whose occurrence does not conform with natural law, and which is deemed to have a supernatural cause, such as God. The Bible records many miracles, such as the waters of the Red Sea dividing for Moses and Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead. The miracles are used as sign of God's omnipotence. However, the nature and possibility of miracle has been a topic of debate. It is difficult to ascertain whether events of this kind occur. Even if extraordinary events do occur, we may provide a scientific explanation for them. Even if science cannot explain such events, we still do not need to posit a supernatural cause for them, for the explanatory gap might be due to the limitation of our present knowledge. Since the view that miracles are possible is sharply in conflict with science, it has been rejected by many religious thinkers.

"A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent." —Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sect. X, Part 1.

Mitigating circumstance, see excuse

Mitigation

The procedure of administering a less severe penalty for

罪:《人类知识原理》,第一章,第132页。

最低量词汇

对罗素而言,包含在最低量词汇中的语词可以使我们表达已知知识体系中的每个命题。这套词汇中的任何语词都无法用其中的其他语词来定义,而只能通过熟知事物来把握。这些语词代表了经验的硬核,由此,我们的语句与语言之外的世界相关联。对罗素来说,这套词汇将减少某人的语言强迫我们假设的实体数量,从而减低无保证的关于本体的形而上学的可能性。某一特定主题所要求的最低量词汇将随着对该主题研究的发展而减少。

"我把这样的词汇称为'最低量'词汇,如果它不包含可以由该词汇中其他语词来作字面定义的语词。"——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第94页。

奇迹

[源自拉丁语 *miror* (惊异)] 指其发生不合自然规律,且被认为有一超自然原因即上帝的非常事件。《圣经》记载着许多奇迹,譬如,为摩西和耶稣分开的红海之水使拉撒路重新复活。奇迹被当做上帝全能的标记。但是,奇迹的本性和可能性一直是争论的题目。很难确定这类事件是否发生。即使非常事件真的发生,我们也可以对它们提供一种科学的解释。即使科学不能解释这样的事件,我们也依然不需要为它们假定超自然的原因,因为解释的缺陷可能是由于我们现行知识的限制所致。由于奇迹可能的观点与科学尖锐冲突,所以,它已经被许多宗教思想家抛弃。

"奇迹可以被准确地界定为是神的特殊意志对自然规律的违背,或由于某个不可见的行为者的干预。"——休谟:《人类理智研究》,第十部,第一部分。

减责环境

见“藉口”条。

减刑

对已证明有罪的被告实施较轻惩罚的程

a convicted accused. In a criminal trial, before sentence is passed on someone convicted of a crime, a plea in mitigation can normally be presented by or on behalf of the accused, suggesting why the penalty should be moderated. This is usually done by citing evidence such as the abnormality of his mentality when he conducted the crime or by debating the effect of minimising the importance of other evidence or facts. Mitigation is different from justification, which proves that an action is in accordance with law, and excuse, which seeks to acquit the accused of responsibility for the action.

"Mitigation... presupposes that someone is convicted and liable to be punished and the question of the severity of his punishment is to be decided." — Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, 1968, p. 15.

Mixed hypothetical syllogism

A syllogism which has a conditional proposition as one premise, and a categorical proposition as another. Its conclusion is a categorical proposition. It has two correct forms of inference; the constructive hypothetical syllogism (also called *modus ponens*): "If p then q; p; therefore q", and the destructive hypothetical syllogism (also called *modus tollens*): "If p then q; not q, therefore, not p". It also has two incorrect forms of inference. In contrast to the constructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of affirming the consequent: "If p then q; q; then p". In contrast to the destructive hypothetical syllogism is the fallacy of denying the antecedent: "If p then q; not p; therefore not q". A mixed hypothetical syllogism contrasts with a pure hypothetical syllogism which has conditional propositions as both of its premises and also has a conditional proposition as its conclusion.

"A syllogism having one conditional premise and one categorical premise is called a mixed hypothetical syllogism." — Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, 7th ed., p. 252.

Mixed modes, see mode (Locke)

Mnemic causation

[from Greek, *mneme*, memory] A term employed by Russell, inspired by the psychologist Richard Semon, to express the relationship between a past event and the subsequent remembering of it. An animal's response to present impulse is determined not only by the present value of a stimulus but also by memories of past rewards and frustration. It is a kind of action at a distance by which experience produces subsequent memory-images, but it is argued that such a relation does not have to be causal.

"We find sometimes that, in mnemic causation, an image or word, as stimulus, has the same effect (or very nearly the same effect) as belongs to some object." —

序。在刑事审判中,在对某人确定有罪的判决宣布之前,通常可由被告或被告的代表提出减刑的请求,提出为什么对被告的惩罚应当减轻。这通常是通过引用诸如他在犯罪时精神反常这类证据,或通过使其他证据或事实的重要性降至最低的辩论进行的。减刑与无罪辩护不同,后者证明一种行为是依据法律的,而赦免则是试图宣判对这行为负有责任的被告无罪。

"减刑的前提条件是,某人被证明是有罪的并且应受到惩罚,但对他惩罚的严厉程度的问题还有待解决。"——哈特:《惩罚与责任》,1968年,第15页。

混合的假言三段论

一种以一条件命题作为一个前提,以一直言命题作为另一前提的三段论,其结论是一直言命题。它有两种正确的推理形式:构成式假言三段论(亦称肯定前件式):"如果p则q; p; 所以q。" 破坏式假言三段论(亦称否定后件式):"如果p则q; 非q; 所以非p。" 它也有两种不正确的推理形式。与构成式假言三段论相对的是肯定后件的谬误:"如果p则q; q; 所以p"; 与破坏式假言三段论相对的是否定前件式:"如果p则q; 非p; 所以非q"。混合的假言二段论与纯假言三段论形成对照,后者以条件命题作为它的两个前提,并且还以一条件命题作为它的结论。

"有一个条件前提和一个直言前提的三段论叫做混合的假言三段论。"——柯比:《逻辑导论》,1986年,第7版,第252页。

混合样式

见“样式(洛克)”条。

记忆因果关系

[源自希腊文: *mneme*, 指“记忆”] 罗素采用的术语,得自于心理学家R. 西蒙的启发,用以表示一个过去事件与随后关于它的记忆之间的关系。动物对于当下刺激的反应,不仅取决于当下的刺激值,也取决于对以往酬劳和挫折的记忆。它是经验借以产生随后的记忆映象的一种远距行为。但有人认为这样的关系并非必须是因果的。

"我们发现有时(在记忆因果关系中)一个映象或语词作为刺激,有着与属于某个对象的相同效果(或非常近于相同的效果)。"——罗素:《心的分析》,1921年,第209页。

Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1918, p. 209.

Modal epistemic logic, see epistemic modalities

Modal logic

A branch of logic which deals with the logical relationships between propositions containing modal terms such as necessarily or possibly. Its study originated with Aristotle and flourished in the medieval period. In this century it was revived by C. I. Lewis out of dissatisfaction with the account of material implication given by Frege and Russell. Lewis introduced two new operators to propositional and predicate calculus and used them to construct modal axiom systems. The operator *L* is symbolised as \Box and read as "It is necessary that...", and the operator *M* is symbolised as \Diamond and read as "It is possible that...". Important additional modal systems have been constructed, but the validity of the principles of inference in modal logic has been a matter of debate. Quine has been especially critical of modality. However, through the work of Kripke, D. Lewis and others, modal logic has been closely associated with possible world semantics and has become a central focus of work in contemporary logic.

"Modal logic is intended to represent arguments involving essentially the concepts of necessity and possibility." —Haack, *Philosophy of Logic*, 1978, p. 170.

Modal realism

A theory associated with the American philosopher David Lewis, claiming that different possible worlds exist and are as real as the actual world. These other worlds are unactualised possibilities. The inhabitants of possible worlds have their respective counterparts in our world. The only significant difference between the actual world and other possible worlds is that the actual world is the world that we inhabit and that is spatially and temporally related to us. Hence, to think in terms of logical possibilities is to think of different real worlds. Every way that a world could be is a way that some world is. Whenever such-and-such might be the case, there is some world in which such-and-such is the case.

This theory has been under attack. One criticism is that if possible worlds and the actual world have the same ontological status, then a possible world would be actual rather than possible. If this were true, we could not account for the difference between an event happening in our world and merely being a logical possibility. But Lewis argues that his theory can provide the most satisfactory interpretation of modal propositions. On his account, "it is possible that *p*" is true if and only if in some possible worlds, *p*; and "it is necessary that *p*" is true if and only if in every possible

模态认知逻辑

见“认知模态”条。

模态逻辑

一个逻辑分支,处理含模态词如“必然”或“可能”的命题之间的逻辑关系。模态逻辑研究起源于亚里士多德,在中世纪曾繁盛一时。在本世纪, C. I. 刘易斯由于不满意弗雷格和罗素给出的对实质蕴涵的说明,而使模态逻辑得到复兴。刘易斯把两个新的算子引入命题演算和谓词演算,并使用它们构造模态公理系统。算子“*L*”被符号化为 \Box ,读作“……是必然的”;算子“*M*”被符号化为 \Diamond ,读作“……是可能的”。已经构造出各种另外的模态系统,但关于模态逻辑中推理原则的有效性一直存在争论。奎因对模态提出了特殊的批评意见。不过,由于克里普克、D. 刘易斯和其他人的工作,模态逻辑已经与可能世界语义学紧密连在一起,并且已成为当代逻辑中最为核心的领域。

“模态逻辑旨在展示本质上包含必然性和可能性概念的论证。”——哈克:《逻辑哲学》,1978年,第170页。

模态实在论

与美国哲学家 D. 刘易斯相关联的一种理论,它断言:不同的可能世界存在着,并且像现实世界一样是实在的。这些另外的世界是未现实化的可能性。可能世界的居民在我们的世界中有它们各自的对应体。现实世界和其他可能世界之间惟一有意义的差别在于:现实世界是我们所居住的世界,是在空间上和时间上与我们相关联的世界。所以,根据逻辑可能性去思考就是思考不同的实在世界。一世界的每一种可能存在方式就是某个世界的实际存在方式。只要如此这般的情形可能发生,则存在某个世界,如此这般的情形在其中确实发生。

这一理论已经受到了攻击。批评之一是:如果可能世界和现实世界有同样的本体论地位,则可能世界将是现实的而不是可能的。如果这样的话,我们就不能说明在我们的世界中发生的一个事件和单纯的逻辑可能性之间的差别。但刘易斯争辩说,他的理论能够对模态命题提供最令人满意的解释。按他的说明,“*p* 是可能的”为真当且仅当在某个可能世界中 *p*; “*p* 是必然的”为真当且仅当在每个可能世界中 *p*。他还相信,模态实在论能够用于解释像因果性、条件句、命题态度的内容和存在量化等现象。

world, *p*. He also believes that modal realism can be used to explain phenomena such as causation, conditionals, the content of propositional attitudes and existential quantification.

"I advocate a thesis of the plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds that our world is but one world among many." -D. Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 1986, p. 2.

Modality

The ways or modes in which a proposition or statement is judged to be true or false. There are various classifications of modalities, such as epistemic modality [it is known (or unknown) that *p*]; deontic modality [it is obligatory (or permissible) that *p*]; temporal modality [it was (or is now or will be) *p*]. Of central concern to logic is logical or alethic modality [necessarily (or possibly) *p*]. Modal logic studies the logical relationships between statements of alethic modality. The doctrine of possible worlds has been developed to provide a semantics for modal logic and has stirred much recent debate in logic and metaphysics.

Modality can be distinguished into *de re* modality (in which a modal term modifies a predicate ascribed to a subject, such as "a is necessarily *f*") and *de dicto* modality (in which a modal term modifies a whole proposition, such as "it is necessary that *fa*").

"Another set of notions as to which philosophy has allowed itself to fall into hopeless confusions through not sufficiently separating propositions and propositional functions are the notions of 'modality': *necessary*, *possible*, and *impossible*. (Sometimes *contingent* or *assertoric* is used instead of *possible*)." -Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 165.

Modality *de dicto*

Modality *de dicto* attributes modal terms (necessary, possible) to describe a proposition (Latin: *dictum*), such as "it is necessary that *p*". This contrasts with modality *de re* which attributes modal terms to modify an object (Latin: *res*), such as "a is necessarily *f*". The distinction can be traced to Aristotle's *Prior Analytic*, I. 9, and is widely discussed together with essentialism because modality *de re* asserts of some object that it has some property essentially. This seems to support the recent revival of essentialism, but anti-essentialists or nominalists reject the claim that an object can necessarily possess a property and argue that all necessity is *de dicto*.

"An assertion *de dicto*, for example, 'necessarily nine is composite', predicates a modal property—in this instance necessary truth—of another dictum or proposition—'nine is composite'." -Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 1974, p. 9.

"我提倡世界多样性的论题，或模态实在论，它主张我们的世界只不过是众多世界中的一个。"——刘易斯：《论多样世界》，1986年，第2页。

模态

一命题或陈述被断定为真或为假的方式或样式。存在各种不同的模态分类：认知模态 [已知 (或未知) *p*]；道义模态 [*p* 是义务的 (或允许的)]；时间模态 [过去 (或现在或将来) *p*]。对于逻辑来说至关重要的是“逻辑模态”或“真势模态” (“必然 *p*” 或 “可能 *p*”)。模态逻辑研究真势模态的陈述之间的逻辑关系。为了给模态逻辑提供语义学，已经发展出可能世界的学说，后者近来在逻辑学和形而上学中引发了许多论战。

模态能够区分为“从物”模态 (其中模态词修饰从属于主词的谓词，例如 “a 必然是 *f*”) 和“从言”模态 (其中模态词修饰整个命题，例如 “必然 *fa*”)。

“此外尚有一组概念，关于这些概念的讨论由于没有把命题和命题函项完全区分开，哲学已使自身陷入无望的混乱之中。这组概念就是‘模态’的概念：“必然”、“可能”和“不可能” (有时偶然或实然被用来代替可能)。”——罗素：《数理哲学导论》，1919年，第165页。

从言模态

“从言”模态把模态词 (必然，可能) 用于描述命题 (拉丁文 *dictum*)，例如 “必然 *p*”。这与“从物”模态恰成对照，后者把模态词用于修饰对象 (拉丁文 *res*)，例如 “a 必然是 *f*”。这一区分可以追溯到亚里士多德的《前分析》第1卷第9章，并且与本质主义一起得到广泛讨论，因为“从物”模态断定某对象具有某些本质属性。这似乎支持了本质主义的新近复兴，但反本质主义者或唯名论者拒绝一对象能够必然地具有一属性这一断言，并论证说所有必然性都是从言的。

“一个从言的断定，举例来说，‘必然地9是复合的’，对另一话语或命题——‘9是复合的’——断定了一模态性质，在此例中是必然真。”——普兰汀格：《必然性的本性》，1974年，第9页。

Modality *de re*, see modality *de dicto*

Mode

[from Latin: *modus*, measure, form or manner] The determinations a thing possesses, the way a quality presents itself or the form in which a thing can be understood. In medieval philosophy, a mode is a characteristic of a thing which marks it out from other things. In both Descartes and Spinoza, there is a system of substance attribute-mode. Thinking and extension are the two principal attributes of substance, and modes are various ways or forms of thinking or extension. Locke took modes as one kind of complex idea. He divided them into simple modes, which are different combinations of the same ideas, and mixed modes, which are the combinations of several different simple modes.

"By mode I understand the modifications of substance, or that which is in another thing through which also it is conceived." - Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, def. 5.

Mode (Locke)

Both Descartes and Spinoza defined a mode as the affection of substance, but Locke used the word for one sort of complex idea which depends on substances. Modes are further divided into two kinds: simple and mixed. Simple modes are complex ideas which are combinations of the same simple ideas or ideas of the same kind. They are the result of the mental operations of compounding or enlarging the simple ideas given in experience. Space, time, number and infinity, for example, are all classified as simple modes. Mixed modes are complex ideas which are combinations of different kinds of simple ideas. They can be gained through experience and observation, by invention and by explaining the names of actions. Mixed modes differ from ideas of substance because ideas of substance must have a prototype in nature, but the mind in framing mixed modes need not determine whether they designate what exists in nature. The majority of examples of mixed modes lie in the sphere of morals and law. Mixed modes can be said to be the names of specific qualities and actions that are important for social life, especially for moral judgements.

"First, modes I call such complex *ideas* which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances;... And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon." - Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 12, 4.

Mode of production

The way of producing goods. Marx used this term in

从物模态

见“从言模态”条。

样式

[源自拉丁文 *modus*, 尺度、形式或方式] 指一个事物所具有的规定, 一个性质呈现自身的方式, 一个事物借以能被理解的形式等等。在中世纪哲学中, 一个样式就是事物的一个特征, 它使该事物同其他事物区分开。在笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎那里都有实体—属性—样式结构的体系。思维和广延是实体的两个主要属性, 样式是思维或广延的各种各样的方式或形式。洛克把样式当做一种复杂观念, 区分为“简单样式”和“混合样式”。简单样式是同一观念的不同结合, 混合样式是若干不同简单样式的结合。

“我将样式理解为实体的变状, 或在他物内, 通过他物而被构想的东西。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, 第一部分, 定义 5。

样式 (洛克)

笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎都把样式界定为实体的作用, 而洛克用该词指一种依赖于实体的混合观念。样式进而分为两类: 简单样式和混合样式。简单样式是同样一些简单观念或同一种简单观念结合起来的复杂观念, 是对经验中给予的简单观念进行“混合”或“扩大”的内心活动的结果。例如, 空间、时间、数目、无限等都被归类为简单观念。混合样式是由不同种类的简单观念结合起来的复杂观念。它们可以通过经验和观察, 借助发明和对行为名称的解释来获得。混合样式与实体观念的不同在于, 实体观念必须有自然界中的原型, 而心灵在构成混合样式时不必确定它们是否指示在自然界中存在的东西。混合样式的大多数例子都出在道德和法律领域。所以, 它们可以说是对于社会生活, 尤其是对于道德判断很重要的特定性质和行为的名称。

“首先, 我将这样一些复杂“观念”称作样式, 它们不论怎样混合, 其中都不包含它们独自存在的假定, 反而它们被认为是依赖于实体、或受实体影响的……而如果在此我使用样式这个词的含义与通常意义有些不同, 我请求原谅。”——洛克:《人类理智论》, 第二卷, 第十二章, 第 4 节。

生产方式

生产财富的方式。马克思在许多意义上使

various senses. The material mode of production contains the productive forces. The social mode of production comprises the social characteristics of the productive process, including the purpose of production, the form of surplus labour presented by production and the mode of exploitation in the production. In some uses, the mode of production includes both material and social modes and combines the productive forces and the relations of production. For Marx, modes of production vary historically.

"The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process generally." — Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*.

Modern logic, another name for symbolic logic

Modernity

An ambiguous term that generally refers to the central characteristic of the modern period as established in the Enlightenment. Postmodernists contrast modernity with postmodernity. In philosophy, modernity is normally taken to begin with Descartes' work in the seventeenth century and to be concerned with the issues, problems and standards of relevance which have since occupied Western philosophers. Authors and critics vary in their accounts of the main strands of modernity. In general, modernity is associated with the supremacy of pure rationality and with the self-assertiveness of the modern self. Equipped with rationality, modern persons seek consensus over a unified metaphysical framework to view the world. They seek their own subjective autonomy and ignore the constraints of history, tradition and culture. They aggressively attempt to organise and control the natural environment, with science as their guiding discipline. Aesthetic objects and their appreciation are measured in terms of economic benefit. Modernity was effective in the rise of industrial capitalism. The critique of modernity has been the chief topic of critical theory, postmodernism, post-structuralism and communitarianism. Each criticism was from a separate standpoint and from a different understanding of modernity.

"The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their own logic." — Habermas, in Foster (ed), *Postmodern Culture*, p. 9.

Modes of scepticism

[from Greek; *tropos*, wa, manner + *skepsis*, investigation, enquiry]. As a technical term in ancient scepticism, a pattern of argument, something like Aristotle's *topos*. Ancient scepticism established many modes aiming to

用这个词。物质生产方式包括生产力, 社会生产方式构成生产过程的社会特征, 包括生产目的, 生产所存在的剩余劳动形式和生产中的剥削方式。在某些用法上, 生产方式包括物质的和社会的方式, 和生产力与生产关系的结合。对马克思来说, 生产方式具有历史性。

"物质生活条件的生产方式决定社会的、政治的和理智生活的一般过程。" —— 马克思, 《政治经济学批判》导言》。

现代逻辑

"符号逻辑" 的另一个名称。

现代性 (或译 "近代性")

这是一个含糊用语, 用来一般性地指称由启蒙运动建立起的现代 (近代) 时期所具有的特点。后现代主义者把现代性与后现代性对立起来。在哲学中, 一般认为现代性始于 17 世纪笛卡尔的工作, 与那时以来西方哲学家们所关注的争论、问题和标准相关。关于现代性的主要成分, 作家们和批评家们的说明多有不同。一般讲来, 现代性与纯粹理性的至上和近代自我的自我肯定相关联。依据理性, 现代 (近代) 的人们寻找那看待世界的统一形而上学构架。他们追求自己主体的独立性, 忽视历史、传统和文化的限制。他们以科学为利器, 得寸进尺地试图安排和控制自然环境, 通过经济利益来衡量美学对象并形成自己的评价。现代性在工业资本主义上升期间是有效的。对于现代性的批判已成为批判理论、后现代主义、后结构主义和共同体主义的首要论题。每种批判都从某个特殊立场出发并基于对现代性的不同理解。

"由 18 世纪的启蒙哲学家们制定的现代性方案包含他们的这样一些努力: 依照他们的逻辑发展客观的科学、普遍的道德和法律, 以及独立的艺术。" —— 哈贝马斯, 见《后现代文化》(福斯特编辑), 第 9 页。

怀疑派论式

[源自希腊语 *tropos* (方式、样式) 和 *skepsis* (考察、探究)] 作为古代怀疑派的专业术语, 它意指论证的范型, 有些像亚里士多德的 *topos*。古代怀疑派建立了多种论式, 其目的是要表明

show the oppositions or contradictions of appearance and to conclude that suspension of judgement is necessary. The most famous and important are the Ten Modes, which form the methodology of scepticism. They are recorded by Sextus Empiricus and ascribed to the Pyrrhonist philosopher Aenesidemus: (1) the mode depending on the variations among animals; (2) that depending on the differences among animals; (3) that depending on the variable constitutions of the sense-organs; (4) that depending on circumstances; (5) that depending on positions; (6) that depending on admixtures; (7) that depending on the quantities of things; (8) that depending on relativity; (9) that depending on the frequency of encounters; (10) that depending on customs and laws.

"In order for us to get a more accurate impression of these oppositions, I shall append the modes through which suspension of judgement is inferred." — Sextus, *Outline of Pyrrhonism*, I, pp. 35-9.

Modularity

A theory of the cognitive processes in the philosophy of mind that originated largely with Jerry Fodor's book *The Modularity of Mind* (1983). The traditional theory of mind considers it to be a general faculty which is exercised in various domains. But theorists of modularity claim that mind is composed mainly of modules. Modules are cognitive systems (input systems) which are relatively independent of each other, each performing its own information-processing autonomously. Fodor lists eight characteristics of being a module: domain specificity, mandatoriness, information encapsulation, speed, shallow output, lack of access of other processes to intermediate representations, natural localization and susceptibility to characteristic breakdown. According to the modularity hypothesis, the human mind should have unique physical structures for acquiring language and for parsing sensations. Although this hypothesis has been disputed, it has led to much fruitful debate.

"Roughly, modular cognitive systems are domain specific, innately specified, hardwired, autonomous, and not assembled. Since modular systems are domain-specific computational mechanisms, it follows that they are species of veridical faculties. I shall assume, hopefully, that this gives us a notion of modularity that is good enough to work with." Fodor, *Modularity of Mind*, 1983, p. 37.

Modus ponens

[Latin; affirming mood, also called *modus ponendo ponens*] A form of hypothetical syllogism named by medieval logicians and providing a rule of inference of the form: "If p then q; p; therefore q". By this rule we infer from the antecedent of a true implication to its consequent. It is the principle that whatever a true proposition implies is itself

现象的对立或矛盾,并得出有必要悬置判断的结论。其中最著名也是最重要的是“十论式”,它们构成怀疑派的方法论。塞克斯都·恩披里柯记录下这十个论式,并将其归功于皮浪主义哲学家爱那西德穆。(1)关于动物中不同变化的论式;(2)关于动物中差异的论式;(3)关于感官可变构造的论式;(4)关于环境情况的论式;(5)关于位置的论式;(6)关于混合物的论式;(7)关于事物数量的论式;(8)关于相对关系的论式;(9)关于经常遭遇的论式;(10)关于习俗和法律的论式。

“为了使我们对这些对立能得到更为准确的印象,我将附上这些论式,通过它们,推出悬置判断的结论。”——塞克斯都:《皮浪主义纲要》,I,第35—39页。

组合性

心的哲学中一种关于认知加工的理论,主要产生于J. 福多的《心的组合性》(1983)一书。心的传统理论将心视为在各种不同领域起作用的普遍官能。但组合论声称,心主要是由组件构成的。组件是彼此相对独立的认知系统(输入系统),各自自主地完成自己的信息加工。福多列举了组件的八个特性:领域特定性、强制性、信息封闭、快捷、浅输出、封闭于中介表征的其他加工、自然定位及敏感于特性损坏。根据组合性假设,人的心应当有独特的物理结构来习得语言和解析感觉。尽管这一假设引起争论,但它所引发的争论是富有成果的。

“大致地说,组件认知系统是特定领域的、先天确定的、硬件的、自主的和非集合的。因为组件系统是特定领域的计算机制,所以它们是那种真实的官能。我该假定,这有希望给予我们一个足够好的组合性概念。”——福多:《心的组合性》,1983年,第37页。

肯定前件式

[拉丁文,肯定式,也叫 *modus ponendo ponens*] 中世纪逻辑学家命名的一种假言三段论形式,提供了一条推理规则,其形式是:“如果p则q; p; 所以q。”根据这一规则,我们从真蕴涵式的前件推出它的后件。它是这样一条原理:真命题所蕴涵的命题本身是真的。它亦称

true. It is also called the affirming mood. In contrast, *modus tollens* has the form: "If p then q ; not q ; not p ". In *modus ponens*, if the categorical premise affirms the consequent rather than the antecedent of the conditional premise, that is, "If p then q ; q ; therefore p ", the argument commits a fallacy called affirming the consequent.

"In the *modus ponens* (also called the constructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise affirms the antecedent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the affirmation of its consequent." —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 352.

Modus tollens

[Latin; denying mood, also called *modus tollendo tollens*] A form of hypothetical syllogism providing a rule of inference of the form: "If p then q ; not q ; therefore not p ". By *modus tollens*, we infer from the denial of the consequent of an implication to the denial of its antecedent. It is the principle that whatever implies a false proposition is itself false. It contrasts with *modus ponens*: "If p then q ; p ; therefore q ". In *modus tollens*, if the categorical premise denies the antecedent rather than the consequent of the conditional premises, the argument commits a fallacy called denying the antecedent.

"In the *modus tollens* (also called the destructive hypothetical syllogism) the categorical premise denies the consequent of the hypothetical premise, thereby justifying as a conclusion the denial of its antecedent" —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 352.

Molecular facts. see atomic facts

Molecular propositions

Propositions which are built from the conjunction of atomic propositions related by words such as "and", "or" and "if-then". For example, " p or q " is a molecular proposition made from the atomic propositions " p " and " q " and the logical connective "or". While atomic propositions represent atomic facts, molecular propositions represent molecular facts composed of atomic facts. A molecular proposition is a truth-functional compound of atomic propositions. That is, its truth-value is decided by the truth values of the atomic propositions composing it and by the logical terms conjoining those atomic propositions.

" 'Molecular' propositions are such as contain conjunctions —if, or, and, unless, etc. —and such words are the marks of molecular proposition." —Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 63.

"肯定式"。与它构成对照的是所谓的"否定后件式",其形式为:"如果 p 则 q ; 非 q ; 所以非 p 。"在肯定前件式中,如果直言前提肯定的是条件前提的后件而不是前件,即是说,"如果 p 则 q ; q ; 所以 p ",该论证就犯了肯定后件的谬误。

"在肯定前件式(亦称构成式假言三段论)中,直言前提肯定假言前提的前件,由此证明以肯定它的后件作为结论是合理的。"——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第352页。

否定后件式

[拉丁文,否定式,亦称 *modus tollendo tollens*] 假言三段论的一种形式,规定了一条推理规则,其形式如下:"如果 p 则 q ; 非 q , 所以非 p 。"根据否定后件式,我们从一蕴涵式后件的否定推出其前件的否定。它是这样一条原理:蕴涵假命题的命题本身是假的。它相对于肯定前件式:"如果 p 则 q ; p ; 所以 q 。"在否定后件式中,如果直言前提否定条件前提的前件而不是后件,该论证就犯了所谓的否定前件的谬误。

"在否定后件式(亦称破斥式假言三段论)中,直言前提否定假言前提的后件,由此证实否定其前件作为结论是合理的。"——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第352页。

分子事实

见"原子事实"条。

分子命题

由诸如"和"、"或"、"如果……那么"等词连接,从"原子命题"的结合而建构成的命题。例如," p 或 q "就是由原子命题 " p " 和 " q " 以及逻辑联结词"或"构成的分子命题。如原子命题表现了"原子事实",分子命题也表现了由原子事实构成的"分子事实"。分子命题是原子命题的真值函项的复合。这就是说,其真值由构成它的原子命题的真值和连接这些原子命题的逻辑词来决定。

" '分子命题'是这样的,它们包含某些联结词——如果、或者、并且、除非等等——因而这些词是分子命题的标记。"——罗素:《我们关于外部世界的知识》,1926年,第63页。

Molyneux's problem

A problem about the correlation between sight and touch, proposed by the Irish politician and scientist William Molyneux (1656-1698) in a letter addressed to Locke, and which is included by Locke in the second edition of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (ii, ix, 8). Suppose a blind person has learned to distinguish a cube from a sphere of the same metal by the sense of touch. If the person is suddenly made to see, can he immediately distinguish the two objects by sight before touching them? Both Molyneux and Locke answered this question in the negative. They believed that our ordinary perceptions depend on judgements based on experience. A perceiver must learn to build perceptual knowledge by correlating the contents from different channels. Berkeley agreed with this solution but claimed that it proved his own thesis that the data of touch and the data of sight are heterogeneous. Leibniz also discussed this problem, but derived a different answer. He suggested that the two sets of experience have one element in common, that is, extension. Hence it is possible to infer from one type of idea to another. Empirical testing seems to favour Locke's solution.

"A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke in his *Essay* :... that the blind man at first sight would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe which the cube, whilst he only saw them."—Berkeley, *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, Sect. 132.

Monadic relation, Russell's term for quality

Monadology, see monads

Monads

[from Greek: *monas*, unit] Leibniz's mature term for his conception of substance. In his early period he used terms such as substantial form, substantial unity, atom of substance or entelechy. Monads are the ultimate constituents of reality. They are simple, without parts, extension, or shape and are indivisible. They do not affect each other. So each monad is windowless, like a world of its own. It is self-sufficient and a true atom of nature. The simplicity of a monad, however, is compatible with its internal complexity. Leibniz identified monads with perception and appetition. Thus each monad changes, but its change comes from an internal principle and not from an external cause. To be active is the main characteristic of monads. Based on the contents of their perceptions, Leibniz distinguishes three grades of monads. The first grade possesses only basic properties of perception and appetition, with no self-

莫利纽克斯问题

关于视觉和触觉相互关系的问题,由爱尔兰政治家和科学家 W. 莫利纽克斯(1656—1698)在给洛克的一封信中提出。洛克将它收入《人类理智论》第二版(第二卷,第九章,第8节)。假定一个盲人学会用触觉区分同样金属的立方体和球体。如果这个人突然能视物了,他在触到它们之前能够马上用视觉区分两个物体吗?对这个问题莫利纽克斯和洛克两人都给了否定的回答。他们认为,我们的普通知觉依赖于以经验为基础的判断。一个知觉者必须学会通过将来自不同渠道的内容相互联系来建立感性知识。巴克莱同意这一解答,但声称这一解答证明了他自己的论点:触觉和视觉的材料是异类的。莱布尼茨也讨论了这个问题,但引出了不同的回答。他提出,这两组经验有一共同的元素,那就是广延。因此,从一类观念推出另一类观念是可能的。经验的验证似乎有利于洛克的答案。

“对我们的原则的进一步确定,可以从莫利纽克斯问题的解决中得出,该解决办法由洛克先生发表于他的《人类理智论》中……盲人第一眼不能确切说出哪一个是球体,哪一个是立方体,而只是看见它们。”——巴克莱:《视觉新论》,第132节。

一元关系

罗素用于性质的术语。

单子论

见“单子”条。

单子

[源自希腊文 *monas*, 单位] 莱布尼茨对其实体概念所用的一个成熟的词。在早期,他使用“实体形式”、“实体单位”、“实体原子”、“隐得来希”等词。单子是实在的终极要素。它们是简单的,没有部分、广延或形状,它们是不可分割的。它们互不影响。所以,每个单子都“没有窗户”,就像一个属于它自己的世界。它是自足的,是自然界的真正原子。然而,单子的单纯性可以同它内在的复杂性相容。莱布尼茨将单子等同于知觉和欲望。这样,每一个单子都在变化,但它的变化来自一个内在的原则,而非来自外部的原因。具有能动性是单子的主要特点。根据单子的知觉内容,莱布尼茨将单子区分为三个等级。第一等的单子只有知觉和欲望的基本性质,没有自我意识。第二等的单子是动物的灵魂,它具有比较明晰的知觉,并有记忆相伴随。第三等的单

consciousness. The second grade is animal soul whose perceptions are more distinct and accompanied by memory. The third grade is spirits or rational minds, which are completely self-conscious. Within any monad's perceptual states there is a representation of the relatedness of that monad to all other monads. This provides the foundation for intermonadic relations. Each monad is a mirror of the whole universe. Although each of them is self-enclosed, there is a perfect harmonious relation among them which is pre-established by God. Leibniz's theory of monads is called monadology. Many of the puzzling features of Leibniz's doctrine of monads can be understood in the context of his logic and science.

"A simple substance is that which has no parts. A composite substance is a collection of simple substances, or monads. Monad is a Greek word signifying unity, or what is one." —(Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 267.

Monarchy

[from Greek: *mon*, one — *arche*, rule, rule by one] A type of government in which supreme power and sovereignty are held by one person; the monarch, king or emperor. In many cases, especially where succession to the monarchy is determined by a long-standing hereditary principle, the monarch is viewed as an incarnation of the historical national identity. In some cases, monarchs are elected or emerge through victory in war. The power of monarchical government does not arise from consent or a social contract. The traditional absolute monarchy was inherited and supported by the theory of the divine right of kings. Monarchy contrasts with aristocracy, in which sovereignty lies in the hands of a class of persons, and with democracy, in which sovereignty is in the hands of the majority of people. European monarchies were threatened by the French revolution. Britain developed a compromise between absolute monarchy and liberalism, called constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch mainly plays a ceremonial role, with sovereignty formally held by the monarch and parliament.

"The sovereign may concentrate the entire government in the hands of one single magistrate, from whom all the others will derive their power. This... form of government is the most common, and is called monarchy or royal government." —Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, III, 3.

Mongrel categorical statements

Ryle's term for a statement which falls between categorical statements, which are statements of fact, and hypothetical statements, which are statements of inference or conditionals. They are semi-dispositional claims which explain something as being an occurrence but at the same time a disposition, for example "The bird is migrating" and

子是完全能自我意识的精神或“理性的心灵”。在任何单子的知觉状态内,都表现该单子与其他单子的关系。这就为单子之间的联系提供了根据。每一个单子都是整个宇宙的一面镜子,虽然它们的每一个都是自身封闭的,它们之间却有完全和谐的关系,这个关系是由上帝预先确定的。莱布尼茨关于单子的理论被称作“单子论”。莱布尼茨单子学说的许多令人不解的特征可以在他的逻辑和科学的范围内得到理解。

“单纯的实体是没有部分的实体,复合的实体是简单实体,或单子的集合。‘单子’是希腊词,意思是‘单位’,或‘单一的东西’。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第207页。

君主政体

[源自希腊文,*mon*(一个)和*arche*(统治),即一个人的统治]一种类型的政体,其最高权力和统治权掌握在一个人手里,即君主、国王或皇帝手里。在很多情况下,特别是在君主的继承是由长期存在的世袭原则决定的情况下,君主被看做是历史的国家特性的化身。在有些情况下,君主是通过战争的胜利被选出或涌现出来的。君主政体的权力不是来自人们的同意或社会契约。传统的专制的君主政体是世袭的,并得到国王的神权理论支持。君主政体与统治权掌握在一个阶层手里的贵族政体不同,与统治权掌握在大多数人手里的民主政体也不同。欧洲的君主政体曾受到法国大革命的威胁。英国在专制君主政体和自由主义之间达成了一种妥协,被称为君主立宪制,在这一制度下,君主主要起礼仪性的作用,统治权在形式上掌握在君主和议会手里。

“主权者可以把整个政府都集中于一个独一无二的行政官手里,所有其余的人都从他那里取得权力。这种……政体形式是最常见的,它被称为君主政体或皇家政府。”——卢梭:《社会契约论》,Ⅲ,3。

混杂范畴陈述

赖尔的术语,范畴陈述是关于事实的陈述,假想陈述是对推理或条件句的陈述,混杂范畴陈述则居于二者之间,指将某种东西解释为一个事件并同时又是一个倾向的准倾向说法,例如,“这只鸟正在迁移”和“约翰小心地开车”。它们被用来指一个实际上是一个倾向性表现的活

"John drives carefully". They are employed to refer to an activity which is the actual display of a disposition and thus to explain something in terms of both occurrence and disposition. These kinds of statements can make sense of some mental concepts such as heeding and minding, which seem always to include an element of the actual or the here and now.

"I shall call statements like 'you would do the thing you did' 'semi-hypothetical' or 'mongrel categorical statements'." — Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 135.

Monism

A term coined by Christian Wolff for any metaphysical theory claiming that only one kind of entity really exists. What really exists may be matter (as materialism holds) or mind (as idealism holds). Neutral monism holds that mind and matter are both derived from some neutral primary reality. Spinoza's monism argued that God/Nature was the single ultimate reality. The argument for monism can be traced to Parmenides in ancient Greece. Monism is opposed both to dualism, which claims that there are two fundamental realities in the world, and to pluralism, which claims that there are many ultimate non-reducible principles in reality. A special case of monism was put forward by the British Neo-Hegelians, especially Bradley. According to this claim, all relations are internal to their terms and form part of the identity of the related terms. In saying that any one object exists, we are therefore implicitly affirming the existence of all other objects and reality forms a single unity. Monism has a wider application, referring to any attempt to account for phenomena by a single principle.

"In its extreme form monism sees it as a matter of logic that everything is unified." — Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 10.

Mood

In syllogistic logic, mood is every valid form within each of the four figures of categorical syllogism. For instance, the first mood of the first figure is called "Barbara", with the form: "If all S are Q, and all P are S, then all P are Q".

In the philosophy of mind, mood is a temporary emotional state of the mind which colours a person's reactions.

In the philosophy of language, different moods, such as indicative, imperative, optative and subjunctive, indicate different forces of the same utterance.

"Given any signal σ of the system, L is to assign it an interpretation $\langle \mu, \tau \rangle$. The component, μ , called a mood, indicates whether σ is indicative or imperative. The component τ of an interpretation, called a truth condition, indicates the state of affairs in which σ is true." — Lewis, *Conventions*, 1969, p. 151.

动因而同时用发生和倾向性来解释某个东西。这种陈述可以解释像注意、留心这样的心的概念。这种概念似乎总是包含一个实际的或当前的元素。

"我将称像'你会做你曾做的事'这样的陈述为'准假设的'或'混杂范畴陈述'。" —— 赖尔:《心的概念》, 1949年, 第135页。

一元论

C. 沃尔夫发明的术语, 指任何主张实际上只存在一类实体的形而上学理论。实际存在的可以是物(如唯物主义所主张的), 或是心(如唯心主义所主张的)。中立一元论认为, 心和物二者都来自于某种中立的基本实在。斯宾诺莎的一元论认为, 上帝—自然是单一的最终实在。对一元论的论证可以追溯到古希腊的巴门尼德。一元论既反对二元论——它主张世界上有两种基本实在, 又反对多元论——它主张实在中有许多终极的、不可还原的基质。英国的新黑格尔主义者, 尤其是布拉德雷提出了一种特别的一元论。根据这种主张, 所有的关系都内在于其关系项, 并构成关系项同一性的一部分。在我们说对象存在时, 我们也由此隐含地断定了所有其他对象的存在, 实在构成单一的统一体。一元论应用得较广, 指任何用单一原理来说明现象的企图。

"最极端的一元论把任何事物都是统一的看成一件逻辑上的事。" —— 艾耶尔:《20世纪的哲学》, 1982年, 第10页。

论式, 情绪, 语气

在三段论逻辑中, mood(论式)是直言三段论的四个格每个格内的每一有效式。例如, 第一格的第三论式叫做"巴巴拉", 其形式是: "如果所有的S都是Q, 而所有的P都是S, 那么所有的P都是Q。"

在心的哲学中, mood(情绪)是心的一种暂时的感情上的状态, 这一状态使一个人的反应带有感情色彩。

在语言哲学中, 不同的 mood(语气), 例如陈述的、祈使的、祈愿的、虚拟的, 表示的是同一话语的不同意义。

"设定这一系统为任意符号 σ , L 被指定为它的解释 $\langle \mu, \tau \rangle$ 。解释组成部分 μ 叫做语气, 它表明 σ 是陈述的还是祈使的。解释组成部分 τ 叫做真值条件, 表明 σ 于其中是真的那种事态。" —— 刘易斯:《约定》, 1969年, 第151页。

Moral

[from Latin: *moralis*, manner, custom, conduct, corresponding to Greek *êthos*. Latin *moralis* places greater emphasis on the sense of social expectation, while Greek *êthos* gives heavier weight to individual character.] Being moral concerns human actions which can be evaluated as good or bad and right or wrong. These actions are in our power and we can be held responsible for them. If a person's actions conform to rules of what is morally right, he is said to be moral. If he violates them, he is immoral or morally wrong. A moral action is also opposed to an amoral action, which is morally value-free, that is, neither right nor wrong. Conflicts can arise between socially accepted rules of morality and rules determined by reason and individual conscience.

"The word 'moral' when it is used as a term of praise is contrasted with 'immoral', or sometimes 'amoral', but is contrasted with 'non-moral' when used as a universe-of-discourse word." - Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 26.

Moral absolutism

The view that there are certain moral objective principles which are eternally and universally true, no matter what consequences they bring about. These principles can never justifiably be violated or given up. Paradigms of such principles include "don't lie", "keep your promises", and "don't kill innocent people". Moral absolutism is generally represented by various religious moral systems. Kantian deontology is closely associated with moral absolutism, since it claims that some actions are right or wrong intrinsically or in themselves and that they may never be used as means to ends. However, contemporary deontology tends to distance itself from absolutism by admitting the principle of double effect, although the extent to which this stance is successful is disputed. Generally, moral absolutism is contrasted to consequentialism, which believes that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the consequences it promotes, and hence any moral principle can be overridden. It is also contrasted to moral relativism which claims that all concepts of right and wrong are culturally relative and provincial.

"By 'moral absolutism' is meant the theory according to which there are certain kinds of actions that are absolutely wrong: actions that could never be right whatever the consequences." - Haber (ed.), *Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics*, p. 1.

Moral agent

Any individual who is capable of formulating or following general moral principles and rules, and who has an

道德的

[源自拉丁词 *moralis*, 意为“风度(举止)、习惯、行为”, 对应于希腊词 *êthos*。拉丁词 *moralis* 更多强调的是社会期望, 而希腊词 *êthos* 则有更重的个人品质的色彩]有道德的是指能够评价为善或恶、对或错的人类行为。这些行为是我们能够控制的, 也是我们能够负责的。如果一个人的行为符合道德上正当的规则, 他就可说是有道德的。如果他违反了它们, 他就是不道德的或在道德上是错的。一个道德行为也是与一种非道德的活动相对的, 后者是一种无道德价值的行为, 即既不是对的, 也不是错的。而在社会所接受的道德规则与为理性所确立的规则和个人的良知之间可能会产生冲突。

“‘道德的’一词, 当它用作一个赞美词时, 是与‘不道德的’相对的, 有时是与‘非道德的’相对的, 而当它用作一种普遍的描述词时, 它是与‘无道德的’相对的。”——库珀:《道德思考的多样性》, 1981年, 第26页。

道德绝对主义

这个论点是, 有一定的道德客观原则, 它们是永恒地、普遍地正确, 不论它带来的后果是什么, 这些原则绝不能被合理地侵犯或放弃。这种原则的范例包括“不许撒谎”、“遵守诺言”、“不得杀害无辜”等等。道德绝对主义一般为宗教道德体系所代表。康德的道义论是与道德绝对主义密切相关的, 因为它主张, 某些行为的正当与否, 是由这些行为本身所决定的, 而且这些行为决不是达到目的的手段。不过, 当代道义论通过承认“双重效果原则”而倾向于把它自己与绝对主义区别开来, 虽然对这种姿态成功的程度还有争议。一般而言, 道德绝对主义是与效果论相对的。效果论相信, 一个行为的正当与错误是为它所致的后果所决定的, 因此, 任何道德原则都是可以超越的。它也是与道德相对主义对立的, 道德相对主义宣称, 所有关于正当与错误的道德概念, 都是在文化上相对的和有地方性的。

“‘道德绝对主义’是指这种理论: 它认为某些行为绝对是错的, 不论其后果是什么, 这些行为决不可能是正当的。”——哈伯(编):《绝对主义和对它的效果论的批评》, 第1页。

道德行为者

指任何能够构建或遵循普遍的道德原则和规则的人, 他或她有着自律意志, 能最终决定应

autonomous will so that he can decide ultimately what acts he should perform and not perform. Moral agents can react to the acts of other moral agents. Accordingly they are responsible for their acts and are the subject of blame or praise. Adult human beings are paradigmatic moral agents. Moral agents are contrasted to moral patients: beings that lacks rationality and cannot be held morally accountable for their acts.

"Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as he conceives it, requires."—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 151.

Moral argument for the existence of God

An argument credited to Kant for the existence of God based upon human moral experience. Kant derived morality from reason alone and not from divine authority, but believed that being moral is not sufficient to secure happiness. Happiness must be added to morality, although only a moral person is worthy of being happy. Being happy means that everything proceeds according to my will and desire. A happy moral person has the highest good that can be acquired in the world. But to guarantee that everything will go according to a person's will and desire and thus to ensure the moral person's ultimate happiness, it is inevitable that we postulate the existence of God. The moral argument has been very popular since Hume and Kant attacked the ontological and cosmological arguments and the argument from design, although later versions depart from Kant's formulation. In later versions the argument proceeds from the existence of moral commands to the existence of God as moral commander, from the existence of moral authority to the existence of God as the authoriser, and from the existence of moral laws to the existence of God as law-giver. Thus, morality itself is claimed to be determined by divine will. This argument is criticised by naturalistic ethics which sees no need to postulate God in order to explain the existence of human moral institutions.

"The Moral Argument is a transcendental argument in the sense that it endeavours to show the existence of God is a necessary condition of morality."—T. McPherson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1965, p. 89.

Moral atomism

A variety of ethical theories which take individuals, their rights, value or interests, as the basis for our thinking about moral right and wrong. It contrasts with moral holism, which places ultimate value on the system rather than on the individuals which compose the system. Most

履行和不应履行什么行为的人。一个道德行为者能对其他道德行为者的行为作出反应。因此,他们对自己的行为负有责任,而且也是责备和赞扬的主体。成年人是典型的道德行为者。道德行为者是道德被动者相对照的。道德被动者是指一个缺乏理性、不能为他们的行为负道德责任的人。

"道德行为者是指这样的个体,他们具有多种复杂的能力,尤其是具有能运用公正的道德原则去决定(深思熟虑之后)在道德上应当做以及已经做出这个决定的能力,和能自由地选择不选择按他所认为的道德要求行为的能力。"——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第151页。

上帝存在的道德论证

以人类的道德经验为基础论证上帝存在,此论证归于康德。康德仅从理性而不从神的权威引出道德,但他相信,有道德不足以获得幸福。必须把幸福加到道德上,虽然只有道德的人才配享有幸福。幸福意味着每件事情都按我的意志和欲望进行。一位幸福的、道德的人具有最高的善,而这种善是能在这个世界获得的。但是,为了确保每件事情会按人的意志和欲望进行,并因此而确保道德之人的最终幸福,我们不得不假定上帝存在。由于休谟和康德抨击了本体论论证、宇宙论论证和设计论证,这种道德论证就非常流行,虽然后来的种种说法超出了康德的阐述。在后来的说法中,该论证从道德命令的存在推到作为道德命令者的上帝的存在,从道德权威的存在推到作为授权者的上帝的存在,从道德法则的存在推到作为立法者的上帝的存在。这样,道德本身就被说成是由神的意志决定的。这种论证受到了自然主义伦理学的批判,后者认为,为解释人类道德设定的存在,无需假定上帝。

"'道德论证'是一种超验论证,因为它竭力表明上帝的存在是道德的必要条件。"—麦克斐尔逊:《宗教哲学》,1965年,第89页。

道德原子主义

指那些把个人以及个人的权利、价值或利益作为思考道德对错的基础的理论。它与道德整体主义相对立,后者强调终极价值在于系统而不在于组成系统的个人。大多数西方伦理理论属于道德原子主义,而柏拉图在他的《国家

Western ethical theories belong to moral atomism, while Plato's ethics in the *Republic* is an example of moral holism. The contrast between moral atomism and holism is striking in environmental ethics. While one position extends human-centred ethics to consider the rights or interests of animals, the other position, represented by land ethics, claims that the ecosystem rather than the various individuals in it should be the focus of our moral consideration. This version of moral holism is also called ecological holism.

"Despite their many differences, all of the normative ethical theories discussed so far are in a certain sense atomistic; that is, each demands that individuals be considered equitably." —Regan (ed.), *Matters of Life and Death*, 1993, p. 25.

Moral certainty

The certainty that the natural sciences possess is regarded to be universal or demonstrative, while the social sciences cannot achieve such a degree of certainty, for it involves human affairs. Accordingly, social science is said to possess only moral certainty, because it is generally but not universally true. The word "moral" here is not associated with good or bad, but means pertaining to human affairs or practical concerns. This distinction can be traced to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and has been widely endorsed in the history of philosophy.

"Moral certainty is sufficient to regulate the conduct of one's life even if it is in principle possible that we can be mistaken." —Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, sect. 4.

Moral community

Those within the scope of moral consideration. In traditional ethics, only human beings were held to have membership of the moral community. They are the only objects of moral concern because only human beings have reason and hence know what they are doing. Furthermore, only human beings can be in reciprocal relationships involving the recognition of oneself and others as being in a moral relationship. This implies that the moral community consists exclusively of moral agents. Some contemporary moral philosophers, especially those working in environmental ethics, claims that it is a prejudice to restrict the moral community to human beings. If cognitive conditions are necessary for moral concern, some humans, such as infants and brain damaged persons, should be excluded, and some kinds of animals should be included. They claim that rationality should not be the grounds for belonging to the moral community. But the question of what the criterion should be is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers suggest that all subjects-of-a-life should have the same right to be respected as a member and that the moral community should extend to many kinds of animals. Others believe that

篇》中的伦理学是道德整体主义的一个例证。道德原子主义与整体主义的对立在环境伦理学中最为显著。当一种观点在于将人类中心伦理学扩展到考虑动物的权利与利益时,以土地伦理学为代表的另一种观点主张,应该成为我们道德考虑中心的是生态系统而不是在生态系统中的多样个体。道德整体主义的这种观点也称“生态整体主义”。

“尽管它们有许多不同,目前为止讨论的所有规范伦理学理论在一定的意义上都是原子主义;即每种理论都要求平等地考虑个人。”——里根(编):《生命与死亡的问题》,1993年,第25页。

道德确然性

自然科学所具有的确然性被看做是普遍的和证明性的,而社会科学不能获得这种程度的确然性,因为它涉及到人类的事务。因此,社会科学据说仅有“道德的确然性”,因为它是一般性的,但不是普遍正确的。“道德的”这一词在这里并不与善或恶相联,而是意味着与人类的事务或实践相关。这个区分可追溯到亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》,并在哲学史上多有同道者。

“即使我们犯错误在原则上是可能的,道德确然性也足以调整一个人的行为。”——笛卡尔:《哲学原理》,第四部分。

道德群体

在道德考虑范围内的那些群体。在传统的伦理学中,只有人类被认为具有道德群体成员的资格。他们是道德关注的惟一对象,因为只有人类才有理性,因而知道他们在做什么。进而言之,只有人类才能处于交往关系之中,这些关系包括承认自己与他人处于道德关系之中。这意味着道德群体仅是由道德行为者构成的。当代一些道德哲学家,特别是从事环境伦理学研究的那些人提出,把道德群体限于人类是一种偏见。如果认识条件对于道德关注是必须的,那一些人,如婴儿和脑损伤者,就应被排除在外,而某些动物则应包括在内。他们主张,理性不应是属于道德群体的根据。但判断的标准应是什么却是一个有争议的问题。一些哲学家提出,所有生命主体都应拥有作为一个成员同样受到尊重的权利,因而道德群体应扩展到很多动物。另一些哲学家认为,感觉能力应是判断的标准,因而道德群体应包括任何能感受到痛苦的生命。一些哲学家争论说植物和动物都应被包括在内;还有一些哲学家认为整个生态系统及其成员都属于道德群体。一些哲学家主张,即使我们遇上

sentience should be the criterion and that the moral community should include any being that is capable of suffering. Some argue that plants as well as animals should be included, while others believe that the whole ecosystem and its members belong to the moral community. Some philosophers claim that even if we encountered fully rational non-human beings, our basic moral concern would be restricted to humans on the basis of a recognition of ourselves as members of a species.

"Let us define the notion of the moral community as comprising all those individuals who are of direct moral concern or alternatively, as consisting of all those individuals toward whom moral agents have direct duties."—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 152.

Moral compromise, see compromise

Moral conservatism

A contemporary ethical position emerging out of the anti theory movement, represented by Williams, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre. It attempts to establish ethics without appealing to universal principles, but through examination of particular social conventions, traditions and practices. Its central characteristics include an emphasis on the plurality and diversity of the values and practices of a community, and an objection to any impersonal or universal point of view which places moral judgements above local context. It believes that moral claims can only be assessed from within the historical tradition in which they are embedded, and objects to the universal application of prescriptions. It denies the dichotomy of reason and emotion, and emphasises the formation of virtue. Moral conservatism is associated with virtue ethics, moral particularism, and communitarianism. However, though it tries to distance itself from moral relativism and advocates the practice of critical reflection, it still faces the major difficulty of explaining how it is possible to criticise a culture if the ethical life of the community is primary. The theory is still being developed.

"The second group of writings, *moral conservatism*, offers positive accounts of morality in terms of custom and practice."—Clarke and Simpson, *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*, 1989, p. 3.

Moral dilemma

A situation in which one person is morally pulled in opposite directions. In these situations, different apparently sound reasons support different courses of action that cannot be jointly undertaken. The moral agent has reason to do A and has reason to do B, but he cannot do both A and B. Although it is not this person's fault for getting into the dilemma, whatever direction is chosen will inevitably be

完全理性的非人类的生命,我们基本的道德考虑也应只限于人,理由是我们把自己视为一个物种的成员。

“让我们把道德群体概念定义为包括所有那些直接受到道德关注的个人,或是由所有那些道德行为者对其负有直接责任的个人构成的。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第152页。

道德妥协

见“妥协”条。

道德保守主义

出现在当代反理论运动中的一种伦理观点,以威廉姆斯、纽斯堡姆、麦金泰尔等人为代表。它企图不诉诸于普遍性准则,而是依据特殊的社会习俗、传统和实践来建立伦理学。它的主要特征包括,强调共同体的实践和价值的多元性和差异性,反对把道德判断置于具体情景之上的非个人或普遍的观点。它相信,道德主张只有在它们所体现的历史传统范围内才可能得到评价,它也反对对规定的普遍运用。它否定理性和情感的二分法,而强调德性的形成。道德保守主义与德性伦理学、道德特殊主义和共同体主义相关。不过,虽然它力图把自己与道德相对主义区分开来,提倡实行批评性反思,它仍然面对着这样的主要困难:如果一种共同体的伦理生活是主要的,怎么可能批评这种文化。这个理论仍然在发展中。

“第二类著作,道德保守主义,根据习俗和实践而对道德给予明确说明。”——克拉克和辛普森:《伦理学中的反理论和道德保守主义》,1989年,第3页。

道德困境

这个处境是,一个人在道德上同时被推向了相反的方向。在这类处境中,明显不同却又似乎合理的理由支持着无法联合完成的不同行为过程。道德行为者有理由做A,也有理由做B,但不能既做A又做B。虽然一个人进入这种困境不是他或她个人的过错,但不论这人选择什么方向,都将不可避免地某些方面犯道德错

morally wrong in some respect and result in the sense of guilt or remorse. For example, a case may arise in which telling the truth (which is required as a moral principle) will involve moral wrongdoing by breaking a promise to someone else to remain silent. In another case, returning a weapon one has borrowed may predictably lead to serious injuries to some innocent person. In such cases one cannot do all that is morally required. Moral dilemmas are the stuff of tragedies. Since to hold that there is one sovereign moral principle, for example utilitarianism, leads to moral dilemmas in many circumstances, this phenomenon represents a challenge to such theories. However, it is a test of every moral theory that it provides some reasonable way to deal with moral dilemmas, although the fact that no way is completely effective might tell us something about the nature of morality.

"The standard definition of moral dilemmas seems to include all and only situations when (at the same time) an agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives separately but cannot adopt both together."—Sinnott-Armstrong, *Moral Dilemmas*, 1988, p. 5.

Moral epistemology, see ethical knowledge

Moral expert

Moral philosophers are often regarded as being able to offer advice about how one should live or about whether an action is wrong or right, just as an art historian can advise whether an artwork is real or a forgery. This attitude takes moral philosophers to be moral experts. The notion of a moral expert is strongly objected to by moral non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivism denies the existence of objective ethical value and accordingly rejects the view that there is any authority who can tell us how to live our lives. According to this theory, morality is nothing but an expression of one's own preferences or emotions. What I need to know when I am making a moral judgement is what I feel in the situation in question. The position of non-cognitivism is not widely shared. Nowadays many philosophers sit on government commissions of enquiry and corporate and institutional ethics committees. The need for advice on a variety of morally complicated issues has greatly promoted the development of applied ethics. However, it is not clear whether moral advice is a matter of good judgement which can be detached from any moral theory, an ability to articulate and clarify moral issues without drawing moral conclusions or a combined capacity to provide moral theory leading to moral conclusions. Although they accept the notion of moral advice, some philosophers object to moral experts making moral decisions for us on the grounds that this would compromise our autonomy as moral agents. They

误,而产生一种负疚感或自责感。例如,在一种情形下说真话(这是道德原则所要求的),将不可避免地要毁了对另一个人保持沉默的诺言,或者是归还某人所借的武器,可以预见到将导致对某些无辜者产生严重的伤害。在这些情形中,一个人不能做道德上所要求的所有事,道德困境永远是悲剧的素材。如果我们认为有一种主导性的道德原则,例如功利主义在许多情况下易于导致道德困境,这种现象就代表了对这种理论的一种挑战。不过,提供某种合理的方式来解决道德困境,这已成了每一道德理论的试金石,尽管没有一种方式是完全有效的,而这一事实也许会揭示道德的某种性质。

"对于道德困境的标准定义似乎包括所有并只有这样的处境:即一个行为者在同一时刻应当分别采用两者之一而不能一并采用。"——辛诺特·阿姆斯特朗:《道德困境》,1988年,第5页。

道德知识论

见“伦理知识”条。

道德专家

道德哲学家常常被认为能够对一个人应如何生活,或一个行为是对还是错提出建议,就如同艺术史学家可以提出一件艺术品是否是赝品的建议一样。这一看法把道德哲学家看做道德专家。道德专家这一概念受到道德非认知主义的强烈反对。非认知主义否认客观的道德价值的存在,因此拒绝接受世上存在能告诉我们怎样生活的权威这一观点。按照这一理论,道德不过是某人自我的偏爱或感情的一种表达。在我做出一个道德判断的时候,我需要知道的是在所说的处境中感觉如何。非认知主义的见解不为人们所广泛认同。现今很多哲学家是政府咨询委员会和社团的、公共机构的伦理委员会的成员。对种种复杂的道德问题提出建议的需要极大地促进了应用伦理学的发展。不过,道德建议是否是—种可与任何道德理论相分离的好的判断的问题,是否是一种无需给出道德结论而可以清楚地表达和阐述道德问题的能力,或是否是一种提供通向道德结论的道德理论的综合能力,这些都不清楚。尽管一些哲学家接受道德建议的看法,但他们反对道德专家为我们作道德决定,其理由是这将危及我们作为道德行为者的自律性。他们认为,按他人的计划去生活不会带来一种好生活,无论这种计划有多么好。总之,他们争论说,道德不像其他学科一样是可以教授的。据此,道德专家的性质就成问题了。

claim that leading a life on someone else's plan is not to lead a good life, however good the plan might be. In any case, they argue that morality cannot be taught like other subjects. On this view, the nature of moral expertise becomes problematic.

"The notion of a moral expert makes no sense on the non-cognitivist view, (for) there are no moral facts about which he or she might have special knowledge."—McNaughton, *Moral Vision*, 1988.

Moral holism, see moral atomism

Moral judgement

The content of a proposition which typically discriminates between good or bad or between right and wrong and determines what should be done in a moral context. Also, moral judgement is the capacity to make such judgements or to make them well. Moral judgements are practical in that they provide direct guidance for action. Different ethical theories have different views about the nature of moral judgements and their relation to action. Moral objectivism claims that a true moral judgement corresponds to objective moral properties, but leaves open the question of why knowledge of such facts would guide action. Deontology holds that a moral judgement is a type of command, used to telling people, including ourselves, what we should or should not do. Emotivism claims that a moral judgement is an expression of a purely personal preference. A view derived from Aristotle holds that a moral judgement is an application of universal moral principles to a particular situation within the scope of the principles. This view recognises that practical reason might need to reach an equilibrium between universal rules and particular circumstances when the rules cannot be straightforwardly applied to the circumstance. On this view, a moral judgement has cognitive and rational elements and is more than a mere a response of feeling. It can be universalised and publicly advocated rather than merely privately preferred.

"To make a moral judgement of an action, person, etc. is to judge the action by relating it to either a moral rule or a moral ideal."—Gert, *The Moral Rules*, 1973, p. 173.

Moral knowledge, another term for ethical knowledge

Moral law

For Kant, all moral laws are principles or maxims, but not all principles or maxims are moral laws. A moral law is a maxim on which a rational being acts, and which he would will to be a maxim for all rational beings. A moral law must have objective necessity and be recognised by reason. It must

"道德专家这一概念在非认知主义的观点看来是毫无意义的,因为不存在他或她能具有专门知识的道德事实。"—麦克诺顿:《道德见解》,1988年。

道德整体主义

见“道德原子主义”条。

道德判断

一种命题内容,它典型地区分了好与坏或对与错,并确定了在道德情景中应做什么。道德判断也是做出这种判断或使判断更好的能力。道德判断具有实践性,因为它们提供对行为的直接指导。不同的道德理论对道德判断的本质及它们与行为的关系有不同的看法。道德客观主义主张真实的道德判断是与客观的道德特性相符合的,但没有解决为什么关于这种事实的知识能够指导行为这一问题。义务论认为道德判断是一类命令,它是用来告诉人们,包括我们自己,什么是我们应当或不应当做的。情感主义认为道德判断是纯粹的个人偏爱的表示。一种出自亚里士多德的观点认为,道德判断是普遍的道德原则在这些原则所及范围内的特殊情况中的应用。这一观点认识到,当普遍规范不能直接应用于特殊情况时,实践理性就要求在普遍规范和特殊情况之间达成一种平衡。根据这一观点,道德判断具有认识的和理性的因素,并不只是感情的反应。它可以普遍化并可以公开提倡,而不仅仅是个人的偏好。

"对一个行为、一个人等等做出道德判断,就是通过将它与道德规范或道德理想联系起来去判断那一行为。"—格特:《道德规范》,1973年,第173页。

道德知识

“伦理知识”的另一个词。

道德法则

对于康德来说,一切道德法则都是原则或准则,但并非所有的原则或准则都是道德法则。道德法则是理性存在者按照它来行动并愿意把它作为一切理性存在者的准则的准则。道德法则必须具有客观必然性并通过理性来认识。它

give rise to imperatives which are definite and specific, yet universal in application. In Kant's ethics, a moral law applies only to rational beings and determines how a rational being as such would necessarily act. It lays down a rule that does not admit of exceptions and which commands rather than counsels. A moral law is a categorical imperative. It is not derived from empirical fact, but is prescribed by reason itself as the ground of its own action. Since Kant believed that a person obeys a categorical imperative only if his will is free, the notion of a moral law leads to an assertion of the existence of freedom.

Kant's notion of a moral law is the culmination of a tradition in Western ethics which views ethics as a network of moral laws which are recognised *a priori* and applied universally. This tradition is opposed to the tradition of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which holds that the application of universal principles should be adjusted according to the salient features of the circumstances in which the principles are applied. Kant's notion of a moral law has become the main target of the current revival of virtue ethics.

"In contrast to laws of nature, these laws of freedom are called moral laws." — Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, Introduction, I.

Moral luck

Traditional ethics claims that one's moral status is not subject to luck, that is to matters of chance or factors beyond one's control. Kant states at the outset of his *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* that good will, which is the source of moral worth, is independent of the contingencies of the world. Hence he distinguishes between a moral area which is immune to luck and an amoral area which is inevitably vulnerable to luck, and confines his ethics to rational agency and universal principles. This luck-free morality is challenged by Williams and Nagel. They argue that the estimation of moral worth, and notions such as responsibility, justification, and blame, are indeed subject to luck, and hence morality is also threatened by luck. Williams maintains that luck will influence one's motives, intentions and personality, and is hence closely related to one's moral decisions and moral justifications. Nagel distinguishes different kinds of luck which deeply affect morality: constitutive luck, that is the factors which influence one's constitution as an agent (for example different family background, different environment or education); circumstantial luck, for example the problems and situations one faces; the luck which affects the cause of an action; and the luck which affects the result of an action. Moral dilemmas can also be viewed as a kind of circumstantial luck. Different luck will result in different levels of responsibility for the agent and different moral judgements by others. If I drive a car carelessly, my action will not mean much if no

必须导致确定的、专门的, 然而普遍应用的命令。在康德的伦理学中, 道德法则只应用于理性存在者, 确定了这种理性存在者如何必然地行动。它规定了一种不允许有例外并且是作出命令而不是劝告的规则。因此, 道德法则是绝对命令。它不是来自经验事实, 而是理性把自身规定为它自己行为的根据。由于康德认为, 一个人如果他的意志是自由的, 就只会服从绝对命令, 所以道德法则的观念导致了对自由的存在的确断。

康德的道德法则概念是这样一种西方伦理学传统的顶端, 这种传统把伦理学视为道德法则之网, 而道德法则被先天地认识和普遍地应用。这种传统对立于亚里士多德德性伦理学的传统。后者主张普遍原则的应用应当根据原则被应用的情况的显著特征而调整。康德的道德法则的概念在现代的德性伦理学的复兴中已成为众矢之的。

“相对于自然法则, 这些自由法则称为道德法则。” — 康德:《道德形而上学》, 导言, I。

道德运气

传统伦理学宣称, 一个人的道德形象不受运气、即不受人们不能控制的机遇或因素的影响。康德在他的《道德形而上学基础》的开篇处谈到, 善良意志是道德价值的来源, 是独立于世界的偶然性的。因此, 他区分了一个不受运气影响的道德领域, 和一个不可避免地要受运气影响的非道德领域, 而把他的伦理学界定在理性主体和普遍原则上。这种不受运气约束的道德受到威廉姆斯和内格尔的挑战。他们论证道, 对于道德价值、责任、合理性证明、指责等概念的评估, 确实受到运气的影响, 因此道德也受到运气的威胁。威廉姆斯认为, 运气也影响到一个人的动机、意图和人格, 因此是与一个人的道德决定和道德合理性证明密切相关的。内格尔区分了四种深深影响道德的运气: 构成性运气, 即影响到作为一个行为者的构成性主体的因素(例如, 不同的家庭背景、不同的环境或教育); 环境运气, 即一个人所面对的问题和处境; 影响行为原因的运气以及影响行为结果的运气。道德困境也可看做是一种环境运气。不同的运气对行为者将导致不同层次的责任和对他人会形成不同的道德判断。我心不在焉地开车, 如果不发生什么严重后果, 这种行为没有什么意义, 而如果我碰巧撞倒和压死一个孩子, 那事情就完全不同了。道德运气的问题是反理论运动的一个必不可少的部分, 并导致了诸如德性伦理学和道德情景主义这样的承认运气偶然性的道德思考

serious consequence occurs, but it means something entirely different if I happen to crash and kill a child. The problem of moral luck is an indispensable part of the anti-theory movement, and leads to the creation of moral stances that recognise the contingencies of luck, such as virtue ethics and moral contextualism.

"If moral luck is thinkable, possibly even acceptable, in regard to the character of particular acts, then perhaps the status of certain virtues as virtues can depend on a kind of cosmic (moral) luck."—Slote, *Goods and Virtues*, 1983, p. 57.

Moral patient

A moral status, in contrast to that of moral agent. Traditionally, only rational human beings can be moral agents, for they must hold responsibility for their actions. Marginal human beings, such as children and brain damaged people are not regarded as having moral responsibility for their behaviour, and hence are not moral agents. However, they are still the objects of moral consideration and are protected from suffering by moral laws. Accordingly they are referred to as moral patients. Moral patients cannot formulate or follow moral principles and rules. They can bring about great pain and even disasters to others, but we cannot say that they are morally wrong for doing that. Equally, their acts may bring about good consequences, but we do not say that they are morally right for performing them. Moral agents can act wrongly or rightly in ways that affect moral patients, but moral patients cannot act reciprocally towards moral agents. Contemporary environmental ethics claims that the scope of moral patients should not only include marginal human beings, but also sentient animals, and even the whole biocommunity. A difference in moral status requires different moral considerations and can involve the appeal to different moral principles. This results in a variety of moral tensions in practice. For instance, a foetus is a moral patient. To consider its interest might make abortion immoral. (On the other hand, if we appeal to the autonomy of the mother, abortion would be permissible.

"In contrast to moral agents, moral patients lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behaviours in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do."—Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 152.

Moral philosophy, see ethics and morality

Moral point of view

To consider or judge behaviour from the perspective of moral rules or principles, rather than from the viewpoint of

方式的创造。

“就具体行为的特性而言,如果道德运气是可以考虑的、可能的并且是可接受的话,那么,也许把一定的德性作为德性的地位就取决于一种宇宙性的(道德的)运气。”——斯洛特,《善与德性》,1983年,第57页。

道德被动者

一种道德身份,与道德行为者相对。在传统意义上,惟有有理性的人能够是道德行为者,因为他们能对他们的行为负责。边缘人,诸如儿童和脑损伤者就不被认为能对他们自己的行为负有道德责任,因此不是道德行为者。不过,他们仍然是道德考虑的对象并受到道德法则的保护以免受伤害。因此,他们被归为道德被动者。道德被动者不能构建或遵循道德原则或规范。他们能对他人带来巨大的痛苦甚至灾难,但我们不能说他们这样做在道德上是错的。同样,他们的行为也能带来好的后果,但我们也不能因此而说他们在道德上是正当的。道德行为者影响道德被动者的方式可能是错误的或正当的,但道德被动者不能以相应的行为来回应道德行为者。当代环境伦理学宣称道德被动者的范围不仅应包括边缘人,也应包括有感觉能力的动物,甚至整个生物共同体。不同的道德身份要求不同的道德考虑,涉及到诉诸不同的道德原则。这导致了实践中的多种道德张力。例如,胎儿是一个道德被动者。要考虑他的利益则堕胎就是不道德的。另一方面,假如我们诉诸于母亲的自主性,堕胎就应是许可的。

“与道德行为者相对,道德被动者缺乏使他们能够控制他们自己行为的先决条件,即使他们在道德上能对他们所做的负责。”——里根,《动物权利问题》,1983年,152页。

道德哲学

见“伦理学和道德”条。

道德观点

从道德规范或原则的视角而不是从自我利益的视角来考虑或判断行为。道德哲学的主要

one's self-interest. The main question of moral philosophy is "Why ought I to be moral?". Thus we must justify why human beings should consider their acts from a moral point of view. Different moralists provide and argue for different points of view, and they are always in conflict. The central tradition of modern moral philosophy claims that morality is the only important thing in one's life, but contemporary virtue ethics believes that it is only a part and that human lives should have other commitments. On this basis, the main question of moral philosophy would be Socrates' question "How should I live?".

"In order to consider the relation between individual rationality and what is sometimes called 'the moral point of view' one has to decide on criteria of rationality, and this is a semi-conceptual investigation."—Cooper, *The Diversity of Moral Thinking*, 1981, p. 10.

Moral principle, see moral rule

Moral psychology

An essential part of ethics, especially in contemporary virtue ethics, concerned with the structure and phenomenological analysis of those psychological phenomena which have great bearing on moral behaviour or action. These phenomena include cognitive states such as deliberation and choice; emotional states such as love, mercy, satisfaction, guilt, remorse and shame; and desires, character and personality. Moral psychology aims to improve understanding of human motivations and emotions. It is also related to the philosophy of law.

"... The problem of the origin of moral judgements and moral sentiments, which is often discussed in 'ethical' writings... but nonetheless belongs to the province of moral psychology"—Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 16.

Moral realism

Any moral theory which holds that moral facts or ethical properties, such as being good or bad or being virtuous or evil, exist independent of our beliefs and will, and that ethics should find out truths about them. It is realism applied to moral affairs and moral statements. It is related to moral objectivism, but contrasts to moral subjectivism and moral relativism. Corresponding to Dummett's characterisation of realism, moral realism is also defined as the claim that moral judgements obey the law of excluded middle and can be true or false. The truth of moral judgements is independent of the evaluator's moral beliefs.

Sometimes it is used in a special sense to refer to Jean Piaget's theory which suggests that we have gone through an essential early stage of moral belief in which moral rules are

问题是“我为什么应当是道德的?”我们必须论证为什么人类应当从一种道德观点考虑他们的行为。不同的道德学家提供和论证了不同的道德观点,它们经常是冲突的。现代道德哲学的核心传统认为道德在一个人的生活中是惟一重要的事情,但当代德性伦理学相信道德仅是生活的一部分,人类的生活应该有其他承诺。据此,道德哲学的主要问题应该是苏格拉底的问题:“我应该怎样生活?”

“为了考虑个人理性与有时被称为‘道德观点’的东西的联系,一个人不得不决定理性的标准,并且这是一种准概念式的研究。”——库珀:《道德思考的多样性》,1981年,第10页。

道德原则

见“道德规范”条。

道德心理学

伦理学的一个实质性部分,特别是在当代德性伦理学中,它涉及到那些与道德行为有重大关系的心理现象的结构和现象学的分析。这些现象包括审慎和选择等认知状态,爱、怜悯、满意、负疚、自责、羞愧等情感状态以及欲求、品格、人格等。道德心理学的目的在于较好地理解人的动机和情感。道德心理学也与法哲学相关。

“……道德判断和道德情感的起源问题,常常在‘伦理的’著作中得到讨论……但它们属于道德心理学的范围。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第16页。

道德实在论

这样的道德理论相信,道德事实或伦理性质诸如好(善)与坏、德与恶是不依赖我们的信念和意志而存在的,并认为伦理学应当发现有关它们的真理。它是运用于道德事务和道德陈述的实在论。它与道德客观主义相关,而与道德主观主义和道德相对主义对立。相应于达米特对实在论的描述,道德实在论也被界定为这样的一种主张:道德判断服从排中律因而能够是真或是假。道德判断的真独立于评价者的道德信念。

有时它在一种特别的意义上使用,即指称J. 皮亚杰的理论。皮亚杰的理论认为,我们已经经过了一个道德信念的实质性的早期阶段,在这个阶段,道德规则被看做是永恒的和独立

viewed as eternal and independent of social function and in which the degree of praise and blame depends on the consequences of actions rather than intent. According to Piaget, this may be found in the moral development of children in our societies and among adults in primitive societies.

"Moral realism can now be defined as the claim that some moral judgements are true and every moral judgement is true if and only if certain conditions obtain that are independent of the actual and ideal moral beliefs and choices of the people who judge and are judged."—Sinnott-Armstrong, *Moral Dilemmas*, 1988, p. 5.

Moral reason

The representative form of practical reason, the sort of thinking which leads one to make moral judgements and which guides one's moral acts. Moral reason brings general moral principles to bear on the particular situations of the agent and judges whether one's action and the way it is performed conform to the requirements of moral principles. It enables an agent to decide whether he should act and what he should do. The characteristic feature of moral reason is that it employs ethical terms and makes moral judgements which issue commands and advice. It has been disputed whether the procedure of moral reasoning can be formalised into practical syllogism and whether it deals with ends as well as means.

"Moral reasons are ordinary considerations such as the pain I will cause here if I don't tell her soon. This is a moral reason because it is a salient feature of a situation which generates a demand—the demand that I tell her soon, perhaps."—Dancy, *Moral Reasons*, 1993, p. 251.

Moral rule

A general statement guiding action and feeling by characterising certain kinds of action, such as telling the truth or stealing, as generally right or generally wrong. Moral rules are distinguished from moral principles which underlie moral rules, justify their validity and clarify their scope of application. While moral rules are specific and concrete, moral principles are general and abstract. While moral rules are variable, moral principles hold in all circumstances. Moral principles are used to justify rules and to generate new rules to cope with unforeseen circumstances. Rules are more directly involved than principles in determining the morality of behaviour. The elaboration of a consistent and intelligible body of moral principles and rules is the central task of an ethical theory.

"A moral rule states that a certain kind of actions is generally right (or obligatory), and leaves open the possibility that an act (or omission) of that kind may be justifiable."—Singer, *Generalization in Ethics*, 1963, p. 103.

于其社会功能的;在这个阶段,赞扬和责备的程度取决于行为的后果而不是意图。据皮亚杰看来,这可以在我们社会中的儿童道德发展和原始社会的成年人中发现。

“道德实在论现在能被界定为这种主张:当且仅当一定的条件得到满足,某种道德判断就是真的,甚至每一种道德判断都是真的。这种条件就是:它们独立于下判断和被判断人的实际的和理想的道德信念。”——辛诺特-阿姆斯特朗:《道德困境》,1988年,第5页。

道德理性

实践理性的代表形式,一种引导一个人做出道德判断和指导一个人的道德行为的思维。道德理性使一般的道德原则影响一个人所处的特殊境况,影响对一个人的行为及行为方式是否符合道德原则要求的判断。它能使一个人决定他是否应行动和应做什么。道德理性的典型特征是,它使用伦理学的术语并做出成为要求和建议的道德判断。道德推理的过程是否可被公式化为实践三段论,以及它是否既涉及目的又涉及手段,对这两个问题一直存在争议。

“道德理性是普通的考虑,就如同如果这时我不很快讲出我将招致的痛苦一样。它是道德理性,是因为它的显著特征是一种产生要求的情境,这种要求也许是我这时要很快讲出的。”——丹西:《道德理性》,1993年,第251页。

道德规范

一种通过表明某种行为的性质(如讲真话通常是对的,偷窃通常是错误的)来指导行为和情感的一般陈述。道德规范与道德原则不同,道德原则构成道德规范的基础,它论证道德规范的合理性和阐明它们适用的范围。道德规范是特殊的和具体的,而道德原则是一般的和抽象的。道德规范是易变的,而道德原则适用于所有的情况。道德原则用于论证规范,并产生新的规范以应付意料之外的情况。规范在确定行为的道德性时直接比原则包括更多的内容。对道德原则和规范的一致性和可理解性的详细阐述,是道德理论的中心问题。

“道德规范说明某些行为通常是对的(或必须做的),但留下了是否有可能证明那类行为(或没有履行那类行为)会是正当的问题。”——辛格:《伦理学中的普遍化》,1963年,第103页。

Moral sense

Analogous to the sense of beauty, moral sense is supposed to be an intuitive, disinterested faculty which enables us to recognise moral qualities such as being good and bad, virtuous and vicious from what we feel. If the observation of an action is painful and disquieting, the action must be bad or evil. If the observation of an action results in a pleasant feeling, the action is good and virtuous. On such a basis, moral sense further motivates us towards morally right and virtuous behaviour. Moral sense conflicts with the theological position that God's will is the basis of morality and is also opposed to rationalism, since it insists that reason cannot account for our motivation and claims that morality is felt rather than reasoned. The theory which argues for the existence of moral sense is called moral sense theory, and is particularly associated with the eighteenth century British philosophers Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Moral sense theory tries to base itself on Locke's theory of knowledge, and it is a version of moral intuitionism. It is also called sentimentalism. Its major contribution is to emphasise the role of feeling in morality. Criticism of this theory generally alludes to the fact that there is no justification for positing an extra faculty of moral sense and that such a theory cannot avoid moral relativism.

"One man (Lord Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, etc) says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called 'moral sense'."—Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, III, 1970, p. 26.

Moral sense theory, see moral sense

Moral theory, see ethics and morality

Moral virtue, an alternative expression for ethical virtue

Morality, see ethics and morality

Morals, another term for ethics or moral philosophy

Morals proper, see metaphysics (Kant)

Motion, see change

道德感

类似于美感,道德感被认为是直觉性的、无利害关系的官能,它使我们能够从我们所感觉到的东西认识到诸如好(善)与坏、德性与恶的道德性质。假如对一个行为的观察是痛苦的和令人不安的,这种行为必定是坏的或恶的,如果对一种行为的观察导致一种愉快的感觉,这种行为必定是善的和有道德的。在这样一种基础上,道德感进一步推动我们迈向道德上正当的和有德性的行为。它是与把上帝的意志当做道德基础的神学观对立的,也是与理性主义相对的,因为它坚持认为,理性不能说明我们的动机,道德是感觉到的而不是推理得到的。主张道德感存在的这种理论被称为“道德感理论”,它尤其相联于18世纪的英国哲学家莎夫茨伯利、F. 哈奇森和D. 休谟。道德感理论力图把它自己建立在洛克的认识论上,是道德直觉主义的一种形式,也称为情感主义。其主要贡献在于强调道德中的情感作用。对这个理论的批评一般间接提到这个事实:提出道德感这样一种额外的官能,不可能有任何证明,以及这样一种理论不能避免道德相对主义。

“有人(莎夫茨伯利伯爵、哈奇森、休谟等)说,他有一种东西有意要告诉他什么是对的、什么是错的,它就叫做‘道德感’。”——边沁:《道德与立法原则导论》,第三章,1970年,第26页。

道德感理论

见“道德感”条。

道德理论

见“伦理学和道德”条。

道德德性

“伦理德性”的另一表述。

道德

见“伦理学和道德”条。

道德

被用作“伦理学”或“道德哲学”的另一个名称。

严格意义的道德

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

运动

见“变化”条。

Motive

The moving force which leads a person to behave or act in this way rather than in another way. A motive is closely related to our desire for the objects for which we act. Reason and cause are generally appealed to for explaining behaviour. While many philosophers believe that reason is also a motive, Hume denied that reason has a moving force. It is a continuing matter of controversy whether motivational explanation is also a type of causal explanation, and there is also some disagreement whether a motivational explanation is an explanation in terms of pattern.

"A motive is a want that leads to action, that is, a goal appraised as good for action without further deliberation; it includes effective and deliberate action tendencies."—Arnold, in Mischel (ed.), *Human Action*, 1969, p. 196.

Motive utilitarianism

A version of utilitarianism which applies the principle of utility directly to behavioural dispositions and indirectly to actions. It claims that concern for the maximisation of human happiness is good, but tries to shift ethical consideration from the traditional utilitarian focus on the moral assessment of actions to the assessment of motives which give rise to actions.

"The theory that will be my principal subject here is that one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has more utility than the latter... Let us call this doctrine motive utilitarianism."—Adams, "Motive Utilitarianism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 73 (1976), p. 470.

Motive-consequentialism, see consequentialism

Moving rows, paradox of

One of Zeno's paradoxes designed to show the impossibility of motion. Suppose that there are three equally sized rows A, B and C. Each member of each row occupies a minimal unit of time and a minimal part of space. The row A is at rest, but rows C and B move in opposite directions with equal velocities. When the first member of B passes two members of A (taking two units of time), it will at the same time pass four members of C (taking four units of time), leading to the conclusion that "double the time is equal to half the time". The arguments of this paradox are complicated, and there are various other versions.

"The fourth argument is that concerning the two rows of bodies.... This, he thinks, involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to double that time."—Aristotle, *Physics*, 239b33-6.

M-predicate, see P-predicate

动机

使得一个人以这种而不是那种方式行为或活动的动力。动机与一个人对其行为对象的欲求密切相关。对一个行为的解释常常要借助于理由和原因。许多哲学家认为理由也是动机,但休谟却否认理由具有动力。动机解释是否也是一种因果解释的问题不断引起争议。关于动机解释是否是一种模式解释也存在争议。

“动机是导致活动的愿望,亦即,一个无须进一步的推敲而被褒扬为善的活动目标;它包括有效的和蓄意的活动倾向。”——阿诺德,贝米谢尔(编):《人类活动》,1969年,第196页。

动机功利主义

功利主义的一种形式,它将功利原则直接应用于行为的意向,间接地应用于行为。它认为,对人的最大幸福的关切就是善,但它却试图将伦理学的思考从传统功利主义的以对行为的道德评价为中心,转换为对产生行为的动机评价为中心。

“这个在此将成为我的主题的理论是,就一种动机模式比另一种更多功利色彩而言,前者在道德上优于后者,……让我们把这一学说称为动机功利主义。”——亚当斯:《动机的功利主义》,《哲学杂志》,73(1976),第470页。

动机—效果论

见“效果论”条。

运动列悖论

芝诺关于运动不可能的悖论之一。设想有三个大小相等的排列A、B及C。每一列的每一成员都占据一小个时间单位和一小个空间单位。A列处于静止状态;C和B则以同等速度向相反方向运动。结果,当B的第一个成员越过两个A列成员(两个时间单位)时,它在相同时间中越过四个C列成员(四个时间单位),其结论是,“一倍的时间等于一半的时间”。这一悖论的论证极其复杂,而且有许多不同形式。

“第四个论证是关于两列物体,……他认为这会得出结论说,一给定时间的一半会等于其一倍。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》,239b33—36。

物—谓词

见“入—谓词”条。

Mundus intelligibilis, see intelligible world

Mundus sensibilis, see intelligible world

Mysticism

The view that there exists a transcendent or ultimate reality which cannot be experienced or rationally conceived. That domain is beyond the description of ordinary language, and knowledge of it can only be achieved through mysterious intuition resulting from long-term spiritual cultivation. By gaining a vision of this ineffable ultimate reality, one reaches a joyous and ecstatic union with it, and this union constitutes the ultimate meaning of human life. Mysticism is associated with religious experience and doctrines. Many properties of the Christian God are ineffable and can only be divinely revealed. Mysticism is also associated with traditional metaphysics or speculative philosophy, which seeks after the first principles that cannot be rationally discussed. Since the existence of mystical entities is not provable, and mystical experience is untestable, mysticism is always under suspicion. Wittgenstein was also concerned with mysticism. For him, the mystical is a realm of ultimate importance which can be shown, but cannot be said. This view of the mystical is aesthetic and ethical value and is distinguished from logic.

"The term mysticism is at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible; and in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with superstition and deception." - Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 82.

Myth of passage

A term introduced by D. C. Williams in his paper "The Myth of Passage" (1951). It is a very common to believe that time flows and is a passage. Some philosophers even believe that time as a rolling stream is the feature which distinguishes time from other instances of one-dimensional order, such as the order of points on a line. Williams argued that if time flows past us or if we advance through time, this would be a motion with respect to a hypertime because we could not say that the motion of time is a motion with respect to time itself. Furthermore, if it is of the essence of time that time passes, then hypertime will pass as well, requiring a hyper-hypertime and so on *ad infinitum*. Williams concluded that the passage of time is a myth and should be abandoned.

理智世界

〔“理智世界(intelligible world)”的拉丁词〕见“理智世界(intelligible world)”条。

感性世界

〔“感性世界(sensible world)”的拉丁词〕见“理智世界”条。

神秘主义

这种观点主张,存在着一个超验的或终极的实在,它既不能被经验,也不能被理性把握。那个领域超出日常语言的描述范围,对它的知识只能通过长期的精神教化所形成的神秘直觉才能达到。人一旦目睹这不可名状的终极实在,他就达到一种与它合一的快乐而痴迷的境界,这种合一构成人类生活的终极意义。神秘主义与宗教体验和学说相关联。基督教上帝的许多特性就是不可名状的,只能被神圣启示。神秘主义也与传统形而上学或思辨哲学相关联,因为这种哲学追寻不能被理性讨论的第一原理。既然神秘实体的存在是不可证明的,神秘的体验是不可检验的,那么,神秘主义就总是被怀疑。维特根斯坦也关注神秘主义。在他看来,神秘是第一重要的领域,它能被显示,但却不能被言说。这种神秘的观点具有美学和伦理学价值,但与逻辑相区别。

“在现时,大家一律地把神秘主义一词当做神奇玄妙和不可思议的东西;由于各自的文化背景和思维方式不同,他们对神秘主义的评价也因此相异,一类人认为所指真实无妄,另一类人则称为与迷信和欺诈相关。”——黑格尔《小逻辑》,第82节。

迁移神话

由 D. C. 威廉姆斯在一篇题为《迁移的神话》的论文(1951年)中引入的术语。一种非常普遍的看法认为时间流逝着,并且是一种迁移。有些哲学家甚至相信,时间作为一种潺潺的溪流,是它借以区别于其他一维序列的事例(例如一条线上的点的序列)的特征。威廉姆斯论辩说,如果时间流经我们或者我们穿过时间前进,这将是关于超时间的运动,因为我们不能说时间的运动是关于时间自身的。而且,如果时间的本质即时间流逝,那么超时间也将流逝,需要一种超超时间,如此以至无穷。威廉姆斯得出的结论是,时间迁移是一个神话,应当被抛弃。

“〔有一个命题〕在事件的纯粹扩展之上,和它们的若干特性一起,沿着时间轴,……有着在

"[There is a proposition] that over and above the sheer spread of events, with their several qualities, along the time axis... there is something extra, something active and dynamic, which is often and perhaps best described as passage. This something extra, I am going to plead, is a myth."—D. C. Williams, *Principles of Empirical Realism*, 1966, p. 283.

Myth of the given

A term introduced by the American philosopher W. Sellars in his essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". Many empiricists claim that there is a sort of knowledge which is directly presented to our consciousness and call this knowledge the given. The given, to which each of us has privileged access, presupposes no learning and no forming of associations, but provides the foundation for empirical knowledge. It offers the ultimate court of appeals for all our knowledge claims about the world. All other forms of knowledge are derived from the given according to certain rules.

Sellars labels the alleged existence of such knowledge as "the myth of the given". To call something a myth means that it does not exist at all. Sellars rejects all the central arguments that were put forward to support the existence of the given and claims that empirical knowledge, which is a rational and self-correcting enterprise, has no need for the given. His position has had much influence in questioning the need for foundations in epistemology and other areas of philosophy.

"The idea that observation, strictly and properly so-called, is constituted by certain self-authenticating non-verbal episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are made 'in conformity with the semantical rules of the language', is, of course, the heart of the myth of the given."—Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality*, 1963, p. 169.

此之外的某种东西,某种主动的、动态的东西,它经常并且最好被描述为迁移。我想申明的是,这一之外的某种东西是一种神话。"—威廉姆斯:《经验实在论原理》,1966年,第283页。

所予的神话

美国哲学家 W. 塞拉斯在其论文《经验主义和心的哲学》中提出的术语。许多经验主义者认为,有一种直接呈现于我们意识的知识,并将这种知识称为“所予”。我们每个人都有特权得知的所予不以学习和形成联系为先决条件,但对于经验知识提供了基础。对于我们的有关世界的知识,它设置了上诉的终审法庭。所有其他形式的知识都是根据某些规则从所予中得来的。

塞拉斯把所谓的这种知识的存在贴了个标签,叫做“所予的神话”。把某种东西叫做神话,意味着它根本不存在。塞拉斯反驳了为证明所予存在而提出的所有核心论证,主张经验知识——它是一项理性的、自我校正的事业——并不需要所予。在质疑认识论和哲学其他领域需要基础时,他的立场有极大的影响。

“有人认为观察——严格地和恰当地称呼的——由某种自我证明、非言词的事件构成,当人们‘按照语言的句法规则’做出言词和类似言词的行动时,它的权威性会传递给它们,当然,这种想法是所予的神话的核心。”——塞拉斯:《科学、知觉和实在》,1963年,第169页。

N

Naive realism

The common sense view of the world held by most ordinary people. According to this view, the external world consists of objects such as rocks and trees and the qualities they possess. The world exists and develops independently of our sensations and thought. Our sensations, like mirrors, reflect this world as it is. Such a view also believes uncritically that we have the ability to know the world. However, upon reflection, philosophers find that the nature of the world and our knowledge about it are both much more complicated and puzzling than naive realism suggests. Many so-called secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell are inseparable from our senses rather than properties of things independent of us. Our perceptions sometimes deceive us. From here we may derive many fundamental philosophical questions such as "What is real?", "What is appearance?", "How is illusion possible?", "Is our experience a reliable source of knowledge?". One of the major tasks of philosophy is to uncover the difficulties hidden in the common assumptions of views such as naive realism in order to understand the world better.

"Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false."—Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 15.

Name

A name is traditionally believed to be a mark, sign or expression referring to things in the world. Names are generally divided into general or common names (referring to kinds of individuals) and single or proper names (referring to particular individuals). Names help people to communicate ideas or to remember ideas. Frege distinguished between the sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*) of a name. He held that the fact that two names for the same thing cannot always be used interchangeably indicates that names are not merely referential devices but also have sense in terms of which they refer to objects. Russell rejected Frege's distinction between sense and reference and claimed that only logically proper names such as "this" or "that" refer to objects. Ordinary proper names are actually definite descriptions in disguise. Kripke rejects the view that names are descriptions in part on the grounds that the user of a name does not require identifying information about the object in question. He has pro-

素朴实在论

大多数普通人对于世界所持的一种常识观点。照这种观点,外在世界由诸如岩石、树木及它们所具有的性质构成。世界的存在和发展独立于我们的感觉和思想。我们的感觉像镜子一样如实地反映这个世界。这种观点也不加批判地认为我们有能力认识世界。然而,哲学家在反思之后发现,世界的本性和我们对此的知识都要比素朴实在论所认为的要复杂和令人困惑得多。许多所谓的第二性质,诸如颜色、味道、气味,与我们的感觉不可分,它们不是事物独立于我们的性质。我们的知觉有时会欺骗我们。由此我们会得到许多基本的哲学问题,诸如“什么是实在的?”“什么是现象?”“幻象如何可能?”“我们的经验是知识可靠的源泉吗?”哲学的主要任务之一就是要发现隐藏在诸如素朴实在论这样的日常假设中的困难,以便更好地理解世界。

“素朴实在论导致物理学,而物理学则正确地表明素朴实在是错的,因此,素朴实在论的确是错的;因此,它就是错的。”——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第15页。

名称

名称在传统上被看做是指称世界中事物的标记、记号或表达式。名称通常被分为一般名称或普通名称(指称个体的种类)和单个名称或专门名称(指称特殊的个体)。名称帮助人们交流观念或记忆观念。弗雷格区分了名称的意义(*Sinn*)和指称(*Bedeutung*)。他认为,同一个事物具有的两个名称往往不能交替使用,这一事实表明,名称不仅是指称的手段,而且具有意义,由于这种意义它们才指称对象。罗素抛弃了弗雷格对意义和指称的区分,认为只有“逻辑上的专名”诸如“这个”或“那个”才指称对象。日常的专名实际上是伪装的限定摹状词。克里普克反对认为名称是摹状词的看法,在他看来,名称的使用者并不必须对这个对象有比较清楚的了解。他自己的名称理论认为,名称是严格的指示词,指称在所有世界中存在的同一个体。按这种理解,名词与对象之间关系的建立与维系

posed a theory of names according to which a name is a rigid designator, which refers to the same individual in all worlds in which that individual exists. On his account, the connection between a name and its object is established and maintained causally rather than through descriptive content.

"The name itself is merely a means of pointing to the thing." — Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 245.

Narcissism

[from the Greek myth; *Narkissos*, the youth at the riverside who fell in love with his own reflection in water] Narcissism is self-love or an erotic interest in oneself. Freud believed that narcissism exists when the libido is directed toward the self. Narcissism as a psychological phenomenon normally occurs in childhood when individuals believe that they possess every valued perfection and that they are their own ideal. When people grow up, the response of others and their own critical judgement will lead to the realisation that they are not perfect and they will seek to replace childhood narcissism with a new form of ego ideal.

"Clinical experience had made us familiar with people who behaved in a striking fashion as though they were in love with themselves and this perversion had been given the name of narcissism." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 257.

Narrative

A mode of discourse, which establishes orders or logical relations among various events, and makes them into a sequence. Such a sequence is not merely a chronology of events, but provides a configurational understanding by which each occurrence introduced in the narrative forms part of a meaningful whole. In this way a narrative forms a story. A narrative can be oral or written, about what has happened or about the present, in the first person, third person or in a mixture of the two. Narrative differs from analysis and dialogue. We also need to distinguish between the narrative and its narration, as we distinguish between the story and its telling. Any narrative is open to infinite possibilities of re-narration. Narrative is merely a form of language, and is neutral regarding the truth of its contents. However, narrative has its own discoverable structure rather than being a purely subjective projection. Narrative is the characteristic way of presenting historical knowledge and literature. Its epistemological status and ontological implications have been major topics in contemporary analytic philosophy of history and philosophy of literature. Narrative seems to have important cognitive functions, but it is difficult to settle what these function might be.

"Narrative is a major organising device. It is as important to literature as representation to painting and sculpture;

是因果性的，而不是通过摹状内容的。

"名称本身只是指出事物的手段。"——罗素：《逻辑和知识》，1956年，第245页。

自恋

[源自希腊神话：那喀索斯 (*Narkissos*) 乃一河岸边上的美少年，爱上了自己在水中的倒影，死后化为水仙花] 自恋是指对自己产生爱情或对自己有性爱那样的兴趣。弗洛伊德相信，当里比多 (libido, 由性本能产生的动力) 朝向自我时，就会出现自恋。作为一种心理现象，自恋通常出现在儿童期；表现为当事人相信他们具有一切有价值的完美性，并相信他们是自己的理想。当人们长大后，他人的反应和他们自己的批判性判断使他们认识到自己并非完美，并且试图以新的自我理想形式来代替童年期的自恋。

"临床经验已使我们熟悉这样一种人，他们的行为非同寻常仿佛是在与自己恋爱一样。这样一种反常现象被称之为自恋。"——弗洛伊德：《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》，第18卷，第257页。

叙述

一种话语模式，旨在于不同事件中建立序列或逻辑关系，将其按顺序排列。这种顺序不仅是指事件按照发生的年月顺序排列，而且还提供一种完形的理解力，藉此使得记叙文中所发生的每一事件构成有意义整体的组成部分。这样一来，叙述便构成故事。叙述可以是口头的或笔头的，是关于过去的或现在的，可以用第一人称、第三人称或二者混用。叙述有别于分析和对话。我们在区别故事和讲故事时也需要分清叙述与叙述内容。任何叙述都具有复述的无限可能性。叙述纯然是一种语言形式，对其内容的真实性采取不偏不倚的态度。尽管如此，叙述有其自身的展示结构，并非是单纯的主观投射。叙述是传授历史知识与文学的特有方式。其认识论地位与本体论内涵向来是当代分析的历史哲学与文学哲学的主要话题。叙述看来具有重要的认知功能，但是难以确定这些功能会是什么。

"叙述是一种主要的组织手段。它对文学的重要性犹如再现对绘画和雕塑的重要性；就是说，叙述并非文学的本质所在，因为叙述（类似造型艺术中的再现）不是必不可少的，但是它却是设计多数作品的结构基础。"——朗格：《情感与形式》，1953年，第261页。

that is to say, it is not the essence of literature, for (like representation in plastic art) it is not indispensable, but it is the structural basis on which most works are designed.” — Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 1953, p. 261.

Narrative sentence

A sentence employed by historians in ascribing historical significance to events or persons by connecting them to something which came afterwards, such as “When Petrarch climbed Mount Ventoux he opened the Renaissance”. The problem of assessing the truth value of narrative sentences reflects a distinctive feature of historical knowledge. A person who saw Petrarch climb Mount Ventoux did not know that Petrarch opened Renaissance because no one at that time knew that there would be a Renaissance. As a consequence, a contemporary witness could not know the truth of that narrative sentence. However, historians know that it is true through knowing what happened later. In general, the truth value of a narrative sentence can be known only by those who have access to a temporal whole including all of the relevant time periods.

“I shall designate them as ‘narrative sentences’. Their most general characteristic is that they refer to at least two time-separated events though they only *describe* (are only *about*) the earliest event to which they refer.” — A. C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 1965, p. 43.

Narrow content

The kind of content of a mental state that is purely “in the head” of the subject. It is not related to the world, and is taxonomised according to causal power. It is not subject to existential generalisation, and is not freely substitutable by co-extensive terms. Narrow content contrasts with the ordinary attributes of occurring thoughts and propositional attitudes, which is called wide content or broad content. Wide content is not wholly “in the head” and has a set of truth-conditions. The notion of narrow content is based on Putnam’s distinction between narrow states and wide states. It is useful for providing psychological explanations of behaviour and explaining the privileged access we seem to have to our own mental states.

“The narrow content of a mental state is supposed to be a kind of content that is wholly internal to the mind of the person in the mental state.” — Stalnaker, “Narrow content”, in Anderson and Owen (eds.), *Propositional Attitudes*, 1990, p. 131.

Narrow state

A term introduced by Putnam for the mental states which do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. This is in contrast to wide states, such as being jealous of somebody.

叙述句子

是历史学家通过把事件或人物与随后发生的事情联结起来而将历史的意义归结为这些人物和事件的一种句子。例如,“当彼特拉克登上文都山时,他开辟了文艺复兴时期”。对叙述句子真值的估价问题,反映了历史知识的一个显著特性。一个看到彼特拉克登上文都山的人并不知道彼特拉克开辟了文艺复兴时期,因为当时没人知道将会有一个文艺复兴时期。作为一种推断,当时的目击者无法知道这一叙述句子的真。可是,历史学家通过了解后来所发生的事情而知道它是真的。一般说来,叙述句子的真值只能为那些经历了包括所有相关时期在内的整个时代的人所认识。

“我将把它们称为‘叙述句子’。它们的最主要的特征是:虽然它们仅仅“描述”(仅仅是“关于”)它们所涉及的最早的事件,但它们至少涉及的是两个在时间上分开的事件。”——丹托:《分析的历史哲学》,1965年,第43页。

狭内容

是指一种纯粹“在头脑中”的心的状态的内容。它不与世界相关联,依因果力而分类。它不隶属于存在概括,也不能轻易地由共有术语所取代。狭内容相对于呈现思维和命题态度的普通属性。后者被称为广内容或宽内容。宽内容不完全“在头脑中”并有一系列的真值条件。狭内容概念乃是基于普特南关于狭状态与广状态的区分。它有助于提供关于行为的心理学解释并解释我们对自己的心的状态所具有的优先获知。

“一个心的状态的狭内容被认为是一种完全在具有这个心的状态的人的心的内部的内容。”——斯托奈克:《狭内容》,见安德森和欧文(编):《命题态度》,1990年,第131页。

狭状态

由普特南引进的术语,指不预设任何处于这一状态的主体以外的任何个体的心的状态。这与像忌妒某人这样的广状态相对,后者具有指涉主体以外的世界这样的宽内容。方法论的

which have wide content referring to the world outside the subject. Methodological solipsism is a doctrine which holds that psychology ought to be concerned exclusively with narrow mental or psychological states. What is characteristic of narrow states is narrow content, which is constituted simply by what is "in the head". Fodor uses the notion of a narrow state for those mental states which can be individuated by content without regard to truth or reference. These states are solely determined by the intrinsic properties of an individual, without presupposing that anything other than that individual exists. Other philosophers use the term for mental states shared by molecule-for-molecule duplicates. Different thinkers use different criteria for narrowness, but all agree that a narrow state cannot be a belief that is individuated by particular objects in the believer's environment.

"We shall... refer to the states which are permitted by methodological solipsism as 'psychological states in the narrow sense'." — Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, p. 220.

Nash equilibrium, see game theory

National character

The pattern of thought, feeling and action that is peculiar to a society and its people and forms their particular identity. A national character is cultivated from historical and cultural traditions. Although the explanatory role of national character is disputed, society is claimed to inherit its character from its earlier states, and its character is claimed to form its subsequent states. National character is embodied in public sentiment and social custom, and it greatly influences a society's laws and form of government. J. S. Mill claimed that by analogy to political economy, the social sciences should have a branch, which he called political ethnology, to study national character. Some advocates of the importance of national character, represented by Vico and Herder, emphasise that there is no common measurement of worth for different cultures or characters. This position is echoed by contemporary communitarians. Major problems facing this view are how to avoid relativism and how to make inter-cultural criticism possible. This approach to national character contrasts with liberal universalism, which holds that a set of universal values and rights applies to human beings irrespective of the national communities to which they belong.

"The laws of national (or collective) character are by far the most important class of sociological laws." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VII, p. 905.

Nationalism

In its positive aspect, adherence to a national identity formed by the distinctive characteristics typically derived

唯我论认为心理学只应当关心“狭的”心的状态或心理状态。狭状态的特点在于“狭内容”，后者仅由头脑中的东西所组成。福多使用狭状态概念来指那些不考虑真和指称而可以由内容加以区分的心的状态。这些状态仅仅由个体的内在特性所决定，而不预设任何这一个体以外的东西的存在。另外一些哲学家采用这一概念来指与完全复制品共有的心的状态。不同的人可能使用不同的狭义标准，但所有的人都认为狭状态是一个不由相信者的环境中的特定对象来区分的信念。

“我们应当……将方法论的唯我论所容许的状态称为‘狭义的心理状态’。”——普特南：《心智、语言与实在》，1975年，第220页。

纳西均衡

见“游戏理论”条。

民族特性

民族特性是一个社会及其人民特有的并构成他们独特个性的思想、情感和行为的方式。民族特性是由历史和传统文化培养而成的。虽然对民族特性的解释作用有争议，但人们认为社会继承了它以前状况的特性，它的特性又会构成它后来的状况。民族特性体现在舆论和社会习惯中，对社会的法律和政府的形式有着重大影响。J. S. 密尔主张，社会科学应有一门类似政治经济学那样的研究民族特性的学科，他把这一学科称为政治性格学。以维柯和赫尔德为代表的一些鼓吹民族特性的重要性的人强调，对不同的文化或特性而言，不存在共同的价值尺度。这一见解得到了当代共同体主义者的附和。这一观点面临的主要问题是避免相对主义和如何使各种文化之间的批评成为可能。对民族特性的这一看法是与自由主义的普遍主义相对立的，后者认为一组普遍的价值和权利适用于人类，而无须考虑他们从属的民族共同体。

“民族（或集体的）特性的规律是最重要的社会学规律。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第七卷，第905页。

民族主义

就其积极方面而言，它坚持一个民族的特性，这种特性是由那些典型地起源于一个民族

from one's national history, culture, language, and religion. Nationalism emphasises the nation's rights to self-determination and sovereignty and demands the preservation of its culture. Nationalists often claim that the nation's values and interests, at least in times of danger or crisis, override the individual rights of its citizens. Citizens are required to display patriotism by being loyal to the nation and by serving its collective aims.

Negatively, nationalism attaches unreasonable importance to one's national moral, cultural and political values. An exclusive concern for the interests of one's own nation leads to blindness and belligerence in assessing the values and interests of other nations or minorities within one's own nation. In this sense, nationalism is nearly indistinguishable from chauvinism.

"Nationalism, if we extended the sense of the word 'nation' somewhat, could include the self-centred pursuit of the interest of any individual group." —Hare, *Essays on Political Authority*, 1989, p. 37.

Natura naturans

[Latin: literally nature naturing, that is generating or active nature, in contrast to *natura naturata*, literally nature natured, that is generated or passive nature] These two terms derive from scholastic philosophy, in which *natura naturans* refers to God and *natura naturata* refers to the created world. Spinoza introduced them in his *Ethics*, where *natura naturans* is used for substance and attributes, because they are self-explanatory. *Natura naturata* is used for modes, which follow from substances and attributes and must be explained by them. Accordingly, God and the world are one, but are not absolutely identical.

"From what has gone before, I think it is plain that by *natura naturans* we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, prop. 29.

Natura naturata, see *natura naturans*

Natura non facit saltum, see contiguity

Natural deduction

The method which constructs a logical system merely on the basis of a set of rules of inference without employing any logical truths as axioms. It contrasts with the standard axiomatic method of forming a logical system which requires both a set of axiom like logical truths and a set of rules of inference. The method of natural deduction was developed independently in 1934 by the Polish logician S. Jaskowski and

的历史、文化、语言和宗教的独具特色的特征构成的。民族主义强调民族的自决权和主权,并要求保存它的文化。民族主义者常常声称,民族的价值和利益,至少在危险或危机的时候,是压倒其公民的个人权利的。公民被要求以对民族的忠诚和为民族集体的目标服务来显示爱国主义。

就其消极方面而言,民族主义热衷于对一个民族的道德、文化和政治价值的过度重视。对一个民族自身利益的孤傲的关注,会导致在评价其他民族或自己国家中的少数民族的价值和利益时的盲目无知和好战。从这种意义上讲,民族主义与沙文主义几乎难以区分。

“如果我们将‘民族’这个词的意思扩展一点,民族主义就可以包括以自我为中心的对个别集团利益的追求。”——黑尔,《政治权威论文集》,1989年,第37页。

产生自然的自然

[拉丁词,字面意思是“能自然化的自然”,即能产生的或能动的自然。与它相对的词是 *natura naturata*,字面意思是“被自然产生的自然”,即被产生的或被动的自然]这两个词都来自经院哲学,前者指上帝,后者指被造的世界。斯宾诺莎在他的《伦理学》中引入了这两个词。根据他的观点,*natura naturans* 指实体和属性,因为它们是由自己来说明的,而 *natura naturata* 指样式,它们是从实体和属性来的,必须由后者来说明。相应地,上帝和世界两者为一,但不是绝对的等同。

“从前面所说的看,我想很明显,我们把 *natura naturans* 理解为在自身内,并通过自身被构想的东西,或理解为实体的表示永恒无限本质的那些属性。”——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第一部分,命题29。

被自然产生的自然

见“产生自然的自然”条。

自然从不飞跃

见“接近性”条。

自然演绎

仅仅基于一组推理规则而不使用任何逻辑真理作为公理来构造逻辑系统的方法。它与构造逻辑系统的标准的公理化方法形成对照,后者既要求一组似公理的逻辑真理,又需要一组推理规则。自然演绎方法是由波兰逻辑学家S. 雅斯科夫斯基和德国逻辑学家G. 根岑于1934年各自独立发展的。标准的公理式形式化使逻

the German logician G. Gentzen. While standard axiomatic formalisation makes logic concentrate on the choice and justification of logical truths, the axiomless formalisation of natural deduction focuses on logical consequence, that is on the move from premises to conclusions. For example, from a pair of sentences as premises one infers their conjunction, and from a conjunction one infers either conjunct. With natural deduction, a premise can be introduced at any stage of deduction without need of justification, and a hypothesis can also serve as a premise. In this way, logic not only gets rid of the most troublesome task of justifying its choice of logical truths, but also conforms more properly to its original task, that is, the study of inference.

"The methods of proof so far assembled (techniques for 'natural deduction', as they are sometimes called) permits the demonstration of all logically true propositions constructed out of truth-functional connectives and the quantification of individual variable." —Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, 1967, 3rd ed., p. 129.

Natural kinds

Things which are naturally distinguished, including the species of things such as whales and apples and elements or mass items such as water and gold. These things occur naturally, in contrast to things such as televisions and tables which are invented by human beings. Traditionally, terms naming natural kinds, that is natural kind terms, are taken to be general names that should be defined by giving a connotative meaning or by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of their application.

In the 1970s, Kripke and Putnam, arguing against the traditional theory, suggest that natural kind terms, like proper names, are not connotative. While proper names are rigid designators of an individual, natural kind terms are rigid designators of a kind. They have an essential property, namely, the underlying structure discovered through empirical investigation. Water is H_2O in all possible worlds, so anything that is not H_2O is not water, even if it satisfies some list of superficial features that we think characterise water. Accordingly, it is a necessary truth that water is H_2O , although this truth is *a posteriori*, that is empirically known. A natural kind term is ascribed historically, and the justification for its use is passed on through a causal chain.

"What really distinguishes the classes we count as natural kinds is itself a matter of (high level and very abstract) scientific investigation and not just meaning analysis." —Putnam, in Schwartz (ed.), *Names, Necessity and Natural Kinds*, p. 104.

Natural language, see ordinary language

辑集中关注逻辑真理的选择和辩护,而无公理的自然演绎形式化则重点关注逻辑后承,即从前提到结论的步骤。例如,从一对作为前提的语句人们可以推出它们的合取,并且从一合取人们可以推出任意一个合取支。对于自然演绎来说,一前提可以在演绎的任何步骤引入而不需要辩护,假设也可以用作前提。这样一来,逻辑不仅摆脱了下述最烦难的任务,即证明它对逻辑真理的选择是合理的,而且更恰切地适合它本来的任务,即研究推理。

“迄今所列集的证明方法(它们有时被称作‘自然演绎’技巧)使我们能够证明所有那些由真值函项联结词和个体变元量化构造出来的逻辑真命题。”——柯比:《符号逻辑》,1967年,第3版,第129页。

自然种类

自然地区别开来的事物,包括事物的种类如“鲸”和“苹果”,以及元素或物质名词如“水”和“金”。与人们发明的“电视机”、“桌子”等等相反,这些事物是自然地出现的。传统理论宣称,命名自然种类的词项即自然种类词是通名,应该通过给出其内涵意义或刻画其应用的充分必要条件来给它们下定义。

在20世纪70年代,克里普克和普特南反对传统的理论,提出自然种类词像专名一样,不是内涵性的。若专名是个体的固定指示词,则自然种类词就是种类的固定指示词。它们具有一本质属性,即通过经验研究所发现的底层结构。水在所有可能世界中都是 H_2O ,因此任何不是 H_2O 的东西就不是水,即使它满足我们认为水的特征的某些表面特性。相应地,水是 H_2O 是一必然真理,尽管这是后天地也就是经验地知道的。自然种类词历史地归属于一个因果链条,对其用法的辩护也通过这个链条而传递。

“真正把我们称之为自然种类类别区分开来的,是(高层次和非常抽象的)科学研究工作,而不只是意义分析。”——普特南,见施瓦茨(编):《命名,必然性和自然种类》,第104页。

自然语言

见“日常语言”条。

Natural law, another expression for law of nature

Natural law theory

A position holding that there is a system of natural laws which guides political and legal authority, and sets the moral standards for human conduct. It argues that law is essentially normative and that an unjust law is not a law. Natural law theory has two major forms. Classical natural law theory is based on the distinction between nature and convention and considers natural law to be a conception of justice. It is universal and everlasting, grounded either in God's will or human nature and discovered by human reason. This form can be traced to Aristotle's teleological ethics and Stoicism and was developed by Medieval philosophers in combination with Christian thought. It was revived in this century, especially by John Finnis and Robert Nozick. Modern natural law theory claims that natural laws grant natural rights to each individual. These include rights to freedom, life and equality. Political rights and obligations are derived through the social contract of individuals who hold these natural rights. This theory was developed by Grotius, Locke and Rousseau and was revived in this century especially by John Rawls. Natural law theory forms a major tradition in legal philosophy in virtue of its claim that law is necessarily connected with morality. Human law derives its binding force from natural law and is null if it does not conform with natural law. The chief motive for originating legal positivism was to reject natural law theory.

"A 'natural law' theorist... would insist that all valid moral standards are tacitly incorporated by the Constitution, so that any interpretation that ascribes to it moral stands of an inferior or defective kind must be mistaken." — J. Feinberg, *Offense to Others*, 1985, p. 167.

Natural light

[Latin: *lumen naturale*, also called *lux rationis*, the light of reason] Generally regarded by seventeenth century philosophers as a universal faculty shared by all human beings that could be expected to reach the same view about certain basic issues. Descartes in particular favoured this term, using it to refer to the transparent clarity of cognition. Truths which are presented to the intellect by the natural light allow no room for denial and are not open to doubt. Descartes used it as an authority whenever he wished to introduce some fundamental premises as a basis for further argument. He associated this notion with intuition by defining intuition as what the mind clearly and indubitably conceives from the natural light. According to this view, the natural light could be developed through the study of sciences, but could also be obscured if we are not capable of heeding rea-

自然法

“自然法 (law of nature)” 的另一英文表述。

自然法理论

这一主张认为, 存在一种指导政治权力和法律权力, 并为人们的行为制定道德标准的自然法体系。它论证道, 法在本质上是规范性的, 恶法不是法。自然法理论有两种主要形式。古典的自然法理论以自然和约定的区分为基础, 认为自然法是正义的观念。自然法是普遍的和永恒的, 它或者基于神意, 或者基于人的本性, 并且是为人的理性所发现的。这种自然法理论可以追溯到亚里士多德的目的论伦理学和斯多亚哲学, 并通过与基督教思想的结合为中世纪的哲学家所发展。它在本世纪又得以复兴, 这主要是得益于 J. 芬尼斯和 R. 诺齐克。现代自然法理论认为自然法赋予每一个人以自然权利。这些权利包括自由权、生存权和平等权。政治权利和义务起源于拥有这些自然权利的个人之间的社会契约。这一理论为格劳修斯、洛克和卢梭所发展, 它在本世纪的复兴主要得益于 J. 罗尔斯。由于认为法律与道德有必然的联系, 自然法理论构成了法哲学中一个主要传统。人定法是从自然法获得其约束力的, 如果不与自然法相一致它就等于零。法律实证主义起因的主旨就是反对自然法理论。

“一个‘自然法’理论家会坚持认为, 所有有效的道德标准不言而喻都为宪法所体现, 以至任何把差的或有缺陷的道德标准归结于它的解释都肯定是错误的。” — 芬伯格:《对他人的伤害》, 1985 年, 第 167 页。

自然之光

[拉丁文 *lumen naturale*, 亦称“理性之光” (*lux rationis*)] 17 世纪的哲学家一般把它看做有望能在某些基本问题上达成共识的全体人类共同享有的普遍官能。笛卡尔特别喜欢用这个词指认识的清晰透彻状态。以这种方式出现于理智面前的真理是不容否认、不可怀疑的。每当笛卡尔希望为进一步的证明提出某些基本前提作为基础时, 他都把理性之光当做权威。他把直觉界定为心灵通过自然之光清楚无疑构想的东西, 从而将自然之光这个概念同“直觉”联系起来。根据这个观点, 自然之光可以通过科学研究而得到发展, 但如果我们不能对理性加以关注, 自然之光也可以变得昏暗。

“认识的自然之光或官能是上帝给我们的, 就一个对象的确被这个官能所包含, 即就一个

son.

"The light of nature or faculty of knowledge which God gave us never encompass any object which is not true in so far as it is indeed encompassed by this faculty; that is, in so far as it is clearly and distinctly perceived." - Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. by Cottingham et al), 1985, Vol. 1, p. 203.

Natural philosophers

[Greek: *phusikoi* or *phusiologi*, literally the men who talk about nature; also translated as physicists, referring to the pre-Socratic philosophers who attempted to explain the world by appeal to natural causes, in contrast to the *theologi* who explained the generation and structure of the world in terms of myth and supernatural forces] Aristotle claimed that the founder of the natural philosophy is Thales. Natural philosophy is concerned with the question "What is the world made of?" and natural philosophers usually answer the question by appeal to a single material substratum, something equivalent to Aristotle's material cause. Historians of philosophy, however, generally believe that Aristotle's account is not very accurate, for natural philosophers did not have the concept of matter, and their keyword was "nature", the principle of a thing's growth and present organisation. Most of them wrote books entitled "On Nature".

"Natural philosophers have two modes of explanation. The first set make the underlying body one, ... The second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the one and emerge from it by segregation." - Aristotle, *Physics*, 187a11-20.

Natural philosophy, another name for philosophy of nature

Natural religion, another expression for natural theology

Natural rights

Rights which belong to us simply because of our humanity and not because of any special legal, political or social institutions. According to many writers of the Enlightenment, natural rights, which are held in the state of nature in virtue of natural law, cannot be transferred to the government through a social contract. According to Hobbes, with no government in the state of nature, an individual has a right to take everything necessary to preserve his life or to promote his survival. The supreme natural right to defend and preserve oneself also establishes one of the basic natural laws. But because everyone has natural rights which can conflict with the natural rights of everyone else, Hobbes depicted the state of nature as a state of war of all against all. Ac-

对象被清楚明晰地知觉而言,它决不会把任何不真实的对象包含进来。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第203页。

自然哲学家

[原文为希腊语 *phusikoi* 或者 *phusiologi*, 意指“谈论自然的人”,也被译为“物理学家”,表示苏格拉底以前的那些试图通过研究自然因进而解释世界的哲学家,他们有别于那些依据神话和超自然力量来解释世界生成与结构的神学家] 亚里士多德声称自然哲学家的创始人是泰勒斯。自然哲学家关注的是“世界由什么构成的?”这个问题,他们通常在回答这个问题时主要凭借一种单一的物质基质,等同于亚里士多德所说的质料因。然而,哲学史家一般认为亚里士多德的阐述并不怎么精确,因为自然哲学家并非接受“质料”这个概念,他们的主词是“自然”,而“自然”则是事物生长与现有组织的原理。许多自然哲学家的著作标题是“论自然”。

“自然哲学家有两套解释方式,第一套是将潜在的物体统一为太一,第二套断言对立因素包含在太一之中,但又是从太一中分离出来的。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》,187a11—20。

自然的哲学

“自然哲学 (philosophy of nature)” 的另一名称。

自然宗教

“自然神学” 的另一种表述。

自然权利

是指属于我们只是因为我們的人性而不是因为特殊的法律、政治或社会制度的那些权利。根据启蒙运动时期许多著作家的看法,自然权利是在自然状态下凭借自然法而持有的,它不可能通过社会契约而转移到政府那里。按照霍布斯观点,由于自然状态下没有政府,个人有权取得所需的东西以维持他的生命或促进他的生存。保护和维持自身的最高的自然权利,还确立了一个基本的自然法。不过,由于每个人拥有的自然权利会与其他人拥有的自然权利发生冲突,霍布斯把自然状态描绘为一切人反对一切人的战争状态。按照J. 洛克的见解,自然权利包括生存权、自由权和财产权。边沁公然反对自

according to John Locke, natural rights include the rights to life, liberty and property. Bentham notoriously rejected the possibility of natural rights on the grounds that nature does not provide rights and that rights can only be created by law. In spite of his objections, the notion of natural rights remains influential in moral, social and political thought. Natural rights are considered to be basic rights at the core of human rights. Writers are divided over the need to associate natural rights with natural law.

"The right of nature, which writers commonly call *jus naturale*, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." —Hobbes, *Leviathan*, I, 14.

Natural selection

A central term of Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory. Organisms have features with functions that are adapted to the natural world and that help them survive and reproduce. Christianity claims that this is due to God's design, but Darwin showed that this functional adaptation for survival can be explained by a causal mechanism, natural selection. Adaptations are selected because they aid the survival of individuals or species and are transmitted to succeeding generations. Natural selection gives rise not only to the often striking forms and functions of living creatures but also to their enormous diversity. Those organisms which fail to develop suitable features lose in the struggle for survival and reproduction. The basic spirit of natural selection is summarised in Spencer's phrase survival of the fittest. Natural selection is still at the centre of the dominant accounts of evolution.

"Drawing on the analogy of the animal and plant breeders' skill at transforming through picking desired forms, Darwin christened his new mechanism 'natural selection'." —Ruse, *Taking Darwin Seriously*, 1986, p. 16.

Natural theology

Also called natural religion or rational theology, a theological discipline which tries to prove truths about the existence and attributes of God through the employment of natural human reason. From this viewpoint, reason unaided by revelation can provide a firm basis for religion and shows that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God who created the world. It does not propose a supernatural communication with God through revelation and grace, because such revelation is not rationally justifiable. Rather, it makes use of data available to all rational beings. It intends to prove that theistic beliefs are not only true for believers, but for all rational human beings. It also tries to understand the action of divine providence regarding human beings and to

然权利的可能性,其根据是自然不提供权利,权利只能是由法律造成的。不管边沁如何反对,自然权利的看法仍对道德、社会和政治理论有影响。自然权利被视为人权的核心的基本权利。著作家在是否需要将自然权利和自然法联系起来的问题上存在分歧。

“著作家通常称为 *jus naturale* 的自然权利,就是每一个人拥有的按照自己的意愿运用自身的力量保全自己的天性——也就是保全他本人的生命力的自由;因此,这种自由就是用他自己的判断和理性认为是最适合的手段去做任何事情的自由。”——霍布斯:《利维坦》,第一部,第14章。

自然选择

C. 达尔文进化论的中心术语。有机体具有适应于自然界、从而有助于它们的生存和繁衍的功能特征。基督教宣称这是出自于上帝的设计,但达尔文证明这种适者生存的作用可以解释为一种因果机制,即“自然选择”。适者得以选择是由于它们有助于个体的生存或种类的生存并被遗传给后代。自然选择不仅经常导致生物的令人吃惊的形式和功能,而且导致它们大量的多样性。那些不能发展出这些合适特征的有机体是这种生存和繁殖斗争中的失败者。自然选择的基本精神被概括在斯宾塞的“适者生存”的警句之中。“自然选择”一词仍然处在进化思想的主导图景的中心。

“达尔文利用类比于动物和植物养育者通过挑选想要的形式来改良物种的技艺,把他的新机制命名为‘自然选择’。”——罗斯:《慎思达尔文》,1986年,第16页。

自然神学

也称作“自然宗教”或“理性神学”。神学的一个学科,即力图通过运用自然的人类理智来证明关于上帝存在及其属性的真理。根据这种观点,不靠启示相助的理智,能够为宗教提供坚实的基础,也能表明存在着一位全能的、全知的、全善的创世者上帝,它不提倡通过启示和恩典达到与上帝的超自然的沟通,因为这样的启示是理性不可证明的。它宁愿把一切理性存在物作为有效的证据材料来使用。它试图证明,有神论的信念不仅对于信仰者,而且对于一切有理性的人都是真实的。它也企图理解关于人类的神意行为,并力图处理邪恶问题。因此,自然神学是与超自然神学对应的,后者把关于上帝

deal with the problem of evil. Natural theology is thus contrasted with supernatural theology, which locates the source of truths about God in revelation. In this sense, natural religion is rational, while supernatural theology is not based on reason. This contrast is associated with the contrast between rational and revealed theology. For this reason, natural theology is a branch of metaphysics dealing with divine being. Many traditional arguments for God's existence, such as the ontological argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument and argument from design, are examples of natural theology. Aquinas's five ways are its paradigm. Natural theology was criticised by Hume and Kant. Hume provided especially important criticism of the argument from design. For Kant, natural theology cannot be right because the object whose existence it aims to prove is outside possible human experience where reason inevitably falls into conflict with itself, although he claimed that belief can be maintained not as knowledge but as a matter of faith and hope. Much of natural theology has been assimilated into contemporary philosophical theology.

"The fourth branch of metaphysics is natural or rational theology. The notion of God, or God as a possible being, the proofs of his existence, and his properties, formed the study of this branch." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 36.

Natural virtue

For Hume, virtue is the moral quality in ourselves or others which is approved of by our moral sentiments. He distinguished between natural virtue and artificial virtue. Natural virtues are virtuous tendencies and characteristics which arise from the fundamental propensities of human nature itself and are not cultivated deliberately. These characteristics include charity, benevolence, generosity, the love of one's children, clemency and so on. Artificial virtues, such as justice, allegiance and fidelity, in contrast, are effects of artifice and education and are obtained over a long period of time. They are artificial and invented, but not arbitrary. Hume claimed that natural virtues provide the basis for family life and intimate friendship, while artificial virtue is required for our broader social life.

"When I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial." —Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, III, 2, 1.

Naturalism

The claim that everything is a part of the world of nature and can be explained using the methodology of the natural sciences. Naturalism accepts explanatory monism rather than dualism or pluralism, is committed to science and is opposed to mysticism. In different areas, naturalism has different forms. In metaphysics, it rejects the postulation of any unnatural theoretical entities, faculties or causes, and it re-

的真理来源设定在启示中。在这种意义上,自然宗教是理性的,超自然神学则不以理性为基础。这个对立与理性神学和启示神学之间的对立相关联。正因如此,自然神学是形而上学的一个分支,处理神圣存在问题。关于上帝存在的许多传统论证,如本体论论证、宇宙论论证、目的论论证、道德论证、设计论证等等,都是自然神学的例证。阿奎那的“五法”是它的范例。自然神学受到了休谟和康德的批判。休谟尤其提出了对设计论证的重要批判。在康德看来,自然神学不可能正确,因为它意欲证明其存在的那个对象是处于人类可能的经验范围之外的,在那里理性必然与自己相矛盾,尽管康德自己也宣称信仰必须被维持,但不是作为知识,而是作为信念和希望。自然神学大多已被同化进当代哲学神学中。

“形而上学的第四个分支是自然神学或理性神学。上帝的观念,或作为一种可能存在的上帝,关于他存在的证明、他的特性,构成了这个分支的研究课题。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第36节。

自然的德

在休谟看来,德是在我们自己或他人身上被我们的道德情感所赞许的道德品质。他区分了自然的德和人为的德。自然的德是从人性自身的根本倾向中产生出来的道德趋向和特征,不是刻意培植出来的。这些特征包括博爱、慈善、慷慨、对子女的爱、宽厚等。而人为的德,诸如正义、忠实、真诚之类,是设计和教育的结果,是经过很长一段时期才得到的。它们是为人为的和发明出来的,但不是任意的。休谟声称,自然的德为家庭生活和亲密友谊提供了基础,而人为的德是我们广泛的社会生活所需要的。

“当我否认正义是自然的德时,我所用自然一词,仅仅是与人为的一词对立的。”——休谟:《人性论》,第三卷,第2章,第1节。

自然主义

认为每一事物都是自然世界的一部分,都可以用自然科学的方法加以解释。自然主义承认解释上的一元论,不承认解释上的二元论或多元论。它赞成科学,反对神秘主义。在不同的领域,自然主义有不同的形式。从形而上学方面来看,它反对假设任何非自然的从理论上推出的实体、官能或原因,反对科学探究无法接近的

jects supernatural beings and processes which are inaccessible to scientific inquiry. It also contests the claim that first philosophy is prior to natural science. In epistemology, naturalism holds that epistemological justification and explanation are continuous with natural science and argues that scientific method is the only way to secure our knowledge. According to nineteenth century psychologism and twentieth century naturalised epistemology, epistemology should be assimilated to empirical psychology. Ethical naturalism rejects the is-ought or fact-value distinction and explains ethical terms in terms of natural properties. This position was characterised by Moore as the "naturalistic fallacy", but it is uncertain whether it is a real fallacy. In aesthetics, naturalism holds that artwork should represent the world as it is. In philosophy of mind, naturalism holds that mental phenomena are, or are caused by, brain processes. Recent naturalistic interpretations of Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein place emphasis on unavoidable natural human tendencies rather than on the priority of science. For any form of naturalism, there is a corresponding form of anti-naturalism.

"Naturalism has a representative already in 1830 in the antimetaphysician Auguste Comte, who declared that positive philosophy does not differ in method from the special sciences."—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 72.

Naturalistic epistemology

A term from Quine's paper, "Epistemology naturalised", although Quine himself does not offer an explicit definition of it. Quine takes it as an epistemological project which suggests that in order to discover the grounds for construing knowledge and its acquisition, we must appeal to behavioural psychology and to the historical study of science. The proper questions to ask about knowledge are not about the justification of claims to knowledge, but about how the formation of knowledge is to be explained. We need to reconstruct the notion of evidence so that it refers to the sensory stimulations that cause us to have the scientific beliefs which we possess. The main question that epistemology asks is how one's output of a theory of nature which transcends one's input of evidence is generated in a human subject. Naturalised epistemology was established partly by criticising the traditional epistemology started by Descartes, which believes that epistemology asks how we ought to arrive at our beliefs prior to any scientific reasoning. Quine argues that epistemology should be a branch of natural science, especially a chapter of psychology. Epistemology is contained in the natural sciences and the natural sciences are contained in epistemology. Quine believes that the approach of naturalised epistemology can diminish scepticism and free epistemology from the labour of refuting scepticism.

Quine's controversial project has been followed by many other philosophers who explicitly consider themselves to be

超自然的存在物和过程。它还批驳了第一哲学优于自然科学的主张。从认识论方面来看,自然主义认为认识论上的证明和解释是与自然科学相伴随的持续过程,并论证说科学的方法是我们获得知识的惟一方法。按照19世纪的心理主义和20世纪自然科学化的认识论,认识论应比作经验的心理学。伦理自然主义反对对是与应该,或事实与价值的区分,并用自然的特性来解释伦理学的术语。这一主张被密尔描述为“自然主义的谬误”,但它是否真是谬误还不能肯定。从美学方面来看,自然主义认为艺术作品应体现世界的本来面目。在心的哲学方面,自然主义认为精神现象是大脑活动的过程,或是由大脑活动过程所引起的。近代自然主义的阐述者休谟、康德和维特根斯坦强调的是不可避免的自然人的倾向而不是科学的优越性。对任何形式的自然主义而言,都存在相应形式的反自然主义。

“自然主义早在1830年反形而上学的学者中就有了代表人物A. 孔德,他宣称实证哲学在方法上与特殊的科学没有区别。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第72页。

自然主义认识论

这一术语来自奎因的论文《自然化的认识论》,尽管奎因本人并没有提供它的清晰定义。奎因把这作为一种认识论方案,即提出为了发现构成知识及其获得的基础,我们必须诉诸行为主义心理学以及对科学的历史探究。关于知识可以问及的适当问题,不是有关知识主张的辩护问题,而是关于如何解释知识的形成问题。我们需要重建“证据”的概念,使它指涉那些感官刺激,正是它们导致我们具有我们所拥有的科学信念。认识论所问的主要问题是,人们的超越“证据”(输入)的自然理论(输出)是如何在人类主体中产生的。自然化认识论的确立,部分是通过批判始于笛卡尔的传统认识论,后者认为认识论问的是在任何科学推理之前,我们应如何得出我们的信念。奎因论认为,认识论应当是自然科学的一个分支,尤其是心理学的一章。认识论包含在自然科学中,而自然科学也包含在认识论中。奎因相信,自然化认识论的方法可以消除怀疑论,把认识论从反驳怀疑论的努力中解脱出来。

奎因的这一有争议的方案,为其他许多明确认为自己做的是规范认识论的哲学家所追随。他们认为,人类及他们的认知官能是自然中的实体,并主张自然科学、尤其是生物学和经验心理学的成果对认识论是至关重要的。

“对于知识主张的系统评价是认识论的中

pursuing normative epistemology. They see human beings and their cognitive faculties as entities in nature and hold that the results of natural sciences, particularly biology and empirical psychology, are crucial to epistemology.

"The systematic assessment of claims to knowledge is the central task of epistemology. According to naturalistic epistemologists, this task cannot be well performed unless proper attention is paid to the place of the knowing subject in nature."—Shimony and Nails (eds.), *Naturalistic Epistemology*, 1987, p. 1.

Naturalistic ethics

Also called ethical naturalism. In a broad sense, the view that ethical statements are empirical or positive and must be understood in terms of natural propensities of human beings, without mysterious intuitions or divine help. As attacked by Moore, it is the view held, for example, by Utilitarianism and evolutionary ethics, according to which there is no sharp demarcation between statements of fact and statements of value. As a consequence, ethical properties are natural properties and we may derive "ought" from "is". Moore accuses this view of committing the naturalistic fallacy, but proponents of naturalistic ethics have tried to show that this is not a fallacy at all.

"... Theories which owe their prevalence to the supposition that good can be defined by reference to a natural object... are what I mean by the name, ... 'Naturalistic Ethics'." Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 39.

Naturalistic fallacy

Moore claims that philosophers traditionally define the conception of good in terms of natural properties or attributes, such as pleasure, the desirable, progress in evolution; in so doing they confuse the ethical conception of "good" with a natural object, and ignore the distinction between what good means and what things are good. This, according to Moore, is the "naturalistic fallacy". Instead of seeking a naturalistic definition, Moore argued that we should see "good" as a simple indefinable non-natural quality to which we have access through a kind of intuition. Moore argues that all philosophers who derive ethics from metaphysics committed this fallacy. Consequently, ethics was said not to be based on metaphysics, and could not be reduced to any natural or social science. This idea echoes Hume's view that "ought" is different from and cannot be derived from "is". But it is disputable whether this is really a genuine fallacy. In particular, there have been recent attempts to justify the derivation of "ought" statements from "is" statements. Moore's influential *Principia Ethica* attempted to dispose of the naturalistic fallacy, but his arguments against naturalism and for his own account have both been challenged.

心任务。按照自然主义认识论,除非适当注意到认识主体在自然中的地位,否则这一任务就不可能很好地执行。”——西莫尼和奈耳斯(编)《自然主义认识论》,1987年,第1页。

自然主义伦理学

也叫伦理的自然主义。在宽泛的意义上,它主张伦理陈述是经验的或实证的,必须根据人类的自然倾向来理解,无需神秘的直觉或神灵的帮助。正如摩尔所批评的那样,这是由(例如说)功利主义和进化论伦理学主张的观点,它认为在事实陈述和价值陈述之间没有分明的分界线。结果,伦理性质就是自然性质,我们可以从“是”推出“应当”。摩尔谴责这种观点犯了自然主义谬误,但自然主义伦理学的支持者力图证明这根本不是什么谬误。

"……认为善可以靠指称自然对象来定义,由于这种看法而得以流行的理论……就是我用这名称所指的……‘自然主义伦理学’。”——摩尔:《伦理学原理》,1903年,第39页。

自然主义谬误

摩尔认为,哲学家以传统方式用自然性质或属性,诸如快乐,可欲的事物,进化过程中的进步来定义善这个概念。在这么做的时候,他们混淆了“善”这个伦理概念和自然对象,忽视了善的意思和事物很好的意思之间的区别。在摩尔看来,这就是“自然主义的谬误”。摩尔不寻求自然主义的定义,而主张我们应把“善”视为简单的、不可定义的、非自然的性质,我们是通过一种直觉来得到它的。摩尔认为,所有从形而上学得到伦理学的哲学家都犯有这种错误。因此,伦理学被说成是并非基于形而上学,不能还原为任何一种自然科学或社会科学。这种看法是呼应了休谟的观点:“应当”与“是”不同,“应当”也不能从“是”中推导出来。但对于这是否确为一种真正的谬误,是有争议的。特别是最近有人要证明从“是”这样的陈述推导出“应当”这样的陈述是有理由的。摩尔有影响的著作《伦理学原理》力图清除自然主义谬误,但他反对自然主义和支持自己说明的论证都受到了挑战。

“我曾说明过,那种[自然主义的]谬误在于这样的意图:善不过是意味着某种简单的或复杂的概念,可以用自然的性质来定义。”——摩

"That [naturalistic] fallacy, I explained, consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion, that can be defined in terms of natural qualities."—Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 73.

Nature

[Greek: *physis*, from the verb *phuein*, to grow or to give birth to; Aristotle's book *Physics* is "On Nature"] Nature stands in contrast to things made by men, such as conventional things or artefacts. Aristotle defines nature as the inner origin of the change or stability of a thing. Such a source comprises (1) the material from which a thing is made, and (2) the structure of the thing. Both matter and form are thus nature, although Aristotle held that form is more a nature than matter. Pre-Socratic philosophy is generally called the philosophy of nature because it seeks for the ultimate material stuff out of which the world is constructed. For Aristotle, a discussion of matter as nature leads to a discussion of necessity. His discussion of form as nature leads to teleology, and eventually to the theory of the unmoved mover as the final cause of nature, for Aristotle claims that a formal cause coincides with an efficient cause and a final cause. Aristotle requires those who study nature to know both matter and form, but the latter is more important. In Aristotle's ethics, nature means (1) the original constitution or tendency that a man has without involving human intervention, in contrast to what results in him from law and education, and (2) a man's function or the end to which he tends. The task of ethics is to develop this natural tendency in order to achieve the appropriate natural end.

Nature is also used to refer to the totality of things in the universe. Our knowledge of this natural world changes with the development of sciences. Nature in this sense is sometimes contrasted with man, with nature seen as exploitable by human rationality, but this attitude has been recently challenged by some aspects of environmental philosophy, according to which humans must be seen only as part of nature.

"The word nature has two principal meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, or it denotes things as they would be, apart from human intervention."—J. S. Mill, *Collected Works of J. S. Mill*, 1969, X, p. 401.

Naturphilosophie

[German: nature-philosophy] A view of nature which flourished in the Romantic criticism of science in Germany at the beginning of nineteenth century and which was fully elaborated by the German philosopher Schelling. It criticised the Newtonian scientific view of nature which treated nature as mechanistic and meaningless and suggested that nature undergoes a process of self-development culminating in a state

of perfection. —Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 73.

自然

[源自希腊语中的动词 *phuein* (意指“生长”或“化育”)；亚里士多德的著作《物理学》就是“论自然”] 自然与人为的事物(诸如习俗或人工制品)截然不同。亚里士多德把自然定义为事物变化或稳定的内在起源或本源。这一本源包括(1)一物形成的物质材料和(2)此物的结构。因此,质料与形式便是自然,尽管亚里士多德认为形式与其说是质料不如说是自然。前苏格拉底哲学一般被称为自然哲学,因为它探讨的是构成世界的终极物质材料。在亚里士多德看来,讨论质料即自然的结果是讨论必然性。他本人对形式即自然的论述导向了目的论,最终又导向了作为自然之终极因的不动的动者理论,因为他认为形式因与动力因和终极因是一致的。亚里士多德要求研究自然的人应当熟悉质料与形式,但又认为后者更为重要。在亚里士多德的伦理学里,自然意指(1)人在未受人类干扰时所具有的本性或倾向,这与法律和教育在他身上所形成的东西是截然不同的;(2)人所习惯的职能或追求的目的。伦理学的任务在于发展这种自然本性以便获取适当的自然目的。

“自然”也被用来表示宇宙万物的整体。人们对这个自然界的认识是随着科学的发展而变化的。自然在此意义上有时与人形成对立,因为自然被视为人类理性掠夺的对象,但是,这种态度最近遇到环境哲学某些方面的挑战,根据环境哲学的某些观点,人应当被看成是自然的一部分。

“自然一词的基本含义有二:一是表示事物的整个系统,即所有事物特性的集合体;二是表示事物成其所然,不受人类干预。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》,1969年,第十卷,第401页。

自然的哲学

[“自然的哲学”的德语词] 19世纪初在德国浪漫主义对科学的批评中兴盛起来的自然观。它由德国哲学家谢林充分地加以详细阐发。它批判牛顿的自然科学观,后者把自然视为机械的和无意义的,而前者认为,自然经历了自我发展的过程,在自我呈现的状态中达到顶点。它强调主观和客观、理想和现实的统一。与那通过

of self-presentation. It emphasised unities between the subjective and objective and between the ideal and real. In opposition to the scientific method of exploring nature through external observation and experiment, it sought to understand nature's own language through intuition and contemplation on the grounds that natural phenomena are expressions of life. It also rejected the dichotomy of subject and object, according to which the thinking subject is simply opposed to nature as a world of objects. Instead it claimed that the subject is itself part of nature.

"If you recall what was said about the *Naturphilosophie*, what in humankind is conscious of itself and has come to itself is what has gone through the whole of nature, which has, as it were, carried everything, experienced everything, it is that which has brought everything back into itself, into its essence, from self alienation." —Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, 1994, p. 179.

Nausea

For Sartre, an existentialist feeling of disgust for the facticity and contingency of our bodies in analogy to our physical disgust at our bodies. According to Sartre, awareness of my own body is the basic means by which I have contact with the external world, and nausea becomes my primitive and original feeling about the world and my pure apprehension of myself as factual experience. This basic nausea produces vomiting and provides the ground for various concrete and empirical nauseas, such as those caused by spoiled meat or fresh blood. Nausea is an inescapable concomitant of physical existence and is a disclosure that one's existence is contingent. Nausea is nihilated by active transcendence. The title of one of Sartre's novels is *Nausea*.

"This perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an *insipid* taste which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is *my* taste—this is what we have described elsewhere under the name of *Nausea*. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 338.

Necessarily false, see logical truth

Necessarily true, see logical truth

Necessary condition

Suppose *p* and *q* are related so that *q* only if *p*. Consequently, if *p* is not the case, then *q* is not the case, and if *p* is the case, then *q* is not necessarily the case. *p* is then a necessary condition of *q*.

In contrast, suppose *p* and *q* are related so that if *p* then

外部观察和实验而探索自然的科学方法相对立,它努力通过直观和沉思去理解自然自身的语言,因为它认为自然现象就是生命的表达,它也反对主体和客体的二分法,按此二分法,思维主体只是对立作为对象世界的自然,反之,它主张主体自身是自然的部分。

“如果你回想对自然的哲学所说的话,人类对自身所意识到的和已达到自身的的东西就是经历了整个自然的东西,自然似乎携带一切事物,经验一切事物,那么,正是自然使一切事物从自我异化返回自身,达到它的本质。”——谢林:《论现代哲学史》,1994年,第179页。

厌恶(或译“恶心”)

在萨特看来,这是一种对于我们身体的实际状态和暂时状态的生存主义厌恶感,类似于我们对于自己身体的感官厌恶。据萨特看,对于我自己身体的意识是我与外在世界接触的基本手段,而厌恶则成为我对于世界的原初的和天然的感觉,成为我对于作为事实经验的我自己的纯领受。这种基本的厌恶引起呕吐,并为各种具体和经验中的厌恶,比如那些由腐肉和鲜血引起的厌恶,提供了基础。厌恶是肉体生存不可避免的伴生物,并透露出人的生存是暂时的,厌恶被主动的超越性消除掉。萨特的一部小说的名字就叫做《厌恶》。

“在我的‘为自身’(自为之我)里,总有对于一种无味(*insipid*)之味的不断领受。对于这种无味之味,我不能左右;它甚至在我企图摆脱它的努力之中也伴随着我;它就是我的味道。这就是我在其他地方用‘厌恶’这个名字来描述的东西。一种沉闷的和无法逃脱的厌恶不断地将我的身体透露给我的意识。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译),1957年,第338页。

必然假

见“逻辑真”条。

必然真

见“逻辑真”条。

必要条件

如果 *p* 和 *q* 具有这样的关系:只有 *p* 才 *q*; 于是,如果 *p* 不出现则 *q* 不出现,但是 *p* 出现 *q* 不必然出现,那么, *p* 是 *q* 的必要条件。

相反,如果 *p* 和 *q* 具有下述关系:如果 *p* 则 *q*; 于是,如果 *p* 出现 *q* 就出现,但 *p* 不出现时 *q*

q. Consequently, if p is the case, then q is the case, but if p is not the case, then q is not necessarily the case. p is then a sufficient condition of q. If p is a necessary condition of q, then q is a sufficient condition of p, and if p is a sufficient condition of q, then q is a necessary condition of p.

If p and q are related so that p if and only if q and q if and only if p, then p is both a necessary and sufficient condition of q. If p is a necessary and sufficient condition of q, then q is a necessary and sufficient condition of p. p and q are then logically equivalent statements. Logicians use "iff" as a shorthand for "if and only if".

"When one statement entails another, the truth of the first is a sufficient condition of the truth of the second, and the truth of the second is a necessary condition of the truth of the first."—P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 25.

Necessary / contingent, see contingent / necessary

Necessary truth

The distinction between necessary truth and contingent truth is a version of Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. A necessary truth must be true and could not be false, whatever way the world is. It is true in itself. A contingent truth, on the other hand, depends upon the empirical world and might have been false, had the world been different. Logically necessary truths are based on the principle of contradiction, having negations which are logically impossible. Necessary truths are not established on the basis of sense experience. They are either intuitively analytic or deduced from intuitively acceptable premises. Logical and mathematical truths are generally regarded as the paradigms of necessary truths. For rationalism, necessary truth is truth of reason and is based on the insight into real connections between facts. For empiricism, knowledge of the world must be based on sense-perception. Hence either there are no necessary truths, or there are necessary truths, but they have no direct reference to the factual world. The necessary / contingent distinction is closely related to the *a priori* / *a posteriori* distinction and the analytic / synthetic distinction. It is difficult to get an adequate grasp of any one of these without understanding the others. A crucial question is whether Kant was justified in claiming that some fundamental necessary truths are synthetic and *a priori*. Kripke has argued that some necessary truths are *a posteriori*.

If there are other kinds of necessity and possibility, such as metaphysical or natural necessity and possibility, they could also be used to distinguish between necessary and contingent truths, and necessary truth would become relative to the sort of necessity in question. We could then ask about the relations among the various kinds of necessary truths. In

不必然出现,那么,p是q的充分条件。如果p是q的必要条件,则q是p的充分条件;并且如果p是q的充分条件,则q是p的必要条件。

如果p和q具有下述关系:p当且仅当q,并且q当且仅当p,则p是q的充分必要条件。如果p是q的充分必要条件,则q是p的充分必要条件。p和q因此就是逻辑等值的陈述。逻辑学家使用"iff"作为"if and only if"(当且仅当)的缩写。

"当一个陈述衍推另一个陈述时,前者真是后者真的充分条件,并且后者真是前者真的必要条件。"—斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》,1952年,第25页。

必然/偶然

见"偶然/必然"条。

必然真理

必然真理和偶然真理之分是莱布尼茨的理性真理和事实真理之分的翻版。不论世界取何种方式,一个必然真理必定真不可能假。它自身就是真的。反之,一个偶然真理依赖于经验世界,如果世界有了不同,它就会成为假的。必然真理在逻辑上依据矛盾律,它的否定在逻辑上是不可能的。必然真理不是建立在感觉经验的基础上的。它们要么是直觉分析的,要么是从直觉上认可的前提推演出来的。一般把逻辑的和数学的真理看做必然真理的样板。对于理性主义来说,必然真理是理性的真理,它依据于对事实的真正联系的洞见。对于经验主义来说,有关世界的知识应当建立在感性知觉的基础上。因此,不论有没有必然真理存在,它们同事实世界都没有直接关系。必然和偶然之分同先天和后天之分、分析和综合之分是密切联系的。如果不理解其中一个,就很难恰当把握另一个。一个重要的问题是,当康德说某些根本的必然真理是先天综合真理时,他是否正确。克里普克论证说,有些必然真理是后天的。

如果有其他种类的必然性和可能性,诸如形而上学的或自然的必然性和可能性,那么,它们也可以用于区分必然真理和偶然真理,而且必然真理会变成与此处所说的这类必然性有关。于是,我们就可以提出关于各种不同必然真理之间的关系问题。在此意义上,"必然真理"一词就变得不明确了,而且随关于必然性的不同叙述而异。

"看起来,像我们在纯数学,特别是算术和几何中发现的那类必然真理,必定有一些原则是不依靠实例来证明,因而也不依靠感觉的见

this sense, the term "necessary truth" becomes ambiguous and varies with different accounts of necessity.

"It appears that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics and particularly in arithmetic and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor, consequently, on the testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur to us to think of them."—Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, preface, p. 50.

Necessitarianism

The doctrine that what happens in the world is determined or necessitated by the essence of things or by general laws and hence that necessity and possibility are objective notions. The world has different modes of necessity, such as logical, nomic and metaphysical necessity. Objectively necessary relations in the natural world are the subject-matter of scientific inquiry. The clearest expression of necessitarianism is physical determinism, which claims that nature is determined by universal laws. Necessitarianism is opposed by philosophers who reject all necessity, reject non-logical necessity or consider necessity to be a matter of expectation, a degree of epistemic commitment or a verbal feature, rather than as an objective property. This opposing view can be termed anti-necessitarianism. Another contrasting theory is contingentism, which holds that nature and mind are not completely predetermined and that the world contains irreducible elements of the unpredictable. As necessitarianism is associated with determinism, contingentism is related to indeterminism and accepts the existence of free will.

"Peirce gave the name 'necessitarianism' to the belief in the principle of universal lawfulness."—Bunge, *Causality*, 1959, p. 23.

Necessity

Necessity is ascribed to a state which must occur or is always the same, irrespective of changing circumstances or of our interventions. Necessity is distinguished from contingency or possibility, which is ascribed to a state that may or may not occur and that varies with circumstances. If necessity is unconditional, it is absolute necessity, but if it is based on certain premises, it is relative necessity. Logical necessity is ascribed to a statement or proposition which could not have been false and which is guaranteed to be true by the laws of logic. In contrast, a contingent statement is one whose contradiction is possible. Necessity attached to a whole proposition (in the form "it is necessarily true that...") is necessity *de dicto*, in contrast to necessity *de re*, in which necessity belongs to an object. Necessary knowledge is true under all circumstances and is hence universal. Traditionally, a necessary truth is thought to be analytical and to be known *a priori*, although Kant introduced synthetic *a priori* judgements

证的,尽管没有感觉我们决不会想到它们。"……莱布尼茨:《人类理智新论》,序言,第50页。

必然论

指这么一种观点,认为世界上的事实都为其实质或为一般规律所决定或必需,因此必然性与可能性是客观的概念。世界上有着不同的必然性模式,例如“逻辑的”、“规则的”、“形而上学的”等。自然界中的客观必然关系是科学探究的主题。必然论的最清楚的表达为“物理决定论”,它认为自然为普遍规律所决定。必然论为一些哲学家所反对,他们反对一切必然性,反对非逻辑的必然性,或认为必然性是一种预期问题,或是一种认识论承诺的程度,抑或一种语词特征,而不是一种客观性质。后一种观点可以用术语“反必然论”来表示。另一种与此相对立的理论称为“偶然论”,它主张自然和精神都非完全预先决定的,世界上存在着不可预言事件的不可还原因素。由于必然论与决定论相关联,因此偶然论与非决定论相联系,承认自由意志的存在。

“皮尔士给予普遍合法性原理的信念以‘必然论’的名称。”——邦格:《因果性》,1959年,第23页。

必然性

必然性被描述为一种必定发生或总是相同的状态,无论情况是否发生变化还是我们有否干预,莫不如此。必然性区别于偶然性或可能性,后者指可能发生或可能不发生的状态,也指随情况变化而变化的状态。如果必然性是无条件的,就是绝对的必然性;但如果它以某些前提为基础,则是相对的必然性。逻辑必然性被归结为不能虚假,且其真实性靠逻辑规则确保的陈述或命题。与此相对,偶然陈述指其矛盾陈述可能成立的陈述。必然性附到整个命题上(即以“……必然真实”的形式出现),就叫做关于命题的必然性,和必然性属于对象的关于事物的必然性相对应。必然的知识在一切情形下都真,因此是普遍的。在传统上,必然真理被认为是分析的,并且是先天得知的,虽然康德引入先天综合判断和先验必然性观念来形容判断,为经验的可能性提供条件。克里普克引入了后天必然真

and the notion of transcendental necessity to characterise judgements giving the conditions for the possibility of experience. Kripke introduced the notion of necessary *a posteriori* truth, for truths concerning the essence of a thing which are known through empirical inquiry. This is also called metaphysical necessity. Some philosophers hold that nature is governed by laws of natural necessity, but Hume argued that what appear to be necessary connections in the world are as associations of ideas in mind and involve psychological necessity, which is not objective necessity.

"A thing is called necessary either in reference to its essence or its cause. For the existence of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence and definition of the thing itself or from a given efficient cause." —Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, Prop 33.

Necessity, absolute

For Leibniz, the contrast between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity is basic. Absolute necessity, also called logical, metaphysical or mathematical necessity, is necessary in itself. It is the necessity possessed by a truth whose denial would involve a contradiction, as in the case of the truths of arithmetic and geometry. Absolute necessity is universally and unconditionally the case. The truth of such necessity is the truth of reason. Hypothetical necessity, also called moral, consequential or physical necessity, is necessary, given that such and such antecedents occur. The term "hypothetical necessity" is derived from Aristotle's *Physics* 200a13–14. According to Leibniz, the present state of the world is not absolutely necessary, but is only hypothetically necessary. All laws of nature are only hypothetical, for they depend on God's will to create the best possible world. The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity is an attempt to avoid Spinozistic rigid determinism and to establish the possibility of freedom of the will. It also plays an important role in Leibniz's metaphysics of possible worlds. For other philosophers, hypothetical necessity is also called relative necessity because it is relative to underlying premises.

"There are necessities, which ought to be admitted. For we must distinguish between an absolute and a hypothetical necessity." — Leibniz, *Fifth Paper to Clarke*, Paragraph 4.

Necessity, hypothetical, see necessity, absolute

Necessity, natural

Also called physical necessity. The necessary connection existing between distinct events in the natural world. This sort of necessity is not logical, for it is not guaranteed by the laws of logic, but is based on the laws of nature. It exists, according to some philosophers, because objects are endowed

with ideas, i.e. through empirical inquiry, and the notion of transcendental necessity to characterise judgements giving the conditions for the possibility of experience. Kripke introduced the notion of necessary *a posteriori* truth, for truths concerning the essence of a thing which are known through empirical inquiry. This is also called metaphysical necessity. Some philosophers hold that nature is governed by laws of natural necessity, but Hume argued that what appear to be necessary connections in the world are as associations of ideas in mind and involve psychological necessity, which is not objective necessity.

"一物之被称为必然的,或因其本质,或由其原因。因为一物的存在,或必出于该物自身的本质及定义,或必出于一个给定的动力因。" — 斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》, I, 命题 33。

绝对的必然性

在莱布尼茨那里,绝对的必然性和假说的必然性的对立是一个基本的对立。绝对的必然性也称“逻辑的”、“形而上学的”或“数学的”必然性,它自身就是必然的。绝对的必然性是由那样一种真理所具有的必然性,这种真理的否定包含着矛盾,就像算术或几何的真理那样。绝对的必然性普遍而无条件地都是如此。这样一个必然性的真理是理性的真理。假说的必然性也称“道德的”、“后果的”或“物理的”必然性,它是这样的必然性:假定此前有这样那样的事情发生,那么,它是必然的。“假说的必然性”一词出自亚里士多德的《物理学》200a13–14。根据莱布尼茨的观点,世界的现状不是绝对必然的,只是假说必然的。一切自然规律都只是假说的,因为它们依赖于上帝要创造最好的可能世界的意志。绝对的必然性和假说的必然性的区分是为了避免斯宾诺莎的严格决定论,确立意志自由的可能性所做的一个尝试。它对莱布尼茨关于可能世界的形而上学也起了重要作用。其他一些哲学家也把“假说的必然性”称作“相对的必然性”,因为它是相对于它的基础性前提而言的必然性。

"应当承认有各种必然性存在,我们必须区分绝对的必然性和假说的必然性。" — 莱布尼茨:《致克拉克的第五封信》,第4节。

假说的必然性

见“绝对的必然性”条。

自然的必然性

亦称“物理的必然性”,指存在于自然界各不同事件之间的必然联系。这类必然性因为没有逻辑规律的保证,所以不是逻辑的必然性,它是建立在自然规律的基础上的。根据某些哲学家所说,因为各种对象具有一种力量,它在一定

with a force which compels, under certain circumstances, the occurrence of such and such effects. Materialism generally holds that there is such a natural necessity which serves as the basis of induction and scientific knowledge. But Hume and his followers object to its existence, for no such force is observable. For them, the necessity between matters of facts is psychological, arising from the constant conjunction of states of affairs of given kinds.

"Some necessity is itself necessary; other necessity is contingent. It is, moreover, feasible to think that logical necessity is of the formal type, but that natural or physical necessity is of the latter." — G. H. von Wright, *Truth, Knowledge and Modality*, 1984, p. 69.

Necessity, physical, another name for natural necessity

Necessity, psychological

A form of necessity first discussed by Hume. According to rationalists, logical necessity was the sole valid form of necessity and was confined to the sphere of ideas. Hume claimed that in our knowledge of the natural world, we connect one idea with another through the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causality. There is a sort of necessary connection between the idea of a cause and the idea of its effect, but that is not logical necessity. The causal relation is simply a regulatory relation. This sort of necessity is brought about by the constant conjunction of the two ideas in our minds. Hence it is subjective and psychological rather than objective and logical.

"Psychological necessity, in Hume's view, marks some of our knowledge of matter of fact." — Walsh, *Reason and Experience*, 1947, p. 44.

Necessity, relative, see necessity, absolute

Needs

Anything required to lead a normal human life. It is widely claimed that fundamental and universal needs for a rational agent include the physical conditions for survival and freedom. Further, it is held that a central task of any government is to arrange for the satisfaction of the basic needs of its members, either by itself or through non-governmental institutions. There are various other kinds of human needs, some of which are culturally relative. Philosophers dispute the weight that should be given to the claims of needs in considering how to treat the members of society and how to distribute resources. These disputes are important in discussing justice and in determining the relation between equality and equity.

"The thought we have now arrived at is that a person

情况下,迫使这样那样的结果发生,所以,自然的必然性是存在的。唯物主义一般认为,这样一种作为归纳和科学知识的基础的必然性是存在的。但是,休谟和他的追随者反对这种必然性的存在,因为我们不能观察到任何这样的力量。在他们看来,事实之间的必然性是心理上的,是从既定种类的两个事态的恒常会合中产生出来的。

"有些必然性本身是必然的,有些必然性是偶然的。而且,可以认为逻辑的必然性是前一种必然性,自然的或物理的必然性是后一种必然性。" — 冯·赖特:《真理、知识和模态》,1984年,第69页。

物理的必然性

"自然的必然性"的另一名称。

心理的必然性

休谟首先加以讨论的必然性的一种形式。根据理性主义的观点,逻辑的必然性是必然性的惟一有效形式,而且仅限于观念的范围内。而休谟则声称,在我们关于自然界的知识中,我们通过类似、接近和因果性关系将一个观念和另一个观念联系起来。在原因的观念和它的结果的观念之间有一种必然联系,但它不是逻辑的必然性。因果关系只不过是规则性关系。这种必然性是由于我们心中的两个观念的恒常会合而造成的。因此,它是主观的和心理的,而不是客观的和逻辑的。

"按照休谟观点,心理的必然性是我们的某些事实知识的标志。" — 瓦尔西:《理性和经验》,1947年,第44页。

相对的必然性

见"绝对的必然性"条。

需要

过正常人的生活所需的东西。人们广泛认为,对于一个理性的人而言,基本的和普通的需要包括生存的物质条件和自由。进而言之,这种看法认为,任何一个政府的中心任务都是安排满足其成员的基本需要,无论这种安排是由政府本身来进行还是通过非政府的机构来进行。人类还有其他的各种需要,其中有些是与文化相关的。哲学家们在考虑如何对待社会成员和如何分配资源时,在应给予需要的要求以重视的问题上有争议。这些争议在讨论正义和确定平等与公平的关系时有重要作用。

"我们现在得出的思想是,假如而且只是假如一个人需要 X[绝对地],那(在经济、技术、政治、历史等等方面)就有可能设想,无论什么在

needs X [absolutely] if and only if, whatever morally and socially acceptable variation it is (economically, technologically, politically, historically, etc.) possible to envisage occurring within the relevant time-span, he will be harmed if he goes without X." Wiggins, *Needs, Values, Truth*, 1991, p. 10.

Negation

[from Latin: *negare*, to say no] As a logical term, negation is contrasted to affirmation and the positive and denies either a proposition as a whole or a predicate within a proposition. The standard sign of negation is \neg . A proposition and its negation form a contradiction; both cannot be true and the truth of one implies the falsehood of the other. If a proposition is true, its negation must be false, and *vice versa*. A predicate and its negation are also contradictory. Negation is thus a truth-functional operator, so that we can know the truth value of a proposition formed by an initial proposition and negation if we know the truth value of the initial proposition.

In Hegel's philosophy, negation is mainly a feature of concepts or things. Following Spinoza's idea that all determination is negation, Hegel claimed that negation is also a way of determining what it negates and hence has a positive result.

"Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but as a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form of such being — it is as otherness." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 91.

Negation of the negation

Also called double negation. In formal logic, the negation of the negation of a proposition returns to the original starting-point of the original and unnegated proposition. The negation of "this is red" is "this is not red", but the negation of "this is not red" once again becomes "this is red".

Hegel supposed that a negation of the negation does not return to its original affirmative state, but reaches a higher degree of affirmation than the initial state and represents a greater development of the thing itself. Any finite affirmative contains its contrary or its negation and, according to Hegel, will develop into the latter. This is the first negation. The negation of the negation overcomes the opposition between the original affirmation and its negation. The negation of the negation will itself be negated as the process of negation proceeds. The process of "affirmation-negation-negation of the negation" is equivalent to the process of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis". It provides the architectonic of Hegel's philosophy and is omnipresent in his system. In this process, the first stage is a simple or natural unity; the second stage is one of separation; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, repairs the separation and restores unity on the higher level of a harmonious whole. Hegel also took this pat-

道德方面和社会方面可以接受的变化都会出现在相关的时间跨度中,如果他没有 X,他将受到伤害。"——威金斯:《需要、价值与真理》,1991年,第10页。

否定

[源自拉丁词:*negare*,说不是]作为逻辑术语,否定相对于肯定和确定而言,它或者否定整个命题,或者否定命题的谓项。否定的规范符号是 \neg 。一命题和它的否定形成了矛盾,它们不能同真,其一的真蕴涵了另一命题的假。如一命题为真,它的否定必为假,反之亦然。一谓项和它的否定也是矛盾的。这样,否定就是真值函项的算子,因此,如果我们知道了原初命题的真值,就会知道通过原初命题和它的否定而形成的命题的真值。

在黑格尔哲学中,否定主要指概念或事物的特性。按斯宾诺莎的观点,一切规定即否定,黑格尔主张,否定也是规定它所否定的东西的方式,因而有肯定的结果。

“否定不再是抽象的虚无,而是一种定在和某物,它只是这种存在的形式——它就是作为他物存在。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,91节。

否定之否定

也称为双重否定,在形式逻辑中,一命题的否定之否定返回到原来的、未否定的命题的原来起点。“这是红的”的否定是“这不是红的”,但“这不是红的”的否定又变为“这是红的”。

黑格尔提出,否定之否定没有返回到原来的肯定状态,而是达到了比原初状态更高程度的肯定,并表现了事物自身的更大的发展。任何有限的肯定都包含它的对立或它的否定,并且按黑格尔的观点,前者会发展为后者。这是第一个否定。否定之否定克服了原初的肯定和它的否定之间的对立。否定之否定将自身否定作为否定进行的过程。“肯定—否定—否定之否定”的过程等值于“正题—反题—合题”的过程。它提供黑格尔哲学的建筑术,在其体系中无所不在。在此过程中,第一阶段是单纯的或自然的统一;第二阶段是一种分离;第三阶段,否定之否定,纠正了分离,在更高水平的和谐整体基础上回复统一。黑格尔也把这种发展模型用来描述认识过程。认识的第一阶段是抽象的,相应于知性;第二阶段相应于否定的理性;第三阶段,否定之否定,相应于肯定的理性。

否定之否定以后特别由恩格斯在《反杜林

tern of development to characterise the process of cognition. The first stage of cognition is abstract and corresponds to understanding; the second stage corresponds to negative reason; and the third stage, the negation of the negation, corresponds to positive reason.

The negation of the negation was later adopted to become a basic feature of dialectical materialism, especially by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. He claimed that the negation of the negation is also a law of the natural world and a law in the history of philosophy. Critics have questioned the alleged ubiquity of the dialectic pattern and its capacity to explain the development of consciousness, nature, cognition or history. They question Hegel's understanding of negation and, more generally, logic.

"The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have arrived, is this sublation of the contradiction." Hegel, *Science of Logic*, II, iii, 3.

Negative facts

A negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs, that is "something is not the case", in contrast to a positive fact, the existence of a state of affairs, that is "something is the case". There has been a debate about the nature of negative facts. Russell believes that negative facts exist and are represented by negative propositions. Wittgenstein claims that all elementary propositions depict positive facts and that negative facts, rather than really existing, merely indicate that there is no such combination between objects or things. Hence, what corresponds to a negative fact is a false elementary proposition.

"I think you will find that it is simpler to take negative facts as facts, to assume that 'Socrates is not alive' is really an objective fact in the same sense in which 'Socrates is human' is a fact." Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 214.

Negative liberty

The Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin distinguished between positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the "liberty or freedom to", while negative liberty is the "liberty or freedom from". Negative liberty is characterised by an absence of coercive force. With negative liberty, one is protected from the constraints of moral, legal, political and social requirements, but such constraints seem needed to achieve any sort of positive freedom. Different political philosophies give different priorities to these two kinds of freedom, with proponents of each seeing the rival conception as frustrating its own notion of liberty. Berlin, himself, supports the liberalism associated with negative liberty, while others from a Hegelian or idealist perspective emphasise positive liberty. The soundness of this distinction has been contested, but rich debate has contributed much to contemporary discus-

论》中用来作为辩证唯物主义的基本特征。他主张,否定之否定也是自然界的规律和哲学史的规律。批评家怀疑辩证模型所断定的普遍存在和它解释意识、自然、认识或历史的发展的能力。他们也质疑黑格尔对否定,乃至更一般地对逻辑的理解。

“第二个否定,我们已达到的否定之否定,是这种矛盾的扬弃。”——黑格尔:《逻辑学》,II,iii,3。

否定事实

否定事实是事态的不存在,即是“没有这种情况”,它与肯定事实即事态的存在相反,那是“有这种情况”。关于否定事实的性质一直存在争论。罗素认为存在否定事实,并以否定命题来表示。维特根斯坦认为,所有的基本命题描绘了肯定事实,而否定事实实际上并不存在,仅仅是指明没有这种对象或事物间的结合。因此,对应于否定事实的是假的基本命题。

“我想你会发现,把否定事实当做事实更简单,即假定‘苏格拉底没有活着’确实是一客观事实,其含义和‘苏格拉底是人’为一事实相同。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第214页。

消极自由

牛津大学哲学家I. 柏林区分了积极自由和消极自由。积极自由是“做什么的自由”,而消极自由是“免受什么束缚的自由”。消极自由以不受强制为特征。在消极自由的情况下,一个人得到不受道德、法律、政治和社会要求强制的保护,但这样的强制似乎需要取得任何一种积极自由。不同的政治哲学家对这两种自由给予不同的优先权,每一方的支持者都把对方的看法视为对己方自由概念的阻挠。伯林本人支持与消极自由相联系的自由主义,而其他以黑格尔主义或唯心主义观点为根据的人则强调积极自由。对这种区分的合理性一直有争论,但这一有意义的争论对当代有关自由的讨论做出了很大的贡献。

“(遵循大量的先例)我将把自由(freedom

sions of liberty.

"The first of these senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons.'—Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, pp. 121-2.

Negative responsibility

The responsibility for something which is not caused directly by the agent but which the agent fails to prevent from happening. The notion is derived from the distinction between action and omission or between intervening and letting things take their own course. Moral agents must bear positive responsibility for their actions or intervenings, but should they be responsible for their omissions or for letting things happen? It is a matter of dispute whether we can have negative responsibility. Utilitarianism claims that we should bring about the best consequences, and this implies that we all have negative responsibility. But its critics point out that by accepting this claim we would have boundless responsibilities.

"[T]he notion of negative responsibility: that if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself, in the more everyday restricted sense, bring about."—Williams, in *Utilitarianism For and Against*, 1973, p. 95.

Negative theology

Also called apophatic theology, theism based on the method of the *via negativa*. It describes God by saying what he is not, rather than what he is because as finite beings we cannot recognise God's attributes in any real and full sense and because God is beyond what our language can positively describe. Negative theology claims that religious language is noncognitive and equivocal. The ultimate thing is beyond all human concepts, and so what is affirmed of it must also be denied. Hence, all predicates—not only the negative ones such as evil and false, but also the positive ones such as good and true—should be subtracted from God. Such a negation of description does not lead to scepticism or unbelief, but leads instead to the truth that God is beyond all such words. It is only by removing from God all the imperfections of his creatures that his transcendence and otherness can be safeguarded. Negative theology enables us to maintain the radical distinction between God and his creatures. The Scriptures are full of paradoxical descriptions of God because they try to show something inexpressible which cannot be stated positively. This type of theology is rooted in Platonic thought as

or liberty) (我将在同一含义使用这两个词)的这些意思的首要的意思称为消极的自由,它包含在对这样一个问题的回答中,这一问题就是:让或应当让主体——一个人或人的群体去做什么的范围是什么?或者说,在不受其他人干预的情况下,什么是他能做的或应当能做的?"——柏林:《自由四论》,1969年,第121—122页。

消极责任

这种责任指的是某事不是由某人直接造成的,但此人却没有阻止其发生。这一概念来源于对行动与缺乏行动二者间,或对于预事情和让事情自己发生二者间的区分。道德的人必须对他们的行动或干预负有积极责任,但他们应当对缺乏行动或让事情发生负责任吗?对我们是否能负消极责任人们是有争议的。功利主义认为我们应当造成最好的结果,这含有我们所有的人都负有消极责任的意思。但它的批评者指出,如果接受这一主张,我们将负有无限的责任。

"消极责任这一概念指的是:如果我对一切事情都负有责任,那我就必须对我让其发生的和没有阻止其发生的事情都负有同样大的责任,因为我要对我本人造成的从更为普通意义上讲的事情负责。"——威廉姆斯,见《功利主义:赞成与反对》,1973年,第95页。

否定神学

亦称“阿波发神学”,以否定方法为基础的有神论。它通过断言上帝不是什么,而不是他是什么来描述他。这是因为,我们作为有限的存在,不能认知上帝在任何实在和完全意义上的属性,而且也因为,上帝超越我们的语言所能正面描述的范围。否定神学认为,宗教语言是非认知性的、多含义的。终极事物非一切人类概念所能及,所以,对它的断定必定也是否定的。因此,一切术语(不仅邪恶、虚假之类的否定术语,而且善、真之类的肯定术语)都应从上帝那里抹去。这种否定描述不导致怀疑论或无信仰,相反,会导向上帝超越一切此类语词的真理。只有把他的造物的一切缺陷从上帝那里清除掉,才能确保他的超验性和他性。否定神学使我们能够在上帝和他的造物之间保持根本的区别。《圣经》充满着对上帝自相矛盾的描述,因为它们企图表示不能被肯定说明的不可表述的东西。这种类型的神学,植根于柏拉图的思想中,在新柏拉图主义那里得到发展。它的创立者被认为是亚历山大里亚的克莱门德,主要倡导者

developed in Neo-platonism. Clement of Alexandria is thought to be its founder, and its main proponents were the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides and the German theologian Eckhart.

"When the negative theology says that no conceptions apply to God, it is, in a perhaps still subtler way, making a comparable mistake. For where there are no definite common aspects there are no definite contrasts either." — Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method*, 1970, p. 139.

Neo-Darwinism, see Darwinism

Neo-Hegelianism

Also called British idealism. A Hegelian school developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the British philosophers F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, John McTaggart, and the American philosopher Josiah Royce. This school sought to build an idealistic metaphysical system in which all internally connected particulars are absorbed into a single reality. It ignored the dialectical and historical dimension of Hegel's thought and instead emphasised the relations between time and eternity, between matter and mind and between the many and the one. It claimed that "what is" is the manifestation of spirit and in principle can be known by the human spirit. Subject and object are correlative because they are both rooted in one ultimate spiritual principle. Neo-Hegelianism was a form of absolute idealism which opposed the British empirical tradition and dominated British philosophy for nearly half a century. The interpretation of Hegel in the English-speaking world has been greatly influenced by this school. The analytic philosophy of Russell and Moore grew out of their criticisms of neo-Hegelianism.

"It is not altogether unreasonable to describe British idealism, as is often done, as a Neo-Hegelian movement, provided at least that it is understood that it was a question of receiving stimulus from Hegel rather than of following him in the relation of pupil to master." — Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. vii, 1963, p. 150.

Neo-Kantianism

A philosophical movement prevailing in late nineteenth and early twentieth century German philosophy, with a motto "back to Kant" from Liebman's manifesto, *Kant and the Epigoni*. Precursors of the movement included H. von Helmholtz, Liebman, A. Lange, E. Zeller and Kuno Fischer. Common features of the movement were the repudiation of speculative naturalism and materialism, irrationalism, and the authority of natural science, and its emphasis on the central status of Kant's epistemology in philosophy. More loosely, Neo Kantianism comprised a variety of schools which have different directions and which debated with one another

是犹太哲学家 M. 迈蒙尼德和德国神学家艾克哈特。

"当否定神学断言没有一个概念适于上帝时,在某种或许更加微妙的意义上,它正在犯一种相同的错误。因为凡不存在确定的共同方面的地方,也就根本不存在确定的对比。"——哈特肖恩:《创造性综合与哲学的方法》,1970年,第139页。

新达尔文主义

见“达尔文主义”条。

新黑格尔主义

也称为“英国唯心主义”,在19世纪后期由英国哲学家 F. H. 布拉德雷, B. 鲍桑葵, J. 麦克塔加特和美国哲学家 J. 罗伊斯所发展的黑格尔学派。这个学派企图建立唯心主义的形而上学体系,在此体系中,一切内在联系的特殊性都吸收到单一的实在中。它忽略了黑格尔思想的辩证法和历史方面,而强调时间和永恒、物和心、多和一之间的关系。它主张:“存在者”是精神的表现,原则上可由人类精神来认识。主体和客体是相关的,因为它们都根源于一个最高的精神原理。新黑格尔主义是绝对唯心主义的一种形式,它对立英国经验主义传统,并支配着英国哲学几乎半个世纪。在说英语的世界中对黑格尔的解释受到该学派的巨大影响。罗素和摩尔的分析哲学生长自对新黑格尔主义的批判中。

“人们常常把英国唯心主义描述为新黑格尔主义的运动,这种做法不是全无道理的,只要它被理解为:它是一种从黑格尔那里得到启发因素的问题,而不是像师生关系那样追随他。”——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》,第七卷,1963年,第150页。

新康德主义

盛行于19世纪晚期和20世纪初德国哲学中的一场哲学运动,以“回到康德”的口号为旗帜(这个口号出自李普曼的宣言《康德与模仿者》)。这个运动的先驱包括 H. 冯·赫尔姆霍茨、李普曼、A. 朗格、E. 策勒和 K. 费舍。其共同特征是抛弃思辨的自然主义和唯物主义,抛弃非理性主义以及自然科学的权威,并强调康德认识论在哲学中的核心地位。更宽泛地说,新康德主义包含许多不同方向的、相互争论的各种学派,其中以马堡学派和海德堡学派影响最大。马堡学派强调康德的理论哲学,特别是他对

er. Among these, the Marburg and Heidelberg schools were the most influential. The logico-methodological Marburg school emphasised Kant's theoretical philosophy, especially his idealism in relation to natural science. Its major representatives were H. Cohen, P. Natorp and E. Cassirer. The axiological Heidelberg school, also called the Baden or South-east German school, was more interested in applying Kant's transcendental method to specifying universal cultural value. Its major representatives were W. Windelband and H. Rickert. Outside these schools, A. Riehl's realistic neo-Kantianism argued for the reality of Kant's thing-in-itself. In Göttingen, L. Nelson developed a psychological neo-Kantianism, which holds that introspection plays a central role in discovering *a priori* principles.

"Neo-Kantians ... announced that they had had enough of the airy metaphysical speculations of the idealists and that it was time to return to the spirit of Kant himself." — Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. vii, 1963, p. 8.

Neo-platonism

The philosophical tradition founded by Plotinus, developed through his disciple Porphyry, the Syrian School of Iamblichus, the school of Athens, represented by Plutarch, Proclus and Simplicius, and the Alexandrian school until the fall of Alexandria in 642. Plotinus's *Enneads* (edited by Porphyry) was the source of this tradition, and Proclus's *Elements of Theology* was the systematic exposition of its doctrines. Neo-platonism, which was the last philosophical system of the classical world, explained the origin of the world in terms of Plotinus' three *hypostases* (the one, *nous* and the soul) and the process of emanation. Neo-platonism attempted to reconcile the two supposedly incompatible systems of Plato and Aristotle, by considering Aristotle's philosophy as an introduction to Plato's higher wisdom. This attitude led many Neo-platonists to comment extensively on both Plato and Aristotle and thus contributed greatly to the history of philosophy. Neo-platonism advocated polytheism and mysticism and had a favourable attitude towards theology. Hence it became the main opposition of early Christianity, which it directly attacked. The school of Athens, which was based on Plato's academy, was closed by the emperor Justinian in 529 precisely because of its conflict with Christianity. This event is usually regarded as marking the end of Hellenistic philosophy. However, Neo-platonism exerted great influence upon the development of Christian philosophy because it sought to explain the world by appeal to one ultimate principle. Neo-Platonism was revived in the Renaissance by Ficino in Florence, and there was another resurgence by the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century.

"Neo-platonism emphasised that aspect of Plato's thought that stressed the transcendence of the One (or the Good), and the way the One is beyond all categorical lan-

guage. It was the only philosophical position in the history of the natural sciences, with its logical-methodological character. Its main representatives were H. Cohen, P. Natorp and E. Cassirer. The Heidelberg school (also called the "Baden school" or the "South-east German school") was more interested in applying Kant's transcendental method to specifying universal cultural value, with its axiological character. Its main representatives were W. Windelband and H. Rickert. Outside these schools, A. Riehl's realistic neo-Kantianism argued for the reality of Kant's thing-in-itself. In Göttingen, L. Nelson developed a psychological neo-Kantianism, which holds that introspection plays a central role in discovering *a priori* principles.

"New Kantianism claimed: they had suffered enough from the idealists' empty metaphysical speculations and that it was time to return to the spirit of Kant himself." — K. Popper, *Philosophy of Language*, vol. vii, 1963, p. 8.

新柏拉图主义

由普罗提诺创立的哲学传统,经由他的弟子波菲利、扬布里柯的叙利亚学派,普鲁泰克、普罗克洛和辛普里丘为代表的雅典学派以及亚历山大里亚学派发展,一直持续到公元642年亚历山大里亚城陷落为止。普罗提诺的《九章集》(由波菲利编纂)是该传统的源头,普罗克洛的《神学要旨》是对其学说的系统阐释。新柏拉图主义是古典世界的最后一个哲学体系。它用普罗提诺的三个本在(太一、心智和灵魂)和流溢过程来解释世界的起源。新柏拉图主义通过把亚里士多德哲学视为柏拉图更高智慧的入门,试图调和柏拉图与亚里士多德这两个被认为是不相容的体系。这种态度,使得不少新柏拉图主义者广泛注释柏拉图和亚里士多德,并因而对哲学史作出了重大贡献。新柏拉图主义倡导多神论和神秘主义,甚至对神学也持友好态度。因此,它成为早期基督教的主要竞争对手,甚至直接攻击基督教。以柏拉图的学园为基础的雅典学派之所以在529年被查士丁尼皇帝下令关闭,正是由于它与基督教的冲突。这个事件通常被看做是希腊化哲学终结的一个标志。但是,由于新柏拉图主义通过诉诸一个终极本原来寻求对世界的解释,它对基督教哲学的发展产生了很大影响。在文艺复兴时期,新柏拉图主义被费其诺在佛罗伦萨复活,它的另一次复兴是由剑桥柏拉图派的学者们在17世纪实现的。

"新柏拉图主义强化了柏拉图思想的一个方面,即强调太一(或善)的超验,以及太一处于一切范畴化的语言或思想之外。" — 史蒂威尔,《宗教语言哲学》,1996年,第16页。

guage or thought.” Stiver, *The Philosophy of Religious Language*, 1996, p. 16.

Neo-Pragmatism

A postmodern version of pragmatism developed by the American philosopher Richard Rorty and drawing inspiration from authors such as Dewey, Heidegger, Sellars, Quine and Derrida. It repudiates the notion of universal truth, epistemological foundationalism, representationalism and the notion of epistemic objectivity. It is a nominalist approach which denies that natural kinds and linguistic entities have substantive ontological implications. While traditional pragmatism focuses on experience, Rorty centres on language. Language is contingent on use, and meaning is produced by using words in familiar manners. The self is seen as a “centerless web of beliefs and desires”, and Rorty denies that the subject-matter of the human sciences can be studied in the same ways as we study the subject matter of the natural sciences. Neo-pragmatism, which focuses on social practice and political experimentation, claims that there is no objective and transcendental standpoint from which to pass judgement and that truth must be relative to specific social contexts and practices.

“The sense in which the new pragmatism differs from the old are, first, with regard to the shift from experience to language and, second, with regard to an acquired suspicion of ‘scientific method’ deriving from the historicising of science in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn and P. F. Feyerabend.” Hall, *Richard Rorty*, 1994, p. 101.

Neo-Pythagoreanism

A philosophical and religious tendency that flourished from the first century B.C. to the third century A.D. It regarded Pythagoras as the revealer of religious truth, but it actually mixed early Pythagorean material, Plato's doctrines and the views of the Peripatetics and Stoicism. It stressed the necessity of purification and represented the change of soul according to moral progress. It advocated abandoning all theoretical research and living in union with both superior and inferior gods. It popularised the notion of moral retribution in a future life. Major proponents of neo-Pythagoreanism include Figulus, Apollonius of Tyana and Philo of Alexandria. Neo-Pythagoreanism deeply influenced Neo-platonism and early Christianity.

“For the neo-Pythagorians, philosophy became the art of curing, or a devotional guide. Men were no longer seeking to understand.” -Sheen, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1952, p. 364.

Neo-realism

Also called new realism. An American philosophical movement of the early twentieth century which originated

新实用主义

一种对于实用主义的后现代观点,由美国哲学家 R. 罗蒂阐发。这种观点受到像杜威、海德格尔、塞拉斯、奎因和德里达这样的作者的影响。它拒绝接受普遍真理观、认识论的基础主义、表象主义和认知客观性。这是一种唯名论的方法,否定自然种类和语言存在物具有实体意义上的存在论含义。传统实用主义关注经验,罗蒂则以语言为中心,语言依靠使用,意义来自以熟悉的方式使用词语。自我被看做一张“无中心可言的信念和欲望之网”。罗蒂还否认我们能够以研究自然科学问题的方式来研究人文科学的问题。新实用主义的注意力集中在社会实践和政治实验;它声称并没有一种规范我们判断的客观和先验的立场,真理总是相对于特殊的社会境况和实践而言的。

“新实用主义与老实用主义的区别在于,首先,它经历了从经验到语言的转变;其次,它对‘科学方法’表示怀疑,而这种怀疑来自像 T. 库恩和 P. F. 费耶阿本德这些思想家著作中使科学历史化的努力。”——霍尔:《罗蒂》,1994年,第 101 页。

新毕达戈拉斯主义

盛行于公元前 1 世纪到公元 3 世纪的一种哲学和宗教倾向。它把毕达戈拉斯认作宗教真理的揭示者,但实际上,它是早期毕达戈拉斯学派材料、柏拉图学说、漫步学派和斯多亚派观点的混合物。它强调净化的必然性,并根据道德进步展现灵魂的变化。它鼓吹放弃一切理论研究,要求与诸神和合而生活,无论这些神炼是高等的还是低等的。它散布未来生命中的道德报应观念。新毕达戈拉斯主义的主要人物包括费古鲁、提亚那的阿波隆尼和亚历山大里亚的斐洛。新毕达戈拉斯主义深深地影响了新柏拉图主义和早期基督教。

“在新毕达戈拉斯主义者那里,哲学成了治疗术或皈依向导。人们不再寻求理解。”——谢恩:《宗教哲学》,1952年,第 364 页。

新实在论

也称作“新的实在论”,出现在 20 世纪初美国的一场哲学运动。它开始于《哲学杂志》

with a common manifesto published in the *Journal of Philosophy* (1910), entitled "A Program and First Platform of Six Realists". The six philosophers were Ralph Barton Perry, William P. Montague, E. B. Holt, Walter Pittkin, Edward Spaulding and Walter Marvin. In 1912, they published a co-operative volume *The New Realism* which gave the movement its name. New realism rejected idealism, in particular that of Royce. It claimed that idealism argues fallaciously from the premise that everything known is known to the conclusion that for every thing to be is to be known. It rejected the egocentric predicament, which moves from our being at the centre of what we know to the claim that this placement affects the nature of what we know. The nature of reality cannot be inferred merely from the nature of knowledge. The entities which are the objects of scientific studies are not conditioned by their being known, although they are presented to consciousness and have cognitive relations. As a version of direct realism, neo-realism emphasised a direct acquaintance with physical objects and claimed that what is known is independent of the knowing relation. Reality is a datum, given independently of whatever ideas may be formed about it. The perceived object is identical in substance with a part or aspect of the physical object. The movement was replaced by critical realism as a result of its failure to provide a satisfactory account of error, illusion, doubt, hypothesis, and the progress of knowledge. Occasionally, the term new realism is also used to refer to the refutation of idealism of Russell and Moore and to their attempt to establish a logical method by which legitimate conclusions can be derived from any body of data.

"Neo-realism arose as a protest against Roycean absolutism in particular, and idealism in general." Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 407.

Neo-Scholasticism

Also called Neo-Thomism, a Roman Catholic philosophical and theological movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is a revival of Thomism and seeks to demonstrate that medieval scholasticism, especially the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, is consistent with the development of modern science. The movement assumes that Aquinas' doctrines can be reappropriated to solve modern philosophical problems such as those arising from Cartesian dualism. Neo-Scholasticism attempts to bring Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics into a modern intellectual setting in order to deal with contemporary issues. In 1879 Pope Leo XIII sent his letter *Aeterni Patris* to all bishops of the Church, making Thomas Aquinas the leading Doctor of the Church, and thus sanctioning Thomism as the authoritative and orthodox Catholic theology. It proposed to consider Thomism as the exclusive response in Catholic philosophy and theology to

(1910)上发表的一篇普通的宣言,题目是“六位实在论者的方案与初步纲领”。这六位哲学家是 R. B. 佩里、W. P. 蒙塔古、E. B. 霍尔特、W. 皮特金、E. 斯鲍尔丁和 W. 马文。1912 年,他们出版了一本论文集《新实在论》,随后这场运动就以此命名。新实在论反对唯心论,特别是罗伊斯的唯心论。它声称,唯心论错误地从已知事物被知的前提推出存在即被知的结论。它反对自我中心论的困境,不再相信我们的存在位于我们所知事物的中心,而是认为这种地位影响着我们所知事物的性质。实在的性质无法简单地从知识的性质中推论出来。作为科学研究对象的实体并不是由于它们已被认识而决定的,尽管它们出现在意识中并有认知关系。作为“直接实在论”的一种形式,新实在论强调直接熟知物理对象,认为所知的东西独立于认知关系。实在是一个素材,它独立于任何关于它的可能形成的观念。已知的对象实质上就是物理对象的某个部分或方面。这场运动后来被“批判的实在论”所取代,因为它没能满意地描述错误、幻象、怀疑、假设以及知识的进步。有时,“新的实在论”一词也指罗素和摩尔对唯心论的反叛,他们试图确立逻辑的方法,认为用这种方法可以从任何素材中推出合理的结论。

“新实在论提出的抗议就具体而言是针对罗伊斯的绝对论,而一般来说是针对唯心论的。”——韦克美斯特:《美国哲学观念史》,1949 年,第 407 页。

新经院学派

亦称“新托马斯主义”,在 19 至 20 世纪发展起来的一场罗马天主教哲学和神学运动。它是托马斯主义的复活,力图证明中世纪经院学派,尤其是 T. 阿奎那哲学,与现代科学的发展是一致的。该运动假定,阿奎那的学说能够再一次恰当地解决现代哲学问题,譬如从笛卡尔的二元论生发出来的问题。新经院学派企图把亚里士多德和托马斯的形而上学引入现代的思想背景,以处理当代问题争端。1879 年,教皇列奥十三世向教会的所有主教发送出他的通谕《永恒之父》(*Aeterni Patris*),确定 T. 阿奎那“教会博士”头衔,并批准托马斯主义作为官方的、正统的天主教神学。它提出把托马斯主义认作天主教哲学和神学与现代哲学体系打交道的独一路径。这极大地刺激了新经院学派的发展,起初是在天主教的教育圈内,后来在更广泛的公

modern philosophical systems. This greatly stimulated the development of Neo-Scholasticism, first in Catholic educated circles and then for a wider public. Scholars produced intensive examinations and interpretations of Aquinas' works and established a variety of Thomistic systems. There is not a unified set of doctrines in Neo-Thomism, because different philosophers have adopted different versions of Thomism. Some have even resisted the description Neo-Thomist, although Aquinas' five ways for demonstrating God's existence were regarded as vital for all Neo-Thomist thinkers. The Institute Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier has been an influential centre for Neo-Thomism. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson established an Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto where the influential scholar Joseph Owens applied Thomism to reconstruct Aristotle's metaphysics. Another important representative was Jacques Maritain, whose work has had wide public influence.

"Neo-Scholasticism, a new-realism once more, a doctrine that refuses to fall in with the method foreshadowed by Descartes, or at least if it does so tries hard to avoid its conclusion."—Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 1936, p. 229.

Network theory of meaning, an alternative term for conceptual role theory

Neural network modelling, see connectionism

Neurath's ship

A metaphor invented by the Austrian sociologist and philosopher Otto Neurath. Neurath was a leading member of the Vienna Circle, but disagreed with the epistemological foundationalism of another important member, Rudolf Carnap. Carnap believed that there is a set of incorrigible protocol statements which directly report sense experience. All other valid complex statements are constructed out of these protocol statements. In criticising this picture, Neurath compared our body of knowledge to a ship, and said: "We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismount it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components". Accordingly, knowledge is historically conditioned and is maintained if a sufficient range of its claims is acceptable at any given time. Nevertheless, any piece of knowledge can be replaced to keep the whole project of knowledge going. Nothing can claim to be the foundation of knowledge. This metaphor was adopted by Quine and is widely cited as a powerful image of anti-foundationalism.

"The philosopher's task was well compared by Neurath

共社会中。许多学者对阿奎那著作进行了大量的考察和阐释,也建立起不同的托马斯主义体系。在新托马斯主义中,没有一套统一的学说,因为不同的哲学家采纳的是托马斯主义的不同说法。有些人甚至反对被称作新托马斯主义者,虽然托马斯证明上帝存在的“五法”被所有的新托马斯主义思想家认作富有活力。由 C. 梅西尔创办的、设在卢汶大学的哲学高级研究所是新托马斯主义的一个很有影响的中心。法国哲学家 E. 吉尔松参与创办了设在多伦多的中世纪研究所,正是在这里,产生出那位影响极大的学者 J. 欧文斯,他运用托马斯主义来重构亚里士多德的形而上学。另一位重要代表人物是 J. 马里旦,他的著作具有广泛的公众影响。

“新经院学派是一种新实在论,是这样的学说:避免遭遇笛卡尔所预示的那种方法,或者至少,如果那样做了,也竭力避免它的结论。”——吉尔松:《中世纪哲学精神》,1936年,第229页。

意义的网络理论

“概念作用理论”的别名。

神经网络模拟

见“联结主义”条。

纽拉特之船

由奥地利社会学家和哲学家 O. 纽拉特发明的隐喻。纽拉特是维也纳学派的主导成员之一,但他不同意这一学派的另一中心人物卡尔纳普认识论的基础论。卡尔纳普认为,有一系列的基本句子直接报告感觉经验,它们是无可纠正的。所有其他可靠的复杂陈述都由这些基本句子结构而成。在批评这一图画时,纽拉特将我们的知识体比作一只船。他说:“我们像水手一样,不得不在大海上重造我们的船,从未能将它卸下并用最好的元件来重建它。”因此,知识是以历史为条件的,并且在任意时期,只要其足够多的声称是可接受的,它就得到坚持。然而,知识的任意一部分都可以被代替,以保持整个知识体系的运行。没有什么可以声称是知识的基础。这一隐喻为奎因所采用,并被作为反基础论的有力比喻。

“纽拉特很好地将哲学家的任务比作一个必须在大海上重建他的船的水手的任务。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953,第79页。

to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea." Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 79.

Neuro-philosophy, see connectionism

Neustic/phrastic

Different sentences may have the same content but different moods. For example, "Shut the door!" and "You will shut the door". The content of these two sentences — your shutting the door in the immediate future — is the same, but the sentences differ because one is a command and the other is a statement. In *The Language of Morals*, R. M. Hare called the common content of such sentences the phrastic [from Greek: *phrazein*, literally what is said, to indicate or to show] and called their different moods the neustic [from Greek: *neuein*, to nod, to assent]. With this distinction, he claims that phrastics allow imperatives to stand in logical relations.

"I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to both moods (your shutting the door in the immediate future) the phrastic, and the part that is different in the case of commands and statements (yes or please), the neustic." Hare, *Language of Morals*, 1952, p. 18.

Neutral monism

A theory formulated by the American Pragmatist William James and developed by American realism, but propounded independently by the Austrian philosopher Ernst Mach. In contrast both to idealistic monism (that mind is the real existent) and materialistic monism (that matter is the real existent), the theory holds that both mental things and physical things are constructed out of the same primary stuff which is neither mental nor physical, but neutral between them. Both mind and matter are logical functions of the same stuff. Thus there is no real distinction between mind and matter. Russell in one period accepted this view by claiming that the world is composed of neutral events. This position proposed a solution to the mind-body problem, but there are difficulties with the neutral status of that which constitutes minds and bodies and with how arrangements of what is neutral can issue in minds and bodies. If experiences are proposed as the neutral entities, it is not clear whether neutral monism clarifies or obscures the nature of experience.

"'Neutral monism'... is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical don't differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 15.

神经哲学

见“联结主义”条。

语调/内含

不同的句子可有相同的内容但有不同的语气。例如，“关上门！”和“你将关上门”，这两个句子的内容——你将很快关上门——是相同的，但句子却不同，因为前一个是命令，后一个是陈述。在《道德语言》一书中，R. M. 黑尔把这类句子中的共同内容称作内含[源自希腊文 *phrazein*，字面的意思是所说、所指出或所表明东西]，把它们不同的语气称作语调[源自希腊文 *neuein*，字面的意思是点头表示同意，表示赞同]。通过这一区分，他认为内含允许祈使句出现在逻辑关系中。

“我将把句子中对于两种语气(你将很快关上门)而言是共同的那部分称作内含，把句子中在命令情况和陈述情况(是或请)方面的不同的部分称作语调。”——黑尔：《道德语言》，1952年，第18页。

中立一元论

由美国实用主义者 W. 詹姆斯阐明，由美国实在论所发挥，但由奥地利哲学家 E. 马赫独立提出的一种理论。与唯心主义一元论(认为心是真实的存在)和唯物主义一元论(认为物是真实的存在)相反，这种理论认为心的东西和物的东西都由同样的基本材料构成，这材料既非心的又非物的，而是在二者之间的中立之物。心和物是同一材料的逻辑函项。因此，在心与物之间并无真正的区别。罗素有一段时间接受了这种观点，认为世界由中立的事件构成。这种主张对于心身问题提出了一种解决办法，但对于构成心与身的东西的中立性，对于中立的东西的排列何以能产生于心与身之中的问题，还有一些困难。如果认为经验是中立实体，不清楚中立一元论究竟是澄清了还是模糊了经验的性质。

“‘中立一元论’……是这样的理论：通常被认为是心的事物和通常被认为是物的事物就其内在性质而言并无差异，通常认为一方具有此属性而另一方不具有该属性，差异仅在于排列和前后关系方面。”——罗素：《罗素文集》，第七卷，第15页。

New criticism

A school of literary criticism developed by J. C. Ransom, A. Tate, C. Brooks, among others, in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. It rejected the historical method in literary study which emphasised the influence of history upon literature. Instead it suggested that a literary work is not an historical object, but should be treated merely as a text. It embraced the idea of art for art's sake and emphasised the autonomy of art. The central task of literary criticism should be to focus on the literary devices present in a work, such as harmony, structure of discourse, imagery, figurative use of language and rhythm. Facts external to the work itself were claimed to be irrelevant to the appreciation or criticism of that work. The movement has affinities with Derrida's more recent theory of deconstruction.

"This doctrine (of the new criticism) holds that in trying to understand a work of art we cannot make use of facts external to the work itself—facts of biography, convention and (perhaps) intention."—Casey, "The autonomy of art", in *Philosophy and the Arts* (Royal Institute of Philosophy), 1973, p. 66.

New England transcendentalism, see transcendentalism

New organon

The title of Francis Bacon's major book and also a technical term in his philosophy. The book, titled *Novum Organum* in Latin, was published in 1620, as the second part of a uncompleted project called the Great Instauration. The subtitle of *Novum Organum* is "true directions concerning the interpretation of nature". It was intended as a guide to the correct use of human understanding in the investigation of nature. The central idea is that we should interpret rather than anticipate nature. We can only know on the basis of what has been observed in fact or in thought. Hence, the traditional syllogistic deductive logic which starts from abstract notions and principles is not adequate. Bacon called his own logic new in order to distinguish it from Aristotle's *Organon*, in which syllogistic logic is systematically elaborated. The correct logic should be inductive, although it is not the method of induction in general which he favours, but induction by elimination. What, then, does Bacon mean by a new organon? He claims that there are three basic differences between the old logic and his new logic. (1) While the old logic is aimed at inventing arguments and overcoming an opponent's argument, the new logic aimed to discover the principles of nature itself and to command nature in action. (2) While the old logic focuses mainly on syllogism, new logic rejects it and claims that induction is the form of demonstration which upholds sense and mirrors nature. (3) While in the old logic the starting point of inquiry is princi-

新批评

20 世纪 30—40 年代在美国兴起的一种文学批评学派,倡导者主要有 J. C. 兰萨姆、A. 塔特和 C. 布鲁克斯等人。新批评摒弃文学研究中的历史方法,因为后者侧重历史对文学的影响。相反,新批评认为文学作品并非历史对象,而只能被当做文本。新批评拥护为艺术而艺术的思想,并且强调艺术的自律性。文学批评的中心任务应当注重分析作品中的文学表现手法,譬如和谐、话语结构、想像、语言修辞与节奏等等。对作品欣赏和批评来讲,外在于作品本身的事实是无关紧要的。新批评运动与德里达新近提出的解构理论密切相关。

"(新批评)学说认为,在理解艺术作品的过程中,不可借用外在于作品本身的事实——譬如传记资料、社会习俗、(或许)意向等等。"——卡西:《艺术的自律性》,见皇家哲学研究所编《哲学与艺术》,1973 年,第 66 页。

新英国先验论

见“超验主义”条。

新工具

F. 培根主要著作的标题,也是他哲学的一个专门术语。这本拉丁名为 *Novum Organum* 的著作发表于 1620 年,是一部未完成的被称作“伟大复兴”的写作计划的第二部分。它的副标题是“关于自然解释的真正指导”。培根打算把它用作探索自然时正确运用人类理智的一个指导。它的中心思想是:我们应当解释而不是预测自然。我们只能在事实或思想中已经观察到的东西的基础上来认识。因此,从抽象概念和原则出发的传统三段论演绎逻辑是不恰当的。培根称自己的逻辑是“新的”,以区别于亚里士多德的《工具论》,在后者,三段论逻辑得到系统的阐述。正确的逻辑应当是归纳,尽管他所赞成的不是完全归纳法,而是淘汰归纳法。那么,培根用“新工具”指的是什么呢?他声称,在旧逻辑和他的新逻辑之间有三个基本的区别:(1)旧逻辑的目的是发明论证和驳倒对方的证明,而新逻辑的目的是发现自然本身的原理,在行动中命令自然。(2)旧逻辑主要关注于三段论,而新逻辑拒绝三段论,声称归纳是拥护感觉、反映自然的证明形式。(3)旧逻辑的研究起点是原则,而新逻辑要求我们从对信息的判断开始,这些信息是通过感官获得的。

“至于合法的[归纳]形式,我认为它是新工具。”——培根:《著作集》,1905 年,第 515 页。

ple, new logic requires that we start with a judgement about the information obtained through the senses.

"As for the legitimate form [of induction] I refer it to the new organon." —F. Bacon, *The Works*, 1905, p. 515.

New realism, another name for neo-realism

New riddle of induction

A problem which has provoked heated debate about the nature of induction. Induction is normally characterised in terms of inference to the continuation of previously observed regularities on the assumption of the uniformity of nature. But Nelson Goodman argued that this analysis itself depends on an unjustifiable assumption. Suppose that so far all observed emeralds have been green. The classical analysis of induction will lead us to believe that future emeralds will be green. But suppose there is another predicate *grue*, such that *x* is *grue* if and only if it is green when observed before time *T* (in the future) and blue thereafter. Given this, all our evidence for the hypothesis that emeralds are green equally supports the hypothesis that emeralds are *grue*. The evidence which we naturally take as confirming a given hypothesis always confirms some contrary hypothesis to an equal degree. Thus correct induction cannot be defined in terms of inferences to events similar to those observed. There are no language-independent similarities in nature. Induction can only apply to projectible properties, but the paradox shows that it is unclear what these properties are. This new riddle of induction is also called Goodman's paradox or the *grue* paradox.

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory of confirmation. It is this problem that I call the new riddle of induction." —Goodman, *Problems and Projects*, 1972, p. 386.

Newcomb's problem

A paradox about choice formulated by the American physicist William Newcomb in the early 1960s, and published by Robert Nozick in his paper "Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice" (1969). Suppose that a Supreme Being who has a successful record of prediction offers you two boxes A and B. You can choose to have either both boxes or the Box B alone. He puts a thousand pounds in Box A, and puts either a million pounds in B if he has predicted that you will choose B alone, or nothing if he has predicated that you will choose both boxes. Now which alternative should you choose? One line of reasoning suggests that you should trust

新的实在论

“新实在论”的另一个名称。

新归纳之谜

一个引发了有关归纳本性的热烈争论的问题。归纳的特征表述,通常是依据对于既往所观察到的规则性的持续,亦即依据自然的齐一性的推理。但 N. 古德曼论证说这一分析其本身依赖于一个未得到辩护的论定。假设迄今所观察到的所有绿宝石都是绿色的。经典的归纳分析将导致我们相信未来的绿宝石也是绿色的。但是设想有另一谓词“绿蓝”,使得 *x* 是绿蓝的当且仅当在(未来的)时间 *T* 之前观察它是绿色的,而在这时间之后是蓝色的。假定如此,则我们所有对于假说“绿宝石是绿色的”的证据也同样支持“它们是绿蓝的”这一假说。我们自然地看做确证了一给定假说的证据,总是同等程度地确证某些相反的假说。这样,正确的归纳就不能按照对于已观察到事件的类似事件的推理来定义。自然界中没有独立于语言的相似性,归纳仅能应用于可投射的性质,但是这一悖论表明并不清楚这些性质是什么。这一新归纳之谜也称作“古德曼悖论”或“绿蓝悖论”。

“迄今我们对这个问题既没有答案,也没有有希望的思路,这问题就是什么使类似规律的或可确证的假说区别于偶然的或不可确证的假说;起初似乎仅是较小的技术上的难题的东西,已成为令人满意的确证理论发展的主要障碍。正是这一问题我称之为新归纳之谜。”——古德曼:《问题与投射》,1972年,第386页。

纽康问题

一个有关选择的悖论,由美国物理学家 W. 纽康于 20 世纪 60 年代早期提出,并为 R. 诺齐克在其论文《纽康问题和两条选择原理》(1969 年)中发表。假设一个有着成功的预言纪录的至上存在者提供给你两个盒子 A 和 B。你可以选择或是两个盒子全要,或是仅要盒 B。他在盒 A 中放一千镑,然后在盒 B 中或是放入一百万镑,如果他预测你会仅选盒 B;或是什么也不放,如果他预测你将选两只盒全要的话。现在你应作出何种选择?一种推理思路建议你应相信这个至上存在者的预见能力,因而选择仅要

the demonstrated predictive capacity of the Supreme Being and choose B alone; so you will end up rich. The other reasoning suggests that you should take both, for you can get at least one thousand pounds in this way. If you choose B alone and the Supreme Being has predicted that you would take both boxes, you will end up with nothing. Both ways of reasoning are sound, but they are incompatible. If the Supreme Being's prediction were based on the assumption of your rationality and one option were more rational than the other, you would know what to choose, but any attempt to predict your choice on the basis of rationality will not produce a determinate result.

"Newcomb's problem presents a conflict between dominance reasoning and expected utility reasoning, both of which seem to have great intuitive appeal."—Campbell and Snowden (eds.), *Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation*, 1985, p. 24.

Nicod's criterion

A test of the relevance of evidence for confirmation put forward by the French philosopher Jean Nicod, saying that for a generalisation "All As are Bs", an instance A is B provides confirming evidence; an instance A is not B disconfirms the generalisation and justifies its rejection, and evidence of something which is neither A nor B is irrelevant, that is, it neither confirms nor disconfirms. This criterion is plausible in its own right, but when it is put together with other principles of confirmation, "Hempel's paradox" of confirmation arises.

"Nicod's criterion, ... states that ' $\phi a, \phi a$ ' always confirms, ' $\phi a, \sim \phi a$ ' always disconfirms, while ' $\sim \phi a, \phi a$ ' and ' $\sim \phi a, \sim \phi a$ ' are always irrelevant to, 'of physical necessity all ϕ 's are φ 's'."—Swinburne, *An Introduction to Confirmation Theory*, 1973, p. 152.

Nihilism

[from Latin: *nihil*, nothing] A theory which advocates that nothing is believable and that no distinction is significant. Metaphysical nihilism claims that the world and human life do not have the value and meaning we suppose them to have. Epistemological nihilism holds that no knowledge is possible. Ethical nihilism supposes that there is no ground to justify any absolute moral value. Political nihilism suggests that any political organisation must be corrupt. Nietzsche claimed that he is a nihilist. But his nihilism holds that the world lacks value and meaning if value and meaning are conceived in a traditional way. His nihilism is the devaluation of all values and provides a motive to seek new values.

"Right here is where the destiny of Europe lies—in losing our fear of man we have also lost our love for him, our respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be

B, 由此你最终富起来了; 另一种推理建议你选择两个盒子都要, 这样你至少可以得到一千镑。如果你选择了仅要 B 而那个存在者却预言你会选择二者都要, 你将一无所获。两种推理方式都是正确的, 但它们是不相容的。如果至上存在者的预测是基于对于你的理性的假定, 你的一种选择比另一种更为合理, 则你应能知道选择什么; 可是任何基于理性去预测你的选择的尝试都不会产生一个确定的结果。

"纽康问题表现出优势推理与预期效用推理之间的冲突, 这两种推理看上去都有着直观上极大的吸引力。"——坎贝尔和斯诺敦(编): 《理性的悖谬与合作》, 1985 年, 第 24 页。

尼柯德标准

由法国哲学家 J. 尼柯德提出的关于确证的证据相干性检验, 说的是对于一个概括"所有的 A 是 B", 一个事例"A 是 B"提供了确证证据, 一个事例"A 不是 B"产生了一个反驳或否证, 而关于某物既不是 A 也不是 B 的证据则是不相干的, 即它既没有确证也没有否证。这个标准就其自身而言似乎是合理的, 但当与其他确证原理结合起来, 就产生了关于确证的"亨佩尔悖论"。

"尼柯德标准……说的是对于'所有的 ϕ 是 φ ' 的物理必然性而言, ' $\phi a, \phi a$ ' 总是确证它, ' $\phi a, \sim \phi a$ ' 总是否证它, 而 ' $\sim \phi a, \phi a$ ' 和 ' $\sim \phi a, \sim \phi a$ ' 总是无关的。"——斯文布勒: 《确证理论导论》, 1973 年, 第 152 页。

虚无主义

[源自拉丁文 *nihil* (虚无, 什么也没有)] 一种主张没有可信的东西和没有有意义的区分的理论。形而上学的虚无主义认为世界和人生没有我们假定它们具有的价值和意义。认识论的虚无主义坚持没有任何知识是可能的。伦理的虚无主义提出, 不存在任何能为绝对的道德价值辩护的基础。政治上的虚无主义则建议, 任何政治组织必是腐败的。尼采声称他是一个虚无主义者, 但他的虚无主义所坚持的是: 如果价值和意义以传统的方式来看待, 那么这世界就是无价值和无意义的。他的虚无主义使所有[传统]价值贬值, 并提供去寻求新价值的动机。

"欧洲的命运就在这里: 由于丧失了对人的恐惧, 我们也丧失了我们对他的爱、尊敬和希望, 甚至还丧失了要成为人的意愿。今天, 人的

man. The sight of man now makes us tired — what is nihilism today if it is not that?” — Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, sect. 12.

No ownership theory

A theory which maintains that states of consciousness do not belong to anything, although they may be causally dependent on the body in a contingent way. If something is owned, its ownership is logically transferable, but this is not the case with experience. Strawson ascribed this theory to Wittgenstein at one period and to Schlick, and criticises it in his own discussion of persons. He accepts that the theory correctly claims that the unique role of a single body in one's experience is not sufficient for ascribing experience to it, but argues that the theory itself is incoherent. For the experience or consciousness to be causally dependent on states of the body, it must be owned by something. We could not refer to an independent particular experience. We refer to mental states by way of their owners, and therefore experience must be owned.

“The [no-ownership] theorist could maintain his position only by denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences at all; and his position is ridiculous.” — Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 98.

Noble lie

A falsehood uttered for the interest of the state. The term was introduced by Plato in *Republic* 414-5 for a myth used to safeguard social harmony by persuading a population to accept class distinctions. According to the myth, God made human beings from the earth. For the rulers, he added gold to the composition; for the auxiliaries, he added silver; and for the farmers and other workers, he added iron and bronze. For this reason, rulers should enjoy the greatest prestige. The distinction is not firmly fixed, for a golden child might be born of silver parents. It is the duty of the rulers to ensure that only a golden person can become a ruler. Plato believed that the myth can make the citizens happy with their current status and can thus promote social stability. Other Western political thinkers have accepted the legitimacy of political lies for the sake of public or party interest, and some theorists have examined related questions about the role of myth, ideology or false consciousness in political life.

“How then... might we contrive one of those opportune falsehoods of which we were just now speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city.” — Plato, *Republic*, 414C.

Noble savage

A term introduced by J-J Rousseau, for human beings before the appearance of civilisation and government. In con-

形象使我们厌倦——这不正是今天的虚无主义？”——尼采：《论道德的谱系》，第12节。

无所属论

这种理论认为，意识状态尽管可能以偶然的方式因果地依赖于身体，但却不属于任何事物。如果某物是有所属的，其所属关系就是在逻辑上可传递的；但经验并不是这样。斯特劳森将这一理论归予石里克和某一个时期的维特根斯坦，并在他自己关于人的讨论中对之作出批评。他承认这一理论正确地主张一个单一的身体在一个经验中的独特作用不足以将经验归结于它，但他论辩说，这一理论本身是自相矛盾的。因为经验或意识要因果地依赖于身体的状态，它就必须属于某物。我们不能指称一个独立的特定经验。我们通过其所有者来指称心的状态。因此经验一定是有所属的。

“[无所属]论者若要坚持其立场就必须否认我们曾经指称特定的状态或经验；而这一立场是荒谬的。”——斯特劳森：《个别物》，第98页。

高贵的谎言

为了国家的利益而说的假话。这个词是柏拉图在《国家篇》414—415段讲到一个神话时提出的，这个神话被用来通过劝说全体居民接受阶级的划分来维护社会的和谐。根据这个神话，神用土来造人。对于统治者，神在他们身上加了黄金；对于辅助者，神在他们身上加了白银；对于农民和其他技工，神在他们身上加了铁和铜。由于这一原因，统治者应享有最高的威望。这种区分不是固定不变的，因为统治者的孩子可以出生于辅助者的父母。统治者的责任是保证只有含有黄金成分的人才能成为统治者。柏拉图认为，这个神话可以使平民对他们当前的地位感到愉快，因而可以有益于社会的稳定。其他西方政治思想家承认为了公众或政党利益的政治谎言的合理性，一些思想家还考察了与此相关的神话、意识形态或虚假意识在政治生活中的作用问题。

“不久前，……现在我们或许可以说一个我们刚刚谈过的那些适宜的假话，以便如有可能的话，以一个高贵的谎言使统治者自己相信，或至少使城邦里其他人相信。”——柏拉图：《国家篇》，414C。

高尚的野蛮人

卢梭提出的一个术语，指的是文明与政府出现之前的人类。与霍布斯的处于自然状态下

trast to Hobbes' view that men in the state of nature are savage, Rousseau claims that if they are savages, they are noble savages. He held that human beings in the state of nature are free, peaceful, innocent, independent and happy. They are faithful to human nature and are free from the disease of our civilisation. It is the establishment of society that deforms human nature and makes humans subject to the conditions of domestic slavery. But it is argued that Rousseau held this view only in the early stage of his thought and that in general he did not think that men in the natural state are capable of virtue and moral relationships.

"Except possibly in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, written before his theories had been properly thought out, Rousseau was no believer in the 'noble savage', though that expression is often wrongly associated with his name."—Hail, *Rousseau*, 1973, p. 76.

Noema

[From Greek: *noema*, what is thought about; in contrast to a correlative term, *noesis*, the act of thinking. The terms are related to *nous*, reason] Husserl distinguished two aspects of intentional experience, the material and the formal. While the material aspect comprises the sensory stuffs passively received by consciousness, the formal aspect, or *noesis*, bestows sense on the material stuffs and generates unity among multiplicity by means of its synthetic activities. This account is deeply influenced by Kant's discussion of apperception. *Noema*, in contrast, is what is unified and synthesised by *noetic* activity. For Husserl, a major task for phenomenology is to reveal the *noetic-noematic* structure of intentional experience. The interpretation of *noema* is a difficult and has been subject to dispute. Generally, it is neither an object nor a part of an object, but is an entity corresponding to Frege's sense (in his distinction between sense and reference). *Noema* is a complex which includes every factor determining the meaning of *noetic* activity. It is the crucial notion for Husserl's theory of intentionality, for he claims that *noema*, rather than objects, are directed by a mental act.

"Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure intuition, and is a correlative 'noematic content', or briefly, 'noema'—terms which we shall henceforth be continually using."—Husserl, *Ideas* (tr. Kersten), 1982, sect. 88.

Noesis

[Greek; variously translated as intellection, intelligence and understanding; it is cognate with the verb *noein* and its object *to noeton*] In a wider sense *noesis* is thought, in contrast to perception (Greek: *aisthesis*). In its narrow sense, *noesis* is identified with *nous* (immediate or intuitive thinking)

的人是野蛮的观点不同,卢梭声称,即使他们是野蛮人,他们也是高尚的野蛮人。他认为,在自然状态下的人是自由的、爱好和平的、单纯的、独立的和快乐的。他们忠于人性,没有我们的文明造成的那种弊病。正是社会的建立才扭曲了人性并使人屈从于国内的奴隶制状态。不过有人争论说,卢梭只是在他思想的早期阶段持这种观点,一般说来他不认为自然状态下的人能具有美德和道德关系。

"可能除了在他的理论完全成熟以前写的《关于艺术的演说》外,卢梭并不是'高尚的野蛮人'的信徒,虽然这一说法常常被错误地与他的名字联系在一起。"——霍尔:《卢梭》,1973年,第76页。

意向对象

[源自希腊文 *noema*,意思是“那被想到的东西”;与之相对相关的希腊词是 *noesis*,指“思想的行为”。这两个词都与 *nous*(努斯,理性,心灵)有关]胡塞尔将意向经验区别为两个方面:质料的方面和形式的方面。质料的方面由意识被动接受的感觉材料组成,而形式的方面,或意向作用,则给予这物质材料以意义,并凭借其综合行为在复合多样中产生出统一。这种讲法受到康德对于统觉讨论的深刻影响。与之相对,意向对象是那被意向作用的行为统一和综合的东西。对于胡塞尔来说,现象学的一项主要任务就是去揭示意向经验中的意向作用—意向对象结构。对于意向对象的解释是困难的,已经引起争论。一般说来,它既不是对象,又不是对象的一部分,而是相应于弗雷格所讲的意义(在其对意义和所指的区分中所讲的)那样一种存在者。意向对象是一个复合体,包括决定意向作用行为意义的每一个因素。它是胡塞尔意向性理论中的关键概念,因为他认为心的行为所指向的是意向对象而非对象。

"在每一点上,对应于意向作用的实项内容的多样化材料,都有一种材料复合体可显示在现实的纯直观中,都有一种相关的'意向对象内容',或简言之,'意向对象'。这些术语我们从此将经常使用。"——胡塞尔:《观念》(克尔斯滕英译),1982年,第88节。

理解

[希腊词,有多种译法,如才智、通晓、理解等;它与动词 *noein* 同词根,它的对象是 *to noeton*]在广义上, *noesis* 意指思想,与感觉(希腊词 *aisthesis*)相对应。在狭义上, *noesis* 与直接或直觉思维意义上的 *nous* 一致,和 *dianoia*(推论思

and contrasted to *dianoia* (discursive thinking). It is the thought which constitutes the being of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and is pure intuitive apprehension in Neo-platonism. In Plato's simile of the Line, *noesis* is beyond *dianoia*, and while *dianoia* is concerned with mathematical entities, *noesis* is the highest state of the mind which reasons from Forms to Forms, reaches first principles, and then deduces from them. It is dialectical or philosophical reason. For Husserl's account of *noesis*, see *noema*.

"Life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by the power of perception or *noesis*." Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1170a16.

Noesis, see *noema*

Nomic necessity

The regularity and uniformity existing amongst contingent natural phenomena. "Spring follows winter" and "Ice melts at a certain temperature" are statements that express empirical laws. They are not logically or mathematically necessary, but appear to be necessary in some sense. This sort of necessity is often called nomic or lawlike necessity. Such a necessity reveals that things will at least generally happen in that way or, in a stronger form, that they must happen in that way or that it is inevitable that they will so happen. Lawlike necessity is often expressed in a hypothetical supposition: if anything had the characteristics $c_1 \dots c_n$, then it would have the characteristic x . Different philosophers have offered various interpretations of this sort of necessity. Hume denied its objectivity by claiming that it is nothing more than our habitual expectation. Among those who have admitted it, medieval thinkers considered it to be due to God's force, while Kant suggested that it results from the imposition of our categories of understanding upon experience.

"The nomic necessity—anything characterised by $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$ would be characterised by x —implies the factual universal that 'everything that is $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$ is actually x '. "—Johnson, *Logic*, III, 1964, p. 9.

Nominal definition, see real definition

Nominal essence

The distinction between real essence and nominal essence, drawn by Locke, roughly corresponds to the traditional metaphysical division between substance and quality or between essence and appearance. A nominal essence is the quality or qualities by which we recognise an item and which justifies on any given occasion applying the item's name to it.

维)相对应。在亚里士多德的《形而上学》中,它是构成“不动的动者”存在的思想,在新柏拉图主义那里,它是纯直觉的领悟。在柏拉图的“线段之喻”中,*noesis* 超越于 *dianoia* 之外,*dianoia* 关涉的是数理实体,而 *noesis* 则是心的最高状态,即从形式出发推论到形式,到达第一原理,然后从它们下降。它是辩证的或哲学的理智。关于胡塞尔对 *noesis* 的主张见“意向对象”条。

“生命是有限定的,对动物而言,为感觉能力所限,对人而言,为感觉或理解的能力所限。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1170a16。

意向作用

见“意向对象”条。

规则必然性

存在于偶然的自然现象之间的规则性和齐一性。“冬去春来”和“冰雪在某一温度下消融”都是表述经验规律的陈述,它们既非逻辑上也非数学上必然的,而只是看上去在某种意义上必然的,这种必然性经常被称作“规则”必然性或拟规律必然性。这种必然性揭示出事情至少一般地将以这种方式发生,其较强的形式则为它们必然以这种方式发生,或是不可避免它们会如此发生。拟规律必然性经常表述于一种假设推测的语境中:如果一事物具有特性 $c_1 \dots c_n$, 则它将具有特性 x 。不同的哲学家对这种必然性提出了各种解释。休谟否认它的客观性,认为它不过是我们的习惯性预期。而在那些承认它的人中,中世纪思想家认为它是出自上帝的力量,康德则提出它来自于我们加在经验上的知性范畴。

“规则必然性——任何为 $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$ 所表征的事物将为 x 所表征——意味着事实上普遍有‘每一个是 $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow r$ 的东西实际上都是 x ’。”——约翰逊:《逻辑学》,第三卷,1964年,第9页。

名义定义

见“真实定义”条。

名义的本质

洛克大致根据实体(或译本体)和性质或者本质和现象的传统形而上学的划分,区分了实在的本质和名义的本质。名义的本质指性质或一组性质,我们依靠它们来辨认一个事项,依靠它们在任何给定的情况下,证明一个人对一个事项名称的使用是正当的。在洛克看来,名义的

For Locke, it is the abstract ideas for which a general or sortal name stands. For example, according to its nominal essence gold is a metal which is malleable, heavy and yellow. Because gold has these properties, we can recognise it as such and can apply the name "gold" to it. A thing's real essence is its internal but unknown constitution. While the qualities which constitute the nominal essence depend on the real essence, only the nominal essence serves to distinguish one thing from another. Traditional metaphysics emphasised real essences, but Locke's philosophy shifted the emphasis to nominal essences. This distinction made essence *qua* unknown real essence superfluous. Berkeley and his followers therefore rejected the notion of real essence, and this leads to phenomenalism.

"[Real essence] is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to name, which is therefore its nominal essence."—Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III,iii,18.

Nominalism

[from Latin: *nomen*, name] The view that the only feature that particulars falling under the same general term have in common is that they are covered by the same term. Hence, universals are only names rather than entities in their own right, although there are universal elements in knowledge. Nominalism is opposed to realism, according to which universals are real entities which are required to explain how general terms apply to different particulars. For nominalism, language, rather than independent reality, underlies perceived similarity. Everything that exists is particular, and universals are terms invented by the mind to talk about similarities. Talk about properties and abstract entities is legitimate only if it can be reduced to talk about particulars. Nominalism follows the spirit of Ockham's razor, that is by avoiding positing the existence of unnecessary entities. Nominalism is the traditional empiricist theory of universals, and its major advocates include Ockham, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and in this century Carnap and Quine, although different philosophers in the tradition have different reasons for rejecting universals and ways of eliminating them. Many philosophers are attracted to the ontological austerity of nominalism, but problems remain concerning how language, especially predication, works on nominalist principles.

"Nominalism maintains that universals are names only, corresponding to no reality."—Walsh, *Reason and Knowledge*, 1947, p. 99.

本质是用通名或类名称来代表的抽象观念。例如,根据金子的名义本质,金子是可延展的、沉重的、黄色的金属,因为金子有这些性质,所以我们可以依此来辨认它,我们可以将“金子”一词用在它之上。一个东西的实在的本质是它的内在的未知的结构。虽然构成名义的本质的各种性质依赖于实在的本质,但只有名义的本质适于将一个东西同另一个东西区分开来。传统的形而上学强调“实在的本质”,而洛克的哲学转而强调名义的本质。这个区分使作为未知的实在的本质这个本质变成多余的。因此巴克莱及其追随者拒绝实在的本质的概念,这导致了现象论。

“黄金的[实在的本质]是黄金的颜色、重量、可熔性、确定性等所有这些性质所依靠的不可感部分的实在结构,这个结构使那团物质成为黄金,或使它有权使用黄金之名,因此这个名称就是黄金的名义本质。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第三卷,第三章,第18节。

唯名论

[源自拉丁文 *nomen*, 名称]指如下观点:被归入同一普遍词之下的各个殊相所共同具有的惟一特征,是它们都为这同一个词所指称。因此,共相只是名称,不是独自的存在物,尽管在知识中有共相的成分。唯名论与唯实论相反,根据唯实论,共相是实在的实体,它们被用来说明普遍词如何应用于不同的殊相。对于唯名论来说,语言而非独立的实在,成为已知相似性的基础。每一存在物都是殊相,共相是为谈论相似物而由心灵发明的词。对性质和抽象实体的谈论,只有当它们可还原为对殊相的谈论时,才是合法的。唯名论遵循奥康剃刀的精神,即避免假定不必要的实体的存在。唯名论是传统的经验主义共相论,它的主要拥护者包括奥康、霍布斯、洛克、巴克莱和本世纪的卡尔纳普、奎因。尽管该传统中的不同哲学家对拒斥共相和消除共相的方法有不同的理由。许多哲学家注意到唯名论的本体严肃性,但是,关于语言,尤其是主谓关系怎样根据唯名论的原则来运作的问题仍然存在。

“唯名论坚持认为,共相仅仅是名称,没有相对应的实在。”——瓦尔西:《理性和知识》,1947年,第99页。

Nomological dangler

A term introduced by Feigl in his 1958 article "The mental and the physical", referring to the lawlike relations which connect intersubjectively confirmable events with events that are in principle not intersubjectively and independently confirmable. It means in particular the laws which relate non-physical conscious experience to their associated brain processes. We accept these relations or laws but they cannot be accounted for in scientific formulations. They are quite outside normal scientific conceptions, that is, they dangle from the nomological net of science. The identity theory of mind attempts to rule out these danglers.

In his 1960 paper "Sensations and brain processes.", Smart used this term for the physical entity that is supposed to dangle from the psychological law rather than to the psychophysical law itself. But he later reverted to Feigl's use, although he viewed such laws with great suspicion.

"At best a nomological dangler would merely subsume a lot of As that are associated with Bs under the generalization 'All As are Bs'. The reason for this is that the nomological danglers would be laws purporting to connect physical events, in fact, neurophysiological ones, with allegedly non-physical ones, conscious experiences."—Smart, *Essays Metaphysical and Moral*, 1987, p. 215.

Nomos

Law or convention, and used to refer to written or customary laws and rules, custom, habits and conventions. Because all of these are men-made and can be changed and modified by men, in Greek philosophy *nomos* is contrasted to *physis* (nature). Democritus claims that such things as colour and taste are conventions, while only atoms and the void are real (natural). In the fourth-fifth century BC, philosophers disputed whether human nature or human morality is *nomos* or *physis*. The defenders of *nomos*, e. g. Protagoras, insist that human nature or morality is affected by the beliefs of different societies. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all attack this relativism, and attempt to base human morality on objective grounds.

"What is fine and what is just, the topics of inquiry in political science, differ and vary so much that they seem to rest on *nomos* only, not on nature."—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094b15-6.

Noncognitivism

Also called non-descriptivism, a type of meta-ethical theory which denies that we can have moral knowledge by intuition, and also denies that ethical statements can be construed as scientific statements, confirmable by observation or inductive reasoning. It claims that ethical terms do not refer to properties and that ethical judgements are not used to convey what is the case and are neither true nor false. Thus, it

法则学关联

由费格尔在他 1958 年的论文《心的与物的》中引入的一个术语,指把主体间可确证事件与原则上不能主体间及独立确证的事件相联系的拟规律关系。它特别意味着那些联系非物理的意识经验与和它们相关的脑过程的规律。我们承认这些关系或规律,但它们不能用科学公式来说明。它们完全在常规科学观念之外,即它们在科学的法则学网络上关联着。“心的同一论”试图罗列出我们的这些关联。

斯马特在他 1960 年的论文《感觉与脑过程》中用这个术语指那些被看做关联于心理学定律而不是心理物理学定律自身的物理实体。但后来他又回到费格尔的用法,尽管在他看来这些规律很有疑问。

“法则学关联充其量不过是把许多与 B 相联系的 A 归属于概括‘所有的 A 都是 B’之中。这么做的理由是,法则学关联是意在将物理事件、事实上是神经生理事件与据说是非物理的事件、即意识经验相联系的规律。”——斯马特:《形而上学与道德文集》,1987 年,第 215 页。

规范

指法律或惯例,也用来表示成文法或不成文法,以及习俗、习惯与惯例等等。因为所有这些东西是人为的,而且是由人来改变或修正的,因此在古希腊哲学中规范(*nomos*)有别于自然(*physis*)。德谟克利特认为,诸如色彩和趣味之类的东西就属惯例,而只有原子和真空属于实在(自然)。公元前 4 至 5 世纪,哲学家对人性或人类道德属于规范还是属于自然的问题争论不休。规范的辩护者有普罗泰戈拉等人,他们坚持认为人性或人类道德是受不同社会之信仰的影响。而苏格拉底、柏拉图和亚里士多德都批评这种相对主义,并且试图把人类道德建立在客观的基础之上。

“美好与公正的东西,作为政治学探讨的话题,是彼此截然不同的,它们看来只是有赖于规范而非自然。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1094b15-16。

非认知主义

也称“非规定主义”,一种元伦理理论,它否定我们能够通过直觉而得到道德知识,也否定伦理陈述能够解释为可为观察或归纳推理证实的科学陈述。它主张伦理词汇不指涉属性,伦理判断不被用来表达事态,因而既不真也不假。因此,它是与许多传统的伦理理论相对立的,这些理论认为,有伦理知识以及规范伦理判断能够

is opposed to the many traditional ethical theories which hold that there is ethical knowledge and that normative ethical judgements can be said to be true or false. These rival theories are therefore termed cognitivism and include both naturalist and nonnaturalist varieties.

The positive thesis of noncognitivism is that in ethical thinking we should concentrate on the non-fact-stating functions of ethical expressions. Exactly what these functions are is an issue dividing many forms of noncognitivism. For some, ethical expressions express attitude; for some, they issue commands; for some, they express exclamations; for some, they are prescriptions; and so on. The most influential noncognitive theories are emotivism, developed by Stevenson, and prescriptivism, developed by Hare.

"Noncognitivism: the job of ethical sentences is not to state facts." Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 203.

Non-consequentialism, see consequentialism

Non-descriptivism, see noncognitivism, descriptivism

Non-doxastic theory, see doxastic theory

Non-Euclidean geometry

We can informally render Euclid's fifth 'parallels' postulate (or Axiom XI) as follows: 'through a given point P not on a line L, there is one and only one line in the plane of P and L that does not meet L'. This axiom turns out to be independent of the other axioms of Euclid. The exploration of the consequences of this fact led to the development of various non-Euclidean geometries. They develop systems in which two different denials of this postulate are used: Lobachevskian geometry contains an infinite number of parallels through P; Reimannian geometry contains no parallels through P. Reimannian geometry has played a crucial role in the development of the General Theory of Relativity.

"If the parallel axiom is independent of the other axioms of Euclid, then a statement incompatible with the parallels axiom can be substituted for it without logically contradicting the other axioms. By trying different alternatives, new axiom systems, called non-Euclidean geometries, were created" —Carnap, *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, 1966, p. 130.

Non-monotonic logics

In logic, an inference is monotonic if a conclusion C, which can be inferred validly from a set of premises, can also

是真或假的。这些匹敌的理论因此也被命名为认知主义,它们包括自然主义和非自然主义。

非认知主义的积极论点是,在伦理思考中,我们应该集中于伦理表达的非事实陈述的功能。正是在说明这些功能的问题上,区分了非认知主义的许多不同形式。在某些人看来,伦理述词表达态度;对于另一些来说,它们发布命令;对于其他一些来说,则表达感叹;而对其他人而言,它们是规定等等。最有影响的非认知主义理论有斯蒂文森发展的情感主义,以及黑尔所发展的规定主义。

"非认知主义,伦理句子的作用不是描述事实。" 布朗特,《伦理理论》,1959年,第203页。

非效果论

见“效果论”条。

非规定主义

见“非认知主义”、“描述主义”条。

非信念论

见“信念论”条。

非欧几何

我们可以把欧几里德的第五条“平行”公设(或第十一条公理)非正式地表述如下:“经过不在直线L上的一给定点P,在平面P和L上有且仅有一条直线不与L相交。”这一公理证明为独立于欧几里德的其他公理。对这一事实的后果的探索导致了各种非欧几何的发展,它们探讨运用了对这公设的两种不同否定形式的系统:罗巴切夫斯基几何学包含经过P的无穷条平行线,黎曼几何学则不包含经过P的平行线。黎曼几何学在广义相对论的发展中起到了关键作用。

“如果平行公理独立于其他欧几里德公理,则一个与平行公理不相容的陈述可用以取代它,而不与其他公理相矛盾。通过尝试不同的选择,新的称作非欧几何的公理系统就创造出来了。” —卡尔纳普,《物理学的哲学基础》,1966年,第130页。

非单调的逻辑

在逻辑中,当一结论C能永真地从一组前提推论出来,也能在无论什么更多的前提被增

be inferred validly no matter what further premises are added to the originally valid argument. It is non-monotonic if the addition of further information leads to a different conclusion. Non-monotonic logics, used in artificial intelligence research, explore logical systems in which monotonicity does not hold.

"Non-monotonic inferences are inferences of the form: a ; there is no reason to suppose otherwise; so b ."— Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought*, 1995, p. 48.

Non-natural property

According to G. E. Moore, ethical terms such as "good" refer to objective properties which are the basis of truth-values of ethical statements. However, these ethical properties are not natural, that is they are not observable or subject to scientific explanation. Instead they can only be known through moral intuition. According to Moore, any attempt to define ethical terms by appeal to natural terms commits the naturalistic fallacy. However, critics deny the existence of such properties or qualities, and claim that the appeal to a special kind of intuition is not convincing. In addition, it is hard to say how non-natural moral properties could guide our actions.

"The alleged concept of a nonnatural property is not connected with experience, does not function to guide expectations, is not part of a theoretical system with consequences predicative of observation, in the way in which this is true of the concepts of empirical science."—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 190.

Nonnaturalism (ethical)

In opposition to ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism claims that ethical terms cannot be defined by appeal to natural terms. Ethical properties are presented as non-natural properties that are not observable and not subject to scientific explanation. There is a firm distinction between ought and is, or between value and fact, so that ethical statements (value statements or "ought" statements) cannot be derived from statements of facts. To attempt to do so is to commit the so called naturalistic fallacy. Distinct from non-cognitivism, non-naturalism argues that ethical statements have objective meanings and truth-values because they refer to non-natural ethical properties, but they can only be known by intuition, rather than by observation or experiment, as naturalism holds. In this century, the main proponent of non-naturalism is G. E. Moore.

"The most vulnerable point of nonnaturalist doctrine, however, is the epistemology, the theory of how we know or are justified in believing ethical statements."— Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 183.

加到原来永真的主目上都会永真地推论出来,那么这个推理就是单调的。当所增加的信息导致了不同的结论,那么它就是非单调的。非单调的逻辑被用于人工智能的研究,它探索单调性所没有把握的逻辑体系。

"非单调的推理是这种形式的推理: a ;没有理由假定其他方面;因此 b 。"—普里斯特,《超出思想的界限》,1995年,第48页。

非自然的特性

依据 G. E. 摩尔的观点,伦理词汇诸如"善",指的是作为伦理陈述真值基础的客观特性。不过,这些伦理特性不是自然的,即它们不是可观察的或可为科学解释的,它们只能通过"道德直觉"而被认识。据摩尔看来,任何以自然词汇来为伦理词汇下定义的企图都要犯自然主义的谬误。不过,批评家否定这样的特性或性质的存在,宣称诉诸一种特别的直觉不是令人信服的。此外,很难说这些非自然的特性怎样指导我们的行动。

"所谓的非自然特性的概念不与经验相联,没有指导期望的作用,不是有着可观察的效果理论系统的一部分。而经验科学的概念具有这些特性。"—布朗特,《伦理理论》,1959年,第190页。

非自然主义(伦理学的)

与伦理学的自然主义相对,伦理学的非自然主义主张,伦理词汇不能诉诸自然词汇而下定义,伦理特性是非自然特性,是不可观察和不可为科学解释的。在"应当"与"是"或"价值"与"事实"之间有着确定的区分,所以伦理陈述(即价值陈述或"应当"陈述)不能从对事实的陈述中得出。企图这样做就犯了所谓自然主义的谬误。与非认知主义相区分,非自然主义相信伦理陈述有客观意义和真值,因为它们指非自然的伦理特性,但它们只有靠直觉才可认识到,而不是通过观察或实验,如同自然主义所认为的那样。在20世纪,非自然主义的主要提倡者是 G. E. 摩尔。

"不过,非自然主义最脆弱的地方是认识论,即关于我们怎样知道或怎样证明我们相信伦理陈述为合理的理论。"—布朗特,《伦理理论》,1959年,第183页。

Non-reflexive, see irreflexive

Nonsense

Inspired by Kant's description of reason's inevitably failed attempt to extend beyond the limits of knowledge, Wittgenstein draws a demarcation between meaningful propositions and meaningless propositions. While meaningful propositions are bipolar, that is, either true or false, meaningless propositions are not bipolar and are hence nonsensical. Such propositions are not obviously false or pointless, but simply lack sense. Most questions asked in philosophy and the propositions with which we attempt to answer them are nonsense (German *Unsinn*), and one cannot say that they are true or false. These propositions fail in their attempt to say something about the world, due to our failure to understand the logical syntax of language which is obscured by grammar. Nonsense can be divided into overt nonsense and covert nonsense. Overt nonsense can be seen intuitively to be nonsense, such as the question "Is the good more or less identical than the beautiful?", but covert nonsense has to be discovered by analysis. For Wittgenstein, the task of proper philosophy is to clarify good sense. What is nonsensical cannot be said, but can be shown. In this sense, even his own theory of logical syntax is nonsensical, for it tries to say what can only be shown. In the Vienna Circle, all statements which are not capable of scientific treatment or are not verifiable are nonsense, and "nonsense" accordingly becomes a label for metaphysical statements. Nonsense should be distinguished from what is senseless.

"It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be shown, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, preface.

Non-teleological ethics, see consequentialism

Non-tuism

A term coined by the economist Wicksteed in *The Common Sense of Political Economy and Selected Papers and Reviews on Economic Theory* (1933), originally referring to the specific character of economic relations. Non-tuists are not interested in the interests of those with whom they interact. This sort of motivation is neither egoistic nor altruistic. Some philosophers extend this term to the moral area to offer a rationale for morality, suggesting that people are neither egoists nor altruists. We need moral constraints, but morality is merely a device rather than a fundamental concern for others.

"The market requires only that persons be conceived as not taking an interest in the interests of those with whom they exchange. This is Wicksteed's requirement of non-

非自返

见“反自返的”条。

无意义

康德认为,如果理性企图超越知识的界线就不可避免地会失败,受此激励,维特根斯坦在有意义的命题和无意义的命题间划出一条界线。有意义的命题是两极性的,即是说要么真,要么假,而无意义的命题不是两极性的,因此是无意义的。这样的命题不是明显地错或不得要领,而只是没有意义。哲学中提出的大部分问题和用来回答这些问题的命题是无意义(德文为 *Unsinn*),我们不能说,它们是真还是假。这些命题在力图对世界有所述说时失败了,是因为未能懂得语言的逻辑句法,它被语法弄得模糊不清。无意义可以分为明显的和不明显的两种。明显的无意义可以被直观地看到是无意义,例如这样的问题:“善或多或少等同于美吗?”但不明显的无意义需要用分析来发现。对维特根斯坦而言,哲学的专门任务是澄清适当的涵义。无意义的东西不能说出,而只能显示。在此含义上,甚至他自己关于逻辑句法的理论也是无意义的,因为它试图说出只能显示的东西。在维也纳小组中,一切不能够科学处理或不可证实的陈述都是无意义,因此“无意义”成了形而上学陈述的标签。应将无意义与没有意义的东西相区别。

“因此,只是在语言中,界限才能显示,而处于界限另一边的只会是无意义。”——维特根斯坦,《逻辑哲学论》,序言。

非目的论的伦理学

见“效果论”条。

非亲密性

经济学家威克德在他的《政治经济学常识和经济理论论文及评论选》(1933年)中所造的一个词,最初是指经济关系的特殊性质。非亲密者对于他们所接触的那些人的利益不感兴趣。这种动机既不是利己主义也不是利他主义。某些哲学家把这个词引入道德领域,来论证道德的合理性,认为人们既不是利己主义的,也不是利他主义的,我们需要道德束缚,但道德仅是一种工具,而非对他人的根本性的关注。

“市场所需要的仅仅是,不对与他们交换的人的利益感兴趣的那些人。这是威克德对于非亲密性的要求。”——高塞:《约定的道德》,1986年,第87页。

tuism" Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement*, 1986, p. 87.

Normative

From norm, which means standard or rule and it is associated with evaluation. A theory is normative if it involves norm-prescription and is descriptive if it simply describes the facts but does not prescribe what one ought to do. Normative ethics is the subject of inquiring about the principles or rules of correct moral behaviour and is contrasted to meta-ethics, which analyses the meaning and logical relations of evaluative terms. To define a normative term in terms of non-moral properties is called by Moore the definist fallacy. Sociologists as well as moral philosophers have pictures our lives as governed by complex hierarchies of norms.

"Theories that prescribe standards are normative."
Glymour, *Thinking Things Through*, 1992, p. 110.

Normative egoism, see egoism, ethical

Notation

The abbreviation for a notational system or notational scheme, which consists of certain characters or symbols. Notation is the mark of identification distinguishing one type of art from another and determining whether two works belong to the same form of art. It also determines whether two performances are the instances of the same work or whether different inscriptions are copies of the same score. Notation indicates the constitutive properties of a work and distinguishes them from its contingent properties. Establishing this distinction generally relies on boundaries drawn in the antecedent practices. Some forms of art, such as music, have traditional notation, while other, like painting, do not. For other forms of art, like dance, attempts to provide a notation have lacked total success. Since notation is a system of characters, it should be syntactically disjoint so that all marks belonging to the same character are interchangeable without syntactic effects. It should also be finitely differentiated, that is to say, by using the notation we can tell whether or not two marks belong to the same character. Moreover, a notation should also be semantically unambiguous, so that, for example, performances of different works cannot conform to the same score.

"In sum, the properties required of a notational system are unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation. These are in no sense merely recommended for a good and useful notation but are features that distinguish notational systems—good or bad—from non-notational systems."—Nelson Goodman, *Language of Art*, 1968, p. 156.

规范的

源自名词“规范”，意为“标准”或“规则”，与“评价”相联。一个理论如果涉及到规范规定，它就是规范的，如果只是叙述事实而不规定一个人应当做什么，就是描述的。规范伦理学是研究正确道德行为的原则和规则的科学，是与元伦理学相对的，元伦理学分析评价词的意义和逻辑关系。依据非道德的特性为一个规范词汇下定义，被摩尔称为定义主义的谬误。社会学家和道德哲学家把我们的生活描画为被复杂的规范等级体系所支配的图画。

“规定标准的理论是规范的。”——格里摩尔：《透彻思考问题》，1992年，第110页。

规范利己主义

见“伦理利己主义”条。

标志法

“标志系统”或“标志图式”的缩写形式，由某些特征或符号构成。标志法是一种识别的标志，表示一种艺术与另一种艺术的区别，同时还决定两件作品是否属于同类艺术。另外，标志法还决定两台演出是否是同一作品的实例，或者不同的题词是否是同一总谱的拷贝。标志法表明作品的构成特性，同时又使其有别于作品的偶然特性。建立这种区别一般取决于在先前实践中所划定的界限。有些艺术形式，譬如音乐，具有传统的标志法，而其他一些艺术形式，譬如绘画，则没有这种方法。另外一些艺术形式，譬如舞蹈，虽然试图提供一种标志法，但却未能取得完全的成功。由于标志法是一种特征系统，因此应当在句法结构上予以拆解，从而使所有属于相同特征的标志在没有句法作用的情况下能够彼此变通。标志法的区分也应当是有限的，也就是说，人们凭借标志法便可辨别出两个标志是否属于同一特征。另外，一种标志法也应当在语义上是非歧义性的，如此一来，不同作品的演出就不会遵从同一总谱。

“总而言之，标志系统所需要具备的特性包括非歧义性、句法与语义的拆解性与差异性。这些特性绝非是为一套优秀的和有用的标志法所设定的条件，而是区别标志系统（无论好坏）与非标志系统的特征使然。”——古德曼：《艺术语言》，1968年，第156页。

Notational scheme. see notation

Not-being

That which is not. Parmenides claimed that not-being can be neither spoken nor thought, for everything that can be spoken or thought is being. He also believed that Heraclitus's position that everything is always in change amounts to saying that a thing is both being and not-being, and this is an account which can only lead to opinion rather than truth. Plato argues that Forms or Ideas are truly beings and that the sensible world as appearance is both being and not-being. According to Plato's analysis in the *Sophist*, not-being is neither absolutely nothing nor a kind of thing. Instead it is the absence of being, and is "other than" or "being different from" a positive determination or being. In Plotinus, "not being" refers to matter, which is at the bottom of the hierarchy of reality, and is identified with pure passivity, evil and darkness. Modern discussion tends to follow Plato and characterise not-being as a negative event, which is expressed by negative propositions. But there has been debate concerning how to avoid a commitment to non-existents through negative propositions. If not-being is a negative property, then we must find a way to distinguish negative properties from positive properties. Non-being is generally taken to be identical with nothingness.

"When we speak of 'not being', it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different."— Plato, *Sophist*, 257b.

Nothingness

Also called negation, not-being, or nihilation. Nothing is an abbreviated form of "not-anything". The nature of negation has been a difficult puzzle from the Pre-Socratic philosophers. Through nominalisation, negation seems to become an entity, "the not", and the ontological status of nothing becomes a problem. Parmenides claimed that not-being is unsayable. Plato suggested that not-being exists and means "other-than-being". Aristotle believed that not-being is what lacks any and every property. The dispute continued through medieval philosophy, which tried to connect nothingness, privation and evil. At the beginning of his *Logic*, Hegel proposed a dialectic of Being and Nothingness.

In contemporary philosophy, there are two quite different usages. Heidegger took "nothingness" (German: *das Nichts*) as a referring expression, denoting a special kind of subject matter. We can experience nothingness, that is the experience that human existence has no ground and is meaningless. This experience is revealed in anxiety and culminates in the experience of death. Sartre distinguished between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The former is conscious being, especially human being, and the latter is the being of

标志图式

见“标志法”条。

不是

即那不是(不存在)的事物。巴门尼德认为,“不是”既不能被说,也不能被想,因为一切能说能想都是“是”。他也相信赫拉克利特的观点,即一切事物都处于变化之中,等于是说一切事物即“是”又“不是”。这种说法只能产生意见,而不能产生真理。柏拉图论证说,形式或形相是真实的“是”,而可感世界作为现象则既“是”又“不是”。根据柏拉图在《智者篇》中的分析,“不是”既非绝对的无又非一类事物。事实上,它是“是”(存在)的缺乏,是“异于”或“不同于”——正面的规定或“是”。在普罗提诺的哲学中,“不是”乃指质料,处于现实等级的底层,并等同于纯被动、邪恶与黑暗。近代讨论倾向于跟随柏拉图,把“不是”看做是一否定事件,由否定命题表示。但如何避免由否定命题引起的对不存在的承诺,一直是一个争论不休的问题。如果“不是”是一个否定属性,难道我们不是得设法区分否定属性与肯定属性吗?“不是”一般当做是“无”的同义词。

“当我们说‘不是’时,我们似乎不是指那与存在物相反的东西,而是指与其不同的东西。”——柏拉图:《智者篇》,257b。

无

也叫作否定、不是或虚无。“无”是“并非任何东西”的缩写形式。自前苏格拉底的哲学家们以来,否定的性质就成了一个令人困惑的难题。通过命名或名词化,否定似乎成为了一个存在者,即“这个并非”;而无的存在论身份也就成了一个难题。巴门尼德声称,“不是”是不可说的。柏拉图则提议说,“不是”也存在着(exists),并且意味着“在存在之外”。亚里士多德相信“不是”缺少任何性质。这类争论贯穿了中世纪哲学,那时的人们试图将无、缺乏与邪恶联系起来。黑格尔在他的《小逻辑》开端,提出了一种是与无的辩证法。

在当代哲学中,对这个词有两种很不同的用法。海德格尔将“无”(德文为: *das Nichts*) 当做一个指示一种特殊主题的指称表达式。我们能体验到无,即体验到人类生存的无根基和无(现成)意义的状态。这种体验在畏惧中透露出来,并在对死亡的体验中达到高峰。萨特区别了“为自身的存在”(自为存在)和“在自身中的存在”(自在存在)。前者是有意识的存在,特别是人类存在;后者则是世界中事物的存在,受制于

things in the world that are causally determined. Consciousness as being-for-itself is directed upon some object, but is also aware of itself as conscious of some object. Hence it presents a vacancy or gap between itself and its object, by which consciousness detaches itself from the rest of the world or being-in-itself and identifies itself by reference to the things which are other than itself. For Sartre, this gap is precisely what nothingness is, as an awareness of he-is-not-what-he-is or he-is-what-he-is-not. Hence, nothingness is the separation between itself and its object and is an implicit awareness of not-being-the-object. Sartre holds that this separation is the source of human freedom by causing human beings to choose what they will be rather than simply being. Consciousness is negation in itself because it cannot exist without a separation from its object. Human being, as the agent of consciousness, is the only being that can bring nothingness into the world. It takes a different view of being-in-the-world and modifies it. The awareness of nothingness results in feeling anguish, and an escape from anguish leads one to fall into bad faith. The conception of nothingness lies at the foundation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

On the other hand, Carnap rejects Heidegger's use of "nothing" as typical metaphysical nonsense. Nothing does not refer to anything, but simply marks the absence of an expected existent. For Carnap, Heidegger's question about nothing is a violation of logical syntax. It is generally held in analytic philosophy that nothingness is a pseudo-object which is invoked to fill the gap produced by insisting that every mental state is intentional in form. In modern logic, "nothing" is interpreted in terms of quantified sentences rather than as a designator of an object.

"We perceived then that Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of Being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called *négalités*." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 22.

Nooumenon

[from Greek: *noein*, to think, hence the thing thought or the intelligible thing; plural: *noumena*] A thing as intelligible object or ultimate reality, in contrast to a *phenomenon*, which is a thing as it appears or is sensed. This ancient distinction was carefully explored in Plato's theory of ideas. But the term *noumenon* is especially associated with Kant. In his philosophy, *noumenon* is mainly used in a negative sense, as something which is beyond the limits of sensibility, intuition or experience, that is beyond the world of appearance. Hence, a *noumenon* is an unknown thing, employed to show the limits of possible knowledge, which is postulated by pure reason as a starting point for all scientific inquiries. Kant

因果律。作为“为了自身的存在”的意识指向某个对象,但也意识到自身乃是对某对象意识。因此,这意识在它自身与其对象之间造成了一个空档,凭借此空档而使自身脱离世界的其余部分或“在自身中的存在”,并在与那些不是其自身的东西的关联中得到自己的身份。对于萨特,这个空档正是“无”所意味的,也就是对于“他不是他所是”或“他是其所不是”的状态的意识。所以,无是自身与其对象的分离,并且是对于“不是此对象”状态的模糊意识。萨特认为这种分离是人类自由之源,迫使人类存在者们去选择他们将成为的状态,而不仅仅是一种〔现成的〕存在状态。意识是在自身中的否定,因为它不能不以与其对象分离的方式生存。人类有意识,因而是能将无带入此世界的惟一存在者。萨特在此采取一种与〔海德格尔的〕“在此世界之中存在”不同的观点并修改了它。对于无的意识导致焦虑感,而逃避焦虑则导致自欺〔bad faith, 伪劣信念〕。无这个概念是萨特《有与无》〔或《存在与虚无》〕一书的基础。

另一方面,卡尔纳普将海德格尔对于“无”的使用当做典型的形而上学胡说来拒斥。无并不指涉任何东西,而只标志着某个被期待存在者的缺失。在卡尔纳普看来,海德格尔关于无的探求违反了逻辑语法。分析哲学中的普遍看法是:无是一种伪对象,来自要填充一种空档的企图;此空档则出自这样一种主张,即认定每个心的状态在形式上都是意向性的。在当代逻辑中,“无”通过量词化的语句而得到解释,并不被当做某个对象的指称者。

“我们于是知道,无既不能被视为外在于存在,又不是—个补充性的和抽象的观念,也不是—个存在被悬置起来后的无限背景。无必须在存在的中心处被给出,以使得我们能够理解那被我们称之为‘否定’的真实性所具有的特殊类型。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译),1957年,第22页。

本体

〔源自希腊文 *noein*(思维),其意为“被思想的事物”,或“理智的事物”,复数是: *noumena*〕作为可理解对象或终极实在的事物,相对于现象,即“显现的或可感的事物”。这个区别古已有之,并在柏拉图的形式论中得到充分的讨论。但是“本体”(noumenon)一词特别与康德有关。在他的哲学中,本体主要用于消极的意义,即某种超越于感性、直观或经验界限的东西,即超越现象世界的东西。因此,本体是不可知之物,用于表明可能知识的界限。它只是纯粹理性设定以作为一切科学探究的起点。在康德看来,这样的设定作为人类自由的条件尤为必要。而且,我们

held that such a postulation is necessary as a condition of a human freedom. Also, if we attribute objectivity to the *noumenon*, we proceed from a logical form without content to an object necessarily existing in itself as an object of positive knowledge. For Kant, this is a dialectical error which leads inevitably to the errors of traditional metaphysics. *Noumenon* is sometimes used interchangeably with thing-in-itself, although each has its own emphasis.

"The concept of a noumenon that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding -- is not in any way contradictory." --Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B310.

Nous

[Greek: intellect in general or in some aspect] Anaxagoras took *nous* to be a cosmic force separating elements from the primitive mixture and setting up the order of the world. Although not satisfied with the detailed explanation given by Anaxagoras, Socrates was inspired by this account. In his simile of the line, Plato took *nous* to be the highest level of intellect. In contrast to *dianoia* (discursive reasoning) which is concerned with mathematical reality and proceeds from hypotheses to a conclusion, *nous* is concerned with Forms and proceeds from hypotheses to the first principle from which everything else is deduced. Aristotle used *nous* in various senses: (1) general rational thought and understanding which is not distinguished from *dianoia*; (2) intuitive reasoning which grasps the first principles of demonstrative sciences, principles which are necessary and admit of no further justification; (3) practical *nous* which grasps the relevant features of particular cases, and is an element of practical reason; (4) active reason, which immediately grasps pure forms and is an eternal, divine intellect altogether separable from body, an account which conflicts with Aristotle's other views about soul.

"No other kind of thought except *nous* is more accurate than scientific knowledge." --Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 100b8.

Nuclear deterrence, see deterrence

Null class

A class or set of which nothing is a member. It is often symbolized by " \emptyset " and is also called the null set or empty class. This is the smallest set possible. Logically, since sets are distinguished from one another by their members, only one null-class is possible. Since we tend to think of a set or class as a heap, the existence of the null class seems puzzling, but if we think of classes more abstractly the puzzle disappears.

"One of these concerns the null-class, i. e. the class

如果把客观性归于它,那么,我们就从一个没有内容的逻辑形式进展到一个必然地自在存在的对象,一个实证知识的对象。在康德看来,这是一种辩证的谬误,是不可避免地导致传统形而上学错误的根源。本体有时可与“物自体”交替使用,尽管它们分别有不同的侧重点。

“本体之概念——它关涉于不应被思考作是感性对象,而是只通过纯理智认作是物自身的東西——是绝无矛盾的概念。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B310。

努斯

[希腊文,指理智一般,或在某些方面的理智]阿那克萨戈拉把努斯当做一种宇宙力量,它从原初混沌中将元素分离出来,并建立世界秩序。苏格拉底虽然对阿那克萨戈拉所提供的详细解释不甚满意,但却从中受到了启发。在其线段之喻中,柏拉图把努斯看做是理智的最高阶段,与 *dianoia* (推论理性) 相对。 *Dianoia* 关涉数学实在,从假设推至结论;而努斯则关注形式,从假设进展到第一原则,再从第一原则推出其他一切。亚里士多德在许多意义上使用努斯一词:(1)一般理性思想和理解,与 *dianoia* 不加区别;(2)直观推理,它把握证明科学的第一原则,即那些必然的,不必需要进一步说明的原则;(3)实践努斯,它把握特殊情形的相关特征,是实践理性的一个因素;(4)主动理性,它直接领悟纯形式,是一种可与肉体相分离的永恒的神圣的理智。不过,这一学说很难与亚里士多德关于灵魂的其他学说相调和。

“除了努斯外,没有其他思维比科学知识更精确。”——亚里士多德:《后分析》,100b8。

核威慑

见“威慑”条。

零类

没有元素的类或集合。常常以符号“ \emptyset ”来表示,也常常称为零集或空类。这是可能的最小的集合。从逻辑上说,因为集合是以元素的数目而相互区别的,所以只可能有一个零类。因为我们倾向于认为一个集合或类是一些东西的堆积,所以零类的存在似乎令人困惑,但如果我们更为抽象地想像类,则困惑就会消失。

“这些关心之一是零类,即没有元素组成的类,它是很难在纯外延的基础上处理的。”——

consisting of no members, which is difficult to deal with on a purely extensional basis.”—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 267.

Nulla poena sine lege

[Latin; no punishment without law making it so] A principle that requires any determination of offence to be justified by appeal to clearly defined and preannounced laws. The grounds for imposing punishment on wrongdoers cannot be a discretionary matter, but must be according to expressed or expressible legal forms. Statutes must be clear in what they enjoin and forbid, so that the citizens have clear knowledge about how they should behave. An associate principle is *nullum crimen sine lege* (Latin; no crime without law making it so).

“*Nulla poena sine lege* is the battlecry (and translated with strict accuracy, let us not forget, it means ‘No punishment without a statute’).” —N. MacCormick, *H. L. A. Hart*, 1981, p. 132.

Nullum crimen sine lege

[Latin; no crime without law making it so] A principle that conduct does not constitute a crime unless it has previously been declared to be criminal by the law. Anything that is not forbidden within a certain normative rule or system is permitted within that rule or system. Whatever is not prohibited is thereby *ipso facto* permitted. It is a rule about people’s freedom to act, which is also called the principle of legality. If a judge creates new offences in order to punish morally objectionable or harmful acts, he violates this principle. The principle is associated with the rule *nulla poena sine lege* (Latin; no punishment without law making it so).

“A *nullum crimen* [*sine lege*] rule permitting all not-forbidden acts and forbearances may or may not occur within a given normative order.” von Wright, *Norm and Action*, 1963, p. 87.

Number

Philosophical issues arise over the ontological status of numbers. The Greek Pythagoreans discovered relationships of ratio and proportion among natural numbers and even considered number to be the first principle which determines the structure of the world. The tendency of contemporary philosophy of mathematics to identify numbers with sets has led to the revival of Platonism in mathematics. The traditional position holds that numbers are used to answer questions of the form “How many X’s are there?” and, hence, that a number is a property ascribed to an object or group of objects. This view was rejected by Frege who argued that a number statement ascribes a property to concepts rather than to objects. Hence a number is a second-level predicate rather

罗素：《逻辑和知识》，1956年，第267页。

非根据法律不得惩罚

[拉丁文，从字义上讲就是“不是法律认可的犯罪就不得惩罚”]它指的是这样一条原则，即要求对任何犯罪行为的判决都要通过诉诸明确规定的并且是事先宣布的法律而被证明是公正的。对犯罪之人施加惩罚的根据不能是任意的事，而必须依据表达出的或可表达的法律形式。法规对其所禁止的事情必须是明确的，以使得公民清楚地知道他们应怎样行为。与此相关的原则是 *nullum crimen sine lege* (拉丁文；不是法律认可的犯罪就不是犯罪)。

“非根据法律不得惩罚是这样一一个口号(将其严格准确地翻译过来，我们不要忘记，它的意思就是‘没有法规不能惩罚’)。”——麦考密克：《H. L. A. 哈特》，1981年，第132页。

非根据法律不得判罪

[拉丁文，不是法律认可的犯罪就不是犯罪]它指的是这样一条原则，即一个行为除非以前已被法律宣布为犯罪，否则它不构成犯罪。任何事情，只要不是在某一规范的法律规则或法律制度中被禁止，它就是为那种法律规则或法律制度所允许的。不禁止的也就是实际上允许的。这是有关人的行动自由的一条准则，它也被称作合法性原则。如果一个法官为了惩罚道德上的有害或伤害行为而提出新的违法行为，他就违背了这一原则。与此相关的原则是 *nulla poena sine lege* (拉丁文；非根据法律不得惩罚)。

“在一个既定的规范的制度中，[非根据法律]不得判罪的准则允许所有非禁止的行为，宽容也许会发生，也许不会发生。”——冯·赖特：《规范与行为》，1963年，第87页。

数

有关数的本体论地位引起许多哲学问题。希腊毕达哥拉斯学派发现了自然数中的比率和比例间的联系，甚至认为数是决定世界结构的第一原则。当代数学哲学把数与集合相等同的趋向导致了柏拉图主义在数学中的复兴。传统的观点认为，数是用来回答“有多少X存在”这类问题的，因此，数是归属于一个对象或一组对象的特性。弗雷格反对这一观点，认为一个数陈述是将特性归属于概念，而不是归属于对象。因此，数是二阶谓词，而不是一阶谓词。在这一基础上，弗雷格推论说，存在像数一样，也是概念的特性而不是对象的特性。

“一个数的陈述内容乃是一种关于一个概

than a first level predicate. On this basis, Frege inferred that existence, like number, is a property of concepts rather than of objects.

"The content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept."—Frege, *The Foundation of Arithmetic*, Sec. 54.

Numinous

[from Latin: *numin*, a spirit inhabiting a natural object or phenomenon, filling it with a sense of divine presence] A term introduced by the German philosopher of religion Rudolf Otto. Otto claimed that the term holy is used both in a religious and an ethical sense and suggested that we need a term simply for the part of the meaning of holy which is distinct from absolute moral goodness. He put forward the numinous as term to designate the awe-inspiring and overpowering object of human religious experience. The numinous has been understood as a distinguishing feature of religion. Although the experience of the numinous is meant to characterise religion in isolation from moral sense, it is a matter of dispute whether a distinction between the numinous and other aspects of the holy is tenable. In a related secular sense, the numinous appeals to the high emotions or aesthetic sense.

"For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin *numen*. *Omen* has given us 'ominous', and there is no reason why from *numen* we should not similarly form a word 'numinous'."—Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, 1950, p. 7.

念的断定。”——弗雷格：《算术的基础》，54 节。

圣秘

[源自拉丁词, *numin*, 居于—自然对象或现象中的精灵, 赋予事物或现象以神圣呈现的意义] 这个术语是由德国宗教哲学家鲁道夫·奥托引入的。奥托认为, “神圣”一词既用于它的宗教意义, 也用于它的伦理意义, 他提议, 我们应该用一个新词, 单纯指称与绝对的道德善相区别的“神圣”一词的那部分意义。他提出“圣秘”一词, 用于指人类宗教体验的庄严和超力量的对象。圣秘被理解为宗教的一个特殊特征。虽然圣秘的体验意味着排除道德含义, 仅具宗教特征, 但圣秘和其他方面的神圣之间的区分是否站得住脚, 是个有争议的问题。在相对世俗的意义上, 圣秘求助于高尚情感和美学含义。

“为此目的, 我采用一个由拉丁语 *numen* 造出的词。既然 *omen* (预兆) 给了我们 'ominous' (预兆的), 我们为什么没有理由从 *numen* 同样地构成 'numinous' 一词呢。”——奥托：《神圣观念》，1950 年, 第 7 页。

O

Obiter dictum, see *ratio decidendi*

Object

[German: *Gegenstand*] A generic term for whatever is the bearer of a proper name, or whatever can be referred to or designated, approximately identical with “thing”. Objects can be distinguished from their properties and relations and also from subjects. Physical objects are real, but there are also unreal objects such as phantoms or images. Unlike physical objects, abstract objects are not spatiotemporal. Intentional objects are objects of mental states, like desire or hope, and need not exist. Objects are often recognised in ontology as the most basic entities, although some recent arguments have rejected the priority of objects in favour of events.

For Wittgenstein objects are the constituents of states of affairs or atomic facts, and thus form the substance of the world. Every object contains in its nature all the possibilities of combining with other objects. In themselves, objects are simple and unchanging. What changes is the combination or separation of objects (the complex objects). In this way objects are related to the atoms of ancient atomism. Objects are correlated to the simple names which constitute propositions. The simple names are discovered through logical analysis and are the terminus of such analysis.

“A name means an object. The object is its meaning.”—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3. 203.

Object language

Russell developed the notion of a hierarchy of languages. The language of the lowest order, in which symbol and vocabulary are not determined by the logical conditions, is called the object language or primary language. This is the language with which we talk about extra-linguistic things and objects. It applies object-words and studying it involves the relation between sentences and non-linguistic occurrences. Any given ordinary language is an object language. It is so called, in contrast to higher order languages which deal not with objects, but with the lower order languages. Tarski takes the notion of an object language and contrasts it with metalanguage, in which we talk about an object language.

“I call this the ‘object language’, or the ‘primary language’. In this language, every word ‘denotes’ or

附带意见

见“判决理由”条

对象

[德文 *Gegenstand*] 对任何作为专名的承担者, 或可以被指称、被命名的东西的一般称呼, 与“事物”十分相近。对象可以区别于其特性和关系, 也可以区别于主体。物理对象是实在的, 但也有不实在的对象, 例如幽灵或心象。抽象对象与物理对象不同, 不具有时空性。意向对象是心的状态的对象, 如欲望或希望, 是不需存在的。对象常常被认为是在本体论中最基本的实体, 虽然近来有些论证否认对象的优先性而宁要事件。

对维特根斯坦而言, 对象是事态或原子事实的组成部分, 从而成为世界的实体。每个对象在其本性中包含与其他对象结合的全部可能性。就其自身而言, 对象是简单的、不变的。变化的是对象的结合或分离(复合对象)。这样, 对象与古代原子论中的原子有关。对象与构成命题的简单名称相关。简单名称通过逻辑分析而发现, 是分析的最终产物。

“名称意指对象。对象是其意义。”——维特根斯坦, 《逻辑哲学论》, 3. 203。

对象语言

罗素提出了语言分层的观念。最底层的语言, 其中的符号和词汇并不由逻辑条件所决定, 叫做对象语言或初阶语言。这是我们用以谈论语言之外的事物和对象的语言。它应用对象语词, 对它的研究涉及到语句和非语言事件之间的关系。任何给定的日常语言都是对象语言。之所以如此称呼它, 是为了与不处理对象、而处理较低阶语言的更高阶语言相对照。塔斯基提出了对象语言的概念, 并将其与元语言(我们用其谈论对象语言)相比较。

“我把这叫做‘对象语言’或‘初阶语言’。在这一语言内, 每一个词都‘指示’或‘意谓’某个可感知的对象或此类对象的集合; 并且当单独使用时, 每一个词都断定了它所指示或意谓的

'means' a sensible object or set of such objects; and when used alone, asserts the sensible presence of the object, or of one of the set of objects, which it denotes or means." Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 20.

Object sentence. see pseudo-object sentence

Object words

Object words indicate the presence of what they mean through indicating something that one can point to, such as "cat", "France", and so on. In contrast, syntax words are words such as "or", "not", "than", "but", which do not indicate anything one can point to, but can only be defined verbally in terms of other syntax words.

"Some words denote objects, others express characteristics of our belief attitude; the former are object-words, the latter syntax words."—Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 521.

Objective knowledge

Popper's term for linguistically formulated theories which form the constituents of his "World 3". Knowledge in this sense is man-made but transcends its origins and has various properties and relationships independent of any subject's awareness of them. In Popper's view, it contrasts with subjective knowledge, which is a dispositional expectation or anticipation of relevant impending events and is a kind of adaptation to the environment. The study of subjective knowledge belongs to psychology. Popper claimed that this distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is ignored in traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology views knowledge as justified true belief or as perception, and hence limits knowledge to the utterances or expressions of the knowing subject. This is the source of many difficulties in traditional epistemology, especially its justificationism.

"The traditional theories of knowledge (from Plato's *Theaetetus* to Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*) fail to make a clear distinction between objective and subjective knowledge." Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (ed. Schilpp), 1974, p. 1028.

Objective particulars

Strawson's term for particulars which are not the private occurrences or states or conditions of oneself or anyone else, but rather are the actual or possible public objects of experience or states of consciousness. These particulars are reidentifiable in speaker-hearer identification. Objective particulars, which Strawson also calls public particulars, contrast to private particulars, that is sensations, mental events or sense-data in general.

"I shall henceforth use the phrase, 'objective

某个对象或对象集合中某个元素的可感知的出现。"——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第20页。

对象语句

见“伪对象语句”条。

对象词

对象词通过指示人们可以指向的某物,例如“猫”、“法国”等等而指出它们所意味的东西的存在。与之相对的是句法词,如“或”、“并非”、“比之于”、“但是”,它们不指任何人可以指向的东西,而只能通过其他句法词作字面上的定义。

“有些词指对象,其他的词表示我们信念态度的特征,前者为对象词,后者为句法词。”

罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第521页。

客观知识

波普的术语,指用语言系统表述的理论,它们构成他的“世界3”的成分。这种意义上的知识是人创造的,但却超越其起源,具有各种独立于主体对它们的认识的性质和关系。在波普看来,与之对立的“主观知识”是一种对于相关的即将发生事件的倾向性期望或预期,是一种对于环境的适应。主观知识的研究属于心理学。波普认为客观知识和主观知识之间的区别在传统认识论中被忽视了,因为传统认识论把知识看做是得到证明的真的信念或感知,因而把知识仅限于认识主体的表达或表述。这是传统认识论、尤其是其证明主义中许多困难的根源。

“传统的知识论(从柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》到维特根斯坦的《论确定性》)未能在客观知识和主观知识间作出明确区分。”——波普:《K. 波普的哲学》(希耳普编),1974年,第1028页。

客观殊相

斯特劳森以此术语指称这样一类殊相,它们不是自己或其他某人的私人的事件或状态或条件,而是现实的或可能的公共经验对象或意识状态。这些殊相是可以在说者—听者的认同中得到再辨认的。客观殊相相对于私人殊相,即一般性的感觉、心的事件或感觉资料。斯特劳森也把它们叫做公共殊相。

“我将以‘客观殊相’这一术语作为‘为思想者所区分的殊相’这一术语的缩写。”——斯特

particulars' as an abbreviation of the entire phrase, 'particulars distinguished by the thinker, etc. '—Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 61.

Objectivism

The contrast between objectivism and subjectivism is a central and recurring feature of philosophy. Objectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are determined by external objects and their relations independent of our minds, while subjectivist theories claim that truth and falsity are relative to our minds. The contrast between these two positions is presented differently in different areas of philosophy. Objectivist metaphysics claims that the external world exists without regard to our minds, while subjectivist metaphysics claims that the world exists only insofar as it exists for us. Objectivist epistemology holds that the source and validity of knowledge are derived from external objects, while subjectivist epistemology claims that the source and validity of knowledge are derived primarily from our sensibility and our ability to form conceptions. Both naturalist and anti-naturalist varieties of objectivist ethics suggest that ethical properties and values exist independent of our belief and desires, while subjectivist ethics proposes that ethical judgements cannot be judged true or false according to an objective standard, but are rather the expression of our emotions or feelings. Objectivist aesthetics holds that aesthetic properties are inherent in things, while subjectivist aesthetics claims that they are projected by us upon the objects. Subjectivism is associated with anti-realism and idealism, while objectivism is associated with realism. However, objectivism is not identical with materialism, for it can be held in either materialist or idealist form.

"[T]he objectivism of the natural sciences tries to view them [social complexes] from the outside; it treats social phenomena not as something of which the human mind is a part and the principles of whose organisation we can reconstruct from the familiar parts, but as if they were objects directly perceived by us as a whole."—Hayek, in O'Neill, *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, 1973, p. 44.

Objectivity

Belonging to objects and not to ourselves as subjects; also, beliefs or perceptions which are not limited or distorted by the bias or partiality. Objectivity can be contrasted with subjectivity and with a lack of objectivity. We can be objective in determining beliefs, and our judgements themselves can be objective. In spite of the dangers, we often use our assessment of the person judging to guide our determination of the objectivity of the judgement. A commitment to objectivity is a general mark of intellectual integrity, according to which one respects the virtue of truth and seeks valid and unbiased theories, explanations and judgements. A theory or

劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第61页。

客观主义

客观主义和主观主义的对立是哲学的一个主要的和反复出现的特征。客观主义的理论认为,真理和谬误是由独立于我们的心的外在对象及其关系决定的;而主观主义的理论则认为,真理和谬误是同我们的心相关的。这两种观点的对立在哲学的不同领域有不同的表现。客观主义的形而上学主张外在世界的存在与我们的心无关,主观主义的形而上学则主张世界仅仅是为我们而存在的。客观主义的认识论认为知识的源泉和正确性来自外部对象,而主观主义的认识论则认为知识的源泉和正确性主要是来自我们的感觉和我们形成概念的能力。各种客观主义的伦理学,无论是自然主义的还是反自然主义的,都提出道德的特性和价值的存在不依赖于我们的信念和愿望;主观主义的伦理学则提出,道德判断不能根据客观标准来判定对错,而只能根据我们感情或感觉的表达来判定对错。客观主义的美学认为,美的特性是事物固有的;主观主义的美学则认为,美的特性是我们赋予对象的。主观主义是与反实在论和观念主义相联系的,客观主义则是与实在论相联系的。不过,客观主义并不等同于唯物主义,因为它既有唯物主义的形式,又有唯心主义的形式。

“自然科学的客观主义试图从外部来观察它们[社会复杂现象];它不是把社会现象看做在某种意义上是这样一种现象,即人的心是其中一个部分,其组织原则我们可以从熟知的部分加以重构,而是把它们看做仿佛是我们直接看到的作为一个整体的对象。”——海耶克,载于奥尼尔编辑的《个人主义的模式和集体主义的模式》,1973年,第44页。

客观性

客观性从属于对象,而不从属于作为主体的我们自身。客观性也从属于不受偏见或偏好的限制或歪曲的信念或感觉。客观性可与主观性和缺少客观性相对照。我们对信念的确定可以是客观的,我们的判断本身也可以是客观的。我们常常是不顾危险而用我们对人的判断的评价去指导我们对判断的客观性的确定。对客观性的赞成是诚实的智力活动的一般标志,为此,人们尊重真理的功效,追求正确公正的理论、解释和判断。一个理论或一个判断,如果与外部事实相符或能够通过合理的方式被确定为真或

judgement is objective if it corresponds to external facts or can be determined to be true or false by rational means. Sometimes these two senses are related because a theory can be rationally judged because it conforms to facts, but more often a theory is abstract and idealised and does not correspond directly or sensibly to any facts. In this case, a theory is regarded as objective if it is can be justified rationally, with agreement available or expected from all reasonable persons. The primary task of a theory should be to explain the sort of objectivity which is possible for it and to state the conditions which would justify its rational acceptance. Moreover, a sound account of rationality is required to enable us to achieve the objectivity of theories and judgements through overcoming partiality, arbitrariness, relativity and bias and to assess the objectivity of people. Because personal and social intention and prejudice are indispensably involved in many fields, the possibility of objectivity in history and ethics, for example, has been an issue of dispute.

"We might explain the objectivity of a judgement that p as follows. There exists knowledge k such that everyone with this knowledge agrees that p is true (and expects that anyone else with this knowledge would agree that p is true and would have this very same expectation), while there is no further knowledge which, when added to k , undercuts the agreement that p ."—R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 728.

Objectual quantifier

Quine distinguishes two interpretations of the quantifier, the objectual quantifier and the substitutional quantifier. He, along with Davidson, endorses the objectual quantifier interpretation, according to which one should interpret a quantifier in terms of the values of the variables and the objects over which the variables range. For example, $(x)Fx$ is interpreted as "For all objects x in the domain D , Fx ". According to the substitutional quantifier interpretation one should interpret a quantifier by appealing to substituends rather than values of the variables, that is, the expressions that can be substituted for the variables. On this view, $(x)Fx$ is interpreted to be "All substitution instances of $F...$ are true". These two interpretations involve some different consequences. For example, the substitutional interpretation of the quantifier says that the truth of quantified formulae can be directly defined by the truth of their substituted atomic formulae, but this is not admitted by the objectual interpretation.

"The Q-quantifiers are called 'objectual'. The reason is that whether or not a quantification is true upon an interpretation depends on how things are with the objects in the domain of interpretation." Sainsbury, *Logical Form*, 1991, p. 197.

伪,就是客观的。有时这两种意义上的客观性是相联系的,因为一种理论可被合理地判断是由于它与事实相符,但更多的情况是,一种理论是抽象的和观念化的,不与任何事实直接地或明显地相符。在后一种情况下,一种理论,如果它能合理地证明为正确的,并可得到或期望得到所有有理性的人的同意,它就被视为是客观的。一种理论的首要任务应是说明那种对其是可能的客观性,并阐明那些可以证明它在理性上可被接受的条件。此外,对合理性的正确说明也是需要的,从而使我们能够通过克服不公正、专断、相对性和偏见而取得理论和判断的客观性,并能对人们的客观性做出评价。由于个人及社会的意向和偏见不可避免地卷入许多领域,客观性是否可能一直是一个争论的问题,例如,在历史学和伦理学中就是如此。

"我们可以对一个判断 p 的客观性解释如下:存在着知识 k ,以致每一具有这一知识的人都同意 p 这一判断是真的(而且期望其他具有这一知识的人也会同意 p 这一判断是真的并会有与这极为相同的期望),同时也不存在进一步的、在对 k 做出补充时会从根本上损害同意判断 p 的知识。"—诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第728页。

对象量词

奎因区分了关于量词的解释,对象量词和替换量词。他与戴维森一道,赞成对象量词解释,根据这一解释,人们应该根据变元的值和变元值域中的那些对象来解释量词。例如, $(x)Fx$ 被解释为"对论域 D 中的所有对象 x , Fx "。根据替换量词解释,人们应该通过诉诸替换例而不是变元的值,也就是凭借能够用来替换变元的那些表达式来解释量词。按这种观点, $(x)Fx$ 被解释为" $F...$ 的所有替换例是真的"。这两种解释包含某些不同的后果。例如,量词的替换解释说:量化公式的真能够直接用其被替换的原子公式的真来定义,而量词的对象解释则不允许这样做。

"Q-量词叫做'对象的',其理由是:量化命题根据一解释是否为真,取决于事物是如何与解释域中的对象相关的。"—塞斯伯里:《逻辑形式》,1991年,第197页。

Obligation

[from Latin: *obligare*, to bind one to something] Generally, something we are required to do arising from some circumstance, such as having signed a contract or having made a promise. Duty is also something we are required to do, but generally because of some social or other role that we occupy. In Kant's ethics, an obligation is the general dependence of the human will upon the moral law, while duty is the necessity of acting from obligation. Obligation informs not only duty but also rights. Many philosophers, however, use obligation and duty interchangeably as a determination of what ought to be done.

"The connexion between duties and the demands of others comes out clearly in the fact that we use the word 'obligation' as a synonym for 'duty'." Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1951, p. 200.

Obligationes

[Latin: the conditions under which the parties to a dispute agree to proceed] A form of disputation adopted in medieval universities from the early thirteenth century. It involved a respondent and an opponent. The opponent was obliged to make the respondent concede or deny his initial propositions. On the basis of Aristotle's discussion of form of debate in *Topics* and *De Sophistic Elenchis*, medieval logicians engaged in various studies concerning the rules of *obligationes*. Normally, the rules were characterised in terms of the feature of constructive counterfactual reasoning.

"Obligationes are obligations assumed by a party to a disputation, or conditions within which such a discussion must be conducted."—Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 1962, p. 234.

Oblique intention, see direct intention

Observation language

Many philosophers divide the language of each branch of the sciences into observation language and theoretical language. Observation language is directly related to sense impressions and can be analysed in the standard empirical way. It is characterised by observability, explicit definability and extensionality. Theoretical language, on the other hand, is not directly related to sense experience, but talks about unobservable properties and events (e. g. atoms, electrons) which are also called theoretical constructs or hypothetical constructs. The terms an observation language employs are called observational terms, and those employed by theoretical language are called theoretical terms. One major issue in the methodology of science is about the relationship between the two kinds of languages. Should theoretical language be translated and replaced by observation language? How can it

义务

[源自拉丁文 *obligare*, 把某人与某物捆在一起] 它一般意指某种我们在某些情况下被要求去做的事情, 诸如对已签订的合同, 已作出的诺言要履行。职责也是某种我们被要求去做的事情, 但一般是出于人们所担任的某种社会的或其他的角色。在康德伦理学中, 义务是指人类意志对道德法则的一般性依赖, 而职责是出于义务的行为必然性。义务不仅表示职责也表示权利。然而, 对大多数哲学家来说, 义务和职责可交替使用, 都是指对应该做的事情的规定。

“职责和他人的要求之间的联系清楚地表现于这种事实, 我们把‘义务’用作‘职责’的同义词。”——诺威尔-史密斯:《伦理学》, 1950年, 第200页。

尽责

[拉丁词, 争辩的双方同意按此进行的条件] 中世纪的大学所采用的一种辩论形式, 始于13世纪早期。它包括一位应答者和一位反对者。反对者迫使应答者赞成或反对他最初提出的命题。以亚里士多德在《正位篇》和《驳诡辩》中提出的对辩论形式的讨论为基础, 中世纪逻辑学家们致力于尽责规则的多种研究。通常来说, 这些规则具有建构反事实推理的特征。

“所谓尽责, 是参加辩论的一方所承担的责任, 或者是这种讨论必须得以在其中进行的条件。”——W. 涅尔和 M. 涅尔:《逻辑学的发展》, 1962年, 第234页。

间接意图

见“直接意图”条。

观察语言

许多哲学家都把每一科学分支的语言分为观察语言和理论语言。观察语言直接与感觉印象相联系, 可以用标准的经验方法加以分析。它通常被刻画为可观察性、明确的可定义性和可扩延性。另一方面, 理论语言则不是直接与感觉经验相联, 而是谈论不可观察的特性和事件(例如原子, 电子), 这些也被称作“理论构造物”或“假设的构造物”。观察语言使用的术语被称作“观察术语”, 而理论语言使用的术语则被称作“理论术语”。科学方法论的一个主要问题就是讨论这两种语言之间的关系。理论语言应该翻译和替代为观察语言吗? 这如何能够做到? 我们怎能知道理论语言是有意义的? 理论术语所指称的东西的本体论地位是什么? 对这些问题一直存在各种讨论。参见“双语模型”、“克雷格定

be done? How can we know that theoretical language is meaningful? What is the ontological status of an item to which a theoretical expression refers? Various discussions have taken place about these issues. See also double language model, Craig's theorem, Ramsey sentence, correspondence rules.

"The observation language uses terms designating observable properties and relations for the description of observable things or events."—Carnap, in *Minnesota Studies of the Philosophy Of Science*, 1, 1956, p. 65.

Observation proposition, see basic proposition or protocol sentence

Observation sentence

Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. An occasion sentence is a report about observation, sense-data or stimulations, but its acceptance relies on the circumstances of its utterance. If an occasion sentence is assented to or dissented from consistently in response to the same stimulation, it is an observation sentence. The verdict of its truth and falsity depends only on present sensory stimulation, although certain stored information which is implied in the expression of the sentence itself is inevitably relevant to determining whether it is true. Hence, an observation sentence is not private, but must be acceptable by the speech community. All speakers of a language give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation. Observation sentences correspond to the protocol sentences of logical positivism, which offered an influential account of the foundations of empirical knowledge. Critics deny that protocol sentences are the basis of empirical knowledge, either because they lack the possibility of being true or false or because empirical knowledge does not need foundations.

"A sentence . . . is an observation sentence if all verdicts on it depend on present sensory stimulation and on no stored information beyond what goes into understanding the sentence." Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 77.

Observation term

Empiricist philosophy of science has commonly divides the language of science into theoretical language, concerning unobservable entities, properties and relations, and observation language, concerning items, like sense impressions, which are claimed to be observable, although "observation" in this sense covers perception, sensation and even introspection. Observation terms are employed in this observation language to refer to observable items. Each observation term has an explicit and determinate extension and can be displayed in a limited model. According to proponents of this

theory, "拉姆塞语句"、"对应规则".

"观察语言使用术语指称可观察的特性和关系,用于描述可观察的事物或事件。"——卡尔纳普,载《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第一卷,1956年,第65页。

观察命题

见“基本命题”或“记录语句”条。

观察句子

观察句子是“场合句子”的子集。一个场合句子是对观察、感觉材料或刺激的报道,但对它的接受则依赖于说出它的环境。如果一个场合句子在对相同刺激的反应中前后一致地得到赞同或反对,那么它就是一个观察句子。对其真假的裁决完全取决于眼下的感觉刺激,尽管蕴涵在这个句子自身表达式中的某个储存的信息不可避免地确定它是否为真有关。因此,观察句子不是私人的,而必须是可以为言语共同体所接受的。当同时出现了相同的刺激,所有使用这个语言的人都会做出相同的裁决。观察句子对应于逻辑实证主义的“记录语句”,而逻辑实证主义则提出了对经验知识基础的有力论述。批评者们否认记录语句是经验知识的基础,或是因为这些句子欠缺被判定为真假的可能性,或是因为经验知识不需要基础。

“一个句子……是一个观察句子,是由于对它的所有裁决都依赖于眼下的感觉刺激,而任何储存的信息都没有超出对这个句子的理解。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性及其他论文》,1969年,第77页。

观察术语

经验主义的科学哲学通常把科学的语言划分为理论语言和观察语言,前者涉及观察不到的存在物、特性和关系,后者涉及的是像感觉印象这样的被认为是可观察得到的东西,虽然这种意义上的“观察”包括感觉、知觉甚至内省。在这种观察语言中,观察术语被用来指可观察得到的东西。每一观察术语都有清晰确定的扩展范围,并可在一个限定的模式中展现。在这一观点的支持者看来,观察术语大多是通过实指获得的,它们的意义是由于它们的对象的出现而

view, observation terms are learned mostly by ostension, with their meaning reinforced by the presence of their objects, with any questions of context or definition irrelevant to understanding them. Observation terms are widely applied to publicly observable bodies as well as to private sensory states. Observation terms can be directly analysed empirically. In contrast to observation terms, theoretical terms are employed by theoretical language to refer to unobservable or theoretical entities and their features. Philosophers of science disagree whether all theoretical terms can be eliminated from a theory, that is, whether they can be translated into or replaced by observation terms. Some philosophers claim that the distinction between observation terms and theoretical terms cannot be maintained because all terms are theory-laden.

"In regard to an observational term it is possible, under suitable circumstances, to decide by means of direct observation whether the term does or does not apply to a given situation." —Hempel, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. II, 1958, p. 42.

Obversion

In traditional logic, an immediate inference which derives a conclusion from another proposition by negating its predicate term and changing its quality either from affirmative to negative or from negative to affirmative. The conclusion, called the obverse, is a logical equivalent of the premise, called the obvertend. All four forms of proposition in traditional logic can be validly obversed: "All *s* are *p*" is obversed into "No *s* are non-*p*"; "No *s* are *p*" into "All *s* are non-*p*"; "Some *s* are *p*" into "Some *s* are not non-*p*"; and "Some *s* are not *p*" into "Some *s* are non-*p*".

"Obversion is a process of immediate inference in which the inferred proposition (or obverse), while retaining the original subject, has for its predicate the contradictory of the predicate of the original proposition (or obvertend)." —Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 133.

Occasion sentence

Quine's term, for sentences whose meanings are relative to their context and which contain indexical words, for example, "It is snowing" or "It is Thursday". They are true on some occasions of utterance, and false on others. Whether such a sentence is acceptable depends on the background. We should only assent to these sentences when it is indeed snowing or Thursday. The sentence "It is snowing" is more observational than "It is Thursday". Observation sentences are a subset of occasion sentences. If all speakers assent to an occasion sentence in response to the same stimulations, then it is an observation sentence. Occasion sentences are directly connected with sensory stimulations and are contrasted to standing sentences which are not relative to context and

得到加强,以及有关语境的问题或与理解它们无关的定义获得的。观察术语被广泛地应用于明显可观察得到的物体以及个人的感觉状况。观察术语可直接做经验的分析。相对观察术语而言,理论术语被理论语言用来指观察不到的或假设的存在物及其特征。科学哲学家对是否所有的理论术语都能被从理论中清除,即它们是否能被转化为观察术语或被观察术语所取代,持有不同意见。一些哲学家认为,观察术语和理论术语之间的区分不能维持,因为所有的术语都充满理论。

“就一个观察术语而言,有可能在适当的情况下,通过直接观察的方法来决定这一术语是否适用于一个给定的条件。”——亨佩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第二卷,1958年,第42页。

换质

传统逻辑中从另一命题导出结论命题的直接推理,其办法是否定原命题的谓词,并将其性质由肯定变为否定或者由否定变为肯定。结论(叫做“换质命题”)是前提(叫做“被换质命题”)的逻辑等值命题。传统逻辑中所有四种命题形式都可以有效地换质:“所有 *s* 是 *p*”被换质为“没有 *s* 是非 *p*”;“没有 *s* 是 *p*”换质为“所有 *s* 是非 *p*”;“有些 *s* 是 *p*”换质为“有些 *s* 不是非 *p*”;“有些 *s* 不是 *p*”换质为“有些 *s* 是非 *p*”。

“换质是一直接推理过程,其中推出命题(或换质命题)仍保留原有主词,而以原命题(或被换质命题)谓词的矛盾作为它的谓词。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第133页。

场合句子

奎因的术语,是指其意义与语境有关并带有索引词的句子。例如,“下雪了”或“今天是星期二”。它们在某些被说出的场合是真的,而在另一些场合则是假的。是否能够接受这种句子取决于背景。当的确下雪了或是星期二时,我们才能同意这些句子。“下雪了”这个句子比“今天是星期二”更具有观察性。“观察句子”是场合句子的一个子集。如果所有的说者对相同的刺激都赞同某个场合句子,那么它就是一个观察句子。场合句子直接关系到感觉刺激,它与“标准句子”相反,而标准句子则与语境无关,是经常并永远会得到赞同的。标准句子是对常识说法的分析或陈述,例如“雪是白的”。

which have assent always and all the time. Standing sentences are either analytic or statements of a common-sense truism, for example, "Snow is white".

"We must concentrate on occasion sentences. These, as opposed to standing sentences, are sentences whose truth value changes from occasion to occasion, so that a fresh verdict has to be promoted each time."—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 25.

Occasionalism

A doctrine developed by Descartes' disciple Malebranche as a solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem. He claimed that the two completely distinct substances, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, can causally interact with each other because of the miraculous intervention of God. God regulates the world so that our volitions are followed by bodily movements, and conversely that certain patterns of bodily movements give rise to appropriate emotions and sensations in the mind. The so-called natural causes are actually occasions on which God acts to produce the effects which usually accompany the natural causes. There is no real causation in the finite created world, no real efficacy of finite causes. Only an infinite substance can be a genuine cause of anything at all. Occasionalism maintained mechanical explanation by grounding it outside the limits of physics proper. This provided a new metaphysical framework. This theory was criticised by its contemporary critic Leibniz who replaced it with his own theory of pre-established harmony.

"The occasionalists were a group of 17th century philosophers who maintained that human volitions never really cause bodily movements but are only the occasions for divine intervention in the physical world."—Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 277.

Ockham's razor

A methodological principle in theory construction associated with the medieval philosopher William of Ockham, although Aristotle suggested it in his criticism of Plato's theory of ideas. The principle states that one should not posit the existence of more entities than are absolutely necessary for adequate philosophical explanation. Accordingly, if two or more theories have the same explanatory force, the one which makes use of the fewest assumptions and explanatory principles should be chosen, other things being equal. Common formulations of this principle are "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" or "Plurality is never to be posited without need" (Latin: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitate*). But this is the invention of the seventeenth century rather than Ockham's own formulation, which was "It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer". Simplicity is the spirit of this principle. The term Ockham's razor was introduced by Sir William Hamil-

"我们必须关注场合句子。与标准句子相反,这些句子的真值是随场合而变化的,因而每次都要求一种新的裁决。"——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第25页。

偶因论

由笛卡尔的信徒马勒伯朗士发展出的一个学说,用作解决笛卡尔的心—身问题的一个办法。马勒伯朗士主张,两个完全不同的实体,思维的东西和广延的东西,可以因上帝的奇异干预而互相发生因果作用。上帝对世界进行调节,使得我们的意志有肉体活动跟随,而且反过来,某种方式的肉体活动也在心中引起适当的情绪和感觉。所谓自然的原因实际上是上帝对之发生作用以产生出结果来的偶因,这些结果通常伴随着自然的原因。在有限的被造世界上没有真正的因果关系,没有有限原因的真正效应。只有一个无限的实体才能完全成为任何事物的真正原因。偶因论坚持机械论的说明方式,而将它的根据建立在物理学自身界限之外。这样就提供了一个新的形而上学框架。这个理论遭到了同时代的批评家莱布尼茨的批判,莱布尼茨用自己的前定和谐理论来取代它。

"偶因论者是一批 17 世纪的哲学家,他们坚持认为,人类意志从未实际引起身体的运动,它们只是神干预物理世界的偶然原因。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第277页。

奥康剃刀

理论构造中的一条方法论原则,与中世纪哲学家奥康的威廉的名字连在一起,尽管亚里士多德在批评柏拉图的形相论时提到过它。这一原则陈述说,人们不应设定比合适的哲学解释所绝对必需的实体更多的实体。相应地,在具有同等解释力的两个或多个理论中,人们应该选择使用了最少的假定和解释原则的那个理论,假如其他情况都相同的话。这一原则的通行表述是"除非必要,勿增实体"或"若无必要,绝不设定多样性"(拉丁语: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda prater necessitate*)。但这是 17 世纪的发明,而不是奥康本人的表述。他只是说:"用较多的东西去做用较少的东西能够做的事情,是无意义的。"简单性是这一原则的精髓。"奥康剃刀"一词是由威廉·汉密尔顿爵士引入的,他把它等同于所谓的节俭原则("自然从不用比所需要的更复杂的工具去工作")。奥康剃刀亦称"简

tion, who identified it with the so-called principle of parsimony: nature never works by more complex instruments than are necessary. Ockham's razor is also called the principle of simplicity or the principle of economy, and has wide application in metaphysical debates.

"Ockham's razor counsels us against an unnecessary luxuriance of principles or laws or statements of existence." Stuart, *Essays Metaphysical and Moral*, 1987, p. 38.

Oedipus complex

In Greek myth, Oedipus, acting according to his destiny, killed his father and married his mother. Freud claimed that in the mental life of a male child there is desire for his mother as a sexual object and hatred for his father as a rival. He calls this pattern the "Oedipus Complex" and claims that it is a central factor in the child's experience of his relations to his parents and in his later sexual development. Because the Oedipus Complex can lead to later neuroses, Freud sought access to the feelings, images and relations characterising the complex in dealing with later problems. The complex itself presents a fundamental tension between sexual drive and the submission to the parental authority. It is also claimed to be a source of religion, society, morals and arts. In girls, the complex is allegedly manifested is a wish to take the mother's place. Moving beyond the complex in a child is meant to allow acceptance of the value of one's parents. The dissolution of the complex in society provides defence of authority.

"In the very earliest years of childhood (approximately between the ages of two and five) a convergence of the sexual impulses occurs of which, in the case of boys, the object is the mother. This choice of an object, in conjunction with a corresponding attitude of rivalry and hostility towards the father, provides the content of what is known as the Oedipus Complex, which is of the greatest importance in determining the final shape of his erotic life."—Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 18, p. 245.

Offence, see harm

Oligarchy

[from Greek: *oligos*, few or small | Literally, rule by the few, but for Plato a state ruled by the rich, maybe because the rich are the few most likely to dominate a state. In the *Republic*, oligarchy is the second stage in the degeneration of the Ideal State, the first stage being timocracy or rule by the spirited rather than the rational element. Oligarchy is dominated by the appetite for money-making, and the unity of the state is fragile because of conflict between the poor and

单性原则"或"经济原则",并且在形而上学论战中有广泛应用。

"奥康剃刀忠告我们勿在使用原则或规律或存在陈述方面不必要的奢侈。"——斯马特:《形而上学与道德文集》,1987年,第38页。

俄狄浦斯情结

在古希腊神话中,俄狄浦斯在其命运支配下,杀父娶母。弗洛伊德声称在男孩子的心灵生活中,有以其母亲为性对象的欲望,并将其父当做情敌来憎恨。他将这种心态样式叫做"俄狄浦斯情结",认为它是孩子与其父母的关系以及他后来的性发展中的一个中心事实。由于俄狄浦斯情结会导致后来发生的精神病,弗洛伊德在对付这些问题时寻求了解这情结特有的感情、形象和关系。这情结本身造成了性冲动和屈从父母权威之间的基本张力。它也被认为是宗教、社会、伦理和艺术的一个来源。在女孩子中,这种情结被说成是表现于要取代其母亲的位置的愿望。一个孩子超出这情结就意味着承认其家长的重要性。在社会中,此情结的消解就意味着对于权威的护持。

"在儿童期的最早年头(大约2岁至5岁),出现了性冲动的会聚。就男孩子说来,其对象是母亲。这种对象的选择,加上相应的对父亲的竞争敌意态度,提供了所谓俄狄浦斯情结的内容。它在决定这个孩子性生活的最后形态上是最重要的。"——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第十八卷,第245页。

冒犯

见"伤害"条。

寡头政制

[源自希腊文:*oligos*,少或小]从字面上讲,寡头政制就是少数人的统治,但在柏拉图看来,它指的是富人统治的国家,这也许是因为统治一个国家的富人最可能是少数人。在柏拉图的《国家篇》中,寡头政制是理想国家退化中的第二阶段,第一阶段是尊荣政制,或者说是被情绪的而不是被合理的因素所统治的阶级。寡头政制被发财的欲望所支配,而且由于穷人和富人

the rich. Parallel to this state, the oligarchic man also lacks internal harmony. He is dominated by the desire for money, and his reason and spirits are forced to work only in the interests of money. Oligarchy is more unjust and more miserable than timocracy and will further degenerate into democracy and tyranny.

"Oligarchy is of necessity not one city but two, one of the poor and the other of the rich, living in the same place and always plotting against each other."—Plato, *Republic*, 551d.

Omnipotence

[from Latin: *omnis*, all — *potens*, powerful] One of the chief divine attributes. By being all powerful, God has infinite or maximal power and is the ruler of everything. The notion of an all powerful being has given rise to many logical impossibilities, called the paradoxes of omnipotence. Can God create a rock so large that he cannot move it? If he cannot, he is not omnipotent because there are limits on what he can create. If he can, he is not omnipotent, because there are limits on what he can move. Other questions leading to paradox include "Can God's deny God's essence?", "Can God lie?", "Can God sin?". Some philosophers try to redefine the notion of omnipotence in order to avoid such problems. A deeper philosophical problem emerges from combining divine omnipotence, omniscience and goodness. How are the claims that God is all powerful, all knowing and perfectly good compatible with the existence of evil? None of the many responses to this question, such as the claim that evil is due to the fall of the first man or the claim that God permits evil as a means of purifying the soul, has won general approval, but belief in God is often enhanced rather than diminished through experience of evil in the world.

"Theists have often wished to claim that God is omnipotent, that is, literally, can do anything."—R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 149.

Omniscience

[from Latin: *omnis*, all — *sciens*, present participle of *scire*, to know] One of the chief divine attributes, according to which God is all knowing or has unlimited knowledge. This attribute gives rise to the paradox of God's omniscience, a perennial problem concerning freedom of the will. This paradox has two versions. The first concerns God's omniscience and human freedom. If every future thing happens exactly as God knows it will happen, how is there room for human freedom of the will? This version of the paradox has led philosophers to examine whether God's foreknowledge of a future human act implies that the human agent lacks control over the act or is not responsible for it. Another version of the paradox concerns God's omniscience and his own free will. If everything occurs according to complete divine fore-

的冲突,国家的统一很脆弱。与这一情况相伴,寡头统治者也缺少内在的和谐。他为金钱的欲望所支配,他的理性和情绪被驱使着只是为金钱去工作。寡头政制比尊荣政制更不公正、更悲惨,它将进而退化到民主政制,然后是僭主政制。

“寡头政制的城邦必然不是一个而是两个,一个是富人的城邦,一个是穷人的城邦,它们生活在同一个地方,总是在互相阴谋反对对方。”——柏拉图:《国家篇》,551d。

全能

[源自拉丁语 *omnis* (全部) 和 *potens* (力量的)] 主要的神性之一。所谓全能,指上帝具有无限的或最大的力量,是万物的统治者。全能存在的观念引起了许多逻辑上的不可能性,即所谓的全能悖论。上帝能够创造出一块大得他不能移动的岩石吗? 如果不能,他就不是全能的,因为他能创造的东西有限;如果能,他也不是全能的,因为他能移动的东西有限。导致悖论的其他问题包括“上帝能否定上帝的本质吗?”“上帝能躺卧吗?”“上帝能犯罪吗?”有些哲学家企图重新界定全能观念,以便避开这样的问题。一个更深层次的哲学问题源于神的全能、全知和全善的结合。上帝全能、全知和全善的断言如何与邪恶的存在不矛盾? 对这个问题,有许多种回答,譬如认为邪恶是由于第一个人的堕落,或认为上帝容许邪恶作为净化灵魂的一种手段,但是,没有一种回答赢得普遍赞同,不过,人们在世上经验到恶,只是增进而不是减少对上帝的信仰。

“有神论者经常愿意主张上帝全能,从字面上讲,即上帝能做任何事情。”——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第149页。

全知

[源自拉丁语, *omnis* (全部) 和 *sciens* (*scire* 的现在分词,知道)] 主要的神性之一。根据这个属性,上帝知道一切,或有无限的知识。这个属性引出了上帝的全知悖论,关于意志自由的一个永恒的问题。这个悖论有两种形式。其一是关于上帝的全知与人类的自由。如果每个将来的事物都恰好像上帝知道它将发生的那样发生,人类的意志自由如何有存在的空间? 悖论的这个形式导致哲学家们考察上帝对未来的行为行为的预知是否意味着人类行为者缺乏对行为的控制力或不应对它负责任。这个悖论的另一种形式是关于上帝的全知与他自己的自由意志。如果每物都按照完全的神圣预知发生,上帝怎么能够行使他自己的自由意志? 如果上帝被认

knowledge, how can God exercise his own free will? Another problem concerning the scope of divine foreknowledge arises if God is held to have no sensory organs and to exist outside time. It is difficult to understand how God in these circumstances could have knowledge of material and temporal things.

"Traditionally, God is said to be omniscient, to know all things." — R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 162.

On, Greek; the participle of being

One

[Greek: *hen*] Many Greek philosophers argued that their first principles, no matter whether they are one or many, must be at one with themselves and form a unity. Aristotle discussed various meanings of the term one in *Metaphysics*, book 5. Things might be called one because of accidental features or by their own nature. Of things that are called one in terms of their nature, they might be continuous, have the same substratum, have the same genus or share the same definition. Things can also be one in number, in species or in genus. Plotinus called his absolute transcendent first principle the One, and identified it with the Good or God. It is the power behind everything, the source of the Divine Mind and Souls (Forms), although the One itself is neither Mind nor Soul. It is beyond being, for if it is a being, it must be describable by a predicate, and that would involve duality and compromise its unity. Therefore, the One can only be understood negatively and is beyond the reach of our thought or language. It is the simple object of intuitive knowledge. Plotinus' One is based on the Good in Plato's *Republic*, and prepared the way for the development of negative theology.

"Everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1016b23.

One over many

We can apply one predicate to many different things. How can they be related in this way? According to Plato, a common description suggests that there is a common intrinsic feature of nature shared by these different things which determines their real existence. This common nature is one and the same and stands over many particular things. This is Plato's "one over many principle". He called the one common nature Form or Idea and declared that Ideas are objects independent of our minds and that each of the many particulars imitates or participates in their Idea. Ideas are objects of knowledge, while particulars are objects of opinion. The central aim of Plato's Theory of Ideas is to argue for this principle and to deal with various difficulties arising from it.

为是无感官的,存在于时间之外的,则产生了神圣预知的范围的问题。很难理解上帝在这些情况中如何能够具有关于物质的和时间性事物的知识。

“在传统上,上帝被说成全知的,即知道一切东西。”——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第162页。

是

希腊词,“是(being)”的分词。

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[希腊语是 *hen*] 许多希腊哲学家都认为,他们的第一原则必定是自身一致的、统一的,无论它们是一还是多。亚里士多德在《形而上学》第五卷中讨论了“一”这个词的不同含义。事物由于偶性或由于自身本性都可被称为一。由于自身本性而被称为一的事物,原因又有多种,可能因其是连续的,或有相同的载体,或有相同的属,或分有相同的定义等等。事物也能在数目上、种上或属上是一。普罗提诺把他那个绝对超验的第一本原称为“太一”,并将它与善或神同一。它是万物背后的力量,是“神圣心智”和“灵魂”(“形式”)的根源,虽然“太一”自身既不是“心智”,也不是“灵魂”。它是超存在的,因为如果它是一个存在,就必定可被述语描述,而这会陷入二元性,损害它的元一性。所以,“太一”只能被否定地理解,并超越于我们的思想或语言所能达到的范围。它是直觉知识的单一对象。普罗提诺的“太一”,以柏拉图《国家篇》中的“善”为基础,为否定神学的发展开辟了道路。

“无论在何处,一在数量上或种类上都是不可分的。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1016b23。

多上之一

我们可以把同一谓词应用于许多不同的事物。它们如何能以这一方式相连?根据柏拉图的解释,一个共同的解释表明有一个共同的自然特征存在;这一特征为许多事物所分有,并决定了它们的真实存在。这一共同本性是单一的,居于许多特殊事物之上。这便是柏拉图的“多上之一”的原则”。他把这一共同性质叫做“形式”或“形相”,并认为它们是独立于我们心灵的对象,而许多殊相中的每一个则模仿或分有形相。形相是知识的对象,而殊相是意见的对象。柏拉图“形相论”的中心目的是要论证这一原则,并处理由此而引起的种种困难。这些困难后来变成了争论不已的“殊相与共相关系问题”。关于这

These difficulties have become the problem of the relation between universals and particulars. The discussion of this problem forms one of the chief issues in Western metaphysics, although it is closely linked to logical questions about meaning and predication. The one over many problem is also called the one-many problem, but this latter expression is also used to ask whether the substance of the world is one or many in the debate between monism and pluralism.

"Those who say that the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form."—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1040b28-30.

One-many problem, see one over many

Ontico-ontological distinction

Heidegger's distinction, concerning two levels of analysis of *Dasein*. The ontic level is concerned with the concrete, specific and local matter of *Dasein*, i. e. the factual matter open to observation, which Heidegger calls *existentiell*. The ontological level is, on the other hand, concerned with the deep structure that underlies and instantialises the ontical or *existentiell* matter and provides a phenomenological description. This deep structure is called by Heidegger *existentiale*. *Dasein* has three main *existentiales*, i. e. existentiality, facticity and fallingness. The problems of traditional metaphysics confuse these two levels by taking Being as entity. Heidegger's own fundamental ontology is both ontical, that is the analysis of the actual existence of *Dasein*, and ontological, that is the analysis of the general conditions of possibility for existence. This is because *Dasein* itself is both ontical (as an entity), and ontological (the only entity that can ask the question of Being). In these terms, his thought contrasts with Husserl's phenomenology, which brackets the phenomenon.

"By indicating *Dasein's* ontico-ontological priority in this provisional manner, we have grounded our demonstration that the question of Being is ontico-ontologically distinctive."—Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, pp. 34-5.

Ontological argument

One of the most celebrated arguments attempting to prove the existence of God. It was first formulated in the eleventh century by Anselm of Canterbury in *Proslogion*. The argument assumes that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. If he is thus, God must exist in our understanding. But if he exists in the understanding only and does not exist in reality, a being which is greater than

一问题的讨论构成了西方形而上学的一个主要议题,而且它与关于意义和谓词的逻辑问题密切相关。“多上之一”的问题也叫“——多问题”。不过此一表述还用于在一元论与多元论之间的辩论中询问世界的本体是一还是多。

“那些说形式存在的人,在一方面是对的,即认为形式是分离的存在,如果它们是本体的话;可在另一方面则不对了,因为他们说形式是多上之一。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1040b28—30。

——多问题

见“多上之一”条。

存在者的与存在论的区别(或译“本体的与本体论的区别”)

海德格尔对于缘在(*Dasein*)分析的两个层次的区别。存在者的(ontic)层次涉及缘在的具体的、特殊的和局部的方面,即可观察到的事实的方面。海德格尔称之为“生存者的”(Existenziell, 英文为 existentiell)。另一方面,存在论的层次涉及位于存在者或生存者方面之下的深层结构,提供现象学的描述,这个深层结构被海德格尔称为“生存论性质”(Existenzial, 英译为 existentiale)。缘在有三种主要的生存论性质:生存性、实际性和沉沦性。传统形而上学的问题在于混淆了这两个层次,将存在当做了存在者。海德格尔自己的基础存在论既是存在者的,即对于缘在实际生存的分析,也是存在论的,即对于生存可能性的一般条件的分析。这是因为缘在本身既是存在者的(作为一个存在者),又是存在论的(能追问存在问题的惟一存在者)。因此,他的主张与胡塞尔的将(存在)现象置入括弧之内(即悬置掉存在问题)的现象学相反。

“以这种先行引导的方式,我们显示出了缘在在存在者与存在论上的优先地位;因此从根本上支持了这样一个证明,即存在问题在存在者与存在论上是有区别的。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第34—35页。

本体论论证

试图证明上帝存在的最有名的论证之一。它是11世纪时,由坎特伯雷的安瑟尔谟在他的《宣讲》中第一次系统讲述的。该论证假定,上帝是一个能被设想的无与伦比的伟大存在。如果上帝果真如此,就必定存在于我们的理解中。但如果他仅存在于我们的理解中而不存在于现实中,就可设想出一个比上帝还伟大的存在,即既

God is conceivable, namely a being which exists both in our understanding and in reality. But since it is a premise of the argument that God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, it is contradictory and logically impossible for us to conceive a being which is greater than God. Therefore, God must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality.

Gaunilo, a contemporary of Anselm, and later figures such as Descartes sought to reject the ontological argument by asserting that similar arguments could prove the existence of absurd things, such as the greatest possible island. Anselm replied that in talking about a thing so great that nothing greater could be conceived, he was making a logical point about greatness rather than a factual point about different kinds of things.

Kant proposed the most important objection to the ontological argument with his claim that existence is not a predicate. His view is a major topic of discussion in contemporary philosophical logic.

Few philosophers are convinced by the ontological argument, but many find it difficult to overcome. Today there are both opponents and defenders of the argument, and many new versions have been elaborated, with some relying on recent developments in modal logic. The American philosopher A. Plantinga argues in this way. It is possible for there to be a being that has maximal greatness. Therefore, a possible being in some world *w* has maximal greatness. A being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence in every world. A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in that world. If a being has maximal excellence in every world, it has maximal excellence in this world. If a being has maximal excellence in this world, then it has omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection in this world. But these are the attributes of God, and if a being has these attributes in this world, then that being is God.

The ontological argument is so fascinating because it leads into many significant philosophical questions, such as "Is existence a property?", "Can there be existential propositions that are necessarily true?" and "In what sense of 'is' can we say that something does not exist?". The modern versions are more plausible if entities retain their identity across worlds, but are less persuasive if terms designate counterparts from one world to another or if possible worlds and their contents are understood as descriptions rather than as real objects of reference. If these and many other problems are not solved, a proper analysis of the ontological argument will continue to elude us.

"Because of the crucial role which the concept of existence or being plays in this argument it has been called the Ontological Argument."—C. J. F. Williams, *What is Existence*, p. 17.

存在于我们的理解中又存在于现实中的一个存在。但是,既然论证的前提是上帝乃能被设想的无与伦比的一个伟大存在,那么,我们设想一个比上帝还伟大的存在就是矛盾的,在逻辑上是不可能的。所以,上帝必定不仅存在于理解中,而且也存在于现实中。

安瑟尔谟的同代人高尼罗,以及后来的笛卡尔等人,通过断定同样的论证也能证明荒谬事物的存在(譬如最大可能的岛屿),力图反驳本体论论证。安瑟尔谟回答说,在谈论一物如此之大,以至于无物能被设想为与之伦比时,他指的是关于人的逻辑点,而不是关于不同种类事物的事实点。

康德以他存在不是一个谓词的主张提出了对本体论论证的最为重要的反驳。他的观点是当代哲学逻辑讨论的一个主要论题。

很少有哲学家信服本体论论证,但许多哲学家发现,克服它却不容易。在当今,既有该论证的反对者,也有辩护者,而且,又出现了不少新的表述,有些表述以模态逻辑的新近发展为依靠。美国哲学家 A. 普兰汀格就是以这种方式论证的。一个极度伟大的存在是有可能的。所以,在某个世界 *w* 中,有一个可能的极度伟大的存在。在一个给定世界中具有极度伟大的存在,仅当它在每一世界中都极度优秀。一个在给定世界中具有极度优秀的存在,仅当它在那个世界具有全知、全能和道德的完美。如果一个存在在每个世界都极度优秀,它在这个世界也极度优秀。如果一个存在在这个世界极度优秀,那么,它在这个世界就具有全知、全能和道德的完美。但是,这些都是上帝的属性,而且,如果一个存在在这个世界具有这些属性,那么,那个存在就是上帝。

本体论论证之所以如此具有魅力,是因为它引入了许多有意义的哲学问题,譬如,“存在是一种特性吗?”“能有必然真的存在命题吗?”“在‘是’的什么意义上,我们能够说某物不存在?”现代的各种说法更具可能性,如果实体在不同世界中能保持同一的话,但却更不令人信服,如果术语指称从一个世界到另一个世界的摹本,或如果可能世界及其内容被理解作是描绘而非指称的实在对象的话。如果这些以及许多的其他问题得不到解决,我们将依然达不到对于本体论论证的真切分析。

“由于存在概念在这个论证中所起的决定性作用,它被称为本体论论证。”——威廉姆斯:《什么是存在》,第 17 页。

Ontological commitment

The use of language commits us to the existence of external objects, for example saying "Pegasus has wings", carries a commitment to the existence of Pegasus. A person's ontology consists of the set of objects which he takes to exist, that is, which he takes to make up the furniture of the world. Theories differ according to what objects they posit as existing in the world. Ontology is the answer to the question "what is there?" Determining which answer is right amounts to determining what ontological commitments are acceptable. We are thus faced with the problem of finding a criterion for ontological commitment. The famous criterion put forward by Quine, is that a theory is committed to those objects which must exist if it is true. A theory is committed to the existence of entities of a certain kind if and only if they must be counted among the values of its bound variables of quantification in order for the theory to be true. This criterion is a development of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Its major significance is to show that when a singular term occurs in a true statement, it does not automatically warrant an assertion that the term refers to something real or existent.

"If what we want is a standard for our own guidance in appraising the ontological commitments of one or another of our theories, and in altering those commitments by revision of our theory, then the criterion at hand well suits our purpose."—Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 105.

Ontological guilt, another expression for anguish

Ontological relativity

One of Quine's main doctrines, which holds that there are no absolute facts according to which we may determine the ontological commitments of a theory. There is no determinate answer either to the question "what is there?" or to the question "what objects is one really talking about?". The ontological imports of a theory can only make sense relative to a translation or an interpretation of some background theory or language; and this background theory is itself relative to some further translation of it into another theory. An ontological question, if taken absolutely, is meaningless. To answer "what is F", we have to say "An F is a G". But then we can ask: "what is G?". We always need further terms in relation to which we can again ask or answer questions. The regress can only be stopped when we ultimately accept some background theory at face value. Hence, a full interpretation of a theory is nothing more than a complete translation of the theory into another theory, using our manual of translation which is essentially inscrutable and indeterminate. This relativity thesis is a radical departure from a basic assumption

本体论的承诺

使用了语言我们就承诺了外在对象的存在。例如,当我们说“柏伽索斯有双翼”时,我们会相信存在一个柏伽索斯。某人的本体论是由他视为存在的一些对象构成的,就是说,他把它们看做是组成世界的内容。各种理论正是根据它们认为存在于世界上的对象而千差万别的。本体论是对“何物存在?”这个问题的回答。决定哪一种回答是正确的,也就是决定可以接受什么样的本体论承诺。我们因而面临着发现本体论承诺标准的问题。由奎因提出的著名标准是,如果一个理论是真的,那么它就承诺了必定存在某些对象,也就是说,一个理论承诺了某种实体的存在,当且仅当在使这个理论为真的量化的约束变项值中,这些实体必须是可数的。这个标准是对罗素限定摹状词理论的发展,其主要意义在于,它表明,当单个词出现在真的陈述中时,它并不自动地保证它指称了某个实在的或存在的东西。

“如果我们需要的是一种标准,它能引导我们评价我们这个或那个理论的本体论承诺,并通过修正我们的理论而改变这些承诺,那么这里的标准就非常适合我们的目的。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第105页。

存在论之罪感

“焦虑”的另一种表达。

本体论的相对性

奎因的主要理论之一,它认为不存在这样的绝对事实,根据这一事实我们可以决定一个理论的本体论承诺。对“何物存在”或“人们实际上谈论的对象是什么”这种问题,不存在任何决定性的答案。一种理论的本体论地位只有相对于对某种背景理论或语言的解释或翻译才有意义;而背景理论本身也是相对于把它进一步翻译为另一种理论。绝对地谈论本体论问题是无意义的。如果要回答“F是什么?”我们就得说“一个F是一个G”。但我们于是就会问“G是什么?”我们总是需要对能够再次提出或回答的问题做出进一步的说明。而只有当我们最终接受了某种背景理论作为价值取向时,这种无穷后退才会停止。因而,对一种理论的完整解释,不过是我们基本上无法理解的和不确定的翻译手册,把这种理论全部翻译为另一种理论。这种相对性论题完全背离了包括卡尔纳普和维特根斯坦等许多分析哲学家所持的一种基本假定,他们认为,我们从一开始就可以绝对地谈论

which many analytic philosophers, including Carnap and the early Wittgenstein, held, namely that we can start with absolute talk about the structure, meaning, or content of linguistic expressions. Ontological relativity implies not only that reality itself is indeterminate, but also that the conceptual import of our language in talking about reality is similarly incomplete and indeterminate. Carnap's distinction between external questions which deal with linguistic structures and internal questions which deal with facts, collapses over this thesis, for external questions themselves become relative and factual.

"Paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary, then, is our only recourse; and such is ontological relativity." -Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, 1969, p. 54.

Ontology

[from Greek: *logos*, theory + *ont*, being] The Latin term *ontologia* was introduced in the seventeenth century for a branch of metaphysics to be distinguished from other branches, namely rational theology, rational cosmology and rational psychology. Christian Wolff did much to gain acceptance for the term. As the theoretical or general part of metaphysics and as the general theory of being, ontology is often used for metaphysics as a whole. Ontology deals with the essential characteristics of being itself (of Aristotle's being *qua* being), and asks the questions such as "What is or what exists?", "What kind of thing exists primarily?" and "How are different kinds of being related to one another?". The investigation of the meaning of being began with Parmenides and received a systematic discussion in Aristotle. In this century, Heidegger and Quine have taken completely different approaches to ontology. Heidegger asks what character Being must have if human consciousness is to be what it is. Quine proposes his maxim "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" to determine what things a theory claims to exist. His doctrine of ontological relativity suggests that what we can take to exist is relative to the theory and language that we bring to the situation.

"... the general thought of an intimate connection between logic and ontology or metaphysics has run like a thread, one of many threads, right through the history of philosophy, from Aristotle to the present." -Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics*, 1992, p. 37.

Open concept, see open-texture

Open sentence

A formula which has one or more free variables, in contrast to a closed sentence which is a formula that has no free variable. When the variables in an open sentence are replaced

结构、意义或语言表达式的内容。本体论的相对性不仅表明实在本身是不确定的,而且表明我们的语言在谈论实在时的概念意义同样是不完整的、不确定的。这个论题推翻了卡尔纳普对涉及语言结构的“外部问题”和涉及事实的“内部问题”的区分,因为外部问题本身也是相对的,有关事实的。

“于是,某些先前熟悉的词汇中的意译,就成了我们的惟一依靠;这就是本体论的相对性。”——奎因:《本体论的相对性及其他论文》,1969年,第54页。

本体论

[源自希腊文:*logos*(理论)和 *ont*(是,或存在)] [严格地说,应译做“是论”或“存在论”。] 在17世纪,学者们创造了拉丁词“*ontologia*”,指称形而上学的一分支,以区别于其他分支,即理性神学,理性宇宙论和理性心理学。C. 沃尔夫为这一术语的盛行作了不少贡献。作为形而上学的一般性的或理论性的部分,作为关于“是”的一般理论,本体论常常用以指整个形而上学。本体论关注“是”自身(即亚里士多德的作为“是”的“是”)的本质特性,其主要的问题包括“什么是‘是’或什么存在?”“什么样的事物在某种意义上存在?”以及“不同种类的‘是’如何互相联系?”对“是”的意义的研究始于巴门尼德,在亚里士多德哲学中得到了系统的讨论。在本世纪,海德格尔和奎因采取了极不相同的本体论研究方式。海德格尔问如果人类意识具有所“是”的本质,“是”必须具有什么特征。奎因提出其格言“‘是’即一约束变项的值”来决定一个理论可确定其存在的是何事物。他的本体相对性主张表明,我们可以认为存在的事物相对于我们引入当下环境中的理论和语言。

“关于逻辑与本体论或形而上学之间密切关系的普遍思想,就像千丝聚一线,横穿从亚里士多德至今的整个哲学史。”——斯特劳森:《分析与形而上学》,1992年,第37页。

开放概念

见“开放性”条。

开语句

开语句是含一个或多个自由变元的公式,与作为不含自由变元的公式的闭语句形成对照。当开语句中的这些变元被普通表达式所替

by ordinary expressions, it becomes a genuine or closed sentence. For instance, "X is mortal" is an open sentence. If we replace "X" with "Socrates", we have a closed sentence "Socrates is mortal". Open sentences are sentential or propositional functions rather than sentences or propositions themselves, and hence are neither true nor false. An open sentence is true or false according to the values of its variables. The extension of an open sentence is the class of all the objects of which the open sentence is true. A closed sentence, on the other hand, has a truth-value and is actually a statement.

"Expressions such as 'X is a book', 'X=X', 'X is a man' \supset 'X is mortal', which are like statements except for containing 'X' without a quantifier, are called 'open sentences'."—Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 1952, p. 90.

Open society

The distinction between an open society and a closed society was first proposed by Bergson, but Popper gave the term its current importance. Member of an open society are autonomous individuals who can decide on the basis of their own intelligence what to do. Members compete fairly for social positions. In contrast, a closed society is authoritarian or totalitarian, and its members do not have a free choice over what to do. A closed society is supported by an ideology which functions like a magical taboo, while an open society is rational and critical. Liberal democratic society is an example of an open society, while the Platonic ideal state is a typical closed society.

"The magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society; the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society."—Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 1, 1945, p. 173.

Open-question argument

Moore's argument against naturalism in *Principia Ethica*. Naturalism, in his understanding, defines "good" or other ethical terms by reference to natural or non-ethical qualities. If such a procedure were right, he argues, then the statement that what is F (some natural property) is good would be identical with the statement that whatever F is F. But this is not the case. For whatever F is F is a tautology and its denial involves self-contradiction. That what is F is good, on the other hand, remains open to question. Whatever natural properties a naturalist uses to define "good", we can still ask, "Are these natural properties good?". A negative answer to such a question will not involve self-contradiction. Hence this kind of statement is not really a definition of "good", and naturalism is wrong. Moore claims that "good" is indefinable. This argument is a subject of controversy, for it is not generally accepted that the definition of an ethical term must be analytic. The nature of definition more general-

代时,它就成为一个真正的语句或闭语句。举例来说,"X是有死的"是一开语句。如果我们用"苏格拉底"替换X,我们就得到一闭语句"苏格拉底是有死的"。开语句是语句或命题函项,而不是语句或命题本身,所以既不真也不假。开语句根据它的变元的值为真或为假,并且它的外延是使该开语句为真的所有那些对象的类。另一方面,闭语句有真值并且实际上是一陈述。

"像'X是一本书', 'X=X', 'X是人' \supset 'X是有死的'这样的表达式,除含有'X'而不含量词外,它们类似于陈述,叫做'开语句'。"—奎因:《逻辑方法》,1952年,第90页。

开放社会

对开放社会和封闭社会的区分首先是由柏格森提出的,但波普赋予开放社会这一术语以现时的重要性。一个开放社会的成员是自主的个人,他们可以基于自己的理智决定做什么。成员们公平地竞争社会地位。与此相反,封闭社会是独裁主义的或极权主义的,它的成员不能自由选择做什么。封闭社会靠意识形态支持,后者的作用类似巫术的禁忌,而开放社会则是理性的和批判的。自由民主社会是开放社会的样板,而柏拉图的理想国则是典型的封闭社会。

"神秘的或部族的或集体主义的社会也可称为封闭社会;而每个人都面临个人决定的社会则称为开放社会。"—波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》,第一卷,1945年,第173页。

未决问题论证

摩尔在他的《伦理学原理》中反对自然主义的论证。摩尔理解的自然主义是参照自然或非伦理的性质来定义"善"和其他伦理概念的。他认为,如果这样一种方法是正确的,那称作F(F代表自然特性)的东西是善这样一种陈述就与"不论什么F都是F"的陈述相等同。但情形并不是如此。因为"不论什么F是F"是一同义反复,它的否定涉及到自我矛盾。另一方面,那什么F是善,仍然是未决问题。一个自然主义者不论用什么自然特性来定义"善",我们仍然可以问,"这些自然特性是善吗?"对于这种问题的否定回答并不涉及到自相矛盾。因此,这种陈述并不真正回答是"善"的定义,因此自然主义是错的。摩尔宣称"善"是不可定义的。这个论证引起不少争论,因为一个伦理词的定义必须是可分析的这样一种观点并不被普遍接受。更普遍的是,在评论这个论证中,对这种定义的性质产

ly can be called into question in assessing the argument.

"Moore's most important suggestion was the proposal of what has been called the 'open question' test or criterion for sameness of meaning."—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 164.

Open-texture

A term introduced by Friedrich Waismann in his paper "Verifiability" (1945) for an unavoidable feature of empirical terms or statements. An empirical term, no matter how precise its core meaning, faces unlimited uncertainties of meaning when its dominant reference is extended or when it is employed in different contexts. The number of possible conditions in which it may be used is infinite. In the face of such open-texture, Waismann concluded that no final verifiability is available for empirical statements. Open-texture is the possibility of vagueness, because vagueness arises when a word is actually used in a fluctuating way while open texture exists because there are always possible gaps in determining the meaning of a term. The term is used widely in legal philosophy for the particular cases in which a legal rule, although having a core of settled meaning, is unclear regarding what it prescribes or prohibits. No clean-cut conceptual boundary is provided in these cases, and consequently general legal rules are limited in their capacity to determine decisions and must be supplemented by judicial discretion. H. L. A. Hart took this feature of legal rules as an instrument for the criticism of legal formalism.

The notion of an open concept, which is derived from open texture, is a concept which has an incomplete intension and needs to be modified in order to deal with unforeseen situations. It does not admit of a precise definition. The necessary and sufficient conditions of its application are not fixed. An open concept is not a vague concept but is the basis of the possibility of vagueness. Such concepts can be extended or modified, but they cannot be replaced by concepts that are not open. All concepts displaying what Wittgenstein called family resemblance are open concepts.

"Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness." Waismann, in Flew (ed.), *Logic and Language* (first series), 1963, p. 120.

Operational definition

A definition of a theoretical terms formed by constructing a set of performable operations or activities. A conception of an object is the sum of our ideas of the observable consequences of this object disclosed by operations. This idea can be traced back to Peirce's pragmatic maxim and is a type of definition articulated by Bridgman as the central doctrine of operationism. A scientific term can be meaningful only when it can be defined operationally. The claim, to a certain extent, is a generalisation of the working practice of sci-

生疑问。

"摩尔的最重要的意见是提出被称作'未决问题'的检验标准或意义相同的标准。"——布朗特:《伦理理论》,1959年,第164页。

开放性

F. 魏斯曼在他的《可证实性》(1945)一文中提出的一个术语,以表示经验术语或陈述的一个不可避免的特征。一个经验术语,无论它的核心意思是多么准确,在它的主要指称被扩大时,或在它被用于不同的语境中时,都会面临无限的意义不确定。它被用于的可能的条件是无数的。面对这一开放性特征,魏斯曼断定,对经验陈述而言,最终的可证实性是得不到的。开放性就是含糊性的可能性,因为含糊性是在一个词实际上是以一种不确定的方式使用时出现的,而开放性的存在是由于在确定一个术语的意义时总存在可能的空白。这一术语在法哲学中被广泛用来指称这样的特殊情况,即一条法规尽管具有意义确定的核心内容,但就它规定的东西或禁止的东西而言又是不清楚的。在这些情况下不能提供明晰的概念界定,因而,一般的法规在确定判决的能力上受到限制,必须为法官的斟酌处理所补充。H. L. A. 哈特把法规的这一特征作为批判法律形式主义的一个武器。

对开放概念的见解来自开放性,它指的是一个概念其意义是不完整的,为了处理意料不到的情况就需要对它做修改。它不承认精确的定义。它适用的必要的和充分的条件是不固定的。一个开放的概念不是一个含混的概念,但却是可能造成含混的基础。这样的概念可以被扩展或修改,但不能被非开放的概念所取代。所有展示维特根斯坦所说的家族相似的概念都是开放的概念。

"开放性是与含混的可能性相类似的东西。"——魏斯曼,见弗留(编):《逻辑和语言》第一辑,1963年,第120页。

操作定义

通过构造一组可实行的操作或活动所形成的理论术语的定义。一个对象的概念,是我们通过操作所揭示的关于这个对象的可观察结果的观念之和。这一观念可以追溯到皮尔士的实用主义格言,而作为一类定义,则由布里奇曼把它表述为其操作主义的核心主张。一个科学术语仅当它被操作地定义时才是有意义的,这一观念在某种程度上是对科学家工作实践的概括。

"操作定义是借助于观察术语以限定理论

tists.

"[O]perational definitions [are] statements specifying the meanings of theoretical terms with the help of observational ones." —Hempel, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. ii, 1958, p. 49.

Operationalism, another term for operationism

Operationism

[from Latin: *operari*, work] Also called operationalism, a theory first proposed in physics by P. W. Bridgman, and then applied to other fields. It holds that things and their properties, powers and interactions, as the subject-matter of science, should be understood in terms of operations that scientists perform. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of operations, and the meaning of scientific terms is established in terms of a description of a set of operations, that is in terms of operational definitions. To be operationally meaningful, a statement must be confirmable at least in principle. This theory denies the distinction between theory and evidence. In the final analysis, a scientific theory is connected to operations that are empirically rooted. As a movement within the philosophy of science it is closely linked with logical positivism. The application of this theory to the field of psychology led to the emergence of behaviourism. A major difficulty is that it cannot guarantee that the experiments or selected operations are scientifically valuable or that the meaning of a term remains the same if it is approached from more than one experimental directions.

"The principle of operationism says that a term is empirically meaningful only if an operational definition can be given for it." —Carnap, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. i, 1956, p. 65.

Operator, see logical constant

O-proposition, see A-proposition

Optimism

[From Latin: *optimus*, the best] A French term (*optimisme*) referring to Leibniz's claim in *Theodicy* that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds because God who created it is the most perfect being. More generally, optimism is a positive and hopeful attitude towards things and the future, involving the claim that in the long run things are getting better. Optimism is contrasted to pessimism, which holds that this world is radically imperfect or that the future will be worse than the present. Schopenhauer's thought is

术语的意义的陈述。”——亨佩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第二卷,1958年,第49页。

操作主义

“操作主义(operationism)”的另一英文表述。

操作主义

[源自拉丁文 *operari*, 意思是“劳作”]其另一种英文表述为 operationalism。这个理论首先为 P. W. 布里奇曼在物理学中提出,然后应用于其他领域。它主张事物及其特性、能力和相互作用作为科学的主题,应按照科学家实施的操作来理解。科学知识是操作的知识,科学术语的意义应按照对一组操作的描述,即按照操作定义来确定。一个陈述必须至少原则上是可确证的,才是操作上有意义的。这个理论否认理论和证据之间的区别,归根结底,一个科学理论与植根于经验的操作相联系。作为科学哲学中的一种倾向,它与逻辑实证主义密切相关。这个理论对心理学领域的应用导致了行为主义的出现。其主要困难是不能保证实验或操作在科学上是有价值的,也不能保证一个术语的意义在从不同的实验方向来探索时,仍然会是一样的。

“操作主义原理认为一个术语是经验上有意义的,仅当能给它一个操作定义时。”——卡尔纳普,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第一卷,1956年,第65页。

算子

见“逻辑常项”条。

O 命题

见“A 命题”条。

乐观主义

[源自拉丁词: *optimus*, 最佳]法语词(*optimisme*)指莱布尼茨在《神正论》中的主张:现实世界是一切可能世界中最好的世界,因为创造它的上帝是最完善的存在。更一般地说,乐观主义是一种对待事物和未来的积极的和充满希望的态度,它声称,从长远来看,事情会越来越好。乐观主义对比于悲观主义,后者认为这个世界从根本上是不完善的,未来将比现在更糟。叔本华的思想是哲学中悲观主义的最重要的例子。

the most important example of pessimism in philosophy.

"I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, whether it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbour nothing but words under their absurd, but also a really wicked, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind."—Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* (tr. Payne), I, p. 326.

Ordinary language

Everyday and non-technical language as an object of philosophical investigation. It can be distinguished from natural language, a term for actual human languages as studied in the philosophy of language and linguistics. Language has been a central concern of twentieth century philosophy. Some philosophers believe that ordinary language is defective and must be replaced by a rigorously reconstructed language or grammatical system (an ideal language), while others argue that we should rather seek to understand the logical diversity and complexity of ordinary language and its correct use to deal with philosophical problems. They hold that a replacement for ordinary language is unnecessary and impossible. This difference in attitude has led to a major division in analytical philosophy between ideal language philosophy represented by Russell and Carnap and ordinary language philosophy represented by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin.

"Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word; in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word."—Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, 1970, p. 133.

Ordinary language philosophy

A kind of linguistic philosophy, originating with criticism of the ideal language philosophy of Russell, certain interpretations of Wittgenstein's early philosophy and Logic Positivism. Ideal language philosophy claims that we need an artificial language to be a suitable vehicle for philosophical reasoning, with a view to solving the philosophical perplexities caused by the unsystematic, irregular and imperfect nature of ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophy believes that the creation of an ideal language to replace ordinary language is unnecessary and also impossible. Rather, we must pay close attention to the meanings, categories, implications, grammatical or logical forms, functions, uses and distinctions in ordinary language. This approach to philosophy was pioneered by Moore and practised in varying ways by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hare, Austin and Strawson. Because this approach to philosophy was fully developed in Oxford, it also became known as Oxford philosophy. According to Strawson, we must uncover the nature of linguistic structure as it has traditionally been presented. Ordinary language presupposes a structure of reality and hence an in-

"我在这里不能阻止那种乐观主义的陈述,不论它是那些无头脑的人们独无仅有的一派胡言,还是一种实在恶劣的思维方式,对人类的难言之苦的辛酸的嘲笑。"——叔本华:《作为意志和表象的世界》(佩尼译),第一卷,第326页。

日常语言

作为哲学研究对象的每天使用的非专业语言,可以区别于自然语言,后者是指语言哲学和语言学研究的人类现实语言。语言一直是20世纪哲学关心的中心内容。某些哲学家相信,日常语言是有缺陷的,必须用严格构造起来的语言体系或语法体系(一种理想语言)取而代之;而另外的哲学家则认为,我们更应当去理解日常语言的逻辑多样性和复杂性,正确地使用它讨论哲学问题。这种看法认为,对日常语言的替换不仅是不必要的,而且是不可能的。这种不同的态度导致了分析哲学中以罗素、卡尔纳普等人为代表的理想语言哲学和以后期维特根斯坦、赖尔和奥斯汀等人为代表的日常语言哲学之间的主要分歧。

"当然,日常语言的确不是最后的语言:它在原则上是可以随处补充、改进和替换的。只是要记住,它是最初的语言。"——奥斯汀:《哲学论文集》,1970年,第133页。

日常语言哲学

一种语言哲学,开始于批评罗素的理想语言哲学,以及对维特根斯坦前期哲学和逻辑实证主义的某些解释。理想语言哲学声称,我们需要创造一种人工语言作为哲学推理的恰当工具,并认为可以解决由于日常语言的没有体系、无规则和不完善而造成的哲学困惑。日常语言哲学相信,创造一种理想语言来取代日常语言,这不仅是没有必要的,而且是不可能的。相反,我们必须更加关注日常语言中的意义、范畴、蕴涵、语法形式或逻辑形式、功能、用法和区别。摩尔是这种哲学方法的先驱,而后期维特根斯坦、赖尔、黑尔、奥斯汀和斯特劳森则以各种方式运用这种方法。由于这种哲学方法完全是在牛津得到发展的,因而它也被看做是"牛津哲学"。根据斯特劳森的看法,我们必须像传统所做的那样揭示语言结构的性质。日常语言预设了实在的结构,因而研究这种语言也就是理解可能存在的语言之外的世界的有效方式。这就是他"描述的形而上学"的核心。日常语言哲学特别强调从使用语言表达式中提出的问题。奥斯汀的言

vestigation of that language is a fruitful means of understanding what the extralinguistic world may really be like. This is the essence of his descriptive metaphysics. Ordinary language philosophy emphasises in particular the problems that have arisen from the use of linguistic expressions. This dimension was developed in Austin's speech-act theory.

"Ordinary language philosophers saw the task of linguistic philosophy to lie in the clarification of the ordinary concepts that give rise to philosophical puzzles."—Katz, *Linguistic Philosophy*, 1971, p. 177.

Organon

[Greek; instrument or tool] The title given to the collection of Aristotle's logical works by sixth century commentators rather than by Aristotle himself. These logical works include the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistic Elenchi*. These works do not form an organic whole and were composed at different dates. The reason for naming them collectively derived from Aristotle's view that logic is not a part of science, but is rather an instrument of thought.

"Logical matters have the place of a tool (Organon) in philosophy."—Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Topics*, 74. 29.

Original apperception, see transcendental apperception

Original choice an alternative expression for fundamental project

Original position

A hypothetical bargaining situation postulated by Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*, in which the basic structure of just society can be rationally chosen. Each participant in the original position acts under two conditions. The first condition limits their knowledge through a veil of ignorance. Participants are ignorant of the circumstances of their society and their position in them, their particular talents and their special interests. The second condition is motivational, participants are rational and mutually self-interested. They are not altruistic and do not have substantive moral sentiments. In addition, there are some formal constraints upon the principles to be chosen. They must be formulated in general terms which avoid proper names and hold for a well-ordered society in perpetuity; they must be universal and hold for everyone in the society throughout their lives; they must be open to public knowledge; they must be capable of ordering competing claims; and they must provide the highest and final court of appeal for claims. According to Rawls, the principles chosen in the original position will be the principles of justice, partly because the original position is intended to achieve ideal impartiality and partly because the principles selected will

语行为理论推进了这个方面的研究。

"日常语言哲学家把语言哲学的任务看做是对产生哲学困惑的日常概念的澄清。"—卡兹:《语言哲学》,1971年,第177页。

《工具论》

[希腊文,"工具"]6世纪的注释家而非亚里士多德本人将该名作为题目给予亚里士多德的逻辑著作。这些逻辑著作包括《范畴》,《解释》,《前分析》,《后分析》,《正位篇》和《驳诡辩》。这些著作并不构成一个有机整体。它们是在不同时期写成的。把它们集在一起的根据是亚里士多德的观点,即逻辑不是科学的一部分,而是一种思想的工具。

"逻辑问题在哲学中具有工具的地位。"—阿弗罗迪西的亚历山大:《正位篇》,74.29。

本源的统觉

见"先验统觉"条。

原初的选择

"基本谋划"的另一种表达。

原初状态

罗尔斯在《正义论》中要求的一种假设的达成协议情况,在这种情况下,正义社会的基本结构可以合理地选择。原初状态的每一参加者都在两个条件下行事。第一个条件以无知之幕后限制他们的知识。参加者不知道他们的社会环境及他们在其中的地位,也不知道他们的才能和特殊利益。第二个条件是动机方面的,参加者是理性的和相互冷淡的。他们不是利他主义的,没有真实存在的道德情操。此外,还存在一些对所选原则的形式限制。它们必须以一般概念提出,这些概念不能是专有名称并始终适合一个组织良好的社会;它们必须是普遍的并适合社会中每一个人的终身;它们对公众的知识必须是公开的;它们必须能够安排冲突的要求,它们必须为那些要求提供最高和最终的上诉法庭。根据罗尔斯的论述,在原初状态下选择的的原则将是正义的原则,这部分地是因为原初状态试图实现理想的公正,部分是因为所选择的的原则与我们直觉的正义概念相符合。原初状态可以被看成是对康德的自律和绝对命令观念的一个程序性解释。这一状态下所有的人都是自由、平等和

cohere with our intuitive notion of justice. The original position can be viewed a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the Categorical Imperative. All agents in that position are free, equal and rational beings who are autonomous because they choose the law themselves. The original position differs from the state of nature in classical social contract theory because it is a device to give us insight into our moral and political thinking rather than an exercise in historical speculation. If an agreement on principles is not reached in the original position, we remain in our imperfect and imperfectly understood society. In classical social contract theory, the participants would return to the state of nature.

"The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principle agreed to will be just." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 136.

Original sin

A Judeo-Christian doctrine. According to the *Bible*, the common ancestors of all human beings, Adam and Eve, could not resist the temptation of the Devil and broke the divine injunction not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Hence they committed original sin and lost the favour God. PS. 51. 5 says: "I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (cf. Genesis, 3, Romans, 5. 21). This sin has been transmitted to all the descendants of Adam and Eve and is therefore shared by them all, although the precise method of this transmission has been a subject of dispute among theologians. This official doctrine of original sin is essential for the Catholic Church, for it justifies the need to have Grace for redemption, the need for the sacrament of Baptism, and the justification of eternal punishment for those who are not saved. It is, however, unclear whether this is a personal guilt on the part of each individual or each individual's share of a defective human nature. The doctrine is criticised as being inconsistent with God's omnipotence, omniscience and his absolute goodness, for it must be God who created the Devil, and God must have had foreknowledge that Adam would be tempted. Critics ask why God did not help Adam to overcome this temptation. It is also cruel for God to multiply Adam's sin throughout humanity. Philosophically, the doctrine might be regarded as a confession of the natural inadequacy of human beings and our inability to lead perfectly virtuous lives. The enduring power of the account of original sin lies more in the Biblical narrative and in our recognition of our own imperfection than with the philosophical argument.

"Original sin consists in human nature being left to itself by the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God has bestowed on men's creation." — Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia2, 17, 9.

理性的人,他们是自主的,因为他们自己选择法律。原初状态不同于古典的社会契约论中的自然状态,因为它是给我们洞察我们的道德和政治思想的一种手段,而不是一种历史推测中的运用。如果对原则的一致同意在原初状态下没有达成,那我们就仍然是有缺陷的,我们对社会的理解仍然是有缺陷的。在古典的社会契约理论中,参加者应返回到自然状态。

"原初状态的观念旨在建立一种公平的程序,以便任何被一致同意的原则都将是正义的。" — 罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第136页。

原罪

犹太基督教的一种学说。根据《圣经》,所有人的共同祖先亚当和夏娃没能抵挡住恶魔的诱惑,破了不得偷食智慧之树果实的戒律。因此,他们犯下了原罪,失去了上帝的宠爱。《诗篇》51. 5说:"我是在罪孽里生的,在我母亲怀我的时候就有罪。"(也参见《创世纪》3,《罗马书》5. 21)这种罪被遗传给了亚当和夏娃的所有后裔,所以,被他们大家所分有,虽然此种遗传的恰当方法是神学家们争论的问题。这种官方的原罪学说对天主教教会来说,是至关重要的,因为它证明了恩典对于救赎的必需,洗礼圣礼的必需,对没获救的人进行永久惩罚的正当。但不清楚的是,它是每一个人都有罪,还是每个人分有有缺陷的人类本性。这个学说被人批评为与上帝的全能、全知和绝对善不一致,因为创造了那个恶魔的必定是上帝,而上帝又必定预知了亚当会受诱惑。批评者们问,为什么上帝没有帮助亚当战胜这个诱惑。上帝通过人性来增大亚当的原罪也是残忍的。从哲学上说,这个学说可被看做是人类本性不完善以及我们不能过完美的有德性的生活的自白。这一原罪学说的持续力量并非在于哲学论证,而是在于圣经的叙述,在于我们对自身不完美性的认识。

"原罪存在于人类本性中,是被遗留给它自身的,通过上帝赐予人的超自然馈赠才得以解脱。" — 阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia2, 17, 9.

Ostensive definition

The term, introduced by W. E. Johnson in his *Logic* in 1921, was discussed in detail by Russell, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists. An ostensive definition proceeds by simply pointing to something or showing actual examples of the thing being defined, as we usually do when we teach a child. For example, we point to a house and say, "The word 'house' means this". There are three factors in this kind of definition: a demonstrative term, a deictic (pointing) gesture and a sample of what the word designates. For Wittgenstein, an ostensive definition only answers the question "What is that called?" and does not settle how a term will be used in the future. It therefore does not fix the meaning of a term at all. For a private ostensive definition, I seemingly could concentrate my attention on a particular sensation and associate it with a particular sign. The problem is that the sign must be defined in terms of our public language, but in a private ostensive definition it can only be used to name the sensation for myself alone. Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a private ostensive definition as part of his rejection of the possibility of a private language.

"It is obvious that an ostensive definition must depend upon experience."—Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 368.

Ostensive proposition

Ayer's term for a kind of proposition which other logical positivists held to be the direct record of an immediate experience and therefore to have self-evident validity. These propositions are taken to be purely demonstrative in character and cannot be refuted by further evidence. Instead they are the ultimate foundation for determining the validity of other empirical propositions. Ayer himself denies the existence of ostensive propositions, for if a proposition is ostensive, it must consist of purely demonstrative symbols. As a consequence, it would merely name a situation without describing anything about it. Such a sentence cannot be a genuine proposition and cannot even be expressed.

"But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced, without referring in any way beyond."—Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1948, p. 91.

Other, the

In phenomenological philosophy since Husserl, humans other than the subject, self or ego. The self's relation to the Other gives rise to the problem of one's knowledge of other minds that is also discussed in analytical philosophy, but issues concerning the Other in ontology, ethics and political philosophy have come to be considered more fundamental. Emmanuel Levinas argued that the possibility of ethics rests on respecting the absolute alterity or otherness of the Other

实指定义

这个术语由 W. E. 约翰逊于 1921 年在其《逻辑学》一书中提出, 罗素、维特根斯坦和逻辑实证主义者对之做了详细讨论。实指定义的给出是仅指着某物, 或出示被定义事物的实例, 就像我们平常教小孩时那样。例如, 我们指着一栋房子说: "‘房子’这个词指的是这个东西。" 这种定义有三个要素: 指示词、直指(指着)的姿势, 以及语词所指示的样本。对维特根斯坦而言, 实指定义只回答这个问题: "那个东西叫什么?" 而不解决语词在将来如何使用的问题。因此, 这完全没有确定语词的意义。对于私人的实指定义而言, 我似乎可以把我的注意力集中于某一特定感觉, 将其与一特定符号相联系。问题在于, 这符号必须以我们的公共语言来定义, 但在私人的实指定义中, 这只能用来称呼我一个人的感觉。维特根斯坦否认私人实指定义的可能性, 作为他拒斥私人语言可能性的部分内容。

"显而易见, 实指定义必须依靠经验。"——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》, 1940 年, 第 368 页。

实指命题

艾耶尔对一类命题的称呼, 其他逻辑实证主义者认为这类命题是对当下经验的直接记录, 因此具有自明的有效性。人们认为这些命题的特征是纯粹指示性的, 不能被将来的证据驳斥。相反, 它们倒是决定其他经验命题的有效性的最终基础。艾耶尔本人否认存在实指命题, 因为一个命题如果是实指的, 它就必须由纯指示性符号构成。其结果是, 它仅仅命名了一种情况, 而没有描述有关它的任何事情。这样的语句不可能是真正的命题, 甚至不能表达出来。

"但是, 一命题是实指的, 仅当它记录了直接经验到的东西, 而决不指称除此之外的东西。"——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》, 1948 年, 第 91 页。

他人

在胡塞尔以来的现象学哲学中, 这是指不同于主体、自己或自我的人。自我对他人的关系产生了对他心的认识问题, 该问题也在分析哲学中讨论, 但关于他人在本体论、伦理学和政治哲学的争论问题已逐渐被认为是更基本的问题。E. 莱维纳斯证明, 伦理学的可能性依赖于对绝对的他在性或他人的他在的尊重, 而不是把他人还原为意识的对象。我们满足这种根本

rather than reducing the Other to an object of consciousness. Our ability to satisfy this radical demand depends on our understanding of how we can think an alterity which transcends our categories of thought. The Other presents problems of separation, opposition and alienation. In broader cultural terms, death, madness and the unconscious have been called the Other because they fall outside the model of rational self consciousness. The notion of the Other has been embraced in anthropology, post-colonial philosophy and feminism in an attempt to undermine the entrenched conceptual priority of the metropolitan culture and the male.

"The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say 'you' or 'we' is not a plural of the 'I'." — Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 39.

Other minds

If one can have direct knowledge only of one's own mental states, it is a serious philosophical question how and what we can know about other minds, that is whether other persons have minds and what other persons are thinking and feeling. Descartes saw free and intelligent action, especially in the use of language, inexplicable without the actor having a mind. A prominent traditional account relies on an argument by analogy. We may find correlations between our own physical behaviour and our own psychological or mental states. The knowledge of these correlations can be used as inductive evidence, so that if we observe similar physical behaviour exhibited by another person, we can infer ultimately by appeal to our own experience, that he has a certain kind of mental state. The conclusion thus inferred is not secure, for physical resemblance does not logically entail mental resemblance, the inductive base is very small and we can never check to see if our inference is sound. This argument is criticised for example by behaviourists who argue that if psychophysical relationships are contingent, then one can not even establish a correlation between bodily states and mental states. Wittgenstein's rejection of the possibility of a private language has challenged the basis of the analogy response, but for many it has also undermined the problem of other minds itself.

"Let's us begin with the problem of other minds. How can we know another person is in pain, or thrilled, or overcome with emotion, or thinking about philosophy?" — R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1984, p. 218.

Other-regarding, see self-regarding

Ought

[related to owe, suggesting that something that is not being done should be done] A general word used in moral

要求的能力取决于我们对如何能思维一个超越我们的思想范畴的他在的理解。他人产生了分离、对立和异化的问题。在更广泛的文化意义上,死亡、疯狂和无意识一直被称为他在,因为它们处于理性的自我意识的模式之外。他人的概念一直在人类学、后殖民地哲学和女性主义运动中被加以研究,企图破坏或削弱宗主国文化和男性的根深蒂固的概念优先性。

“绝对的他在是他人。他和我相加并不构成数目。在其中我说‘你们’或‘我们’的集体不是‘我’的复数。”——莱维纳斯:《整体与无限》,第39页。

他心

如果我们只具有关于自己的心的状态的直接知识,那么就有这样一个重大的哲学问题:我们是如何了解他心的?关于他心我们知道些什么?亦即,他人是否具有心以及他人的思维和感觉是什么?笛卡尔认为行为者若没有心,那我们就不能解释他何以具有自由的智能行为,特别是语言使用中的这种行为。对于他心知识的传统描述是借助于类比论证。我们可能发现我们自己的物理或身体状态与我们自己的心理的或心的状态之间的关联。关于这些关联的知识可以被用作归纳证据,所以如果我们观察到另一个人表现出某种物理状态,我们就可以最终借助于我们自己的经验、通过归纳来推断他具有某种心的状态。这样推断出的结论显然是不牢固的,因为物理的相似并不在逻辑上推断心的相似。归纳的根据十分微弱,而且我们永远不能检验我们的推断是否正确。这一论证为(例如)行为主义者所批评,他们认为,如果心物关系是偶然的,那么一个人就不能在身的状态与心的状态之间建立关联。维特根斯坦对私人语言可能性的拒斥对类推反应的基础提出了挑战,可对许多人来说,它也削弱了他心问题本身。

“让我们从他心问题开始。我们怎么能够知道另一个人是处于疼痛中、感到激动、被情绪压倒还是在进行哲学思维?”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1984年,第218页。

他人相关

见“自我相关”条。

应当

[与“拖欠”有关,说明某事未做而该做]在道德话语中作为义务和职责的主要表述的一个

discourse as the principal expression of obligation and duty. Many moral philosophers consider "I ought to" to be identical in meaning to "I am obligated". Many major issues surround the notion of ought. Is there a kind of "ought" which is specifically moral and, if so, how does it relate to other kinds of "ought"? What is the relation between ought and is, in particular can evaluative claims about what we ought to do be derived solely from factual claims? Does ought imply can or are there things which we ought to attempt to do even if we know that we shall fail? Is the moral "ought" independent of other motives to action, such as sympathy or self-interest, and is the moral worth of what we do spoiled if we act on these other motives rather than through a recognition of the authority of this "ought"? The analysis of ought-statement is one of the main topics in Prescriptivism.

"If the analysis of 'ought' which I have just sketched bears any close relation to the use of 'ought' in ordinary language, it shows how it is that moral judgements provide reasons for acting in one way rather than another."—R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, pp. 196-7.

Ought implies can

A formula in Kant's ethics, meaning that correctly judging that a given agent is morally obliged to perform a certain action logically presupposes that the agent can perform it. He can perform it not just if he wants, prefers, or wills to, but in some absolute sense. This capacity is a categorical freedom in contrast to the hypothetical freedom defended by Hume and others, for it is freedom both to do and to forbear doing a certain action under the same set of conditions.

"Perhaps all that the formula 'ought implies can' means is that it would be pointless to issue an imperative if it were impossible that the imperative should be obeyed."—Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 63.

Ousia

[Greek: substance, essence, entity, reality, from *ousa*, the singular feminine participle of *einai*, to be; the term is closely linked to *on*, the neutral participle of *einai*] Although Plato used *on* and *ousia* synonymously, Aristotle classified different kinds of being and used *ousia* for *on* (being) in its first sense, namely, ultimate reality. In the *Categories*, Aristotle defined *ousia* as the ultimate subject which underlies everything else. According to this test, a sensible individual is primary *ousia*, while species and genus are secondary *ousia*. In the *Metaphysics*, *ousia* is the focal meaning of being, but it is divided into form, matter and the composite of matter and form. If *ousia* were still determined by the subject criterion, matter would be the primary subject and hence primary *ousia*. But Aristotle held this to be impossible, and presented the separation (independent existence) of

广义词。许多道德哲学家认为“我应当”在意思上等同于“我有责任”。围绕着“应当”这个概念有许多重大问题。是否有一种“应当”特别具有道德性,若如此,它与其他种类的“应当”关系如何?“应当”和“是”的关系如何,特别是,关于我们应当做什么的评价性论断能够仅从事实性论断中得到吗?应当是否蕴涵能够,或者说是否有我们应当尽力去做的事,即便我们知道我们做不成?道德的“应当”独立于其他行动的动机,诸如同情或自私吗,如果我们遵从这些其他的动机而不是通过服从这个“应当”的权威性而行动,我们所做事情道德价值会受到污损吗?对应当陈述的分析是规定主义的主要话题之一。

“如果我刚才概述的对‘应当’的分析与在日常语言中对‘应当’的使用有任何密切关系,它表明道德判断何以对这样行动而不是那样行动提供了理由。”——黑尔,《道德语言》,1952年,第196—197页。

应该隐含能够

康德伦理学的一个公式,意思是对一个既定的人在道德上应该履行某一行为的正确判断,在逻辑上就预先假定了这个人能够履行它。他能履行它不仅仅是假如他想要、喜欢或愿意履行就能履行,而是在绝对意义上的能履行。这一能力是一种绝对自由,它与休谟及其他人为之辩护的假设的自由相反,因为它既是在同一条件下进行某一行为的自由,也是在同一条件下克制进行某一行为的自由。

“也许‘应该隐含能够’这一公式的全部含义就是:如果一个命令应被遵守是不可能的,那发布这个命令就是无意义的。”——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第63页。

本是

[希腊词,本体,本质,实体,实在,源自 *ousa*, 希腊动词 *einai* (是) 的阴性单数分词; 故它与 *einai* 的中性分词“是”或“存在”(希腊词 *on*) 紧密相连] 柏拉图将 *on* 和 *ousia* 作同义词使用。亚里士多德区分了不同种类的“是”,并把 *ousia* 用作“是”的第一含义,即终极实在。在《范畴》中,亚里士多德把 *ousia* 定义作是承载其他一切事物的终极主体。根据这种规定,可感的个别事物是第一 *ousia*, 而属和种乃是第二 *ousia*。在《形而上学》中, *ousia* 是“是”的中心含义。但它被划分成形式、质料和形式与质料的复合物。如果 *ousia* 仍是由主体标准确定的,则质料就会是第一主体,也因而成为第一 *ousia*。但亚里士多德认为这是不可能的,他引入本体与其地位的分离(独立存在),作为“这一个”(*to de ti*),成为

substance and its status as a *this (tode ti)* as more important criteria for deciding what is *ousia*. According to these new criteria, form is *ousia* in the primary sense, with composites being *ousia* in a derivative sense. Species and genus, which are secondary *ousia* in the *Categories*, are rejected as *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*. This has given rise to the problem of explaining the relation between form and the universal.

To search for primary *ousia* is tantamount to searching for primary being. Aristotle emphasised the central position of *ousia* in the network of categories. All other categories depend on *ousia* for their existence, and *ousia* is prior to them in time, knowledge and definition. Thus, Aristotle claimed in the *Metaphysics* Z that the study of being can be reduced to the study of *ousia* (ousiology). Ousiology has come to be used for describing Aristotle's mature view of ontology.

Ousia is generally translated as substance as a consequence of Boethius' influential medieval commentary on the *Categories* in which *ousia* and subject coincide. But this translation is unsatisfactory because substance has no etymological connection with *ousia*. Moreover, the translation does not really fit with the doctrine of *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*. Alternative English translations of *ousia* include essence, entity and reality.

"It follows, then, that 'ousia' has two senses, (a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (b) that which, being a 'this', is also separated—and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing."—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017b23-25.

Ousiology, see *ousia*

Outer sense, see inner sense

Overman, an English translation of *Übermensch*

Owl of Minerva

Minerva was the Roman goddess of wisdom, and her companion the owl was traditionally regarded as being wise. In his preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel used the owl of Minerva, which flies only at dusk, as a metaphor for the nature of philosophy. It implies that philosophy is essentially retrospective and can provide understanding of a stage of reality only after it has occurred. This claim challenges the view that we have a universal capacity to know independent of our context as subjects of knowledge.

"When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it can-

决定什么是 *ousia* 的更重要的标准。根据这些新标准,形式是第一意义的 *ousia*,而复合物则是派生意义上的。种和属在《范畴》中被看做是第二 *ousia*(本体),而在《形而上学》中不被承认是 *ousia*(本体)。这引起了如何解释形式与共相的关系这一问题。

寻求第一 *ousia* 即等于寻求第一“是”。亚里士多德强调 *ousia* 在范畴网络中的中心地位。一切其他范畴都依靠 *ousia* 而存在,而 *ousia* 在时间、知识和定义上都是在先的。所以,亚里士多德在《形而上学》第七卷认为,对“是”的研究可以归结为对 *ousia* 的研究(本是论)。本是论变成了一个专门描绘亚里士多德成熟的本体论观点的术语。

Ousia 一般译作“本体”(substance),历史上这是由于中世纪哲学家波埃修斯关于《范畴》的极有影响的注释,而在《范畴》中 *ousia* 与主体是重合的。但这种翻译并不令人满意,因为 substance 与 *ousia* 并无字根上的联系。此外,这一译法也并不符合《形而上学》中的 *ousia* 学说。其他关于 *ousia* 的英译包括 essence, entity 和 reality。(中文按 substance 译作“本体”,甚至“实体”。但根据该词与“是”的关系,最精确的译法当为“本是”。)

“*Ousia* 因而有两义:(a)最终的基质,它不再述说其他任何事物,(b)那作为‘这一个’,也是分离的事物——这一本性乃是每一事物的形状或形式。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1017b23-25。

本是论

见“本是”条。

外感

见“内感”条。

超人

对“超人”[一般英译为“superman”]的另一种英文翻译。

密纳发的猫头鹰

密纳发是罗马智慧女神,她的同伴猫头鹰传统上被视为具有聪明智慧。黑格尔在《法哲学》序言中把在黄昏起飞的密纳发的猫头鹰作为对哲学本性的比喻,意思是,哲学本质上是反思的,它只能理解某个已经发生而成为过去的实在阶段。这个主张向以下观点提出了挑战:我们作为认识主体具有不依赖于我们的前后关系的普遍的认识能力。

“当哲学把它的灰色描绘成灰色之时,这一生活形态就老化了。把哲学的灰色描绘成灰色,不能使生活形态返老还童,而只能对之加以理

not be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only within the falling of the dusk."—Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, preface.

Ownership

In political and legal philosophy, a relationship of absolute or limited control between persons and property. We can ask about the origin of ownership and about its legitimacy. We can argue that ownership should be governed by rules of licit acquisition and transmission or by rules of fair distribution. As part of a general exploration of rights, we can examine whether ownership rights are absolute or relative to other social concerns. We can explore the claim that some things should not be owned or the claim that persons, if they may be owned at all, should be the subject of self-ownership. We can examine whether other social relations, including relations between parents and children or between persons and social or political institutions, can be understood in terms of ownership. We can ask whether we own our actions and the actions of those whom we authorise to represent us in institutions.

Ownership has been extended to examine our relations, as persons or bodies, to our mental states and to explore the claim that our bodies are our own. An investigation of ownership in this domain leads to questions about the nature of persons and about the mind-body relationship. Different accounts of causal relations between mental events and bodily events carry different justifications for our ownership of our mental states. Although in the following views ownership of our mental states is ascribed to ourselves as bodies, the mind-body relations that are discussed can also offer a necessary basis for ascribing ownership to ourselves as persons.

According to interactionism, a body owns mental states if there is a particular sort of interaction between them. For epiphenomenalism, a body owns mental states if events in the body are the main or only cause of events in the mind. For double-aspect theory, mental states are owned by a body because a mind and a body are different aspects of the same basic entity and are not causally distinct from one another. For parallelism, there is a parallel relationship between mental and bodily states, with ownership related to this association rather than to causal priority. According to the identity theory of mind, mental states are owned by the body which has brain states that are identical to those mental states.

All of these theories, which link mental states to bodies, conflict with a no ownership theory, which denies that mental phenomena must belong to a certain person or to a certain body. Hume's bundle theory implies that mental items are not necessarily owned by the mind to which they belong because the mind is an accidental collection or bundle of such items, but other philosophers reject the possibility of mental states which do not belong to a subject or person.

解。密纳发的猫头鹰只有在黄昏来临之际,才会展翅飞翔。”——黑格尔:《法哲学》,序言。

所有权

所有权在政治哲学和法哲学中是指人和财产之间的绝对的或有限的控制关系。我们可以询问所有权的起源及其合法性。我们可以争论所有权应由合法获得和遗传的规则所决定,还是由公平分配规则所决定。作为对权利的一般性探究,我们可以考察所有权对其他社会事物是绝对的还是相对的。我们可以探究那种认为某些东西不应成为所有物的说法,或那种认为如果人们也可以被所有,他们就应是自我所有的主体的说法。我们可以考察其他社会关系,包括父母和孩子的关系,或人们和社会或政治机构的关系,是否可以从所有权方面来理解。我们可以询问我们是否拥有我们的行为,是否拥有那些我们授权在公共机构中代表我们的人的行为。

所有权已被扩展到考察我们作为人或身体与我们心的状态的关系,探究那种认为我们的身体是我们自己的说法。在这一领域对所有权问题的研究导致了有关人的本质和身心关系的问题。对心身活动因果关系的不同说明包含着对我们心的状态所有权的不同辩护。虽然在下面的观点中,对我们心的状态的所有权被归为作为肉体的我们自身,但所讨论的这些身心关系仍可为把所有权归于作为人的我们自身提供一个必要的基础。

按照交互作用论,如果在身和心的状态之间存在一种特殊的相互作用,那么身就拥有心的状态。对附随现象论而言,如果身的活动是心的活动的主要或惟一的原因,身就拥有心的状态。根据两面理论,心的状态是为身拥有的,因为心和身是同一基本实体的不同方面,它们在因果上是区分不开的。平行论认为,在心的状态和身的状态之间存在一种平行的关系,所有权与这种联系相关,而不是与原因的首要性相关。根据心的同一论,心的状态为身所拥有,身的大脑的状态与那些心的状态是同一的。

所有这些将心的状态与身相连的理论都同非所有权理论相冲突,后者否认心的现象必须属于某一个人或某一身体。休谟的捆束理论意味着心的成分不必为它们从属的心所拥有,因为心是这些成分的偶然集合或捆束,但其他哲学家拒绝心的状态不属于一个主体或人这种可能性。

是什么使我的身体成为我的,以及我如何知道我的身体是我的,这些问题要求对我们的身体在我们作为主体和相关者中的位置有一个了解。

The questions of what makes my body mine and how I know that my body is mine require an understanding of the place of our bodies in our being subjects and agents.

"Let us name the relation which everybody speaks of in this way by calling a certain body his own, the relation of ownership."—John Wisdom, *Problems of Mind and Matter*, 1934, p. 37.

Oxford philosophy

Philosophy has been studied and taught at Oxford since the thirteenth century, and from as early as the fourteenth century, Oxford has contributed eminent philosophers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Hobbes, Locke and Bentham were students of Oxford. From the nineteenth century to the first part of this century, Oxford has contributed J. H. Newman, B. Butler, Cook Wilson, H. A. Prichard, and R. G. Collingwood, among others. However, "Oxford philosophy" as a technical term refers to a distinct approach to analytical philosophy that flourished at Oxford after the Second World War. It places emphasis on clarifying perennial philosophical problems in terms of the analysis of ordinary language, and is in contrast to Logical Positivism and the Russellian strand of philosophy in Cambridge. This approach started with H. H. Price and Gilbert Ryle, although it is related to the work of G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein's later work in Cambridge. It was further articulated in distinctive ways by J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It made Oxford the dominant centre of analytical philosophy from the 1940s to the 1960s, and is also called "Ordinary Language Philosophy". Other contemporary Oxford philosophers include H. L. A. Hart, A. J. Ayer, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, G. E. L. Owen, Michael Dummett, Bernard Williams, David Pears, R. M. Hare, Charles Taylor and Ronald Dworkin. But these philosophers have different approaches, and some would vigorously reject being classes as Oxford philosophers in the above sense. Oxford is still a major centre of philosophy today and is the birth place of this dictionary.

"During the last quarter of a century Oxford has occupied, or reoccupied, a position it last held, perhaps, six hundreds years ago: that of a great centre of philosophy in the Western world."—Strawson, "Meaning and Truth", in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, 1971, p. 170.

"让我们把每一个人以这种方式谈及的,即称某一肉体是他自己这种关系,称为所有权关系。"——威斯顿:《心与物的问题》,1934年,第37页。

牛津哲学

从13世纪开始牛津一直在研究和教授哲学,而且早在14世纪,牛津就产生了杰出的哲学家,例如D. 司各脱和奥康的威廉。霍布斯、洛克和边沁都是牛津的学生。从19世纪到本世纪初,牛津产生了J. H. 纽曼、B. 巴特勒、C. 威尔逊、H. A. 普里查德和R. G. 柯林伍德等人。然而,"牛津哲学"作为一个专门术语,是指第二次世界大战以后在牛津逐渐形成的一种分析哲学的独特方法。它强调通过分析日常语言澄清历史遗留下来的哲学问题,这与罗素风格的剑桥哲学和逻辑实证主义相对。这种方法开始于H. H. 普赖斯和G. 赖尔,这虽然与G. E. 摩尔的工作和后期维特根斯坦在剑桥的工作有关,但最后是由J. L. 奥斯汀和P. F. 斯特劳森以不同的方式充分阐明的。它使牛津从40年代到60年代成为分析哲学的主要核心,这也被称作"日常语言哲学"。其他的当代牛津哲学家包括H. L. A. 哈特、A. J. 艾耶尔、E. 安斯康、P. 福特、G. E. L. 欧文、M. 达米特、B. 威廉姆斯、D. 皮尔斯、R. M. 黑尔、C. 泰勒、R. 德沃金等人。但这些哲学家有着不同的方法,其中某些人就坚决反对被称作上述意义上的"牛津哲学家"。牛津至今仍然是哲学的一个主要中心,也是本词典的诞生地。

"在本世纪过去的15年期间,牛津一直占据着或先前就占据着它在(也许)600年前就占据着的地位:这就是西方世界伟大的哲学中心。"——斯特劳森:《意义与真理》,载《逻辑-语言学论集》,1971年,第170页。

P

Pacifism

[from Latin: *pacificare*, to make be at peace] A position that objects to war as a means to achieve national aims or to solve disputes. More broadly, it objects to any sort of killing and violence. It claims that even the use of force to meet force is wrong and that nobody may use force without specific overriding justification. Pacifism advocates co-operation and negotiation and actively encourages activities promoting peace. Absolute pacifism holds that war and violence are intrinsically wrong and cannot possibly be justified. Critics argue that pacifists fail to distinguish between aggression and legitimate national defence in a just war and fail to distinguish between intentional harming or killing and legitimate individual self-defence. Many forms of pacifism are conditional, in that they claim that war and violence are *prima facie* wrong, but allow that wrong to be overridden. In this respect, they approach their rival theory of a just war.

"A. J. P. Taylor coined the word pacifism as a general descriptive term designed to cover all the different attempts made (for any reason) to abolish war, and we can contrast this idea with that of pacifism proper, which involves being against a war on more than merely pragmatic grounds. Pacifism proper involves a moral judgement and a personal commitment." — Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 1986, p. 3.

Paideia

[Greek: education, from *pais*, child] In ancient Greece, *paideia* included *mousike* (mainly literature and song) and gymnastics. Moral education trained a youth by habituation until he acquired the right habits, that is the right patterns of action. Education was not confined to children and youth, for adults were held to need it as well to become as virtuous as possible.

"What will this *paideia* be? ... It is in part physical training for the body and training in the arts for the soul." — Plato, *Republic*, 376e.

Pain

Either physical or mental suffering which is generally regarded to be a negative feeling. The main tenet of hedonism is that it is human nature to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain. However, philosophers have been puzzled by the nature of this feeling. Wittgenstein sought to show that pain is

和平主义

[源自拉丁文: *pacificare*, 使处于和平状态] 一种反对把战争作为达到国家的目的或解决争端的手段的主张, 更广义地讲, 它反对任何形式的杀害和暴力。它甚至认为用武力反对武力是错误的, 没有特别的、压倒一切的正当理由任何人都不能使用武力。和平主义提倡合作和协商, 并积极鼓励促进和平的活动。绝对的和平主义认为战争和暴力从本质上就是错误的, 是不可能为之辩护的。批评家们争论说, 和平主义者没有区分侵略与正义战争中正当的国家的防卫, 也没有区分有意的伤害或杀害与合法的个人自卫。很多形式的和平主义是有条件的, 因为它们认为战争和暴力不言而喻是错误的, 但又允许制服这种错误。就这方面而言, 它们与其对立面正义战争的理论又是相近的。

"A. J. P. 泰勒创造了和平主义这个一般描述性的概念, 用来涵盖所有不同的取消战争的企图(不论是出于什么理由), 我们可以将这一概念与严格意义上的和平主义做比较, 后者包含的反对战争不仅是基于实用主义的理由。严格意义的和平主义包含道德判断和个人的信奉。" —— 泰西曼:《和平主义和正义战争》, 1986年, 第3页。

教育

[希腊词, 意为“教育”, 源自 *pais* (孩子)] 在古希腊, 教育包括文艺修养(主要是文学和歌曲)和体育锻炼。道德教育通过习俗来培养一个青年, 直到他获得适当的习性, 也就是正确的行为方式。教育也不仅仅局限于青少年, 因成年人也需要它, 以尽可能地变为有德性的。

"这种教育是什么?……它部分是关于身体的体育锻炼, 部分是关于灵魂的文艺方面的训练。" —— 柏拉图:《国家篇》, 376e。

疼痛

物理的或心的痛苦, 通常被认为是一种负面的感觉。享乐主义的主要原则是: 人的本性就是追求快感逃避痛苦。但哲学家一直对这种感觉的性质感到困扰。维特根斯坦试图表明疼痛不是用只有自己能懂的私人语言来表达的私人

not a private sensation expressed by a private language which can only be understood by oneself. In order to be used in a public language, expressions for pain must have meanings for which there are public criteria given in the outward expression of pain. Other philosophers reject the criterial account in favour of reducing pain to pain behaviour. This behaviourist move is rejected by the identity theory which identifies pain with neurological processes. On the basis of his account of meaning and identity, Kripke argues that because we can describe a world in which pain states and accompanying physical state are not identical, they are not identical in the actual world. Some philosophers ask why we would wish to avoid pain on accounts which do not give central consideration to its raw qualitative feel. Scholars also debate over whether there is a common and intrinsic quality shared by all token feelings of pain.

"The truth is; it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain, but not to say it about myself." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 246.

Panentheism

[from Greek: *pan*, all + *en*, in + *theos*, god] The view that all things are imbued with God's being through being parts of God or Absolute Being. Because on this view God extends beyond all that there is in the world, panentheism rejects the pantheist claim that God is identical with the totality of things. Rather, God is consciousness and the highest possible unity. This position was developed by the German philosopher Karl Christian Krause by combining Spinoza's notion of substance and Fichte's notion of self-consciousness. Whitehead also used this term in his process theology.

"Panentheism is the view that all is God, while panentheism occupies a position midway between theism and pantheism. For panentheists, while it is not strictly true that everything is God, everything is lodged or embedded within God, making the two interdependent." —C. Taliaferro, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds), *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 447.

Panosomatism, another term for reism

Panpsychism

[from Greek: *pan*, all — *psyche*, soul] The view that everything in the universe, including things which we ordinarily regard as not living, possesses a mental aspect or level of consciousness, although this does not imply that each thing has a mind or soul like our own. The universe as a whole is considered to be alive, with the character of an animated organism. God is described as being completely immanent in all things as a psychic force or spirit. Panpsychism is

感觉。疼痛表述要在公共语言中使用,对于其意义就一定要有一个由疼痛的外部表达所给定的公共标准。其他哲学家拒斥标准论,而主张将疼痛还原为疼痛行为。这种行为主义的解释也被同一论所拒斥,后者将疼痛同一于神经过程。克里普克根据其对意义及同一性的解释,认为我们可以描述一个世界,其中疼痛状态与所附随的物理状态不同一,所以它们在现实世界中也不同一。由于不给疼痛的原初性质感觉以中心地位,有的哲学家就问为什么我们会希望逃避疼痛。学者们还就是否有一个为所有的痛觉例证所共有的普通的、内在的性质展开争论。

"真实的情况是:说别人怀疑我是否处于疼痛中是有意义的,而这样来说我自己就是没有意义的。"——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第246节。

万物在神论

[源自希腊语, *pan* (一切) 和 *en* (在……之中) 及 *theos* (神)] 指这种观点:万物因其是上帝或绝对存在者的一部分而受上帝存在的影响。因为按这种观点,上帝延伸的范围在世上存在的一切东西之外,所以,万物在神论否认泛神论者主张的上帝与事物总体的同一。他们宁愿认为上帝是意识,是最高的可能统一体。这种见解被德国哲学家 K. C. 克劳斯所发展,他把斯宾诺莎的实体观念和费希特的自我意识观念结合了起来。怀特海在他的过程神学中,也使用了这个术语。

"万物在神论是这样的观点:一切都是神。它占据的是一神论和泛神论之间的中间位置。在万物在神论者看来,即使万物是神的说法不严格真切,但为了使两者相互依赖,万物也寄宿或置留于神之中。"——塔里亚斐洛,见布宁和崔-詹姆斯编的《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》,1996年,第447页。

泛体论

"实有论"的另一个名称。

泛心论

[源自希腊语, *pan* (一切) 和 *psyche* (灵魂)] 指这种观点:宇宙中的每一事物,包括我们通常认为没有生命的事物,都具有心的方面或意识水平,尽管这并不意味着每物都有像我们自己一样的心或灵魂。作为整体的宇宙被认作是活生生的,具有生物有机体的特征。上帝被描述为作为一种灵魂力量或精神完全内在于万物之中。泛心论也被称作"活力论"、"物活论"

also called animism, hylozoism [from Greek: *hule*, matter + *zoe*, life] or mentalism.

In spite of the difficulty of accepting panpsychism's explanation of mental aspects, the theory has been endorsed by some thinkers who find greater difficulty in alternative explanations of how mental phenomena can be caused by non-mental things. Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Schelling and Whitehead offer different forms of panpsychism.

"By panpsychism I mean the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms." —Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, 1979, p. 181.

Pantheism

[from Greek: *pan*, all + *theos*, god] A term originated by John Toland for the belief that God is identical with the universe, that is with the totality of all there is, rather than being a supernatural power above or alongside the universe. Because God is the universe taken as a whole, no divine act of creation is required and the distinction between God and his creatures, sharply drawn in Christianity, is denied. All is God, and God is all. Everything in the universe is a mode or element of God. The claim that the divine is all-inclusive distinguishes pantheism from panentheism, which holds that God includes all things but is greater than their totality. The most important pantheist was Spinoza who offered sophisticated arguments to support the claim that there is only one substance which can be understood as God or nature. Hegel was also a pantheist in virtue of his identification of God with the whole of Being.

"Pantheism applies the term 'God' in such a way that nothing positive can be distinct from him. God is considered wholly immanent within the universe, and the universe—in so far as its has being—is identical with God." —Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 303.

Paradigm

[from Greek: *paradeigma*, model, pattern] Plato describes Forms as paradigms to which particular objects have a likeness or resemblance, and to which we must look in order to acquire knowledge. In the *Republic* it is said that the ideal state might be a paradigm laid up in the heaven; in another dialogue, the *Timaeus*, Forms are paradigms by reference to which the divine craftsman constructs the sensible world.

In this century, the American philosopher Thomas Kuhn in his classic *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), employs the word "paradigm" to refer to a framework of concepts, assumptions and approaches within which members of a scientific community conduct their research. When a paradigm has to be changed or shifted, there comes a scientific revolution.

"Close historical investigation of a given speciality at a

[hylozoism, 源自希腊语 *hule* (质料、物质) 和 *zoe* (生命)] 或 "心灵论".

虽然难以接受泛心论对心的方面的解释, 但还是有些思想家承认了这种理论, 因为他们发现另一种选择解释起来难度更大, 即心的现象如何能被非心的事物引起。莱布尼茨、叔本华、谢林和怀特海都提出过不同形式的泛心论。

"所谓泛心论, 我意指这种观点: 宇宙的基本物理要素具有心的特性, 无论它们是否是生命有机体的部分。" ——内格尔: 《人的主要问题》, 1979年, 第181页。

泛神论

[源自希腊语 *pan* (一切) 和 *theos* (神)] J. 托兰德发明的一个术语, 用以指称这种信念: 神与宇宙同一, 即与存在的一切之总和同一, 而不是在宇宙之上和之侧的超自然力量。由于神是当做整体的宇宙, 因而无需任何神圣的创造行为, 基督教中严格坚持的神与他的创造物之间的区别也被否定了。一切是神, 神也是一切。宇宙中的每物都是神的样式或成分。神是所包括的一切这个主张把泛神论和万物在神论区别开来, 后者认为神包括万物但比它们的总和更大。最重要的泛神论者是斯宾诺莎, 他提出了一些复杂的论证来支持这样的主张: 只存在着一个实体, 它能被理解为神或自然。由于把神和整个存在视为同一, 黑格尔也是一位泛神论者。

"泛神论在这种意义上应用 '神' 这个词: 没有任何确实的东西能与他不同。神被认为完全地内在于宇宙之中, 而宇宙——仅就它具有存在而言——是与神同一的。" ——费勒: 《现代宗教哲学基础》, 1968年, 第303页。

范式

[源自希腊词 *paradeigma*, 意指 "模范" 或 "模型"] 柏拉图把形式描写为范式——即具有相似性的特殊对象的范式, 认为人们审视范式是为了获取知识。柏拉图在《国家篇》里谈到, 理想国或许是建立在天国的范式; 在另一篇题为《蒂迈欧篇》的对话里, 形式即范式, 具有神性的工匠凭借范式建构了感觉世界。

在本世纪, 美国哲学家 T. 库恩在其经典著作《科学革命的结构》(1962年) 中, 使用 "范式" 一词来表示一种由诸多概念、假设与方法构成的框架, 在此框架中科学共同体的成员从事着他们的研究。当某一范式需要变化或转型时, 就会发生一场科学革命。

"在特定时间对特定专业进行仔细的历史研究, 就会发现一套重现的、半标准的展示方

given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community's paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises." —Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, p. 43.

Paradigm case argument

A challenge to scepticism regarding the existence of such things as the external world, free will, valid inductive arguments, certainty or time. The paradigm case argument claims that if we have learned to use a referring expression for which typical or paradigmatic referents have become the meaning of that expression, then such an expression refers in standard cases to genuine existents. Our ability to employ a certain type of expression in ordinary speech is the proof that it has application. Accordingly, if a words such as "table" and "chair" are in common use, there must be physical objects. Similarly, the fact that words such as "choose" and "decide" are in common use shows the existence of free will. This argument, influenced by Wittgenstein's theory of language games, had wide appeal in the 1950s and 1960s. The argument was criticised because different ways of teaching an expression might involve different, and perhaps conflicting, paradigms. Many philosophers are dissatisfied with conformity to linguistic norms as the mark of truth. Accordingly, the argument is currently little used.

"The paradigm case argument held that some situations were the very type of situation wherein was taught the application of a term, 'free will' for example, the term must refer to that type of situation." —R. Nozick *Philosophical Explanations*, 1984, p. 168.

Paradigm shift

In contrast to the traditional view that science is cumulative in the gradual increase of its empirical content within a stable framework, Kuhn explained scientific change in terms of revolutionary shifts in scientific paradigms as well as in terms of work carried out within a paradigm in periods of normal science. A paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, has two dimensions. First, it is a set of beliefs, values, techniques, practices and examples of explanatory success shared by a scientific community within a social and institutional context. Secondly, a paradigm is the model or explanatory framework which normal sciences apply to solve problems. However, the scope of any given paradigm is limited. Once there is an accumulation of outstanding problems which cannot be solved within a paradigm, a scientific community go into crisis. In response to the crisis, a new paradigm will emerge. The new paradigm is better than its predecessor because it can formulate new problems and set procedures for solving the existing accumulation of outstanding problems. Scientific revolutions

式,即一套表明其概念、观察与工具运用方面的各种理论的方式。这些便是该共同体的范式,大多体现于教材、讲座与实验工作之中。”——库恩:《科学革命的结构》,1962年,第43页。

范例论证

对于关于外部世界、自由意志、有效归纳论证、确定性或时间的怀疑论的一种挑战。范例论证断定,如果我们已经学会用一指称表达式,而这一表达式已经具有典型的或范例性的指称作为其意义,则这一表达式在标准的情形中就会指称真正的存在物。我们在日常语言中使用某一特定表达式的能力就证明了它是可以使用的。因此,如果一个像“桌子”和“椅子”这样的词汇是大家共同使用的,则一定有物理对象存在。同样地,如果“选择”和“决定”这样的词汇是大家共同使用的,那就一定存在有自由意志。受维特根斯坦语言游戏理论的影响,这一论证在50年代及60年代具有十分广泛的影响。这一论证也受到批评,因为教授一种表达式的不同方式可能牵涉到不同乃至相冲突的范例。许多哲学家也对把遵从语言规范作为真理的标志表示不满。因此,这一论证现在很少使用。

“范例论证认为某些情境是教会一个术语的使用的情境类型,例如‘自由意志’这一术语一定是指那样一类情境。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1984年,第168页。

范式转换

传统观点认为,在一个稳定的框架内,科学的经验内容的逐渐增加是累积的,与此相对立,库恩以科学范式的革命性转换,以在规范科学时期内范式所进行的工作,来说明科学的变化。库恩意义上的范式有两个层面。在第一层面上,它是一组为一个科学共同体在一个社会和体制情境中所共有的成功说明的信念、价值、技术、实践和范例。在第二层面上,范式是常规科学用以解决问题的模型或说明框架。然而,任何给定范式的范围都是有限的。当在一个范式中不能解决的突出问题累积起来,这个科学共同体就面临着危机。作为对危机的反应,一个新的范式将会出现。这个新范式要优于旧范式,因为它能形成新的问题,并能设定程序以解决现存累积的未解决问题。当科学家舍弃旧范式并代之以新范式时,科学革命就发生了。因为一个新范式涉及到概念、理论结构及科学实践的根本性转换,新旧范式之间是不可通约的。因此科学革命

happen when scientists reject an old paradigm and replace it with a new one. Because an new paradigm involves fundamental shifts in concepts, theoretical structures and scientific practices, the old and new paradigms are incommensurable. Hence scientific revolution is equivalent to paradigm shift. The replacement of a paradigm by another is also informed by political and social development.

"What seems to have been involved was the exploitation by genius of perceptual possibilities made available by a medieval paradigm shift." —Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, p. 118.

Paradox

[from Greek; *para*, beyond or *doxa*, belief] Literally, something which is against the generally accepted view or something which looks implausible but implies a philosophical challenge. In logic, a paradox is a contradictory position arising from sound premises or sound proof. In this sense, it is a synonym for an antinomy. Medieval logicians called paradoxes *insolubilia*. In ancient Greece, Zeno of Elea and the Megarians invented a number of interesting paradoxes, but paradoxes became the focus of serious philosophical concern after the discovery of Russell's paradox, which posed fundamental issues of philosophical method and principles. Russell's paradox gave rise to a crisis in Frege's logicist programme, and the intellectual advance of the programme depended upon overcoming this paradox.

Generally, following Peano and Ramsey, paradoxes are divided into two main types: semantic paradoxes and logical paradoxes (or set-theoretical paradoxes). Semantic paradoxes, such as the liar paradox, Berry's paradox, Richard's paradox and Grelling's paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of semantic concepts, such as truth, falsity and definability. Logical paradoxes, such as Russell's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, and Cantor's paradox, arise because of some peculiarity of set-theoretical concepts and due to faulty logic and mathematics. Such a distinction is not without controversy. Russell, for instance, claimed that all paradoxes arise because of violations of the vicious circle principle. The general solution of semantic paradoxes involves replacing ordinary language with artificially constructed language. The general procedure for solving logical paradoxes involves restricting set-existence principles. But both of these types of solutions have been contested. Various paradoxes are recorded in this dictionary under their particular names.

"A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises." —Sainsbury, *Paradoxes*, 1995, 2nd ed., p. 1.

Paradox of confirmation, another expression for Hempel's paradox

等同于范式转换。一个范式为另一个范式所取代,也是在政治和社会发展中所得来的。

“看起来是天才对知觉可能性的探索,其实是建立在一个中世纪的范式转换的基础上的。”——库恩:《科学革命的结构》,1962年,第118页。

悖论

[源自希腊语 *para* (超越,在……之上)和 *doxa* (信念)]从字面上说,它意指某种与通常接受的观点相反的东西,某种看起来不合理但意味着哲学挑战的东西。在逻辑中,悖论是从可靠的前提或可靠的证明中产生的矛盾立场。在这种意义上,它是二律背反(antinomy)的同义语。中世纪逻辑学家把悖论叫做不可解问题(*insolubilia*)。在古希腊,埃利亚的芝诺和麦加拉学派发明了大量有意思的悖论,但只是在发现了罗素悖论之后,悖论才开始在哲学上受到严肃关注,并引出了许多有关哲学方法和原则的根本问题。罗素悖论引发了弗雷格逻辑主义纲领中的危机,这一纲领的思想发展取决于克服这个悖论。

一般遵循皮亚诺和拉姆塞的做法,把悖论分成两种主要类型:语义悖论和逻辑悖论(或集合论悖论)。语义悖论,像说谎者悖论,贝里悖论,理查德悖论和格里林悖论,产生于真、假、可定义性等语义概念的某些特性。逻辑悖论,像罗素悖论,布拉里-福蒂悖论和康托尔悖论,产生于集合论概念的某些特性以及有缺陷的逻辑和数学。这样一种划分不是没有争议的。举例来说,罗素认为,所有悖论都产生于违背了恶性循环原则。对语义悖论的一般解决方案涉及到用人工构造的语言替代日常语言。对逻辑悖论的一般解决方案涉及到给集合存在的原则施加限制。但这两种解决方案都是有争议的。本辞典按它们各自的名称收录了各种悖论。

“悖论可以定义为从明显可接受的前提凭借明显可接受的推理而导出的不可接受的结论。”——塞斯伯里:《悖论》,1995年,第2版,第1页。

确证悖论

“亨佩尔悖论”的另一种表述。

Paradox of God's omniscience, see omniscience

Paradox of self-deception, see self-deception

Paradox of size, see Cantor's paradox

Paradox of the heap, see sorites paradox

Parallel distributed processing, see connectionism

Parallelism

Also called psycho-physical parallelism, a theory which is particularly associated with Spinoza. It claims that the mental realm and the physical realm, or thought and extension, do not affect each other in any way. Instead, they are independent of each other, although there is a precise correspondence between them. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, 7). If two items in the physical realm are similar, their counterparts in the mental realm are similar; and vice versa. If two items in thought are related as cause and effect, their corresponding items in extension are also related as cause and effect. However, mental events never cause bodily events, and bodily events never cause mental events. There are physical causal laws and there are psychological laws, but there cannot be any psycho-physical causal laws. Parallelism is a classical response to the Cartesian mind-body problem. Sometimes Spinoza claimed that such a parallelism is a relation of identity on the grounds that each mental mode is a physical mode. This view, together with his claim that thought and extension are different attributes of one and the same substance, has led many scholars to argue that Spinoza's philosophy of mind should be termed a dual-aspect theory.

"Parallelism, in the mild sense, is the proposition that for every mental event there is a bodily event which always accompanies it."—John Wisdom, *Problem of Mind and Matter*, 1934, p. 103.

Paralogism

[from Greek: *para*, beyond + *logizesthai*, to reason] Generally, a formally invalid inference. Aristotle in *Poetics* defined a paralogism as the fallacy of inferring from the truth of the consequence to the truth of the premise. For Kant, a paralogism is the inevitable erroneous outcome of reason in rational psychology when it extends beyond the limits of ex-

上帝全知悖论

见“全知”条。

自欺悖论

见“自欺”条。

规模悖论

见“康托尔悖论”条。

堆的悖论

见“积累悖论”条。

并行分布加工

见“联结主义”条。

平行论

也称“心—物平行论”，这个理论特别与斯宾诺莎有关。它主张，心理界和物理界，或思想和广延，在任何情况下都互不影响。它们是互相独立的。不过，在它们之间有精确的相应。“观念的秩序和联系与事物的秩序和联系是一样的”（斯宾诺莎：《伦理学》，第二部分，第7章）。如果物理界中的两个事项是相似的，它们在心理界中的对应者也是相似的，反之亦然。如果思想中的两个事项因果联系着，它们在广延中的对应事项也因果联系着。无论如何，心的事件决不会引起任何物理事件，反之，身体事件也不会引起心的事件。存在着物理的因果律和心理的因果律，但不可能有任何心理—物理的因果律。平行论是对笛卡尔的心—身问题的一个经典回答。有时，斯宾诺莎声称这样的平行论主张的是一种同一性关系，其根据就在于：每个心的样式就是一个物理的样式。这个观点以及他关于思想和广延是同一个实体的不同属性的看法一起，使许多学者认为应当把斯宾诺莎的心的哲学称作“两面理论”。

“在适度的意义上，平行论是这样的命题：对于每一个心的事件都有一个永远与之相伴随的身体事件。”——威斯顿：《心与物的问题》，1934年，第103页。

谬误推理

[源自希腊文 *para*（超越）和 *logizesthai*（推理）]一般指在形式上无效的推理。亚里士多德在他的《诗学》中把它规定为从结论为真推出前提为真的谬论。对于康德来说，谬误推理是理性在理性心理学中超越经验界限的不可避免的结果。理性从“我思”的先验根据引致四种谬误

perience. Reason leads from the transcendental ground of the "I think" to four kinds of paralogism: (1) the soul is a substance; (2) the soul is simple; (3) the soul is identical over time; (4) the soul is self-conscious only. Kant also called these claims transcendental paralogisms. He held that all of these inferences are invalid because they infer from the formal conditions of thought to a substance of thought. Kant's target in exposing the paralogism is the rational psychology of Descartes and his rationalist successors and the misinterpretation of the *Cogito* which infers from thinking to existence.

"In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself. . . . This dialectical inference I shall entitle the transcendental paralogism." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B398.

Paraphrasis, another term for contextual definition

Pareto improvement, see Pareto optimality

Pareto optimality

A principle, also called Pareto efficiency, named after the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, referring to a state whereby no one can be better off without making someone else worse off. A change makes at least one person better off and no one worse off is called a Pareto improvement. In this case, at least one individual prefers X to Y, and no one else regards Y as better than X. To change from Y to X certainly improves the welfare of the whole society. Pareto optimality and Pareto improvement are widely accepted as criteria for justifying or criticising changes in economic policy. They are also used to evaluate the utilitarian summing of welfare across individuals without the need to compare interpersonal utility. Since each policy change in a social context generates a loser, a Pareto improvement is hard to achieve.

"The familiar economist's concept of Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality) is a very different matter. A distribution of resources is Pareto efficient if no change in that distribution can be made that leaves no one worse off and at least one person better off." —Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 239.

Parsimony, the principle of , another term for Ockham's razor

Partial concept

For Kant, each concept typically contains other concepts, namely, various predicates which can jointly apply to

推理：(1) 灵魂是实体；(2) 灵魂是单纯的；(3) 灵魂在时间流程中同一；(4) 灵魂只是自我意识。康德也把它们称为先验谬误推理。他认为，所有这些推理都是无效的，因为它们从思想的形式条件推论出思想的实体。康德在阐述谬误推理时所对准的靶子是笛卡尔的理性心理学和他的理性主义后继者以及对“我思”的曲解，即从思维推论出存在。

“在第一种三段论中，我从绝不包含杂多的主体的先验概念来推断这个主体自身的绝对统一，……这种辩证推理我命之为先验的谬误推理。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，B398。

释义

“语境定义”的另一表述。

帕累托改良

见“帕累托最佳度”条。

帕累托最佳度

以意大利经济学家和社会学家 V. 帕累托命名的一个原则，也称帕累托效率，指这样一种状态：在那样一种状态中，如果不使另一个人更坏，则一个人不能变得更好。一种至少使某人境况更佳，但不使任何一个人更坏的变化，被称作帕累托改良。在这种情形中，至少有一个人偏爱 X 而不是 Y，但没有人把 Y 看做比 X 更好。而从 Y 变到 X 确实改善了整个社会的福利。帕累托最佳度和帕累托改良被广泛地接受为是辩护或批评经济政策变化的标准。它们也被用来评价福利的功利性增长而不需要比较人际间的功利。由于在社会背景中每一次政策改变将产生一类失败者，因而帕累托改良是很难实现的。

“经济学家所熟悉的概念帕累托效率(或帕累托最佳度)这一概念是一种相当不同的事情。如果不使任何人更糟而至少使一个人处境更好，则不能对分配作任何改变，即这种分配或方法合乎帕累托效率。”——德沃金：《原则问题》，1986年，第239页。

最经济原则

“奥康剃刀”的另一个名称。

部分的概念

在康德看来，每个概念一般都包含其他概念，即各种谓项，它们能共同地应用于这个概念

the object or instance of this concept. A predicate contained in this concept is a partial concept, for it can identify its object only in virtue of being conjoined with other predicates contained in the same concept. All partial concepts are related, either co-ordinately, such as being a man and being rational, or subordinately, such as being a man and being an animal. The process of clarifying all partial concepts and their relationships is conceptual analysis, and the result of this process is an analytic judgement.

"For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with parts and proceed from these to the whole."—Kant, *Logic*, Introduction, VIII.

Participation

[Greek: *methexis*, from the verb *metechein*, to participate, to share in and to partake] In Plato's theory of Forms, particular things possess some characteristic because they participate in the relevant Forms; e. g., beautiful things are beautiful because they participate the form "beauty". So particular things are only the less complete realisation of the form. However, the form is one, and particular things are many, how can one single form be in many things at the same time? In what way do things participate a Form? This is the problem of how universals can be in particulars. Plato formulates it in his self-criticism in the *Parmenides*, and the problem remains today. In his later dialogues Plato talks more about the participation of one Form in other Forms, rather than the participation of particular things in the Forms. Neo-platonism also uses this concept in the sense that the lower orders of beings participate in the higher.

"It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it participates in that absolute beauty, and for no other reason."—Plato, *Phaedo*, 100c.

Particular

[from Latin: *pars*, *partis*, part] For Aristotle, particulars cannot be predicated of things, in contrast to a universal, which can be predicated of many things. "Particular" is used an adjective for things that are partial, limited or some, rather than whole, unlimited or all. As a noun, "particular" has various applications, with some of them leading to philosophical dispute. As a single entity of a class or kind, a particular has a unique path through space and time and unlike universals cannot be instantiated by other entities, however similar they are to the initial particular. A particular is a unity, in contrast to an aggregation of things. If we maintain the notion of substance, a particular is a substance which bears attributes, qualities or properties, whilst attributes are universals. Particulars include historical events, material objects, people and their shadows, but do not include qualities and properties, numbers and species. Particulars should be

的对象或事例。包含于这个概念中的谓项就是部分的概念，因为它只有同借助于那些包含于同一概念的谓项结合在一起才能识别其对象。所有的部分的概念都是相关的，或者是同位的（例如，“是一个人”和“是有理性的”），或者是从属的（例如，“是一个人”和“是一个动物”），澄清所有部分概念和它们的关系的过程就是概念分析；它的结果是分析判断。

“如果我制造一个明晰的概念，那么我从部分〔概念〕开始，由这些部分进展到整体。”——康德：《逻辑》，导言，VIII。

分有

[希腊词 *methexis*, 源自动词 *metechein*, 意指“分有”、“共有”、“参与”] 在柏拉图的形式学说里，特殊事物之所以具有某些特征，是因为它们分有了相关的形式，譬如，美的事物之所以是美的，是因为它们分有了“美”的形式。如此说来，特殊的事物只是形式的不完满的实现而已。尽管形式是一，特殊事物是多，但是单一的形式何以能够同时出现在许多事物中呢？事物又是以何种方式分有形式的呢？此乃共相如何成为殊相的问题。柏拉图在《巴门尼德篇》里以自我批评的方式对此做了详细的阐述，然而，这个问题一直延续至今。在后来的对话里，柏拉图谈论更多的是一种形式分有多种形式的问题，而不是特殊事物分有多种形式的问题。新柏拉图主义者也使用这一概念意指低级存在物分有高级存在物。

“在我看来，除了绝对美之外，所有其他美的东西之所以是美的，是因为它分有了那种绝对美，此外别无其他原因。”——柏拉图：《斐多篇》，100c。

殊相

[源自拉丁词: *pars*, *partis* (部分)] 在亚里士多德看来，殊相不能用作事物的谓词，与此相对，共相是可以作许多事物的谓词的。“殊相”用作形容词是指部分的、有限的或某些事物，而不是指全部的、无限的或所有的事物。作为一个名词，“殊相”有多种用法，其中有些引起了哲学争论。作为某一类或某一种中的一个单一个体，殊相有着独特的穿越时空的轨迹；与共相不同的是，殊相不能用其他个体说明，而相同的是，它们都是最初的殊相。一个殊相是一个统一体，与此相对的是许多事物的堆积。如果我们保留使用本体这一观念，殊相便是一个承载属性、性质或特性的本体，而属性则是共相。殊相包括历史事件、物质对象、人及他们的影子，但不包括性质、特性、数和属。殊相应与“个别”相区分，因为虽然一切殊相都是个别，但许

distinguished from individuals, for while all particulars are individuals, many individuals, instead of being particulars, are abstract and general. Philosophers have different opinions about the ontological status of particulars, depending on their account of universals.

"A particular is defined as an entity which can only enter into complexes as the subject of a predication or as one of the terms of a relation, never as itself a predicate or a relation." --Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 58.

Particular proposition

In traditional syllogistic logic, propositions of the form "some S are P" or "some S are not P" are called particular propositions. Propositions of the first form, particular affirmative propositions, are symbolised as "I" (SIP), and propositions of the second form, particular negative propositions, are symbolised as "O" (SOP). In the predicate calculus, a particular affirmative proposition is analysed as "there is at least one x such that x is S and x is P". Particular propositions are generally held to contain referring expressions and therefore to have existential import. Particular propositions are contrasted to universal propositions, that is propositions of the form "all S are P" and "all S are not P". Together, these are the four basic types of propositions in traditional logic.

"The proposition 'Some x's are y's' makes an assertion about part of the class x and is, therefore, called a particular proposition." --Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 1950, p. 46.

Particularised quality, another term for abstract particular

Partition

The division of a class into sub-classes (each of which is called a partition class, and all of which jointly form an exclusive class), or a process of dividing a whole into its parts, as long as the parts are homogeneous with each other and with the whole. For instance, the property "having the same weight as" can divide a class in terms of weight into a sub-class which includes all objects with that weight. An object with that weight belongs to only one sub-class. Partition is closely related to the notion of equivalent class within which each member bears an equivalent relation to every other member. A related concept is resolution which is a process of exhibiting a whole in terms of its components. Both partition and resolution are forms of analysis.

"By partition is meant transforming what is first presented as a mere unit by exhibiting it in the form of a whole consisting of parts." --Johnson, *Logic*, part II, 1921, p. 116.

多个别是抽象的,一般的,而殊相则不是,哲学家们根据各自对共相的理解,对殊相的本体论地位有不同的观点。

“殊相可定义为这样一个事物,它只是作为主谓关系中的主词或作为一种关系的一端而进入复合体,而其自身则不作谓词或联系。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第七卷,第56页。

特称命题

在传统三段论逻辑中,“某些S是P”或“一些S不是P”的命题形式叫做特称命题。第一种命题形式即特称肯定命题,用符号“I”(SIP)表示,第二种命题形式是特称否定命题,用符号“O”(SOP)表示。在谓词演算中,特称肯定命题被分析为:“至少存在一个x,以致这个x是S并且x是P”。特称命题一般被认为含有指称表达式,因此具有存在意义。特称命题相对比于全称命题,后者的命题形式是“所有S是P”和“所有S不是P”,它们一起构成传统逻辑的四种基本类型的命题。

“命题‘某些x's是y's’作出了对某类x的部分的断定,因此被称为特殊命题。”——斯特宾:《现代逻辑导论》,1950年,第46页。

特殊化的质

“抽象殊相”的另一表述。

划分

把一个类分成子类(每一个子类叫做划分类,所有子类一起构成全类),或把一个整体分成其部分的过程,只要这些部分是相互同质的并且与整体也是同质的。例如,“与……有相同的重量”这个特性能够根据重量从一个类分出一个子类,后者包括有该重量的所有对象。具有该重量的某个对象只属于一个子类。划分与等价类的概念密切相关,在等价类中每一个元素与每一个其他元素有等价关系。一个相关的概念是分解(resolution),后者是根据其构成要素来展示一整体的过程。划分和分解都是分析的形式。

“所谓划分,是使初看起来是一纯粹单元的东西变形,其办法是显示它是由各部分组成的一个整体。”——约翰逊:《逻辑学》,第I卷,1921年,第116页。

Partitive term, Quine's expression for mass noun

Pascal's wager

A practical argument to suggest that it is rational to believe in God, formulated by the French thinker Blaise Pascal in his *Pensées* (1670). Pascal initiated the use of practical argumentation as a new line of thought in support of Christian faith. If we cannot use metaphysics to prove decisively whether or not God exists, what then should we do? On the basis of his work on probability, Pascal claimed that belief in God is the soundest bet in face of the uncertainty of an after-life. If we believe, then God either exists or does not exist. If he does not exist, we lose little. If he exists, we will be awarded eternal bliss and avoid the possibility of going to the hell. Hence, the choice to be a believer carries with it the possibility of immense gain, while the choice not to believe carries with it the possibility of a vastly greater loss. This argument has been treated scornfully by critics, but it has been accepted by some as a legitimate theological use of practical reason. It can be placed in a context of examples from rational choice theory, although Pascal's wager concerns the choice of belief rather than action. For this reason, it is related to problems about the will and belief in James' pragmatism.

"Notwithstanding its methodological modernity as a course of argumentation cast in the mold of decision theory, the spirit of Pascal's Wager is thus profoundly conservative in its substantive message." —Rescher, *Pascal's Wager*, 1985, p. 6.

Passion, see feeling

Passive intellect, see active intellect

Past

The past is meant in some sense to contain what happened at an earlier time, but it is not clear that the past is real. Objectivists argue that the past exists independent of human minds and knowledge and provides a basis for historical statements. For sceptics, the past can hardly exist. What actually exists must be present, but if the past were present, it would not be the past. Because it is the past, it cannot exist. For subjectivists and relativists, the past exists merely as a construction of historians.

How, then, would it be possible to establish the truth of a statement about the past? For sceptics, the past does not exist and knowledge of the past is impossible. According to relativists, because the intentions and prejudices of historians

部分词

李因用于指“总量词”的名称。

帕斯卡尔的赌博

假定相信上帝合理的一个实用论证, 由法国思想家 B. 帕斯卡尔在他的《思想录》(1670) 一书中系统表述。帕斯卡尔把实践论证的用途作为新的思想线索加以引入, 以支持基督教信仰。如果我们不能运用形而上学来确切地证明上帝是否存在, 那么, 我们应该做什么呢? 以他的或然性理论为基础, 帕斯卡尔认为, 相信上帝是面对来世不确定性的最为稳妥的赌博。如果我们相信, 那么, 上帝或者存在或者不存在。如果他不存在, 我们没多少损失; 如果他存在, 我们将被赐予永远的福祉, 避免进入地狱的可能性。因此, 选择做一名信仰者意味着随之有巨大得益的可能性, 而选择不相信则意味着随之有更巨大的受损的可能性。过去, 批评家们对这个论证采取了蔑视对待的态度, 但近来却被有些人接受, 认为这是实践理性的一种合法的神学运用。它可以看做是理性选择理论的一例, 虽然帕斯卡尔的赌博关注的是信仰的选择, 而不是行为的选择。由于这一原因, 它与詹姆斯实用主义关于意志与信念问题相关。

“虽然作为一个论证方向, 它的方法论上的现代性具有决定论的性格, 但帕斯卡尔赌博的精神就其实质性的使命来说, 却是极其保守的。”——雷谢尔: 《帕斯卡尔赌博》, 1985 年, 第 6 页。

激情

见“情感”条。

被动理智

见“主动理智”条。

过去

从某种意义上讲, 过去被解释为早些时候发生的事情, 但过去是否是真实的并不清楚。客观主义者论证说, 过去的存在是不依赖于人的心和知识的, 过去为历史陈述提供了一个基础。对怀疑论者来讲, 过去简直是不存在的。实际存在的只能是现实的, 如果过去是现实的, 那它就不是过去。因为它是过去, 它不可能存在。在主观主义者和相对主义者看来, 过去仅仅作为历史学家的建构而存在。

那么, 如何才能确立关于过去的陈述的真实性? 对怀疑论者来讲, 过去是不存在的, 因而关于过去的知识是不可能的。在相对主义者看来, 由于历史学家的意志和偏见在历史探究中

are indispensable to historical inquiry, historical knowledge need not be rejected, but it is not objective. For objectivists, historical knowledge represents what really took place, but because historical statements are made on the basis of memory, testimony and evidence rather than on direct observation, we can still ask how it is possible to secure the reliability of statements about the past. Some claim that such statements are about the present rather than about the past, and others claim that they are rules for the prediction of future historical experiences. The existence and intelligibility of the past have been important topics in contemporary analytic philosophy.

"From my own part, I do not find anything excessively paradoxical in the view that propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those 'historical' experiences which are commonly said to verify them, and I do not see how else 'pure knowledge of the past' is to be analysed." — Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1967, p. 102.

Past-referring term

In our conceptual scheme, all expressions or terms describing present objects can be classified into three kinds: past-referring terms, temporally neutral terms and future-referring terms. Past-referring terms apply to present events or objects in a way which entails the existence of an event or object at an earlier time logically related to the present object. For example, to call a woman a mother entails that she gave a birth to a child. Temporally neutral terms apply to present events or objects, but do not imply any reference to past or future items. For example, to call somebody a man does not imply anything about the past or future. Future-referring terms apply to present items in a way which is conditioned by their reference to some future objects or events. For example, to call a woman a mother-to-be entails that she will give birth at some future time. Historical language is rich in past-referring terms, but philosophers and logicians argue over the possibility of determining the truth-value of historical statements which contains past-referring terms.

"By a past-referring term, I shall mean a term, whose correct application to a present object or event, logically involves a reference to some earlier object or event which may or may not be causally related to the object to which the term is applied." — A. C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 1965, p. 71.

Paternalism

[from Latin: *pater*, father] Paternalism is derived from parental caring towards one's children. In ethics it means interfering with another person's liberty or freedom in the belief that one is promoting the good of that person, or preventing harm from occurring to that person, even if one's action provokes that person's disagreement or protest. Paternalism is challenged by liberalism and is now often viewed as

是不可避免的,对历史知识虽无需拒绝,但它却不是客观的。对客观主义者而言,历史知识描述的是真实发生的事情,但由于历史陈述是根据记忆、证明和证据而不是根据直接观察做出的,我们还可提出如何才能保证关于过去的陈述的可靠性问题,一些人认为,这样的陈述是关于现在的陈述而不是关于过去的陈述,另一些人则认为,它们是对未来历史经验做出预言的规则。过去的存在和可理解性一直是当代分析哲学的一个重要课题。

“就我个人而言,我没有发现这样一种观点中有什么过多自相矛盾的东西,这种观点就是:有关过去的陈述是对那些‘历史’经验做出预言的规则,这些经验通常被说成是对那些历史陈述的证实。我看不出其他‘纯粹的关于过去的知识’是如何被分析的。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1967年,第102页。

指称过去的用语

在我们的概念体系中,所有描述现存物体的语词和术语可分为三类:指称过去的用语,时间中立的用语和指称将来的用语。指称过去的用语是通过使早些时候存在的事件或物体与现存物体在逻辑上相联而应用于现存事件或物体的。例如,叫一个女人“妈妈”,意味着她生过一个小孩。时间中立的用语应用于现存的事件或物体,但不含有与过去或将来的东西的联系。例如,称某人“一个男人”不含有涉及过去或将来的内容。指称将来的用语通过规定现存事件或物体与某些将来的事件或物体的联系而应用于现存的事件或物体。例如,称一个女人“未来的妈妈”,意味着她将来要生小孩。历史语言含有丰富的指称过去的用语,但哲学家和逻辑学家对包含指称过去的用语的历史陈述的真值能否确定存在争议。

“就指称过去的用语而言,我指的是这样一个术语,将其正确地应用于现存的物体或事件,就在逻辑上包含着与某一更早的物体或事件的关系,这更早的物体或事件与这一术语所应用的物体或事件也许有因果联系,也许没有因果联系。”——丹托:《分析的历史哲学》,1965年,第71页。

家长主义

[源自拉丁词 *pater*, 意为父亲] 家长主义源于父母对自己孩子的关怀。在伦理学中,它意为某人干涉另一个人的自由,而相信他这样做正在促进他所干涉的那人的善,或使他所干扰自由的人免遭伤害,即使这个行动引起了那人的反对或抗议。家长主义受到自由主义的挑战,在现代社会一般被认为是对自由、自主和个人权

a violation of liberty, autonomy, and individual rights. It can be justified towards moral patients who do not have a sufficient degree of rationality to choose and act.

"Paternalistic intervention must be justified by the evident failure or absence of reason and will." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 250.

Pathetic fallacy

The term was introduced by John Ruskin in *Modern Painters*, vol. 3 (1856), referring to the alleged fallacy that projecting or ascribing human emotions, intentions, dispositions and thoughts to inanimate things as if they were really capable of these qualities. For instance, one is committing this fallacy if one says that weather is friendly or that the sea is angry. In general, it means the human tendency to project our subjective feeling caused by the external thing into the external thing itself.

"Pathetic fallacy... is the fallacy of treating a psychological relation as an independently existing property." — Sorensen, *Thought Experiments*, 1992, p. 128.

Pathos

[Greek: suffering, feeling or what happens to affect a person; plural, *pathe*; from *paschein*, to suffer, to undergo, to experience] For Aristotle, *paschein* and the contrasting *poiein* (to make, to do) are both categories. *Pathos* has a passive tone. In Greek, *pathos* is a changeable quality, but especially concerns extreme grief, misfortune or distress. As the feeling of an individual, it is also contrasted with *ethos* (communal feeling).

"By *pathe*, I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, in general whatever implies pleasure or pain." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b22-4.

Patriarchy

[from Greek: *pater*, father + *arche*, rule] Originally, a social system centred around an extended family with a male as its leader (patriarch). For many feminists, patriarchy is the universally perpetuated male power over women and male aggression toward women. They claim that a patriarchal attitude or prejudice runs through all economic and social institutions. Societies are often patriarchal in the sense that the male half of the population uses various deeply embedded means to control the female half. A main concern of radical feminism is to uncover the roots of patriarchy and to reveal its various representative forms.

"Patriarch is a name was coined to denote the universal domination of women by men." — Nyre, *Feminist Theory and the Philosophy of Men*, 1988, p. 95.

利的侵犯,但对于“道德被动者”则被看做是合理的。道德被动者即是缺乏足够的理性程度来选择行为的人。

“如有明显的理性或意志的缺失,家长主义的干涉就是合理的。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第250页。

感情误置

这个词由J. 拉斯金在其《现代画家》(第3卷,1856年)一书中引入,用来指称这样一种误置,即将人类的感情、意向、脾气和思想投射到或归到无生命的东西上,仿佛它们真的能够具有这些品性似的。例如,如果一个人说“天气友善”或“大海愤怒”,就犯了这种误置的错误。一般说来,这种误置就意味着这样一种人类倾向,它将我们由外物引起的主观感情投射到了外物本身上面。

“感情误置……是将心理关系当做独立的存在特性的错误。”——索仑森:《思想实验》,1992年,第128页。

感受

[希腊词,指遭受,情感或一切影响一个人所发生的事。复数是 *pathe*,它来自动词 *paschein* (遭受,经受,经验)] 在亚里士多德哲学中,*paschein* 与相反的动词 *poiein* (制作,做)都是范畴。感受具有被动的含义。在希腊文中,*pathos* 是一种可变的质,但特别是指极度的悲哀、不幸或痛苦。作为个人情感,它也与 *ethos* (公共情感)相对立。

“所谓感受,我是指欲望,愤怒,恐惧,信心,嫉妒,欢喜,爱,恨,盼望,羡慕,怜悯等一般而言隐含快乐或痛苦的东西。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1105b22—24。

父权制

[源自希腊文: *pater* (父亲)和 *arche* (统治)] 最初指的是围绕以一个男人为主导(父权)的扩大的家庭为核心的社会制度。对很多女性主义者来说,父权制是男权对妇女的普遍的永久性的压迫和男人对妇女的侵犯。他们认为父权制的看法或偏见贯穿于所有经济和社会的组织机构及其制度。从占人口半数的男人使用各种深藏的手段控制半数的妇女这种意义上讲,社会常常是父权制的社会。激进的女性主义主要关注的一个问题是揭露父权制的根源和展示其种种有代表性的形式。

“父权制是一个创造出来用以表示男人对妇女的普遍统治的名词。”——尼雷:《女性主义理论和男人的哲学》,1988年,第95页。

Peirce's thesis

The claim that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the evidence for its truth. In other words, the conditions of semantic evaluation supervene upon confirmation relations or confirmation relations are semantic relations. This is a form of verificationism which equates meaning with evidence. According to this theory, if two theories have different entailments, they differ with respect to what observation statements are true.

"Peirce's thesis just is the claim that confirmation relations constitute semantic relations and are therefore not contingent." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 51.

Per accidens

[Latin: by accident] A scholastic term for the accidents possessed by a substance or for the non-essential properties which a thing has but which it may lose without changing its nature. A *per accidens* predication is a predication in which an accident is predicated of a substance. A *per accidens* thing is either an accident or a composite of a substance and an accident. *Per accidens* contrasts with *per se* (Latin: by itself), which is a substance itself or is the essential property which a thing possesses and cannot lose without changing its nature. In scholastic philosophy, God alone is a being *per se* in the absolute sense, for anything else will have to depend on God for existence. Sometimes, *per se* means what is directly intended in an action, while *per accidens* is a result which is not directly intended.

"All that exists of another (*quod est per accidens*) comes back to what exists of itself (*quod est per se*)." —Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 49, 3.

Per se, see *per accidens*

Percepta

The term for the properties which an observer actually perceives or observes. Percepta contrast with *percipienda*, the properties which we think that an object should appear to have, according to our knowledge of its nature and its position. When I watch a round tower from a distance, it is round according to *percipienda*, but might be square according to *percepta*. There are various forms of discrepancy between the *percepta* and *percipienda* of a given object. One may change while another not. This distinction is useful in discussing the nature of perceptual consciousness.

"I shall use the term 'percepta' or 'actually perceived properties' to refer to how the object actually appears to an observer." —Hirst, *The Problem of Perception*, 1959, p. 246.

皮尔士论题

它认为, 一个句子的意义是由证明其为真的证据所确定的, 换句话说, 语义评价的条件伴随着确证关系, 或者确证关系是语义关系。这是把意义等同于证据的一种证实主义形式。根据这种理论, 如果两个理论有着不同的内容, 那么它们在为真的观察陈述方面也是不同的。

"皮尔士论题只是认为, 确证关系构成了语义关系, 因而它们不是偶然的。" ——福多和拉普:《整体论》, 1992年, 第51页。

偶性地

[拉丁语, 偶性地] 经院哲学术语, 指实体具有的偶性, 或指一物具有但如果失去不会改变该物本性的那种非本质特性。*Per accidens* 的述语是实体由偶性陈述的述语, *Per accidens* 的事物或指偶性, 或指实体和偶性的合成物。*Per accidens* 对应于 *per se* (拉丁语, 由自身), 而 *Per se* 指实体本身, 或指一物具有且不能失去, 否则会改变该物本性的那种本质特性。在经院哲学中, 只有上帝能是绝对意义上的 *per se* 的存在, 因为其他的任何事物将不得不依赖上帝才能存在。有时, *per se* 意指在行为中直接企图的东西, *per accidens* 则是不直接企图的结果。

"由偶性而存在的一切, 都背对由自身而存在的东西。" ——阿奎那:《神学大全》, Ia, 49, 3。

由自身

见“偶性地”条。

实际知觉特性

指一个知觉者真正知觉或观察到的特性。它与“应当知觉特性”相对, 后者是我们根据我们关于客体的本质和地位的知识认为一个对象应当看起来具有的特性。当我从远处看一个圆形的塔时, 根据应当知觉特性它是圆的, 但根据实际知觉特性它却可能是方的。一个给定对象的“实际知觉特性”与“应当知觉特性”之间有各种不同形式的差异。其中的一个可能发生变化, 而另一个却没有变化。这一区分在关于知觉意识的讨论中是有用的。

"我将使用‘实际知觉特性’或‘实际知觉到的特性’这一术语来指对象对一个观察者所真正呈现的样子。" ——赫斯特:《知觉问题》, 1959年, 第246页。

Perception

The faculty of being aware of the world, the contents of sensory experience, and what is perceived. Perception involves both our capacity to be sensorily affected by external objects and our ability to bring these objects under concepts, although other capacities might also have a role to play. The analysis of perception and the attempt to deal with sceptical arguments about perceptual knowledge are central philosophical topics, in particular in epistemology. A major problem is whether we directly perceive sense data or the external physical world. This is related to problems about nature of the external world and our knowledge of it. Perception is the area where scepticism functions actively and where the distinction between phenomenalism and realism is sharply drawn. There are various positions about how to understand perception, such as the causal theory of perception, the representative theory of perception, and various forms of perceptual realism. There are also competing accounts of the relations between perception and belief and between perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge.

“‘Perception’ is a generic term which may be defined disjunctively as either seeing or hearing or touching or ... etc. Perception, in short, is awareness of the external world through the senses.” —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 120.

Percepts

Sometimes identified with sense-data. Whereas sense-data directly represent particulars and concrete items, percepts are closer to subjective states in an act of perception. Percepts are contrasted with concepts, which are the abstractions in thinking.

“The immediate object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the percept.” —*Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 1933, 4: 538.

Perceptual consciousness

The consciousness which is presented in the same way in normal perception, illusion and hallucination. The term is introduced by H. H. Price in order to deal with the relation in perception between sense-data and material objects and to uncover the nature of perceiving. However, the nature of perceptual consciousness itself is disputed. Some philosophers believe that it consists in seeing a datum and judging or inferring that the datum belongs to a material object. For others, including Price, perceptual consciousness senses a datum and takes it for granted that it belongs to a material object.

The dispute between “judging” and “taking for granted” in an account of perceiving is characteristic of many philosophical arguments in which slight verbal differences signal important theoretical conflicts.

知觉

意识这个世界的官能，感性经验的内容和所感觉到的东西。知觉既是指我们受外界对象感性影响的能力，也是指把这些对象归属于概念的能力，虽然其他的能力也起这种作用。对知觉的分析和解决有关感性知识的怀疑主义论证，是主要的哲学论题，尤其是在认识论中。一个主要的问题是，我们是否可直接感觉到感性材料或外部的客观世界。这是与外部世界和我们对外部世界的知识相关的问题。正是在这个知觉领域，怀疑论极为活跃，现象论和实在论的区分鲜明。关于理解知觉有许多理论，诸如知觉的因果论，知觉的反映论，和各种形式的知觉实在论。关于知觉与信念的关系、感性知识和推理知识的关系也有许多讨论。

“‘知觉’是一个一般性概念，可分别界定为看、听、接触、或……等等。总之，知觉是通过感官对外部世界的意识。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949年，第120页。

知觉对象

有时等同于“感觉材料”。感觉材料直接代表殊相和具体的东西，而知觉对象则与知觉活动中的主体状态更为接近。“知觉对象”与概念相对，后者指思维中的抽象物。

“在最终的分析中，所有知识和思维的直接对象是知觉对象。”——《C. S. 皮尔士文集》，1933年，第4卷，第538页。

知觉意识

与在正常的知觉、错觉和幻觉中相同的方式呈现的意识。H. H. 普赖斯提出这个术语是为了处理知觉中感觉材料和物质对象之间的关系，发现知觉活动的性质。然而，知觉意识的性质本身引起了争议。有的哲学家认为，它由看见一感觉材料，判断或推论出感觉材料属于物质对象构成。包括普赖斯在内的其他人认为知觉意识感觉到一感觉材料，并认为它属于物质对象是不言而喻的。

在说明知觉行为时，“判断”和“视为不言而喻”之间的争执是许多哲学论证中的典型特征，其中一点微小的言词差别都标志着重大的理论冲突。

“我们必须为我们已经谈论过的意识的非感觉方式找到某个名称。至于现在，我们将简单

"We must find some name for the non-sensuous mode of consciousness of which we have spoken. For the present we shall simply call it 'perceptual consciousness'." --H. H. Price, *Perception*, p. 25.

Perceptual knowledge

Knowledge about the world around us acquired through the activation of our sense organs, especially our eyes. We know that we can cross the street when we see that the traffic light is green. Perceptual knowledge is concerned with perceptual facts, and so must be distinguished from the perception of simple objects. It is not sensation, pure perception or mere acquaintance. Perceptual knowledge is associated with previously acquired ideas. A proposition of the form "S knows that P" reports perceptual knowledge if P is a perceptual proposition. It is controversial whether sense perception itself can lead to justified beliefs. While direct realism insists that experience itself can provide the justification required for this kind of knowledge, many other philosophers believe that such knowledge must involve some background knowledge or assumptions about connecting regularities which might be gained by inductive inference from past observations.

"Perceptual knowledge is knowledge that one sees or hears or smells or tastes or feels some specific sort of non-mental thing (s) or state (s) of affairs or event (s)." --Ginet, *Knowledge, Perception and Memory*, 1995, p. 82.

Percipienda, see *percepta*

Perennial philosophy, English expression for *philosophia perennis*

Perfect duty, see *imperfect duty*

Perfection, the principle of, another expression for the principle of the best

Perfectionism

The ethical position which claims that the good of human actions consists in whether they promote the maximal realisation of human excellence, measured by the ideal standards of perfection in fields such as art, science and culture. This theory presupposes that there are certain kinds of activities or experiences that possess the highest values and the deepest significance and encourages people to pursue these activities and experiences. It supposes that some human beings are intrinsically inferior to other human beings and that some forms of human life are intrinsically inferior to other forms of human life. Hence it endorses an aristocratic view of

地将其称为‘知觉意识’。”——普赖斯：《知觉》，1961年，第25页。

知觉知识

通过我们的感官活动特别是眼睛的活动而得到的关于我们周围世界的知识。我们知道，当我们看到交通灯是绿的时候，我们就可以穿越街道。知觉知识关心的是知觉的事实，因此必须把它与关于简单对象的知觉区分开来。它不是感觉、纯粹的知觉或简单的感性认识。知觉知识是与先前获得的观念相联系的。如果P是一个知觉命题的话，那么，一个具有“S知道P”这种形式的命题表达的就是知觉知识。但对感性知觉本身是否能够带来得到辨明的信念，这尚有争论。直接的实在论坚持认为，经验本身就可以产生这种知识所需要的阐明，而其他许多哲学家则相信，这种知识必定包含了有关连接规律的背景知识或假设，这些规律是可以通过对过去观察的归纳推理得到的。

“知觉知识就是人们看到、听到、闻到、尝到或感觉到某种特殊的非心的事物或事态或事件的知识。”——吉内特：《知识、知觉和记忆》，1995年，第82页。

应当知觉特性

见“实际知觉特性”条。

永恒哲学

“永恒哲学 (*philosophia perennis*)”的英文词。

完全职责

见“不完全职责”条。

最完善世界原则

“最好世界原理”的另一表述。

完美主义

这种伦理立场主张，人类行为的善在于是否有利于人类的卓越的最大实现，其衡量的尺度就是在诸如艺术、科学、文化领域里的完美的理想标准。这个理论的前提条件是，某种活动或经验具有最高的价值和最深的意义，并鼓励人们追求这些活动和经验。它设定某些人是内在地低于其他人的，并认为有些人类生活的方式是内在地低于其他方式的。因此它赞成有关人类社会的贵族观而反对平等主义。它认为一个社会应当安排得可以最大程度地获得人类的卓越。罗尔斯用这个概念指亚里士多德和尼采持

human society and is opposed to egalitarianism. It argues that a society should be so arranged as to maximise the achievement of human excellence. John Rawls employed this term to refer to the position held by Aristotle and Nietzsche. Rawls argues that since the notion of intrinsic value is controversial, perfectionism should be bypassed as a political principle.

"Teleological doctrines differ, pretty clearly, according to how the conception of the good is specified. It is taken as the realisation of human excellence in the various forms of culture, we have what may be called perfectionism." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 25.

Performance and competence, see competence and performance

Performative

Austin's term for utterances which are contrasted with ordinary statements, or constatives. The distinction mainly consists in two aspects. First, while a constative merely states an independently existing fact, a performative utterance, such as "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", or "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow", does not describe anything, but constitutes an action. Such sentences actually do something in the appropriate circumstances, that is naming or betting. Secondly, while the truth or falsity of a constative is determined by the distinct fact or state of affairs it describes, a performative is open to assessment according to whether it is a happy or unhappy act, not in terms of truth and falsity. Austin made a great effort to establish a clear-cut distinction between constatives and performatives because he believed that many philosophical problems have arisen because people do not understand the nature of performatives. But Austin was unable to find a satisfactory criterion for performatives, and he gave up this distinction in favour of his theory of illocution in *How to Do Things With Words*.

"The name [performative] is derived, of course, from 'perform', the usual verb with the noun 'action'; it indicates that the issuing of the utterances is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something." — Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, pp. 6-7.

Performative theory of truth

A form of deflationary theory of truth, ascribed to Peter Strawson. It claims that the truth predicate is used not to describe things, but to perform certain speech acts such as agreeing, conceding or endorsing. By saying "That is true" we agree or endorse another speaker's utterance. The primary characteristic of truth is to perform this endorsing or confirmatory speech function. The theory is also called the *amen theory of truth*.

有的观点。罗尔斯认为,由于内在价值的概念是易于引起争议的,完美主义不应作为一个政治原则。

“很明显,根据怎样说明善的概念,目的论的学说是不同的。它被看做是在不同形式的文化中的人类卓越的实现,这样我们就有了所谓完美主义。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第25页。

运用和能力

见“能力和运用”条。

完成行为式

奥斯汀的术语,是指与普通陈述或记述式相对而言的话语。这种区别主要有两个方面:首先,记述式只是陈述独立存在的事实,而完成行为式话语,诸如“我命名这条船为伊丽莎白号”或“我向你赌六个便士明天下雨”,它们并没有描述任何东西,而只是构成了一种行为。这种语句实际上是在某种恰当的场合做某个事情,即命名或打赌。其次,记述式的真假是由它所描述的事实或事态决定的,而对完成行为式的评价则以得体或不得体,而不是以真假为标准的。奥斯汀竭尽全力地确立记述式与完成行为式之间的明确区分,因为他相信,许多哲学问题的出现都是由于人们不了解完成行为式的性质。但奥斯汀无法找到一种令人满意的完成行为式标准,所以他在《如何以言行事》中放弃了这种区分而采取他的以言行事理论。

“这个名称[完成行为式]当然来自‘行动’,即名词‘行为’的普通动词形式;它表明,说出话语就是在完成行为——这并不是通常认为的那种只是说出某些东西。”——奥斯汀:《如何以言行事》,1962年,第6—7页。

真理履行论

真理紧缩(deflationary)论的一种形式,由P. 斯特劳森提出。它宣称,真谓词不是用来描述事物的,而是用来展示某种言语行为的,如同同意、承认、赞成等。通过说“那是真的”,我们就同意或赞成了另一个说话者的话语。真理的首要特征就在于这种赞成或肯定的言语功能。这种理论亦称“真理的阿门(amen)理论”。

“较不熟悉的情形是斯特劳森对真理的履

"A less familiar case is Strawson's performative account of truth. This turns on ... the fact that by saying 'That is true' we can endorse an utterance made by another speaker." — Price, *Facts and the Functions of Truth*, 1988, p. 26.

Peripatetics

A term applied to Aristotle and his pupils. According to tradition, the term was derived from *peripatein* (to walk about) because Aristotle and his pupils were said to spend long periods every day walking up and down discussing advanced philosophical questions in the garden of the Lyceum, the school Aristotle founded in 335, BC. But according to another account, the term was derived from *peripatos* (covered walking hall), which was a part of the Lyceum. The Peripatetics whose names are known include Theophrastus of Eresus, Strato of Lampsacus and Eudemus of Rhodes. If the chief characteristic of Plato's Academy was its mathematical achievement, the Peripatetics contributed greatly to various natural sciences, in particular to botany, biology and medicine. In the Hellenistic period, the Peripatetics, Academics, Stoics and Epicureans were the four major schools in Athens.

"The Peripatetic school, as an institution comparable to the Academy, was probably not founded until after [Aristotle's] death. But with some distinguished students and associates he collected a natural history museum and library of maps and manuscripts ... and organised a program of research which inter alia laid the foundation for all histories of Greek natural philosophy, mathematics and astronomy, and medicine." — Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, 1986, p. 151.

Perlocutionary act

Austin's term for his third kind of speech act. While locutionary acts are concerned with meaning, and illocutionary acts are concerned with the way an utterance is taken, perlocutionary acts are linguistic acts which by saying something with design or intention, bring about specific effects on the feelings, thoughts or behaviour of the hearers, for example, persuading or convincing someone to do something. It is essentially a consequential act.

"Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons ... We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution." — Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 1962, p. 101.

Perseity - see aseity

行式说明。这依赖于……下述事实，即通过说‘那是真的’，我们能够赞成另一个说话者所说的话语。”——普赖斯：《事实和真理的功用》，1988年，第26页。

散步学派

此名用以指亚里士多德及其学生（或译作“逍遥学派”）。根据传统，该词出自 *peripatein*（散步，漫步），据说亚里士多德和他的学生每天花许多时间在里克昂（亚里士多德于公元前335年所创的学校）的花园中边散步边讨论高深的哲学问题。可另一种说法是，该词出自 *peripatos*（有顶的散步廊）。那是里克昂设施的一部分。著名的散步学派成员包括爱里苏斯的泰奥弗拉斯多、朗伯塞库斯的斯特拉多及罗特的欧德谟斯。如果柏拉图学院派的主要特征是其数学成就，散步学派则对众多自然科学贡献良多，尤其是在植物学、生物学和医学方面。在晚期希腊时代，散步学派与学院派、斯多亚派和伊壁鸠鲁派一起是雅典的四个主要学派。

“散步派学派，作为一个可与学院相比的机构，可能是在[亚里士多德]死后才建立的。但与他的一些杰出的学生和助手一起，亚里士多德收集了一个自然史博物馆，一个藏有地图和手稿的图书馆……还组织了一个研究项目，这一项目的众多贡献之一是奠定了希腊自然哲学、数学、天文学和医学的历史基础。”——欧文：《逻辑、科学和辩证法》，1986年，第151页。

以言取效的行为

奥斯汀所说的第三种言语行为。以言表意的行为关心的是意义，以言行事的行为关心的是说出一句话所用的方式，而以言取效的行为则是语言行为，这种行为通过说出带有设想或意图的东西，对听者的情感、思想或行为产生特别的效果。例如，敦促或确信某人做某事。这基本上是一种后果性的行为。

“说出什么东西，通常会或往往会对听众、说者或其他人的情感、思想或行为产生一定的后果……我们把运用这种行为称作运用以言取效的行为或以言取效。”——奥斯汀：《如何以言行事》，1962年，第101页。

自主

见“自足性”条。

Person

[from Latin: *persona*, mask or actor, a man's role or dignity in relation to other men] In theological usage, *persona* is the equivalent of the Greek *hypostasis* (standing under) and is closely related to the notion of *ousia* (substance). For Boethius, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature.

Locke argued that consciousness provides the criterion of being the same person over time, although being a person presupposes having a body. Locke in turn identified consciousness with memory. He also held that person is a forensic notion that is related to responsibility and to reward and punishment. Hence in a legal sense, there can be artificial persons, like companies, as well as natural persons, so long as persons have legal responsibility and status. For Descartes and later dualists, a person is a combination of a mind and a body that are essentially distinct. In contrast, Strawson held that "person" is a logically primitive technical term. A person owns both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics, but cannot be reduced either to something mental or to something physical. The concept of a person is presupposed by both physical states and state of consciousness. Strawson's arguments have led to much discussion and have helped to place the nature of a person as a central topic in contemporary metaphysics.

Metaphysics usually discusses persons rather than human beings, partly to leave conceptual room for non-human persons and partly to avoid giving too much emphasis to biological classification in forming the concept of a person. Some forms of species-based naturalism would challenge both of these motives. The notion of a person implies that the central phenomena of personhood, such as thinking, experiencing, acting and having moral worth are related to one another, although many philosophers would defend the status of severely brain-damaged human beings as persons.

"What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type." —Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, pp. 101-2.

Person-affecting restriction

A position which claims that the evaluation of moral choices should appeal to the outcome produced by the choices for the persons affected. If choice A brings a worse outcome than choice B to at least some specific individuals and if choice B does not bring a worse outcome than choice A to any specific individuals, then choice A is worse than choice B. According to Derek Parfit, such a restriction can be applied universally in moral areas. Many choices, particularly those involving the interests of future generations, cannot be

人

[源自拉丁文 *persona* (面具或演员), 一个人在与他人关系中的角色或尊严] 在神学的用法中, *persona* 是希腊词 *hypostasis* (处在……之下) 的对应词, 与 *ousia* (实体或本体) 的概念有密切关系。在波埃修斯看来, 一个人就是一个具有理性本质的单个实体。

洛克论证说, 虽然要成为一个人必须先要有身体, 但是, 意识为某个人在一段时间后仍为同一个人提供了标准。洛克转而又将意识等同于记忆。他还认为人的概念是与责任、赏罚相关的论辩的概念。因此, 在法律的意义, 既可以有自然人, 也可以有人为的人, 如各种公司, 只要这些“人”有法律责任和地位。对于笛卡尔和后来的二元论者来说, 一个人就是在本质上截然不同的心与身的结合。与此相反, 斯特劳森认为, “人”是一个逻辑上原始的专用词。一个人拥有意识状态和肉体特性两者, 但是他既不能还原为心的东西, 也不能还原为物的东西。人的概念是以物理状态和意识状态两者为先决条件的。斯特劳森的证明引起了许多讨论, 使得人的性质问题被确立为当代形而上学的中心论题。

形而上学通常讨论人而不讨论人类, 部分是为了在概念上给非人类的人 (non human persons) 留出余地, 部分是为了避免在形成人的概念时过分强调生物学上的分类。某些形式的自然主义是以物种为根据的, 它们会向上述两种动机提出异议。人的概念意味着, 人的主要现象, 诸如思维、经验、行动、具有道德价值等, 都是互相关联的, 尽管许多哲学家会捍卫人类中严重脑损伤者仍具有的人的地位。

“我用人的概念指的是那样一种类型的存在物的概念, 即属于意识状态的谓词和属于肉体特性、物理状态等的谓词, 都可以同样用于那个单独类型〔存在物〕的一个单一个体上。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》, 1959年, 第101-102页。

人的影响的限定

这一见解认为, 道德选择的评价应诉诸于这些选择对受影响的人所产生的结果。如果至少对某些具体的人而言, 选择A产生了一个比选择B更坏的结果; 如果对任何具体的人而言, 选择B没有产生一个比选择A更坏的结果; 那选择A就比选择B更坏。按照D. 帕菲特的看法, 这种限定可被普遍应用于道德领域。很多选择, 特别是那些包含后代人利益的选择, 不能由它们对未来个人的影响来判断, 因为我

judged by their effects on future individuals because we have no way of telling what individuals there will be.

"The Person-affecting Restriction: This part of morality, the part concerned with human well-being, should be explained entirely in terms of what would be good or bad for those people whom our acts affect." —Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 1984, Set. 134.

Personal identity

In a popular sense, personal identity is determined by the fundamental values, loyalties, associations and aims of a person's life. In contrast, the philosophical investigation of personal identity seeks to explain the criteria by which an individual is identified as the same person at different times, in spite of having changed characteristics. The problem of personal identity (also called the problem of the self or the problem of self-identity or the problem of self-knowledge) arises from the difficulties in accounting for how the ascription of personal identity is justified. Since the discussion of personal identity concentrates on the necessary and sufficient conditions under which we recognise or re-identify a person, the problem is also called the problem of the criteria of personal identity, although criterial relations can be looser than those set out by necessary and sufficient conditions.

Locke and Hume provided two classic discussions of personal identity. Locke claimed that the criterion of personal identity is consciousness, in particular memory. His position has been attacked as not providing sufficient conditions for personal identity by those who argue that personal identity is impossible without bodily continuity. Moreover, Locke's view seems circular if we distinguish between genuine memory and apparent memory. The memory test of personal identity seems to fail because genuine memory presupposes identity rather than providing an independent test for identity.

According to Hume, we perceive nothing but impressions and ideas and do not have an impression or idea of a unique and simple self. He therefore maintains that the notion of personal identity is a fiction. What we really have is a bundle or collection of particular perceptions, which we ascribe without justification (and perhaps without need of justification) to a continuing self.

Contemporary discussion is characterised by sophisticated testing of the arguments for the bodily criterion and the memory criterion of personal identity. Discussion has been shaped by considerations of the logic of identity, which is an all or nothing relationship and a relationship which blocks two distinct entities at the same time from being identical with one another. In particular, thought experiments about split-brains indicate that an apparent advantage for the bodily criterion is illusory. The English philosopher Derek Parfit argues that attempts to cope with the problem of personal identity fail, but that what is really important to us is conti-

们无法说出将来的个人是什么样的。

“人的影响的限定：道德的这一部分，即涉及人的幸福的部分，应当完全以对受我们影响的那些人将是好是坏来解释。”——帕菲特：《理性与人》，1984年，第134节。

人格的同一性

在通常的意义上，人格的同一性是根据一个人生活中的基本价值、忠诚、交际和目标来确定的。与此相对照，哲学对人格同一性的探讨力图对一些标准作出说明，根据这些标准，一个人被认为在不同时间里是同一个人，而不管他的特点已经改变。人格同一性问题（也称作“自我等同问题”、“自我同一性问题”或“自我认识问题”）是在说明人格同一性的归因如何得到证明时所遇到的困难中产生的。既然对人格同一性的讨论集中在我们辨认或再认一个人时所依据的充要条件上，所以，这个问题也被称作人格同一性的标准问题，尽管标准关系可能不如根据充要条件表示的关系那么严格。

洛克和休谟提出了关于人格同一性的两个经典讨论。洛克声称，人格同一性的标准是意识，尤其是记忆。他的主张受到了抨击，因为它没有提供人格同一性的充足条件，那些抨击他的人论证说，没有肉体的持续，人格的同一性是不可能的，而且，如果我们将真正的记忆和表面的记忆区分开来，洛克的观点似乎陷入了循环。对人格同一性的记忆检验似乎是不成功的，因为真正的记忆是以同一性为先决条件的，而不是提供对同一性的独立检验。

根据休谟的观点，我们知觉的只是印象和观念，而且我们没有惟一而简单的自我的印象或观念。因此他坚持认为，人格同一性的概念是一个虚构。我们实际具有的是一把或一束特殊的知觉，我们没有正当理由（或许不需要正当的理由）就将它们归于一个持续自我。

当代的讨论是以细致地检验对人格同一性的肉体标准和记忆标准的各种证明为特征的。讨论体现为对同一性逻辑的考察。同一性逻辑是一种或者全有或者全无的关系，一种阻止两个截然不同的实体同时互相等同的关系。尤其对裂脑人的思想实验表明，肉体标准的表面优势是虚幻的。英国哲学家D. 帕菲特论证说，解决同一性问题的尝试虽然失败了，但是，对我们真正重要的是在我们的生活中的持续性与关联性和我们作为人的生存。他声称这些事情可以被理解，而同时又避免了人格同一性的僵化。其他一些哲学家认为，对人格同一性的讨论应当更贴近于科学，而不是当前许多讨论中引进的对各种事例的科学虚构。奎因已经证明，人格的

nuity and connectedness in our lives and our survival as a person. He claims that these matters can be understood while avoiding the rigidities of personal identity. Other philosophers hold that the discussion of personal identity should be closer to science than to the science fiction of the examples introduced in many recent discussions. Quine has argued that the problem of personal identity adds nothing important to the more general problem of identity.

Personal identity is intensively discussed in contemporary philosophy for its own sake, but also because it is related to other major issues, such as dualism, survival and immortality, self-knowledge, responsibility, morality and the self.

"Philosophers are continuing the long-standing debate as to whether personal identity should be analysed in terms of the identity of the relevant bodies or in terms of some sort of continuity of memory and character." —Brody, *Identity and Essence*, 1980, p. 3.

Personalism

Also called personism, a philosophical movement that flourished in the early part of the twentieth century in the United States, with G. H. Howison, B. P. Bowne and E. S. Brightman as its leading proponents. According to its central doctrines, persons are ontologically ultimate and personality has the highest value. Experience, which discovers meaning, belongs to some self. All hypothetical and inferred entities must be reduced to the experience of a self, with their truth tested by their coherence with the total data of experience. Reality as a whole is an expression of a universal personal consciousness, and characteristics possessed by persons and their personality are the fundamental elements in the explanation of reality. For personalists, God is the external person who constitutes the most coherent value of all interactions.

Personalism, which has developed over the last two centuries, can be traced back to the theological use of the notion of person. The Greeks associated person and *hypothesis* (standing under) with the notion of *ousia* (substance). As a consequence, personalism has been integrally connected with theism, holding that God is the transcendent person and the creator of all other persons. Personalism has had realistic, absolutist, idealistic, pantheistic and other forms, many of which can be viewed as varieties of idealism. The exploration of human existence in existentialism and phenomenology has been influenced by personalism.

In a related use, personalism concerns ideas developed by the French philosophers and theologians E. Mounier, J. Maritain and E. Gilson, who claimed that God is an infinite person in contrast to finite persons like ourselves and that the autonomy and value of the person is of supreme importance.

The term personalism also designates the philosophy of

同一性问题并未给更基本的同一性问题增加任何重要东西。

在当代哲学中,人格的同一性因其本身之故被认真讨论,不过,这也是因为它与其他一些主要论题有关系,诸如二元论、生存和不朽、自我认识、责任、道德和自我等论题。

“哲学家们继续对人格的同一性应当根据有关的身体的同一性来分析,还是应当根据记忆和性格的某种持续性来分析,进行了长期的争论。”——布洛迪:《同一性和本质》,1980年,第3页。

人格主义

亦称 personism, 20 世纪上半叶流行于美国的一个哲学运动,主要倡导者有 G. H. 霍维森、B. P. 鲍恩和 E. S. 布赖特曼。根据它的核心学说,人在本体论意义上是第一的,人格具有最高价值。发现意义的经验属于某个自我。因此,一切假设的和推论的实体,连同靠它们与总体的经验材料的一致而被检验的真理,都必定被化归为自我的经验。作为整体的实在是普遍的个人意识的表现,个人具有的性格特征和人格是实在解释中的根本要素。在人格主义者看来,上帝是外在的人格,他构成一切相互作用的最有凝聚力的价值。

在上两个世纪得到了系统发展的人格主义,能被追溯到人之观念的神学运用。希腊人把“人”和本在(*hypothesis*,直译为“站在下面”)与本体(*ousia*)的观念相结合。结果,人格主义内在地与有神论相结合,认为神是超验的人,是一切其他人的创造者。人格主义有实在论、绝对论、观念论、泛神论和其他形式,其中的许多形式能被认作是观念论的不同种类。存在主义和现象学对于人类存在的探究,深受人格主义的影响。

人格主义还有一种相关的用法,指由法国哲学家和神学家 E. 穆尼埃、J. 马里旦和 E. 吉尔松等人发展的观念。他们主张,上帝是无限的人格,对应于像我们自己一样的有限人格,这种人格的自主和价值是最为重要的。

“人格主义”一词也指称由拉姆塞和德·费莱蒂开创,由沙伐奇发展的概率哲学。按照他们的观点,概率不是被发现的某种客观的东西,而是对命题真实性确信程度的一种人格表现。

“人格主义或人格论是这样的哲学理论:—

probability initiated by Ramsey and de Finetti and developed by L. J. Savage, according to which probability is a personal expression of a degree of confidence in the truth of a proposition and not something objective to be discovered.

"Personalism or personism is the philosophical theory that a person is (or many persons are) the supreme reality, i. e. highest in value and dominant in power." —Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 326.

Personality

The general character of being a person or the distinctive features of mind and character of an individual person. As a biological concept, personality is related to species membership. Philosophers of mind and philosophers of psychology are interested in personality as a psychological concept dealing with psychological functions, abilities and capacities. Moral philosophers are interested in ethical personality. Political and social philosophers are concerned with persons in relation to political or social entities. The conception of personality thus has different levels.

"Personality is the totality of human potentialities, activities, and habits organized by the person in the active pursuit of his self ideal." —Arnold, in Mischel (ed), *Human Action*, 1969, p. 196.

Perspective

The term Russell uses to refer to all the momentary sets of data, both perceived and unperceived, which present the universe from a certain point of view. In doing so he uses the subjective data of psychologists in their classification of particulars which correspond to the "things" used by physicists to classify objects. The actually perceived perspective is called by Russell a "private world", that is the view of the world which a percipient has at any given moment. The totality of perspectives in an individual's life is that person's "biography".

"The assemblage of all my present objects of sense, which is what I call a 'perspective'." —Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 1918, p. 139.

Persuasive definition

A term introduced by Stevenson. In defining terms which have both descriptive meaning (referring to qualities in things), and strongly emotive meaning (expressing or arousing affective or emotional states), we alter the descriptive meaning but keep the emotive meaning unchanged in the term's application. The purpose of persuasive definition is, consciously or unconsciously, to secure a change in people's attitudes and interests. The speaker introduces a new sense which the hearer accepts without being aware that he is being influenced. For example, when Hitler claimed that "national

人格(或多个人格)是至上的实在,即在价值上最高,在力量上最具支配性。”——韦克美斯特:《美国哲学观念史》,1949年,第326页。

人格

作为一个人的·一般性格或心灵的独特特征和个人的性格。作为生物学概念,人格与种族成员相关。心的哲学家和心理学的哲学家乐于把人格作为研究心理学功能、才能和能力的心理学概念。道德哲学家感兴趣于伦理上的人格。政治的和社会的哲学家关注与政治或社会存在体相联系的个人。这样,人格概念具有不同的层次。

“人格是个人在对他自身理想的积极追求中所形成的人的潜能、活动和习惯的全体。”——阿诺德,见米谢尔:《人类活动》,1969年,第196页。

视域

罗素用此术语来指一切短暂的感觉材料集合,不管是知觉到的还是未知觉到的,它从某个特定的角度呈现了宇宙。罗素在这样使用此术语时,用到了心理学家在对殊相做分类时用的主观材料,它们对应于物理学家在对对象分类时用到的“事物”。罗素把实际知觉到的视域称为“私人世界”,这是一个知觉者在任意特定时刻所具有的世界观。个人生活中的整个视域就是此人的“传记”。

“我的全部当下感觉对象的集合,就是我称为的‘视域’。”——罗素:《神秘主义和逻辑》,1918年,第139页。

劝说定义

斯蒂文森所采用的术语。在定义那些既有描述意义(指一个事物的性质)又有很强的情感意义(表达或唤起情感状态)的术语时,我们可在该词的运用中改变其描述意义但保持其情感意义不变。劝说定义的目的是有意无意地寻求人们的态度和兴趣的改变。说者引入一种新的意义,听者接受了但没有意识到他已经受到了影响。例如,当希特勒宣称“国家社会主义是真正的民主”时,他正在运用一种劝说定义。

“劝说定义,如运用得巧妙,旨在重新引导

socialism is true democracy", he was employing a persuasive definition.

"A persuasive definition, tacitly employed, is at work in redirecting attitudes." —Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, 1944, p. 213.

Pessimism

[from Latin; *pessimus*, the worst] A term originally used for Schopenhauer's world-view in *The World as Will and Representation* (1844). He believed that this world is the worst of all possible worlds because it is determined by blind and irrational will. Hence hope is unreasonable, and life is nothing, empty, meaningless and painful. The term also applies to philosophies which emphasise nihilism, nothingness, anxiety, absurdity, and death, for example those of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre. In common use, pessimism is a negative and despondent attitude which focuses on the least hopeful side of situations. In contrast, optimism is a hopeful attitude which sees the world as meaningful. In a form proposed by Leibniz, optimism claims that this world is the best of all possible worlds.

"There are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism." —William James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 184.

Petitio principii, The Latin term for begging the question.

Phantom limb

A phenomenon which was first described and investigated by Descartes. If one's arm is amputated, one may afterwards feel that it is still there and feel pain in the non-existent fingers, wrist and forearm. This is because the nerves which previously connected the arm to the brain and which remain in the untouched part of the limb continue to send impulses like those normally caused by external stimulations. This phenomenon seems to have raised two problems for the philosophy of perception. First, it seems to indicate that sensations occur only in the brain and that the mind is not immediately affected by all parts of body, but only by the brain. Secondly, the mental states of phantom limb patients can be explained by psycho-physical laws. The pain this patient feels is akin to an hallucination. This last point suggests problems for the representative theory of perception.

"The brain— or some part of it— inadvertently played a mechanical trick on the mind. That was Descartes' explanation of phantom-limb hallucinations." —Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 1991, p. 8.

Phenomenal property, see qualia

态度。”——斯蒂文森：《伦理学与语言》，1944年，第213页。

悲观主义

[源自拉丁文 *pessimus*, 最坏的] 这一术语最初用来指叔本华在《作为意志和表象的世界》(1844)一书中阐述的世界观。他认为这个世界是所有可能的世界中最坏的世界，因为它是被盲目的和非理性意志所决定的。因此，希望是非理智的，生活是虚无的、空洞的、无意义的和痛苦的。这一术语也被用于那些强调虚无主义、虚幻、焦虑、荒谬和死亡的哲学，例如尼采、海德格尔、萨特的哲学。在通常的用法中，悲观主义是一种只看到事情最无希望一面的消极失望的态度。相比之下，乐观主义是一种把世界看做富有意义的怀有希望的态度。在莱布尼茨提出的一种形式中，乐观主义声称这个世界是所有可能世界中的最好的。

“一些不幸福的人认为拯救这个世界是不可能的。他们的看法被认为是悲观主义。”——詹姆斯：《实用主义》，1955年，184页。

窃取论题

“窃取论题 (begging the question)” 的拉丁词。

幻肢

由笛卡尔首先描述和研究的一个现象。如果一个人的手臂由于某种原因被截掉，这个人可能以后还会感到手臂仍在那里并感到不存在的手指、手腕和前臂在疼痛。这是因为保存在肢体未损坏部分的先前连结手臂与大脑的神经仍在传递通常由外部刺激所引起的冲动。这一现象对知觉哲学提出了两个问题。其一，它似乎表明感觉只发生于大脑，亦即，心不是直接受身体所有部分的影响，而只是受大脑的影响。其二，幻肢患者的心的状态可以用心物定律来解释。这个病人所感到的疼痛类似于幻觉。这最后一点对知觉的表征理论提出了一个问题。

“大脑——或它的某一部分——无意地对心玩了一个花招。那就是笛卡尔对幻肢幻觉的解释。”——丹奈特：《解释意识》，1991年，第8页。

现象特性

见“感受性”条。

Phenomenalism

Acceptance of the sense datum theory, according to which what we are directly aware of in perception is not the material object itself but rather *sensa*, renders problematic the nature and status of material objects as the cause of perception. Phenomenalism is one attempt to elucidate the nature of material objects by reducing them to sense-data. It is derived from Berkeley's immaterialism that holds only phenomena or sense-data can be known. There is no underlying substratum behind appearance. Reality is the totality of all actual and possible conscious experience, and cannot be said to exist independent of these experiences. Berkeley, unlike later phenomenologists, holds that material objects are combinations of actual sense impressions. As a consequence, he has to introduce God to preserve the continuity of objects and the existence of unobserved objects. Hume's claim that what we know to exist is nothing more than *sensa* occurring in various patterns or sequences raises the problem of what fills the gaps between actual *sensa*. J. S. Mill's position, which is called *factual phenomenalism*, is that material objects are permanent possibilities of sensation. Hence a material thing consists of a family of actual and possible sense-data. However, it sounds odd to say that possible sense-data are constituents of material things. Another way of filling the gap between actual *sensa*, called *sensibilism*, was developed by Russell (although he later abandoned it) and Price. On this view, *sensibilia* are unsensed sense-data, while sense-data amount to sensed *sensibilia*. Hence a material thing is described as a family of items with a similar status, except that sense-data are sensed and *sensibilia* are unsensed. The dominant version of phenomenalism to appear in this century was developed by the Logical Positivists and Operationalists and is called *linguistic phenomenalism* or *analytical phenomenalism*. This theory attempts to explain the notion of material object by reducing or translating all statements about material objects into statements about perceptual experience or *sensa*. The main difficulty with linguistic phenomenalism is that the equivalence between statements about *sensa* and statements about physical objects is hard to find. Phenomenalism is generally considered to be unsuccessful, for to specify the meaning of *sensa* and to distinguish one sense-datum from another always seems to involve reference to material things. Phenomenalism gives priority to experience and constructs the world out of it, but experience itself needs to be constructed out of the actual way of the world. Even Ayer, a chief proponent of linguistic phenomenalism, disavowed it in his later works.

"The phenomenalist is bound to hold that the identity of any physical body is subject to analysis in terms of sense-data." Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, 1956, p. 190.

现象主义

是对感觉材料论的接受。根据这种理论,我们在知觉中直接觉知的并非物质对象本身,而是感觉材料,这就使得物质对象作为知觉原因的本质和地位成了问题。现象主义是试图通过将物质对象还原为感觉材料来解释物质对象的本质的一个尝试。它源自巴克莱的非物质论,这个观点认为只有现象或感觉材料才是可知的。在外观的后面没有另外的根基。现实就是所有实际的与可能的意识经验的总和,不能独立于这些经验而存在。与后来的现象主义者不同,巴克莱认为,物质对象就是实际的感觉印象的组合。结果,他不得不引入上帝来保持对象的连续性和未观察到的对象的存在。休谟说道,我们所确知存在的只是以各种模式和顺序出现的感觉材料。这也导致填补实际的感觉材料之间的空缺问题。J. S. 密尔的观点被称为“事实现象主义”,他认为物质对象是“感觉的永久可能性”。因此一个物质的东西是由一族实际的和可能的感觉材料所组成的。然而,说可能的感觉材料是物质的东西的组成部分未免有些离奇。填补实际的感觉材料之间之空缺的另一方法是由罗素(尽管他后来放弃了这一观点)和普赖斯提出的“感觉主义”。这一观点认为,可感觉物是未感觉到的感觉材料,而感觉材料则相当于感觉到的可感觉物。因此一个物质的东西就被描述为一族具有相似地位的项目,只是感觉材料是被感觉到的,而可感觉物是未被感觉到的。出现于本世纪的主导的现象主义形式是逻辑实证主义者和操作主义者所提出的“语言现象主义”或“分析现象主义”。这一理论试图通过将所有关于物质对象的陈述还原或转译为关于知觉经验或感觉材料的陈述来解释物质对象概念。语言现象主义的主要困难在于,我们很难找到感觉陈述与关于物理对象的陈述之间的同义语。通常认为现象主义是不成功的,因为要区分感觉的意义并将一个感觉材料与另一个感觉材料区分开来似乎总是包含着对物质的东西的指称。现象主义给经验以优先地位并由它来建构世界,但经验本身却需要由世界的实际方式来建构。甚至语言现象主义的主要支持者之一艾耶尔也在其后期著作中拒斥它。

“现象主义者注定要认为,任何物理体的确认都要经受借助于感觉材料的分析。”——艾耶尔:《知识问题》,1956年,第190页。

Phenomenological epoche, see phenomenological reduction

Phenomenological reduction

The characteristic methodological procedure of Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenological reduction is a means of detecting the intentional or essential structure of experience. By turning away from the sense contents of my own stream of experiences, I can concentrate on what is essential, basic and irreducible in experience. The reduction moves from the empirical to the transcendental level and provides access to the intentional structure or *noematic* content of experience, which is the source of our knowledge of the world. The reduction contrasts to the reduction of all knowledge into certain basic or protocol sensory experiences or statements in phenomenism or logical positivism.

The basic instrument of phenomenological reduction is phenomenological *epoche* (Greek: holding back, hence suspension of judgement). In our cognitive relationship with the world, our natural attitude assumes the existence of the external spatio-temporal world and assumes the existence of ourselves as psycho-physical individuals. Husserl's phenomenological *epoche* "brackets" this natural attitude or puts it out of play. This bracketing does not deny the existence of the fact-world, but refrains from any judgement regarding the world and our own physical being within it. For Husserl, we can thus regard our experience in a different manner and enter the region of transcendently purified experiences. We can consider consciousness strictly as intentional agency, also called "transcendental consciousness", "pure consciousness" or "absolute consciousness". We are in a position to have *eidetic* or essential intuition towards the intentional structures of experience.

Phenomenological *epoche* is also called transcendental reduction. This is what phenomenological reduction normally means, but sometimes Husserl broadens its reference to include *eidetic* intuition as well. The whole programme is influenced by the Cartesian method of doubt and is intended to provide an absolutely certain grounds for knowledge.

"On grounds of method this operation will split up into different steps of 'disconnexion' or 'bracketing', and thus our method will assume the character of a graded reduction. For this reason we propose to speak, and even preponderantly, of phenomenological reductions (though, in respect of their unity as a whole, we would speak in unitary form of the phenomenological reduction)." —Husserl, *Ideas* (tr. Kersten), 1982, sect. 33.

Phenomenology

[from Greek *phainomenon*: to appear + *logos*: theory, literally, a theory of appearance] The idea of phenomenology can be traced to Aristotle's "saving the *phainomena*", but the

现象学的悬置

见“现象学还原”条。

现象学的还原

胡塞尔现象学特有的方法论步骤。现象学的还原是一个探测体验的意向结构或本质结构的方式。通过撇开我自己的体验流中的感官内容,我就能专注于这体验中本质性的、基本的和不可还原的东西了。这还原从经验的层次移向先验的层次,使得我们可以达到体验的意向结构或意向对象的内容;而这结构或内容乃是我们关于这个世界的知识的源头。这种还原与现象主义或逻辑实证主义中那种将所有知识还原为某些基本的或记录式的感觉经验或陈述的做法正相反对。

现象学还原的基本方式是现象学的悬置(*epoche*,这个词为希腊文,意味着“抑制”,衍变为“判断的中止”)。在我们与世界的认知关系中,我们的自然态度预设了外部时空世界的实存,并预设了作为心理及肉身个体的我们自身的实存。胡塞尔的现象学悬置将这种自然态度“放进括弧之中”或让它失去作用。这种放进括弧的悬置并不否认事实世界的实存,只是抑制住关于这个世界和我们在其中的身体存在的判断。这样,在胡塞尔看来,我们就能以不同的方式来看待我们的体验,进入被先验地纯粹化了的体验领域。我们于是能将意识严格地视为意向机能,也叫做“先验的意识”、“纯意识”或“绝对意识”。我们就这样处在了一个让本质直观面对体验的意向结构的地位上。

现象学的悬置也叫做“先验的还原”。这就是“现象学的还原”一般所意味的,但有时胡塞尔扩大了它的指称范围,将本质直观也包括了进来。这整个学说受到笛卡尔的怀疑方法的影响,意在为知识提供一个绝对确实的基础。

“作为方法,这种操作(即悬置)将分为‘分离’或‘加括弧’的不同步骤;因此,我们的方法将具有分级还原的特点。出于这个理由,我们要谈论、甚至是强调复数形式的现象学还原(尽管就其全体的统一性而言,我们将以合一的方式谈论现象学的还原)。”——胡塞尔:《观念》(克尔斯滕英译),1982年,第33节。

现象学

[源自希腊文 *phainomenon* (显现) 和 *logos* (理论);字面意思为“关于显现的理论”]关于现象学的观念可追溯到亚里士多德的“从赫拉

word was first used by J. H. Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff, in his *Neues Organon* (1764), meaning the study of the forms of appearances and illusions. Kant took over this word, claiming that phenomenology determined the principles of sensibility and understanding which can be applied only to the world of appearance and not to things-in-themselves. Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* brought this word into prominence. However, for Hegel, phenomena are not illusions or appearances. They are stages in the development of knowledge, in the manifestations of which Spirit itself appears, and are the expressions of a self-developing Absolute idea. Phenomenology is therefore the study of the evolutionary process of consciousness from its simplest to its most sophisticated forms. The American pragmatist C. S. Peirce developed in his early work a kind of phenomenology, also called "phaneroscopy", as a system of categories to classify the main types of phenomena that make up the world.

Phenomenology in its most popular sense refers to an influential philosophical movement, founded by Edmund Husserl and developed in Germany by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger and in France by Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It has gradually fused with Existentialism and Hermeneutics. In this sense, Phenomenology is a philosophy of consciousness concerned with the truth or rationale of immediate experience. Originally, Husserl conceived phenomenology as a philosophical method to reveal and elucidate the internal structures and essential features of various types of experience. Through analysis of this sort, one could discover the ultimate sources of our knowledge, especially the fundamental logical and epistemological categories. In his later stage, Husserl considered phenomenology to be first philosophy, which could describe the region of pure experience in which all sciences are rooted and provide a unified theory of science and knowledge. Husserl's phenomenology was deeply influenced by Descartes' demand that knowledge be clear and distinct and opposed relying on any *a priori* assumption that has to be justified elsewhere. Phenomenology in this sense differs from studies that seek to explain things, for example, from their causal relations or evolutionary origins. Its slogan is "to the things (phenomena) themselves". Husserl emphasised the function of intuition in achieving insights into the essential structures of experience. Phenomenology characteristically emphasises the intentionality of consciousness. Its philosophical novelty is the demonstration that intentional objects of every sort, existing and non-existing, can and should be described in their own right. Phenomenology can be contrasted with analytical philosophy, which is concerned with the analysis of propositions, although J. L. Austin sometimes called his work linguistic phenomenology.

Heidegger analysed the two components of the word "phenomenology". On his analysis, *phenomenon* means that

克利特的“流变”中“拯救现象”之说，但这个词首先是由 J. H. 朗姆贝特（他是沃尔夫的一个追随者）在其《新工具论》（1764 年）中使用的，意味着对显露和假象诸形式的研究。康德采用了这个词，认为现象学的任务是确定感觉和知性的原则；这些原则只适用于显现的世界，不可用于物自身。黑格尔的《精神现象学》使这个词获得了突出的地位。然而，对黑格尔来说，现象不是假象或显露，它们是在知识的发展中、在精神显示自身的展现中的各个阶段，并且是自身发展着的绝对理念的表达。现象学因此就是对意识的进化过程，即从最简单到最复杂形式的过程的研究。美国实用主义者 C. S. 皮尔士在他的早期著作中提出了一种现象学，也被他称作“phaneroscopy”（显象学）；将它当做对于那构成了这世界的主要现象类型进行分类的范畴系统。

现象学在它最广为人知的意义上指的是一个影响深远的哲学运动，由 E. 胡塞尔建立，在德国由 M. 舍勒、N. 哈特曼和 M. 海德格尔发展，在法国为 G. 马塞尔、J.-P. 萨特和 M. 梅洛-庞蒂所阐发。它逐渐地与生存主义和解释学融合。在这个意义上，现象学是一种关于意识的哲学，涉及直接体验的真理和原则。一开始，胡塞尔将现象学设想为一种揭示和说明不同的体验类型的内在结构和本质特点的哲学方法。通过这种分析，我们能够发现知识的最终源头，特别是基本的逻辑和认识论的范畴。在他的后期阶段，胡塞尔将现象学看做第一哲学，它可描述所有的科学都植根于其中的纯粹体验的领域，并为科学和知识提供一个统一理论。胡塞尔的现象学受到笛卡尔这样一个要求的深刻影响，即知识必须是清楚明白的，不可依赖于任何还要在其他地方被证实的先天假设。在这个意义上，现象学不同于那些去解释事物的研究，比如那些从因果关系或进化来源方面对事物的解释研究。它的口号是：“到事情（现象）本身中去。”胡塞尔强调直觉在获得对体验的本质结构的洞察方面的功能。现象学特别强调意识的意向性。它的哲学新颖性在于表明每一种意向对象，不管是实存的还是非实存的，都能够并且应该以其自身的方式被描述。现象学与关心命题分析的分析哲学极为不同，尽管 J. L. 奥斯汀有时也称他的工作为语言现象学。

海德格尔分析了“现象学”这个词中的两个成分。在他的分析中，“现象”（*phenomenon*）意味着“那在自身中显示自身者”；“学”或“逻各斯”（*logos*）从 *legomenon*，即“那被显示者”这个词来。他的结论是现象学意味着“让那在自身中显示自身者被从其自身看到”。因此，现象学仅仅是一种方法，它告诉人们一个研究应该如何去进行，而不是什么东西应该被研究。这个方

which shows itself in itself and *logos* is derived from *legomenon*, that which is exhibited. He concludes that phenomenology means "to let that which shows itself in itself be seen from itself". Accordingly, phenomenology is merely a method, which prescribes how a study should be conducted rather than what should be studied. The method indicates that any subject-matter must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. Heidegger called his own approach to *Dasein* and Being "hermeneutic phenomenology". Here "hermeneutic" does not refer to a method for uncovering the meaning embodied in an expression, but to the constitution of *Dasein*. The whole expression refers to a method by which Being can be approached or brought to self showing.

"Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experience in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them." —Husserl, *Logical Investigations II* (tr. by Findlay), 1970, p. 862.

Phenomenon

[From Greek: *phainomenon*, what appears by itself, hence appearance] Perceptual appearance in general, that is what may be observed and how things look. For Aristotle, all the widely accepted beliefs, things commonly held as well as the beliefs of the wise about a certain matter, are also phenomena. In this latter sense, phenomenon means the same as *legomenon* (what is said) and *endoxa* (common belief). Phenomena of this kind were taken by Aristotle to be the starting-point of dialectical argument. He claimed that a good theory should start from the phenomena and insofar as possible should be consistent with the phenomena and explain the phenomena. This is what he called saving the phenomena. A scientific theory should enable us to understand the empirical phenomena, and a philosophical theory should enable us to understand the phenomena in the sense of common beliefs.

"This view [that there is no weakness of will] plainly contradicts the phenomena." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145b27.

Philanthropy

[from Greek *philos*, love + *anthropos*, man, loving one's fellow men] A synonym for love, benevolence, altruism and charity. Philanthropy is regarded as a virtue, especially in Christian ethics. In modern times, the term is used for large-scale actions to help those who are poor and in need. Sometimes, governmental agencies offering social support, such as the social welfare or health systems are regarded as socially philanthropic institutions. Some occupations in the areas of health, education, welfare or social work are associated with a philanthropic vocation.

法指出, 必须直接展示和直接表明任何被讨论的主题。海德格尔称他自己对缘在 (*Dasein*) 和存在的探讨为“解释学的现象学”。这里, “解释学”并不意味着那种揭示隐含在某种表达中的意义的方法, 而是指缘在的构成。这个表达式 [解释学的现象学] 指一种能够进入存在或让存在自身显现的方法。

“因此, 现象学是关于普遍意义上的体验的理论, 包括所有在体验中被给予的并可在体验中被明白发现的东西, 不管它是实在的还是意向的。”——胡塞尔:《逻辑研究》第二卷 (芬德雷英译), 1970 年, 第 862 页。

现象

[源自希腊文 *phainomenon*, “显现自身的东西”, 等于“表象”] 它一般意为感知表象, 即可以感觉到的东西和事物所看起来的样子。对亚里士多德来说, 一切广泛接受的信仰, 共同认可的东西, 以及聪明人对某些事物的看法, 也都是现象。在这后一种意义上, 现象就等同于 *legomenon* (所说的东西) 和 *endoxa* (共同信仰)。这类现象被亚里士多德看做是辩证论证的出发点。他认为, 一个好的理论应当从现象出发, 尽可能地与现象相一致, 并解释现象。这便是他所谓的“拯救现象”。一个科学理论应使我们明白经验现象, 而一个哲学理论应使我们明白共同信仰意义上的现象。

“[说意志薄弱不存在] 这样一种观点显然与现象相矛盾。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1145b27。

慈善

[源自希腊文 *philos* (爱) 和 *anthropos* (人), 即爱同胞] 爱、仁慈、利他主义和博爱的同义词。慈善被认为是一种美德, 特别是在基督教伦理学中。在当代, 这一术语用来指大范围地帮助那些贫穷的、有困难的人的行为。有时政府机构提供的社会帮助, 如社会福利制度或国家医疗保险制度被认为是社会慈善机构。一些卫生、教育、福利或社会工作领域的职业是与慈善行业相联系的。

“如果社会工作想要存在下去, 那么就必须

"If social work is to exist at all, there have to be either private philanthropists or a system of imposing philanthropy on the general public by means of taxes." —Downie and Telfer, *Caring and Curing*, 1980, p. 12.

Philia

[Greek: friendship, derived from *philein*, love, but without sexual implications. Empedocles uses a slightly different term *philotes* (also love or friendship) which, in opposition to *neikos* (strife), is the unifying principle of elements.] *Philia* is an affectionate personal relationship, requiring some degree of mutual goodwill, mutual recognition and shared activities. *Philia*, which is much broader than our current notion of friendship, includes the love of members of families for each other, the favourable attitudes of business partners and of fellow citizens for each other, and the mutual admiration between virtuous men for virtuous character. *Philia* is a major topic in Greek ethics, for it is taken as a kind of virtue and as a necessary condition for happiness. Aristotle chiefly distinguishes three types of friendship: for pleasure, for usefulness and for goodness. While the first two kinds are incidental, the last kind is complete and perfect, especially between virtuous men. Each virtuous person wishes the other to be good for the good of the other party itself. The root of the perfect friendship is to take the friend as another self, with friendship being a kind of self-love of a good man. Aristotle's discussion of friendship seems to offer an approach for breaking the antithesis between egoism and altruism and therefore attracts much current attention. Friendship is also a major topic in contextualist and feminist approaches to moral philosophy.

"The defining features of *philia* (friendship) that are found in friendship to one's neighbours would seem to be derived from features of friendship towards oneself." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a1-2.

Philosophe

[French: philosopher] The eighteenth century French thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Montesquieu, Helvetius, Condillac, D'Holbach, and other Encyclopedists. These philosophers are generally materialists, atheists and liberals. They believed in the strength of reason and scientific knowledge and intended to judge everything in accordance with the measure of reason.

"The French philosophes of the eighteenth century were the examples we sought to imitate, and we hope to accomplish no less results." — *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, I, p. 111.

Philosopher-king, see guardians

有私人慈善家，或有通过税收手段强加于一般大众的慈善制度。”——道尼和特尔弗：《关怀和治疗》，1980年，第12页。

友情

[希腊语，指友谊，源自 *philein* 一词，意思是没有性爱的爱或爱情。恩培多克勒使用了一个稍有差异的词 *philote*，意思是指友爱或友谊。这种友爱与冲突 (*neikos*) 相对立，是统一诸要素的原理] 友情表示一种友爱的人际关系，需要某种程度的相互友善、相互承认和协同活动。友情的内涵要比现行的友谊观念更为广泛，包括家庭成员之间的爱护，商务伙伴与同胞之间的友好态度以及有德之士对道德品格的相互仰慕等等。在希腊伦理学中，友情是一个主要话题，因为它是一种美德，是幸福的必要条件。亚里士多德主要区分了三种友情：为了愉快的友情，为了有用的友情和为了善的友情。前两种友情是偶然发生的，后一种友情才是完美的，尤其是在有德之士之间。每位有德之士都期望他人善待对方。完美友情的根源在于把朋友当做另一个自我，将友情视为善者的一种自爱。亚里士多德在论述友情时提出了一种打破自我主义与利他主义彼此对立的方法，因此十分引人注目。在研究道德哲学的语境主义和女性主义方法中，友情也是主要的话题。

“友情的决定性特征存在于对邻居的友情之中，这一点源自对待自己的友情特征。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1166a1-2。

启蒙哲学家

[法语，哲学家] 18世纪法国启蒙运动思想家，诸如伏尔泰、卢梭、狄德罗、孟德斯鸠、爱尔维修、孔迪亚克、霍尔巴赫，以及其他百科全书派人物。这些哲学家一般都是唯物主义者、无神论者和自由主义者。他们相信理性和科学知识的力量，并试图依据理性的尺度评判一切。

“18世纪法国哲学家是我们追求效仿的榜样，我们希望取得他们那样多的成就。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第一卷，第111页。

哲学王

见“护卫者”条。

Philosophia perennis

[Latin: perennial philosophy] A metaphysical thesis that there is a single Divine reality as an impersonal Absolute is common to all great Western and Eastern religions. The soul is the divine spark of light in our body, and by means of its contemplative practice we can have mystical access to this divine reality. The term and the basic idea can be traced to Leibniz, but the thesis was fully explicated by Aldous Huxley in *The Perennial Philosophy* (1946). According to Huxley, perennial philosophy unifies all religions with the consequence that there is only one sort of mysticism or fundamental metaphysics. Opponents argue that the thesis wrongly amalgamates different strands of mysticism.

"*Philosophia perennis*—the phrase was coined by Leibniz, but the thing—the metaphysic that recognises a divine reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or even identical with, divine reality; the ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent ground of all being—the thing is immemorial and universal." —Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, 1945, vii.

Philosophical anthropology

[from Greek: *anthropos*, man] The comprehensive study of human nature, which considers each human being as a biological, psychological, cultural, social and religious complex, in contrast to the simplicity of God and to the traditional rationalist view of man as an exclusively rational being. All discussions about man as such belong to philosophical anthropology, and in this broad sense it is as old as philosophy itself. Kant considered anthropology to be a pragmatic branch of philosophy concerning "what man as a freely acting entity makes of himself or can and should make of himself". Feuerbach took anthropology as a synonym for philosophy. Based on the German philosophical tradition, Max Scheler introduced philosophical anthropology in *Man's Place in Nature* (1928) as a special discipline. This discipline was a synthesis of Dilthey's life philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology, but also embraced most of the social sciences. Scheler attempted to discover the basic structure of human nature and accordingly to explain human existence, experiences, potentialities and various other aspects of human activities. He also sought to establish philosophical anthropology as the foundation of other social sciences in virtue of its central aim of achieving human self-understanding. Consistent with this aim, Scheler used philosophical anthropology to criticise his contemporary bourgeois society in terms of the theory of alienation of Hegel and Marx. Other major figures of philosophical anthropology include Plessner, Gehlen, Cassirer and Sartre. As an interdisciplinary study, philosophical anthropology has practitioners in many areas and has developed various approaches to the study of man.

永恒哲学

[拉丁语,永恒哲学]一个形而上学论题,其主张是:存在着一个单一的神圣实在,作为非人格的绝对,它对西方和东方的一切大的宗教都是共同的。灵魂是我们体内的神圣火花,依靠它的沉思实践,我们能够神秘地达到这个神圣的实在。这个术语及其基本观念可以追溯到莱布尼茨,但是,该论题的充分阐释,却是由 A. 赫胥黎在其《永恒哲学》(1946)一书中完成的。按照赫胥黎的观点,永恒哲学统一所有的宗教,因此,只存在着一种神秘主义或根本形而上学。但是,反对者们认为这个论题错误地混淆了神秘主义的不同标准。

"*Philosophia perennis* 是由莱布尼茨生造的一个短语,但是那个东西——形而上学认作是作为事物、生命和精神世界实体的神圣实在;心理学发现它是灵魂中的某个相似于、甚或同一于神圣实在的东西;伦理学将其视作人的终极目的置于一切存在内在的、超验的根据的知识中——那个东西是恒古的、普遍的。"——赫胥黎:《永恒哲学》,1946年, vii。

哲学人类学

[源自希腊文 *anthropos*, 人] 对人的本质的综合研究,它把每个人视为生物的、心理的、文化的、社会的和宗教的复合体,这与上帝缩影的观点和把人视为惟一理性存在物的传统理性主义观点形成对照。所有关于这样的人的讨论都属于哲学人类学,从广义上讲,它和哲学本身一样久远。康德把人类学看做是哲学的一个实用分支,它关心的是"作为自由行动存在物的人塑造自身,或能够和应当塑造自身"。费尔巴哈把人类学作为哲学的同义词。在德国哲学传统的基础上, M. 舍勒在他的《人在宇宙中的地位》(1928)一书中提出了作为一门特殊学科的哲学人类学。这一学科是狄尔泰的生命哲学和胡塞尔的现象学的综合,但也包含绝大部分社会科学。舍勒试图发现人的本质的基本结构,从而解释人的存在、经验、潜能和人的活动的其他各方面。他还试图把哲学人类学确立为其他社会科学的基础,其根据是哲学人类学的中心目的是达到人的自我理解。与这一目的相一致,舍勒还根据黑格尔和马克思的异化理论,将哲学人类学用于对当代资本主义社会的批判。哲学人类学的其他主要代表人物包括普莱斯特纳、盖伦、卡西尔和萨特。作为一门交叉学科,哲学人类学在很多领域都有实践者并发展出各种不同的研究人的方法。

"理论家们对人们具有的(他们的'哲学人类学',就像人们称呼的那样)愿望和要求存在争执,而且常常是强烈的争执,但没有一方怀疑,只要人们的要求和信念能够一致,他们的行

"The theorists disagree, often very strongly, over the wants and desires that people have (their 'philosophical anthropology', as it is often termed), but neither side doubts that if only people's wants and beliefs could be identified their action would be intelligible." Yearley, *Science and Sociological Practice*, 1984, p. 88.

Philosophical behaviourism, see behaviourism

Philosophical hermeneutics, see hermeneutics

Philosophical logic

Russell's term for the study of philosophical problems arising from applying formal logic to natural language. It does not contain formal logical systems themselves, and it is not confined to arguments which formal logic has codified. In British philosophy, philosophical logic is considered to be a basic philosophical discipline, concerned with the analysis of key notions indispensable to rational thinking such as analyticity, necessity, definition, description, entailment, existence, identity, reference, predication, proposition, quantification, truth, meaning, negation and existential statements. Many problems in philosophical logic are intertwined with other branches of philosophy, especially with epistemology and ontology.

Some scholars suggest that philosophical logic can also be called "philosophy of logic". But others try to distinguish them on the grounds that philosophical logic is a philosophy interested in language, thought and the world structure, while philosophy of logic is the study of the scope and nature of logic systems, especially philosophical issues arising from non-standard logic.

"The contrast between philosophical logic and philosophy of logic can accordingly be put like this: when one does philosophy of logic, one is philosophising about logic; but when one does philosophical logic, one is philosophising." Grayling, *An Introduction to Philosophical Logic*, 1982, p. 15.

Philosophical psychology, see philosophy of psychology

Philosophical radicals

A group of political and economic liberals deeply influenced by Jeremy Bentham and active in London in the first half of the nineteenth century, including the philosopher James Mill and later his son John Stuart Mill, legal philosopher John Austin, economist David Ricardo, lawyer E. Chadwick and classical historian George Grote. They criticised the evils existing in the government and social policies

of just what is understandable."——耶利:《科学和社会学实践》,1984年,第88页。

哲学行为主义

见“行为主义”条。

哲学解释学

见“解释学”条。

哲学逻辑

罗素的术语,指把形式逻辑应用于自然语言而产生的哲学问题的研究。它并不包含形式逻辑体系本身,也不限于形式逻辑已经整理过的证明。在英国哲学中,哲学逻辑被视为基本的哲学学科,它涉及对理性思维不可缺少的关键概念的分析,如分析性,必然性,定义,描述,衍推,存在,同一性,指称,谓词,命题,量词限定,真,意义,否定,存在陈述等概念。哲学逻辑中的许多问题与哲学的其他部门相互联结,特别与认识论和本体论密切相关。

某些学者提出,哲学逻辑也可称为“逻辑哲学”。但是其他学者对它们作出区分,根据是,哲学逻辑是研究语言、思想和世界结构的哲学,而逻辑哲学是对逻辑系统的本性和范围,特别是从非规范逻辑中产生的哲学问题的研究。

“哲学逻辑和逻辑哲学因此能这样对比:当某人做逻辑哲学时,那么他就是在做关于逻辑的哲学研究;但是当某人做哲学逻辑时,那么他就是在做哲学研究。”——格雷林:《哲学逻辑导论》,1982年,第15页。

哲学心理学

见“心理学哲学”条。

哲学激进主义者

一群深受J. 边沁影响,于19世纪上半叶活跃于伦敦的哲学和经济学的自由主义者,包括哲学家詹姆斯·密尔和他的儿子约翰·斯图亚特·密尔,法哲学家J. 奥斯汀,经济学家D. 李嘉图,律师E. 查德威克和古典历史学家G. 格罗特。他们批判当时存在于不列颠政府和社会政策中的弊病,认为所有这些弊病在于政府、

of Britain at that time and believed that the source of all evils lay in the aristocratic principle adopted by the government, economic monopolies and the established church. The group embraced Bentham's utilitarianism, Adam Smith's economics, Austin's rational jurisprudence and J. S. Mill's rationale for democracy. They tried to provide a justification for radically transforming the traditional aristocratic regime into a modern, secular, democratic market society. This group exerted great influence upon British philosophy and political life.

"Those whom... we call philosophic radicals are those who in politics observe the common practice of philosophers—that is, who, when they are discussing means, begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of cause." —*The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, VI, p. 353.

Philosophical theology

A contemporary discipline largely derived from the methods and subject-matter of natural theology. It employs standard techniques of reasoning and makes use of every possible consideration to justify theistic belief and to examine the coherence and implications of various traditional theistic doctrines. It aims to clarify the content of the central concepts, presuppositions and tenets of theological commitment. Its main questions include the concept of God, the nature of divine attributes, the source of our ideas of God, proofs of the existence of God, the nature of divine knowledge, the essence of divine creation, God's relation to time, and God's relation to human beings. It differs from the philosophy of religion in that it is not a neutral discussion about theism, but presupposes the existence of God. It is essentially a way of using philosophy to do theology rather than an independent philosophical enterprise.

"Philosophical theology is a species contained within the theological genus. Insofar as its specific difference is that it makes use of philosophical methods and techniques to explicate the meaning or to discover the implications of theological doctrines, it continues to stand within [the] 'theological circle'." — Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, 1968, p. 10.

Philosophy (Kant)

Kant held that philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists concretely, but which we can endeavour to approximate by many different routes. What we learn is not philosophy itself, but how to philosophise by exercising our talent to reason on certain actually existing philosophical attempts. Since human reason is always active, it is impossible to offer an ultimate and dogmatic answer to the question of what philosophy is and who possesses it. That would mean the end of philosophising and hence the

经济垄断组织和国教奉行的贵族统治原则。这些人信奉边沁的功利主义、A. 斯密的经济学、奥斯汀的理性法学和 J. S. 密尔对民主的理论说明。他们力图为将传统的贵族统治的社会转变为现代的、世俗的和民主的市场社会而进行的激进的变革提供论证。这些人对英国的哲学和政治生活产生了重大的影响。

“那些我们称之为哲学激进主义者的人，是在政治上奉行哲学家的通常习惯的人——就是说，当他们讨论手段时，是从考虑目的入手，当他们期望产生结果时，思考的是原因。”——《J. S. 密尔著作集》，第六卷，第 353 页。

哲学神学

一门当代的学科，很大程度上以自然神学的方法和主题为基础。它使用标准的推理技巧，应用每种可能的材料，为有神论的信条提供证明，并考察各种传统的有神论学说的统一性和复杂含义。它的目的，是要弄清神学信奉的主要概念、假设和教义的内容。它的主要问题包括上帝的概念、神性的本性、我们的上帝观念的来源、上帝存在的证据、神圣知识的本性、神圣创造的本质、上帝与时间的关系、上帝与人类的关系等等。它与宗教哲学的区别在于，它不是中立地讨论有神论，而是以上帝存在为前提条件。它本质上是以哲学的方式来建构神学，而不是一种独立的哲学事业。

“哲学神学是包含在神学这个属内的一个种。虽然它的种差是运用哲学的方法和技巧来阐释神学学说的意义或发现神学学说的蕴意，但它依旧处在‘神学圈’内。”——费勒：《现代宗教哲学基础》，1968 年，第 10 页。

哲学（康德）

康德认为，哲学只是一可能科学的观念，它并非具体地存在于任何地方，但我们可以通过不同的途径来努力接近它。我们所学的不是哲学本身，而是如何进行哲学思考，即在某些已存在的哲学尝试中去锻炼我们的推理能力。因为人类理性总是主动的，对“什么是哲学”和“谁拥有哲学”的问题作出最终的和独断性的回答是不可能的。那意味着哲学思考的终结，因而是哲学的死亡。

death of philosophy.

Accordingly, for Kant philosophy is an activity of reason rather than a static body of knowledge. He thought that the scholastic tradition took philosophy to be the logical perfection of knowledge, but another conception which forms the real basis of philosophy takes it as a science for relating all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason. The so-called philosopher is the lawgiver of human reason. Philosophical knowledge can arise either out of pure reason or empirical inquiry. Kant's own philosophy is systematic, attempting to answer all the questions of philosophy in a single scheme, and critical, determining the limits as well as the extent of our knowledge through an examination of reason by itself.

Kant divided the philosophy of pure reason into a propaedeutic, which deals with the *a priori* knowledge of the faculty of reason, and metaphysics as the system of pure reason. The latter is divided into the metaphysics of nature, which is concerned with what is, and the metaphysics of morals, which is concerned with what ought to be. They are respectively the theoretical and practical employment of pure reason.

"The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, ... the philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals that which ought to be." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A840/B868.

Philosophy (Logical Positivism)

On the basis of a strong conviction that science serves as a paradigm for all knowledge, Logical Positivism requires philosophy to have scientific standards of precision and objectivity. There are only two kinds of statements that meet the strict standards of science, that is *a priori* statements of logic and pure mathematics, and empirical statements. Thus, most of the statements in traditional metaphysics and moral philosophy cannot constitute knowledge and should be eliminated. The positive role of philosophy is concerned with the logical analysis of the rules and frameworks of scientific theory and language and is a department of logic. Philosophy must employ scientific method to provide knowledge, and epistemology is nothing more than the philosophy of science.

"Once philosophy is purified of all scientific elements, only the logic of science remains." —Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 279.

Philosophy (Ryle)

To clarify the nature of philosophy was one of Ryle's major concerns. Logical Positivism had dethroned philosophy from its position of priority regarding the sciences, and Ryle tried to show what is left for philosophy to do. He held that Philosophy does not have its own domain and is not concerned with the problems of entities. It is a meta occupation

因此对于康德来说,哲学是一种理性的活动,而不是一静态的知识系统。他认为,经院哲学的传统把哲学作为知识的逻辑完满,但构成哲学真正基础的另一概念是把它看做连接一切知识与人类理性本质目的的科学。所谓的哲学家乃是人类理性的立法者。哲学知识既可产生于纯粹理性,也可产生于经验研究。康德自己的哲学是体系性的,企图以单一的模式回答所有的哲学问题;其哲学又是批判的,它通过对理性自身的考察来规定我们知识的界限和范围。

康德把纯粹理性哲学划分为涉及理性官能的先天知识的预备性学科,和作为纯粹理性体系的形而上学。后者又依次划分为论及“什么是”的自然形而上学和涉及“什么应当是”的道德形而上学。它们分别是纯粹理性的理论应用和实践应用。

“人类理性之立法(哲学)有两大目标,即自然和自由……自然哲学论究一切存在(是),道德哲学论究什么应该存在。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A840/B868。

哲学(逻辑实证主义)

逻辑实证主义相信,科学可以作为一切知识的范例。根据这种坚定的信念,它要求哲学也应该具有精确性和客观性这样的科学标准。而只有两种陈述满足这样严格的科学标准,即先天的逻辑和纯数学陈述以及经验陈述。因而,传统形而上学和道德哲学中的大多数陈述都不能构成知识,应该被清除掉。哲学的积极作用是关于对科学理论和语言的结构与规则的逻辑分析,是逻辑的一部分。哲学必须用科学的方法提供知识,而认识论则只是科学哲学。

“一旦哲学清除了一切科学成分,那么剩下的就只能是关于科学的逻辑。”——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第279页。

哲学(赖尔)

澄清哲学的本质是赖尔所关心的主要问题。逻辑实证主义已经否认了哲学对科学的优先性,而赖尔则试图表明哲学还可以做什么。他认为哲学没有它自己的领域,而且也不关心存在问题。它是一个超职业,它所要做的就是揭示支持我们的日常或科学语言的表面语法的逻辑

and an activity with the role of laying bare the logical categories which underlie the surface grammar of our ordinary or scientific language. This is necessary because these logical structure are often hidden or distorted by surface grammar. Philosophy has the function of mapping and comparing the logical geography of concepts and clarifying the connections between concepts. In brief, the task of philosophy is not to discover truth about the world but to re-arrange and analyse language in order to reveal its correct logical form or real meaning. It is not an empirical science, but is closely associated with a logic of diverse categories or forms. Ryle's work was a major example of the linguistic turn taken by English-speaking philosophy in this century.

"Science talks about the world, while philosophy talks about talk about the world." — Ryle, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, p. 237.

Philosophy (Wittgenstein)

Philosophy does not present any picture of reality, and it can neither explain nor deduce anything. In trying to do so, philosophy becomes traditional metaphysics, which can give no meaning to its expressions. Proper philosophy should stop this misleading way of working. Philosophy is different from the natural sciences and shares no method with them. It can neither confirm nor refute scientific investigations. Since the whole of natural science is constituted by the totality of true propositions, philosophical propositions are not truths.

Philosophy is an activity rather than a theory and aims to cure us of the misuse of ordinary language by means of clarifying propositions. Most traditional philosophical questions are generated through the misuse of language, and hence we should not seek to answer them (the solutions for them do not exist). We should rather treat the questions as we treat illness. We should make the questions disappear by showing how they violate logical syntax. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein proposes that the way to clarify language is to reveal its hidden structure, but in *Philosophical Investigations* he turns to the study of language-games to clarify language.

"All philosophy is a 'critique of language'." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.0031.

Philosophy of art, see aesthetics

Philosophy of biology

A relatively independent area of the philosophy of science dealing with philosophical issues arising from biological studies. Because of certain characteristics of biological inquiry, philosophy of biology is more than the mere application of general principles of scientific explanation. Biology explains a trait of an organism in terms of its function to pro-

vide. This is necessary, because these logical structures are often masked or distorted by surface grammar. Philosophy has the function of mapping and comparing the logical geography of concepts and clarifying the connections between concepts. In brief, the task of philosophy is not to discover truth about the world but to re-arrange and analyse language in order to reveal its correct logical form or real meaning. It is not an empirical science, but is closely associated with a logic of diverse categories or forms. Ryle's work was a major example of the linguistic turn taken by English-speaking philosophy in this century.

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See "Aesthetics" entry.

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more the well being, development or survival of that organism, its genes or its species. This functional explanation seems to explain a cause by its effect and hence to differ from a standard causal explanation which explains an effect by its cause and it also differs from the covering law model of explanation. The nature of functional or teleological explanation and its rationality therefore become major topics in the field. Many philosophers argue that we should understand biological traits in terms of the past evolutionary history of the organism rather than in terms of their future consequences. On this view, functional explanation can be assimilated to a causal account. Other philosophers of biology argue for an autonomous level of functional explanation which cannot be reduced to ordinary causality. Darwin's theory of evolution led to the formulation of various philosophical problems concerning for example the logic of natural selection and the implications of the concepts of adaptation and fitness. In a sense, philosophy of biology is the discussion of the philosophical problems raised by the theory of evolution. The biological classification of species had been a paradigm of philosophical classification of reality. Darwin suggested that species themselves evolve. The features of a species are not eternal, and the distinctions between species are not fixed. This evolutionary perspective has seriously transformed our understanding of the structure of the world. From the theory of evolution, philosophers have developed evolutionary epistemology, which attempts to explain cognitive faculties, knowledge acquisition and the progress of knowledge in terms of the process of natural selection. Philosophers have also proposed an evolutionary ethics, which claims that what we ought to do should be determined on an evolutionary basis according the principle of the survival of the fittest. Evolutionary ethics can also have a less controversial role in explaining the pattern of our ethical thinking in terms of our being members of a particular naturally evolved species. Some philosophers also attempt to explain social, cultural and psychological phenomena in terms of biological structure in a reductionist approach called socio-biology.

"Evolutionary biology is the centre of gravity for both the science of biology and for the philosophy of the science. The philosophy of biology does not end with evolutionary issues, but that is where I think it begins." - Sober, *Philosophy of Biology*, 1993, xix.

Philosophy of education

A branch of applied philosophy dealing with philosophical issues in education. Although philosophy of education can be traced to Plato's *Republic*, it did not become a specific branch of philosophy until the beginning of the twentieth century. Interacting with political philosophy, the philosophy of education attempts to work out a conception of education which is suitable for contemporary liberal society. In

说明原因,因而不同于通常的从其原因来说明效果的标准因果说明,也不同于说明的覆盖律模型。这种功能的或目的论的说明的本性及其合理性问题,因而成为这一领域的一个主要论题。许多哲学家论证说,我们应当按照有机体过去的进化史,而不是按它未来的结果来理解生物学特性。按这种观点,功能说明能同化为一种因果说明。而另一些生物学哲学家则主张一种不能归结为一般因果性的自主性层次的功能说明。达尔文进化论导致了种种哲学问题的提出,例如自然选择的逻辑、适应和合目的性概念的涵义等。在某种意义上,生物学哲学就是有关进化论提出的哲学问题的讨论。生物学的物种分类是哲学中实在分类的一个范式。达尔文提出物种自身也在进化,种的特征并非永恒的,种之间的区别并非固定的。这种进化的视域极大地转变了我们对世界结构的理解。哲学家们由进化理论发展出“进化认识论”,它试图按照自然选择过程来说明认知才能、知识获取和知识进展;哲学家们也发展出“进化伦理学”,它相信我们的道德规范应基于按“适者生存”原则的进化来决定。进化伦理学也可以有不那么引起争议的功用,因它能根据我们是一种独特的自然进化物种的一员来说明我们伦理思维的模式。有些哲学家还试图依据生物学结构来说明社会、文化和心理学现象,这种还原论方法被称作“社会生物学”。

“进化论生物学对于生物学科学和科学哲学二者都处于问题的中心。生物学哲学并非终止于进化论问题,但我认为它正是由此开始的。”——索伯:《生物学哲学》,1993年,第xix页。

教育哲学

应用哲学的一个分支,它涉及的是教育中的哲学问题。虽然教育哲学可以追溯到柏拉图的《国家篇》,但直到20世纪初它才成为哲学的一个专门分支。与政治哲学相互影响,教育哲学试图创立一个适合当代自由社会的教育概念。柏拉图和卢梭认为,教育的目标是一个具有牢固的共同价值的正义社会;与此相反,当代自由

contrast to both Plato and Rousseau, who believed that education aims at a just society with strongly shared values, contemporary liberal education theorists, such as John Dewey, Michael Oakeshott, Paul Hirst and R. S. Peters, hold that education is individualistic, existing simply for the sake of developing one's rational mind, exploring with our natural inquisitiveness, acquiring knowledge for the sake of knowledge or cultivating personal autonomy. The philosophy of education is concerned with a series of problems arising from this picture of education, such as the relation between education and moral development, education and censorship, education and the role of art, the education of personal emotion and feeling and the equality of educational opportunity. It also provides a critical evaluation of educational theory. Different theories of human nature result in different theories of education. In the twentieth century, the development of psychology, such as Freud's psychoanalysis and Piaget's theory of the stages of psychological development in the child, have deeply affected the discussion of education, although in Freud's case not always to its benefit. In radically incompatible ways, Chomsky's linguistics and Skinner's behaviourism altered notions of learning. Philosophy of education is less developed than other branches of the philosophy of the social sciences.

"Philosophy of education focuses on the language of educational theory and practice." —Moore, *Philosophy of Education*, 1982, p. 6.

Philosophy of history

History is the actual human past, but it is also a branch of knowledge about the human past. Correspondingly, there are two major types of philosophy of history. Speculative philosophy of history is concerned with actual history and seeks to provide a philosophical history of the world. Analytic philosophy of history, in contrast, is concerned with historical thinking and knowledge and with other philosophical issues arising out of the practice of historians. The distinction between these two kinds of philosophy of history is widely characterised as also being a distinction between substantive and critical philosophy of history and between material and formal philosophy of history.

Speculative philosophy of history can be traced to its origin in Augustine's *City of God*. It assumes that history is not a sequential aggregate of random past events and argues that an underlying factor or structure renders the whole historical process rational and intelligible. The claim that temporal succession itself has logical implications was first derived from a theology and teleological world view which viewed human history as controlled by some divine force. In the Enlightenment, some philosophers, such as the eighteenth century French Encyclopedists, were inspired by the development of physics to explore the uniformity of history on the

主义的教育理论家如 J. 杜威、M. 奥克肖特、P. 赫斯特和 R. S. 彼得斯主张,教育是个人主义的,它的存在只是为了发展人的理性心智,探究我们天生的好奇心,是为了知识而学知识,或为了培养个人的自主。与此相关,教育哲学关注这样一系列由这一教育图式引起的问题,如教育和道德发展的关系、教育和检查制度、教育和艺术的作用、个人的情感教育和教育机会的平等。它还对教育理论提出批判性的评价。不同的人性理论导致了不同的教育理论。在 20 世纪,心理学的发展,如弗洛伊德的精神分析和皮亚杰的儿童心理发展阶段理论,对教育的研讨产生了深刻的影响,尽管后者并不总是从弗洛伊德那里受益。乔姆斯基的语言学和施金纳的行为主义以极不相同的方式改变了学习的观念。与社会科学的其它哲学分支相比,教育哲学的发展极其缓慢。

"教育哲学关注的是教育理论与实践的语言。"——摩尔:《教育哲学》,1982 年,第 6 页。

历史哲学

历史是现实人类的过去,它也是关于人类过去的一个学科。与此相应,历史哲学有两种主要的类型。思辨的历史哲学涉及的是实际的历史,并试图提供一部哲学的世界历史。相比之下,分析的历史哲学涉及的是历史思考和历史知识,以及产生于历史学家实践的其他的哲学问题。这两类历史哲学的区别也被广泛地说成是实在的历史哲学和批判的历史哲学的区别,以及实质的历史哲学和形式的历史哲学的区别。

思辨的历史哲学可以溯源至奥古斯丁的《上帝之城》。它假定历史不是偶然的过去事件的前后堆积,并论证说一个基本的因素或结构使得整个历史过程成为合理的和可以理解的。时间的连续性本身就有逻辑意义这一主张,最初来自神学和把人类历史视为由某种神的力量控制的目的论的世界观。在启蒙运动时期,一些哲学家,如 18 世纪法国百科全书派,受物理学的发展所鼓舞,根据人性的一致性这一假定探讨了历史的一致性。另一些哲学家,如 G. 维柯和 J. G. 赫尔德,则赞同更为经验的方法,即将历史的意义同它的文化背景联系起来的方法。黑格尔主张,历史有一个秘密计划,历史的发展

basis of the assumption of the uniformity of human nature. Others, such as Giambattista Vico and J. G. Herder, endorsed a more empirical approach in connecting the meaning of history with its cultural milieu. Hegel claimed that history has a plot and that the development of history is a dialectical movement governed by the absolute spirit. Marx substituted an economic foundation for Hegel's absolute spirit as the engine for historical development. In the twentieth century, authors such as Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler continued to believe in the overall meaning of human history, but substantive philosophy of history is in general out of favour.

Analytic philosophy of history emerged in the twentieth century. Rather than dealing with the underlying structure of actual history, its subject-matter is the underlying structure of historic explanation and the nature of historical understanding. It is concerned with the conceptual framework of historical thinking and the nature of historical objectivity. Analytic philosophy of history has two general tendencies. The first, represented by Hempel, attempts to assimilate historical explanation to scientific explanation and to offer a model of universal laws for historical knowledge. The second, influenced by the works of Rickert, Dilthey, Croce and Collingwood, is the mainstream of analytic philosophy of history. It distinguishes historical study from the natural science and argues for the autonomy of history. It does not take a historical event as an instance of a covering law, but attempts to understand the reasons behind each action. In the work of Lyotard, Foucault and others, it is concerned with the epistemological status of narrative, which is the characteristic form of presenting historical knowledge.

"Unlike their speculative predecessors, most present-day contributors to the philosophy of history take it to be a second order form of inquiry with the aim, not of trying to seek and assess the human past itself, but rather of seeking to elucidate and assess the ways in which historians typically describe or comprehend that past." (Gardiner (ed), *The Philosophy of History*, 1974, p. 3.

Philosophy of language

Contemporary philosophy of language resulted from the linguistic turn in philosophy and is based on the assumption that all philosophical analysis can be reduced to the analysis of language. In a broad sense, philosophy of language is nearly synonymous with analytic philosophy. Hence, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, and the early and later Wittgenstein all exemplified different philosophical approaches to language in dealing with philosophical problems.

In a narrow sense, philosophy of language is related to linguistics or the science of language and is concerned with the underlying reality of language and its philosophical import. Traditionally semiotics is divided into syntax, seman-

是一个由绝对精神统治的辩证运动。马克思用经济基础取代了黑格尔的绝对精神作为历史发展的动力。在 20 世纪,一些学者,如 A. 汤因比和 O. 斯宾格勒,仍然相信人类历史的总体意义,但实质的历史哲学一般说来已不受欢迎。

分析的历史哲学出现于 20 世纪。它的论题涉及的不是实际历史的基本结构,而是历史说明的基本结构和历史理解的本质。它关注的是历史思维的概念结构和历史客观性的本质。分析的历史哲学有两种大体的趋势。第一种趋势以亨佩尔为代表,它试图将历史说明与自然科学说明同化,并试图为历史知识提出一个普遍规律的模式。第二种趋势受到李凯尔特、狄尔泰、克罗齐和柯林伍德的著作的影响,是分析的历史哲学的主流。它把历史研究与自然科学区别开来,并为历史的自律性做辩护。它不把历史事件看做覆盖律的例证,而是试图理解每一行为背后的原因。在利奥塔、福柯和其他人的著作中,它涉及的是叙述的认识论地位,而叙述乃是展现历史知识的特有形式。

"与他们思辨的前辈不同,绝大多数现今致力于历史哲学的研究者都把它看做第二等级的研究形式,其目的不是试图探索和评价人类过去本身,而是试图阐明和评价历史学家有代表性的描述或领会那种过去的方式。"——加德纳(编辑):《历史哲学》,1974 年,第 3 页。

语言哲学

当代语言哲学产生于哲学中的“语言的转向”,它基于这样的一种假定,即认为一切哲学分析都可以还原为对语言的分析。在广义上,语言哲学几乎是“分析哲学”的同义语。因而,逻辑实证主义、牛津日常语言哲学和前后期的维特根斯坦,都是用不同的语言哲学方法讨论哲学问题的。

在狭义上,语言哲学与语言学或语言学科有关,它关心的是内在的语言实在及其哲学意义。符号学在传统上被分为句法学、语义学和语用学。语言哲学讨论的是句法学与语义学之间的区分问题,以及诸如言语行为理论和格莱斯

tics and pragmatics. The philosophy of language deals with the problem of the distinction between syntax and semantics, and some pragmatic problems, for example in the theory of speech acts and Grice's theory of conversational implication. There are different conceptions of what the philosophy of language should be, but its central concern is with semantic questions such as meaning, truth, reference, predication, quantification and the nature of the propositions. Other major issues in this field of philosophy are the universal features of language and the relationships between language and world and between language and thought. Because of the inseparable relations between logic and language and among intentionality, understanding, thinking and language, the philosophy of language shares many common topics with philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. It is sometimes regarded as a part of the philosophy of mind and sometimes even as a part of the philosophy of action. An influential type of philosophy of language developed out of Chomsky's generative grammar, which tries to uncover the structure of conceptual knowledge by revealing the linguistic structure underlying surface irregularities and variations.

"Though the philosophy of language might be reasonably be thought of as comprising anything that philosophers do when they think, qua philosophers, about knowledge... I have presented the philosophy of language in one of its guises, as an attempt to get clear about the basic concepts we use in thinking about language." - Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, xi.

Philosophy of law

Also called legal philosophy, a branch of philosophy that deals with philosophical problems or issues concerning the law and legal systems and that applies philosophical method to legal problems. The major topics of this field are: the nature and the definition of law, properties and identity conditions of legal systems, the ends to be attained by law, legal responsibility, legal reasoning, the nature and justification of punishment, the nature and justification of the state's coercive power and the relationships between moral right and legal right, between moral obligation and legal obligation, and between law and justice.

Philosophy of law is often used as a synonym for jurisprudence (from Latin: *juris prudentia*, knowledge of or skill in law). Jurisprudence, however, has a wider reference. Some of its divisions, such as analytical jurisprudence (the logical analysis of law and of legal concepts) and normative or critical jurisprudence (the evaluation of law and legal obligations) fall into the domain of philosophy of law. Other divisions such as historical jurisprudence (dealing with the origin and development of law), sociological jurisprudence (dealing with the relationship between legal rules and legal behaviour) and functional jurisprudence (dealing with legal

的交谈意义理论这样一些语用学问题。对语言哲学应当是什么还存在着不同的看法,但它的核心问题无疑是诸如意义、真理、指称、谓词、量化和命题的性质等这样的语义学问题。在这个哲学领域中的其他主要问题是,语言的一般特征和语言与世界以及语言与思想之间的关系。由于逻辑与语言和意向性、理解、思维与语言之间不可分的关系,语言哲学就与哲学逻辑和心的哲学有着许多共同关心的问题。有时,它也被看做心的哲学的一部分,有时,甚至被看做行为哲学的一部分。一种较有影响的语言哲学出自乔姆斯基的生成语法,它试图通过揭示隐藏在各种不规则和变化背后的语言结构,揭示概念知识的结构。

“虽然有理由把语言哲学看做是哲学家们在思考知识问题时所做的一切,……但我始终按照语言哲学的字义,把它看做是企图澄清我们在思考语言时所使用的基本概念。”——阿尔斯通:《语言哲学》,1964年,第xi页。

法哲学

也称为legal philosophy,哲学的一个分支,涉及的是与法律和法律制度相关的哲学问题或争论,以及哲学方法在法律问题中的应用。这一领域的主要论题有:法律的本质和定义、法律体系的特性和同一性的条件,法律所要达到的目的,法律责任,法律推理,惩罚的本质及其正当性,国家的强制权力的本质及其正当性以及道德权利和法律权利、道德责任和法律责任以及法和正义之间的关系。

法哲学也常常被用来作为“法理学”(源自拉丁语 *juris prudentia*, 关于法律的知识 and 技巧)的同义语。不过,法理学涉及的面更宽。它的某些分支,如分析的法理学(涉及的是法律和法律概念的逻辑分析)和规范的或批判的法理学(它涉及的是法律评价和法律责任)属于法哲学的领域。其他分支,如历史法理学(涉及的是法的起源和发展),社会学法理学(涉及的是法律规范和法律行为的关系)和功能法理学(涉及的是法律规范和社会需要),则同法哲学无关。

法哲学可以追溯到柏拉图的《法篇》,以及亚里士多德对分配正义和平均正义的区分。对法律的主要的哲学探讨包括:以T. 阿奎那为

norms and social needs), are not the concerns of philosophy of law.

Philosophy of law can be traced to Plato's *Laces*, and Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice. Major philosophical approaches to law include natural law theory, represented by Thomas Aquinas, which holds that law is essentially connected with moral right and good; legal positivism, represented by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H. L. A. Hart, which argues for the moral neutrality of law and separates law from morality; and legal realism, represented by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Alf Ross, which claims that the law should be understood in terms of how it operates in courts.

"The philosophy of law studies philosophical problems raised by the existence and practice of law." —Dworkin (ed.). *The Philosophy of Law*, 1977, introduction, p. 1.

Philosophy of logic, see philosophical logic

Philosophy of mathematics

Starting with Plato, mathematics has been viewed by philosophers as the model of necessary truth and *a priori* knowledge. Hence, the ontological status of mathematical objects, the foundation of mathematics, the nature of mathematical knowledge and truth, and the structure and function of mathematical theories have been of central interest for many philosophers. Modern philosophy of mathematics started with Frege's logicism and the establishment of set theory in mathematics. In opposition to the traditional claim that there is a kind of mathematical intuition which guarantees the necessity of mathematical truth, logicism argues that mathematics can be reduced to logic, and this idea was classically presented in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. The approach inspired logical positivism, but was attacked by Quine with his criticism of the notion of analyticity. The paradox Russell discovered in set theory led to a foundational crisis of mathematics. To cope with the crisis, philosophers of mathematics have adopted different approaches. Some philosophers, following Plato, believe that mathematical objects are abstract entities independent of our minds, and this realistic position is called mathematical Platonism. Others, like Quine and Putnam, suggest that mathematics does not have objects proper to itself. Hilbert's formalist programme saw the meaning of mathematical expressions in terms of the formal mathematical system to which they belong rather than in terms of objects. Hilbert's attempt to prove the consistency and completeness of formal systems expressing arithmetic was undermined by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. In the Kantian tradition, others claim that mathematical objects are mental constructions or creations, a view best represented by constructivism.

代表的自然法理论,这一理论认为法律在本质上是与道德权利和善相联系的;以J. 边沁、J. 奥斯汀和 H. L. A. 哈特等人为代表的法学实证主义,这一理论坚持法律的道德中立思想,把法律与道德分离开来;以及以 O. W. 小霍尔姆斯和 A. 罗斯为代表的法学现实主义,这一理论认为应当根据法律如何在法庭中起作用去理解它。

“法哲学研究的是由于法律的存在和实践而出现的哲学问题。”——德沃金编:《法哲学》,1977年,导言,第1页。

逻辑哲学

见“哲学逻辑”条。

数学哲学

自柏拉图始,数学就被哲学家看做是必然真和先验知识的模型。由此,数学对象的本体论地位,数学基础,数学知识和数学真的本性,数学理论的结构和功能等成为许多哲学家的主要兴趣之所在。现代数学哲学始于弗雷格的逻辑主义和集合论在数学中的确立。传统观点认为,有一种数学直觉保证了数学真的必然性,与此观点相对立,逻辑主义相信数学可以还原为逻辑,这种观念在罗素和怀特海的《数学原理》中得到经典体现。这鼓舞了逻辑实证主义,但却受到了奎因通过他对分析性概念的批评所进行的攻击。罗素在集合论中所发现的悖论导致了数学基础的危机,而为了克服这一危机,数学哲学家采取了不同的方式。有些哲学家追随柏拉图,相信数学对象是独立于我们意识的抽象实体,这种实在论立场被称为“数学柏拉图主义”;还有些哲学家如奎因和普特南则提出数学并没有自己特有的对象。希尔伯特的形式主义纲领根据数学表达式所属的形式系统而不是对象来解释表达式的意义。希尔伯特试图证明表达算术的形式系统的一致性和完全性,但这一努力为哥德尔不完全性定理所摧毁。康德传统中的其他哲学家认为数学对象是心的构造或创造,这种立场的最好表述为“构造主义”;布劳维尔的直觉主义试图通过证明的构造去解释数学推理,这导致否认处于经典数学核心的排中律。数学哲学与当代本体论、认识论和当前的实在论与反实在论之争中的许多问题密切相关。

“数学哲学的中心问题是数学真的定义。”——卡里:《形式主义数学哲学纲要》,1951年,第3页。

Brouwer's intuitionism, which attempted to explain mathematical reasoning in terms of the construction of proofs, led to the denial of the law of excluded middle which is at the heart of classical mathematics. Philosophy of mathematics is closely connected with contemporary issues in ontology and epistemology and with current debates between realism and anti-realism.

"The central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is the definition of mathematical truth." —Curry, *Outline of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics*, 1951, p. 3.

Philosophy of mind

The philosophical examination of the nature of the mind and its relationship with body. Plato and Aristotle provided theories of mind, and so have many modern philosophers, in particular Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant. But only with the emergence of psychology as a distinct discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, did the philosophy of mind become an independent sub-discipline within philosophy. Since then, theories of mind have aimed at deepening our understanding of the mind itself, rather than at placing an account of the mind within a traditional metaphysical or epistemological framework. Franz Brentano and his successors played a major role in this process.

Contemporary philosophy of mind established a new focus with the publication of Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Ryle tried to understand our mental states by analysing the logical structures and relations of our mental concepts. This work is distinguished from psychology, which studies the actual operations of mind through experimental methods and from philosophy of psychology which investigates the philosophical implications of the results and methods of psychology. Major topics in the philosophy of mind include the mind-body problem; the nature of the mind; consciousness; mental causation; intentionality, propositional attitudes and mental contents; knowledge and belief; representation; perception; feelings; sensations; thought and language; will; and the emotions. Various approaches to the mind have been explored, such as dualism, phenomenalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, parallelism, materialism, functionalism and eliminativism. The philosophy of mind has been an extremely active discipline in recent decades. In the most recent years, some philosophers have sought to soften the distinction between philosophical and empirical studies of the mind and have linked philosophy of mind with such fields as computational modelling and cognitive psychology.

"The aim of the philosophy of mind is to conduct an a priori investigation into the essential nature of mental phenomena, by elucidating the latent content of mental concepts." —McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 14.

心的哲学

对心的本质及其与身的关系的哲学考察。柏拉图和亚里士多德曾提出过关于心的理论,许多近代哲学家也是如此,特别是笛卡尔、洛克、休谟和康德。但只是当心理学在19世纪末成为一个独立的学科时,心的哲学才成为哲学的独立分支。因为从那以后,心的理论旨在加深我们对心本身的理解,而不是在一个传统的形而上的或认识论的框架中置入一个关于心的说明。F. 布伦塔诺及其继承者在这一过程中起到了重要作用。

当代心的哲学随着赖尔《心的概念》(1949)一书的出版而确立了新的问题。赖尔试图通过分析我们的心的概念的逻辑结构和关系来理解我们的心的状态,这与通过实验方法来研究心的实际操作的心理学的本身不同,也不同于研究心理学成果与方法的哲学意义的心理学哲学。心的哲学的主要论题包括心身问题、心的本质、意识、心的因果性、意向性、命题态度和心的内容、知识和信念、表征、知觉、情感、感觉、思维和语言、意愿以及情绪等等。心的哲学对心提供了多种多样的研究方法,如二元论、现象论、附随现象论、行为主义、平行论、唯物论、功能主义及取消论。近年来心的哲学成为哲学中最为活跃的部分。最近,有的哲学家试图弱化关于心的哲学与经验研究之间的区分,并将心的哲学与像计算机模拟和认知心理学这样的领域相联系。

"心的哲学的目标就是通过阐明心的概念的潜在内容来进行对心的现象的必要本质的先验研究。"——麦金:《心的特性》,1982年,第14页。

Philosophy of nature

In one sense, the analysis and clarification of the concepts used by natural scientists, particularly those concepts that cut across the frontiers of the various scientific disciplines. In a traditional sense, philosophy of nature employs the philosophical contemplation of nature to work out general principles to explain the constituent stuff, basic structure and movement of the natural world. This study was the main preoccupation the Pre-Socratic philosophers who originated western philosophy. Philosophy of nature is also called "physics" [from Greek: *physis*, nature], and one of Aristotle's major philosophical works is entitled *Physics*. Philosophy of nature has been a standard part of Western metaphysical systems, although it has been increasingly superseded by the empirical study of nature. Kant, however, held that philosophy of nature should seek to determine the basic concepts and principles on which scientists could build the whole structure of their knowledge of the world by establishing the *a priori* presuppositions of natural science. For Hegel, philosophy of nature stood above the empirical natural sciences by providing its own insights into the structure of facts and by going beyond scientific investigation. Philosophy of nature is also called "natural philosophy", but it should not be confused with the nature-philosophy (*Naturphilosophie*) of the German romantic movement.

"The philosophy of nature takes up the material which physics has prepared for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warranted base." —Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, Introduction 10.

Philosophy of organism

A term used by Alfred North Whitehead for his own metaphysical outlook, although his metaphysics, which is also called process philosophy. Influenced by field theory in physics, he believed that the ultimate basis of the natural world is force rather than matter. Nature is analysed into units called actual occasions. An actual occasion is a process of becoming with its own orientation and is like the Leibnizian monad, although it is not windowless. Each actual occasion actively interrelates with other actual occasions in its immediate past. This process is called *concretere* (Latin: to grow together) and generates an actual entity. Whitehead claimed that this picture explains the organic structure of the world. Physics studies smaller units, while biology studies larger units. Each unit has its own inner structure and is an organism. Larger units are systems of smaller units.

"In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity'." —

自然哲学

在一种意义上,是指为自然科学家所使用的概念,尤其是对那些横跨各门学科的概念加以分析和澄清的一个哲学分支。在传统意义上,自然哲学运用对自然的哲学沉思而制造出一般原理以解释自然界的构成材料、基本结构和运动。这个研究是前苏格拉底哲学家关注的主题,他们开创了西方哲学。自然哲学也称为“物理学”[源自希腊词: *physis*, 自然],亚里士多德的一本重要哲学著作就题名为《物理学》。自然哲学一直是西方形而上学体系的标准部分,虽然它已逐渐被对自然的经验研究所代替。然而,康德认为,自然哲学应该努力规定基本概念和原理,在这些概念和原理的基础上,自然科学家才能通过建立自然科学的先天前提而建构他们对世界的整个知识结构。对于黑格尔来说,自然哲学凌驾于经验自然科学之上,因为前者提供它自己对事实结构的洞察,并超越科学的研究。自然哲学不应与德国浪漫主义运动的“自然的哲学”相混。

“自然哲学在物理学使它达到的立脚点上接受物理学从经验中为它准备的材料,并把这种材料加以重构,以至于不再把经验作为最终有根据的基础。”——黑格尔:《自然哲学》,导言 10。

有机体哲学

英国哲学家 A. N. 怀特海用于他自己的形而上学观点的名称,尽管他的形而上学一般也称作“过程哲学”。为物理学中的场论所影响,他相信自然界的终极基础是力而不是物质。自然被分析为称作“现实事态”的单位。一个现实事态就是一个带有其自身方向性的生成过程。它就像莱布尼茨的单子,但不是无窗的。每个现实事态都与刚刚过去的其他现实事态能动地互相关联。这个过程叫做 *concretere* (源自拉丁文,意思是“共同生长”),并且产生出“现实实有”。怀特海宣称这一图景说明了世界的有机结构。物理学研究较小的单位,而生物学研究较大的单位。每一单位都有其内在结构,都是一个有机体。较大的单位是较小单位的系统。

“在所有哲学理论中都有一个基本原理,它借助于其偶然性而现实化。只有通过它偶然的体现,它才能特征化;离开了这些偶然性也就丧失了现实性。在有机体哲学中,这个基本原理用‘创造性’这一术语表示。”——怀特海:《过程与实在》,1929年,第10页。

Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 1929, p. 13.

Philosophy of physics

A discipline of philosophy of science dealing with the philosophical impact of the development of modern physics, in particular philosophical issues arising in theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, modern thermodynamics and contemporary cosmology. The major topics of philosophy of physics include space, time, motion, probability, causation and objectivity in the quantum world. The discipline also investigates the foundations of physical theory, the aim of a physical theory, the inter-relation of physical theories and scientific methodology in physics and the logical systems suitable for modern physics. By exploring ideas and methods developed in physics, philosophy of physics contributes to our understanding of physics as a science. It tests the implications of new metaphysical claims arising within physics and shapes our insight into both human knowledge and the nature of things.

"The philosophy of physics performs at least four useful functions, which may be called philosophical assimilation, research planning, quality control, and home cleaning."

Bunge, *Philosophy of Physics*, 1973, p. 13.

Philosophy of psychology

The study of psychological concepts and theories, philosophical presuppositions of approaches to psychology and implications of psychological discoveries. It is part of a general development in the philosophy of science towards the integration of empirical and philosophical aspects of study, but in some respects philosophy of psychology overlaps with philosophy of mind. For many contemporary philosophers, philosophy of psychology has replaced philosophical psychology, which sought to analyse psychological concepts without attending to major developments in scientific psychology.

Philosophy of psychology is concerned with empirical or experimental psychology. Empirical psychology as an independent discipline began with the establishment of the first psychology laboratory at University of Leipzig in 1879 by the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, although empirical psychology was also based initially on the associationist theory developed by Hume and J. S. Mill. Philosophy of psychology explores complex relations among different theories of mind, empirical data and experiment in seeking a general account of the nature of mind. Psychological theories contributing to philosophical discussions about the mind have included Gestalt Theory, Freudian theory and behaviourism, but the source of much recent influence is cognitive science, in which the boundary between philosophy and psychology remains undetermined. This boundary is also challenged within philosophy, with Quine's naturalised epistemology tending to reduce epistemology to psychology.

物理学哲学

科学哲学的一门学科,它研究现代物理学发展的哲学影响,特别是在相对论、量子力学、现代热力学和当代宇宙学中产生的哲学问题。物理学哲学的主要论题包括空间、时间、运动、可能性、因果性和量子世界的客观性。这个学科也研究物理学理论的基础和目的、物理学理论和其科学方法、适合于现代物理学的逻辑体系的相互关系。通过探索物理学中所提出的观念和方法,物理学哲学对作为科学的物理学作出了我们的理解。它考察了在物理学中产生的新的形而上学主张的内涵,并形成我们对人类知识和事物本性的见识。

"物理学哲学至少执行四种有用的功能,它们可称为哲学同化、研究规划、质量控制和家园清洁。"——邦格:《物理学哲学》,1973年,第13页。

心理学哲学

对于心理学概念和理论、心理学方法的哲学前提和心理学发现的含义的研究。它是科学哲学中总体发展的一部分;这种发展的倾向是要整合研究中经验的和哲学的这两个方面。但在某些方面,心理学哲学与心的哲学相重叠。对于许多当代哲学家来说,心理学哲学已经取代了哲学心理学;后者试图在不关注科学心理学主要进展的情况下分析心理学概念。

心理学哲学涉及到经验心理学或实验心理学。经验心理学作为一门独立学科始于1879年莱比锡大学的第一座心理学实验室的建立,它出自德国心理学家W. 冯特之手;尽管在这之前,休谟和J. S. 密尔提出的联想主义理论已为经验心理学提供了一个初步的基础。心理学哲学探讨那些关于心灵、经验材料和实验的不同理论之间的关系,以寻求对于心灵本质的普遍性说明。已经影响到关于心的哲学讨论的心理学理论有格式塔理论、弗洛伊德理论和行为主义;但相当多的近期影响的来源是认知科学,其中哲学与心理学界限是未定的。在哲学里,由于奎因的自然化的认识论要将认识论还原为心理学,这样一种界限也受到挑战。

"心理学哲学就是对于科学心理学的结果和方法的本质及意义的哲学研究。"——麦金:《心的特性》,1982年,第4页。

"[P]hilosophy of psychology, that is, the philosophical study of the nature and significance of the results and methods of scientific psychology." — McGinn, *The Character of Mind*, 1982, p. 4.

Philosophy of pure reason, see metaphysics (Kant)

Philosophy of religion

A branch of philosophy dealing with the meaning, nature and philosophical implications of religious beliefs and claims and of religious practices. Theoretically, all religions constitute its subject-matter, but since the philosophy of religion as a speciality developed in Western countries, it naturally focuses on the claims of Western religions, especially the doctrines of Christianity but also including doctrines of Judaism and Islam. Its main topics include: the conception of God; the conceptual analysis of divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, eternity, and the paradoxes resulting from these attributes; the logical characteristics of religious language; the examination of the logical structure of arguments for and against the existence of God, in particular of the most influential arguments such as the ontological argument, the argument from design, the cosmological argument and the problem of evil; the relation between faith and reason; the relations between religion and morality, art and science; the philosophical comparison of different forms of religion; the phenomenology of religious experience and its role, if any, in justifying religious belief; the methods of religious argument; the afterlife or immortality; the discussions of particular Christian doctrines such as the Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement. Many of these themes are also included in metaphysics and were the central topics in medieval philosophy.

"What are the distinctive features of religious ideas? Do they here and there contain contradictions? On what possible basis can they be considered true or false? How do they mesh in, if at all, with the other concepts which we use? Such are the questions which typically fall within the ambit of the philosophy of religion." — Ninian Smart, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1970, v.

Philosophy of science

The study of logical, epistemological and metaphysical problems arising from reflections on the sciences and scientific activities. It is a philosophical critique of science. This area is new as a specific discipline and has emerged in conjunction with the intellectual achievements of modern science, but in a wider sense has been a part of epistemology and metaphysics in the philosophical tradition. The exact bound of its research domain is hard to define, for science itself comprises a wide range of activities, modes of thoughts

纯粹理性哲学

见“形而上学(康德)”条。

宗教哲学

哲学的一个分支,研究宗教信条和主张以及宗教实践活动的意义、本性和哲学蕴意。从理论上讲,一切宗教都建构有自己的主题。但是,既然宗教哲学作为一个专业是在西方国家中发展起来的,那么,它自然要聚焦在西方宗教的主张,尤其是基督教学说上,但也包括犹太教和伊斯兰教的学说。它的主要论题包括:上帝的概念;对全能、全知、善、永恒等神性以及导源于这些神性的悖论的概念分析;宗教语言的逻辑特征;对关于上帝存在的论证和反驳的逻辑结构考察,特别是对那些最有影响的论证的考察,譬如本体论论证、设计论证、宇宙论论证和邪恶难题;信仰和理性之间的关系;宗教和道德、艺术、科学的关系;不同形式宗教的哲学比较;宗教体验及其在证明宗教信仰中的作用(如果有某种作用的话)的现象学;宗教论证的方法;来世或不朽;对“三位一体说”、“道成肉身说”、“赎罪说”等特殊基督教学说的讨论等等。其中的许多题目也包括在形而上学中,而且是中世纪哲学的核心论题。

“宗教观念的不同特征是什么?它们包含有这样那样的矛盾吗?在什么可能的基础上,它们能被认作真的或假的?如果真有必要的话,它们怎样与我们使用的其他概念相吻合?诸如此类的问题,是典型地属于宗教哲学范围的问题。”——斯马特:《宗教哲学》,1970年,v。

科学哲学

对于由反思科学和科学活动而产生的逻辑、认识论和本体论问题的研究。它是对科学的哲学批判。这一领域作为一个新的特殊学科,其产生是与近代科学在思想上的成就相关联的,但在更广泛的意义上,它是哲学传统中认识论和形而上学的一部分。其研究领域的精确边界很难确定,因为科学本身是由范围广泛的活动、思想方式和话语构成的。一般而言,它所研究的最重要的问题有:科学的目的;科学概念之间和

and discourses. In general, the most important issues it investigates include the aims of science, the relations between scientific concepts and between scientific propositions; the principles assumed in science; the nature and structure of scientific rationality and methodology; scientific knowledge and its confirmation; rationality and scientific progress; explanation; scientific laws; natural necessity; probability; the unity or diversity of science; reduction and relations among the sciences; objectivity in science; certainty and fallibility in science; theory, observation, experiment in science; models in science; the ontological implications of science and the nature of theoretical entities; scientific creativity, invention and discovery; science and other knowledge; science and religion; the social effects of scientific ideas; the relation of philosophy of science to history and sociology of science; the ethics of science. Major figures in this field include the logical positivists (logical analysis of the structure of science, verificationism), Hempel (scientific explanation), Popper (falsificationism), Lakatos (progressive and degenerating research programmes) and Kuhn (paradigm shift and scientific revolutions). Before the Second World War, philosophy of science mainly focused on the logic of science. Since then, philosophers have been more interested in the developmental paradigms of sciences and the epistemology of science.

Aside from general issues regarding the enterprise of science, there are specific problems arising in particular fields of science leading to discipline-specific studies, such as philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology and philosophy of psychology.

"In any event, much is gained in the way of clarifying the aims of philosophical analysis by limiting the philosophy of science to a group of related questions that arise in attempting to understand the intellectual products of scientific inquiry as embodied in explicitly formulated statements." — Ernest Nagel, in Danto and Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science*, 1960, p. 13.

Philosophy of social science

In the eighteenth century enlightenment, social sciences aimed to achieve the ideal of scientific objectivity and universality. But are natural sciences and social sciences similar? Philosophers who emphasise the meaning of human action or the role of ideology in social scientific inquiry believe that social sciences explain the social world in a distinct way. The tension between scientific explanation and interpretative understanding led to the emergence of the philosophy of social sciences. This discipline is concerned with the methodology and knowledge claims of the social sciences, especially with the logic of theory construction in the social sciences, with the nature, validity and adequacy of social theory, and with causation or laws among social phenomena. It is also concerned with explanation without universal laws and the role

科学命题之间的关系;科学中设定的原理;科学合理性和方法论的本性和结构;科学知识及其确证;合理性与科学进步;说明;科学法则;自然必然性;或然性;科学的统一性与多样性;科学之间的还原和关系;科学中的客观性;科学中的确定性和可错性;理论,观察,科学实验;科学模型;科学的本体论意义与理论实体之本性;科学的创造性、发明与发现;科学与其他知识;科学与宗教,科学观念的社会影响;科学哲学与科学史和科学社会学的关系;科学伦理学等。这一领域的主要代表人物包括逻辑实证主义者(科学结构的逻辑分析,证实主义),亨佩尔(科学说明),波普(证伪主义),拉卡托斯(进步与退化的研究纲领)和库恩(范式转换与科学革命)。在第二次世界大战前,科学哲学主要集中于科学的逻辑。自那以后,哲学家逐渐对科学的发展范式和科学认识论更感兴趣。

除了关于科学事业的一般问题外,还有出现于科学的特定领域中的专门问题。对于它们的研究形成了科学哲学中的几个专门学科,例如数学哲学、物理学哲学、生物学哲学、心理学哲学,等等。

“无论如何,澄清哲学分析目的的方式都会大有收获,而这种澄清借助于把科学哲学限于一组相关的问题,这些问题产生于试图去理解体现在清晰表述的陈述中的科学探究的精神产物。”——内格尔,见丹托和莫根贝瑟(编):《科学哲学》,1960年,第13页。

社会科学哲学

在18世纪的启蒙运动中,社会科学的目的寻求实现科学的客观性和普遍性的理想。但自然科学和社会科学相同吗?强调社会科学探究中人的行为的意义或意识形态的作用的哲学家,相信社会科学是以独特的方式解释人类社会的。科学说明与阐释性理解之间的矛盾导致了社会科学哲学的出现。这一学科关注的是社会科学的方法论和有关知识的主张,特别是社会科学中理论框架的逻辑,社会理论的本质、有效性和适应性,以及社会现象中的因果联系或规律。它还关注无需普遍规律的说明,以及社会科学中的意义和解释的作用。它的目的是阐明应用于社会科学中的推理形式和说明框架。它所涉及的一个中心问题是在说明的优先性上社

of meaning and interpretation in the social sciences. It aims to elucidate the forms of reasoning and explanatory frameworks practised in social sciences. A central question concerns the relation between social institutions and individuals with regard to explanatory priority, leading to a long-standing debate concerning methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. Major approaches in the philosophy of social science include those initiated by Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber. The hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamer have challenged the unity of science model of the social sciences proposed by the logical positivists. The later work of Wittgenstein influenced Peter Winch's attack on an account of the social sciences on the model of the natural sciences. Martin Hollis, who emphasises the importance of rationality in understanding society, has argued for a possible accommodation between the rival traditions in the philosophy of social sciences. On this view, we must take care to determine the sort of questions we are asking and the sort of answers which would be appropriate. The philosophy of social sciences should be distinguished from social philosophy, for while social philosophy is the philosophical discussion of the substance of human society, the philosophy of social science deals with philosophical, in particular epistemological and methodological, issues arising out of the practice of social scientists. Nevertheless, the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is a recent example of how these two philosophical enterprises can influence one another and in some instances merge.

"To what extent can society be studied in the same way as nature? Without exaggerating, I think one could call this question the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences." — Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*, 1979, p. 1.

Philosophy of thought

A new philosophical approach to thought represented by Christopher Peacocke and the late Gareth Evans. Its roots can be traced to Frege's criticism of psychologism and his assertion that thought is the third realm (the others being the physical and the psychological). In contrast to the central tenet of traditional analytical philosophy that an analysis of thought must depend on the analysis of language and that language is prior to thought, advocates of the philosophy of thought believe that the order of priority of this analysis should be reversed. Language can only be explained in terms of antecedently given notions which are thought-laden. Hence, the central consideration of philosophy is no longer language, but thought. It is thought that determines language, and not *vice versa*. Thought can be explained independent of language. Of course, traditional Cartesian epistemology also focuses on the question of the nature of thought,

会制度和个人之间的关系,这导致了关于方法论的集体主义和方法论的个人主义的长时期争论。社会科学哲学中的主要方法包括那些由杜克海姆、卡尔·马克思和M.韦伯开创的方法。狄尔泰与伽达默尔的解释学对逻辑实证主义提出的社会科学的科学模式的统一性提出了挑战。维特根斯坦的后期著作影响了P.温奇对以自然科学为模型的社会科学论述的非难。M.霍利斯强调合理性在理解社会中的重要性,并对社会科学哲学中的对立传统之间可能的和解做了论证。据此,我们必须小心确定我们所问的问题及适合它的答案。社会科学哲学应与社会学哲学相互分开,因为社会学哲学是对人类社会本体的哲学探讨,而社会科学哲学涉及的则是产生了社会科学家实践的哲学问题,特别是认识论和方法论的问题。不过,麦金泰尔最近的工作表明了这两个哲学事业如何能够相互影响并在一定情况下结合。

"在何种程度上社会能以研究自然的同样方法进行研究?毫不夸张地说,我想人们可以把这个问题叫做社会科学哲学的首要问题。"——巴斯卡:《自然主义的可能性》,1979年,第1页。

思想哲学

对思想的一种新的哲学探讨,以C.皮考克和已故的G.埃文斯为代表。它的根源可以追溯到弗雷格对心理主义的批判和对思想是“第三领域”(其他两个领域是物理领域和心理领域)这一观点的肯定。传统分析哲学的核心原则是,思想的分析必定依赖于语言的分析,语言先于思想。与此相对,思想哲学的拥护者认为,分析的这一先后顺序应当倒过来。语言只能根据先已给出的、充满着思想的概念来说明。因此,哲学主要考虑的不再是语言,而是思想。决定语言的正是思想,而不是相反。思想可以不需语言而得到说明。当然,传统的笛卡尔的认识论也关注思想的性质的问题,不过,思想哲学把思想认作命题的内容,研究如下之类的问题:如何成为一个思想,我们如何把握一个思想,思想有怎样的结构,思想是如何关于某物的,我们如何

but the philosophy of thought considers thought as the content of propositions and deals with questions such as what it is to be a thought, how a thought can be grasped, how a thought is structured, how a thought can be about something, how we can judge a thought to be true and how concepts that we grasp are related to thoughts. This type of philosophy is distinct from the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, although it is related to them.

"The philosophy of thought concerns itself with the question what it is to be a thought, and with the structure of thoughts and their components; what it is for a thought to be about an object of one or another kind, what it is to grasp a concept and how a concept can be a component of a thought." Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, 1983, p. 129.

Phonologism

Derrida's term for the feature of traditional metaphysics which establishes an opposition between speech and writing and then prefers speech or voice to writing. Voice [Greek: *phono*] is traditionally considered to be the locus of truth, the real sign of essence and truth and the presence of consciousness to itself. One 'hears' the voice of 'reason' when one seeks the truth. Writing is considered to be a parasitic, supplementary, inferior and derivative form of communication. Such a philosophical tradition is fully presented in Plato's *Phaedrus*, and even Lévi-Strauss accepts this view. Derrida's notion of phonologism is closely associated with, or even used interchangeably with his notions of logocentrism and metaphysics of presence. The speech/writing opposition is one of the main objects of Derrida's deconstruction.

"This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning." — Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Spivak), 1974, pp. 11-2.

Phrase-marker

Chomsky's term for the components of the structural skeleton of a sentence. It is generated by starting with a rule for rewriting the sentence and further expanding its components using phrase-structure rules, eventually reaching a categorial structure. This structure will mark items such as noun phrases, prepositional phrases and clauses. Phrase-markers are the elementary units from which deep structures are constituted. When we insert words into phrase markers and tidy them up, for example to ensure that the words have the right endings, we will have an actual sentence.

"The base of the syntactic component is a system of rules that generate a highly restricted (perhaps finite) set of basic strings, each with an associated structural description called a base phrase marker." — Chomsky, *Aspects of the*

能判断一个思想是正确的, 我们所把握的概念是如何与思想联系着的。此类哲学与语言哲学和心的哲学有关系, 但又与它们不同。

"思想哲学关心的问题是如何成为一个思想, 以及思想的结构和成分问题: 一个思想如何成为关于这种或那种对象的思想, 如何掌握一个概念以及一个概念如何成为一个思想的组成部分。" —— 达米特: 《分析哲学的起源》, 1983年, 第129页。

语音主义 (或译“语音中心主义”)

德里达用来表示传统形而上学特点的词, 形而上学将说话与书写对立起来, 并看重说话或语音 (voice, 声音), 贬低书写。语音 [古希腊文为 *phono*] 在传统中被认为是真理所在地、本质和真理的真实符号以及意识对自身的显现。当一个人追求真理时, 他/她“听到了”“理性的”声音。书写则被认为是寄生的、附加的、低级的和衍生出的交流形式。这样一个哲学传统充分表现在柏拉图的《费得罗篇》中, 甚至列维-斯特劳斯也接受这种观点。德里达关于语音主义的观点与他关于逻各斯中心主义和在场的形而上学这两个观念有密切联系, 甚至可以相互使用。这种语音与书写的对立是德里达要解构的主要对象之一。

“所以, 这个观念就保持在逻各斯中心主义, 也叫做语音中心主义的遗产之中: 语音与存在、语音与存在的意义、语音与意义的理念性的绝对亲近。” —— 德里达: 《论书写学》(斯庇瓦克英译), 1974年, 第11-12页。

短语记号

乔姆斯基的术语, 指一个句子构架的组成部分。它首先产生于重写这个句子的规则, 然后用短语结构的规则扩展其组成部分, 最后达到一种范畴结构。这种结构就标记为名词短语、介词短语、从句等等。短语记号是构成深层结构的基本单位。当我们把语词插入短语记号并把它们整理一番 (譬如当我们确信这些语词有恰当的头尾), 我们就会得到一个实际的句子。

“句法成分的基础是一套规则体系, 它们产生了一套严格限制的 (或许是有限的) 基本线索, 而其中具有相关结构描述的每个线索称作基本的短语记号。” —— 乔姆斯基: 《句法理论的若干方面》, 1965年, 第17页。

Theory of Syntax, 1965, p. 17.

Phrase-structure grammar

One of the three models Chomsky uses in order to characterise our understanding of language and grammar (the other models are finite state grammar and transformational grammar). It is a form of grammar associated with the theory of linguistic structure based upon immediate constituent analysis or parsing (from Latin; *pars*, part). This analysis parses a sentence into various components and then assigns these components to categories such as Noun, Verb, Adverb, and so on. A language which can be thus derived is called a phrase-structure language. This analysis is characterised by the use of diagrams and the introduction of rewriting rules for turning symbols into other symbols. For example, we can rewrite "Sentence" as "Noun Phrase - Verb Phrase" and then rewrite "Noun Phrase" as "Article - Noun", and so on. The different aspects of an utterance are successively disclosed in such an analysis. However, it can only be applied when we know what sentence we want to derive, and it fails to exhibit the intuited inter-relationships that hold between different sentences. For instance, this grammar cannot incorporate "to be" into the class of verbs. Hence, Chomsky takes this grammar to be inadequate for linguistic description, and holds that it should be replaced by transformational grammar.

"A phrase-structure grammar consists of an unordered set of rewriting rules, and assigns a structural description that can be represented as a tree-diagram with nodes labelled by symbols of the vocabulary." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 88.

Phrase-structure language, see phrase structure grammar

Phrastic, see noautic / phrastic

Phronesis, Greek term for practical wisdom

Physical determinism

The belief that everything in the world, including human action, is governed by universal laws of nature. This position was presented in ancient atomism, and was fully articulated by Hobbes. The development of modern science, especially physics, led many to think that physical determinism must be true. Science claims that its aim is to discover these objective laws. If we can provide a complete physical explanation at this time for one thing, we will be able to predict its future on the grounds of natural laws. Human freedom should be understood as the lack of constraints, rather

短语结构语法

乔姆斯基用于阐明理解语言和语法的三种模式之一(另外两个是“有限状态语法”和“转换语法”)。它是与一种语言结构理论相关的语法形式,而这种理论是基于直接的结构分析或分解(源自拉丁语 *pars*, 即“部分”)。这种分析是把句子分解为各种组成部分,然后赋予这些部分这样一些范畴,诸如名词、动词、副词等等。由此产生的语言就被称作短语结构语言。这种分析被明显地刻画为使用图表和引入把某些符号转换为其他符号的重写规则,譬如,把“句子”重写成“名词短语+动词短语”,又把“名词短语”重写成“冠词+名词”,等等。话语的不同部分在这种分析中不断地得到揭示。但这只能用在当我们知道我们想要推出什么样的句子的时候,它并没有展现不同句子之间直观到的内在关系。譬如,这种语法不能把“to be”归为一种动词。因而,乔姆斯基认为这种语法不适合语言描述,并认为应该把它替换为转换生成语法。

“短语结构语法是由一些不规则的重写规则构成的,它确定了一种结构描述,这种描述可以表示为一种以词汇符号做标记的三维图表。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》,1965年,第88页。

短语结构语言

见“短语结构语法”条。

内含

见“语调/内含”条。

实践智慧

“实践智慧 (practical wisdom)”的希腊词。

物理决定论

相信世界中的一切事物,包括人的活动,都是由自然的普遍规律支配的。这一见解出现于古代原子论中,并被霍布斯明确表述。现代科学的发展,特别是物理学的发展,使得很多人认为物理决定论肯定是对的。科学宣称其目的是发现这些客观规律。如果我们能在此时为一事物提供完整的物理解释,我们将能根据自然规律预测它的未来。人的自由应被理解为不受强制,而不是脱离这种因果关系。如果我们所做的一切都可以用物理规律解释,灵魂不朽就必须

than as freedom from such causation. If all that we do is explicable in terms of physical laws, the immortality of soul must be denied.

"Physical determinism is based on there being physical laws of nature, many of which have actually been discovered, and of whose truth we can reasonably hope to be quite certain, together with the claim that all other features of the world are dependent on physical factors." — Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970, p. 65.

Physical objects, another term for material objects

Physical phenomenon, see mental phenomenon

Physicalism

A refinement of materialism introduced because not all physical phenomena are material. Physicalism assumes that the physical sciences can encompass everything in the world, and that ultimately everything in the world can be explained through physics. It is possible to reduce any scientific predicate to a physical predicate. The word was introduced by the Logical Positivists for the claim that all scientific statements could be translated into statements about physical or observable objects. In this sense, physicalism is close to scientism, which claims that any language which cannot be reduced to scientific language is defective. Carnap took physicalism as a synonym for behaviourism. However, the Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart contrasted physicalism with behaviourism, taking the former to be a scientific approach and the latter a linguistic approach. Smart's physicalism is also called the identity theory of mind or central-state materialism, because its main thesis is that mental events are identical to brain events. On this view, propositions about mental states turn out to be propositions about brain states that belong to the science of neuro-physiology. Neuro-physiology, in turn, is reducible to physics. However, the physicalist view that the identity between mental states and brain states is contingent identity has been challenged by Kripke's claim that all identity is necessary identity. The issues raised by this criticism include the nature of reference, description, meaning, identity, modality and theory.

"The thesis of physicalism maintains that the physical language is a universal language of science—that is to say, that every language of any sub-domain of science can be equipollently translated into the physical language." — Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 320.

Physico theological argument

Kant's term for his version of the argument from design. The physico-theological argument is one of the three

予以否认。

"物理决定论是以自然中物理规律的存在为基础的,这些规律有许多实际上已被发现,对这些规律的真理性的,连同那种认为世界的所有其他特性都取决于物理要素的观点,我们都能有理由希望是确定无疑的。"——鲁卡斯:《意志的自由》1970年,第65页。

物理对象

“物质对象”的另一说法。

物理现象

见“心的现象”条。

物理主义

一种改良的唯物论,其引入是因为并非一切物理现象都是物质的。物理主义认为物理科学可涵包世界上的一切,并且宇宙中的万事万物都可以最终借助于物理学而得到彻底的解释。有可能将任何科学谓项都还原为物理谓项。逻辑实证主义者创造这一词汇来指这样一种观点:所有的科学陈述都可以被转译为关于物理的或可观察的对象的陈述。在这个意义上,物理主义近乎“科学主义”,后者认为任何不能还原为科学语言的语言都是有缺陷的。卡尔纳普视物理主义为行为主义的同义语,然而,澳大利亚哲学家 J. J. C. 斯马特则将物理主义与行为主义相对立,将前者视为一个科学方法,而将后者视为语言方法。斯马特的物理主义又被称为“心的同一论”或“中心状态唯物论”,因为其主要论点是,心的事件同一于大脑事件。根据这一观点,关于心的状态的命题就是关于属于神经生理科学的大脑状态的命题,而神经生理科学则转而可以还原为物理学。不过,物理主义关于心的状态与大脑状态的同一是偶然同一的观点受到了克里普克的挑战。他认为,一切同一都是必然同一。由这一批评所引发的问题包括指称的性质,摹状,意义,同一,模态及理论等。

“物理主义的观点认为,物理语言是科学的普遍语言——也就是说,任何科学分支的每一语言都可以等同地转译为物理语言。”——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第320页。

自然神论证明

康德的术语,是他关于设计论证的一种形式。自然神论证明是三个主要的上帝存在的神

main theistic proofs for the existence of God, the other two being the ontological argument and the cosmological argument. It argues from observations that the world is purposive and teleologically arranged to the conclusion that there must be an intelligent designer who created it. For Kant, this argument is not sufficient to prove the existence of God because it relies upon the presupposition that there is a supreme being and is thus ultimately based on the ontological argument. Kant argued in detail for the impossibility of the ontological argument and held that its rejection showed that both the cosmological and physico-theological arguments are impossible as well.

"Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A630/B658.

Pictorial form

Wittgenstein claims that a proposition is a logical picture of reality. The elements in a picture are connected with one another in a certain way, and this is the structure of a picture. But how is such a structure possible? The possibility of the structure is called its pictorial form, which is the common element shared by a picture and the reality it represents. Pictorial form is the way a picture represents how objects are related to one another, allowing a picture to depict any reality whose form it has. The conception of pictorial form generalises the notion of picture beyond its primitive base. The distinction between form and structure enables Wittgenstein to solve the ancient puzzle of the possibility of false judgement.

"Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.151.

Picture theory

Wittgenstein's theory of the proposition in the *Tractatus*, according to which a proposition is a picture of reality. To understand a proposition is to know the situation that it represents. The term "picture" (German: *Bild*) is derived both from a drawn picture and from the mathematical sense of an abstract model. All propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Each elementary proposition is composed of unanalysable names which designate simple "objects". The sense of a proposition is the state of affairs it depicts. The way that elements are related in a proposition represents the same way in which objects are related to each other. Hence, a proposition has a pictorial nature. However, it is a logical picture which shares a "pictorial form" with what it depicts, rather than resembling what it depicts spatially. Although all propositions are pictures, not all pictures are propositions. It is a matter of dispute whether the picture

theory is a proof of the existence of God (the other two being the ontological argument and the cosmological argument). It argues from observations that the world is purposive and teleologically arranged to the conclusion that there must be an intelligent designer who created it. For Kant, this argument is not sufficient to prove the existence of God because it relies upon the presupposition that there is a supreme being and is thus ultimately based on the ontological argument. Kant argued in detail for the impossibility of the ontological argument and held that its rejection showed that both the cosmological and physico-theological arguments are impossible as well.

"Therefore the proof of the existence of the highest being rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A630/B658.

Image form

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theory of propositions collapses with Wittgenstein's rejection of the metaphysics of logical atomism of the *Tractatus*.

"It is commonly said that Wittgenstein after the *Tractatus* abandoned the picture theory of proposition." — Kenny, *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*, 1984, p. 21.

Piecemeal engineering

Popper's proposal for an approach to social change. Piecemeal social engineering contrasts with the utopian engineering of rapid, large-scale reform or revolution. Instead of setting up a positive blueprint for society and then seeking the means to realise it, piecemeal engineering confronts the ills of society through a succession of limited reforms. Social life is so complicated that we cannot tell in advance the unintended consequences of any policy, and these consequences might be harmful. If reform is too complex, rapid or wide-ranging, we cannot trace harmful consequences to their source and correct them. Popper argued that reforming society by piecemeal social engineering would improve institutions and maintain social stability more effectively than utopian strategies. Some critics argue that a policy of piecemeal social engineering would succeed only if there is social agreement, but on such matters there are often deep divisions.

"The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good." — Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies* 1945, p. 158.

Pietism

A devotional religious movement within Protestantism, springing from Lutheranism and flourishing in Germany in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was founded by the German Lutheran pastor Philipp Jakob Spener. The name of the movement was derived from the twice-weekly Bible study meetings for devout lay people (called *collegia pietatis*) under Spener's organisation. The movement aimed at being free from the influence of Church and tradition. It stressed autonomous subjectivity and claimed that the real purpose of redemption is to bring the religious subjectivity of man into lively play. The real interest of theology should be to promote the exercise of godliness. The individual should determine the shape of his own religious life by confronting the Bible. The movement emphasised individual experience and practicality rather than evidence and reason. It was concerned with particular problems and situations rather than with the establishment of universal principles. Pietism was the religion of Kant, and the movement also produced figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Gotfried Arnold.

"Pietism represented a turning towards a more inward, emotional, and enthusiastic form of Christianity." — Pinson,

"人们通常说，维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》之后放弃了命题的图像论。"——肯尼：《维特根斯坦的遗产》，1984年，第21页。

渐进工程

波普提出的一种社会变革的方式。渐进式社会工程是相对于激烈的、大规模的改革或革命的乌托邦式工程而言的。渐进工程不是先提出一个明确的社会蓝图然后再寻找方法来实现它，而是通过一系列有限的改革来对抗社会的弊病。社会生活是如此复杂以至我们不可能预先知道任何政策所带来的意想之外的后果，而且这些后果也许是有害的。如果改革太复杂、太快或规模过大，我们就不能找出有害后果的根源并纠正它们。波普论证说，以渐进的社会工程改革社会将会改善社会制度并维持社会的稳定，这样做比乌托邦的策略更有效。一些批评家争辩说，渐进的社会工程的政策只有在社会一致同意的情况下才能成功，但对这样的问题常常存在很深的分歧。

"因此，渐进的工程将采取寻找社会最严重、最迫切解决的社会弊端并与之斗争的方法，而不是采取寻找社会最伟大的终极幸福并为之奋斗的方法。"——波普：《开放的社会及其敌人》，1945年，第158页。

虔敬主义

新教内的一个虔诚的宗教运动，发源于路德教，盛行于17世纪到18世纪早期的德国。由德国的路德教牧师P. J. 斯庇勒创立。该运动的名称源出于在斯庇勒组织下为虔诚的俗界人士举办的每星期两次的圣经研讨会议（被称为 *collegia pietatis*）。该运动的目标是为了摆脱教会和传统的影响。它强调自治的主体性，主张救赎的实在目的是把人的宗教主体性鲜活地发挥出来。神学的实际效用应该是促进敬神的实行。个体应该通过对照圣经，决定他自己的宗教生活形式。该运动强调的是个体体验和实践性，而不是证据和理由。它关注的是特殊问题和境遇，而不是普遍原则的建立。虔敬主义是康德的宗教，该运动也产生出了F. 施莱尔马赫和G. 阿诺德这样的人物。

"虔敬主义代表了基督教转向到较为内向的、激情的和热情的形式。"——宾森：《虔敬主义在日耳曼民族主义中的作用》，1968年，第14页。

Pietism as a Factor in the Role of German Nationalism, 1968, p. 14.

Pineal gland

Descartes held that mind and body are two entities which are completely different in nature. How, then, can the soul have a unified relationship with the entire body? How can mind and body mutually affect one another? Descartes' answer is that the soul does not exercise its functions directly on the body, but affects the body through the pineal gland. The pineal gland is an organ which is situated in the middle of the brain, and which is unique to humans. For Descartes, the pineal gland is the seat of the soul. He claimed that the mind generates movements in the pineal gland, which in turn generates movements in the nerves and hence the body. Giving a location to mind-body interaction is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of psycho-physical causation. The rejection of this appeal to the pineal gland led to the parallelism of Spinoza, the occasionalism of Malebranche and the pre-established harmony of Leibniz.

"There is no other place in the body where they can be thus united unless they are so in this gland." Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, 1. 32.

Plagiarism, see forgery

Platonism

Philosophy derived from the spirit of the philosophy of Plato, in particular from his Theory of Forms, which contrasts reality with phenomena; soul with body; knowledge with opinion; reason with sensation; and rationality with emotion. It then claims that the first member of each contrasting pair is superior or more real than the second member. Such contrasts form an essential ingredient of Western philosophy and has inspired many philosophers since Plato. In this sense, Whitehead reasonably claimed that all subsequent philosophies are footnotes to Plato. Those who claim explicitly to be the heirs of Plato include the Academy tradition (the Old, Middle, and New Academy), Neo-platonism, the Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino and the Cambridge Platonism of the seventeenth century. In contemporary philosophy, all positions which suggest the independent existence of abstract objects are called Platonism. According to these accounts, abstracta can be grasped by the mind, but cannot be created by it. Platonism in this sense is virtually synonymous with realism and is opposed to nominalism.

"Empiricism may properly be contrasted with platonism. For the platonist believes ... that the propositions of logic and mathematics concern an abstract (non-physical and changeless) but genuinely mind-independent realm of objects, including universals such as beauty and wisdom, as

松果腺

笛卡尔认为,心灵和肉体是性质上完全不同的两个东西。那么,灵魂怎么能同整个身体有一种统一的关系呢?它们怎样互相影响的呢?笛卡尔的回答是:灵魂并不将其功能直接作用于身体,而是通过松果腺来做到的。松果腺是位于脑中部的一个器官,它是人类独有的。笛卡尔认为,松果腺是灵魂的所在地。心灵在松果腺中产生各种运动,这些运动转而又在神经中,而后在身体上产生运动。给身心的相互作用指定一个地点不是解决心—物因果关系问题的满意办法。放弃求助松果腺,就引出了斯宾诺莎的平行论、马勒伯朗士的偶因论和莱布尼茨的前定和谐论。

"除了在这个腺体内它们(灵魂和肉体)可以那样结合以外,它们在身体的任何其他地方都不能那样结合。"——笛卡尔:《灵魂的激情》,第一部分,第32节。

抄袭

见“赝品”条。

柏拉图主义

源于柏拉图哲学精神的哲学,尤其以他的“理念论”为基础。“理念论”把实在和现象、灵魂和肉体、知识和意见、理性和感觉、理智和激情对应起来,随后断言,这每组对应关系中的前者要优于后者,或比后者更实在。这样的对应,形成了西方哲学的一种本质要素,启发着从柏拉图以来的许多哲学家。在这种意义上,怀特海断言一切后随的哲学都是对柏拉图脚注是有道理的。明确承认是柏拉图后继者的人,包括柏拉图学园传统(老学园、中期学园和新学园)、新柏拉图主义、M. 费其诺为代表的文艺复兴时期的柏拉图主义和17世纪的剑桥柏拉图学派。在当代哲学中,凡认为抽象对象独立存在的一切主张都被称作“柏拉图主义”。根据这些说明,抽象物能被心智把握,但不能被它创造。在这种意义上,柏拉图主义实际上是“唯实论”的同义语,而与“唯名论”相对。

“经验主义可以恰当地和柏拉图主义相对应。因为柏拉图主义者相信……逻辑和数学命题关注的是抽象的(非物理的、无变化的),但又完全独立于心智的对象领域,包括美、智慧等共相,也包括自然数等数学实体。”——卡拉塞斯:《人类知识与人类本性》,1992年,第10页。

well as mathematical entities such as the natural numbers.” Carruthers, *Human Knowledge and Human Nature*, 1992, p. 10.

Plato's beard

Quine's term for a classical puzzle, which can be traced to Plato's *Sophist* and concerns the existence of nonbeing. We can formulate the true sentence, “The Queen of China does not exist”, but it seems plausible to claim that the non-existent Queen must in some sense be for us to make sense of denying her existence. Yet it seems self-contradictory to say that we can infer the being of something from its nonbeing. This puzzle has led philosophers to examine both the nature of reference and the logical form of existential propositions.

“This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard.” Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, pp. 1-2.

Plausibility

A claim is plausible if it subjectively seems worthy of belief even if we have not necessarily studied its objective ground. Plausibility is thus acceptable credibility, and its degree of credibility can depend in part on the authority that advocates it. A plausible claim can turn out to be false, and an implausible claim can turn out to be true. People can disagree on what they find to be plausible. Plausibility is distinct from probability, which is related to alternatives. A belief is probable if its degree of likelihood is greater than that of its alternatives. Probability is more objective than plausibility.

“All holding-to-be true based on grounds concerning which we do not investigate whether they contain a large or a small degree of truth is plausibility.” —Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 113.

Pleasure

[Greek: *hedone*, from which hedonism is derived] Pleasure is taken to be contrary to pain but related to enjoyment and liking. Plato in the *Philebus* argues that pleasure is an indeterminate state and cannot be measured, a position challenged by social choice and other theories which depend on some way of measuring pleasure. Aristotle holds that pleasure, in contrast to movement, is an activity having its own end and is the natural accompaniment of successful activity, whether of the mind or the senses. Pleasure is not identical to happiness, but is an important part of it. This position opposes traditional hedonism, which claims that pleasure is the only or the highest good. According to Utilitarianism an action is justified to the extent that it tends to produce pleasure and to reduce pain. Pleasure is generally viewed as an agreeable feeling, but there is much debate regarding its nature,

柏拉图的胡子

奎因的术语，指一个可溯至柏拉图《智者篇》的经典性难题，关注“不是”的存在，我们可以构建一真实的句子，“中国的皇后不存在”。但我们有理由断定，不存在的皇后必定自某种意义上“是”〔存在〕，因而使得我们可否定其存在。可是说我们可从一个事物的“不是”〔不存在〕中推出其“是”〔存在〕，这是自相矛盾的，这一难题吸引了许多哲学家去考察指称的性质和存在命题的逻辑形式。

“这是古老的柏拉图的关于‘不是’的谜。‘不是’必定在某种意义上‘是’；不然，‘不是’又是什么？这一棘手的学说可取绰号为柏拉图的胡子。”——奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》，1956年，第1—2页。

似真性

一个信念是似真的，如果它主观上值得相信，尽管我们尚未必要地研究其客观基础的。这样，似真性就是可接受的可信性，其可信度部分地依赖于提倡它的权威。一个似真观点可证明为是假的，而一个不似真观点可证明为是真的。人们对他们认为是似真的东西会有不同观点。似真性区别于与选择相关的或然性，一个信念是或然的，如果其真实性程度大于其他选择。或然性比似真性更客观。

“所有那些我们主张其为真，但其基础又并非我们对其真实度的研究，就是似真性。”——康德：《逻辑学讲义》（杨编辑），1992年，第113页。

快感

〔希腊词是 *hedone*，“享乐主义”（hedonism）源自该词〕快感与痛苦相对，与享受和喜欢相关。在《费利布篇》中，柏拉图争辩说，快感是一种不确定的状态，是无法衡量的，这一立场受到有赖于某种快感衡量方式的社会选择与其他学说的挑战。亚里士多德认为快感与运动截然相反，它是一种有其自身目的的活动，是成功活动的自然伴随物，无论这种活动是心灵的还是感官的。快感与幸福不同，但却是幸福的重要组成部分。这一立场反对传统的享乐主义，因为后者把快感当做惟一的或至高的善。按照功利主义的观点，举凡产生快感并且消减痛苦的行动就是合理的。快感通常被视为一种欣快的感受，但在其本质、分类及其同欲望的关系等问题上争论颇多，这其中的部分原因在于

classification and relation to desire, in part because of its central role in the discussion of human motivation and value.

"Appetite's concern is pleasure and pain." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1111b17.

Pluralism

[From Latin *pluris*, more than one] A doctrine, opposed to monism and dualism, holding that reality consists of many things and that none of its constituents is more fundamental than any of the others. It is therefore impossible to reduce everything in reality to one or two ultimate principles. For pluralism there are many worlds which we are able to construct through the use of different systems of concepts and different standards of measurement. Leibniz's theory of monads, Russell's logical atomism and later Wittgenstein's theory of language games are different forms of pluralism. Sometimes pluralism means that reality has no basic unity or continuity, but is essentially fragmented or indeterminate. In ethics, pluralism means that there are various competing ethical interests or values which cannot be reduced to one single overriding interest or value.

"The extreme form of pluralism is the assumption that all relations are external, with the consequence that the existence of any one object is logically independent of the existence of any other." —Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 10.

Pneuma

[Greek: breath] A key term in Stoic philosophy of nature. *Pneuma* was held to be a compound of fire and air, although not a simple chemical compound, and was also called artistic or intelligent *pneuma*. Through having two components, *pneuma* was held to have a peculiar tensional movement making it continuously active. It was described as a material substance with fine and tenuous structure, but also as a cohesive force or energy which pervades the universe to account for its change and persistence. As Nature, God or the universal *logos*, it acted on matter, that is the elements of earth and water, to hold them together. *Pneuma* worked in the macrocosm and also in every individual body. The concept of *pneuma* was influenced by the Pre-Socratics and in turn influenced the postulation of *aether* in the science of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. It is also comparable to a field of force in contemporary physics.

"This pneuma possesses two parts, elements or conditions, which are blended with one another through and through, the cold and hot, or if one wished to describe them by different names taken from their substances: air and fire." —Chrysippus, in Gelen, *On Hippocrates and Plato's Doctrines*, 5, 3, 8.

Pneumatology, another expression for rational psychology

快感在讨论人类动机和价值过程中的重要作用。

"欲望所关心的是快感与痛苦。" ——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1111b17。

多元论

[源自拉丁文 *pluris*, "多于·"] 与一元论和二元论相反, 这种学说认为实在由许多事物组成, 其组成元素中没有哪一种比任何其他种更为基本。因此不可能把实在中的任何东西都还原为一种或两种最终的基质。对多元论而言, 有多个世界, 我们可以通过使用不同的概念系统和不同的测量标准而把它们构造出来。莱布尼茨的单子论、罗素的逻辑原子论以及后期维特根斯坦的语言游戏论都是不同形式的多元论。有时, 多元论指的是实在没有基本统一性或连续性, 它本质上是支离破碎和不确定的。在伦理学中, 多元论指有各种对立的伦理兴趣和价值, 不能把它们还原成单一的、压倒一切的兴趣和价值。

"多元论的极端形式是这种假设: 所有的关系都是外在的, 因此任何对象的存在在逻辑上都独立于任何其他对象的存在。" ——艾耶尔: 《20 世纪的哲学》, 1982 年, 第 10 页。

普纽玛

[希腊文, 气息] 斯多亚自然哲学的中心概念。它被认为是火与气的复合物, 虽然不是一种简单的化学复合物。他们也称为"技艺性的"或"理智的"普纽玛。因为普纽玛有两个成分, 它便有一种独特的张力运动, 使其不断地活动。它是一种结构稀薄精致的物质本体, 但也像一种凝聚力或能量般贯穿整个宇宙, 说明后者的变化和持续。它作为自然, 作为神, 作为普遍的逻各斯, 而作用于质料, 即土和水的元素, 将它们相结合。普纽玛既在宏观宇宙, 也在每个个别物体中起作用。这一观念深受前苏格拉底哲学影响, 并转而影响了 17 至 19 世纪科学中关于以太的设定。它也可与当代物理学的"力场"观念相对照。

"这一普纽玛拥有两个部分, 两种元素或两种条件; 它们一直在互相混合, 既冷又热; 如果人们要用取自它们本体的不同名称来描绘它们, 即是气与火。" ——克吕西波, 见盖伦: 《论希波克拉底和柏拉图的学说》, 5, 3, 8。

圣灵论

Poiesis

[Greek: from *poiein*, to act, to do or to make] For Aristotle, *poiesis* is restricted to making or producing which has as its aim something beyond itself, for example ship-building, which has the aim of producing a vessel. It is distinguished from *praxis* (action, conduct), which has aims and value in itself. *Poiesis* belongs to *techné* (craft), while *praxis* belongs to *phronesis* (practical reason). In another sense, *poiesis* is used specifically for poetry and its composition.

"The state involving reason and concerned with action is different from the state involving reason and concerned with *poiesis*." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a3-4.

Polar-related concept pair

A pair of concepts which are opposite in meaning, where each of them can be understood or identified only in terms of its contrast with the other. The notion is also called conceptual polarity. Neither member of the pair has an autonomous existence as a concept apart from the other, and neither member can logically be reduced to the other. In many cases, one concept of the polar pair is formed in association with the other from which it is distinguished. Examples of polar pairs include up and down, unity and plurality, physical and mental and error and truth. The application of each entails the possibility of applying the other. In the history of Western philosophy, various polarities have been established, and usually one member is thought to be superior to the other. Derrida's deconstructionism is intended to reject dichotomous conceptual structures and their relations of unequal power and value, but it is difficult to determine whether we can do without such concept pairs or whether objectionable implications of value can be detached from them.

"A particularly important type of discrimination is that where one concept which, so to speak, includes by exclusion. Concepts related in this way and such constitute the most important concepts of our thinking, we denoted as 'polar-related concept pairs'." —Reiss, *The Basis of Scientific Thinking*, 1961, p. 5.

Polish notation

The notation employed in contemporary logic is generally Russellian symbolism. Yet there is an important kind of notation which was originates by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz and which was widely employed by Polish logicians between two world wars. It was also preferred by the logician Arthur Prior. The chief characteristic of Polish notation is that it places all its operators immediately before their arguments, and thus gets rid of parentheses. This helps avoid ambiguity and better serves automatic processing. The

"理性心理学"的另一表述。

创制

[希腊词, 源自 *poiein*, 行动、做或制作] 对亚里士多德而言, 创制限于那目的不在自身内的制作或生产, 例如, 造船业的目的是制造船。它与实践(举动, 行为)相区分, 后者具有目的和价值于自身。创制属于技艺(*techné*), 而实践属于实践理性(*phronesis*)。在另一意义上, 创制专门用来指诗及其创作。

"理性地关涉行为的状态不同于理性地关涉创制的状态。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》, 1140a3—4。

极性相关的概念对

一对意义相反、但每一个只能在与另一个的对比中才能理解或鉴别的概念。这一概念也被称作“概念的两极性”。这种概念中的任何一个都既不能作为离开另一方的孤立概念而自主存在, 也不能在逻辑上还原为另一方。在许多情形中, 这种极性对中的一个概念都在与自己相区别的另一概念的相关中形成。这种概念对的例子有“上—下”, “统一性—多元性”, “物理的—心理的”, “错误—真理”等。每一概念的应用都蕴涵着另一方应用的可能性。西方哲学史中确立起种种概念对, 并且通常认为有一方高于另一方。德里达的解构主义力图拒斥两极概念结构以及它们间在力量与价值上不相等的关系, 不过很难决定我们可否取消这些概念对, 或者价值的客观化含义是否可与它们相分离。

“一种特别重要的辨别类型, 是一个概念由排斥而得以包容。以这种方式相关、并由此构成我们思维中最重要的概念, 我们称之为‘极性相关的概念对’。”——里斯:《科学思维基础》, 1961年, 第5页。

波兰记法

在当代逻辑中所使用的记法一般是罗素的符号体系。不过, 还有一类重要的记法, 它起源于波兰逻辑学家卢卡西维茨, 并且被波兰逻辑学家在两次世界大战之间所广泛使用, 亦为逻辑学家普赖尔所偏爱。波兰记法的主要特点在于, 它把所有的算子直接置于其主目之前, 由此就省掉了括号。这有助于避免歧义并更适用于自动编程。下面是这组记号的表列, 括号内是其中文解释:

following is the list of this set of notation, with an English explanation in bracket;

Np (not p)

Apq (either p or q)

Kpq (both p and q)

Cpq (if p then q)

Epq (p if and only if q)

Mp (possibly p)

Lp (necessarily p)

Ixy (x is the same as y)

$\Sigma x\phi x$ (for some x, ϕx)

$\Pi x\phi x$ (for every x, ϕx)

"Polish notation shows which expressions are arguments and which expressions are functions by always writing all arguments to the right of their functions." — Williams, *What is Existence*, 1981, p. 50.

Political liberty

According to liberalism, the basic rights or liberties that citizens of a just society holds equally. It is the liberty held in virtue of citizenship. Political liberty includes negative liberties, such as freedom from the arbitrary arrest and the freedom to pursue one's own interests and plans without obstruction, and positive liberties, such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to possess property. Political liberties provide the main content of human rights.

"I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others." — Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, p. 122.

Political obligation

The duty to obey the laws and rules of the state. A fundamental problem for political philosophy concerns the grounds for accepting the authority of the state, given that state jurisdiction has the character of universality and compulsion. Under what conditions is obedience required or disobedience justified? These issues are closely associated with attempts to determine the basis of the authority of the state, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate governments, and the problem of civil disobedience. Political obligation cannot be understood merely in terms of prudence and the fear of coercive power. Various theories of political obligation have been put forward over the centuries, such as those focusing on divine right, the social contract, consent, the general will, justice and rationality.

"[H]aving a political obligation ordinarily presupposes the existence of a rule (whether a legal rule or some other type) which forbids or requires a specified form of conduct." — Flathman, *Political Obligation*, 1972, xxiv.

Np (非 p)

Apq (或者 p 或者 q)

Kpq (既 p 又 q)

Cpq (如果 p 则 q)

Epq (p 当且仅当 q)

Mp (可能 p)

Lp (必然 p)

Ixy (x 与 y 同一)

$\Sigma x\phi x$ (对某些 x, ϕx)

$\Pi x\phi x$ (对每一个 x, ϕx)

"波兰记法凭借把所有主目总是写在其函项的右边,从而表明了哪些表达式是主目,哪些表达式是它们的函项。"——威廉姆斯:《什么是存在》,1981年,第50页。

政治自由

根据自由主义,政治自由是一个公正社会的公民平等拥有的那些基本权利或自由。它是凭借公民身份而拥有的自由。政治自由包括消极的自由和积极的自由,前者如不受随意逮捕的自由,不受妨碍地追求自己的利益和计划的自由,后者如思想的自由、言论的自由、集会的自由和拥有财产的权利。政治自由为人权提供了主要的内容。

"正常说来,我在没有人或团体干预我的活动这种程度上是自由的。政治自由在这种意义上仅仅是一个范围,在这一范围内,一个人可以不受他人的妨碍去行动。"——柏林:《自由四论》,1969年,第122页。

政治义务

遵守国家的法律和法规的责任。对政治哲学而言,假定国家司法权具有普遍和强制的特性,那所涉及的一个基本问题就是,接受国家权威性的根据是什么?在什么样的条件下所需的服从或不服从才是正当的?这些问题与确定国家权威基础的努力、区分合法政府和非法政府及公民的不服从问题密切相关。政治义务仅从谨慎和对强权的恐惧是不能被理解的。有关政治义务的各种理论被提出已有许多世纪了,如那些关注神权、社会契约、同意、共同意志、正义和合理性的理论。

"政治义务通常以存在一个规定(不管是合法的规定还是其他类型的规定)为先决条件,这一规定禁止或要求一种特定的行为方式。"——弗拉茨曼:《政治义务》,1972年,第xxiv页。

Political philosophy

Political philosophy is distinguished from political science on the grounds that political science is empirical and descriptive, explaining how government in fact works, while political philosophy is normative, establishing the norms or ideal standards which prescribe how governments ought to work. In fact, the boundary between the two fields is not clear. Political theory includes both empirical and normative investigations. Contemporary political philosophers bring analytic skill and ethical commitment to their work. They seek theoretical insight into basic political concepts, such as justice, equality, liberty, democracy, nationalism, the state, power, authority, citizenship, rights and obligations and look for rational grounds to accept or reject particular political institutions. Political philosophers assess existing political institutions and ideologies and in some cases seek to justify alternative political and social systems if existing arrangements are unacceptable. Plato's *Republic* remains the major classic. Other prominent political philosophers include Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Burke, Hegel, Mill and Marx. Much recent discussion in political philosophy has responded to the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

A rigid demarcation between political and social philosophy is impossible, and social philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, have influenced recent political philosophy. Social philosophy also deals with philosophical issues relating to institutions such as the family, religion and education. Critiques of culture and modernity derived from Nietzsche and his successors have also influenced political philosophy.

"Politics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise. Political philosophy is therefore, strictly speaking, the philosophy of the state." — Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, 1970, p. 3.

Political theory

An academic discipline aiming to provide a systematic understanding of the nature and purpose of government and to provide certain views about how political institutions ought to be improved. It is distinct from political philosophy, which seeks to explicate and give theoretical insight into normative political concepts, such as justice, liberty, equality, the state, democracy, authority, citizenship and rights, and from political science, which seeks to provide explanatory theories and classifications in relation to the empirical data of politics. Nevertheless, political theory is closely related to these other disciplines and is often regarded as the theoretical aspect of political science. Traditionally, its main preoccupation has been to analyse the work of the classical political thinkers from Plato to Marx and to apply their insights to current political affairs. Recently, political theorists have be-

政治哲学

政治哲学不同于政治科学,其原因在于政治科学是经验性的和描述性的,它解释一个政府实际上是如何运作的,而政治哲学则是规范性的,它确立那些规定政府应如何运作的准则或理想的标准。事实上这两个领域的界线是不清楚的。政治理论既包括经验方面的调查研究,也包括规范方面的调查研究。当代政治哲学家把分析的技巧和伦理学的承诺带进了他们的研究。他们试图从理论上洞察诸如正义、公平、自由、民主、民族主义、国家、权力、权威、公民身份、权利和义务等基本的政治概念,寻求接受或拒绝特定政治制度的合理根据。政治哲学家评价现存的政治制度和意识形态,如果现存的安排不能被接受,他们有时还试图论证可以替换的政治和社会制度。柏拉图的《国家篇》现在仍是政治哲学的主要经典著作。其他著名的政治哲学家包括亚里士多德、马基雅维利、霍布斯、洛克、休谟、卢梭、康德、博克、黑格尔、密尔和马克思。近来政治哲学的许多讨论已转向 J. 罗尔斯和 R. 诺齐克的著作。

政治哲学和社会哲学之间不可能存在一条严格的界线,一些社会哲学家,如 J. 哈贝马斯,已对近来的政治哲学产生了影响。社会哲学也探讨与诸如家庭、宗教和教育这些与制度相关的哲学问题。起源于尼采和他的后继者的对文化和现代性的批判也对政治哲学产生了影响。

“政治是国家权力的运作或影响这些运作的尝试,因此,从严格意义上讲,政治哲学是关于国家的哲学。”——沃尔夫:《为无政府主义辩护》,1970年,第3页。

政治理论

一门旨在提供对政府的性质和效用的系统理解,并提供某些有关政治制度应如何改进的意见的学科。它与政治哲学不同,后者试图解释并从理论上洞察规范的政治概念,如正义、自由、平等、国家、民主、权威、公民身份和权利;它与政治科学也不同,后者试图提供有关政治经验材料的解释性理论和分类法。不过,政治理论同这两个不同学科联系密切,并常常被视为政治科学的理论方面。从传统上看,它的主要着眼点一直是分析从柏拉图到马克思这些经典政治思想家的著作,并把他们的思想运用于当前的政治事务。近些年来,政治理论家关注的是建构政治进程的形式模型。由于当代对分析—综合,事实—价值区分的质疑,政治哲学、政治理论与政治科学已变得越发接近。

come interested in constructing formal models of political processes. With the contemporary questioning of the analytic synthetic and fact-value distinctions, political philosophy, political theory and political science have drawn more closely together.

"Political theory is ... an essentially mixed mode of thought. It not only embraces deductive argument and empirical theory, but combines these with normative concerns ... so acquiring a practical, action-guiding character." —Miller and Siedentop (eds), *The Nature of Political Theory*, 1983, p. 1.

Polyadic, see dyadic

Polysyllogism

An inference composed of a series of syllogisms in which the conclusion of an earlier syllogism become a premise of a later syllogism in the series. The earlier syllogism is called a prosyllogism, and the later syllogism is called an episyllogism. For example, take (1) all *rs* are *ps*; (2) all *ps* are *qs*, (3) all *rs* are *qs*; (4) all *qs* are *ds*, (5) all *rs* are *ds*. Not only is (3) a conclusion derived from (1) and (2), but it is also a premise of the syllogism composed of (3), (4) and (5). A syllogism with more than two premises is generally analysed as two or more syllogisms.

"A series of syllogisms, one providing a premise of another, is called a polysyllogism." —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 354.

Polytheism

[from Greek: *poly*, many + *theos*, god] A belief that there are many gods, instead of one. Religions that accept and worship many gods are called polytheistic religions. This view is opposed to monotheism (from Greek: *mono*, one, single + *theos*, god), the belief that there is only one God. The religion of the ancient Greeks was polytheistic, and Judaism, Christianity and Islam are monotheistic. It is often held that polytheism is inconsistent with true religious belief, because its gods, who are pictured as quarrelling, lying and cheating, are far from moral perfection. Based on the observation that polytheism characterises the religions of early societies, monotheists argue that polytheism is a stage of human religious development which culminates in monotheism.

"Polytheism: more than one god exists." —Sorensen, *Thought Experiment*, 1992, p. 205.

Pons asinorum

[Latin: the bridge of asses, because asses were traditionally thought to have difficulty in crossing bridges] This term has several usage. It refers to proofs from Euclid's *Elements* of two theorems: first, if two sides of a triangle are

"政治理论是……一种实质上混合的思想模式。它不仅包含演绎性的证明和经验性的理论,而且还把它们与规范的事物结合起来,……从而获得了一种实践的、指导行动的特征。"——米勒、西登托普(编辑):《政治理论的性质》,1983年,第1页。

多元的

见“二元的”条。

复合三段论

由一系列三段论所构成的推理,该系列中较前的三段论的结论变成了较后的三段论的前提。较前的三段论叫做前三段论(prosyllogism),较后的三段论叫做后三段论(episyllogism)。例如,(1)所有*r*都是*p*;(2)所有*p*都是*q*;(3)所有*r*都是*q*;(4)所有*q*都是*d*;(5)所有*r*都是*d*。(3)不仅是从(1)和(2)推出的结论,而且也是由(3),(4)和(5)构成的三段论的一个前提。有多于两个前提的三段论通常被分析为两个或多个三段论。

"一系列三段论,一个为另一个提供了前提,叫做复合三段论。"——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第354页。

多神论

[源自希腊语 *poly* (众多的) 和 *theos* (神)] 一种信仰,相信存在着多个神,而不是一个。接受并崇拜许多神祇的宗教被称作多神论宗教。这种观点与“一神论”(monotheism,源自希腊语 *mono* (一,单) 和 *theos* (神)) 相对立,因为一神论相信只有一位神存在。古代希腊的宗教是多神论,犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教是一神论。一般认为,多神论与真正的宗教信仰是不一致的,因为它的那些被描述为争吵、撒谎和欺诈的神祇,离道德完美相去甚远。基于发现多神论表现了早期社会的宗教特征,一神论者认为,多神论是人类宗教发展过程中的一个阶段,而这个过程的顶点是一神论。

"多神论:有多个神存在。"——索伦森:《思想实验》,1992年,第205页。

驴桥

[拉丁语,“驴桥”。因为在传统上,它被认为是驴子难以通过的桥]这个术语有几种用法。首先,它指源于欧几里德《几何学原理》两个定理的证明。这两个定理是:第一,“如果一个三

equal, then the angles opposite those sides are also equal; and secondly, the Pythagorean theorem, the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Those who fail to follow these proofs are considered to be as stupid as asses. In another sense, a *pons asinorum* is a bridge-like diagram proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. It was used as a study aid to show how to proceed from premises to a given conclusion.

"In the later Middle Ages this diagram (with accompanying mnemonic verses to distinguish good connexions from bad) was used extensively for the teaching of syllogism and came to be known as the *pons asinorum*." —W. Kneale and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, pp. 186-7.

Popular art

Art is often distinguished into serious, higher or esoteric art and popular art. Popular art has dominated modern mass-media culture and has great social influence. Critics of popular art claim that it is inferior to the higher forms of art and fear that it corrupts higher culture. They allege that popular art lacks creativity in both form and content and does no more than please its audience. They see it as intellectually shallow and emotionally disruptive and argue that its appreciation requires neither effort nor training, but only passive response. Popular art is alleged to produce spurious gratification rather than real aesthetic satisfaction. In all, these critics see popular art as intrinsically worthless in aesthetic terms. Cultural elitists claim that popular art is a lower taste that reduces the quality of our culture. Perhaps led by aesthetic attention to film, many recent critics and cultural theorists have adopted a more favourable attitude towards popular arts. They have challenged much of the hostile assessment given above and have argued that fastidious higher arts have benefited greatly from the exuberant strength of popular arts. We should at least distinguish among different forms of popular art. Intelligent appreciation might improve them without destroying their character or their legitimate function.

"The distinction between esoteric and popular arts almost coincides in our civilisation with that between art and entertainment, but need not do so; the former distinction, unlike the latter, does not impute insincerity and the will to manipulate." —F. E. Sparsbott, *The Structure of Aesthetics*, 1963, pp. 138-9.

Pornography

A genre of fiction, initially associated with brothels, focusing on the representation of obscene—often perverse—sexual activities, with the intention of sexually arousing its readers, mainly men. The term now extends to cover any work in any medium with the same content and intention.

角形的两边相等,那么,与那些边对应的角亦相等";第二,毕达哥拉斯定理,即"一个直角三角形斜边的平方等于另两个边平方之和"。没有领会这些证明的人被认为蠢笨如驴。在另一种意义上,它指一个像桥的图表,由阿弗罗迪西的亚历山大在其对亚里士多德《前分析》的评注中提出。它用作研究的一种帮助,表示怎样从前提推进到给定的结论。

"在中世纪后期,这个图表(带有区分正确的联结和错误的联结的记忆韵文)曾被广泛地用于教授三段论,逐渐被通称为驴桥。"——W. 涅尔和M. 涅尔:《逻辑学的发展》,第186—187页。

通俗艺术

艺术经常被分为严肃艺术、高雅艺术或难懂的艺术以及通俗艺术。通俗艺术主导着现代大众传媒文化,具有重大的社会影响力。通俗艺术的批评者认为通俗艺术劣于高雅的艺术形式,同时还担心通俗艺术对高雅文化的腐蚀作用。他们认为通俗艺术在形式与内容方面缺乏创造性,只是一味地迎合和取悦观众。批评家们认为通俗艺术在思想上肤浅,在情感上腐朽,认为欣赏通俗艺术轻而易举、无需训练,只是被动地反应而已。据说,通俗艺术给人以虚假的满足而非真正的审美满足。总之,这些批评家认为通俗艺术从审美角度看没有什么内在价值。文化精英论者宣称,通俗艺术低级趣味,有损文化的品质。或许由于对电影的审美注意,近来许多批评家和文化理论家对通俗艺术采取了一种比较积极的态度。他们向敌视通俗艺术的上述评价提出挑战,认为过分讲究的高雅艺术在很大程度上得益于通俗艺术的勃勃生机。人们至少应当区别对待不同的通俗艺术形式。理智的欣赏或许会在不破坏其特征或合理职能的情况下改善通俗艺术。

"在人类文明中,难懂的艺术与通俗艺术之间的区别几乎等同于艺术与娱乐的区别,但是不必这样划分;这两种区别不同,前者并不把虚伪和意志归咎于操纵。"——斯帕肖特:《美学的结构》,1963年,第138—139页。

色情艺术


一种小说样式,最初与妓院有关,侧重于表现淫秽——经常是堕落的——色情活动,旨在唤起读者(主要是男人)的性欲。现在,色情艺术包括所有具有相同内容与意向并以各种媒体制作的作品。虽然边界难以划分,但是,赤裸裸

Although the boundaries are difficult to draw, hard-core pornography, which depicts cruelty, violence and explicit arousal can be distinguished from soft-core, which does not. Pornography, as distinct from erotic art, is generally considered to have little redeeming aesthetic interest, for its dominant aim is the gratification of sexual fantasy. Because pornography is thought to be morally harmful and degrading to individuals and society, many consider that any material found to be pornographic should be restricted or prohibited. Others argue that pornography should be eliminated because it supports in fantasy real and objectionable patterns of patriarchal domination in society. Opponents argue that pornography has a positive function of dealing with sexual desire without involving unwelcome sexual advances. The issue of censoring pornography is debated in terms of the freedom of thought and the press, on the one hand, and the need to avoid degrading creators and users of pornography, women and society, on the other.

"If we assume that the majority is correct, and that people who publish and consume pornography do the wrong thing, or at least display the wrong sort of character, should they nevertheless have the legal right to do so?" — R. Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*, 1986, p. 336.

Porphyrian tree

The Greek Neo-platonist Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus' *Enneads*, wrote an introduction (Greek: *Isagoge*) to Aristotle's *Categories*. It was translated into Latin by Boethius and became the standard philosophical textbook in the Middle Ages. In his introduction, Porphyry presented the basis of Aristotle's thought as a tree-like scheme of dichotomous divisions which indicates that a species (subgenera) is defined by *genus et differentia* and that the process continues until the lowest species (*infirma species*) is reached. In the category of substance, the tree is:



Thus, to define a human being (for example, Socrates), we shall say that he is a mortal, rational, sensitive, animate, corporeal substance. The tree is the standard device by which medieval metaphysics classified natural kinds.


"A Porphyrian Tree begins with an Aristotelian category ... and moves via a series of dichotomies from the most gen-

的性描写以及描写残忍与暴力的色情艺术，有别于委婉描写此类事情的色情艺术。与难懂的高雅艺术截然相反的是，人们一般认为色情艺术没有什么值得注意的审美兴趣，因为其主导目的是为了满足不同性幻想。由于人们认为色情艺术对个体和社会来讲有伤风化，所以许多人认为应当限制或禁止任何描写色情的东西。有些人争辩说，色情艺术理应取缔，因为它引人思淫或想入非非。而反对者则认为色情艺术具有对付性欲的积极功能，同时又不掺杂讨厌的性挑逗。查封色情艺术的问题向来争论不休，一方面是因为思想与新闻自由所致，另一方面是因为有必要避免贬低作者和色情艺术使用者的身份，避免降低妇女的身份和败坏社会的风气。

"我们如果假定大多数人是正确的，假定出版和消费色情艺术的人们是错误的，或者假定人们表现出一种错误的品格，那么他们到底有没有合法权利这样做呢?"——德沃金：《原则问题》，1986年，第336页。

波菲利之树

古代希腊的新柏拉图主义者、普罗提诺《九章集》的编纂者波菲利撰写了一篇亚里士多德《范畴》的导言（希腊语为 *Isagoge*）。它由波埃修斯译成拉丁文，成为中世纪的标准哲学教科书。在这篇导言中，波菲利把亚里士多德的思想基础表述为一张两叉划分的树状图。这张图表明，一个种（子属）是靠 *genus et differentia*（属加种差）而被定义的，这个过程要一直持续达到最低一级的种（不稳固的种）。以实体范畴为例，这棵树是：



可见，要定义一个人（例如，苏格拉底），我们就要说，他是一个有死的、有理性的、有感觉的、有生命的、有形体的实体。这棵树是中世纪的形而上学区分自然种类所依据的标准设计。

"波菲利之树从亚里士多德的一个范畴开始，……从最一般的属出发，经过一系列的两叉

eral genus through at least some of its species.”——Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, 1997, p. 136.

Port-Royal Logic

In 1662, French theologians and philosophers Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole published *La Logique; Ou, l'Art de Penser (Logic; Or the Art of Thinking)*. Both of them were teachers at Port Royal, a monastery in the south-west of Paris and the intellectual centre of Jansenism. Hence the book is generally called the *Port-Royal Logic*. The book defines logic as the art of managing one's reason in the knowledge of things for the instruction of others and oneself. It claims that the mind has four principal operations: conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering, and the book is divided into four corresponding parts. The *Port-Royal Logic* is established on the basis of Cartesian epistemology and rejects the subtleties of medieval logic. It introduced into logic modern scientific methods and contributed to propositional logic. The book became the standard logic textbook until the nineteenth century and had a wide impact on the development of modern logic. It is also regarded as the precursor of modern linguistic analysis.

"Port royal logic ... both contains an argument against probabilism and is the first occasion on which 'probability' is actually used in what is identifiably our modern sense, susceptible of numerical measurement."——Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability*, 1975, p. 25.

Posit

The assumption or hypothesis which is given as the starting-point of a theory or an explanation. The question of its truth is often left to a later stage of dealing with the theory or explanation or is not dealt with separately at all. For Quine, all the entities we use to explain and organise sense experience are posits. Hence, they are everything that we claim to exist aside from sense experience, including abstract objects as well as physical objects.

"Everything to which we conclude existence is a posit from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built."——Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 2.

Positive fact, see negative fact

Positive freedom, an alternative expression for positive liberty; see negative freedom

式划分,最后到达它的某个最低的种。”——克里兹曼:《有神论的形而上学》,1997年,第136页。

波尔—罗亚尔逻辑

1662年,法国神学家和哲学家A.阿尔诺和P.尼柯尔发表了他们的著作《逻辑学;或思维术》。两人都是波尔—罗亚尔的教师。波尔—罗亚尔是巴黎西南部的一所修道院,是“詹森主义”的思想中心,因此这本书一般被称作《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑学》。该书把逻辑定义为一个人在认识事物时运用理性的艺术,用于指导自己与他人。该书断言心灵有四项主要活动:构想、判断、推理和整理,该书也相应地分为四个对应的部分。《波尔—罗亚尔逻辑》建立在笛卡尔认识论的基础上,它反对中世纪逻辑的琐细,它将近代科学方法引入逻辑,对命题逻辑做出了贡献。该书成为直至19世纪为止的标准逻辑学教科书,并对近代逻辑的发展有广泛的影响。它还被认为是现代语言分析的先驱。

“波尔—罗亚尔逻辑……既包含反对概率论的证明,也是‘概率’一词实际用于与近代相同的、可用数值来测量的意义上的第一次。”——哈金:《概率的出现》,1975年,第25页。

假定

它是指被用做一种理论或说明出发点的那种假设或假说。要确定它为真常常是在讨论理论或说明的最后阶段,或者不能完全单独地确定它为真。在奎因看来,我们用于解释和构造感觉经验的一切实体就是假定。因而,它们就是我们认为在感觉经验之外存在的东西,包括抽象对象以及物理对象。

“我们关于存在的每个推论,从描述构造理论之过程的出发点来看,都是一个假定,同时,从这种正在构造的理论出发点来看,它们也是真实的。”——奎因:《词与物》,1960年,第2页。

肯定事实

见“否定事实”条。

积极自由

“积极的自由”的另一表述:见“消极自由”条。

Positive law

[from Latin, *jus*, law + *positivum*, to lay down, hence laws established by human society and institutions] In contrast to natural law, which holds that laws were authored by God or are based on human nature, positive law relies on the will of legislators and applies only to the members of the community for which the legislators legislate. In the philosophy of law, natural law theory claims that the authority of positive law is derived from its compliance with natural law, while legal positivism argues that there is no necessary connection between positive law and morality. In Austin's command theory of law, the conception of positive law is narrowed to the laws laid down by the sovereign of a political society or its subordinates.

"As contradistinguished to natural law, or to the law of nature (meaning, by these expressions, the law of God), the aggregate of the rules, established by political superiors, is frequently styled positive law, or law existing by position." — Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, 1911, p. 87.

Positive liberty

Positive liberty or positive freedom is concerned with enabling one to be the self-determining master of one's own life and action. With positive liberty, one is autonomous and can freely exercise one's own will. On this view, one's life and decisions do not depend on external forces, but are limited solely by one's capabilities, resources and opportunities. According to Isaiah Berlin, positive liberty contrasts with negative liberty, which is freedom from external interference. Unlike negative liberty, positive liberty has a specific content, so that a person is not deemed to be free unless living according to that content. Berlin argued that such a notion of positive liberty carried with it the danger of despotism and preferred the more open political systems incorporating negative liberty.

"The positive sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master." — Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 1969, p. 122.

Positivism

A philosophical tradition founded by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, although its ancestry may be traced to Francis Bacon. The general spirit of positivism is that philosophy should only be concerned with what is positively given (this is also the meaning of the word "positive") and should avoid any speculative thinking which goes beyond given experience. Accordingly, positivism takes the study of scientific methodology as its major task and presents itself as a kind of philosophy of science. Comte's positivism has a famous Law of the Three Stages which claims that the human mind has developed historically through stages. An initial theological

实在法

[源自拉丁文 *jus* (法) 和 *positivum* (制定), 因此, 是指那些由人类社会和机构制定的法] 与认为法律是神创造的或以人性为基础的自然法不同, 实在法依靠的是立法者的意志并且只应用于立法者为其立法的共同体的成员。在法哲学中, 自然法理论认为实在法的权威来自对自然法的依从, 而法律实证主义则提出实在法和道德之间没有必然联系。在奥斯汀的法的命令理论中, 实在法这一概念被限于由一个政治社会的统治者或他的下属制定的法。

“通过与自然法或自然的法(后一种表达方式意指神的法律)的对比区别, 由政治长官制定的法规的集合体常常被称为实在法, 或通过地位而存在的法。” — 奥斯汀: 《法理学讲义》, 1911年, 第87页。

积极的自由

积极的自由关注的是使一个人能够成为自己决定自己的生活和行动的主人。有了积极的自由, 一个人就是自主的, 可以自由地实行自己的意愿。根据这一观点, 一个人的生活和决定不取决于外在的力量, 而只受他自己的能力、资源和机会的限制。柏林认为, 积极的自由与消极的自由形成对照, 它没有外在的干涉。与消极的自由不同, 积极的自由有特定的内容, 其结果是除非生活与这种内容相一致, 否则不能认为一个人是自由的。柏林论证说, 这种积极的自由概念使其带有专制主义的危险, 因而, 他更喜欢与消极的自由相结合的更为开放的政治制度。

“‘自由’这个词的积极意义来自个人要成为他自己的主人的那种希望。” — 柏林: 《自由四论》, 1969年, 第122页。

实证主义

由法国哲学家 A. 孔德奠基的哲学传统, 虽然其开山祖师可以追溯到 F. 培根。实证主义的一般精神是, 哲学只应当关心实证地给予的东西(这也是“实证的”一词的含义), 应当避免任何在所予经验之外的沉思冥想。因此, 实证主义把科学方法论的研究作为其主要任务, 并使自己呈现为一种科学哲学。孔德的实证主义有一个著名的三阶段定律, 它声称人类精神是通过这些阶段在历史上发展的。最开始的神学阶段特点是力图用超自然的存在物说明事物的内在本性。在其后的形而上学阶段, 早先的神

stage was characterised by attempts to explain the inner nature of things in terms of supernatural beings. In a subsequent metaphysical stage, earlier deities were depersonalised and became explanatory abstractions such as essence or force. Finally, in the positivist stage, the human mind realises that all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and can only be advanced by means of observation and experience and therefore understands that metaphysics should be abandoned. Comte also initiated a positive sociology, which studied human societies in terms of positive methods, and a positive religion, which sought to replace the worship of God with the worship of Humanity. Herbert Spencer linked positivism with the theory of evolution to make the study of the all-embracing evolutionary process the major task of philosophy. The descendants of positivism include the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius, which held that science describes sense-experience and has no need to postulate any hidden entities such as the atom; the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, which developed the principle of verification, incorporated the new logical developments of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, and held an extremely hostile attitude to metaphysics; and legal positivism, which emphasises that law should be as it is (positive law) rather than as we might believe it should be (natural law).

"Apart from Kantianism, there is no contemporary philosophical movement so closely associated with exact science as positivism."—Schlick, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, p. 178.

Possibilism, see actualism

Possible world

Although philosophers had been talking about what is possible long before, the origin of the discussion of possible world is generally credited to Leibniz, who claimed that although our world contains much that is evil, it is nonetheless the best of all possible worlds. In contemporary philosophy, discourse of possible worlds developed into a semantic interpretation for modal logic and a proposal to solve the truth-value problem of counterfactual conditionals. The idea is to construe a counterfactual as stating some possible states of affairs in which things are other than the way they actually are. There are two views about how to understand possible worlds. One is the extreme possibilism held by David Lewis, which claims that the actual world we inhabit is only one of many real worlds, each of which exemplifies ways that things could have been besides the ways that they are. Such an objective interpretation gives rise to the problem of transworld identity, which in turn motivated Lewis to develop his counterpart theory. The other account of possible worlds, represented by Kripke, is in terms of one or more intensional

被非人格化了,成了诸如本质或力量这种说明性的抽象物。最后,在实证阶段,人类精神认识到,一切真正的知识都基于感觉经验,它们只能根据观察和经验而得到推进,从而理解到形而上学应当抛弃。孔德还首创了实证社会学和实证宗教,前者用实证方法研究人类社会,后者寻求用对于人道的崇拜来取代对于上帝的崇拜。H. 斯宾塞把实证主义和进化论联系起来,使对于无所不包的进化进程的研究成为哲学的主要任务。实证主义的后裔包括马赫和阿芬那留斯的经验批判主义,它主张科学描述感觉经验,没有必要假设像原子这样的隐蔽实体;以及维也纳小组的逻辑实证主义,它提出了证实原则,结合了弗雷格、罗素和维特根斯坦的逻辑的新发展,对形而上学持极端敌视态度;还有法学实证主义,它强调法律应当是其所是(即实证法),而不应该是我们可能会认为的当其所是(自然法)。

“除了康德主义,当代没有哪种哲学运动像实证主义那样与精确科学密切相关。”——石里克:《哲学论文集》,第一卷,第178页。

可能主义

见“现实主义”条。

可能世界

尽管很久以前哲学家们就已经在谈论什么是可能的,但对可能世界的讨论的起源通常归功于莱布尼茨。他宣称,虽然我们的世界包含许多恶的东西,但它仍然是所有可能世界中最好的一个。在当代哲学中,可能世界话语已经演变成模态逻辑的一种语义解释,以及解决反事实条件句真值问题的一种方案。其基本思路是把反事实条件句看做是陈述了某种可能的事态,其中的事物以不同于它们实际所是的方式存在着。在如何理解可能世界的问题上存在两种观点。其一是D. 刘易斯所主张的极端可能主义,它断言我们所居住的现实世界只是众多实在世界中的一个,这些世界中每一个都体现着事物的除实际存在方式外的可能存在方式。这样一种客观的解释引起了跨世界的同一性问题,后者反过来又促使刘易斯发展了他的对应体理论。克里普克所代表的关于可能世界的另一种说明,所依据的是一个或多个内涵性术语如属性、命题或事态,以及某些模态概念如可例

items such as properties, propositions or states of affairs and of some modal notions such as instantiability or possible truth. On this view, a possible world is a world whose properties are not actually instantiated or a world which has obtainable but not actually obtaining states of affairs. According to this latter interpretation, a possible world is not another world, but is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. In order to distinguish this account from Lewis' account, Kripke sometimes suggests that we use terms such as a possible state or history of the world or a counterfactual situation to replace the notion of a possible world. There is much debate about the theory of possible worlds, regarding problems such as essentialism, possible but nonactual entities, transworld identity, reference and meaning. Currently, modal concepts are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. "Necessarily *p*" is equivalent to "*p* is true in every possible world", and "Possibly *p*" is equivalent to "*p* is true in some possible world".

"Possible worlds are total 'ways of the world might have been', or states or histories of the entire world." — Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 1980, p. 18.

Post hoc ergo propter hoc, see fallacy of false cause

Post res universals, see *universalia, ante rem*

Post-historical art, see death of art

Postmodernism

A fashionable but elusive term used originally among New York artists and critics in the 1960s to reject any dominant framework dictating artistic style. Postmodernism in art was a reaction to modernism, which has provided such a framework throughout this century. Modernism emphasises experimentation, an inner truth behind surface appearances, and the presence of paradoxical ambiguities and uncertainties in our life experience. In art and literature, postmodernism seeks to cancel the boundary between art and daily life and the distinction between elite and popular taste. It emphasises surface instead of depth and stylistic form rather than content.

In the 1970s, postmodernism was taken up by some influential continental philosophers. Modernity is normally taken to have begun with the work of Descartes in the seventeenth century and has shaped the issues, problems and standards of relevance which have occupied Western philosophers since then. If Descartes is seen as the father of modernism, then postmodernism comprises a variety of cultural positions which reject major features of Cartesian (or allegedly Carte-

zian or possible truth.按照这种观点,可能世界是其属性未被实际例证化的世界,或者是可以得到但未实际得到的事态。根据这后一种解释,可能世界并不是另外一个世界,而是由我们使之关联的描述条件给定的。为了使这种说法与刘易斯的解释区别开来,克里普克有时建议我们用“这个世界的可能状态或历史”或“反事实的情景”之类的术语去代替“可能世界”概念。关于可能世界理论存在很多争论,涉及本质主义,可能但非现实的实体,跨世界的同一性,指称,意义等问题。流行的做法是,经常用可能世界去解释模态概念。“必然 *p*”等于说“*p* 在每个可能世界中真”,“可能 *p*”等于说“*p* 在某个可能世界中真”。

“可能世界是‘这个世界全部可能的存在方式’,或者是这整个世界的状态或历史。”——克里普克:《命名与必然性》,1980年,第18页。

以先后为因果

见“错为因果的谬误”条。

出于事物的共相

见“在物之先的共相”条。

后历史艺术

见“艺术的消亡”条。

后现代主义

一个流行的但意思含混的词,原本由纽约的艺术家和(文学、艺术的)批评家们在20世纪60年代所使用,表示对任何规范艺术风格的主导构架的拒绝。在艺术中,后现代主义是对于本世纪里提供了这样一个主导构架的现代主义的反动;现代主义强调实验法,强调在表面现象之后的内在真理,并强调对于我们生活经验中的悖谬含糊和不确定性的展现。在艺术与文学中,后现代主义尽力取消艺术与日常生活的界限和精英与世俗趣味的区别。它强调的是表面而非深度,是风格形式而非内容。

20世纪70年代中,“后现代主义”被一些有影响力的欧陆哲学家采用。现代性一般被认为始于17世纪笛卡尔的工作,自那时以来,它就规范了西方哲学家们认为是重要的论点、问题和标准。如果笛卡尔被看做现代主义之父,那么后现代主义就由各种这样的文化立场组成,它们都拒绝笛卡尔的(或被说成是笛卡尔的)现代思想的主要特性。笛卡尔的现代主义的一个主要特点就是坚持纯理性的至上地位。对于知

sian) modern thought. A major characteristic of Cartesian modernism is to insist on the supremacy of pure rationality. The pursuit of knowledge should be independent of practical concerns, traditional beliefs and any social, political, and economic interests of those seeking knowledge. Views which stress the priority of the social to the individual; which reject the universalising tendencies of philosophy; which prize irony over knowledge; and which give the irrational and the rational equal claims to roles in our procedures for acquiring knowledge all fall under the postmodernist umbrella. Postmodernism tries to replace logic with narrative because it disputes the claim that meaning can be determined by logical and semantic analysis. It denies univocality and linearity and rejects any theoretical grounds for culture.

The major exponents of postmodernism include Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze. Postmodernism has also greatly influenced the contemporary feminist movement, represented by Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. Postmodernist criticism of modernist concerns with meaning, truth, objectivity, rationality and universality has not led a constructive alternative, but not having a constructive alternative is perhaps part of the point of postmodernism.

"Postmodernism is of great interest to a wide range of people because it directs our attention to changes, the major transformations, taking place in contemporary society and culture." —Sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Post-modernism*, 1993, p. 2.

Post-structuralism

The Saussurian model of linguistics is the basis of structuralism. Post-structuralism originated with the rejection of that model. While Saussure emphasised that each signifier acquires its semantic value only by virtue of its differential position within the structure of language, post-structuralists augmented their account of the relations among signifiers through, for example, Nietzschean concerns with power and Freudian concerns with unconscious origin. They reject the existence of the unity of the stable sign and question the possibility of any descriptive and analytical language. They do not believe that authors are the authority for the meaning and truth of what they write, but claim instead that reading is an active performance creating interpretations rather than a passive consumption of a product. Post-structuralism rejects a static notion of meaning and is hostile to any system or attempt at system construction. A truth-claim for what we say or write is not a matter of course, and meaning is not tightly bound up with truth. Thought is constituted through and through by the codes, conventions, languages-games and discourses that make up a given cultural order. In a sense,

识的追寻应该独立于对实践的关注,独立于传统的信仰和任何有关的社会、政治和经济的利益。与之相对,后现代主义的观点强调社会先于个人、拒绝哲学的普遍化倾向、赞赏反讽甚于赞赏知识、在我们以后现代主义的大旗下获取知识的过程中给予非理性以同理性相平等的地位。后现代主义试图用叙述代替逻辑,因为它不认为意义可以被逻辑的和语义的分析所决定。它否认单义性和线性,拒绝任何为文化提供理论基础的做法。

后现代主义的主要阐发者包括 J. 德里达、R. 罗蒂、J.-F. 利奥塔、E. 莱维纳斯、M. 福柯、J. 鲍德里亚和 G. 德勒兹。后现代主义已极大地影响了以 J. 克里斯特娃和 L. 伊莉格莱为代表的当代女性主义运动。后现代主义对于现代主义关于意义、真理、客观性、理性和普遍性等观点的批判还没能导致一种建设性的替代者;但是不提供建设性的替代者可能就是后现代主义观点的一部分。

"后现代主义引起了许多领域中的人们的极大兴趣,因为它将我们的注意力导向那些发生在当代社会和文化中的转化或重大变形,"——萨罗波:《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》,1993年,第2页。

后结构主义

索绪尔的语言学模式是结构主义的基础。后结构主义始于对这样一个模式的拒绝。索绪尔强调每个能指只有通过它在语言结构中的不同位置才获得其语义值;但后结构主义者却是通过(例如)尼采式的对强力的关注和弗洛伊德式的对无意识起源的关注来论证他们关于能指之间关系的说明。他们否认那种不变的符号统一体的存在,怀疑任何描述性的和分析性的语言的可能性。他们不相信作者对自己所写东西的真实意义具有最终的解释权,而是认为阅读是一个创造解释的积极活动,并非是对某个产品的被动消费。后结构主义拒绝关于意义的静态观念,敌视任何系统或任何去做系统构造的企图。认为我们所说和所写的东西中定有真理并非是天经地义的看法,而意义也并非完全受制于真理性。思想彻头彻尾地由造成某个特定文化状况的习俗、常规、语言游戏和言谈所构成。在某个意义上,后结构主义力图颠覆对于语言结构的传统理解。这个运动受到尼采的影响,它的主要代表人物包括 G. 德勒兹、F. 葛塔瑞、

post structuralism seeks to subvert the traditional understanding of the structures of language. The movement is influenced by Nietzsche, and its major representatives include Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Post-structuralism shares many common features with postmodernism.

"While structuralism sees truth as being 'behind' or 'within' a text, post-structuralism stresses the interaction of reader and text as a productivity." —sarup, *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-modernism*, 1993, p. 2.

Postulates of empirical knowledge

For each of his four groups of categories, Kant introduced principles to show the objective validity of the employment of categories of that kind. For the categories of quantity, quality and relation, the principles are respectively the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception and analogies of experience. For the categories of modality, the principles are the postulates of empirical knowledge. While the other principles determine the ways in which appearances are related to each other, the postulates determine the modes in which the subject of experience is related to its experiences. The postulates include the principle of the possible, which requires that the concepts of things should agree with the formal conditions of experience; the principle of the actual, which requires that the concept is connected to the material conditions of experience; and the principle of the necessary, which requires that the actual experience conforms to both the formal and material conditions of experience. These principles are called postulates, not in the mathematical sense of being immediately certain without justification, but in the sense that they are procedural specifications of relations between the understanding and the synthesis of appearances.

"The same can be asserted of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which concern the synthesis of mere intuition (that is, of the form of appearance), of perception (that is, of the matter of perception), and of experience (that is, of the relation of these perceptions)." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A180/B223.

Potentiality

[Greek, *dunamis*, the power or capacity of one subject to effect change in another subject or the power or capacity of one subject to be affected by another thing] We can distinguish non-rational capacities (the capacity of eyes to see) from rational capacities (the capacity of a person to build). The realisation of these capacities is their exercise. For Aristotle, however, this sense is not important philosophically. Potentiality was important for him through connection with substantial change, in which potentiality is associated with

J.-F. 利奥塔、M. 福柯和 J. 德里达。后结构主义与后现代主义有许多共同点。

"结构主义认为真理存在于一个文本的'后边'或'里边',但后结构主义则强调作为一种产生状态的读者与文本之间的相互作用。"——萨罗波:《后结构主义与后现代主义导论》,1993年,第2页。

经验知识之公准

康德四组范畴的每一组都有一组原理以表明该类范畴应用的客观有效性。对于量、质和关系这三组范畴,它们的原理分别是"直观之公理"、"知觉之预测"和"经验之类推"。至于样式范畴,这一组的原理称为"经验知识之公准"。然而,所有前三组原理规定现象相互联系的方式,公准的原理则规定经验主体与他的经验相联系的方式。公准包括要求事物的概念应当符合经验的形式条件的可能性原理:要求概念与经验的质料条件相联系的现实性原理:要求实际经验要与经验的形式和质料的条件相一致的必然性原理。这些原理被称为"公准",不是在数学的意义上,即是无需论证,直接确定的,而是在这个意义上,即它们是知性和现象综合之间关系的程序上的说明。

"同样可以断定经验思想一般之公准,它关涉单纯直观之综合(即现象形式的综合)、知觉之综合(即知觉事务之综合)及经验之综合(即这些知觉的关系之综合)。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A180/B223。

潜能

[源自希腊词 *dunamis*, 一主体引起另一主体变化的力量或能力,或一主体受另一事物影响的力量或能力]我们可以区分非理性能力(眼睛有看的能力)与理性能力(一个人建造的能力)。这种能力的实现即是它们的实施。但对于亚里士多德而言,这一意义在哲学上并不重要。潜能对他的重要性是通过它与本体变化的关系,在本体变化中,潜能与质料相结合。在这种意义上,潜能乃是一物可能的但尚未实现的状态。

matter. In this sense, potentiality was the possible but unrealised state of a thing. (See the entry on potentiality / actuality.)

"For in the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to potentiality, that we not only ascribe potentiality to that whose nature is to move something else, or to be moved by anything else ... but also use the word in another sense." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048a27-9.

Potentiality / actuality

When Aristotle moved from a static discussion of the structure of reality to a dynamic discussion, he introduced a distinction between potentiality and actuality in association with a distinction between matter and form. He even used these two distinctions interchangeably. Aristotle divided relationships between actuality and potentiality into two major kinds. The first kind likened the relationship to that between motion and power. It conformed to the etymological senses of potentiality and actuality and concerned relations such as that between the capacity to build and the exercise of that capacity. The second kind likened the relationship to that between generated substance and matter. With regard to Aristotle's discussion of substance, it can also be divided into two types. In the first type, matter (potentiality) develops into some form (actuality) to generate a thing, with potentiality and actuality thus belonging to two different stages. In the second type, form (actuality) and proximate matter (potentiality) in a sense exist together as two aspects of the same thing. In various ways, Aristotle held that actuality is prior to potentiality. In Aristotle's theology, God, having an eternal nature, is pure actuality, without involving any potentiality.

"To all such potentialities, then actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1049b11-3.

Pour-soi / en-soi, see being-for-itself

Power

The ability or capacity to compel others to act according to one's aims so that they will do what they would not otherwise have done. Power can also affect how such actions are performed. Political power is the ability to get people to obey explicit or tacit commands in virtue of what they anticipate to be the consequences of obeying or disobeying them. The consequences can range from crude threats and promises to subtle patterns of social control. Political power is not only power to do something, but is also power over others through coercion, domination or hegemony. Understanding the relationship between political power and political authority is

态。(参见“潜能--现实”条。)

“在我们分析的过程中将会看到,就潜能而言,我们不仅把潜能归于那些其本性是推动他物或受他物推动的事物,……而且也在另一意义上使用该词。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1048a27--29。

潜能/现实

当亚里士多德从对现实结构的静态讨论进展到一种动态讨论时,他引入了潜能与现实的区分,与质料与形式的区分相联系,并且不加区分地使用这两者。亚里士多德把潜能与现实关系划分成两类:一类比作运动与能力间的关系,它符合潜能与现实这两词的字根意义,指诸如建筑的能力与该能力的实施这样的关系。另一类比作已生成的本体与质料的关系。它与亚里士多德对本体的讨论相联系,可以进一步划分成两类。在第一类中,质料(潜能)发展到某种形式(现实),产生一个事物。潜能和现实因此属于不同的阶段。在第二类中,形式(现实)与近似质料(潜能)在一种意义上是同一事物的两个方面。亚里士多德认为现实在多种意义上先于潜能。在他的神学中,永恒的神是纯现实的,不涉及到任何潜能。

“对所有这些潜能,现实都既在定义上又在本体性上在先;在时间上,它在一种意义上在先,在另一种意义上则不。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1049b11-13。

为自身的/在自身中的(或译“自为的/自在的”)见“为自身的存在”条。

权力

迫使他人按照自己的目的去行动的能力,以使他人做他们可能还没有做的事。权力还可影响这种行动如何履行。政治权力是使人们服从明确的或不言而喻的命令的能力,因为他们预先知道服从或不服从命令的后果是什么。这些后果可能包括从粗暴的威胁到对宽松的社会控制方式的许诺。政治权力不仅是做事的权力,而且也是通过强迫、统治或霸权压制他人的权力。理解政治权力和政治权威的关系是理解政治科学和政治哲学关系的核心。权力与权威不同,它不包括权利,但它与责任和暴力都有关。

central to understanding the relationship between political science and political philosophy. Unlike authority, power does not involve rights, but it is related both to responsibility and force. Relations of political power may be shaped by culture, history or tradition as well as by brute force.

"Power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." —Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, 1947, p. 152.

P-predicate

Strawson's term for any predicate ascribed to persons and only persons. The apply a P-predicate to something at least implies the possession of consciousness. Examples of this kind of predicate include "is smiling", "is in pain", "believes that you will meet on Tuesday". Philosophical problems arise concerning the possibility of delimiting the class of P-predicates and concerning the closely related possibility of formulating the concept of a person. The logical criteria for the ascription of P-predicates to others closely involves the question of personal identity. P-predicates are contrasted to M-predicates, which can be ascribed to material bodies without consciousness as well as to persons.

"The second kind consists of all the other predicates we apply to persons. These I shall call P-predicates." —Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 104.

Practical ethics, see applied ethics

Practical law, see maxim

Practical reason (Kant)

The practical application of reason, which concerns what one ought to do, in contrast to the theoretical application of reason (theoretical or speculative reason), which concerns what is. Although Kant held that theoretical and practical reason are fundamentally the same, he recognised their different functions and claimed that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason in line with the primacy of our being rational agents over our being rational knowers. While theoretical reason is limited by the bounds of experience, practical reason is inseparable from freedom. Kant identified practical reason with the will, which initiates action. Like theoretical reason, practical reason determines and applies its own principles, but in the case of practical reason the application of its principles commands action. Its supreme principle is the categorical imperative. Hence it is the home of the moral law and is the fundamental basis of our autonomy. In Kant's critical philosophy, three works, *The Groundwork*

政治权力关系可以受到文化、历史或传统以及蛮横的暴力的影响。

"权力是这样一种可能性,即一个处于一种社会关系中的行为者能够执行他自己的意愿而不管他人的反对,并且无视这一可能性依据的基础。"——韦伯:《社会和经济组织的理论》,1947年,第152页。

人—谓词

斯特劳森的术语,指任何归属于人,而且只归属于人的谓词。把一个人—谓词应用于某物至少意为被归属者具有意识。举例说,这类谓词包括“在微笑”,“感觉痛苦”,“相信你们会在星期二见面”。这类谓词所引起的哲学问题包括,界定人—谓词的类的可能性,以及与此紧密相联的阐明人的概念的可能性。把人—谓词归属于他人的逻辑标准涉及到个人认同问题。与人—谓词相对照的是物—谓词。物—谓词既可以归属于无意识的物体也可以归属于人。

“第二类包括其他一切我们应用于人的谓词。我把这些叫做人—谓词。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第104页。

实践伦理学

见“应用伦理学”条。

实践的法则

见“准则”条。

实践理性(康德)

理性的实践应用,关涉人们应该做什么,相对于理性的理论应用(理论的或思辨的理性),它关涉“是什么”。虽然康德认为理论理性和实践理性在根本上是同一个理性,但他认识到它们的不同功能,并主张,既然我们更多地作为理性主动者而不是只作为理性的认知者,因而实践理性对于理论理性具有优先性。理论理性受经验界限所限制,而实践理性则与自由不可分离。康德把实践理性与引发行为的意志相等同。像理论理性一样,实践理性规定和应用它自己的原理。不同的是,实践理性对它的原理的使用诉诸行动。它的最高原理是绝对命令。因此它是道德法则的发源地,是我们自主性的根本基础。在康德的批判哲学中,《道德形而上学基础》、《实践理性批判》和《道德形而上学》这三部著作考察了实践理性的运作过程。

“纯粹实践理性一般而言是为目的的能

for the *Metaphysics of Morals*, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals* examine the operation of practical reason.

"Pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally." — Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, II, ix.

Practical reasoning

A kind of argumentation that is directed towards a certain goal and is based on knowledge of an agent's situation and knowledge that a certain sort of action is a means to reach that goal. Its conclusion is an imperative to pursue a course of action for a particular agent. Its sequence of inference is called practical inference because it aims at a practical conclusion. Practical reasoning gives reasons for actions or desires and it is essentially pragmatic. In contrast, theoretical reasoning aims to derive truth from premises and concentrates on the formal validity of arguments. Practical reasoning was first discussed in Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom, where the action itself was seen as the conclusion. In this century, practical reasoning became a special field of philosophical inquiry, partly due to the works of Anscombe and von Wright. It is characterised as a form of argument appropriate to the humanities, rather than as merely a vehicle of means-end deliberation. Although there is much debate about the elements, scope and procedure of practical reasoning, it is widely agreed that it is significant for explaining human action, establishing ranking and priority in one's life plan, understanding personal responsibility for action and evaluating the actions of others. Some theorists have employed a wider notion of practical reasoning to extend rational choice theory in seeking to understand institutions as well as individual behaviour. Moral reasoning is one of the main forms of practical reasoning.

"What then, is practical reasoning? It is the transition (not necessarily conscious) from belief in the premises to acceptance of the putative conclusions of a practical inference." — Raz (ed.), *Practical Reason*, 1978, p. 5.

Practical syllogism

Aristotle's concept, although he instead used the term *sullogismos ton prakton* (syllogism about action). An inference of practical reason starting from a universal ethical premise and concluding with an action. It has a major premise, such as "since the end is such and such", and a minor premise, such as "this is such and such", and a conclusion. In contrast to modern thinking, Aristotle insisted that the conclusion is not an imperative to do something, but the action itself. According to him, if a man gets an order but does not proceed to act, it is not practical reason. Of the two premises, one provides the good end, and the other gives a possible way to achieve the end. Aristotle offers many examples in his writings, but he does not formalise this reasoning.

力。”——康德：《道德形而上学》，II，ix。

实践推论

一种直接针对某一目标的推论，它基于对当事者情况的了解，以及知道某种行动是达到这一目标的途径。它的结论就是命令特定当事者实现行动进程。它推断的结果被称为实际的推断，因为它的目标是一种实际的结论。实践推论为行动或要求提供理由，它在本质上是务实的。相比之下，理论推论的目的是从前提得出正确认识并将注意力集中于论证的形式的有效性。实践推论在亚里士多德的实践智慧理论中首次被探讨，在那里，行为本身被视为结论。在本世纪，实践推论成为哲学研究的一个专门领域，这部分是由于安斯康及冯·赖特的著作。它被描绘为一种适合于人文学科的论证形式，而不仅仅是一种手段—目的式思考的工具。虽然对实践推论的要素、范围和程序存在很多争议，这种推论对于解释人的活动、确立人们生活计划中的顺序和重点、理解人们对活动的责任，以及评价他人的行为，都有重要意义，这一点已得到广泛的认可。一些理论家业已使用一种更为宽泛的实践推论的概念去扩展理性选择理论，以求理解制度和个人行为。道德推论是实践推论的一种主要形式。

“那么什么是实践推论？它是从对前提的相信到接受由实践推断得出的假设结论的（未必是有意识的）过渡。”——拉兹（编）：《实践推理》，1978年，第5页。

实践三段论

亚里士多德的概念，尽管他自己所使用的术语是 *sullogismos ton prakton*（关于行为的三段论）。一种始于普遍伦理前提而止于行动的关于实践理性的推论。它有一个大前提，诸如“由于目的是如此如此”，一个小前提，诸如“这是如此如此”和一个结论。与现代思维相反，亚里士多德坚持说，结论不是一个做什么的命令，而是行为自身。他认为，如果一个人得到一个命令可又不进一步去做它，这就不是实践理性。在两个前提中，一个提供了好的目的，另一个则提供了一种达到那个目的的可能途径。亚里士多德在他的著作中提供了大量例证，可却未能将该推理形式化。人们一直在争论这种形式化是否可

There is much controversy whether such a formalisation is possible.

"For the syllogism about actions have an origin, viz. 'since the end, i. e. what is best, is of such and such a nature', whatever it may be." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1144a31-4.

Practical wisdom

[Greek: *phronesis*, thought or understanding, also translated as intelligence, practical reason or prudence] Aristotle's technical term for the reasoning which leads to practical activity. In contrast, contemplation or theoretical wisdom is concerned with invariable things, although both theoretical and practical wisdom are intellectual virtues. Like theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom operates at a general level, concerned with the truth of practical judgement and formulating general rules of action. But practical wisdom also works at a particular level, applying general rules to concrete situations of life and finding the right actions to do. It contains a practical intuition, which grasps the features of the particular action, and a practical syllogism, which infers ways and means of achieving the end. Practical wisdom is inseparable from the virtues of character, for the latter decides the right end. Without a right end, a man can only be said to have cleverness rather than practical wisdom. A person of practical wisdom is a *phronimos*.

Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom is ambiguous and unsystematic. It was criticised by Hume, who claimed that emotion rather than reason determines action. It has nevertheless attracted much attention in contemporary moral theory, especially in virtue ethics. If there really is a kind of reason peculiar to moral actions, it may give a new foundation to ethics and solve many traditional difficulties, such as the tension between objectivity and the practical application of moral judgement.

"[P]ractical wisdom is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for human beings." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140b4-6.

Practicalism, another expression for experimentalism

Pragmatic maxim, see pragmatism

Pragmatic theory of truth

A theory of truth held in different forms by the American pragmatists Peirce, James and Dewey. Their common ground was the claim that truth should be approached by enquiring about the difference made by a belief being true, namely to examine the idea of truth at work in its context of

能。

“关于行为的三段论有一个起源，即‘由于目的，即最好的事物，是这样这样的一种性质’，不论这一目的本身是什么。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1144a31—34。

实践智慧

[源自希腊词 *phronesis* (思想或理解)，也译作“明智”、“实践理性”或“慎思”] 亚里士多德的一个专门术语，意为导向实践活动的推理。相反，思辨或理论智慧关注永恒事物，虽然，实践智慧与理论智慧两者都是理智德性。如同理论智慧一样，实践智慧在一般性层面上运作，关注于实践判断的真实性，及构建行为的一般规则。但实践智慧也在具体的层面运作，将一般规则应用于具体的生活领域，确定应当做的正确行为。它包括一种把握具体行为特征的实践直观，和一种推论如何达到那一目的的途径和手段的实践三段论。实践智慧与品格德性是不可分的，因为后者决定了正确的目的。没有正确的目的，一个人只能说是精明的，而不能说具有实践智慧。一个具有实践智慧的人在希腊文中是 *phronimos*。

亚里士多德关于实践智慧的理论是含混的、不系统的。休谟对它做了批判，并认为决定行为的是情感而不是理性。尽管如此，它在当代道德理论，尤其在德性伦理学中受到广泛注意。如果确实有一类与道德行为相关的独特理性，它就会为伦理学提供一个新的基础，并可解决诸如道德判断的客观性与实践应用性之间的矛盾等许多传统的问题。

“实践智慧是这样一种状态，它把握真理，体现理性，关注于对人类有善恶意义的行为。”——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1140b4—6。

实践主义

“实验主义”的另一种表述。

实用主义公式

见“实效主义”条。

真理实用论

由美国实用主义者皮尔士、詹姆斯和杜威以不同方式主张的一种真理论。他们的共同之处在于主张，应该通过探寻由一信念为真所造成的差别去探究真理，也就是说在其使用环境中考察起作用的真观念。但他们的观点是有些

use. But their views are somewhat different. Peirce held that truth is the eventual consensus of those who use the scientific method and go on long enough in their exploration. James believed that true beliefs are those which are confirmed or verified by experience in the long run. For Dewey, truth is a property attaching to ideas which we are warranted in asserting. He preferred the term warranted assertability to truth.

In addition to his attempt to connect utility with verifiability, according to which truth is useful belief in the sense that it is belief which is secure in the long run. James held that truth is that which is good, useful or expedient to believe. Truth is the expedient in our way of thinking just as the right is the expedient in our way of behaving. This account of truth connects truth with utility and was bitterly criticised by Moore, Russell and Carnap on the grounds that false ideas can have utility and still be false and that we should seek truth for itself rather than for its consequences. This later version of James' theory is generally taken to be the standard pragmatic theory of truth, although the accounts of Peirce and Dewey might prove more fruitful.

"It is the cardinal feature of pragmatic theories of truth that true propositions are characterised as those that we accept." - Ayer, *The Concept of a Person*, 1964, p. 180.

Pragmatism

Although Peirce introduced the word pragmatism, he later invented the term pragmatism for his own version of pragmatism, in order to distance himself from other versions, in particular from the anti-intellectualism he saw in James' more popular pragmatism. Pragmatism was originally a method of logic based on Peirce's pragmatic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object". This is a criterion of the clarity of meaning which connects the meaning of general terms with expectations of consequences. To attain a clear meaning of an abstract formula, we need only consider what conceivable practical effects it may involve. The conception of these effects is for us the whole positive significance of that formula. Peirce then tried to use this criterion to clarify traditional problems of philosophy and to dismiss traditional metaphysical problems, although he developed his own robust metaphysical doctrines. Peirce emphasised that pragmatism is a theory of logic rather than a speculative philosophy.

"So then, the writer, finding his bantling 'pragmatism' so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word 'pragmatism', which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." - Peirce, *Collected Works*, V, p. 415.

差别的。皮尔士认为,真理是那些在其探究中运用科学方法的人们持续工作相当长时间之后所达到的最终一致。詹姆斯相信,真信念就是那些最终被经验所确证或证实的信念。对杜威来说,真理是附属于是我们有根据断定的观念的一种特性。他偏爱“有根据的可断定性”(warranted assertability)胜过“真理”。

詹姆斯除了试图把效用与可证实性相联系之外(根据这种观点,真理是在下述意义上有用的信念:它是长期使用起来安全可靠的信念),他还认为真理就是那些好的、有用的和方便得到的信念。真理在我们的思维方式中是便利的,就像正确在我们的行动方式中是便利的一样。对真理的这种解释把真与效用连在一起,这受到了摩尔、罗素、卡尔纳普等人的严厉批评,其理由是:假的观念也能有效用,却仍然是假的,而且我们应该为真理本身而不是为它所造成的后果去追求真理。詹姆斯理论的这后一种形式通常被当做是标准的实用主义真理论,尽管皮尔士和杜威的说明可能证明是更富有成效的。

“实用主义真理论的基本特征就是,真命题被刻画为我们所接受的命题。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念》,1964年,第180页。

实效主义

虽然“实用主义”一词是由皮尔士本人引入的,但他后来又发明了“实效主义”一词来标示自己的实用主义观点,以使自己与其他形式的实用主义保持距离,尤其是与他认为是反理智的詹姆斯的更为通俗的实用主义保持距离。实效主义起初是一种逻辑方法,建立于皮尔士的实用主义公式基础之上。这一公式表述如下:“考虑我们的概念对象可能有什么样的可想像的具有实际意义的效果,这样我们关于这些效果的概念,就是我们关于这个对象的概念的全部。”这是一个意义澄清的标准,它把一般术语的意义与对结果的预期结合起来。为获得一抽象表达式的清晰含义,我们仅需考虑它涉及什么样的可想像的效果。这些效果的概念对我们来说就是这一表达式总体上的确定意义。皮尔士由此试图用这一标准去澄清传统的哲学问题,去消解传统的形而上学问题,尽管他自己也提出了一种强硬的形而上学主张。他强调实效主义是一种逻辑理论,而不是一种思辨哲学。

“如此,作者发现他的孩子‘实用主义’被如此滥用,觉得已是与其吻别,放手让它寻求好运之时。而正是为了表述此学说原初定义的目的,请允许他宣布‘实效主义’一词的诞生,它的丑陋足可保证其免受绑架。”——皮尔士:《文集》,第五卷,第415页。

Pragmatics

[from Greek: *pragma*, action] The analysis of the relations between signs or languages and their users. It is a branch of semiotics, the other two branches being syntactics or syntax, which deals with grammar, and semantics, which deals with reference and truth. General pragmatics is concerned with the general principles of utterance, and applied pragmatics is concerned with special kinds of linguistic interaction. Pragmatics focuses on the context of the actual use of language by speakers such as its purposes, effects, implications and the relations between speakers and listeners. Many philosophers are concerned with its relations to semantics. Pragmatics classifies a wide variety of interesting types of speech acts, and studies the use and implications of indexical expressions, such as I, you, this, here and now. Pragmatics is an important aspect of contemporary philosophy of language.

"Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed." —Stalnaker, "Pragmatics", in Davidson and Harman (eds.) *Semantics of Natural Language*, 1972, p. 383.

Pragmatism

[from Greek *pragma*: things done, action] When Peirce introduced this term in his article "How to make our ideas clear" (1878), he called it his pragmatic maxim, a criterion of meaning according to which the meaning of a theory is equivalent to the practical effects of adopting it. The term was borrowed by William James, who extended it from a criterion of meaning to a theory of truth, such that an idea is respectable or true if the results of accepting it are good or satisfactory. This theory was further developed by John Dewey and F. C. S. Schiller. Russell and Moore accused James of confusing the theory of truth with the theory of utility. Pragmatism claims that knowledge must relate to practical human purposes and to our adaptation to our environment. Intellectual beliefs should be justified in terms of their social, moral and biological utilities. Truth and theory are tools or instruments, and they are not for solving abstract enigmas. Any idea which proves to have a value for concrete life is true. Pragmatism rejects abstraction and absolute principles and turns towards concreteness, facts and action. This philosophy tries to assimilate modern science, especially the theory of evolution and new statistical modes of reasoning, within philosophy and criticises traditional metaphysical speculations. This theory also became an attitude toward life and a movement emphasising actions and practices. But Peirce himself disliked the anti-intellectual tone of this later development and introduced the word *pragmaticism* for his own version of pragmatism. Pragmatism has been regarded as a typically American approach to philosophy and has exerted

语用学

[源自希腊文 *pragma*, 意味着“行动”] 语用学是对记号或语言与其使用者之间关系的分析。它是“符号学”的一个分支, 另外两个分支是句法学或句法(讨论语法)和语义学(讨论指称和真理)。它又进一步分为讨论话语一般原则的普通语用学和讨论具体语言相互作用的应用语用学。语用学关注说者实际使用语言的语境, 诸如目的、效果、意味、说者与听者的关系等等。许多哲学家都关注它与语义学的联系。它区分了各种有意义的言语行为, 并研究索引词表达式的用法与意义, 比如“我”、“你”、“这个”、“这里”、“现在”。语用学是当代语言哲学的重要方面。

“语用学研究的是语言行为以及完成这些行为的语境。”——斯托奈克:《语用学》, 载戴维森和哈曼(编):《自然语言的语义学》, 1972年, 第383页。

实用主义

[源自希腊词 *pragma*, 意为“所做的事”或“行动”] 当皮尔士在1878年的一篇题为《如何使我们的观念清楚》的文章中首次引入这一术语时, 他指的是他的“实用主义公式”, 一个认为理论意义等价于采用它的实际效果的意义标准。“实用主义”一词为 W. 詹姆斯所借用, 从一种意义标准拓展到一种真理理论: 即认为, 如果接受一个观念的结果是好的或令人满意的, 这个观念就是值得重视的或真的。这个理论为 J. 杜威和 F. C. S. 席勒所进一步发展, 但罗素和摩尔指责詹姆斯混淆了真理理论与效用理论。实用主义主张知识必须与实际的人类目的、与我们对环境的适应相关。思想信念必须依据它们的社会、伦理和生物学效用来辩护。真理和理论都是工具或手段, 它们不是用来解决抽象难题的。任何被证明为具有具体生活价值的观念都是真的。实用主义反对抽象和绝对原理, 转向具体、事实和行动。这种哲学试图把近代科学、尤其是进化论和新的统计推理模式吸收到哲学中来, 批判传统的形而上学思辨。这一理论也成为一种对于生活的态度和一场强调行动和实践的运动。但是皮尔士本人不喜欢这种后来发展中的反理智情调, 因而引入“实效主义”一词以指他自己的实用主义形式。实用主义被看做是典型的美国式哲学, 对当代的美国哲学家如奎因、普特南和罗蒂等有着重大影响。

“实用主义代表一种在哲学上非常熟悉的态度, 即经验主义的态度, 在我看来它所代表的

great influence upon contemporary American philosophers such as Quine, Putnam and Rorty.

"Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed." — James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 45.

Praxis, Greek term for action

Preconceived opinions

[Latin: *praejudicia*, prejudices] Descartes adopted this term for the beliefs which everyone forms in childhood. These beliefs are derived from a reliance on tradition and authority and are also generated from the mere use of senses without consulting the light of reason. These opinions are always so deeply rooted in one's mind that they are generally regarded as implanted by nature and are accepted as utterly true and evident. According to Descartes, these preconceived opinions are the chief source of error and when we begin to philosophise seriously, the first step should be to doubt the certainty of these preconceived opinions and replace them with ideas which are consistent with the standards of reason.

"We must first of all lay aside all our preconceived opinions, or at least we must take the greatest care not to put our trust in any of the opinions accepted by us in the past until we have first scrutinised them afresh and confirmed their truth." — Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, I.

Preconception

[Greek: *prolepsis*, also translated as anticipation] A term in the epistemology of Epicurus and Stoicism, a general concept or mental picture generated by repeated similar impressions and experience. Preconceptions record and classify our experience of the world and are foundations of judgments. For example, when we hear "table", we anticipate the kind of thing to which this term refers. Preconceptions are also viewed as the criteria of true perceptual statements. They can be combined together as a basis for inference, and can be used to form the new concepts of things not encountered in experience.

"Preconception, they say, is as it were a perception, or correct opinion or conception, or universal 'stored notion' (i.e. memory) of that which has frequently become evident externally." — Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, X, pp. 32-3.

Preconscious

Freud's term for the latent elements of mind waiting to be discovered. These elements, though not being in consciousness, can be brought to consciousness by ordinary in-

experience, not only in the form it has taken, but also in the form it has taken, and it is less likely to be opposed." — James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 45.

实践

"行为" 的希腊词。

先入之见

[拉丁文 *praejudicia*, 意思是“偏见”] 笛卡尔用这个概念指每个人在童年时形成的信念。这些信念来自对传统和权威的信赖,也是由于只使用感觉而不请教理性之光而产生的。这些意见永远深深扎根于一个人的心中,以致一般认为它们是被自然植入的,并被当做完全真实明白的意见接受下来。根据笛卡尔的观点,这些先入之见是错误的主要来源,当我们开始认真研究哲学的时候,第一步就应当怀疑这些先入之见的确实性,并且用与理性标准相一致的观念来代替它们。

“我们应当首先把我们的一切先入之见抛到一边,或至少应极其小心地、在首先对我们过去接受的意见作了重新检查,进一步确证了它们的真实性之前,不要信赖我们过去接受的任何意见。”——笛卡尔:《哲学原理》,第一部分。

预先概念

[希腊词 *prolepsis*, 也译作“预想”] 伊壁鸠鲁及斯多亚学派认识论中的一个术语,它是指一种从不断重复相似的影像和经验中得出的一般概念或心的图像。预先概念记录和分类了我们的世界经验,是判断的基础。例如,当我们听见“桌子”一词时,我们便预想有一类这个词所指的事物。预想概念也被看做是真实的知觉陈述的标准。它们可互相连结,作为推理的基础,可用来构成关于并非在经验中遭遇的事物的新概念。

“预想概念,他们说,就如同知觉,或正确的意见或观念,或普遍的‘储存概念’(即,记忆),是关于那经常外在地变得显然的事物的。”——第欧根尼·拉尔修:《名哲言行录》,X,第32—33页。

前意识的

弗洛伊德使用的一个词,指心中等待被发现的那些潜在因素。这些因素尽管不在意识之中,但可以通过一般的内省方法被唤入意识。弗

rospective methods. Freud distinguishes explicitly between the unconsciousness and the preconscious. The unconscious is repressed and cannot become conscious in an ordinary way. Furthermore, the unconscious is dynamic in that it is active in the determination of behaviour. The preconscious does not have this function.

"The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call 'preconscious'." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 9, p. 47.

Predestination

[from Latin *praedestinare*, a synonym of predetermination] A theological doctrine which means that all events in someone's life, no matter whether they have happened, are happening, or will happen, have been determined to happen in advance by God. Whether a person's soul will go to heaven or hell has also been decreed by the sovereign will of God when that person was born, no matter how the person behaves in life. According to the doctrine of predestination, God not only has foreknowledge of all that will happen, but also has foreordained that it will happen. This claim arises from the view that God is the cause of everything and is also associated with the view that human beings can be saved only by God's grace. The position had scriptural support in Romans 8 and 9 and Ephesians 1 and was held by Augustine and Calvin, among others. The notion of predestination or predetermination provides the basis for fatalism.

Problems arise for the notion of predestination. If God plans everything and we do not have free will, then God seems to be responsible for our evil deeds. But this cannot be true if God is perfectly good. It is difficult to understand the relation between God's foreknowing and God's foreordaining. In this domain, His omniscience and omnipotence seem hard to distinguish.

In logic, the law of excluded middle has been thought by Łukaziewicz and others to force us into logical predestination when applied to statements about the future. On this view, the truth or falsity of such statements has always been fixed independent of any questions concerning divine knowledge or power. This thought provided a major motive for giving up the law of excluded middle and for developing many-valued logic in contemporary non-classical logic, but others — including many who admire the achievements of many-valued logic — attempt to overcome logical predestination within classical logic.

"If it is held that everything that happens... is planned in every detail, then I do not see how it can be denied that if the responsibility for what we do can be assigned to anyone at all, it must ultimately fall upon the planner rather than ourselves... For someone who takes this view, the doctrine of predestination does seem irresistible." — Ayer, *The Con-*

洛伊德清楚地地区别了无意识和前意识。无意识受到压抑,不能以一般方式进入意识。而且,无意识是动态的,在决定人的行为中起着作用。前意识则没有这种功能。

"这种仅在描述的而非动态的意义上是无意识的潜在者,我们称之为'前意识的'。"——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第九卷,第47页。

宿命论

[源自拉丁文 *praedestinare*, "先定论"的同义词]一种神学学说,指的是人的一生中的所有事件,不管它们是已经发生、正在发生或将要发生,都是预先由上帝决定好要发生的。一个人的灵魂是进天堂还是入地狱也是在此人出生时就由上帝至高无上的意志所判定的,不管他在一生中表现如何。根据宿命论学说,上帝不仅对将要发生的一切有先知,还对将要发生的事情有先定。这种主张出自上帝是万物的原因这一看法,也与人类只能靠上帝的恩典而得救这个看法有联系。这种立场得到圣经中《罗马书》第8章和第9章以及《以弗所书》第1章的支持,除了其他人之外,奥古斯丁和加尔文也持这种立场。宿命论或先定论的概念为天命论提供了基础。

宿命论的概念产生了不少问题。如果上帝规划了一切,而我们没有自由意志,那么上帝似乎要为我们的罪恶行为负责。但这不应该是真的,如果上帝为至善的话。要理解上帝的先知和上帝的先定之间的关系很困难。在这个领域,他的全知和全能似乎难于区分。

在逻辑上,卢卡西维茨和其他人认为排中律在运用于关于未来的陈述时,会强使我们相信逻辑宿命论。根据这种看法,这种陈述的真假总是一定独立于关于神的知识和力量的问题。这种想法提供了在当代非经典逻辑中放弃排中律和提出多值逻辑的主要动力,但其他人——包括很多钦佩多值逻辑成就的人——力图在经典逻辑之内克服逻辑宿命论。

"如果认为发生的每一事情……都是巨细无遗地计划好的,那么我看不出怎么才能否认,如果对于我们所做事情的责任毕竟可以归之于某个人的话,这最终必定要归之于计划者而不是我们……对于持这种观点的人,宿命论的主张似乎是不可抗拒的。"——艾耶尔:《人的概念及其他论文》,1963年,第253—254页。

cept of a Person and Other Essays, 1963, pp. 253-4.

Predetermination, another term for predestination

Predicables

The different relations in which a predicate might stand to a subject in a proposition. In the *Topics*, Aristotle distinguished various predicables: (1) *definition*, in which the predicate states the essence of the subject; (2) *property*, in which the predicate expresses something which is not a constitutive part of the essence, but is inseparably bound up with the subject, for example capable of learning to man; (3) *genus*, in which the predicate defines the subject together with a *differentia*; (4) *accident*, in which the predicate expresses a feature which is neither a constitutive part of the essence nor inseparably bound up with the subject. In the first two of these predicables, the subject and predicate are convertible (we can argue from "X is Y" to "Y is X"), but the latter two are not convertible. According to Aristotle, all problems can be brought under one or other of the predicables, so these predicables are the framework for his whole treatment of the *topoi* (commonplaces). The medieval logician Porphyry added *species* as a fifth kind of predicable. Because species is a subject rather than a predicate for Aristotle, Porphyry's classification produced much confusion.

In addition to this historical sense of predicable, there is an additional sense introduced by the contemporary British philosopher Peter Geach. He noticed that in modern logic the term predicate might refer both to a role that a particular word or phrase is playing in a particular proposition, and to a syntactical category to which expressions belong in virtue of their ability to play this role. To avoid this ambiguity, he uses predicable for membership of the syntactical category and reserves predicate for the actual performance of the predicative role.

"I use 'predicables' as a term for the verbal expressions called 'predicates' by other logicians; I reserve the term 'predicate' for a predicable actually being used as the main function in a given proposition." —Geach, *Logic Matters*, 1972, p. 239.

Predicament, the medieval scholastic equivalent of an Aristotelian category

Predicate

[from Latin: *pare*, in front + *dicere*, to say, literally that which is said in front of] A basic sentence expresses a proposition that some object has a certain attribute ("The dog is running" or "This flower is red") or that there is certain relation between two or more objects ("The horse is

先定论

“宿命论”的另一说法。

述语

在一个命题中，谓词可能保持的与主词的不同关系。在《正位篇》中，亚里士多德区分出不同的述语：(1)“定义”，谓词在其中说明主词的本质；(2)“特性”，谓词所表达的某种东西，虽不是本质的构成部分，但却与主词不可分地连在一起，例如，“学习能力”之于“人”；(3)“属”，谓词与种差一起界定主词；(4)“偶性”，谓词表达的特征既不是本质的构成部分，也不与主词不可分地连在一起。在这些述语中，前两个的主词和谓词可以互换（我们能从“X是Y”论证“Y是X”），但后两个却不可互换。按照亚里士多德的观点，一切问题都能被置于一个或另一个述语之下，所以，这些述语是他对日常用语 (*topoi*) 进行整体处理的框架。中世纪逻辑学家波菲利又添上“种”，作为第五类述语。由于“种”在亚里士多德那里更多地是主词而不是谓词，因而波菲利的分类产生了很大混乱。

除了上述历史上的“述语”含义外，在当代英国哲学家吉奇还引入了另外的含义。他注意到，在现代逻辑中，“谓词”这个词既可指一个特殊的语词或短语在一个特殊的命题中扮演的角色，也可指表达靠自己扮演这种角色的能力所属的句法范畴。为了避免这种歧义，他使用“述语”来表示句法范畴的成员身份，保留“谓词”实际扮演的陈述作用。

“我用‘述语’指其他逻辑学家称为‘谓词’的表述，而保留‘谓词’指实际上作为给定命题中的主要功能来使用的述语。”——吉奇：《逻辑问题》，1972年，第239页。

范畴

中世纪经院哲学对亚里士多德的“范畴”的对应词。

谓词

[源自拉丁文 *pare* (在……面前) 和 *dicere* (叙说)，其字面意思是：“在……前面被叙说的”] 基本语句表达了这种命题，即某个对象有某种属性 (“那条狗在跑”或“这朵花是红的”)，或在两个或多个对象之间存在某种关系 (“马比

larger than the sheep"); The expressions standing for an object (for example "the dog", "this flower", or "the horse" and "the sheep") are called subjects, and the expressions standing for an attribute (for example "is running", "is red") or relation (for example "is larger than") are predicates. A predicate is what is said of a subject in a sentence. A predicate can be a verb, adjective phrase or noun phrase. Predicates are also called predicate expressions or predicate terms. If a given sentence has one subject, its predicate is a one place predicate; if there are two subjects, its predicate is a two place predicate, and so on. One place predicates are connected with intransitive verbs, and two place predicates are connected with transitive verbs or relations. There is also a distinction between logical (first-order) and grammatical (second-order) predicates. A logical or first-order predicate applies to some object, and a grammatical or second order predicate is predicated of a first order predicate. According to this distinction, words such as exist are grammatical predicates rather than a logical predicates.

"The subject is that term about which affirmation or denial is made. The predicate is that term which is affirmed or denies of the subject." Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1928, p. 92.

Predicate logic, another name for predicative calculus

Predicate nominalism

A term introduced by the Australian philosopher David Armstrong for the theory that what universals there are is simply a matter of what predicates there are. In other words, universals are parasitic upon predicate expressions. Although a predicate like "tree" can apply in principle to more than one object, we need not posit some common property by which a common predicate or general term applies to objects. On the contrary, the applicability of a common predicate needs no further explanation and determines the existence of a universal. Strawson's characterisation of universals in *Individuals* is sometimes said to express this theory. Predicate nominalism is one attempt to solve the fundamental difficulty of nominalism, namely, if only particulars exists, how can we bring numerically different particulars under the same general terms? The difficulty for predicate nominalism is that it does not explain how predicates can determine properties or universals.

"According to Predicate Nominalism, an object's possession of (say) the property, being white, is completely determined by the fact that the predicate 'white' applies to this object." —Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism*, 1978, p. 17.

Predicate term, another name for predicate

羊大")。其中代表对象的表达式(例如,上面例子中的“这朵花”,“马”,“那条狗”)叫做主词,表示性质(例如“在跑”,“是红的”)或关系(例如“比……大”)的表达式是谓词。谓词就是在句子中述说主词的东西。谓词可以是动词、形容词短语或名词短语。谓词也叫做“谓词表达式”或“谓词词项”。在…给定语句内,如果有一个主词,则它的谓词是一位谓词;如果有两个主词,则它的谓词是二位谓词,如此等等。一位谓词与不及物动词相关联,二位谓词与及物动词或关系相关联。还存在逻辑(一阶)谓词和语法(二阶)谓词的区分。逻辑或一阶谓词应用于某个对象,而语法或二阶谓词则谓述一阶谓词。根据这一区别,像“存在”这样的词语是语法谓词而不是逻辑谓词。

“主词是对之作出肯定或否定的词项。谓词则是用来肯定或否定主词的词项。”——凯恩斯:《形式逻辑》,1928年,第92页。

谓词逻辑

“谓词演算”的另一个名称。

谓词唯名论

澳大利亚哲学家D.阿姆斯特朗引入的术语,指一种认为共相存在即是谓词存在的理论。换言之,共相是寄生于谓词表述的。虽然像“树”这样的谓词在原则上可应用于多个对象,但我们不必设定一个共同谓词或类名,只有通过它才可应用于对象的某种共同属性。相反,共同谓词的可应用性不需要进一步的解释,它决定了共相的存在。斯特劳森在《个别物》中对共相的描绘有时被认为是表达了这一理论。传统的唯名论面临一个根本性的困难,即如果只有殊相存在,我们如何能把数目上不同的殊相归到同一个类名之下?谓词唯名论是力图解决这一困难的一种尝试。但它也有自己的弱点,因它未能解释谓词如何决定属性或共相。

“根据谓词唯名论,一个对象拥有(比如说)白这一属性,完全是由谓词‘白’应用于这个对象这一事实所决定的。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯名论和唯实论》,1978年,第17页。

谓词词项

Predication

The attribution of a predicate to a subject, or the combination between them. Predication expresses the relation between a thing and its attributes, which is the basic combination in logical thinking. Much of logic depends on understanding the different logical roles of subject and predicate. Predication can be symbolised as Fa (a is F) or Rab (a has relation R with b). Frege held that predicates are unsaturated, that is they contain logical holes which can be filled by subject terms or can be held open by variables. If a predication contains a one-place predicate, it is a one-place predication. If it contains a two-place predicate, it is a two-place predication, and so on. Frege suggested that we distinguish predication from assertion for assertion involves an assent to the truth or falsity of the sentence. While every assertion must be expressed by a predication, not every predication is necessarily an assertion.

"Predication: in logic, the joining of a predicate to a subject of a proposition so as to increase the logical breadth without dismissing the logical depth." —Peirce, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 359.

Predication, metaphysical

A kind of predication related to Aristotle's theory of matter and form, particularly his view that form is predicated of matter, also called form predication. Metaphysical or form predication differs from linguistic predication, which picks out a logical subject and states what that subject is or has. In metaphysical predication, such as "these bones and flesh are Socrates", matter as subject is not a logical subject, but indicates the kind of material stuff (bones and flesh) from which the predicate (Socrates) is constituted or generated by substantial change.

"Let's say that a predicate (a linguistic term) is linguistically predicated of its subject, but that a predicable (a metaphysical term) is metaphysically predicated of its subject." — Lewis, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, 1992, p. 4.

Predicative adjective, see attributive adjective

Predicative calculus

Also called the logic of terms, predicate logic or the calculus of predicates. A logic that analyses subject-predicate sentences, including sentences involving "not" and the quantifiers "all" and "some". It deals with the inner structure of propositions, and the arguments whose validity depend on the arrangement of the terms within the premises and conclusion. Predicative calculus is thus distinguished from proposi-

"谓词"的另一个名称。

主谓关系

把一谓词归属于一主词,或这两者之间的某种结合。它表达了事物与其属性之间的关系,是逻辑思考中基本的组合。逻辑的大部分内容取决于如何理解主词和谓词的不同逻辑作用。主谓关系可以被符号化为" Fa "(a 是 F)或" Rab "(a 与 b 有关系 R)。弗雷格认为,谓词是非饱和的,即是说它们包含逻辑空隙,这些空隙能够用主词填充,或者用变元填充且仍保持开放状态。如果一主谓关系包含一个一位谓词,则它是一位主谓关系。如果它含有一个二位谓词,则它是一二位主谓关系,如此等等。弗雷格建议把主谓关系与断定区别开来,因为断定涉及到对该语句的真或假的某种肯定。尽管每个断定必须由主谓关系来表达,但并非每个主谓关系必然地是一个断定。

"主谓关系:在逻辑中,把命题的谓词与其主词组合起来,以至增加了其逻辑宽度而没有消除其逻辑深度。"——皮尔士:《文集》,第二卷,第359页。

形而上学的主谓关系

一类与亚里士多德的形式质料说,尤其是他的形式述说质料的观点相关的主谓关系,也叫形式的主谓关系。形而上学的或形式的主谓关系不同于语言的主谓关系。语言的主谓关系标出一个逻辑主词,并陈述这一主词是什么或有什么。在形而上学的主谓关系中,如"这些骨头和肉是苏格拉底",作为主词的质料不是逻辑主词,而是表示谓词("苏格拉底")通过本体变化所构成或产生的物质材料("骨与肉")。

"让我们认定,一个谓词(一个语义项)在语义上上述说一个主词,而一个可作谓词的项(一个形而上学的项)是在形而上学上述说其主词。"——刘易斯:《亚里士多德哲学中的本体与主谓关系》,1992年,第4页。

谓词形容词

见"归属性形容词"条。

谓词演算

亦称"词项逻辑", "谓词逻辑"或"谓词演算"。它分析主谓式语句,包括那些含有"并非"和量词"所有"、"有些"的句子。它处理命题的内部结构,以及其有效性依赖于前提和结论内词项排列的论证。谓词演算因此区别于命题演算,后者与命题结构有关,并且以命题作为它的单位。谓词演算有时被刻画为词项逻辑,而

tional calculus, which is concerned with propositional structures and has propositions as its units. Predicative calculus is sometimes characterised as the logic of terms, while propositional logic is the logic of propositions. Predicative logic introduces "x, y, z" as variables ranging over individual objects and "F, G, H" as signs for predicates. At its core is quantification theory, which was developed by Frege to analyse the logical properties of quantifiers. First-order predicate logic, which is elementary logic and a modern replacement of Aristotelian syllogism, deals only with individual variables and their quantifications, while second-order or other higher-order predicate logic is also concerned with relational predicates and other predicate variables.

"The laws of the predicative calculus are of two kinds; 1. those that are peculiar to itself (that is to the logic of terms) and 2. those that are analogous or specifications of the laws of the propositional calculus. The propositional calculus and the predicative calculus belong to one system." Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 94.

Prediction

To forecast that something will happen in advance of its actual happening. This capacity is essential for the human species to survive and is also a central feature of human intelligence. Predicting and controlling the future is a major reason that we pursue knowledge. The problem of how to predict rationally has been of central interest in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Predictability is the main measure by which we may test the efficiency of a scientific theory. The notion of prediction has been associated with the discussion of topics such as free will and determinism, chaos and chance and induction. Problems concerning the truth-value of predictions led to the development of three-valued logic.

"The chain of reasoning which leads from given observational findings to the 'prediction' of new ones actually involves, besides deductive inferences, certain quasi-inductive steps each of which consists in the acceptance of an intermediate statement on the basis of confirming, but usually not logically conclusive, evidence." —Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, 1965, p. 29.

Prediction paradox, another term for surprise examination paradox

Pre-established harmony

Leibniz's proposed solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem. The world, including minds and bodies, is ultimately composed of independent substances or monads. Each monad is isolated and self-enclosed, and develops in accordance with its own internal nature. There is no interaction between finite minds and bodies. No state of a substance has

命题逻辑则被刻画为命题的逻辑。谓词逻辑引入 "x, y, z" 作变元, 以个别的对象为值, 引入 "F, G, H" 作为谓词的记号, 量化理论是其核心部分, 它是由弗雷格提出来分析量词的逻辑特性的。一阶谓词逻辑, 作为初等逻辑和亚里士多德三段论的现代替代物, 只处理个体变元及其量化, 而二阶或高阶谓词逻辑则还关注关系谓词和其他谓词变元。

“谓词演算的规律包括两类: 其一是为它本身 (即词项逻辑) 所特有的规律, 其二是命题演算规律的类似物或限定。命题演算和谓词演算属于一个系统。”——米切尔:《逻辑导论》, 1962 年, 第 94 页。

预测

在某事实发生之前预言某事将发生。对于人这个物种来说, 为了生存下去而具有这种能力是至关重要的, 并且这种能力还决定了人是理智的生物。我们追求知识的主要理由正是为着预测和控制未来。如何进行合理的预测始终是认识论和科学哲学中重点关注的问题。可预测性是我们可以用来检验科学理论的效用的主要手段。预测概念是与关于自由意志和决定论、混沌和机遇、归纳等等的讨论密切相关的。判定预测的真值的努力导致了三值逻辑的发展。

“从给定的观察发现到对新现象的预测的推理链条, 除演绎推理外, 实际上包含着某些准归纳的步骤, 其中每一步都在于根据肯定证据接受某个居间陈述, 但后者在逻辑上通常是非结论性的。”——亨佩尔:《科学说明的诸方面》, 1965 年, 第 29 页。

预告悖论

“意外考试悖论”的另一名称。

前定和谐

莱布尼茨对笛卡尔的心-身问题的解决办法。包括心灵和身体在内的世界最终是由独立的实体或单子构成的。每一个单子都是孤立的、自身封闭的, 根据它自己的内在性质而发展。在有限的心灵和身体之间没有任何相互作用。一个实体的任何状态都不会像一个真正原因那样

as a real cause some state of another substance, for a substance which is properly so-called, must have a kind of self-sufficiency which is incompatible with causal dependence. Yet God, in creating the universe, has pre-established a perfect noncausal harmony of activity among all possible monads. Each monad is like a mirror which reflects the whole universe. A change in one will correspond to a change in other. This harmony is analogous to the non-causal harmony of activity existing between two clocks whose ticking is synchronised perfectly. The doctrine of pre-established harmony is at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. It is, in a sense, an incorporation of occasionalism and the view that each substance has its own internal activity.

"There remains only my hypothesis, that is the way of pre-established harmony, through a prior divine artifice, which has formed each of these substances from the beginning in such a way that by following only its own laws, laws which it received with its being, it nevertheless agrees with the other, as if there were a mutual influence, or as if God always meddled with it, over and above his general concurrence." — Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 148.

Preface paradox

An author, based on the experience that all her previous works contain some mistakes, reasonably acknowledges in the preface of her new book that it also contains mistakes, in spite of her best efforts. This acknowledgement creates a contradiction. On the one hand, she holds that propositions $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots, P_n$ (which are the views she argues for in this book) are true; on the other hand, she also believes that at least one of them is false. This amounts to saying that at one and the same time she believes that all these propositions are true and believes that some of them are false. This reveals an imperfection in what we take ourselves to know.

"We occupy the posture of the so-called 'preface paradox' — standing in the shoes of the author who apologises in his preface for those errors that have doubtless made their way into his work, and yet blithely remains committed to all those assertions in the body of the work itself." — Rescher, *Empirical Inquiry*, 1982, p. 206.

Prejudice

Prejudice is a target of Cartesian doubt and other rationally based philosophy because it is thought to obstruct reason and philosophy in the pursuit of truth. Prejudice is rehabilitated in Gadamer's hermeneutics, where it is viewed as an essential element in our understanding on the basis of Heidegger's notion of a fore-structure of understanding. All understanding involves the projection of meanings arising out of one's own situation and obtained from a certain perspective. Because this fore-structure of understanding is preju-

含有另一实体的某个状态, 因为严格而言的实体应当有一种与因果依赖不相容的自足性。然而上帝在创造宇宙时已经在一切可能的单子之间预先建立了非因果的、完美的活动和谐, 每一单子都像一面镜子反映着整个宇宙。一个之中的变化都将对应于另一个之中的变化。这种和谐类似于两个完全同步运行的钟表之间存在的非因果的动作和谐。前定和谐说是莱布尼茨的形而上学的核心。在某种意义上, 它是偶因论和关于实体有自己的内在能动性观点的混合物。

"只有我的假设仍然保留着, 那就是先前由神的技巧而造成的前定和谐方法, 神的技巧将这些实体的每一个在一开始就按那样一种方式来形成, 使得它只遵循自己的规律——那些它存在时就得到的规律——行事, 却依然与其他的实体相适合, 就好像它们真的互相影响一样, 或好像上帝在他的基本的活动主流之外, 还总在摆弄那个实体一样。"——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989年, 第118页。

序言悖论

作者根据他先前所有著作都包含有错误这个经验, 在他的新著序言中有理由承认, 它也可能包含错误, 尽管他尽了最大的努力。这个承认产生了一个矛盾。一方面, 他认为命题 $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots, P_n$ (他在这本书中论证的观点) 是真的; 但另一方面, 他又相信其中至少有一个是假的。这就等于是说, 他在既相信所有这些命题为真的同时, 又相信其中的一些是假的。这揭示了我们确知知道的东西是不完美的。

"我们处于所谓的'序言悖论'的状态——即处于这样一个作者的位置, 他在序言中为那些无疑曾经出现在他的著作中的错误而表示歉意, 但又轻松地承认就这本书里的所有断言也有错误。"——雷谢尔:《经验探究》, 1982年, 第206页。

偏见

偏见是笛卡尔的怀疑和其他基于理性的哲学所反对的东西, 因为它被视为妨碍了追求真理的理性和哲学。偏见在伽达默尔的解释学中恢复了名誉, 它在那里被视为我们理解中的一个必要因素, 这种看法基于海德格尔关于理解或领会的前结构的观点。所有的理解都涉及意义的投射或筹划, 这投射则出自一个人自己所处的形势, 由某个视域中获得。由于这种理解的前结构就是偏见, 理解或领会不可避免地植根

dice, understanding is inevitably rooted in prejudice. There is no neutral point of view from which we may get the "real" meaning of a text. According to Gadamer, this does not mean that understanding and interpretation are purely subjective. Prejudice is not a matter of subjective opinion, nor is it personal property. Instead, he holds that it is part of tradition and is developed within the historical tradition to which we belong. Prejudice is the historically and culturally determined horizon and the effectivity of history. Furthermore, Gadamer claims that prejudice is not an obstacle or limit to understanding, but by serving as our orientation to meaning, it is the basis for the possibility of understanding.

"What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's finite, historical mode of being." —Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (tr. Glen-Doepel), 1975, p. 246.

Pre-reflective cogito

Sartre's term for a crucial kind of human consciousness. Our consciousness is always directed upon some object of which we are aware. This is the Cartesian or reflective cogito. But this consciousness is itself accompanied by a consciousness that we are aware. Sartre called this second order awareness, which is consciousness directed upon consciousness, pre-reflective cogito. This consciousness, which always passes without being reflected upon, makes reflection possible. The pre-reflective cogito is the condition of the reflective cogito. On Sartre's view of intentionality, therefore, consciousness operates on two levels at once. Sartre account of consciousness led to his rejection of Freud's notion of the unconscious. A major task of Sartre's philosophy was to give a descriptive account of the pre-reflective cogito.

"I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito. This cogito, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective cogito since it appears as the first necessity for non-reflective consciousness to be seen by itself." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 74.

Prescriptivism

A moral theory developed by Hare in *The Languages of Morals* (1952) and *Freedom and Reason* (1963). According to this theory, the main concern of moral philosophy is to clarify the nature of moral terms and statements. Distinct from fact-stating statements which tell us what is the case, ethical statements tell us to do something and are used to guide choices. Such statements must have irreducibly prescriptive elements. To express agreement to a prescription or to accept it is to express one's resolve or decision to carry it out. Prescriptivism emphasises the typically prescriptive use

于偏见。并没有能让我们得到一个文本的“真实”意义的中立视角。按照伽达默尔的看法,这也并不意味着理解和解释是纯主观的。偏见并不就是主观意见,也不是个人癖好;相反,伽达默尔认为它是传统的一部分,在我们所属于的历史传统中发展。偏见是被历史和文化决定的视域,是历史的效果。而且,伽达默尔认为偏见不是理解的障碍或局限,相反,它引导着我们朝向意义的方向,因而是使理解成为可能的基础。

“所需要的是从根本上为偏见概念恢复名誉,并认识到这样一个事实,即存在着合法的偏见,如果我们不加偏见地看待人类存在的有限的和历史的样式的话。”——伽达默尔:《真理与方法》(格兰-多培尔英译),1975年,第246页。

前反思的思想

萨特用来表达一种极重要的人类意识的词。我们的意识总是指向某个我们意识到的对象。这是笛卡尔的或反思的思想。但这种意识本身又被我们知道的〔另〕一个意识所伴随。萨特称之为第二层的意识,也就是指向意识的意识或前反思的思想。这种意识总是不被反思地进行着,但正是它使得反思成为可能。这前反思的思想乃是反思思想的条件。因此,按照萨特关于意向性的观点,意识同时运作在两个层次上。萨特对于意识的解释使得他拒绝弗洛伊德关于无意识的观念。萨特哲学的一个主要任务就是去描述性地说明前反思的思想。

“我相信我已表明所有反思的首要条件是一种前反思的思想。当然,这种思想并不设置对象,它保持在意识之中。尽管如此,它与反思的思想是同源的,因为它是让非反思的意识被自身看到的必要前提。”——萨特:《存在与虚无》(巴奈斯英译),1957年,第74页。

规定主义

为黑尔在他的《道德语言》(1952年)和《自由与理性》(1963年)所发展的一种道德理论。根据这个理论,道德哲学的主要任务是阐明道德词汇和陈述的性质。不同于告诉我们事实是什么的表述事实的描述,伦理陈述告诉我们做什么以及被用来指导我们的选择。这样的陈述必定有不可化简的规定成分。表达对一个规定的同意或者接受,就是表达一个人的决定或者是执行它的决心。规定主义强调对于道德判断的典型的规定性使用。它也主张道德规定是

of moral judgements. It also claims that moral prescription is universal, and is directed to everyone at all times. This principle of universalizability is the reason that Hare calls his theory "universal prescriptivism". Both prescriptivism and emotivism are types of noncognitivism, but they have significant differences. While emotivism emphasises the emotional impact of a moral judgement, and its influence on the hearer's attitude, prescriptivism thinks that this result is not necessary for the success of prescription. Emotivism, in distinguishing between factual statements and ethical statements, claims that only factual statements are the objects of reasoning. Prescriptivism, on the other hand, claims that one can also reason about moral questions. It thus avoids the charge of irrationality.

"For the sake of a name, let me refer to the type of doctrine which I put forward in *The Language of Morals*, and still hold, as 'universal prescriptivism' — a combination, that is to say, of universalism (the view that moral judgements are universalizable) and prescriptivism (the view that they are, at any rate typically, prescriptive)." —Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 1963, p. 16.

Presence

According to Derrida, Western metaphysics from Parmenides to Husserl held the prejudice that the locus of truth is in the pure presence of things themselves to consciousness. Hence he calls traditional Western metaphysics the metaphysics of presence. Because presence gives priority to the spoken over the written, he also considers Western metaphysics to be a tradition of phonocentrism. "To return to the things themselves" has been a central philosophical slogan of the tradition. For Plato, truth lay in the idea or *eidos* (form) which is present to reason, the soul's sight. Plato thus united the notions of presence and evidence with those of objectivity, ideality, and the Good. He established the dichotomy of sensibility and rationality as an ultimate pair of opposing concepts. Plato authorised philosophy as the philosophy of presence or philosophy of *logos*. Derrida calls reason-centred philosophy logocentrism. Aristotle set up a notion of temporal presence through a continuity of time and history. He developed a position of taking the presence of a thing to be its substance, essence and existence. Descartes claimed that the condition of the possibility of knowledge and truth is the clarity and distinctness of ideas immediately present to consciousness. Hegel systematically demonstrated the self-presence of the subject. For most people, presence is the province of certainty. By denying presence, Derrida seems to deny the importance of actual experience. The complex displacement of presence, speech and reason requires careful assessment.

"We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as presence, with all the subdeterminations

普遍的,是在任何时候都对每个人起作用的。这是它的普遍性原则,也是黑尔宁可把他的理论称作为“普遍规定主义”的理由。规定主义和情感主义是非认知主义的两种类型,但它们的意义是不同的。情感主义强调一个道德判断对情感的效果,对听者态度的影响;而规定主义认为这个结果对于规定的成功来说不是必要的。情感主义在区分事实陈述与伦理陈述时,相信惟有事实陈述是推理的对象;而规定主义则主张,人们能够对道德问题进行推理。因此它避免了被指责为是非理性的。

“就名称而言,让我把我在《道德语言》中提出的那类并仍然坚持的学说,称作是‘普遍规定主义’——即普遍主义(把道德判断看成是普遍的观点)和规定主义(即道德判断至少主要地是规定性的)的结合。”——黑尔:《自由与理性》,1963年,第16页。

在场

在德里达看来,从巴门尼德到胡塞尔的西方形而上学都坚持这样一个偏见,即真理的所在地乃是事物本身对意识而言的纯在场。因此他称传统西方形而上学为“在场的形而上学”。由于在场首要关注的是说出的东西而非写出的东西,他也将西方形而上学视为一种语音中心主义的传统。“回到事情本身中”一直是这个传统的最重要的哲学口号。对于柏拉图,真理位于形相或理念之中,而这形相或理念对理性、也就是灵魂之眼而言是在场的。柏拉图因此而将在场和明证的观念与客观性、理念性(相性)和善的观念统一起来。他建立起感性与理性的二元分立,作为所有对立概念的终极模式。柏拉图将在场的哲学或逻各斯的哲学树立为正宗哲学。德里达称以理性为中心的哲学为“逻各斯中心主义”。亚里士多德通过时间和历史的连续性建立起了时间在场的观念。他提出了这样一种立场,即将事物的在场当做这事物的实体、本质和存在。笛卡尔认为,知识和真理可能性的条件是观念的明白和清楚,而这些观念对意识而言都是直接在场的。黑格尔系统地证明主体的自身在场。对绝大多数人而言,在场是确定性的领地。通过否定在场,德里达似乎否定了实际经验的重要性。对这种要逐出在场、说话和理性的复杂观点需要仔细的估价。

“我们已经有了这样一个预知,即语音中心主义的出现伴随着一个历史性的决定:将普遍存在的意义确定为在场;同时伴随着各种依附于这个普遍决定形式的次级决定。在这普遍的

which depend on this general form and which organise within it their system and their historical sequence.”——Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (trans. by Spivak), 1974, p. 12.

Presence-at-hand, see ready-to-hand

Pre-Socratics

A term invented by historians of philosophy to group together the Greek thinkers living between approximately the first half of the sixth century B C and Socrates' lifetime. These include mainly the Milesian school (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), the Pythagoreans, the Eleatic school (Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus), Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). The name is sometimes misleading because some philosophers in this period were actually contemporaries of Socrates. The unity consists rather in the fact that none of them were influenced by Socrates and Plato. They were also called natural philosophers, for many of them concentrated on finding principles to explain the world of nature, although this is not true of Parmenides' way of truth or of Zeno.

The Pre-Socratics took part in the first period of the history of Western philosophy, which began the tradition of free and rational inquiry. None of these philosophers left us a single complete work, so the study of them relies on the scanty and disconnected fragments preserved in the quotations and discussions of the later philosophers, in particular in Aristotle's works and those of his commentators. There was no separation of science and philosophy in this period, but the road leading to this separation was prepared by them. Many contemporary philosophers admire the intellectual freedom and speculative brilliance of the Pre-Socratics and are inspired by their views of man and universe.

“In saying that the Pre-Socratics were rational men I mean no more than this; that the broad and bold theories which they advanced were presented not as ex cathedra pronouncements for the faithful to believe, and the godless to ignore, but as the conclusions of arguments, as reasoned propositions for reasonable men to contemplate and debate.”——Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1979, p. 5.

Presumption

A statement which has some grounds to be considered a candidate for truth, but whose truth is not yet established. It is provisionally acceptable, but falls short of being conclusively acceptable. A presumption possesses a positive but low-level cognitive status and is the raw material for the production of knowledge. A presumption has some similarity to Epicurus' notion of *prolepsis*, the anticipation of the application of a term.

形式中这些次级决定组织起了它们的系统和历史序列。”——德里达：《论书写学》（斯庇瓦克英译），1974年，第12页。

现成在手状态

见“用得称手”条。

前苏格拉底

哲学史家们创造了这一术语，把生活在大约公元前6世纪前半期至苏格拉底时期的希腊思想家归在一起。这些思想家包括米利都学派（泰勒斯，阿那克西曼德，阿那克西美尼），毕达哥拉斯学派，埃利亚学派（巴门尼德，芝诺，梅利索），恩培多克勒，阿那克萨戈拉，原子论者（留基波和德谟克利特）。这一名称有时有些含混，因为这一时期的有些哲学家实际上是苏格拉底的同时代人。这些思想家们的共同之处在于，他们都没有受过苏格拉底和柏拉图的影响。他们也被叫做自然哲学家，因为他们绝大多数都致力于找到可解释自然界的原理，虽然巴门尼德的真理之路与芝诺哲学除外。

前苏格拉底哲学发生于西方哲学史的第一阶段，它开始了自由和理性研究的传统。这些哲学家都没有留给我们一部完整的著作，故对他们的研究是依赖于数量不多且互不相连的残篇。这些残篇被保存在后代哲学家，尤其是亚里士多德及其注释者的引语和讨论中。这一阶段科学与哲学尚未分家，可通往分离之路已经由他们奠定了。许多当代哲学家都敬慕前苏格拉底哲学家的理智自由和思辨才能，并从他们对人和宇宙的观点中吸取灵感。

“说前苏格拉底哲人是理性的人，我的意思只是说：他们提出的大范围的和大胆的理论不是作为教会的宣导，使虔诚的人相信，而被无神论者所忽视；相反，他们的理论是论证的结论，是推论而得的命题，使理性的人去思考和争论。”——巴奈斯：《前苏格拉底哲学家》，1979年，第5页。

假定

一个基于某些论据被考虑为待选的真理，但是其真理性尚未确立的陈述。它是暂时可接受的，但是尚缺乏最后的可接受性。假定拥有确定的然而却是低水准的认知地位，是知识生产的原材料。假定类似于伊壁鸠鲁的 *prolepsis*，即对使用一个词项的预期。

“假定是这样一个问题，它被公开承认为未知（即未知其为真）的，但是有些人宣称（不管

"A presumption is a thesis that is avowedly not known (i. e. known to be true), but having some claim—however tentative or imperfect—to be regarded as a truth." — Rescher, *Methodological Pragmatism*, 1977, p. 115.

Presupposition

In general, what is taken to be true without question as a premise for some conclusion. In this sense, if A presupposes B, B is derivable from A. As a semantic notion, presupposition is a relation between two statements A and B such that A presupposes B if the truth of B is a necessary condition of A of being either true or false. The relation of presupposition differs from the relation of entailment, for if A entails B, the truth of B is a necessary condition of the truth of A, rather than a necessary condition of A possessing a truth value at all. This distinction between presupposition and entailment was employed by Strawson in his attack on Russell's theory of descriptions. For Russell, the statement "The present king of France is bald" entails "There is a present king of France". But Strawson claimed that the former presupposes the latter, but does not entail it. The notion of presupposition is important in the debate about whether "exists" is a predicate and in challenges to the principle of bivalence in three valued logic.

"For if a statement S presupposes a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth-or-falsity of S, then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'." —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 175.

Prima facie duties

[Latin: *prima facie*, so far as it appears on the surface, or on first appearance] A notion elaborated by W. D. Ross in his ethics, for duties relative to occasions, in contrast to absolute duties or duties proper, which we ought to perform in any situation without exception. *Prima facie* duties are also called conditional duties. We have many sorts of self-evident duties, such as keeping a promise, beneficence, justice and self-improvement. In a particular moral situation, more than one of these duties may matter. In such a situation, we have no way of knowing for certain which duty is fundamental. The only thing we can do is to rank all obligations involved in this particular situation and attempt to decide which one is most important on this occasion or to determine where the balance lies. The duty on which we act and which we take to be the most important on this occasion could be less important on another occasion. Thus, all such duties that we perform are *prima facie*, rather than absolute. Ross' theory rejects the moral monism of Kantian or utilitarian theories, which hold that there is an ultimate moral principle to guide our choices or actions. It faces the problem of accounting for the possibility of measuring the importance of different kinds

是试探性地还是不完满地) 它应被看做是真的。”——雷谢尔:《方法论的实用主义》, 1977年, 第115页。

预设

一般而言, 预设是毫无疑问地认为是真的东西, 作为某个结论的前提。在这种意义上, 如果A预设B, 就说B可从A推出来。作为一个语义概念, 预设是两个陈述A和B之间的关系, 使得A预设B, 如果B的真是A为真或为假的必要条件。预设关系不同于衍推关系, 因为A衍推B意味着B的真只是A的真的必要条件, 而根本不是A具有一个真值的必要条件。预设和衍推之间的这一区别, 被斯特劳森用来攻击罗素的摹状词理论。在罗素看来, “当今的法国国王是光头” 衍推 “有一位当今的法国国王”。但斯特劳森认为, 前者预设后者, 而不是衍推后者。预设这个概念在“存在”是否是一个谓词的论战中, 以及在三值逻辑对于二值原则的挑战中很重要。

“因为如果陈述S在下述意义上预设陈述S': S'的真是S的真或假的先决条件, 那么把S和S'的否定组合在一起当然会出现逻辑上荒谬的情形。”——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》, 1952年, 第175页。

当下职责

[*prima facie* (拉丁语), 意为“就表面看来”或“初看起来”] 这个概念被W. D. 罗斯在他的伦理学著作中得到阐发, 指相对于不同场合的职责, 与绝对的职责或者严格说来的职责, 即在任何情况下都应履行而没有例外的职责相对。当下职责也称“有条件的责任”。我们有许多不证自明的责任, 如遵守诺言、仁慈、正义、自我完善等。在一种具体的道德情境中, 也许会出现不止一种职责。在这种情况下, 我们无法知道哪一种责任是更根本的。我们惟一能做的事情是把这种特殊情况下的义务排个队, 力图决定在这种情况下哪个是最重要的或在哪里可平衡它们。我们在这个场合据以行为的职责或认为是最重要的职责, 在另一种场合也许就不那么重要了。因此, 我们所履行的所有责任都是当下的, 而不是绝对的。罗斯的理论是对诸如康德理论和功利主义的道德一元论的拒斥, 后者认为, 有终极的道德原则指导我们的选择或行动。其难题是如何说明测量不同种类的职责的可能性。

“我建议以‘当下职责’或‘有条件的职

of duties.

"I suggest 'Prima facie duty' or 'conditional duty' as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e. g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant." Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 19.

Prima facie justification, see defeasibility

Primary and secondary qualities

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be traced to the ancient atomist Democritus and was also suggested by Galileo, Descartes and the seventeenth century corpuscularian philosophers such as Robert Boyle. But it is Locke who provided philosophical argument for this distinction and made it a significant topic in modern philosophy. For Locke, primary qualities are those which are not separable from the body, such as size, shape, texture and bulk, while secondary qualities are those which are not in the objects themselves but are the powers of primary qualities to produce in us various sensations such as colours, sounds and tastes. In an even broader sense, a secondary quality is also a thing's power to change another thing's operation. The ideas produced by primary qualities resemble the qualities themselves, that is, these ideas are qualitatively identical with the qualities in the body that initiated the whole causal process of perception. In contrast, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in the bodies at all, for although we habitually think of these qualities as existing in the objects themselves, they are actually only powers to produce ideas in us rather than actual attributes which these ideas resemble. Primary qualities, because they really exist in the bodies, are called real qualities. The ideas of primary qualities, unlike the ideas of secondary qualities, were taken to offer something which could be measured, and were thus considered a suitable basis for scientific explanation. All secondary qualities can be reduced to primary qualities.

While Locke claimed that secondary qualities have their physical basis in the bodies which are causally responsible for the ideas of them, Berkeley interpreted secondary qualities as those qualities which do not exist independently of the perception of them. Locke's distinction between perceptible qualities and powers was taken by Berkeley as a distinction between perceptible qualities and mind-independent qualities. Because he rejected the possibility of the latter, he saw all qualities to be on the same footing.

"These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple *ideas* in us; solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." —

责'来简单地指下面这种特征,不同于严格意义的职责,一种行为具有这种特征是由于它是某一类型职责(如遵守诺言),如果不是由于同一时间另有一类更具意义的职责的话,它就是严格意义的职责。"——罗斯:《正当与善良》,第19页。

最初辩明

见“可废弃性”条。

第一性的质和第二性的质

第一性的质和第二性的质的区分可以追溯到古代原子论者德谟克利特,也为伽利略、笛卡尔和像 R. 波义耳那样的 17 世纪微粒论者所提出。然而,正是洛克提出了对这一区分的哲学证明,并使它成为近代哲学中的一个意义深远的论题。根据洛克的观点,第一性的质是与物体不可分的性质,像大小、形状、组织、体积等;第二性的质并不是对象本身中的性质,而是第一性的质在我们身上产生颜色、声音、滋味等各种感觉的能力。在更广泛的意义上,第二性的质也是一事物改变另一事物活动的能力。第一性的质产生的观念相似于该性质本身,即在性质上,这些观念与造成整个知觉因果过程的物体的性质相同。与此相对照,第二性的质的观念与物体中任何东西都毫不相似,因为虽然我们习惯于认为这些性质存在于对象本身,但它们实际只是在我们身上产生观念的能力,而不是这些观念与之相似的实际属性。因为第一性的质实际存在于物体中,所以它们被称作“实在的性质”。第一性的质的观念与第二性的质的观念不同,据认为它们提供了某种可以测量的东西,因而被认为是科学说明的可靠基础。所有第二性的质都可以还原为第一性的质。

洛克主张第二性的质在物体中有物理基础,物体是物体的观念的原因,而巴克莱把第二性的质说成是不能独立于对它们的知觉而存在的。洛克区别的是可被感知的性质和能力,而巴克莱将这种区别变成了可被感知的性质和不依赖于心灵的性质之间的区别。因为他拒斥后者的可能性,所以他认为一切性质都是同样的。

“这些性质我称之为物体的原始的或第一性的质,我想,我们可以观察到这些性质在我们心中产生了以下简单“观念”:固体、广延、形状、运动或静止、数目。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第八章,第10节。

Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 8, 10.

Primary goods

For Rawls, the things which every rational person would want, whatever his plan of life or value orientation might be. Primary goods are basic to the life plans of all rational beings. They are divided into two categories: natural primary goods, including health, vigour, intelligence and imagination and social primary goods, including wealth, power, opportunities, civil rights, such as freedom of thought and speech and the right to participate in political decision making, and, as Rawls particularly emphasises, self-respect. The distribution of social primary goods is of basic concern to the participants who choose the principles of justice in the original position. Primary goods are the subject-matter of the single thin theory of the good and provides the motivation for the unanimous selection of principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance. Critics argue that consideration of primary goods cannot lead to a decision about the principles of justice, either because too little is known for any choice or because too much is known for a unanimous choice. Others argue for a different array of primary goods with different consequences for justice or claim that different values and lifeplans will affect the weighting of the goods even if the agents are temporarily ignorant of them.

"Now primary goods, as I have already remarked, are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants." - Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 92.

Primary language, another term for object language

Primary matter

Leibniz distinguished between primary matter and secondary matter. Primary matter is matter in itself, or bulk. It is not a complete substance, for it is separated from soul or substantial form, and needs the latter to be an organic unity. Primary matter is what is passive in any complete substance, but it serves as the foundation of continuity. Secondary matter, on the other hand, as an aggregate or mass is a collection of substances.

"I understand matter as either secondary or primary, secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance." — Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 162.

Primary reason

Traditionally, reason has been held to explain action. What, then, is the exact relation between a reason and the action it explains? Davidson claims that when agents perform

基本的善

罗尔斯的术语,指每一有理性的人都想要得到的东西,不论他的生活计划和价值取向是什么。基本的善是所有理性的人生活计划的基础。它们被分成两类:自然基本的善和社会基本的善,前者包括健康、精力、理智和想像力,后者包括财富、权力、机会以及公民权利,如思想和言论自由和参加政治决策的权利,还有罗尔斯特别强调的自尊。社会基本的善的分配是那些在原初状态中选择正义原则的参加者首要关注的事情。基本的善是单一的善的弱理论的论题,它提供了在无知之幕后对正义原则的一致选择的动机。批评家认为,对基本善的考虑不能导致对那些正义原则的确定,这既是因为对任何选择所知的东西太少,又是因为对一致的选择所知的太多。其他的批评者则赞成根据对正义的不同重要性对基本的善做不同的排列,或者提出不同的价值观和生活计划将会影响对善的重视,即使参加者暂时还不知道它们。

“而基本的善,像我已经指出过的,是那些被假定为一个理性的人无论他想要别的什么都需要的东西。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第92页。

初阶语言

“对象语言”的另一个名称。

初级的物质

莱布尼茨区分了初级的物质和次级的物质。初级的物质是物质本身,或物块。它不是完整的实体,因为它与灵魂或实体的形式分开了,它要成为有机的统一体,就需要后者。初级的物质虽然是任何完整的实体内的被动的东西,但它是持续性的基础。与此不同,次级的物质是一个堆集或团块,或是多个实体的集合。

“我把物质理解为次级的或初级的。次级的物质实际是一个完整的实体,但它不完全是被动的;初级的物质是完全被动的,但它不是一个完整的实体。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第162页。

第一理由

在传统上,理由一直被认为是用于解释行动的。那么,一个理由和它所解释的行动之间的关系究竟是什么呢?戴维森声称当行为者完成

actions, they have a pro-attitude towards an action of a certain kind, because reason has led them to see or think they see in an action of that kind some feature or consequence which they want or value. Furthermore, agents need to have a belief that acting in a certain way promotes that which they want or value. Such a pro-attitude and belief form the primary reason for agents to act as they did. On Davidson's view, this is how reasons rationalise an action. Their logical relationship can be expressed by a practical syllogism involving the propositional contents of the belief and the pro-attitude. The doctrine of primary reason is the central element of Davidson's causal theory of action, because a primary reason for acting in a certain way can cause an agent to act in that way.

"R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description D only if R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent towards action with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description, has that property." —Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 5.

Primary rules, see rule of recognition

Prime matter

Aristotle's concept of what exists at the absolute beginning of generation. While elements are basic matter for all things, prime matter serves as the subject when elements change into each other. It is therefore more basic than the elements. Prime matter lacks characteristics in itself, but is what remains after even the three dimensions are stripped away, with nothing left to be removed. In itself, prime matter is in none of the categories, but can potentially be everything.

"And not only is nature the prime matter (and this in two senses, either the first, counting from the thing, or the first in general: ...), but also the form and essence." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1015a7-10.

Prime mover, an alternative expression for unmoved mover

Primitive belief, see primitive knowledge

Primitive force

Leibniz claimed that active force is either primitive or derivative. Primitive force is inherent in every corporeal substance and stands in contrast to primary matter. It provides the principle of unity for primary matter and forms an organic unity with it. It is what Leibniz also called substantial form or the first entelechy. Derivative force, on the other hand,

行动时,他们就对于某种行动具有一个“赞成态度”,因为理由使得他们在那种行动中看到或认为他们还看到想要或重视的运动的特征或结果。而且,行为者需要有这样一个信念,即以某种方式行事会产生他们想要的或重视的那个东西。这样一个赞成态度和信念构成行为者如此行事的第一理由。根据戴维森的观点,理由就是这样来将行动理性化的。其逻辑关系可以用一个实际的包含信念和赞成态度的命题内容的三段论来表示。第一理由学说是戴维森“行动的因果理论”的要点,因为,以某种方式行事的第一理由可以导致行为者以那种方式行事。

“只有当 R 由一个行为者对具有某个特性的运动的赞成态度和行为者关于符合某一描述的行动 A 具有那个特性时, R 才是行为者进行符合描述 D 的行动 A 的第一理由。”——戴维森:《关于行动与事件的论文集》,1980年,第5页。

主要规则

见“承认规则”条。

原初质料

亚里士多德的概念,指在生成的绝对开端的存在物。元素是一切事物的基本质料,而原初质料则是元素互相转化的承受体,因而它比元素更根本。原初质料自身没有特征,它是当空间三维被去掉后所留下的,其实已经无可再去了。原初质料自身不在任何范畴内,可它潜在地是一切事物。

“自然不仅是原初质料(这有两种意义,或是当下事物的开端,或是一般的开端,……),也是形式和本质。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1015a7-10。

第一推动者

“不动的推动者”的另一表述。

基本信念

见“基本知识”条。

原始的力

莱布尼茨声称能动的力量有两种:原始的力和派生的力。原始的力是每一个有形的实体固有的,并与初级的物质相对应。它为初级的物质提供了统一性原理,从而与它形成为一个有机的统一体。它也就是莱布尼茨所说的“实体的形式”或“第一隐得来希”,与此不同,派生的

arises from a limitation of primitive force through the collision of bodies with one another.

"Primitive force (which is nothing but the first entelechy) corresponds to the soul or substantial form." — Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Aricw and Garber), 1989, p. 119.

Primitive ideas

The ideas which serve as the grounds for explaining other ideas in a system, but which are not themselves defined by any other ideas within the system. These terms can only be explained by pointing to what is meant. Primitive ideas are associated with primitive propositions, which are the propositions within a given system that are undemonstrable by any other propositions but which form the basis for demonstrating other propositions. Each axiomatic system contains certain primitive ideas and primitive propositions. It is methodologically preferable that any such system should contain the least possible number of primitive ideas and primitive propositions.

"Following Peano, we shall call the undefined ideas and undemonstrated propositions primitive ideas and primitive propositions respectively." — Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 1960, p. 90.

Primitive knowledge

Russell draws a distinction between primitive knowledge and derivative knowledge. Since knowledge is used here in the sense of belief, the distinction is also drawn between primitive belief and derivative belief. Primitive knowledge or belief is the immediate self-evident experience, which does not need the support of any outside evidence. Derivative knowledge or belief is the belief caused by other beliefs and is something which we believe as a result of inference, although the inference might not be strictly logical. For instance, we judge somebody's feelings from the expression of his face. This distinction is similar to that between hard data and soft data.

"The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is derivative, while some is primitive." — Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 75.

Principle

[from Latin: *principium*, composed of *primus*, first, chief — *cipium*, a termination, corresponding to Greek: *arche*, starting-point, beginning] A general reason for doing or omitting to do something. A principle is a foundation or starting-point for any physical and mental operation which applies in a wide range of situations. The most general principles are normally not proved by appeal to subordinate principles derived on their basis.

力是由于物体的相互碰撞从原始力的极限中产生的。

"原始的力(它无非是第一隐得来希)相当于灵魂或实体的形式。"——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989年, 第119页。

初始概念

指在一个系统中用作解释其他概念的根据,但其本身却不为系统中其他概念所定义的概念。这些术语仅能通过指出其意谓来解释。初始概念与初始命题相联系,初始命题是一个给定系统中不能用其他命题证明,但却构成证明其他命题的基础的命题。每个公理系统都包含某些初始概念和初始命题。从方法论上说,任何这类系统最好包含尽可能少的初始概念和初始命题。

"效仿皮亚诺,我们将分别称未加定义的概念和未加证明的命题为初始概念和初始命题。"——怀特海和罗素:《数学原理》,1960年,第90页。

基本知识

罗素区分了基本知识与派生知识。因为这里是在信念的含义上谈知识的,因此这种区分也是在基本信念和派生信念之间作出的。基本知识或基本信念是当下自明的经验,它不需要外部证据的支持。派生知识或派生信念是由其他信念引起的信念,是我们作为推论的结果而相信的东西,虽然不一定是严格的逻辑推论。例如,我们从某人的面部表情来判断他的感觉。这种区分和硬子料与软子料的区分类似。

"当我们着手分析日常知识时首先出现的问题是:有些知识是派生的,而有些知识是基本的。"——罗素:《我们关于外部世界的知识》,1926年,第75页。

原则

[源自拉丁文 *principium*, 由 *primus* (首先的, 主要的) 和 *cipium* (终点) 构成, 对应于希腊文 *arche* (出发点, 开端)] 做某事或不做某事的一般理由。原则是身体行为或心的行为的基础或出发点, 广泛地用于各种情形。最普遍的原则通常不能靠基于它们而产生的次要原则得到证明。

"一切不可证明的判断, 作为一切判断的基

"All unprovable judgements, in so far as they are the ground of all judgements, are called principles, and they are either theoretical or practical." —Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 224.

Principle of charity

A methodological principle for translation or interpretation. A favoured truth theory for a language L should assign truth conditions to most of its sentences held true by a speaker of L in accord with our own view of what is true. In interpreting or translating a system of thought, we must assume that most of the propositions in it are true, that is we must maximise the extent of rationality of the subjects from our point of view. For Quine, this principle is a pre-condition for the possibility of radical translation, and for Davidson it is a pre-condition for radical interpretation. A good theory of interpretation, according to Davidson, should maximise agreement. The principle is based on the claim that only against a background of massive agreement can we intelligibly agree and disagree. It is a charitable assumption about human rationality. It might be false, but if there is no better alternative in interpretation, this can help us to understand what we want to interpret and to make communication possible.

"Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters." —Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, p. 197.

Principle of fractional prudence

A term introduced by C. I. Lewis for the human tendency to choose a good thing which is available now rather than a better thing in the future even though it is equally likely that one will be able to obtain the latter. It is an expression of the preference that humans have for satisfying present desires and the immediate future. Such a tendency is called by other authors time-preference. On some interpretations, humans are biologically determined to care less about our remote desires and about the distant future. Lewis claimed that this kind of concern is irrational, and Derek Parfit calls it a bias because a sound rationality should be concerned with the good of our whole life and should not sacrifice distant goods to near ones. Others, including Bentham, argue that a preference for the near future is a requirement of practical rationality.

"This anomalous conception, that although we should rationally be concerned with the future, we should be less concerned about it according as it is more remote ... This might be called the principle of fractional prudence or of prudence mitigated by impulse." —C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, 1946, p. 493.

础,就被称作原则,它们或者是理论上的,或者是实践上的。"——康德:《逻辑学讲义》(杨编),1992年,第224页。

宽容原则

翻译或解释的方法论原则。根据我们所认为的真,有利于语言L的真理论应该把真值条件赋予被L的说者看做为真的大多数句子。在解释或翻译一种思想体系时,我们必须假定,其中的大多数命题都是真的,即我们必须从我们的角度极大地扩展这些主题的合理性。在奎因看来,这个原则就是可能做出“彻底翻译”的先决条件,而在戴维森看来,这是“彻底解释”的先决条件。根据戴维森的观点,一种好的解释理论应该极大地得到赞同。这个原则是基于这样的事实,我们只有具备广泛认同的背景,才能够有理由说赞同或不赞同。这是关于人类理性的宽容假设,它可能是错的,但如果在解释中没有更好的选择,那么这可以帮助我们理解我们究竟想要解释什么,并且使交流变得可能了。

“我们必须接受宽容;无论我们是否喜欢它,如果我们想要理解他人,我们就必须在大多数情况中把他们看作是正确。”——戴维森:《真理与解释的探究》,1984年,第197页。

分段谨慎原则

C. I. 刘易斯生造的词,指人对善物的选择具有这样的倾向,即宁愿选择现在有用的,而不选择将来更好的东西,即使人们将同等可能地能够获得后者。它是人们对满足当下的欲望和最近的将来持有偏好的表现。这种倾向也被其他著者称为“时间偏好”。按照某些解释,人类在生物学上就被确定为对遥远的欲望和将来不甚关心。刘易斯断言这类关心是不合理的;帕菲特则将此称为“偏见”,因为健全的理性应该关心我们整个生命的善,而不应为取近善而牺牲远善。但是,包括边沁在内的其他一些人却论辩说,偏好最近的将来是实践理性的要求。

“这个不规范的概念,即虽然我们应该理性地关心未来,但我们应该少加挂念,因为它更为遥远……可以把这称作分段谨慎原则,或被冲动减轻的谨慎原则。”——刘易斯:《对知识和价值的分析》,1946年,第493页。

Principle of humanity

A principle put forward by Richard Grandy with the intention of improving the principle of charity. The principle of charity claims that when we translate a different language, we should suppose that most of its assertions and inferences are true and rational. However, granted that, if the translation turns out to be unintelligible for us, it is still useless for our purpose. Hence, in interpreting or translating a system of thought, we must impute to this system patterns of relations among beliefs and desires which are similar to our own. We should suppose that the speaker of that language is a person and has certain basic similarities to ourselves. In this way, we can make the best possible predictions and explanation of the translator behaviour.

"We have, as a pragmatic constraint on translation, the condition that the imputed patterns of relations among beliefs, desires and the world be as similar to our own as possible. This principle I shall call the principle of humanity." — Grandy, "Reference, meaning and belief", *Journal of Philosophy*, (70) 1973, p. 445.

Principle of indeterminacy

Also called the principle of uncertainty. A principle established by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg in 1927 and claiming that in the subatomic world it is in principle impossible to determine simultaneously to an arbitrary degree of accuracy both the position of certain particles such as electrons and the momentum (velocity or direction) of their movement. If the position is known, the determination of their motion is uncertain; and vice versa. Hence full predictive knowledge is permanently impossible concerning the future behaviour of these particles. It has been a major issue whether this uncertainty is a matter of epistemology or ontology. A corollary of this principle is that observed phenomena in the sub-atomic world do not give an accurate picture of reality, for the process of discovery affects what is discovered in the world at this level. On this basis, determinism cannot apply to the subatomic world and is therefore seriously limited. Some philosophers believe that these limits on determinism make room for freedom of the will, while others argue that indeterminacy provides an inappropriate ground for the rationality and intelligence required for the notion of freedom.

"If this principle [of indeterminacy] is true, and physicists seem to have little doubt that it is, it follows that some events are strictly unpredictable even in theory. We simply cannot know enough to make a valid prediction." — Baylis, *Ethics*, 1958, p. 22.

Principle of indifference

If we do not have positive reason to favour either one of

人性原则

由理查德·格兰迪为了改进“宽容原则”而提出的一个原则。宽容原则认为,当我们翻译一种不同的语言,我们就应当假定它的大多数断定和推论都是真的、合理的。然而,假设如果这种翻译最终表明对我们来说是不可理解的,那么前面的那个假定对我们的目的来说也就没有任何用处了。这样,在解释或翻译一种思想体系时,我们必须在这种体系中置入与我们的模式相似的各种信念和愿望的关系模式。我们应当假定,这种语言的说者是一个人,他与我们基本相似。用这种方法,我们就能够做出最有把握的预见和对翻译者行为的说明。

“作为对翻译的一种实用要求,我们有这样一个条件,被置入的信念、愿望和世界的关系模式应当尽可能地与我们的模式相似。我把这个原则称作人性原则。”——格兰迪:《指称、意义与信念》,载《哲学杂志》,第70卷,1973年,第445页。

测不准原理

又称为“不确定性原理”,由德国物理学家W. 海森堡在1927年所提出。这个原理认为,在微粒世界中,同时测定某个如电子这样的粒子的任何程度的准确位置和它们运动的动量(速度或方向),在原则上是不可能的。如果已知微粒的位置,那么,对它们运动的测量就是不确定的;反之亦然。因此,完全地预测这些粒子未来行为的知识是永远不可能的。这种不确定性是认识论的事情还是本体论的事情,一直是一个重要的论争。这个原理的一个必然结果就是:微观粒子世界中所观察到的现象并不提供对实在的准确图画,因为观测过程影响了这个层次的世界中被观测的东西。在此基础上,决定论不能应用于微观粒子世界,因而严格地被限制。某些哲学家认为,对决定论的限制为意志自由让出了地盘,但其他哲学家证明,测不准原理为自由概念所需要的理性和理智所提供的只是不恰当的根据。

“如果这个测不准原理是真实的,并且物理学家们看来很少怀疑它的存在,那么就可以得出这一结论:某些事件甚至在理论上是严格地不可预测的。能否作出有效的预测我们简直一无所知”——贝莱兹:《伦理学》,1958年,第22页。

无差别原则

如果我们没有正面的理由去赞成两个相互

a pair of mutually exclusive and competing theories, we must be indifferent or impartial, and ascribe to them the same degree of probability, since there is no positive ground for assigning unequal degrees. This principle was proposed by Bernoulli, who called it the principle of non-sufficient reason, Laplace, and J. Keynes, who also criticised it. The principle is useful in the theory of choice, but faces difficulties with inductive theories. Its application leads to Bertrand's paradox.

"The principle of indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicting of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability." —J. M. Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 1921, p. 42.

Principle of individuation

To individuate is to specify a character possessed solely by a thing and thus to distinguish it from other things within the same class or species. The principle of individuation explains how such distinctions can be drawn. The problem is associated by medieval philosophers with Aristotle. In *Metaphysics* Z8 he said that when form is universal, matter becomes the principle to distinguish individuals within the same form. However, Aristotle's view of individuation varied, for he also argued that matter itself is indeterminate and must be individuated by form.

Leibniz proposed the identity of indiscernibles as a principle of individuation. He argued that if two entities possess exactly the same characteristics, then these two entities are the numerically identical. This principle implies that entities are different because each possesses a unique set of characteristics and is described by a unique set of predicates. But it is highly disputed whether Leibniz's principle is a necessary truth, with some philosophers arguing that it is logically possible for two numerically distinct entities to have precisely the same set of characteristics.

In *Individuals*, Strawson argues that space and time lie at the basis of all identification and that we can pick out an individual by making reference to the spatio-temporal path it follows and its current position. There are problems with his view, although they can perhaps be overcome. If space and time are relative to entities, then we can determine the spatiotemporal location of any one entity only against the background of an established system of individuated objects in space and time. It is not clear whether our inability to individuate all entities within an absolute space and time is a crucial flaw in a Strawsonian programme of individuating within a relativist setting.

Some philosophers argue that individuation is determined by the bundle of all the characteristics possessed by an individual, and others argue that it is determined by the es-

排斥和竞争的理论中的任意一个,我们必须是“中立的”或“无偏向的”,给它们指派相同的概率度,因为不存在指派不相等概率度的正面根据。这一原则是由伯努利、拉普拉斯和J. 凯恩斯提出来的,伯努利将其称为“不充足理由原则”,凯恩斯则把它作为批评的靶子。这一原则在选择理论中是有用的,但它与归纳理论一样面临着很多难题。它的应用导致“伯特兰悖论”。

“无差别原则断言,如果没有任何已知的理由去对我们的研究对象预测几个选择事件中的某一个而不是另一个将出现,那么相对于这些知识来说,对这每一个选择事件的断定具有同等的概率。”——凯恩斯:《论概率》,1921年,第42页。

个体化原则

所谓个体化就是指明一事物独有的一个特点,从而将这个事物与同类的其他事物区分开来。个体化原则说明如何能作出这样的区分。中世纪哲学家将这个问题与亚里士多德联系起来。在《形而上学》Z8中,亚里士多德说,如果形式是普遍的,质料就变成了将同一形式中的个体区分开来的原则。不过,亚里士多德的个体化观点是有变化的,因为他还证明质料本身是不确定的,必须根据形式使它个体化。

莱布尼茨把不可分辨物的同一性作为个体化原则提出来,他论证说,如果两个东西具有完全相同的特性,那么,这两个东西在数目上就是同一的。这个原则意味着,东西各自不同是因为各自具有独一无二的一组特性,都用独一无二的一组谓词来描述。但是,对于莱布尼茨的原则是否是必然真理有很多争论,有些哲学家论证说,两个数目上不同的东西具有完全相同的一组特性,这在逻辑上是可能的。

在《个别物》一书中,斯特劳森论证说,空间和时间乃是万物识别的基础,而且我们可以通过参考一个个体走过的时空途径和它现在的位置,将这个个体挑选出来。他的观点带来一些问题,尽管这些问题也许是可以解决的。如果空间和时间与存在物有关,那么,我们只能根据时空中既定的个体对象系统的背景,来确定任何一个存在物的时空位置。尚不清楚的是,我们没有能力将绝对时空中的一切存在物个体化这一点,对于斯特劳森建立在相对主义基点上的个体化方案是否是一个严重的缺陷。

有些哲学家论证说,个体化是根据一个个体所具有的全部特征来确定的,另一些哲学家论证说,个体化是根据一个个体的本质特性来确定的。这个本质主义的观点根据是否在承认类本质之外还承认个体本质这一点而有不同的形式。个体化原则具有本体论的维度,涉及使

sential properties of an individual. The essentialist view has different versions, according to whether individual essences as well as essences of kinds are admitted. The principle of individuation has an ontological dimension dealing with the process or circumstances whereby something becomes an individual.

"Given that there are substances, the question that next arises is what marks off any one substance from any other. The mediaeval philosophers called this the problem of the principle of individuation." Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, 1984, p. 69.

Principle of induction

The ground for the validity of inductive reasoning. It assumes that if a certain type of thing A has been found to be associated with a certain type of thing B, if no As are observed which are not associated with Bs, and if the number of observed associations between As and Bs is sufficiently great, then when we observe on a new occasion the presence of an A, a B will probably appear as well. Sometimes this is regarded as equivalent to the principle of the uniformity of nature, which assumes that the future will resemble the past. Because the principle of induction seems to be justified only on the basis of induction, the proof of the principle, if one is needed, presupposes itself.

"The principle [of induction] itself is constantly used in our reasoning, sometimes consciously, and sometimes unconsciously; but there is no reasoning which, starting from some simpler self-evident principle, leads us to the principle of induction as its conclusion." — Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, 1912, p. 66.

Principle of non-sufficient reason, another term for principle of indifference

Principle of parsimony, another name for Ockham's Razor

Principle of perfection, see principle of plenitude

Principle of plenitude

[from Greek: *pleroma*, fullness, completeness] A principle that anything that is possible is realised. A temporalised version of the principle, ascribed to Aristotle, claims that if p is genuinely possible, p will be actualised or realised at some time. The American philosopher Arthur Lovejoy introduced this term and connected the principle with the doctrine of the great chain of being. On his formulation, "no genuine possibility of being can remain unfulfilled". The principle of plenitude is a negative version of the principle of sufficient reason: unless there is sufficient reason for something not to

某物成为个体的过程或环境。

“假定有一些实体存在，随后出现的问题是，把任意实体同任何其他实体划分开来的东西是什么。中世纪哲学家称这个问题为个体化原则问题。” 哈姆林：《形而上学》，1984年，第69页。

归纳原理

归纳推理有效性的基础。它假定，如果发现某类事物 A 与某类事物 B 相联系，并且没有观察到不与 B 联系的 A，那么如果观察到的 A 与 B 相联系的数目足够大，当我们在一个新场合观察到 A 类事物的出现，B 类事物也将很可能出现。有时这被看做与假定未来将类似于过去的“自然的齐一性”原理相同。由于归纳原理似乎只能在归纳的基础上得以辩护，则它的证明预设了它自身，如果需要这证明的话。

“[归纳]原理本身经常被运用于我们的推理，有时是有意识的，有时是无意识的。但是不存在从某种更简单的自明原理出发，给我们导出作为其结论的归纳原理的推理。” — 罗素：《哲学问题》，1912年，第66页。

不充足理由原则

“无差别原则”的另一个名称。

节俭原则

“奥康剃刀”的另一个名称。

完美原则

见“完满原则”条。

完满原则

[源自希腊语 *pleroma*：充满，完全] 任何可能的东西都被实现的原则。此原则的一个时间化表述，归功于亚里士多德，它断言：如果 p 是真正可能的，p 将在某个时间被现实化或被实现。美国哲学家 A. 洛夫乔伊引入了这一术语，并将其与存在之大链学说相关联。按他的表述，“没有任何真正的存在的可能性能够保持不实现”。完满原则是充足理由原则的否定形式：除非有某物不存在的充足理由，那么该物将存在。根据洛夫乔伊的观点，哲学史上有许多人主

be, then that thing exists. According to Lovejoy, the principle has been widely held in the history of philosophy and is identical with what Russell called the principle of perfection in his discussion of Leibniz's philosophy. The principle implies that nature makes no leaps and that there are no sudden transitions of level in the hierarchy of beings in the universe. If an apparent possibility cannot be realised, then it is not genuine, and there are no non-actualised possibilities. These intriguing claims have given rise to much debate.

"I shall call it the principle of plenitude, but shall use the term to cover a wider range of inference from premises identical with Plato's than he himself draws; that is, not only the thesis that the universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deductions from the assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled." Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 1936, p. 52.

Principle of substitutivity, another name for indiscernibility of the identicals

Principle of the best

Leibniz claimed that when God created this world, he did not exercise his will at random but acted according to the principle of the best. God intended to choose to create among an infinite number of possible worlds the best possible world and had the power and knowledge necessary to work out what that best world would be. Thus, any part of the world, any particular contingent thing, has the nature which it has because it is a part of the best possible world. This principle, also called the principle of fitness, or the principle of perfection, offers a reason why this world rather than any other was created and explains the cause of events and existence of things. Leibniz also used this principle to distinguish contingent truths from necessary truths by saying that while necessary truths are based on the principle of non contradiction, a contingent truth is that "which is or appears to be the best among several things which are equally possible". Sometimes Leibniz called this principle the principle of sufficient reason, although the precise meaning of the latter is that every truth has a reason.

"The contingent which exists owes its existence to the principle of what is best, the sufficient reason for things." — Leibniz, *Correspondence with Clarke*, Paper 5, para 9.

Principle of tolerance

At one stage Carnap claimed that an objective answer to questions can be reached as long as all researchers share the same linguistic framework. A linguistic framework embodies a system of logical principles, and sets up logical relations that connect experience to non-protocol sentences. Because

张这一原则,它等同于罗素在其关于莱布尼茨哲学的讨论中提到的“完美原则”。这一原则意味着:自然从不作飞跃,宇宙中的存在等级没有层次的突然跃迁。如果一个明显的可能性不能被实现,那它就不是真正的可能性,不存在任何非现实化的可能性。这些令人迷惑不解的断言引发了许多论战。

“我将把它称作完满原则,但将使用这一术语去包括从与柏拉图的前提相等同的前提出发所进行的推理,这种推理的范围比柏拉图本人所画出的范围更广;也就是说,它不仅指下述论题:宇宙是一个充实的场所,其中可以设想的多种多样的生物都毫无遗漏地得到例示;而且指从下述假定演绎出来的任何其他结论:没有任何真正的存在潜能能够保持不实现。”——洛夫乔伊:《存在之大链》,1936年,第52页。

置换原则

“等同物的不可分辨性”的另一个名称。

最好世界原理

莱布尼茨认为,上帝创造世界时并非随意乱来,而是按照最好世界原理行事。上帝打算在无限可能的世界中选择创造最好的可能世界,而且他有为造出最好世界所必要的能力和知识。这样一来,这个世界的任何部分,任何特殊的偶然事情,具有它所有的性质,乃是因为它是最可能世界的一部分。这个原理也称“合适世界原理”,或“最完善世界原则”,它说明了为什么上帝创造了这个世界而不是任何其他世界的理由,说明了各种事件的以及各种事物存在的原因。莱布尼茨也用这个原理将偶然真理同必然真理区分开来,他说,必然真理是建立在非矛盾律基础上的,而偶然真理“是或看起来是同样可能的若干情形中最好的情形”。有时莱布尼茨称这个原理为“充足理由原理”,尽管后者的确切意思是每一真理都有一个理由。

“现存偶然事件的存在是由于最好事情原理,即事情的充足理由原理。”——莱布尼茨:《与克拉克通信集》,第5封信,第9节。

宽容原则

卡尔纳普声称,在某个阶段,一旦所有的研究者共有相同的语言框架,那么就会得到对问题的客观回答。一种语言框架体现了一种逻辑原理体系,确立了连接经验与非记录句子的逻辑关系。因为语言框架是各种各样的,由此就产

linguistic frameworks are various, a problem arises about how we decide to employ one framework rather than another. For we adopt a framework only if we believe that it is true, but this seems to be circular. Carnap replied that in choosing a framework, we are not concerned with truth, but with pragmatic considerations of simplicity and usefulness. Thus we are at liberty to build up our own form of language or our own logic as we wish. Such an attitude concerning the choice of framework is called by Carnap the principle of tolerance, and it is also called the principle of the conventionality of language forms. For Carnap, there are no morals in logic. What is required of a logician is that he state his method clearly. We should be cautious in making assertions and be critical in examining them, but should be tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.

"The Principle of Tolerance; It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions." —Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 245.

Principle of uncertainty, another term for principle of indeterminacy

Principle of utility

Also called the greatest happiness principle or the greatest felicity principle. The central idea of utilitarianism, which was first formulated by Jeremy Bentham. The principle of utility claims that we should judge the moral value of an action according to the consequence it produces. An action is right in proportion to its tendency to promote utility or happiness; wrong according to its tendency to produce pain for the parties concerned. Utility is proposed not only as the sole criterion of morality, but also as the basis for assessing institutions and for justifying political obligation to the State. Bentham claimed that the principle is the secular foundation of any legal system, with utility as the test for what laws there ought to be. The principle of utility has been challenged on many grounds, including its emphasis on consequence rather than intention in evaluation actions, the priority it gives to the theory of good over the theory of right, its indifference to the distribution of happiness and the difficulty in measuring and aggregating happiness. Other versions of the principle have replaced happiness with other goods, such as the satisfaction of wants.

"By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question." —Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1, p. 2.

Prisoner's dilemma

A classical problem in the theory of choice and the theo-

生了一个问题,即我们是怎样决定运用其中的某个而不是另一个框架的。因为只有当我们相信某个框架是真的,我们才会接受它,但这似乎是一个循环论证。对此,卡尔纳普回答道,在选择一个框架时,我们并不关心真,而是从实用上考虑它的简单和有用。因此,我们是随意地建造我们自己的语言形式或我们的逻辑。卡尔纳普把这种选择框架的态度称作宽容原则,这同样也被称作语言形式的约定性原则。在卡尔纳普看来,逻辑中没有道德而言。对逻辑学家的要求,只是他要清楚地陈述他的方法。我们在形成断定时应当谨慎,在考察它们时应当严格,但在允许语言形式时则应当宽容。

"宽容原则:我们的任务并不是去设立禁止,而是要达到约定。"——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第245页。

不确定性原理

"测不准原理"的另一个词。

功利原则

也被称为最大快乐原则或最大幸福原则。它是功利主义的核心观念,由J. 边沁首先系统提出。功利原则主张我们应根据一个行为所产生的后果来判断它的道德价值。一个行为如与它促进功利或快乐的趋向相称就是正确的;如根据它的趋向会给有关当事人造成痛苦,它就是错的。功利不仅被提出作为道德的惟一标准,而且还被作为评价制度和对国家的政治义务做辩护的基础。边沁认为这一原则是任何法律制度的现世基础,并把功利作为应存在什么样的法律的检验。功利原则在很多方面都受到挑战,包括它在评价行为时对后果而不是对意图的强调、它将利益的原理置于权利的原理之上和它对快乐的分配及对衡量、累计快乐时的困难的漠不关心。这一原则的其他形式已经以其他利益,例如需要的满足,取代了快乐。

"就功利原则而言,它意味着每一行为无论是什么,对它的赞成或不赞成都要根据它表现出的不得不增加或减少其利益正被讨论的当事人的快乐的趋向。"——边沁:《道德与立法原则导论》,1,第2页。

囚犯困境

在选择理论和自我利益理论中的一个经典

ry of self-interest. Two prisoners charged with some joint crime are questioned by the prosecutors separately. Both of them know the following options: (1) if neither of them confesses, each will serve 1 year in prison; (2) if each confesses, everyone will serve 2 years; (3) if one confesses and the other does not, then the one who confesses will be released, and the other will serve 3 years. Neither knows the other's choice. What is the rational choice for each?

If every prisoner pursues his own best interest, the reasonable choice for him is to confess. But then neither gets the best result, and there is the worst overall outcome (4 person-prison years). The case shows that furthering one's own interest does not entail that one gets the best consequence or that the public good will be furthered efficiently. On the contrary, only if both co-operate will the best overall result be obtained. The prisoner's dilemma is widely discussed in modern social, political and moral philosophy for it challenges fundamentally the theory of self-interest. Many political situations, such as the arms race between superpowers, can be modelled as prisoner's dilemmas.

"The hazards of the generalised prisoner's dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 577.

Privacy

In traditional dualism, one assumes that whatever is mental, such as experiences, sense-data, representations or ideas, is private. This can be meant in two senses. In the first sense, my mental phenomena are inalienably owned by me. Only I have them. In the second sense, only I have access to my mental phenomena. They are incommunicable. Only I am in a position to know or to feel that I am in pain. This idea leads to scepticism about other minds, for one can never know whether another person is in pain or not. It also leads to solipsism, for if all experiences must be interpreted through my private experience, the world can only be my world. The idea of privacy is attacked in detail by Wittgenstein.

"In what sense are my sensations private? — Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. — In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense." — Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1. 246.

Private good, see common good

Private language

A term introduced by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy. A private language is a language the words of which refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations, and cannot be understood by another person. Modern philosophy gener-

问题。两个被指控共同参与了某种罪行的囚犯被检察官分隔开来提审。两人都知道如下的选择: (1) 如果他们两人都不坦白, 两人都将判一年的监禁, (2) 如果两人都坦白, 每人都将判两年的监禁, (3) 如果一人坦白, 另一个不坦白, 坦白的那人将被释放, 而另一人则将判三年的监禁。谁都不知道对方的选择。对于每人而言, 合理的选择是什么?

如果每个囚犯要求得到他自己最好的利益, 对他而言合理的选择应是坦白, 但这样两人每一个都不能得到最好的结果, 而是最坏的总的结果 (四年的监禁)。这种情况表明, 寻求私利并不意味着一个人能得到最好的结果, 也不意味着由此可有效地促进公共的善。相反, 只有双方合作才可获得最好的结果。囚犯困境在现代社会、政治和道德哲学中得到广泛讨论, 因而它对自我利益的理论发出了根本的挑战。许多政治局势、诸如超级大国间的军备竞赛, 可以看做是囚犯困境的模型。

"一般化了的囚犯困境的危险可以被正当与善之间的对比所消除。" —— 罗尔斯: 《正义论》, 1971年, 第577页。

私人性

在传统二元论中, 人们认为, 任何心的东西, 诸如经验、感觉材料、表象或观念, 都是私人的。这可能有两种含义。第一种含义是说, 我的心的现象完完全全属于我自己。只有我拥有它们。第二种含义是说, 只有我得知我的心的现象。它们是不可交流的。只有我才处在知道或感觉到我痛的位置上。这种看法导致了关于他心的怀疑论, 因为一个人决不知道另一个人是否疼痛。它也导致了唯我论, 因为如果所有的经验都必须通过我的私有经验来解释, 那么世界就只能是我的世界。私人性的看法受到了维特根斯坦的详尽批评。

"在哪种含义上我的感觉是私人的? —— 唔, 只有我才能知道我是否真的疼痛。另外的人只能推测它。—— 在一种意义上这是错的, 在另一种意义上这是胡说。" —— 维特根斯坦: 《哲学研究》, 第一部分, 第246节。

私人的善

见“共同善”条。

私人语言

维特根斯坦在其后期哲学中提出的术语。私人语言是这样的语言, 其语词指称说者直接的私人感觉, 但不能被其他人所理解。近代哲学大致始于这种主张: 我们的知识基于我们自己

ally starts by claiming that our knowledge is based on our own immediate experience and this experience can be expressed by language, at least to ourselves. Accordingly a private language is possible, and this seems to be supported by the fact that someone may record the occurrence of a particular kind of sensation in his diary and propose to call it by some name. Wittgenstein, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, sections 243-315, argues against the possibility of a private language, for any use of language presupposes a community in which there is agreement in the rules of applying words and signs. If a language is private there is no way in distinguishing between thinking that one is obeying a rule and actually obeying it. So a private language is not a language, and the notion itself is not coherent. The whole empirical approach is misguided because it is based on a misunderstanding of both the nature of experience and the nature of language. The so-called "private language argument" of Wittgenstein is complicated and is subject to various interpretations. It has stimulated much discussion in contemporary philosophy.

"And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a 'private language'." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I. 269.

Private morality, see public morality

Private ostensive definition

In a private ostensive definition, I concentrate my attention on a particular sensation which can be named only by myself and not in terms of a public language. I associate the sensation with a sign, for example the sign "S". Because the meaning of the sign is private, I alone can know it, and another person cannot understand it. For this to be the case, a private ostensive definition requires that there be a private object which only I can recognize. This view is rejected along with the possibility of a private language by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* I. 243-311. If a private object exists as the object of a private ostensive definition, there must be private thought, expressible only in terms of a private language. However, a private language is impossible. Any means of communication must involve criteria of meaning available to others. It is true that sensations have an aspect of subjectivity, but their subjectivity is not of the radical sort which would support a private language and private ostensive definitions.

"You keep on steering towards the idea of the private ostensive definition." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I. 380.

的直接经验,这种经验可以用语言来表达,至少可以对我们自己表达。因此,私人语言是可能的,这一点似乎得到下列事实的支持:某人可以在其日记中记下某种特定感觉的出现,并用某个名称来称呼它。维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》的第243节至315节作出论证,否定私人语言的可能性,因为对语言的使用预设了一个共同体,人们在其中对于运用语词和符号的规则达成了一致意见。如果语言是私人的,就没有办法区分认为一个人在遵守规则和事实上在遵守规则。因此,私人语言不是语言,这个概念本身是不一致的。整个经验主义方法是误导人的,因为它基于对经验本性和语言本性的误解。所谓的维特根斯坦的“私人语言论证”很复杂,受到各种各样的解释。在当代哲学中,它引起了大量的讨论。

“可以将没有其他人懂但我‘好像懂’的声音称为‘私人语言’。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第269节。

私人道德

见“公共道德”条。

私人实指定义

在私人实指定义中,我将注意力集中于某一特定感觉,此感觉只能由我自己命名,而不能用公共语言命名。我将此感觉与一符号,例如符号“S”联系起来。因为此符号的意义是私人的,只有我能知道,其他人不能知道。因为情况就是这样,私人实指定义就要求,有一个只有我才能认识到的私人对象。维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》第一部分第243节至311节否定了私人语言的可能性,从而驳斥了这种看法。如果私人对象作为私人实指定义的对象存在,就必定有私人思想,它只能以私人语言来表达。但是,不可能有私人语言。任何交流方式必定涉及到其他人也可掌握的意义的标准。诚然,感觉有主观性这一方面,但其主观性不属于支持私人语言和私人实指定义的极端的一类。

“你总是执迷于私人实指定义这个想法。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第380节。

Private particular

Strawson's term covering sensations, mental events or sense-data, in contrast to public or objective particulars. To identify private particulars in our common language we need to identify another class of particulars, that is persons who have them. For instance, to identify a private impression of red one must assign the impression to the person who has it. Because of the dependence of their identification upon the identification of persons, Strawson denies that private particulars can be basic particulars, in contrast to the empiricist tradition of constructing persons and external objects from allegedly basic mental entities.

"Identifying reference to 'private particulars' depend on identifying reference to particulars of another type altogether, namely persons."—Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 41.

Private / public dichotomy, see public / private dichotomy

Private world, another expression for perspective

Privation

[Greek: *steresis*, from *steresthai*, to lack or to be deprived of] Normally, something suffers privation when it lacks an attribute which, according to its nature, it should possess. According to Aristotle's analysis, privation, substratum and form are the three basic elements in the process of change. Privation at the beginning of change is the absence of a character which the change will provide at its completion and which the substratum is capable of receiving. For example, if a man changes from being unmusical to being musical, the man is the substratum, unmusical is the privation and musical is the form the man will gain when the change is finished.

"For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being—this not surviving as a constituent of the result."—Aristotle, *Physics*, 193b16-17.

Privileged access

The special position which apparently gives one awareness of what is presently going on in one's own mind, such

as one's thoughts, beliefs, intentions and emotions. Privileged access is contrasted with the lack of special access in one's knowledge of the external world and other minds. For while one's knowledge of the world and other minds is mediated through certain causal factors and is subject to being checked by experience, one's awareness of one's mind is claimed to be immediate, infallible and incorrigible. On this view, either these states are detectable by oneself alone or one is the final authority concerning their existence and their

私人殊相

斯特劳森的术语,指感觉、心的事件或感觉材料,与公共殊相或客观殊相相对。要在我们的共同语言中辨认私人殊相,我们需要辨认另一类殊相,即拥有私人殊相的人。比如,要辨认一私人的红的印象,就需要把这一印象指定给有这一印象的人。由于它们的认同依赖于对人的认同,斯特劳森否认它们是基本殊相。这一立场与经验主义认为从基本的心理事物中构建人和外在对象的传统相对立。

“对‘私人殊相’的辨认性指称完全依赖于对另一类殊相,即人的辨认性指称。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第41页。

私人和公共的两分法

见“公共和私人的两分法”条。

私人世界

“视域”的另一说法。

缺失

[源自希腊文 *steresis*, 源自 *steresthai* (欠缺或被剥夺)] 一般而言,当某物欠缺一种依照其本性它应该具有的属性时,它就处于缺失状态。根据亚里士多德的分析,缺失、基质和形式是变化过程的三种基本因素。处于变化开端的缺失乃是变化在终了时会提供并且基质能接受的特征遗缺。例如,假定一个人从无教养变成有教养:“人”是基质,“无教养”是缺失,而“教养”则是人在变化终了时获得的形式。

“一物是从缺失变来的,缺失自身的本性是非存在——它不会作为变化结果的一种成分而保留。”——亚里士多德:《物理学》,193b16—17。

优先获知

使得一个人能够明显意识到当前在自己的心中所发生的一切,亦即一个人的思想、信念、意向和

情绪等的特殊地位。优先获知与一个人关于外部世界和他心的知识中缺乏特殊路径的情况相对。因为一个人关于世界和他心的知识是由某些因果因素所中介,并由经验来检验,而一个人对自己的心的意识则据说是直接的、完全无误的和不可纠正的。根据这一观点,或者这些状态只能为一个人自己所觉察,或者一个人是关于这些状态的存在和特性的最终权威。无论哪种情况,关于这些心的状态的报告的准确性都是由

character. On either version, the accuracy of the reports of these mental states is verified by oneself. Since Descartes, many philosophers have believed that this special position exists. One's mental states are private and the first-person account has authority. But Ryle, W. Sellars, Wittgenstein and others denied that one has special access to one's own mind which is different from one's access to other minds, in part because the meaning of expressions used from a first-person perspective needs the support of a third-person use in a single language. It is still difficult to understand how to avoid a collapse of mental terms into first-person solipsism or third-person behaviourism.

"I have also tried to show that from the fact that I do have privileged access to my present thoughts and feelings, in the sense that my testimony concerning them cannot be overridden, it does not follow that they are exclusively mine." —Ayer, *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays*, 1963, p. 81.

Pro-attitude

A term borrowed by Davidson from ethical theory for his causal theory of action. A pro-attitude is a mental attitude of an agent directed towards actions of a certain kind. Such attitudes include wants, desires, urges, moral views, aesthetic principles and economic prejudices. Such a set of mental attitudes, together with a belief of the agent that acting in a certain way promotes what the agent wants or values, form the primary reason for an agent to act in the certain way.

"Reference to other attitudes besides wanting, or thinking he ought, may help specify the agent's reasons, but it seems that some positive, or pro-attitude must be involved." —Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 83.

Probabilism

Initially, a doctrine developed by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century to determine what one should do when different authorities are found to disagree. The theory claims that if one is willing to perform an action, and that action has some probability in its favour, one has reason to perform that action without being condemned. Here, probable means supported by authority rather than supported by evidence. One may follow a course of action if it is authorised by some authority of the Church. It does not matter how much weight the authority has. The theory has difficulty in making sense of responsibility and was criticised by the *Port-Royal Logic*. The appearance of probabilism suggests a sense of loss of the certainty that characterised the Renaissance.

In another sense, probabilism is any position which requires one to be content with probability because certainty does not obtain or because it is difficult to know whether cer-

自己来证实的。自笛卡尔以来,很多哲学家都认为存在这个特殊地位。一个人的心的状态是私人的,且第一人称描述是具有权威的。但赖尔、W. 塞拉斯、维特根斯坦等人否认一个人对于自己的心的状态具有不同于对他心的优先获知权。部分理由是,从第一人称视角出发而使用的表述的意义需要在同一语言中第三人称用法的支持。人们仍难以理解如何使心的语汇免于陷入第一人称的唯我论或第三人称的行为主义。

“我对我当前的思想和感觉的证明不可能被否定,在这个意义上,我对它们具有优先获知。我还试图由这一事实表明,这并不意味着它们仅仅是我的。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念及其他论文》,1963年,第81页。

赞成态度

戴维森为其“行动的因果理论”从伦理学理论借用的术语。一个赞成态度是一个主体指向某种行动的心的态度。这样的态度包括愿望、欲求、要求、道德观点、美学原则、经济偏见等等。这样一系列心的态度与主体关于以某种方式行事可以导致他所想要或看重的东西的信念,构成主体以一定方式行事的“第一理由”。

“借助于在想要或想他应该做什么之外的其他态度可能会帮助我们确定主体的理由,但似乎必须涉及某些肯定的或赞成态度。”——戴维森:《关于行动与事件的论文集》,1980年,第83页。

或然论

从历史上讲,它是一种由16世纪的耶稣会发展起来的学说,用以处理当发现不同的权威性典籍不一致时人们应如何做的问题。这种学说主张,如果人们想从事某种行动,且这行动具有某种有利于它的或然性,则人们就有理由采取这一行动而不被指责。这里“或然的”一词意味着为权威典籍所支持而不是为证据所支持。人们可以从事一种行动过程,如果它为教会的权威典籍所许可,至于这种权威有多大分量则是无足轻重的。这一理论的困难在于如何理解责任,并为波尔—罗亚尔逻辑所批评。或然论的出现,显示着作为文艺复兴特征的确定性在某种意义上的丧失。

在另一种意义上,或然论用于指任何要求人们满足于或然性的立场,因为不能获得确定性,或因为很难知道是否能获得确定性。

tainty could obtain.

Probabilism is also used for the claim that all things being equal the simplest theory is the most probable. When two theories seem to be equally supported by the evidence, the simpler one is in general more likely to be true.

"The first contact of theories of probability with modern ethics appears in the Jesuit doctrine of probabilism. According to this doctrine, one is justified in doing an action for which there is any probability, however small, of its results being the best possible." — Keynes, *A Treatise of Probability*, 1929, p. 308.

Probability

The different degrees of truth which a rational belief has when such a belief is more or less inconclusive. Probability can apply the occurrence of events, the existence of states or the truth of propositions.

There are various conceptions of probability corresponding to different theories of probability. Frequency theory, associated with J. Venn and R. von Mises, identifies probability with the frequency of occurrence of events of a given kind. Such an understanding of probability is addressed mainly to physical probability, that is probability as an objective factor in the world and as the subject matter of statistics. Physical probability is indefinite in that it attaches to states of affairs or attributes rather than to propositions. Propensity theory argues that physical probability can pertain to specific individuals as propensities. Subjectivism or personalism, associated with de Finetti and Ramsey, takes probability as the degree of belief in an event. On this understanding probability is epistemic and is concerned with knowledge and opinion rather than with the physical structure of the world. This kind of probability is definite in the sense that it attaches to propositions rather than to attributes. Confirmation theory and range theory hold that probability is a connection between our judgement and the objective world. On this understanding probability has physical and epistemic aspects. All theories of probability attempt to establish that their notion of probability satisfies the formal requirement of the probability calculus.

"In metaphysics, in science, and in conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus, for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of probability is required." — Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability*, 1929, p. 2.

Probability, a priori theory of, another expression for probability, logical relation theory of

Probability, classical theory of

The earliest interpretation of probability, developed

或然性也用于指这样一种主张,即认为在所有情形都相同的情况下,最简单的理论是最有可能的。当两个理论似乎同等地为证据所支持时,一般说来更简单的那个更有可能为真。

“或然性学说与近代伦理学的首次接触出现于耶稣会的或然论学说中。按照这一学说,当一个人的行动结果有无论多小的或然性可能为最好时,他就得到了辩护。”——凯恩斯:《论概率》,1929年,第308页。

概率〔也译“或然性”〕

“概率”是指当一个合理信念还多少是非结论性的时候它所具有的不同程度的真。概率可应用于事件的发生、状态的存在或命题的真值。

对应于不同的概率理论,有着不同的概率的概念。与J. 文恩和R. 冯·密斯相联系的频率理论,把概率等同于某个特定事件发生的频率。对概率的这种理解主要是针对物理概率,即作为世界中的一种客观因素,并作为统计学的主题的概率。物理概率是无限的,即它是附属于事态或属性而不是命题的。倾向性理论争辩说物理概率可以作为倾向性附属于特殊的个体。与德·费莱蒂和拉姆塞相联系的主观主义或人格主义,则把概率看做是对一个事件的置信度。按这种理解,概率是认知的,即与知识和意见而不是世界的物理结构相关。这种概率就其附属于命题而不是属性而言是有限的。确证理论和变程理论认为概率是我们的判断与客观世界之间的连接,按这种理解,概率具有物理的方面和认知的方面。所有的概率理论都致力于使它们的概率观念满足概率演算的形式要求。

“在形而上学、科学和行为中,我们惯于将合理信念建于其上的大多数争论,都被承认为程度不同地是非结论性的。因此,对于这些知识分支的哲学论述而言,概率的研究是需要的。”——凯恩斯:《论概率》,1929年,第2页。

先验概率理论

“逻辑关系概率理论”的另一种表述。

古典概率理论

最早的概率解释,由伯努利、贝叶斯和拉普

during the eighteenth century by Bernoulli, Bayes and Laplace. Laplace defined probability as the ratio of the number of favourable cases to the total number of relevant and equally likely cases. This came to be known as the classical definition of probability. This theory takes probability as a ratio among equipossible alternatives and has received comprehensive mathematical elaboration. According to the principle of indifference, it assumes that prior to having any evidence the same degree of probability (equipossibility) should be assigned to each alternative. This account involves a vicious circle because it defines probability in terms of equipossible alternatives, but equipossibility presupposes an understanding of probability. Various attempts have arisen to amend the principle of indifference to avoid this consequence.

"The classical interpretation [of probability] is one of the oldest and best known; it defines probability as the ratio of favourable to equally possible cases." —Salmon, *The Foundations of Scientific Inference*, 1966, p. 65.

Probability, logical relation theory of

Also called the logical theory of probability or the *a priori* theory of probability, an interpretation of probability which proposes that probability is related to propositions rather than to the occurrence of events. Unlike the relative frequency theory, it holds that probability does not concern frequency but is a logical relation between propositions that have been formulated in accordance with evidence and other propositions, hypotheses, whose truth or falsity has not yet been determined by evidence. The probability of a proposition is thus relative to the given evidence and varies with it. It is a measure of the logical support for a proposition on the basis of evidence. The theory was developed by J. M. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, Harold Jeffreys and Carnap, among others. While Keynes and Jeffreys rejected the frequency interpretation of probability, Carnap believed that logical probability differs in nature from empirical or statistical probability, which is the subject-matter of frequency theory. Logical relation theory is a more sophisticated version of the classical theory of probability. It defines probability as the degree of certainty that our beliefs about future events can have as rationally be justified by the available evidence. A problem for the theory is that it cannot verify the ways of constructing the required logical relation. Also, as Carnap saw, not all probability claims can be dealt with by the theory.

"The whole logical relation theory is vitiated, I believe, because it makes out probability to attach to the relations between evidence and conclusions rather than to propositions, or propositional functions, by themselves." —Lucas, *The Concept of Probability*, 1970, p. 50.

Probability, propensity theory of

An interpretation of probability, associated with Pop-

per at the 18th century. Laplace defined "probability" as the ratio of the number of favourable cases to the total number of relevant and equally likely cases. This came to be known as the classical definition of probability. This theory takes probability as a ratio among equipossible alternatives and has received comprehensive mathematical elaboration. According to the principle of indifference, it assumes that prior to having any evidence the same degree of probability (equipossibility) should be assigned to each alternative. This account involves a vicious circle because it defines probability in terms of equipossible alternatives, but equipossibility presupposes an understanding of probability. Various attempts have arisen to amend the principle of indifference to avoid this consequence.

"[Probability's] classical definition is the earliest and most famous definition; it defines probability as the ratio of favourable to equally possible cases." —Salmon, *The Foundations of Scientific Inference*, 1966, p. 65.

Logical relation probability theory

Also called "logical probability theory" or "prior probability theory", a theory of probability, which proposes that probability is related to propositions rather than to the occurrence of events. Unlike the relative frequency theory, it holds that probability does not concern frequency but is a logical relation between propositions that have been formulated in accordance with evidence and other propositions, hypotheses, whose truth or falsity has not yet been determined by evidence. The probability of a proposition is thus relative to the given evidence and varies with it. It is a measure of the logical support for a proposition on the basis of evidence. The theory was developed by J. M. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, Harold Jeffreys and Carnap, among others. While Keynes and Jeffreys rejected the frequency interpretation of probability, Carnap believed that logical probability differs in nature from empirical or statistical probability, which is the subject-matter of frequency theory. Logical relation theory is a more sophisticated version of the classical theory of probability. It defines probability as the degree of certainty that our beliefs about future events can have as rationally be justified by the available evidence. A problem for the theory is that it cannot verify the ways of constructing the required logical relation. Also, as Carnap saw, not all probability claims can be dealt with by the theory.

"I think the whole logical relation theory is wrong, because it takes probability to be a relation between evidence and conclusions, rather than a relation between propositions or propositional functions, by themselves." —Lucas, *The Concept of Probability*, 1970, p. 50.

Propensity probability theory

An interpretation of probability, associated with Pop-

per, that developed out of the relative frequency theory of probability. Both theories agree that probability is an objective feature of reality. While the relative frequency theory considers probability to be an attribute of an infinite sequence of events which we can represent with a finite sample, the propensity theory considers probability primarily to be a primitive undefined attribute of single events although it can also account for the probability of sequences. Probability should be understood as the propensity or disposition of a situation to produce a given result. The main difficulty with this theory lies in the primitiveness of the notion of propensity, which seems to introduce a mysterious theoretical entity. Also, it is unclear whether the propensity of a single case is necessary to understand probability over a sequence.

"All versions of the propensity theory have two important features that no relative frequency account can have. They apply just as well to indefinite populations as to finite ones. And they all allow probabilities to be assigned to superficial individual events." — L. J. Cohen, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability*, 1989, p. 55.

Probability, relative frequency theory of

An interpretation of probability which holds that probability is the relative or statistical frequency of occurrence within a reference class. It applies primarily to infinite sequences, of which we must take finite samples. It is an objective theory for, as observed frequency, probability is an attribute of the real world. A probability statement is taken as an assertion about the world. Probability concerns a group or a series. That one event is more likely to happen than another means that, for an infinite sequence or a large finite sample, events of the first kind will occur more frequently than events of the other kind. The theory can be traced to Aristotle who claimed that the probable is that which happens for the most part. Its modern expositors include John Venn, Hans Reichenbach and Richard von Mises. This theory fits well with common sense and has a great appeal to the empiricists, but its understanding of probability in terms of hypothetical infinite sequences is rejected by some as being unnecessarily abstract. The theory invites other objections, including those related to the possibility of ascertaining the values of the limit to which the relative frequency will tend over an infinite sequence. There are also problems in applying a frequency to the probability of a single event. A given event may be seen as belonging to different reference classes yielding different probabilities.

"Relative frequency theory [of probability] ... defines probability as the (limiting) relative frequency of some characteristic in some (infinite) sequence." — Logue, *Projective Probability*, 1995, p. 2.

Probability, subjective theory of

相联系,它由“相对频率概率理论”中发展出来。这两种理论都赞同概率是实在的一种客观特征。其中相对频率理论把概率看做我们可用有限样本表征的无限事件系列的一个属性,倾向性理论则认为概率首先是单个事件的初始未定属性,尽管它也能说明系列概率。概率应被理解为一种情形产生给定结果的倾向或趋向。这个理论的主要困难在于倾向性概念的原始性,它看来引入了一种神秘的理论实体。同时,单个事件的倾向是否为理解系列的概率所必需也是不清楚的。

“所有形式的倾向性理论都具有相对频率理论无法具有的两个重要特征。它们都既可以应用于无限的样本也可以用于有限样本。它们都允许把概率归属于表面上单个的事件。”——柯亨:《归纳哲学和概率导论》,1989年,第55页。

相对频率概率理论

一种关于概率的解释,主张概率是一个参照类中事件的相对频率或统计频率。它首先应用于我们必须从中选取有限样本的无穷系列。它是一种客观的理论,因为概率作为观察到的频率,是实在世界的一种属性。概率陈述被认为是有关世界的断言。概率关涉一组或一系列事件。一个事件比其他事件更有可能发生,意味着在一无穷系列或一很大的有限样本中前一种会比其他种更为频繁地发生。这一理论可以追溯到亚里士多德,他提出或然的就是大多数地方都发生的。其近代阐释者包括J. 文恩、H. 赖兴巴赫和R. 冯·密斯。这一理论与常识相当一致,对经验主义者有极大的吸引力。但是它依据假设的无穷系列来理解概率,被有些人斥为不必要的抽象。这一理论也导致了其他许多反对,包括那些相关于对一无穷系列确定相对频率所趋于的极限值的可能性的反对意见。这一理论在应用频率于单一事件的概率上也存在问题。一个给定的事件可被看做属于不同参照类,导致不同的或然性。

“[概率]的相对频率理论……定义概率为在某个无穷序列中某些特性的(极限)相对频率。”——洛格:《投射概率》,1995年,第2页。

主观主义概率理论

Also called personalism, an interpretation of probability which claims that the probability of a proposition is the measure of the subject's degree of reasonable belief or confidence in it. Reasonable belief is constrained by coherence rather than by empirical evidence. Since the intensity of confidence varies from one person to another, it follows that probability varies between subjects. Probability is the degree of belief that a given person has in a given statement on the basis of given evidence. If I believe with perfect certainty that it will rain tomorrow, then my subjective probability is 1. This theory differs from the logical relation theory of probability in that it does not take the relation between a statement and a body of evidence as a purely logical relation. This position has been defended by Ramsey, B. de Finetti and L. J. Savage. Its major difficulty is to justify the notion of reasonable belief, which seems to require a conception of probability. It also has difficulty in explicating the intersubjective assessment of probabilities. Hence a subjective theory of probability cannot fully account for the concept of probability.

"The subjective theory ... defines probability as the degree of belief of a given person in a given proposition at a specific time." —Weatherford, *Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory*, 1982, p. 6.

Probability calculus

Of the conclusions inferred from probable inferences, some are more reliable than others. Logicians and probabilists have developed a branch of mathematics to determine degrees of probability, and this is called the probability calculus. This is a deductive meta-logical system which is neutral about the material meanings of probability and studies only the mathematical laws involving probability or the logical structure of probability. There are many versions of this calculus. The basic axioms these different systems share include: (1) If P and Q are disjoint, their probability is the sum of the probability of each disjunct minus the probability of their conjunction: $\text{Prob}(P \vee Q) = \text{Prob}(P) + \text{Prob}(Q) - \text{Prob}(P \wedge Q)$; (2) if P is a tautology, then $\text{Prob}(P) = 1$; (3) $0 \leq \text{Prob}(P) \leq 1$.

"We have then a calculus of probability, which, when given its customary interpretation in terms of scientific statements, allows us to calculate relative probabilities of alternative hypotheses in the light of changing evidence." —Caws, *The Philosophy of Science*, 1965, p. 204.

Problem of evil, see evil

Problem of other minds, see other minds

Problem of the self, see personal identity

也称为“人格主义”，是对概率的一种解释，主张命题的概率是主体合理的置信度或对它的信心的量度。合理的信念取决于一致性而不是经验证据。由于信心的强度随不同的人而变化，因此概率在主体之间也有变化。概率是一特定个人对于一基于特定证据的特定陈述所具有的置信度。如果我以完全的确定性相信明天将会下雨，则我的主观概率为1。这一理论不同于“逻辑关系概率理论”之处，在于它不把陈述与证据之间的关系看做是纯逻辑的。这种立场为拉姆塞、B. 德·费莱蒂和L. J. 沙伐奇等所坚持。其主要困难在于对“合理的信念”这个概念的辩护，这被认为本身就需要一种概率的概念。其他的困难还有阐释主体间对概率的评估等。因此一种主观主义概率理论不能完全说明概率的概念。

“主观主义理论……定义概率为一特定个人在一特定时刻对一特定命题的置信度。”——威瑟福特：《概率论的哲学基础》，1982年，第6页。

概率演算

在由或然性推理得出的结论中，有些比其他结论更可靠。逻辑学家和概率论学者发展起一个数学分支以确定或然性程度，这就称作“概率演算”。概率演算是一个演绎的元逻辑系统，对于概率的实质性含义是中性的，只研究涉及概率或概率的逻辑结构的数学规律。关于这种演算有着许多不同的形式，这些不同的系统所共有的基本公理包括：(1) 如果P和Q是不相交的，则它们的概率是每一个不相交项的概率之和减去它们的合取的概率： $\text{Pr}(P \vee Q) = \text{Pr}(P) + \text{Pr}(Q) - \text{Pr}(P \wedge Q)$ ；(2) 如果P为重言式，则 $\text{Pr}(P) = 1$ ；(3) $0 \leq \text{Pr}(P) \leq 1$ 。

“这样我们就得到了概率演算，在给出它的用科学陈述表达的惯常解释后，它允许我们依据变化着的证据去计算可供选择的假说的相关概率。”——考斯：《科学哲学》，1965年，第204页。

恶的问题

见“恶”条。

他心问题

见“他心”条。

自我问题

见“人格的同一性”条。

Problem of the speckled hen, an alternative expression for the dilemma of attention

Process theology

An approach to God within the conceptual framework of Whitehead's process philosophy, represented by Whitehead and the American philosopher and Theologian Charles Hartshorne. While in traditional theology, God is pure actuality and stands above the world of change, process theology explains God and his relation to the world in terms of change. It emphasises the temporality of God and believes that to be unchanging is to be abstract and dead. For Whitehead, God's being has two aspects, a primordial nature which is his nature in himself and a consequential nature which is constituted by his response to the temporal world and is characterised by process or becoming. The former aspect is formal, conceptual and unconscious, while the latter aspect is material, determined, and conscious. Hartshorne also adopts a similar distinction between the necessary existence of God and his contingent actuality. He claims that God is a temporal society of experiential events.

"The term 'process theology' is applied to the theological speculations produced by a group of twentieth century thinkers. . . . They believe that the idea of 'process' or 'becoming' must be taken as the chief category for interpreting the nature of both the world and God." — Owen, *Concepts of Deity*, 1971, p. 75.

Process-product ambiguity

An expression is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning and it is uncertain which meaning should be used in a given context. Some expressions can be used both to stand for a process and to stand for the product resulting from that process. The word "see" might mean either "I am seeing" or "I have seen". The failure to distinguish between a process and a product in the same context can lead to confusion.

"As a source of confusion, the process-product ambiguity is over-rated. Most processes are easily distinguished from their corresponding product." — Dretske, *Explaining Behaviour*, 1988, p. 73.

Productive force

[German: *Produktivkräfte*, also translated as force of production or productive power] The key category in historical materialism, covering the sum of the elements or factors in the process of producing material use-value, including both the subjective factor of human labour power and the objective factors of the means of production. The means of production are further divided into the object of labour (natural resources including both raw materials and non-raw materials) and the means of labour, such as instruments.

花斑母鸡问题

“注意两难”的另一表达。

过程神学

以怀特海“过程哲学”的概念框架为依据建构的一种对上帝的研究视角，代表人物是怀特海及美国哲学家和神学家哈特肖恩。传统神学认为，上帝是纯粹的现实性，高居于变化的世界之上，过程神学则依据变化来解释上帝及其与世界的关系。它强调上帝的时间性，相信不变是抽象的、僵死的。在怀特海看来，上帝的存在有两个方面，一是原初的本性，即自身本有的本性，二是后继的本性，是由他对变动世界的反应构成的，并具有过程或变化的特征。前一个方面是形式的、概念的、无意识的，后一个方面是物质的、确定的、有意识的。哈特肖恩也在上帝的必然存在性和偶然现实性之间采用了类似的区分。他断言，上帝是经验事件的世俗社会。

“‘过程神学’一词用指20世纪的一批思想家所产生的神学思考……他们相信，‘过程’或‘变化’的观念必须被当成阐释世界和上帝本性的首要范畴。”——欧文：《神的概念》，1971年，第75页。

过程与结果的模糊性

如果一个表达式具有不止一个意义，而且在把它用于某种语境时意义是不确定的，那么，这个表达式就是模糊的。某些表达式既可以用于指一个过程，又可以指产生于这个过程的结果。例如，“看”这个词，既可以意味着“我正在看”，又可以意味着“我曾看见”。在相同的语境中没有区分过程和结果，就会导致混乱。

“作为混乱的来源，过程与结果的模糊性被估计过高了。许多过程是很容易与它们相应的结果区分开来的。”——德雷斯克：《解释行为》，1988年，第73页。

生产力

[德语词: *Produktivkräfte*, 也译为“生产能力”] 历史唯物主义的主要范畴，涵盖生产物质使用价值过程的诸因素或环节，包括人类劳动能力的主观因素和生产资料的客观因素的总和。生产资料被进一步划分为劳动对象(包括天然材料和非天然材料的自然资源)和劳动工具，如仪器等。历史唯物主义认为，生产力是基本的解释术语。它们决定生产关系的性质，生产关系作为经济结构，给法律与政治的和意识形态的

For historical materialism, the forces of production are fundamental in explanatory terms. They determine the character of the relations of production, that is the economic structure, and inform the legal/political and ideological superstructure with content. Productive forces set humans above animals and actualise human capacity. According to Marx, the forces of production always advance throughout history. When they develop to a certain stage, the existing relations of production will no longer correspond to them and will constrain further development. At such times, Marx claimed, social revolutions will take place because the forces of production will break through the fetters of existing relations of production and establish new relations of production which are suitable for further progress. Productive forces are the ultimate determinant of human history.

All of the main claims for the role of productive forces in Marx's explanatory structure have been challenged and defended within Marxism and by other theorists.

"A social formation never comes to an end before all the forces of production which it can accommodate are developed and new, higher relations of production never come into place before the material conditions of their existence have gestated in the womb of the old society."—Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*.

Prohairesis. Greek term for decision

Projectibility

A term introduced by Goodman in his discussion of the problem of confirmation. A projection is an inference from the known to the unknown on the grounds of induction from past experience. Projectibility is the degree of entrenchment of this inference. If all observed emeralds are green, we may reasonably infer that future emeralds are green, but not that they are grue (green before some future time *T* and blue thereafter) for "green" is a projectible predicate and is well entrenched, having a high frequency of projection, while "grue" is not well entrenched. This is true even though the claims that all emeralds are grue and that all emeralds are green have equal inductive support. Grounding projectibility involves distinguishing between valid projections and invalid projections. Inductive reasoning can apply only to projectible properties or hypotheses rather than to all properties or hypotheses. Hence, to decide which property is projectible becomes an important issue in epistemology. According to Goodman, a hypothesis is projectible if all conflicting hypotheses are overridden. By introducing the notion of projectibility, and by defining it in terms of the historical record of entrenchment through actual projections, Goodman rejects the traditional discussion of confirmation which allows green and grue to be equally confirmed and aims to construct a

上层建筑赋予内容。生产力使人类超出动物,使人类能力现实化。按马克思的观点,生产力永远推动着整个历史。当生产力发展到某个阶段,现存的生产关系不再适应它们并限制它们的进一步发展。在这个时候,马克思认为,社会革命就会发生,因为生产力将冲破现存生产关系的桎梏,建立起适合进一步发展的新的生产关系。生产力是人类历史最终的决定力量。

一切关于生产力在马克思解释框架中所起作用的主要观点,都始终受到了马克思主义内部的以及其他的理论家们的挑战。

“无论哪一种社会形态,在它们所能容纳的全部生产力发挥出来以前,是决不会灭亡的;而新的更高的生产关系,在它存在的物质条件在旧社会的胎胞里成熟以前,是决不会出现的。”——马克思:《(政治经济学批判)序言》。

决定

“决定 (decision)” 的希腊词。

可投射性

由古德曼在讨论确证问题中所引入的术语。投射是依据对已往经验的归纳而从已知到未知的推理。可投射性是这种推理的牢靠程度。如果所有观察到的绿宝石都是绿的,我们就有理由推理说未来的绿宝石是绿的,而不说它们是绿蓝的(在某个未来时间 *T* 之前为绿而自那之后为蓝),因为“绿”是一个可投射的性质,被更牢靠地确立,即具有更高的投射频率,而“绿蓝”则并不牢靠。即使所有的绿宝石都是绿蓝的与所有绿宝石都是绿的这二者有同样的归纳支持,情况也是如此。确立可投射性的基础,涉及区分有效投射和无效投射。归纳推理仅适用于可投射的性质或假说而不是所有的性质或假说。因此,决定哪个性质是可投射的,就成为认识论中的重要议题。在古德曼看来,一个假说是可投射的,当所有与之相冲突的假说都被否定时,通过引入可投射性概念,并且通过由历史的实际投射的牢靠性记录来确定它,古德曼反对传统对确证的探讨,这一传统允许绿与绿蓝被同等确证的探讨,而他则致力于构造一种纯句法学的确证定义。

“如果我们从证据和假说着手,从既往的投射着手,我们的任务就成为基于实际的投射来

purely syntactical definition of confirmation.

"If we start with past projections as well as evidence and hypotheses, our task becomes that of defining valid projection—or projectibility—on the basis of actual projections."

Goodman, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, 1973, p. 86.

Proof theory

A theory dealing with axiomatic systems founded by Hilbert in the 1920s as a tool for carrying out his programme in the foundations of mathematics. In rejecting the claim that the foundations of mathematical analysis were built on sand, Hilbert introduces proof theory to show the consistency of both analysis and set theory, and to establish the decidability of each mathematical question. Although Hilbert's program was undermined by Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of elementary mathematics by using natural deduction and sequent calculi. Gentzen extended proof theory into a general theory that examines how proofs in formal logical systems, that is systems determined by their axioms and rules of inference, can be investigated by mathematical techniques. Proof theory is now a branch of mathematical logic.

"Hilbert introduced his proof theory. This theory treated the axiom systems of mathematics as pure syntax, distinguishing them from what he called mathematics, where meaning was permitted." — Moore, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences*, vol. xi, 1988, p. 116.

Propensity

Generally conceived as the inner and probabilistic disposition or state in virtue of which a thing or a person will act in a certain way under normal circumstances, unless it is blocked by some external force. That I have a propensity to reduce my fat means that I do so if no counter measures are taken. That I have the propensity to have a certain belief means that I will maintain this belief unless it is strongly refuted by some concluding evidence. The term propensity is closely related to the acquisition of belief and to the theory of probability. Popper developed a propensity interpretation of probability according to which the probability of a single case is its propensity.

"Let us say that someone has a propensity to be J if he is in such a state that he will be J unless some special blocking factors intervene." — Smith and Jones, *The Philosophy of Mind*, 1986, p. 112.

Proper name

A simple symbol for a particular, which does not have further symbols as its parts, in contrasted to a description, which is a complex symbol. Whether a proper name has sense in itself has been a puzzling question since Plato's *Theaetetus*. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* claims that a prop-

确定有效投射（或可投射性）。"——古德曼：*《事实、虚构与预测》*，1973年，第86页。

证明理论

由希尔伯特于20年代所建立的处理公理化系统的理论，作为在数学的基础上实施其纲领的工具。为了反对那种认为数学分析的基础是建立在沙滩上的观念，希尔伯特引入了证明理论以表明分析与集合论二者的一致性，并确立每个数学问题的可决定性。尽管希尔伯特的纲领为哥德尔不完全性定理所摧毁，吉哈德·根岑通过引入自然演绎和连续演算而证明了基础数学的一致性。根岑把证明理论扩展为一种一般理论，以考察在为系统的公理和推理规则所决定的形式逻辑系统中，如何可以用数学技巧来研究证明。证明理论现已成为数理逻辑的一个分支。

"希尔伯特引入了他的证明理论。这一理论把数学的公理系统作为纯粹的句法来处理，以区别于允许意义出现的他所谓的数学。"——摩尔，见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》，1988年，第11期，第116页。

倾向性

通常被认为是使得一个事物或一个人在通常情境下以某种方式行事的内部的或盖然的倾向或状态，除非为某种外部力量所阻碍。我具有减肥的倾向意味着如果不采取相反的措施我就会这样做。我具有持有某个信念的倾向意味着除非为某个结论性的证据所强烈反驳，我就会保持这一信念。“倾向性”一词与信念的获得和概率论有密切的关系。波普提出了关于概率的倾向性解释，他认为，一个单个事例的概率就是它的倾向性。

"让我们这样说，某人在这样一个状态中就具有一个成为J的倾向，除非受到某种阻碍因素的干预，他就会成为J。"——史密斯和琼斯：*《心的哲学》*，1986年，第112页。

专名

表示殊相的简单符号，它没有进一步的符号作为其组成部分，这与作为复杂符号的摹状词相反。专名本身是否具有涵义，这是一个自柏拉图的《泰阿泰德篇》以来一直困惑着人们的问题。维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中主张，专名

er name designates a particular directly and has that particular as its meaning. As a consequence, the proper name has no sense in itself. However, Frege points out that proper names can occur in informative identity statements, for example "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" and uses his distinction between sense and reference to account for this phenomenon. The claim that proper names have descriptive content also gains support from the fact that proper names can appear in existential statements, such as "The Morning Star exists". Russell, in a defence of Wittgenstein's view, distinguishes between ordinary proper names and logically proper names. An ordinary proper name has sense, but is in fact a disguised description. For example, "Socrates" is an abbreviation of something like "the philosopher who drank hemlock". On the other hand, logically proper names, for example names for the items in one's current experience, have their meaning in the objects they stand for. Kripke and Putnam criticise Frege's and Russell's accounts of proper names. Descriptions can be useful in fixing the reference of a proper name, but the meaning of the name is determined by the features (for example, of inner structure or origin) which make the item what it is. These features need not be immediately available to experience, but like water being H_2O , can be discovered.

"The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names is rather curious." -- Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 200.

Proper name theory

A theory about the meaning of the word "I", holding that the word "I" is a logically proper name, that is a word that directly designates an object with which the speaker is acquainted. I can know that I am aware of something or that I am having a certain experience only because I have perceived that there is a subject of experience that has this awareness or experience. "I" is a proper name for this particular subject. A difficulty for this position is that even if we accept that I perceive a self as a subject of experience, it is not clear how I would establish that this self is myself.

"According to proper name theory the person who knows an ego-centric fact is prehending, not only a certain particular as an experience of a certain kind, but also another particular." Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, 1933, vol. II, p. 174.

Property

A property is a feature or aspect by which a thing can be described or characterised. It is a characteristic that a thing is said to possess and is synonymous with "attribute". An Aristotelian or medieval *proprium*, a characteristic which is unique to the essence of a thing but which is not in its defini-

直接命名殊相,并以该殊相为其意义。其结果是专名本身无涵义。但是,弗雷格指出,专名可以出现在提供信息的同一陈述中,例如“晨星是暮星”,他还利用其对于涵义和指称的区别来说明这一现象。专名有描述内容的主张还从这一事实得到支持:专名可以出现在存在陈述中,例如“晨星存在”。罗素在捍卫维特根斯坦的观点时区分了普通专名和逻辑专名。普通专名有涵义,但事实上是乔装打扮的摹状词。例如,“苏格拉底”是像“喝了毒药的哲学家”这种东西的缩略表达。另一方面,逻辑专名,例如表示一个人当下经验中的东西的名称,以它们所代表的对象为其意义。克里普克和普特南批评了弗雷格和罗素对于专名的说明。摹状词在确定专名的指称中可能是有用的,但名称的意义出使一物成为此物的特征(例如,其内部结构或起源)来决定。这些特征勿需直接与经验有关,而是像可以发现水为 H_2O 一样。

“在理论上可以代表殊相的惟一的一种词是专名,而专名的全部问题是颇为奇怪的。”——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第200页。

专名理论

关于词汇“我”的意义的一个理论,认为词汇“我”是一个逻辑上的专名,即一个直接命名说话者所认识的对象词汇。我能够知道我正意识到某事或正具有某个经验,这只是因为我知觉到有一个经验的主体具有这个意识或经验。“我”是这个特定主体的一个专名。这一观点的困难在于,即便我们承认我知觉到一个作为经验的主体的自我,还是不清楚我怎么知道这个自我就是我自己。

“根据专名理论,知道一个自我中心事实的人不只是在领会作为某种经验的特定东西,而且还在领会另一个东西。”——布劳德:《麦克塔加特哲学考察》,1933年,第二卷,第174页。

特性

特性是一个事物可据此得以描绘或刻画的特征或方面。它是一物所拥有的特点,与“属性”意义相同。一个亚里士多德式的或中世纪的 *proprium*, 即一个为一物的本质所特有可又不在该物的定义中的特征,也是一特性。特性经常

tion, is also a property. Properties are often divided into essential and accidental properties, which are also called internal and external properties. An essential or internal property belongs to the essence of a thing, such that the thing cannot lose an essential property without losing its identity. On the other hand, the possession or non-possession of an accidental or external property by a thing does not affect its identity. Interest in essential properties has been revived by recent work in modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility.

"If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2. 0123.

Property dualism, see dualism

Property instance, another term for abstract particular

Proposition

The basic unit of logical analysis, characteristically stated by a declarative sentence and the bearer of the truth-value true or false. There is controversy over the relationships between propositions, statements and sentences. Many theorists identify propositions with statements. Both are distinguished from sentences, but some philosophers wish to eliminate propositions as abstract entities in favour of sentences. If both kinds of entity are accepted, all propositions are sentences or are expressed by sentences. Only declarative sentences generally express propositions, although sentences of interrogative, imperative and other forms have propositional content. A proposition can usually be represented by a "that" clause. Understanding the nature and structure of propositions is often seen as the central task of philosophical logic. Philosophers consider the functions of components of propositions, such as names, predicates and logical constants and consider how the components are unified into something having a truth value. They examine how the form, meaning and use of propositions are related and how different propositions can enter into logical relations. There has been much recent discussion of how linguistic or psychological states can have propositional contents.

"Let us, ... define a proposition as any complete sentence capable of expressing a statement." —Russell, *Collected Papers*, vol. VII p. 105.

Proposition / sentence

A sentence is a group of words (symbols, signs) ordered according to some grammatical rule in any actual or artificial language. Sentences of various grammatical forms are best suited to indicate, plead, request, order, interrogate and so on, although such sentences can also be used outside

划分为本质特性与偶然特性；它们也分别叫做内在的和外在的特性。本质或内在特性属于一物的本质，这使得一个事物如失去了这一特性也就失去了其身份。另一方面，一个事物拥有或不拥有一偶然或外在特性并不影响其身份。对本质特性的兴趣在最近的模态逻辑即关于必然性和可能性的逻辑中得到复兴。

“如果我必须知道一个对象，尽管我并不必知道其外在特性，但我必须知道它的所有内在特性。”——维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》，2.0123。

性质二元论

见“二元论”条。

特性个例

“抽象殊相”的另一表述。

命题

逻辑分析的基本单位，其特点由陈述句表示，是真值“真”“假”的承受者。对于命题、陈述和语句的关系存在着争论。许多理论家把命题与陈述合而为一。这两者都区别于句子，但某些哲学家希望把命题作为抽象的存在物而加以排除，更愿使用句子概念。如果这两种存在物都被接受，那么，所有的命题都是句子或以句子来表达。一般只有陈述句表达命题，虽然疑问句、祈使句和其他形式语句也含有命题的内容。一个命题通常能以“that”子句来表示。理解命题的结构和本性常被视为哲学逻辑的中心任务。哲学家考察命题的组成成分的功能，如名称、谓词和逻辑常项，考察这些成分如何结合成为某种有真值的东西。他们考察命题的形式、意义和用法如何相联系，不同的命题如何形成逻辑关系。对于言语的或心理的陈述如何能具有命题的内容，近年来一直有很多讨论。

“让我们……把命题规定为任何能表达陈述的完整语句。”——罗素：《文集》，第七卷，第105页。

命题和语句

语句是一组语词（符号、记号）在实际的或人工的语言中按某种语法规则排列成序。具有各种语法形式的语句被最恰当地用于指示、辩解、请求、命令、询问等等，虽然这些语句也可用于它们的基本功能以外的目的。语句并不必

their primary functions. A sentence is not necessarily meaningful, and the same sentence may have different meanings and may be used in different ways. All these characteristics make it difficult to determine in the abstract whether a given sentence is true or false or even whether in principle it is verifiable.

Philosophers therefore introduce the term "proposition" for abstract objects which are expressed by sentences and which bear truth values. A proposition can in principle be expressed by a sentence, but not all sentences express propositions. Once sentences and propositions are distinguished, philosophers ask how features of meaning and truth should be divided between the two, which is the vehicle for asserting or denying, for stating that some predicate holds of some subject or that certain items are related in a certain way. A proposition can be expressed by grammatically different sentences or by sentences in different languages, so long as the sentences have the same content. For instance, "A conquered B" and "B was conquered by A" are two sentences that express the same proposition. Propositions seem at first glance to be most closely related to indicative sentences, but sentences of other kinds can be understood to have a propositional content as well.

Ayer takes propositions to be logical constructions out of synonymous sentences rather than as Platonic entities existing in their own right. A proposition, not a sentence, is generally recognised as the truth bearer, while meaning is often ascribed to sentences or statements. We can say that truth or falsity are not merely for one particular sentence S, but for all sentences which are logically equivalent to S. However, there are widely disputed problems in philosophical logic about the existence, nature and individuation of propositions. Philosophers hostile to abstract entities try to do without propositions or to see them as a mere device for dealing with sentences. Realists and reductionists of various sorts must all provide accounts of how propositions and sentences are related.

"The word 'proposition', ... will be reserved for what is expressed by sentences which are literally meaningful." — Ayer, *Language, Logic and Truth*, 1946, p. 8.

Propositional attitude

Russell's term for mental activities signified by verbs such as think, hope, fear, want, wish, believe, guess and consider. These verbs are propositional verbs, in contrast to the cognitive verbs such as know, see, smell or feel. Both kinds of verb demand a grammatical accusative. However, propositional verbs, unlike cognitive verbs, do not necessarily have to have something in reality that answers to their grammatical accusatives. If I see X, there is an X, and if I see that p, then p is true. However, if I hope X, it is open whether there is an X or not, and if I hope that p, it remains

然是有意义的,同一个语句可能有不同的意义,可以按不同的方式使用。所有这些特点使得很难抽象地决定一已知语句是真还是假,甚或决定它能否在原则上可证实。

哲学家因而引入了“命题”这个术语来表示由语句表达的、承载真值的抽象对象。命题在原则上可由语句表达,但并不是所有的语句都表达命题。一旦把语句和命题作了区别,哲学家就要问意义和真理的特征应如何在二者之间划分,肯定或否定、陈述某谓词与某主词相匹配或某些语词以某种方式相关联的载体是什么。命题可以由语法上不同的语句或不同语言的语句来表达,只要这些语句有相同的内容。例如“A征服了B”和“B被A征服”是两个表达了相同命题的语句。命题初看起来似乎与指示性语句关系最密切,但可以把其他种类的语句理解为也具有命题的内容。

艾耶尔把命题当成出自同义语句的逻辑构造,而不是像柏拉图式的独立存在的实体。被广泛承认为真值承载者的是命题,而不是语句,而意义常常被归诸于语句或陈述。我们可以说,真或假不仅仅是对一特定语句S而言,而是对一切与S在逻辑上等值的语句而言。但是在哲学逻辑中,关于命题的存在、性质以及个体化,是有着广泛争论的问题。敌视抽象实体的哲学家力图排斥命题,或仅仅把命题视为处理语句的工具。各式各样的实在论者和还原论者都必定要对命题和语句如何相关提供说明。

“‘命题’这个词……将保留给由在字面上有意义的语句所表达的东西。”——艾耶尔:《语言、逻辑和真理》,1946年,第8页。

命题态度

罗素的术语,指由“认为”、“希望”、“担忧”、“要求”、“但愿”、“相信”、“猜测”、“考虑”之类的动词所表示的心的活动。这些动词是命题动词,以与“知道”、“看见”、“闻起来”、“觉得”等认知动词相区别。这两种类型的动词都需要语法宾格。不过,与认知动词不同,命题动词并不必然有现实中的某物与其语法宾格相对应。如果我看见X,那么有X;如果我看见P,则P是真的。不过,如果我希望X,X是否存在却是悬而未决的;如果我希望P,P是否为真也

open whether p is true. A propositional attitude expresses an attitude to a proposition. Thus, the contexts of all propositional attitudes are intentional. There are many philosophical problems associated with the notion of propositional attitudes. These include the question of whether co-referential designators can be substituted *salva veritate* in the context of propositional attitudes, and the related notion of a referentially opaque context. There are also problems with related notions such as belief, intentionality and content.

"We pass next to the analysis of propositional attitudes, that is believing, desiring, doubting, etc. that so and-so is the case." —Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940, p. 21.

Propositional belief, see belief in and belief that

Propositional calculus

One main branch of modern formal logic, also called propositional logic, sentential calculus, sentential logic, the logic of propositions and the theory of truth functions. Anticipated partially by the Stoics, it was systematically developed in the works of Frege, Peirce, Russell and Wittgenstein. It formulates the principles of inference in terms of the truth-functional constants of arguments. These constants include negation (not), conjunction (and), disjunction (or), implication (if ... then) and equivalence (if and only if). Each of them is symbolised by logical notation. There are various schemes of logical notation, but one widely used notation contains " \sim " (negation), " \wedge " (conjunction), " \vee " (disjunction), " \supset " (implication) and " \equiv " (equivalence). The basic constituents of an argument are propositions (symbolised as $p, q, r \dots$). The validity of an argument is determined through the truth-table method by the truth-values of its components and the logical constants connecting them. Since propositional logic requires that all propositions are either true or false and cannot be both, it is also called two-valued logic. Because of its importance for any systematic development of thought, it was also called by Whitehead and Russell, the theory of deduction, or by Kneale primary logic.

"The propositional calculus is characterised by the fact that all its propositions have as hypothesis and as consequent the assertion of a material implication." —Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, p. 13.

Propositional content, see content

Propositional form, another term for form of proposition

仍然是悬而未决的。命题态度表达了对一个命题的态度。于是,所有命题态度的语境都是内涵性的。有许多哲学问题与命题态度概念相关。这些问题包括:指称相同的指示词在命题态度的语境中是否可以保真地相互替换,以及与此相关的指称晦暗语境概念。还有与“信念”,“内涵性”,“内容”等概念相关的问题。

“我们下面进入对命题态度的分析,而命题态度是指相信、期望、怀疑等等如此这般的情形发生。”——罗素:《对意义和真理的探究》,1940年,第21页。

命题信念

见“信以为真”和“相信某事”条。

命题演算

现代形式逻辑的一个主要分支,亦称“命题逻辑”,“语句演算”,“语句逻辑”,“命题的逻辑”以及真值函项理论。它部分地为斯多亚学派所预先研究,其系统发展是在弗雷格、皮尔士、罗素和维特根斯坦的著作中。命题演算根据论证的真值函项常项来表述推理原则。这些常项包括否定(并非),合取(并且),析取(或者),蕴涵(如果……则)和等值(当且仅当)。其中每一个都用逻辑记法符号化。存在不同的逻辑记号模式,但其中得到广泛使用的一种记法是“ \sim ”(否定),“ \wedge ”(合取),“ \vee ”(析取),“ \supset ”(蕴涵)和“ \equiv ”(等值)。论证的基本构成要素是命题(用 p, q, r 等等表示)。论证的有效性通过真值表方法由支命题的真值和联结这些支命题的逻辑常项所决定。由于命题逻辑要求所有的命题都是或者真或者假但不能既真又假,它亦称二值逻辑。由于它对思想的任何系统展开所具有的重要性,它亦被怀特海和罗素称作“演绎理论”,或被涅尔称作“初等逻辑”。

“命题演算的特征在于下述事实:它的所有命题都以断定实质蕴涵作为假设并作为后承。”——罗素:《数学原则》,1903年,第13页。

命题内容

见“内容”条。

命题的形式

“命题形式”的另一说法。

Propositional function

An expression or schema, such as “x is mortal”, which can be converted into a proposition, such as “Socrates is mortal”, by replacing “x” with a determinate value, in this case “Socrates”. The term originates in Frege’s investigation into the possibility of deriving mathematics from logical axioms. Russell, who applies the notion of propositional functions in the analysis of propositions, argues that general propositions state connections between propositional functions. For instance, “all men are mortal” can be analyzed into “whatever x may be, if x is a man, x is mortal”. The appeal to propositional functions enables Russell to dispose of the grammatical subjects of universal propositions which we wrongly suppose to refer to existing objects. This manoeuvre is a major factor in his theory of descriptions. A propositional function is necessary if it is always true, impossible if it is sometimes true, and sometimes false. It is impossible if it is never true.

“A form of words containing an undetermined variable—for instance, ‘x is a man’—is called a ‘propositional function’ if when a value is assigned to the variable, the form of words becomes a proposition.” —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 468.

Propositional knowledge

Knowledge that something is the case, instances of which are expressed in the form of a proposition, i. e. S knows that p, where p can be verbally formulated. As knowledge-that or knowledge by description, it is in contrast to knowledge by acquaintance (perceptual knowledge), that is knowledge of a simple object, *a priori* knowledge, and knowledge-how. The traditional or standard analysis of propositional knowledge is that it must satisfy three conditions: A knows p requires that (1) A believes p, (2) p is true and (3) A is justified in believing p. Historically, the majority of epistemological theories have analysed each of these conditions and their interrelationships. Since Gettier posed his counterexamples to this definition, epistemologists have been discussing whether we need to add a fourth condition to propositional knowledge, and if so, what it should be.

“The general definition of propositional knowledge that I propose to defend is along traditional lines and can be expressed as follows: S knows that P if and only if (1) P, (2) S is confident that P, and (3) S’s being so is supported by a disinterested justification for being so, (4) that is externally conclusive.” —Ginet, *Knowledge, Perception, Memory*, 1995, p. 12.

Propositional logic, another term for propositional calculus

命题函项

一种表达式或格式,如像“x 是有死的”,可以用一个确定的值来代替“x”,从而将其转变为命题,如变成“苏格拉底是有死的”,这里的确定值是“苏格拉底”。这个术语起源于弗雷格研究能否从逻辑公理中导出数学。罗素将命题函项的概念运用于对命题的分析,主张全称命题陈述了命题函项之间的关系。例如,“所有的人都是有死的”可以分析为“不管 x 可能是什么,如果 x 是人,则 x 是有死的”。求助于命题函项使得罗素可以处置全称命题的语法主词,我们往往错误地以为它们指称存在的对象。这种策略是他摹状词理论中的主要内容。如果一个命题函项永远为真,则它是必然的。如果它有时为真有时为假,则它是可能的。如果它永不真,则它是不可能的。

“包含一不定变项的语词排列形式——例如‘x 是一个人’——称为‘命题函项’,如果把一值赋予变项则该语词形式就成为一命题。”——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第468页。

命题知识

以命题形式表达具体事件的知识,即 S 知道 p,在这里,p 是在语言上构成的知识。它是关于内容的知识或描述的知识,与之相对的是亲知的知识(知觉知识),即关于简单对象的知识、先天的知识和关于方法的知识。对命题知识的传统分析或标准分析是,它必须满足三个条件:A 知道 p 需要(1) A 相信 p,(2) p 是真的,(3) A 有充分的理由相信 p。在历史上,绝大多数的认识论理论都分析了这些条件及其相互关系。自从盖梯尔提出他对这个定义的反证以来,认识论者们就在讨论,我们是否需要对命题知识补充第四个条件,如果需要的话,那么它应当是什么。

“我提出捍卫的对命题知识的一般定义,是沿袭着传统的路线,可以把它表达如下:S 知道 P,当且仅当(1) P,(2) S 确信 P,(3) S 的这种确信得到了对此的公正辨明的支持,(4)这在客观上是确定的。”——吉内特:《知识、知觉和记忆》,1995年,第12页。

命题逻辑

表示“命题演算”的另一个术语。

Propositional object, another expression for proposition

Propositional sign

A sign which expresses a thought or a proposition. In Medieval Latin *propositio* has this meaning, although in modern English “proposition” refers rather to propositional contents. According to Wittgenstein, if a sign is a propositional sign, all of its elements must be co-ordinated with one another in a determinate way. A proposition is not a different entity from a propositional sign, but is just a propositional sign taken together with its pictorial relation to its objects.

“A proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.” —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.12.

Propositional verb, see propositional attitude

Prosentential theory of truth

The term “prosentence” was formed on analogy with “pronoun” in line with the claim that sentences containing truth predicates such as “That is true” relate to sentences in the way that pronouns relate to nouns. An anaphoric pronoun acquires its references from antecedent expressions and can be replaced by its antecedent. For instance, in “John is a student, and he is intelligent”, the pronoun “he” acquires its reference through its relation to the earlier expression “John” and can be replaced by “John”. The prosentential theory of truth claims that a sentence with the truth predicate “is true” has a similar anaphoric function. The only difference is that its reference is acquired from an antecedent sentence rather than an antecedent noun. “That is true”, can be replaced by an antecedent sentence. Accordingly, the truth predicate responds to and comments upon the assertion expressed by that sentence. In particular, the truth predicate does not introduce a property or common characteristic shared by true propositions. It is content-redundant and can be used to provide emphasis. The theory resembles the disquotational theory of truth.

“Briefly, a principal claim of the prosentential theory is that ‘That is true’ and ‘It is true’ are ‘prosentences’. Prosentences function much as pronouns do, except that prosentences occupy the positions in sentences that declarative sentences occupy, while pronouns occupy the positions names occupy.” —Grover, *A Prosentential Theory of Truth*, 1992, p. 12.

Protocol sentences

[from German: *Protokollsätze*, sometimes translated as protocol statements] For Carnap and Neurath, statements which others call basic propositions, basic sentences or basic statements. They are also similar to the atomic proposition

命题对象

“命题”的另一种说法。

命题符号

表达一个思想或命题的符号。在中世纪的拉丁文中, *propositio* 有这种意义, 虽然在现代英语中“命题”更确切地说是指命题的内容。照维特根斯坦的看法, 如果一个符号是命题符号, 则它的所有成分必须以一种确定方式协调一致。命题不是与命题符号不同的东西, 而只是与其对于对象的描绘关系置于一起的命题符号。

“命题是在其与世界的投影关系中的命题符号。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》, 3.12.

命题动词

见“命题态度”条。

真理的代语句论

“代语句”这一术语的构成与“代词”相类似, 它符合这个主张: 包含有像“那是真的”这样的真值谓词的语句, 语句的关系正如代词和名词的关系一样。一个在句首重复的代词可从先行的表达式获得它的指称。譬如, 在“约翰是一名学生, 并且他理解力强”这句话中, 代词“他”通过联系于先前的表达“约翰”而获得它的指称, 并且可以“约翰”来代替。真理的代语句论主张, 具有真值谓词“是真的”的语句具有同样的首语重复功能。唯一的区别是, 它的指称是从先行的语句而不是从先行的名词而获得。“那是真的”可以由先行的语句来代替。因此, 真值谓词对那个语句所表达的断定作出反应和评价。尤其是, 真值谓词并不产生真命题所具有的性质或共同特性。它是多余的内容, 可以用来作出强调。这个理论类似于“真理的消除引语论”。

“简言之, 代语句论的基本主张是: ‘那是真的’和‘它是真的’是‘代语句’。代语句起着和代词一样的作用, 所不同的是, 代语句在句子中具有陈述语句所具有的地位, 而代词则具有名词所具有的地位。”——格罗弗:《真理的代语句论》, 1992年, 第12页。

记录语句

[源自德文 *Protokollsätze*, 有时译为“记录陈述”] 对卡尔纳普和纽拉特而言, 是指其他人称为“基本命题”、“基本语句”或“基本陈述”的陈述。它们也与罗素及维特根斯坦的原子命

of Russell and Wittgenstein. Carnap, in the material mode of speech, defines protocol sentences in terms of our simplest state of knowledge and referring to directly given experience or phenomena. More satisfactorily in the formal mode of speech, he characterises these sentences by their logical place in science, saying that they are the statements which need no further justification and that all other statements of science are verified by reference to them. The notion of protocol statement is significant for Logical Positivism, which held that science is a system of statements based on and verified by experiment and observation and that protocol statements are the basis of verification.

It is a characteristic of protocol sentences that they can be verified only solipsistically and that they therefore provide a poor basis for publicly shared scientific knowledge. Given their peculiar nature, problems arise about the meaning and truth of protocol sentences. There are difficulties in deciding how to identify sentences as protocol sentences and to explain why their truth should be immune from further tests. The private language argument deepens these problems. These difficulties about protocol sentences made the views of logical positivism about the foundations of science untenable. As a result, Carnap and Neurath were driven to rely upon the logical relations between statements rather than ascribing a privileged epistemological position to some. Protocol sentences are also called "observation sentences", but Schlick claimed that observation statements cannot be written down or memorised as protocol statements can.

"Regardless of this diversity of opinion it is certain that a sequence of words has a meaning only if its relations of deducibility to the protocol sentences are fixed, whatever the characteristics of the protocol sentences may be." —Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" in Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*, 1959, p. 63.

Providence

[from Greek; *pronoia*, foresight, foreknowledge and the Latin equivalent; *providentia*] A crucial religious term for the relation between God and the world, although the extent and meaning of providence has been a topic of dispute. In Stoicism, providence is a non-personal divine order pervading the world. In Christianity, it concerns God's prior knowledge or his plan which guides the path of the world and man. In a broad sense, it covers all of the activities by which God directly controls nature, man and history, including creating and sustaining the world, and the activity of sustaining it. Theologians usually distinguish between general providence, which is God's working through natural laws, and special providence, which is God's working through some specific action such as delivering a message through a prophet. Some argue that special providence includes mira-

题相类似。卡尔纳普以实质的说话方式,用我们最简单的知识状态来定义记录语句,指称直接给予的经验或现象。在使用更令人满意的形式说话方式时,他以这些语句在科学中的逻辑地位来表征它们,说它们是勿需进一步证明的陈述,所有其他科学陈述都是靠与它们的关系而得到证明的。记录陈述的概念对于逻辑实证主义具有重大意义,它认为科学是基于实验和观察并由它们证实的陈述系统,记录陈述正是证实的基础。

记录语句的特点是,它们只能够以唯我论的方式得到证实,因此它们为公共分享的科学知识所提供的基础很薄弱。假定它们具有这种特性,关于记录语句的意义和为真的问题就出现了。要决定如何辨识语句为记录语句,解释它们的真为什么应免于进一步的检验,还有许多困难。私人语言论证深化了这些问题。关于记录语句的这些困难使得逻辑实证主义关于科学基础的观点站不住脚了。其结果是,卡尔纳普和纽拉特被迫依赖陈述间的逻辑关系,而不是把认识论上的特权地位赋予某些陈述。记录语句也叫“观察句子”,但石里克认为观察陈述不能像记录陈述那样被写下来和记住。

“不管这些观点的分歧,确定无疑的是,一串语词有意义,仅当它与记录语句的可推演关系得到了肯定,不管这些记录语句有什么特征。”——卡尔纳普:《通过语言的逻辑分析清除形而上学》,载于艾耶尔编:《逻辑实证主义》,1959年,第63页。

神意

[源自希腊语 *pronoia* (先见、预知),拉丁语的同类词是 *providentia*] 这个严格的宗教词汇用来指上帝和世界之间的关系,虽然神意的精确范围和含义一直是个有争议的论题。在斯多亚学派那里,神意是弥漫于世界的一种非人格的神圣秩序。在基督教中,它指上帝的先知或他为指导世界和人的行为方向而作的计划。从广义上讲,它涵盖上帝的一切活动,通过这些活动,上帝直接控制自然、人和历史,包括世界的创造和维持以及维持它的活动。神学家们通常区分出“一般的神意”和“特别的神意”,前者指上帝通过自然规律起作用,后者指上帝通过某种特别行为起作用,譬如通过先知者传递信息。有些人主张特别的神意也包括奇迹,但遭到了阿奎那的反驳。无论“神意”一词在什么意义

cles as well, but this was rejected by Aquinas. No matter how it is used, the relationship between providence and human free will has been a central problem for theology.

"In taking care of things, there is a distinction between the two, namely the reason in their planned disposition, and this is termed providence, and the disposing and execution, and this is termed government. The first is eternal, the second temporal." Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 22, 2.

Prudence

The exercise of intelligence or rationality to safeguard one's own interest. According to prudence, the calculation of individual loss and gain motivates an action. It judges what one ought to do with respect to one's desires, inclinations and interest. Prudence differs from morality, which judges what one ought to by reference to the rights of others and one's obligations to others as well as by reference to one's moral concerns with oneself. To act prudently is in itself neither moral nor immoral, but is simply to act wisely and rationally within the scope of one's aims and interests. Acting prudently does not entail that one will satisfy one's own desire at the expense of others. Prudence is opposed not to morality, but to imprudence, that is to acting unwisely, irrationally or foolishly. A moral person does not necessarily act imprudently, and an imprudent person does not necessarily act immorally. Prudence often coincides with common-sense morality.

"The word 'prudence' is used in a double sense: firstly, it can mean worldly wisdom, and secondly, private wisdom. The former is the skill of someone in influencing others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting advantage. The value of the former is properly reduced to the latter, and it might better be said of one who is prudent in the former sense but not in the latter that he is clever and cunning, but on the whole imprudent."—Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (tr. by Ellington), 1981, p. 26.

Pseudo-concepts

A Logical Positivist term for those concepts which appear to be meaningful but which are actually meaningless. Any word or concept should have a meaning, which allows it to pick out objects or other entities. According to logical positivists, however, many words are deprived of any meaning through their metaphysical use. Terms such as Principle, God, the Absolute, the Infinite, Being as Being and Essence are all pseudo-concepts. Although metaphysicians think that they have meaning, these words cannot be used in sentences to assert anything. They are merely allusions to associated images and feelings which do not bestow a meaning on the expressions. They fail to satisfy empirical criteria of meaningfulness, and the definitions given to them in metaphysics

上使用, 它和人的自由意志之间的关系都是神学的一个中心问题。

“在对事物的照看上, 下面二者之间是有区别的, 一是按计划排列事物的缘由, 它被叫做神意, 二是排列和施行, 它被叫做管理。前者是永恒的, 后者是暂时的。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》, Ia, 22, 2。

谨慎

保护一个人自身利益的智力或理性的运用。根据谨慎的含义, 对个人得失的计算是行为的动机。它断定一个人应该做什么的着眼点是一个人的要求、倾向和利益。谨慎不同于道德, 后者判断一个人应该做什么联系他人的权利和一个人对他人的义务, 以及联系一个人涉及自身的道德。谨慎地行事本身无所谓道德还是不道德, 它只是在一个人的目的和利益范围内明智而理性地行事。谨慎地行事并不要一个人以牺牲他人来满足自己的要求。谨慎不是和道德相对, 而是和冒失相对, 即和行事不明智、非理性或愚蠢相对。一个道德的人不一定行事谨慎, 一个不谨慎的人不一定行事不道德, 谨慎常常与通常意义上的道德相一致。

“‘谨慎’这个词被在双重意义上使用: 首先, 它可意指老于世故, 其次, 它可意指个人的明智。前者是某人影响他人以便利用他们实现自己意图的技巧。后者是为了自己持久的利益而把所有这些意图结合起来的明智。前者的价值应变为后者的价值, 一个人是聪明而狡猾的, 对此也许这样说更好, 即他就前一种意义而不是后一种意义而言是谨慎的, 但总的来说是不谨慎的。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》(埃灵顿译), 1981年, 第26页。

伪概念

逻辑实证主义的术语, 用于指这些概念, 它们看起来是有意义的但实际上是无意义的。任何语词或概念都应该有意义, 使得它辨识出对象或其他实体。但在逻辑实证主义者看来, 许多语词因为它们的形而上学用法而失去了意义。诸如“本原”、“上帝”、“绝对”、“无限”、“是之所是”、“本质”这样的语词都是假概念。虽然形而上学家认为它们有意义, 但这些语词不能用到断定任何事物的语句中。它们不过是一些把意象和情感联系起来的虚幻的东西, 并不把意义赋予表达式。它们不能满足经验主义的有意义性标准, 在形而上学中给它们的定义是伪定义。包含伪概念的语句是伪语句。

are pseudo-definitions. The sentences which contain a pseudo-concept are pseudo-sentences.

"If it only seems to have a meaning while it really does not, we speak of a 'pseudo-concept'" Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language", in Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*, 1959, pp. 61-2.

Pseudo-object, another term for logical fiction

Pseudo-object sentence

Carnap distinguishes among three kinds of sentences: (a) an "object sentence", which speaks of an object. For instance, "Babylon was a big town"; (b) a "syntactical sentence", which speaks of a word. For instance, "The word 'Babylon' occurred in yesterday's lecture"; (c) a "pseudo-object sentence", which is formulated as though it refers to objects in the world while in reality it is a syntactical sentence that concerns expressions of the object language. For instance, "Babylon was treated of in yesterday's lecture". Such a sentence has a misleading resemblance to a sentence which speaks about the object Babylon, but it is actually about the word "Babylon". The sentence "Roundness is a universal" is a pseudo-object sentence, and should be replaced with the syntactical sentence "'round' is a predicate". Carnap also calls this kind of sentence a quasi-syntactical sentence. According to him, philosophical statements are syntactical, but in the history of philosophy they have been treated as object sentences or statements. In this mistake lies the root of many traditional problems. We should translate pseudo-object sentences from the material mode of speech into the formal mode of speech by substituting their syntactical equivalents for them, that is we should treat pseudo-object sentences as claims about words, a practice which would avoid much confusion and endless controversy.

"Thus, these sentences are syntactical sentences in virtue of their content, though they are disguised as object sentences. We will call them pseudo-object sentences." — Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, 1937, p. 285.

Pseudo-paradox, see barber paradox

Pseudo-predicate

Also called metaphysical predicate. A term introduced by Carnap for predicates such as "individual", "universal", "number" and "necessary" that are employed frequently in metaphysics. Sentences in which these predicates function appear to convey certain ontological information, but they do not actually introduce any properties of the objects designated by these sentences. A sentence containing a pseudo-predi-

"如果概念只是看起来有意义,而实际上并无意义,我们就说这是'伪概念'。"——卡尔纳普:《通过逻辑语言的分析清除形而上学》,载于艾耶尔编:《逻辑实证主义》,1959年,第61—62页。

假对象

“逻辑虚构”的另一说法。

伪对象语句

卡尔纳普在以下三种语句之间作出了区分:(a)“对象语句”,它谈及对象。例如“巴比伦是座大城”;(b)“句法语句”,它谈及语词。例如“‘巴比伦’这个词出现于昨天的讲演中”;(c)“伪对象语句”,它被说成好像指称了世界上的对象,但实际上是关于对象语言表达式的句法语句。例如,“在昨天的讲演中提到了巴比伦”。这样的语句与谈到对象巴比伦的语句有令人误导的相似性,但它实际上只涉及“巴比伦”这个词。语句“圆是共相”是伪对象语句,应当被代之以句法语句“‘圆’是谓词”。卡尔纳普也把这种语句叫做“准句法语句”。在他看来,哲学陈述是句法性的,但在哲学史上它们被当成了对象语句或对象陈述。在这种错误中,植下了许多传统问题的根源。我们应当把伪对象语句从实质说话方式翻译成形式说话方式,用句法上等同的东西代替它们,即是说,我们应当把伪对象语句当成为对语词作了断言,实行这种办法会避免许多混乱和无穷的争议。

“因此,这些语句就其内容而言是句法语句,虽然它们伪装成是对象语句。我们将把它们称为伪对象语句。”——卡尔纳普:《语言的逻辑句法》,1937年,第285页。

虚假悖论

见“理发师悖论”条。

虚假谓词

也叫“形而上谓词”。卡尔纳普引入的术语,指经常为形而上学所采用的诸如“个别”、“共相”、“数”和“必然”等谓词。这些谓词在其中起作用的句子似乎在传达本体论信息,可它们实际上并没有给这些句子所表达的对象引入任何特性。包含一个虚假谓词的句子要么是分析性真实的要么是无意义的。这些谓词的真实作

cate is either analytically true or meaningless. The real role of these predicates concerns syntactical classification. The sentence "2 is a number" does not express anything about a property of 2, but rather classifies "2" as a numerical expression. A pseudo-predicate is eliminated when one converts a material mode of speech into a formal mode of speech.

" 'P' is a pseudo-predicate if any sentence obtained from the sentential function 'Px' by substituting a value for 'x' is either analytically true or meaningless on account of resulting from the substitution of an inadmissible value." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 411.

Pseudo-problem

Early analytical philosophy, especially logical positivism, claimed that the majority of traditional and perennial metaphysical problems are not genuine questions, although they appear to be. Logical analysis reveals that although these problem have the same grammatical form as genuine questions, they in fact arise from a misuse of language. For example, the question "Does God exist?" arises because metaphysicians confuse the copulative use and the existential use of the verb "to be". Accordingly, pseudo-problems can be dismissed through semantic analysis.

"Grammatical similarities foster the illusion, which proves a source of immortal metaphysical pseudo-problems, as though 'real' and 'unreal' referred to opposite properties of things, just like 'kind-unkind', 'living-dead', 'stable-unstable'." —Pap, *Elements of Analytical Philosophy*, 1949, p. 143.

Pseudo-proposition

A term introduced by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, referring to any judgement which attempts to say that which can only be shown. Unlike other propositions, pseudo-propositions cannot be analysed into atomic pictures and their combinations and therefore they are not pictures of the world. Wittgenstein thinks that in different ways the propositions of logic, mathematics, the *a priori* parts of natural science, ethics and philosophy — including the propositions of his own *Tractatus* — are all pseudo-propositions. Logical Positivists developed this idea in their attack on metaphysics by saying that all propositions and statements which purport to make a factual claim but which cannot be verified by experience are pseudo-propositions. They have emotional significance, but lack cognitive meaning. There are many attempts to retrieve at least some of the fields discarded in this way by Logical Positivism.

"The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.2.

用涉及到句法分类。“2 是一个数”这样的句子并不表达 2 的任何特性，而只是把 2 分类作为一个数的表述。当我们从实质的说话方式转换成形式的说话方式时，虚假谓词便可取消。

“如果从句子函数 ‘Px’ 中通过对 x 代入一个值而获得的任何句子，因为得自一个不可接纳的值的代入，要么是在分析上为真，要么是无意义的，则 P 是虚假谓词。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949 年，第 411 页。

虚假问题

早期分析哲学，尤其是逻辑实证主义，认为大多数传统的和永久性的形而上学问题都不是真正的哲学问题，虽然它们显得是这样的。逻辑分析表明，尽管这些问题在语法结构上与真正的问题相同，它们事实上产生于对语言的误用。例如，“上帝存在吗？”这样的问题之所以产生，乃是因为形而上学家们混淆了动词“是”的系词用法和它的存在用法。因而，伪问题通过语义分析就可以得到消除。

“语法上的相似滋生了这种幻觉，而它们证明是不朽形而上学虚假问题的根源，仿佛‘真’和‘不真’是指事物的相反的属性，就如同‘好’和‘不好’，‘活’和‘死’，‘稳定’和‘不稳定’一样。”——帕普：《分析哲学原理》，1949 年，第 143 页。

假命题

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中引入的术语，指企图说出只能显示的东西的判断。与其他命题不同，假命题不能被分析为原子图像及其结合，因此不是世界的图像。维特根斯坦认为，逻辑和数学命题，自然科学、伦理学和哲学中的先验部分——包括他自己的《逻辑哲学论》中的命题，在另一种方式之下都是假命题。逻辑实证主义者在攻击形而上学时发展了这种看法，他们说，旨在论说事实的但不能被经验证实的全部命题和陈述都是假命题。它们具有情感意义，但缺乏认识意义。这样，逻辑实证主义就放弃了许多人们至少在其中作出大量努力的领域。

“数学命题是等式，因此是假命题。”——维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》，6.2。

Pseudo-science

[from Greek; *pseudo*, false or unreal] A doctrine or set of views that falsely claims the status of science or knowledge. In unhealthy academic circumstances, especially where an enforced orthodox exists, all other schools can be condemned without justification as pseudo-sciences. Determining whether a doctrine is a pseudo-science is an issue in the philosophy of science and requires that one first determines what counts as scientific knowledge. For Logical Positivism, if a thesis satisfies the verifiability criterion, it is scientific; otherwise it is pseudo-scientific. Accordingly, traditional metaphysics is pseudo-scientific and meaningless because none of its claims can be verified. Popper claimed that the criterion for demarcating science from pseudo-science is that of falsifiability. To be scientific, a theory must be falsifiable, that is, in principle there must be some observation statements that would contradict the theory. Popper does not deny that the statements of a pseudo-science are meaningful. Some critics of Popper claim that pseudo-sciences are typically both falsifiable and falsified, but are still retained by their supporters. From this perspective, the integrity of individual investigators and of the institutions of the scientific community is a more important consideration in distinguishing science from pseudo-science.

"Social scientists use the epithets 'scientific' and 'pseudo-scientific' as a major part of the ritual language of denunciation." — Yearley, *Science and Sociological Practice*, 1984, p. 122.

Pseudo-statement

A statement-like word sequence which cannot be reduced to protocol sentences or statements and which cannot pass the test of the verification principle, either because it contains meaningless words (pseudo-concepts) or because it puts together meaningful words in a way violating syntax. Such a word sequence appears to be a statement but it is not. It fails to assert anything and expresses neither a true proposition nor a false proposition. Pseudo-statements are of major concern to Logical Positivism, which labels all metaphysical statements as pseudo-statements. They claim that the origin of metaphysical pseudo-statements lies in the logical defects of ordinary language. The notion of pseudo-statements is the target to which much criticism of Logical Positivism has been directed.

"Our thesis, now, is that logical analysis reveals the alleged statements of metaphysics to be pseudo-statements." — Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language", in Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*, 1959, p. 61.

Psyche, Greek term for soul

伪科学

[源自希腊语 *pseudo*, “虚假的”、“不真实的”]是对科学或知识状况提出错误主张的一种学说或一套观点。在不健康的学术环境中,尤其是在强硬正统派存在的地方,一切其他学派都会不加辩护地被指责为伪科学。如何确定一种学说是否是伪科学,是科学哲学中的一个争论问题,而且,还需要首先确定,到底什么东西算是科学知识。在逻辑实证主义看来,如果一个命题满足可证实性标准,就是科学的;否则就是伪科学的。因此,传统形而上学是伪科学的和毫无意义的,因为它的主张无一能被证实。波普断言,划分科学与伪科学的标准是可证伪。如果一个理论是科学的,它必定可证伪,也就是说,原则上必定有某种会与该理论相矛盾的观察陈述存在。波普并不否认伪科学的陈述是有意义的。有些波普的批评者认为,伪科学一般地既是可以证伪的,也是已经证伪了的,但仍为其支持者所拥护。从这一角度看,单个研究者的整合性、科学共同体机制的整合性乃是区分科学与伪科学的更为重要的因素。

“社会科学家把‘科学的’和‘伪科学的’这对性质形容词作为宣言式的礼仪语言的主要部分来使用。”——耶利:《科学和社会学实践》,1984年,第122页。

伪陈述

貌似陈述的一串词,不能将其还原为记录语句或陈述,不能通过证实原则的检验,原因在于包含了无意义的语词(伪概念)或是在于把有意义的词以违反句法的方法放在一起。这种语词串貌似陈述,但实际上不是。它未能对事物作出任何断定,既未表达真命题,也未表达假命题。伪陈述是逻辑实证主义的主要关注点,它给所有的形而上学陈述贴上了伪陈述的标签。他们认为,形而上学伪陈述源于日常语言的逻辑缺陷。伪陈述的概念成了很多针对逻辑实证主义的批评的靶子。

“现在,我们的观点是,逻辑分析揭示了所谓的形而上学陈述是伪陈述。”——卡尔纳普:《通过语言的逻辑分析清除形而上学》,载于艾耶尔编:《逻辑实证主义》,1959年,第61页。

灵魂

“灵魂(soul)”的希腊词。

Psychoanalysis

A therapeutic practice and associated theory of mind founded by Freud. As a theory, it postulates the existence of an unconscious mind, comprising painful thoughts which through repression are excluded from consciousness, except as disguised through symbolic transformation in such phenomena as dreams, puns and slips of the tongue. The unconscious has a dynamic role in determining behaviour. Psychoanalytic theory places great emphasis on the origin of neurosis in the sexual drives and fantasies of early childhood, especially the in relations of a child to his parents through the Oedipus Complex. The theory claims to reveal and explain a variety of affective disturbances and intellectual blindnesses in people not suffering from a psychic disorder. The theory has a causal physical side in Freud's early concern with the workings of the nervous system, but also an interpretative side based on interpreting back to their origin the repressed thoughts which surface consciously in symbolically distorted ways through such things as dreams, puns and slips of the tongue. For analysts, anything important in an analytic session is likely to be below the surface of overt meaning.

As a therapy, classical psychoanalysis is ideally conducted as a kind talking cure. In regular conversations between analyst and patient, the analyst's neutrality allows the patient to project the repressed early relations and emotions allegedly at the root of the disorder. The analyst may employ various techniques, including dream interpretation or free association, to reach what is repressed. The analyst analyses what the patient says, trying to reveal from the recovered material the repressed unconscious thoughts allegedly at the root of the patient's illness. The main aim of psychoanalysis is to bring repressed thoughts to consciousness, and this kind of discovery, when accepted by the patient, is meant to lead to a cure.

Freud claimed that psychoanalysis, after the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions, was the third blow to human claims to uniqueness. He believed that it provided a key to the theory of human nature and suggested that philosophy should correct its long-term prejudice in favour of the conscious. The discovery of the processes of the unconscious mind would enlarge our conception of the self and greatly enhance human self-knowledge. Freud also used a psychoanalytic approach to interpret art and culture.

In spite of a suggestive richness which has placed psychoanalysis near the centre of many developments of twentieth century culture, virtually all of its major claims as a theory and its major practices as a therapy have been attacked by outside critics and through schisms and expulsions by those within the psychoanalytic movement. The promise of therapeutic success remains broadly unfulfilled. Psychoanalysis has been attacked as bad science, as pseudo-science and as a bad humane discipline, and the best way to characterise and

心理分析

由弗洛伊德创立的一种有关心的治疗实践及相关的理论。作为一个理论,它设定一个无意识心灵的存在,它由令人痛苦的思想组成,这些思想遭到压抑,被排除出了意识,只能通过像梦、双关语和口误这些象征转换的现象而伪装出现。这个无意识在决定人的行为中扮演一个原动力的角色。心理分析理论极为强调神经病起源于早年儿童期的性驱动和性想像,特别是一个孩子通过俄狄浦斯情节与其父母发生的关系。这个理论声称它揭示和解释了那些未患精神失常病的人们所具有的各种感情躁动和理智盲点。在弗洛伊德早期对于神经系统作用的关注中,这个理论具有服从因果律的物理的一面,但也有解释的一面;就这后一面说来,此理论通过找出被压抑的思想的起源来解释它们。这些被压抑的思想以梦、双关语和口语这些扭曲了的象征方式出现于意识中。对于心理分析家们而言,在分析阶段中的任何重要东西都可能处于公开意义的表层之下。

作为一种疗法,经典的心理分析从理想上讲是一种谈话治疗。在分析家和病人之间定期安排的谈话中,分析家的中立性使得病人可以唤出那些被压抑着的早年关系和感情,它们被认为是〔精神〕不正常的根源。分析家可以使用各种技巧,包括对梦的解释或自由联想,来得到那被压抑的东西。分析家分析病人所说的东西,试图从这些重新获得的材料中揭示出那些被压抑的无意识思想,它们被认为是病人所患疾病的原因。心理分析的主要目标是将被压抑的思想带入意识,而这种发现如被病人接受,就意味着治愈的开始。

弗洛伊德声称,心理分析是继哥白尼和达尔文的革命之后,对人类自视独特态度的第三次冲击。他相信它提供了解决人类本性问题的关键性的东西,并建议哲学应该纠正它长期以来偏重意识的失误。对于无意识心灵过程的发现将扩大我们关于自我的概念,大大提高人类的自知水平。弗洛伊德还运用心理分析方法来解释艺术和文化。

尽管这启发人的丰富性使心理分析差不多处于20世纪许多发展的中心,但它所有主要的理论和治疗实践的主张遭到了外部批评者与心理分析运动中的分裂者和持异端者的攻击。治疗成功的许诺在很大程度上得不到兑现。心理分析已被攻击为坏科学、伪科学和糟糕的人文学科;如何最合适地去描述它、估价它,依然是个让人争论不休的问题。某些心的哲学以及欧陆哲学的所有主要流派都受到心理分析的影响。

“心理分析意味着:(1)这样一个调查程序,它调查的物质过程以任何其他方法都几乎不可

assess the enterprise remains in dispute. Some philosophy of mind and almost all major schools of continental philosophy have been influenced by psychoanalysis.

"Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of material processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way; (2) of a method (based on that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 18, p. 235.

Psycholinguistics

An interdisciplinary science of psychology and linguistics, dealing mainly with individual psychological reality and the processes which determine the production, acquisition and learning of language. Although the name of this discipline appeared in 1895 in a book by the German scholar Meringer, the discipline did not flourish until the 1950s, marked by the publication of C. E. Osgood and T. A. Sebeok, eds, *Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems* (1954). The development of psycholinguistics is stipulated by Chomsky's work in linguistics and psychological cognitivism. Scholars disagree widely about the characterisation of this discipline and its main problems. But its basic tenet is to oppose the behavioural theory of language, to discover the psychological entities behind linguistic structures and to determine the competence beneath the performances of language-speakers. Recently its focus has been on the devices of language acquisition.

"Psycholinguistics is the study of the mental mechanisms that make it possible for people to use language. It is a scientific discipline whose goal is a coherent theory of the way in which language is produced and understood." — Garnham, *Psycholinguistics*, 1985, p. 1.

Psychological determinism

The view that human behaviour or action is determined by psychological events within the agent's mind, rather than by objective natural laws as physical determinism claims. What underlies this position is the dualist view of the relation between body and soul which was dominant in Greek philosophy and was fully articulated by Descartes. On this view, the body and soul are two distinct entities, with the soul governing the body. Psychological determinism denies that there is a problem of free will. Freedom is freedom from coercion and constraints, and an act is free if the agent performs it in accordance with the determination of the mind.

"Psychological determinism maintains that there are certain psychological laws, which we are beginning to discover, enabling us to predict, usually on the basis of his experiences in early infancy, how a man will respond to different situa-

达到; (2) 一种基于这种调查的方法, 用来诊治神经失常; (3) 通过这些进程得到的心理信息的集合, 它被逐渐地积累起来, 发展成为一门新的科学学科。" — 弗洛伊德: 《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》, 第十八卷, 第 235 页。

心理语言学

心理学与语言学的交叉学科, 主要讨论确定语言产生、获得和学习的个人心理现实和过程。虽然这个学科的名称早在 1895 年就出现在德国学者梅林格的著作中, 但这个学科本身直到 20 世纪 50 年代才得到兴起, 其标志就是由 C. E. 奥古德和 T. A. 西彪克编辑的《心理语言学: 理论与研究问题概观》(1954) 一书的出版。乔姆斯基在语言学和心理认识论方面的工作作为心理语言学的发展确立了方向。关于这个学科的特征和主要问题, 学者们并没有达成广泛的一致。但它的基本信念是要反对语言的行为理论, 发现语言结构之下的心理实体以及确定语言使用者活动的的能力。近年来, 它始终关注语言的获得机制。

"心理语言学是研究人们之所以能够使用语言的心理机制。这门科学的目标在于得到一种关于产生和理解语言之方式的连贯理论。" — 加纳姆: 《心理语言学》, 1985 年, 第 1 页。

心理决定论

这一观点认为, 人的行为或行动是由人内心的心理事件决定的, 而不是像物理决定论所说的那样是由客观的自然规律决定的。构成这一观点的基础是身体与灵魂关系的二元论观点, 后者曾在古希腊哲学中居支配地位, 并在笛卡尔的哲学中得到充分阐述。按照这一观点, 身体和灵魂是两个不同的实体, 灵魂支配身体。心理决定论否认自由意志问题的存在。自由是摆脱强迫和压制的自由。如果一个人是根据心的决定去行事, 那他的行动就是自由的。

"心理决定论强调存在某些心理规律, 这些规律是我们在开始时要发现的, 它们能使我们通常是基于一个人婴幼儿时期的经历去预测他在后来的人生中如何应付不同的情况。" — 鲁卡斯: 《意志的自由》, 1970 年, 第 65 页。

tions throughout his later life.”—Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970, p. 65.

Psychological egoism

The position that by nature people pursue what they believe to be in their self-interest and are by nature egoistic. Certainly, people may sacrifice their immediate and obvious self-interests but only if doing so is a means to a longer-term self-interested goal. This is a psychological theory about the dispositions and motivations of human nature, rather than an ethical position about the moral virtue of these motivations and their consequent behaviour. For this reason, ethical egoism is also called normative egoism. Psychological egoism provides a basis for ethical egoism, and if it is true, all versions of ethical altruism are psychologically groundless. Yet it is hard to prove that psychological egoism is true, and critics maintain that we are also motivated by non-egoistic desires.

“Psychological egoism... can be formulated as follows: A person can perform an act only if that act has at least as much agent utility as any alternative.”—Feldman, *Introductory Ethics*, 1978, p. 86.

Psychologism

A theory which became popular in the nineteenth century and was initiated by the German philosophers J. F. Fries and F. E. Beneke. According to its neo-Kantian position, psychology is the basis of philosophy and introspection is the primary method of philosophical enquiry. Every discipline in philosophy is nothing more than applied psychology. The view was especially associated with logic. In that area it rejected Kant's transcendental psychology as unscientific mystery mongering and claimed that logic is based upon the laws of thought which can be explained in terms of empirical psychological principles. It attempted to explain logical connections in terms of psychological causes and therefore tended to confuse logical issues and psychological issues. It had some connection with both British empiricism and naturalism. J. S. Mill and R. H. Lotze defended psychologism in their logic by claiming that introspection provides the only basis for the axioms of mathematics and the principles of logic. The position was severely criticised by Frege and Carnap, but has been revived in naturalised epistemology.

“Psychologism, that is, the explanation of sense in terms of some inner psychological mechanism possessed by the speaker.”—Dummett, *The Sea of Language*, 1993, pp. 101-2.

Psychologist's fallacy

William James' term for the confusion of a psychologist's own characterisations of a mental state with the actual features of the original mental state that he is

心理利己主义

这个观点认为,人出于本性追求他们认为是他们的自我利益的东西,故在本性上是利己的。无疑,人们也许会牺牲他们的直接明显的自我利益,但这样做的目的是充当长期自我利益目标的一个工具而已。这是一种关于人的性情与动机的心理理论,而不是关于这些动机和它们的行为后果的道德德性的伦理观点。因为这个原因,伦理利己主义也被称为规范利己主义。但心理利己主义为伦理利己主义提供了一个基础。假如它是正确的,所有的伦理利他主义的说法就没有心理学的根据。但难于证明它是正确的,批评家坚持认为,我们同样为非利己的欲望所驱动。

“心理利己主义……能够表述如下:只有当一个行动与任何其他选择相比对于行为者的功利至少是一样多时,一个人才能够实行这个行动。”——弗尔德曼:《伦理学导论》,1978年,第86页。

心理主义

一种在19世纪普遍流传的理论,由德国哲学家J. F. 弗里斯和F. E. 贝内克首创。这是一种新康德主义的立场,它认为,心理学是哲学的基础,内省是哲学探究的主要方法。哲学中的每个学科都只不过是应用心理学。这种看法与逻辑有着特殊的关系,在这里,它把康德的先验心理学视为非科学的迷信而加以抛弃,声称逻辑是以思想规律为基础的,而这些规律可以用经验心理学原理加以解释。它试图用心理学原因解释逻辑联结,因而往往混淆了逻辑问题与心理学问题。它与英国经验主义和自然主义有着某种联系。J. S. 密尔和R. H. 洛采都在自己的逻辑中捍卫心理主义,他们声称,内省为数学公理和逻辑原理提供了惟一基础。这个立场遭到了弗雷格和卡尔纳普的严厉批评,但在自然化的认识论中却得到了复兴。

“心理主义,即用说者具有的某个内在心理机制解释意义。”——达米特:《语言之海》,1993年,第101—102页。

心理学者谬误

W. 詹姆斯的术语,用以指对心理学者自身心的状态特征与他正在研究的原本心的状态的实际特征的混淆。这种谬误有不同表述,既可

studying. It has different formulations, and can refer either to a psychologist's relation to the experience of others or to a person's comments on his own experience. The fallacy also arises from the psychologist's failure to recognise the hierarchy of relations of an original mental state. A person who possesses such a mental state may report at a higher level, and the psychologist will comment in turn on the report. He will believe that the original mental state may only have the characteristics he defines within his theory and will take his own knowledge as the whole sphere of knowledge about the object. With the formulation of this fallacy, James claimed that there is a gap between theoretical constructs and the experience on which they are based.

"Another variety of the psychologist's fallacy is the assumption that the mental state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it." —James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. 1, p. 197.

Psycho-physical parallelism, see parallelism

Public choice

Also called social choice, an area of political philosophy that is heavily influenced by economic theory and concerns the establishment of a logic of rational social action, such as voting procedures, lobbying or electoral reform. Each individual is motivated to act by self-interest, and a rational choice is necessary for an action to achieve greatest advantage. However, under many circumstances, action has to be social and the rationality of individual choice has to depend on the rationality of the choices of other agents. Otherwise, a choice seeking the greatest consequence can turn out to obtain the worst outcome, as the prisoner's dilemma powerfully indicates. A major concern of public choice theory is to establish how rational agents might co-ordinate to achieve their mutual advantage. Since the public good is not the simple aggregate of individual goods, another aspect of public choice theory is to work out the strategy by which a society can generate a single rational and impartial choice to maximise public goods from the various rational preferences of individuals, although Kenneth Arrow has shown that on certain plausible assumptions this is not possible. Since democracy is based on such an ideal, public choice theory becomes important for virtually every operation of democracy.

"Public choice applies economists' method to politics, and in particular, to two central problems: the collective action problem and the problem of aggregating preferences." —McLean, *Public Choice*, 1987, p. 10.

Public goods

Goods which anyone may enjoy whether or not they pay for them, for instance police protection or traffic lights.

指心理学者与他人经验的关系,也可指一个人对自己经验的评论。这种谬误的产生也因为心理学者不能识别最初心的状态的关系层次结构。一个拥有这种心的状态的人可以在一更高的层次上报告,而心理学家再就基于前者的报告加以评述。于是他会相信最初心的状态只具有他在其理论中所定义的特性,因而把自己的知识当做关于这个对象的全部知识。詹姆斯通过对这一谬误的表述,意在指出在理论构造物和作为其基础的经验之间有着相当的差距。

“另一种心理学者谬误,是假定所研究的心状态对于自身的意识,必定与心理学者对它的意识一样。”——詹姆斯:《心理学原理》,1890年,第1卷,第197页。

心—物平行论

见“平行论”条。

公众选择

也被称为社会选择,是政治哲学的一个领域,它受到经济学理论的很大影响,涉及的是对诸如投票程序、游说或选举的改革这些合理的社会活动的逻辑确立。每一个人都是在个人利益的促使下去行动的,合理的选择对于取得最大利益的行为是必要的。可是,在很多情况下,行为都必须都是社会性的,个人的合理选择必须依赖于其他人选择的合理性。否则,追求最佳结果的选择就会最终得到最坏的结果,就如同因犯困境有力地表明的那样。公众选择理论关注的一个主要问题是确立理性的人能如何协调以实现他们的互利。由于公众的利益不是个人利益的简单相加,公众选择理论的另一面就是制定策略,据此,一个社会就能从个人的各种合理选择中产生一个单一合理而公正的选择以实现最大的公众的利益,尽管K.阿罗已表明,根据某些可能的假定,这是不可能的。由于民主是基于这样一种理想,公众选择理论实际上对每一民主制度的运行都是重要的。

“公众选择把经济学家的方法运用于政治学,特别是运用于两个中心问题:集体行为问题和集合的选择问题。”——麦克利恩:《公众选择》,1987年,第10页。

公共利益

任何人都可以享受的利益,而不管他们是否对这些利益做出过贡献,如警察的保护或交

They are not subjected to crowding, that is one person's enjoyment of a public good does not entail that other people will enjoy the good less. The problem of public goods is associated with that of the free rider, for if no one pays for enjoying them, the public goods will be difficult to maintain. As a result, either the quality of the goods will be reduced or these goods might be entirely withdrawn. Understanding the possibility of maintaining public goods is also a central concern of public choice theory.

"A pure public good is defined as a good requiring indivisibility of production and consumption, non rivalness and non-excludability." —McLean, *Public Choice*, 1987, p. 11.

Public morality

The sphere in which standards of human behaviour are enforced by the law and violations of this moral legislation are subject to punishment according to the criminal law. Murder and stealing, for instance, are matters for public morality. It is generally held that public morality is essential to the maintenance of communal existence. In contrast, private morality and law are different spheres, and violations of private moral principles are condemned but are not subject to the law. Sometimes the demarcation between public and private morality is not easy to draw, for example in the cases of prostitution and pornography. It is a matter of controversy on what grounds and to what extent a society has the right to enforce its prevailing morality.

"The public morality of a state consists partly of those central tenets of morality which no reasonable man, we think, can reasonably dissent from; and partly of those collective aspirations and ideals which the community, either implicitly in the course of its history, or explicitly by deliberate avowals, has collectively adopted or affirmed." —Lucas, *The Principles of Politics*, 1985, p. 318.

Public particulars, see objective particulars

Public /private dichotomy

The distinction between the public and private spheres amounts to a distinction between the political and the personal and between what falls under the law and what falls outside the law. The state and social power should not apply to the private sphere, which is the limit of the public institutions of law. Traditionally, the family, home and personal taste and preference are private or domestic matters. Religion sometimes joins these other concerns and is a sign that the distinction is not absolute. Whatever the boundaries, the invasion of the private sphere is considered shameful. In contrast, the public sphere is the domain of relationships which are subject to the regulations of law and political authority. The distinction between the public and the private is essential

通指示灯。它们不会出现拥挤的问题,一个人对公共利益的享受不会使其他人少享受它们。公共利益问题与只享受而不付酬报相关,因为如果没人为享受它们付酬报,公共利益就难以为继。其结果只能是,要么公共利益的质量会降低,要么这些利益可能就根本提供不了。对维持公共利益的可能性的理解也是公众选择理论的一个核心问题。

"纯粹的公共利益被定义为这样一种利益,这种利益要求生产和消费以及非竞争和非排他的不可分离。"——麦克利恩:《公众选择》,1987年,第11页。

公共道德

公共道德是这样—一个领域,在这一领域中,人们行为的准则是由法律所强制的,违反这一道德法规将根据刑法而受到制裁。例如,谋杀和偷窃就是公共道德的问题。一般认为,公共道德对维护共同的生存是必不可少的。相比之下,私人道德和法律则是两个不同的领域,违反私人道德原则会受到谴责,但不受法律的管辖。有时公共道德和私人道德之间的界限不容易区分,如卖淫和色情描写问题。社会根据什么和在多大程度上有权强制其流行的道德是一个有争议的问题。

"—一个国家的公共道德,部分地是由一些道德的核心原则构成的,这些原则我们认为没有一个有理性的人会对它们合理地持有异议;部分地是由一些已为公众接受和肯定的共同要求和理想构成,这些要求和理想或者隐含在其历史过程中,或者为有意的宣称所明确表述。"——鲁卡斯:《政治学原理》,1985年,第318页。

公共殊相

见“客观殊相”条。

公共和私人的两分法

公共领域和私人领域之间的区分,相当于政治领域和个人领域之间的区分、法律管辖之内的东西和法律管辖之外的东西的区分。国家和社会的权力不应运用于私人领域,这是对公共法律机构的限制。从传统上讲,家庭、住宅及个人的兴趣和偏爱是个人的或家里的事。宗教有时连接这些其他方面的事情,它表明这种区分不是绝对的。无论这种区分的界线是什么,对私人领域的侵犯都被认为是可耻的。相比之下,公共领域是受法律规范和政治权威支配的关系的领域。对自由主义理论而言,公共与私人的区分对于维护个人的隐私权和自由(虽然其他权利是基于公共领域的)及表明政治权威的合法

for liberal theory to maintain the privacy-based rights and freedom of the individual (although other rights are based in the public sphere) and to indicate the legitimate extent of political authority. The distinction is not respected in fascist and totalitarian systems.

The distinction is challenged by many feminists, who describe the public sphere as one of justice, autonomy and independence and the private sphere as one of care, nurturing and bonding. Feminists claim that the distinction is gender based, that it legitimates the exclusion of women from the public sphere, that it ignores domestic violence and male domination over women and children in the private sphere. Hence, feminism attempts to demolish this dichotomy or to remove it from patterns of domination.

"A clear dichotomy between the public (political and economic) and the private (domestic and personal) has been taken for granted, and only the former has been regarded as the appropriate sphere for developmental studies and theories of justice, respectively, to attach to." —Okin, in Nussbaum and Glover (eds), *Women, Culture and Development*, 1995, p. 179.

Punctuate property

Also called atomistic property, a property which is unique to the thing that possesses it, and is not shared by any other things. In contrast, an anatomic property or holistic property is a property possessed by at least two things. A major question in contemporary philosophy of language asks whether a semantic property can be punctuate.

"An atomistic or punctuate property is one which might, in principle, be instantiated by only one thing." —Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 1.

Punishment

Punishment contains three factors: (1) it is the infliction of harm to the wrongdoer; (2) this infliction is imposed by authority; (3) the authority imposes the infliction intentionally. Since punishment itself looks like a kind of harm, it requires a theoretical justification. Historically, there are two rival theories of the justification of punishment. The first is retributivism which claims that a wrongdoer deserves a punishment because it is in proportion to his offence. Through punishment, a society indicates its intolerance of certain types of behaviour committed by rational beings. Accordingly, punishment in itself is an intrinsic good. The second position is utilitarianism or consequentialism which claims that punishment itself is an evil, but it can be justified if this evil is outweighed by the good consequences of its results. These consequences include: the deterrence of the same offender from committing crime again, the prevention of others from doing the same wrong, and the rehabilitation of the offender. There is much debate about which of these

限度是至关重要的。这种区分在法西斯主义和极权主义制度中是不受尊重的。

这种区分受到很多女性主义者的挑战,她们把公共领域说成是公正的、自主的和独立的领域,而把私人领域说成是照管、养育和维系的领域。女性主义者认为,这一区分是以性别为基础的,它使将妇女排除在公共领域之外合法化,它无视私人领域里的家庭暴力和男人对妇女和儿童的统治。因此,女性主义者试图推翻这种两分法或使其摆脱支配的模式。

“公共的(政治的和经济的)和私人的(家庭的和个人的)之间明确的两分法一直被认为是理所当然的,而且只有前者一直被视为发展研究和正义理论分别隶属的适当的领域。”——奥肯,见纽斯堡姆和格洛弗(编):《妇女、文化和发展》,1995年,第179页。

精细特性

也称作“原子特性”,是指拥有它的事物唯一具有的那种特性,而其他任何事物都不具有这个特性。与之对应的是解剖特性或“整体特性”,这是至少为两个事物所拥有的特性。当代语言哲学中讨论的一个主要问题就是,语义特性是否能够是精细的。

“原子的或精细的特性在于,它原则上只能用一个事物加以说明。”——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第1页。

刑罚

刑罚包含三个因素:(1)它是对做坏事的人的伤害性的处罚;(2)这种处罚是由权力强加的;(3)这一权力是有意识地强加那种处罚的。由于刑罚本身看上去是一种伤害,它要求一种理论上证明其是正当的理由。从历史上看,有两种争论不休的有关刑罚的正当性的理论。第一种是惩罚主义,它主张做坏事的人应受刑罚,因为这与他的罪过是相称的。通过刑罚,一个社会表明它对有理性的人的某些行为是不能容忍的。因此,刑罚就其本身而言是一种内在的善。第二种主张是功利主义或后果主义,它认为刑罚本身是恶的,但如果这种恶在价值上为其所导致的好的后果所超过,它就可以被认为是正当的。这些后果包括:制止同一犯罪者再次犯罪,防止其他人犯同样的罪行,以及使犯罪者从新做人。对在正当的刑罚中这些后果中的哪一种应置于优先地位,人们有很大的争议。这两种立场为得到承认而相互争论。惩罚主义认为,假

consequences should have priority in justifying punishment. These two positions have vied with one another for acceptance. According to retributivism, an utilitarian position could lead to the punishment of the innocent provided that it can produce better consequences. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, charges retributivism with cruelty, for it favours harm and suffering even if it does not produce any good. Various proposals have been advanced to reconcile the conflict between retributivism and utilitarianism concerning punishment, but they are generally unconvincing. One influential suggestion is that utilitarianism should be appealed to when we justify the need of a society for a system of punishment, and retributism should be appealed to if we need to justify the punishment of a particular person in a particular way.

"Let us describe punishment as simply an authority's infliction of a penalty on an offender, and now allow an offender to be a man who has broken a rule out of intention or negligence, or a man who has broken certain rules out of neither, or a man who occupies a certain position of authority with respect to a rule-breaker in either of the preceding sense." Honderich, *Punishment*, 1989, p. 19.

Pure

In Kant's philosophy, something which is independent of experience. It is associated with terms such as transcendental, form, spontaneity, autonomy, original, *a priori* and rational and contrasts with terms such as empirical, matter, receptivity, heteronomy, derived, *a posteriori* and sensational. Kant also used pure as an adjective to qualify terms such as apperception, concept, intuition, principle, reason, representation.

"A priori modes of knowledge are entitled pure when there is no admixture of anything empirical." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B3.

Pure apperception, see transcendental apperception

Pure concepts of reason, see idea (Kant)

Pure ego theory

Locke claimed that we do not know the substance which is the bearer of all attributes and only recognise its existence through its various attributes. The pure ego theory of the self is the application of this epistemological and metaphysical claim to the problem of the self. The theory holds that the self itself is unknown, for it is outside experience, yet we know of its existence through its manifestations. A pure ego is the substance of all psychological attributes, and is the grammatical subject of all psychological statements. It is a

如刑罚能产生更好的后果,那功利主义的主张就会导致刑罚无辜。另一方面,功利主义则指责惩罚主义残酷,因为后者赞同伤害和使人痛苦,即使在处罚并不导致任何好的结果的情况下也是如此。调和惩罚主义与功利主义二者在刑罚问题上的分歧的各种尝试已经提出,但一般说来都不能让人信服。一种有影响的建议是,当我们论证一个社会需要一种刑罚制度时需求助于功利主义,如果我们需要论证对某人处以某种刑罚时则应求助于惩罚主义。

"让我们把刑罚简单地描述为权力对犯罪者实行的一种处罚,那犯罪者就可以是一个故意或因疏忽触犯了法规的人,或一个既不是故意也不因疏忽触犯法规的人,或一个与前两种意义上的触犯法规者相关的掌握某种权力的人。"——洪德里奇:《惩罚》,1989年,第19页。

纯粹

在康德哲学中,它指某种独立于经验的东西。它常常与下列术语相关联:先验、形式、自发性、自律、本源的、先天的和理性的等,而与它相对的是这样的术语:经验的、质料、接受性、他律、派生的、后天的和感性的。“纯粹”在康德那里也用作形容词来修饰限制统觉、概念、直觉、原理、理性、表象等术语。

“知识的先天方式如果未混杂有任何经验的东西时,使命之曰纯粹。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B3。

纯粹统觉

见“先验统觉”条。

理性纯粹概念

见“观念(康德)”条。

纯自我理论

洛克声称,我们并不了解那个具有所有属性的实体,我们只通过其各种属性来认识其存在。关于自我的纯自我理论是这一认识论的和形而上学主张在自我问题上的应用。这一理论主张,自我本身是未知的,因为它在经验之外,但我们通过它的表现而得知它的存在。一个纯自我是那个具有所有的心理属性的实体,在语法上是所有的心理陈述的主语。它是一个支持在自我的一段短暂历史中的各种事件的整体性

peculiar constituent which supports the unity of the various events in one temporal slice of the history of a self, and it is the unity of the successive slices of the total history of a self. Such a pure ego is an inferred entity, which is posited because there must be something which underlies and supports various modes of experience. We may call it the I, the self, the ego or the subject. The totality of states of the same mind belong to this pure ego and it persists as long as the mind persists. This theory can be contrasted to the bundle theory. A major difficulty faced by pure ego theory is how to account for the knowledge of one's own self. Kant's claim that the "I think" which accompanies all our representations is not an object and Wittgenstein's critical assessment of the metaphysical subject might help us to retain the self without requiring that it is a pure substantial basis for our experiences.

"The pure ego theory preserves the unity and the endurance of the self, but it does so at the cost of making the self non-experiential, and that is at odds with our native knowledge of ourselves." —Evans, *The Subject of Consciousness*, 1970, p. 30.

Pure hypothetical syllogism, see mixed hypothetical syllogism

Pure reason, see *Critique of Pure Reason*

Pure theory of law

A theory developed by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen and philosophically based on Neo-Kantianism. The theory is pure in the sense that the law should be a universally valid system that is free of all that is changeable and yet able to give ideals which guide lawyers in the search for justice. All moral, political and sociological contents must be purged from the science of law. According to Kelsen, law is a system of norms, a hierarchy of normative relations which measures human conduct by the use of sanction. The legal norms constitute a relation of condition and sequence rather than a command. "If A is done, B ought to happen". The validity of legal norms is not based on conflicting authorities, but is ultimately derived from a basic norm (*Grundnorm*) which is postulated in the historically first constitution. The validity of the basic norm is not derived, but must be assumed as an initial hypothesis. Legal theory is concerned with the conceptual tools for analysing the relations between the fundamental norms and all lower norms within a legal system. It is not concerned with its moral content, which should be the subject-matter of politics or moral theory. On this basis, Kelsen attacked natural law theory, which insists on a necessary connection between law and morality. He drew a sharp distinction between "is" and "ought", and denied the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge of legal

的特殊组成成分, 又是自我的整个历史的相继片段的整体。这样一个纯自我是一个推断的存在物, 它之被假定是因为一定要有某种东西支持各种形式的经验。我们可以称之为我、自我或主体等等。同一个心的诸种状态的整体属于这个纯自我并且这个纯自我与心持续的时间一样长。这一理论可与捆束理论相对照。纯自我理论所面临的主要困难, 在于如何说明一个人关于自己的自我的知识。康德认为, 那伴随我们一切表征的“我认为”不是一个对象, 而维特根斯坦则对形而上学主体做了批判考察, 他们的观点或许可以帮助我们保留自我, 而不要求它是我们经验的纯实体性基础。

“纯自我理论维护自我的统一和持续, 但它这样做的代价是使自我变成非经验的东西, 而这与我们关于自己的朴素知识是相左的。”

埃文斯:《意识的主体》, 1970年, 第30页。

纯假言三段论

见“混合的假言三段论”条。

纯粹理性

见“《纯粹理性批判》”条。

纯粹法学

奥地利法哲学家H. 凯尔逊创立的一种理论, 其哲学基础是新康德主义。这一理论在这样一种意义上是纯粹的, 即法律应当是一种普遍有效的体系, 这一体系摆脱了一切可变的東西, 但能提供指导律师寻求正义的理想。所有道德的、政治的和社会学的内容都必须从法律科学中清除出去。在凯尔逊看来, 法律是一个规范的体系, 是运用制裁来衡量人类行为的规范关系的等级结构。法律规范构成一种条件和结果的关系而不是一种命令。“如果做了A, B就应该发生”。法律规范的效力不是基于冲突的权力, 而是最终起源于历史上第一部宪法中所要求的“基本规范”(Grundnorm)。这种基本规范的效力不是派生的, 但必须被假定为最初的前提条件。法学理论涉及的是用来分析一个法律体系中的基本规范和所有低级规范之间关系的概念工具。它不涉及道德内容, 后者应是政治学或道德理论的主题。以此为基础, 凯尔逊攻击了坚持认为法律和道德之间有必然联系的自然法理论。他在“是”与“应当”之间做了截然的区分, 并否认获取法律规范的客观性知识的可能性。法律科学是描述性的而不是规定性的。凯尔逊的纯粹法学是20世纪最有影响的法学理论之一, 他的探讨类似奥斯汀的分析的法理学, 并为

norms. The science of law is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Kelsen's pure theory of law is one of the most influential legal theories in the twentieth century. His approach is similar to Austin's analytical jurisprudence, and was further developed by H. L. A. Hart.

"A pure theory of law must be uncontaminated by politics, ethics, sociology, history. Its task is knowledge of all that is essential and necessary to law, and therefore freed from all that is changing and accidental in it." —Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, 1967, p. 275.

Purely referential, see referentially opaque

Pyrrhonism, see scepticism

Pythagoreanism

Philosophy of the Greek philosopher Pythagoras and his followers. Little literature exists to enable us to present a systematic picture of this philosophy or even to distinguish Pythagoras' own view from those of his followers. Generally, Pythagoreanism is a mixture of religion and science. It accepted the transmigration of the soul and enjoined the practice of an ascetic way of life. The aim of philosophy was to purify the soul. Through its study in mathematics, music, and astronomy, Pythagoreanism derived the doctrine that number is the first principle of all things and that the whole universe is a harmony. Accordingly, it held that everything could be explained in mathematical terms. All this deeply influenced Euclid, Empedocles and especially Plato. In the first century BC there was a revival of Pythagoreanism, usually called Neo-Pythagoreanism, which concentrated on the mystical and superstitious side of Pythagoreanism and its reverence for number. This revival had great impact on Neo-platonism.

"With Pythagoreanism begins the transformation of the Greek mode of thought by a foreign element which originated in the Orphic mysticism." —Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, 1980, p. 3.

H. L. A. 哈特进一步发展。

“纯粹法学肯定没有被政治学、伦理学、社会学和历史学所污染。它的任务是认识所有对法律说来是本质的和必然的东西,因此,它也就摆脱了其中所有变化的和偶然的东西。” 弗里德曼:《法学理论》,1967年,第275页。

纯指称

见“指称上的隐晦”条。

皮浪主义

见“怀疑主义”条。

毕达戈拉斯主义

指希腊哲学家毕达戈拉斯及其追随者的哲学。由于所存文献极少,我们很难对该派哲学作系统描述,甚至要将毕达戈拉斯本人的观点与其追随者的观点相区分也不是一件容易的事。一般地说,毕达戈拉斯主义是科学与宗教的混合物。它相信灵魂轮回,实践一种禁欲的生活方式。哲学的目的被认为是净化灵魂。通过它在数学、音乐和天文学等领域的研究,毕达戈拉斯主义主张,数是万物的第一原则(本原),并且整个宇宙是一种和谐。据此,一切事物都用数学术语来解释。所有这些深深地影响了欧几里德、恩培多克勒,尤其是柏拉图。在公元前1世纪,有一场毕达戈拉斯主义的复兴运动,通常叫做“新毕达戈拉斯主义”。新毕达戈拉斯主义集中发展毕达戈拉斯主义的神秘的和超自然的方面,尤其是后者对数的崇拜。这场复兴运动对新柏拉图主义影响甚巨。

“从毕达戈拉斯主义开始,希腊思想方式由于受到起自奥尔菲神秘主义的外来因素的影响而发生变化。” —策勒:《希腊哲学史纲要》,1980年,第3页。

Q

Quadrivium

The liberal arts curriculum in the medieval university consisted in seven disciplines, which were divided into a lower division of *trivium*, including grammar, rhetoric and logic, and a higher division of *quadrivium*, including geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. The former is concerned with the art of discussion, and the latter is concerned with the physical world and its principles. The *quadrivium* was studied after the study of the *trivium* was completed. Virtually every graduate of a medieval university received a training in these seven subjects.

"The *quadrivium*-geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music-constituted a 'scientific' syllabus, summarising the principles of order in the physical world." - Haren, *Medieval Thought*, p. 68.

Quale, singular of qualia

Qualia

[the plural of quale, from Latin; *qualis*, of such a kind or qualities]. The immediately experienced contents or objects of sense-awareness, giving what it feels like to have a sensation or to be in a perceptual state. Qualia, which include things such as the smell of coffee or the taste of sugar, are also called phenomenal properties. Qualia are neither intentional nor representational. How to understand the nature of qualia has been a matter of debate. Different accounts have been developed on the basis of different analyses of sense-data. The term was introduced by C. I. Lewis and Goodman for the simplest qualitative elements in the contents of sense-experience. Ayer claims that a quale should be distinguished from a sensory particular which is confined to a momentary episode of awareness. Instead a quale is a sensory universal, intersubjective and repeatable. It can be empirically realised in different minds and at different times.

"My qualia, then, are visual or other sensory patterns. I conceive of their range as being very wide. Anything counts as a quale that a person is able to pick out as a recurrent or potentially recurrent feature of his sense-experiences, from a two-dimensional colour expanse to a complex three-dimensional gestalt." - Ayer, *The Origins of Pragmatism*, 1968, p. 309.

四艺

在中世纪的大学中，学艺的课程由七门学科组成，分为低级和高级两段，低级的是 *trivium*（三艺），包括语法、修辞和逻辑，高级的是四艺，包括几何、算术、天文和音乐。前段涉及的是讨论的艺术，后段涉及的则是物理世界及其原理。“四艺”要在“三艺”的学习完成之后才能进行。实际上，中世纪大学的每个毕业生都接受了这七门功课的训练。

“四艺（即几何、算术、天文和音乐）构成了一张‘科学的’课表，因为它扼要讲授了物质世界中秩序的原理。” 哈仁：《中世纪思想》，第 68 页。

感受性

“感受性 (qualia)” 的单数。

感受性

「quale 的复数，源自拉丁文 *qualis*，是这种的或具有这样的性质的」指直接经验到的内容或感觉意识的对象，亦即具有一个感觉或处于一个知觉状态的样子。诸如咖啡的气味、糖的味道，这样的感受性也被称为“现象特性”。感受性既不是意向的，也不是表征的。如何理解感受性的本质一直是一个有争论的话题。基于对“感觉材料”的不同分析，人们提出了不同的解释。这一术语由 C. I. 刘易斯和古德曼引进，指感觉经验的内容中最简单的性质元素。艾耶尔声称，一个感受性应当与一个局限于意识的瞬间情节的感觉殊相相区别。一个感受性是一个普遍的、主体间的、可重复的感觉。它可以在不同的时刻、在不同的心中经验地实现。

“因此，我的感受性是视觉的或其他感觉模式的。我设想它们的范围是非常广的。从二维的颜色平面到复杂的三维格式塔，一个人由其感觉经验中所能看到的任何再发的或潜在再发的特征都是一个感受性。”——艾耶尔：《实用主义的起源》，1968 年，第 309 页。

Qualified good

Kant's distinction between qualified good and unqualified good contrasts with the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic goods drawn by utilitarianism. For Kant, many goods are intrinsic, such as pleasure, the absence of pain and happiness in general, because they are not for further ends. But they are still goods with qualification, rather than goods which are absolute or unqualified. Even happiness is good only when it is deserved and is not good if it is enjoyed by a bad person who does not deserve it. Many other traditional goods, such as moderation or courage, can be put to bad use under some circumstances. Kant held that the only unqualified good, which is good whatever the circumstances, is a good will and that other goods always presuppose a good will.

"Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of a person. But they are far from being rightly called good without qualification... For without the principles of a good will, they can become extremely bad." —Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 394.

Quality of life

The degree of satisfaction or happiness in one's life. A traditional version of utilitarianism claims that the quality of life should be assessed by utility according to an objective measure such as GNP per capita. But this raises problems, because even with utility there are problems about its distribution and its bearing on people's life. It seems that many other indicators have to be included, such as health care, education, social and natural environments, life expectancy, the legal privileges one enjoys and the freedom one has. Furthermore, in many cases the quality of life seems to be a subjective matter about how one feels about one's life, without regard to external conditions. A person could be very happy in a situation which others judge to be miserable. Accordingly, it is a matter of dispute whether there is a unique standard of requirements which leads to a better quality of life the more completely it is satisfied. In discussions of euthanasia and suicide, some philosophers ask whether it is morally permissible to terminate a life that is not worth living in terms of quality of life.

"When we inquire about the prosperity of a nation or a region of the world, and about the quality of life of its inhabitants, Sissy Jupe's problem still arises: how do we determine this? What information do we require? Which criteria are truly relevant to human 'thriving'?" —Nussbaum and Sen (eds), *The Quality of Life*, 1993, p. 1.

有条件的善

康德作出的有条件的善和无条件的善的区别,与功利主义作出的工具的善和内在的善的区别相对照。对于康德来说,许多善是内在的,如愉快、没有痛苦和一般的幸福,因为它们不是为了更进一步的目。但它们仍然是有条件的善,不是绝对的或无条件的。因为,即使幸福是善的也只有当它是应得的时候,如果幸福被那些不应得到它的坏人获得,那么幸福就不是善的。许多其他传统的善,如节制,勇敢等等,在某些情况下也可以服务于恶。康德认为,惟一的无条件的善,即在任何情况下都保持为善的惟一的东西,乃是善良意志,其他的善永远以善良意志为条件。

“节制情欲,情感适度,自持自制,深思熟虑不仅在许多方面来看是善的,而且甚至看来构成了一个人的内在价值的一部分。但它们远不能说成是无条件的善……因为不以善良意志为原则,它们就会变成极端的恶。”——康德:《道德形而上学基础》,第394页。

生活质量

对人生活的满意或幸福的程度。传统的功利主义观点认为,生活质量应根据一种客观的尺度,如人均国民生产总值由功利来评估。但这引起了问题,因为即使就功利来说,也还存在有关它的分配以及它对人生活的影响问题。看起来还有很多其他指标必须包括进去,如保健、教育、社会和自然环境、估计寿命、所享受的法律特权以及所拥有的自由。此外,在很多情况下,生活质量似乎只是一个主观的问题,即只是一个人如何感受其生活的问题,而与外部条件无关。一个人在其他人看来是悲惨的境况下也可以是非常愉快的。因此,是否存在一个惟一的导致令人更完全满意的更好的生活质量的要求标准,是一个有争议的问题。在有关安乐死和自杀的讨论中,一些哲学家提出了这样一个问题:在一个人就其生活质量而言已不值得活下去的情况下,从道德上讲是否允许结束他的生命?

“当我们询问一个国家或世界的一个地区的繁荣,以及其居民的生活质量时,S.朱佩的问题还会出现:我们如何确定这个问题?我们所需的信息是什么?哪一标准是真正与人的‘繁荣’相关的?”——纽斯堡姆和森(编):《生活质量》,1993年,第1页。

Quantifier

In categorical propositions of standard form, "some" is a quantifier for particular propositions and "all" or "no" are quantifiers for universal propositions. Modern predicate logic calls "some" the existential quantifier and "all" the universal quantifier. The existential quantifier is symbolised as $(\exists x)$, which reads "there is at least one x that..." or "for some x ...". The universal quantifier is symbolised as (x) or $(\forall x)$, which reads "for any x ..." or "for all x ...". Quantifiers are employed in sentences with variables (x, y, \dots), predicates (F, G, \dots), relations (R, \dots), the identity sign ($=$) and the logical constants (and, or, not, if-then...), $(\exists x)(\exists y)$ (if Fx and Gy , then $x = y$) reads "For some x and for some y , if x is F and y is G , then x is identical with y ". The individual or multiple use of the universal quantifier "all" and the existential quantifier "there exists" to bind variables in sentences has been seen as the key to the development of a powerful and flexible system of modern predicate logic. Quantifiers can occur more than once in a statement, for example "All human beings have some ancestors". The application of the quantifier, called quantification, turns an open sentence with unbound variables into a closed sentence in which the variables are bound with quantifiers. There is debate whether quantifiers can bind items other than individual variables, such as predicate, relational or sentential variables.

"Usual notations for these respective purposes are ' (x) ' and ' $(\exists x)$ ', conveniently read 'everything x is such that' and 'something x is such that'. These prefixes are known, for unobvious but traceable reasons, as quantifiers, universal or existential." —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 163.

Quantum theory

A modern physical theory, developed by Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg and Schrödinger to deal with the structure and behaviour of sub-atomic particles. According to quantum theory, in the subatomic world the position and velocity of an electron at any moment can be known only with mutually related uncertainty. Newton's theory of causality does not apply in the microworld. For sub-atomic particles, we can specify neither the energy at a particular time nor the momentum at a particular position with precision. We can, however, calculate the energy over a period of time or the momentum over a range of positions. This lack of certainty at a fundamental physical level establishes a new picture of reality and seriously undermines the classical conceptions of particle and thing. The principle "every event has a cause" is no longer true *a priori*. If the theory of relativity challenges the traditional concepts of time and space, quantum mechanics challenges the traditional conceptions of physical causality and determinism. Although the theory has had great empirical success, interpreting the theory and explaining why it

量词

在标准形式的直言命题中，“有些”是一个用于特称命题的量词，而“所有”或“没有”是用于全称命题的量词。现代谓词逻辑称“有些”为存在量词，称“所有”为全称量词。存在量词用符号 $(\exists x)$ 表示，读作“至少存在一个 x ……”或“对有些 x ……”。而全称量词用符号表示为 (x) 或 $(\forall x)$ ，意思是“对于所有 x ……”或“对任何 x ……”。量词被运用于带有变项 (x, y ……)，谓词 (F, G ……)，关系 (R, \dots)，等号 ($=$) 和逻辑常项 (与、或、非、如果……则) 等的句子中。 $(\exists x)(\exists y)$ (如果 Fx 与 Gy ，则 $x = y$) 读作“对于有些 x 和有些 y ，如果 x 是 F 并且 y 是 G ，那么 x 等于 y ”。全称量词“所有”和存在量词“存在”的单独或复合使用以使变项在句子中连接起来，被视为发展出一个有力的灵活的现代谓词逻辑系统的关键。量词在陈述中可以不止一次地出现，例如“所有的人都是一些先辈”。量词的应用称作量化，它使带有无约束变量的开语句变为闭语句，其中变量为量词所约束。关于量词是否能连接不同于个体变量的其他变量，如谓词、关系或句子变量，则仍有争议。

“对于这些不同意义的通常记号为 ' (x) ' 和 ' $(\exists x)$ '，方便地读作 '每一个 x 如何如何' 和 '有些 x 如何如何'。这些前缀出于不明显的但可探寻的理由，被称作量词，即全称量词或存在量词。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第163页。

量子理论

由普朗克、波尔、海森堡和薛定谔提出和发展的现代物理学理论，研究微观粒子的行为和结构。按照量子理论，在微粒世界中，一个电子在任何时刻的位置和速度只能以相关的不确定性来认识。牛顿的因果性理论不能应用于微观世界。对于微观粒子，我们既不能精确地测定特定时刻的能量，也不能精确地测定特定位置的动量。然而，我们能预测一段时间内的能量或一个区间位置的动量。在基础物理学层次上缺乏确定性这件事情，建立了一幅新的实在图像并严重地破坏了粒子和物的古典概念。“一切事件都有原因”的原理不再是先天的真理。如果相对论是对传统的时间和空间概念的挑战，那么，量子力学就是对传统的物理因果性和决定论概念的挑战。虽然这个理论已经在经验上取得了巨大的成功，但对这个理论的解释和阐明它为什么成功一直处于激烈的论争之中。在传统上，一直存在着两个阵营。哥本哈根派的解释是以波尔和海森堡的观点为基础而发展起来的，它提

succeeds have been matters of fierce debate. Traditionally, there have been two camps. The Copenhagen interpretation, developed on the basis of the views of Bohr and Heisenberg, offers an anti-realist interpretation, which claims that quantum theory does not describe the way the world is. The rival realist interpretation, developed from Einstein's criticism of Bohr and defended by Popper and Putnam, argues that a quantum system is really fully determinate like classical systems, even though our knowledge of the system is indeterminate.

"Quantum theory gives us a highly workable algorithm for making prediction about the results of measurements, but philosophers and physicists are in total disagreement about what, . . . quantum theory tells us about the way the quantum world is." —Gibbins, *Particles and Paradoxes*, 1987, p. x.

Quasi-syntactical sentence, see pseudo-object sentence

Quaterno terminorum, the Latin name for the four-term fallacy

Quid facti, see deduction (Kant)

Quid juris, see deduction (Kant)

Quidditas

[from Latin: *quid*, what, and *quidditas*, whatness, quiddity]. The essential characteristic or nature of a thing, the nature which makes a thing the kind of thing it is. *Quidditas* serves as the content of definition and as the object of *intellectus*. It is a synonym of *essentia* (essence). To discover *quidditas* is to answer the question *quid est?* (What is it?). Duns Scotus contrasted *quidditas* to *haecceitas*, that is a unique essence or individual form which determines a thing's individuality.

"The proper object of the intellect is the whatness of things (*quidditas*)."—Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a85, 6.

Quine-Duhem thesis, see Duhem-Quine thesis

出了反实在论的解释,认为量子理论并不描述世界存在的方式。与其对立的实在论的解释是从爱因斯坦对波尔的批评而发展起来的,由波普和普特南加以辩护,他们认为,量子体系实际上像古典体系一样是完全确定的,即使我们对这个体系的认识是不确定的。

“量子理论为对测量结果作出预测而给我们提供了高度可操作的计算方法,但哲学家和物理学家对此意见分歧,……量子理论告诉我们关于量子世界存在的方式。”——吉宾斯:《粒子和悖论》,1987年,第x页。

准句法语句

见“伪对象语句”条。

四词项谬误

“四词项谬误 (four term-fallacy)”的拉丁名称。

事实问题

见“演绎 (康德)”条。

权利问题

见“演绎 (康德)”条。

本是

[源自拉丁语 *quid*, 意为“什么”, *quidditas* 指“什么性质”,通常译为“本是” (quiddity)] 它是一物的本质特征或本性,这个本性使一物成为它所是的那类事物。本是用作定义的内涵和理智的对象。它是本质 (*essentia*) 的同义语。发现本是是为了回答 *quid est?* (它是什么?) 的问题。D. 司各脱把它对比于此在,即决定一物个体性的独有本质或个体形式。

“理智的适当对象是事物的本是。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,1a85, 6。

奎因—杜恒论题

见“杜恒—奎因论题”条。

R

Racism

The claim that there is a biologically determined hierarchy of capacity or value among different races and that allegedly inferior races should be ruled by allegedly superior races. Racism is generally driven by fear and hatred and has led to major genocidal violence. Modern European racism can be traced to the eighteenth century, along with the emergence of anthropology as a discipline that compares and evaluates racial differences. This development, however, was preceded by similar patterns in the period of discovery and conquest of non-European peoples which began at the end of the fifteenth century. Racism has often been presented as a scientific enterprise, but its notion of race and its empirical claims about different peoples have repeatedly been shown to be unjustified and it is best understood as a pseudo-science. Racism has been particularly identified with the ideology and practice of slavery and other repressive control of African, Asian and indigenous American and Australian peoples. Historically, racism was employed to justify colonialism and imperialism and to destroy indigenous people and their culture. Racism is related to anti-semitism and in Germany was the intellectual foundation of Nazism. Theories attending to economic, cultural, historical, social or universal human factors have sought to explain the conditions under which racism arises and why it provides such deep and powerful motives for destructive action. Colonial studies and post-colonial studies place these questions in historical context. All forms of racism are dangerous in practice, for they tend to create the inequalities between people that they claim to discover. Some philosophers try to determine whether oppression based on class, race or gender is most fundamental to understanding modern society and culture.

"Most definitions of racism tend to be based on the concept of biologically determined superiority of one human population, group or race over another." - Castles, *Here for Good*, 1984, p. 194.

Radical empiricism

William James' characterisation of his empirical doctrine, which has three basic facets: a postulate that only things definable in terms drawn from experience are debatable; a statement of fact that the relations between things are as much matters of direct particular experience as the things themselves; and a generalised conclusion that the parts of ex-

种族主义

声称在不同种族中存在一种由生物学决定的能力或价值的等级, 所谓的劣等种族应由所谓的优等种族来统治。种族主义通常受恐惧和憎恨所驱使, 并造成了大规模的灭绝种族的暴力行为。现代欧洲种族主义可以追溯到 18 世纪, 随之出现的是作为一门比较和评价种族差异的学科的人类学。不过, 在这一发展之前在 15 世纪末开始的对非欧洲人的发现和征服期间已有类似模式。种族主义常常装扮成科学事业, 但它的种族概念和它对不同人民的经验论断已反复表明它是荒谬的, 它最好被理解为伪科学。种族主义特别是指对非洲、亚洲、土著美洲和澳大利亚各族人民的奴隶制的思想和行为以及其他高压控制。从历史上看, 种族主义被用于为殖民主义和帝国主义以及毁灭土著人及其文化做辩护。种族主义与反犹太主义相关, 在德国, 它是纳粹主义的思想基础。那些关注经济、文化、历史、社会或普遍人类因素的理论已在试图说明种族主义产生的条件, 以及为什么它为毁灭性的行为提供了如此深入和强有力的动机。殖民地研究和后殖民地研究将这些问题置于历史联系之中。所有形式的种族主义在实践中都是危险的, 因为它们倾向在它们声称发现的人民之间制造不平等。某些哲学家试图确定, 基于阶级、种族或性别的压制对于理解现代社会和文化是否是最根本的。

"大多数种族主义的定义倾向于以生物决定意义上的一种人、一个集团或一个种族对另一的优越性概念为基础。" —— 卡索斯: 《追求善》, 1984 年, 第 194 页。

彻底的经验主义

W. 詹姆斯对其经验主义学说的表述, 具有三个基本层面: 公设——只有可用得自于经验的语句来定义的事物才是可争辩的; 事实陈述——事物之间的关系如同事物自身一样是直接的特定经验的对象; 一般结论——经验的各部分由其自身也是经验部分的关系, 而得以彼

perience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. Experience is pure and needs no trans-empirical support. The radical nature of this empiricism is in its conclusion which takes experience to be something neither mental nor physical. Instead experience becomes the ultimate constituent of the universe out of which material and mental things are constructed. This is a position developed later by Russell in his *Analysis of Mind* as neutral monism. Radical empiricism is distinguished from traditional empiricism through denying the distinction between our sensations and external objects. James tried to provide a new account of knowledge and a solution to the mind-body problem. He called his position "radical", not because it was extreme, but because it attempts to remedy the defects he saw in traditional empiricism, namely its failure to include the relations of experience within the basic contents of experience. He also tried to reconcile empiricism and rationalism using his distinction between rough-minded and tender-minded temperaments. James claimed that his radical empiricism and his pragmatism do not entail one another. However, commentators usually conclude that at least some features of pragmatism lend support to radical empiricism.

Feyerabend used the term radical empiricism for the position that science should employ a single set of mutually consistent theories and reject theoretical pluralism.

"I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which I give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail." James, *The Meaning of Truth*, 1909, p. xii.

Radical feminism

The belief that dominant political and social systems are characterised by oppression and that male oppression of women has provided the model for all other forms of oppression, such as racial or class oppression. The material condition of the subjection of women lies in their role in reproduction. Women are always slaves or objects, and men are always masters or subjects. Radical feminists argue that rape, pornography, prostitution, marriage and heterosexuality are all imposed by male power over women, either directly or through a range of indirect stratagems. They claim that the relationship between male and female must always be conflictual. Radical feminism seeks to analyse the roots of the oppression of women by men and to uncover the various ways in which male power is exercised, with the desire that such understanding will lead to drastic political and social reforms. This position was initiated by de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949), which was influenced by Sartre's existentialism. Other influential works include Figs' *Patriarchal Attitude* (1978), Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex* (1971), Greer's *The Female Eunuch* (1970), and Millett's *Sexual*

此结合为一体。经验是纯粹的,不需要超经验的支持。这种经验主义的彻底性,在于它的结论把经验看做既非心理的,也非物理的东西。相反,经验成为物的和心的东西得以构造的宇宙的终极要素。这一观点后来为罗素在其《心的分析》一书中发展为“中立一元论”。彻底的经验主义有别于传统经验主义之处,在于否认我们的感觉与外部对象之间的区别。詹姆斯试图提供一种新的知识说明和对心-身问题的解决。他称其立场为“彻底的”,并非因为它是极端的,而是因为它意在弥补他所认为的传统经验主义的缺陷,即没能把经验的关系也包括在经验的基本内容之中。他也试图用他所区分的讲究实际的和崇尚空想的这两种不同研究风格,来调和经验论与唯理论。詹姆斯宣称他的彻底经验主义与他的实用主义并不彼此蕴涵,但评论者一般认为实用主义的某些特征至少部分支持着彻底经验主义。

费耶阿本德用彻底的经验主义这一术语,指那种认为科学应当采用单一组彼此相一致的理论而反对理论多元化的立场。

“我感兴趣的是另一种我称之为彻底经验主义的哲学学说,依我看,实用主义真理论的确立是使彻底经验主义流行起来的具有头等重要性的一步。”——詹姆斯:《真理的意义》,1909年,第xii页。

激进的女性主义

认为占主导地位的政治和社会制度是以压迫为特征的,男人对妇女的压迫为所有其他形式的压迫,如种族和阶级压迫提供了模式。妇女从属地位的物质条件在于她们在生殖中的角色。妇女总是奴隶或客体,而男人则总是主人或主体。激进的女性主义者争论说,强奸、色情描写、卖淫、婚姻和异性爱都是由男人对妇女的权力所强加的,不管这种强加是直接的还是通过一系列间接的策略。她们认为男人和女人之间的关系必然总会发生冲突。激进的女性主义力图分析男人压迫女人的根源,揭示男人权力运用的各种方式,并期望这种理解将导致激烈的政治和社会变革。这一主张是由波伏娃在她的《第二性》(1949)一书中首先提出的,它受到萨特的存在主义的影响。其他有影响的著作包括费格斯的《家长的态度》(1978)、费尔斯通的《性辩证法》(1971)、格内尔的《女太监》(1970)和米勒特的《性政治学》(1985)。

“在《第二性》中论述广泛的主题为激进的女性主义主张开辟了道路,这些主张是:在所有

Politics (1985).

"The breadth of subjects treated in *The Second Sex* prepared the way for radical feminist claims that: Patriarchy is the universal constant in all political and economic systems, that sexism dates from the beginning of history, that society is a repertoire of manoeuvres in which male subjects establish power over female objects." — Nyre, *Feminist Theory and the Philosophy of Man*, 1988, p. 95.

Radical interpretation

A process of interpreting a language unknown to the interpreter without relying upon existing linguistic knowledge. It tries to answer the question how we can understand a particular utterance that is not antecedently given and cannot be helped by a translation manual. The theory is developed by D. Davidson, patterned on Quine's radical translation. While radical translation intends to establish a linking of synonyms, radical interpretation requires that we establish the truth conditions of the sentences of a foreign language. While Quine's radical translation avoids the use of psychological terms like belief and desire, radical interpretation requires the interpreter to specify the beliefs and desires of the speakers. This interpretation relies heavily on the principle of charity, that is the assumption that most of the utterances in the language express true beliefs.

"The term 'radical interpretation' is meant to suggest strong kinship with Quine's 'radical translation'. Kinship is not identity, and 'interpretation' in place of 'translation' marks one of the differences; a greater emphasis on the explicitly semantical in the former." — Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, p. 126.

Radical philosophy

A British philosophical movement that arose in the 1970s with the journal *Radical Philosophy* (1972-) as its main forum. Its aim has been to contest the philosophical predominance of analytical philosophy in British universities and intellectual life. In its early phase, it rejected Oxford philosophy, although many members of the radical philosophy group were educated in Oxford. It complained that analytical philosophy was narrow and complacent and that it ignored many crucial issues that require a philosophical response, including specific questions of culture, tradition, history and politics. It held that the dominant British philosophy was a specialised subject that had little to offer anyone outside a small circle of professional philosophers. Radical philosophy has attempted to change this situation by challenging and subverting linguistic philosophy. The journal did not lay down a philosophical line, although it paid a great deal of attention to traditions ignored by analytical philosophy, especially to European philosophical movements such as phenomenology and existentialism, contemporary Hegelian

的政治和经济制度中,父权制是普遍永恒的;性别歧视从历史一开始就存在;社会全部是对抗演习,在这些对抗演习中男性主体确立了对女性客体的权力。"——尼雷:《女性主义理论和男人的哲学》,1988年,第95页。

彻底的解释

无须依赖现存的语言知识而解释一种解释者未知语言的过程。它试图回答这样一个问题,我们如何能够理解一个先前并未见过而且无法得到翻译手册帮助的特殊句子。戴维森根据奎因的“彻底的翻译”提出了这个理论。彻底的翻译是要确立同义词之间的联系,而彻底的解释则需要我们确立一种外语句子的真值条件。奎因的彻底的翻译避免使用像信念和愿望这样的心理学术语,而彻底的解释则需要解释者详细地说明外语使用者的信念和愿望。这种解释强烈地依赖于“宽容原则”,即假定这种语言中的大多数话都表达着真的信念。

“所谓的‘彻底的解释’这个词,表明了它与奎因的‘彻底的翻译’有着强烈的血缘关系。这种血缘关系并不是两者相同,区分之一就是‘解释’替换了‘翻译’;即它更多地强调前者中语义的清晰性。”——戴维森:《真理与解释的探究》,1984年,第126页。

激进哲学

20世纪70年代在英国出现的一场哲学运动,以《激进哲学》(1972—)杂志为其主要论坛。它的目的是挑战分析哲学在英国大学和精神生活中的哲学上的优势。在它的早期阶段,它反对牛津哲学,尽管激进哲学群体中的很多成员都是在牛津接受的教育。它抱怨分析哲学领域狭窄而且自满自足,并且无视很多要求哲学做出反应的至关重要的问题,包括文化、传统、历史和政治方面的特殊问题。它认为,居支配地位的英国哲学是一个专门学科,不为职业哲学家小圈子以外的人提供任何东西。激进哲学试图通过挑战和推翻语言哲学来改变这一现状。它的杂志虽然对为分析哲学所忽视的传统,特别是欧洲哲学运动如现象学和存在主义、当代黑格尔主义和马克思主义哲学、结构主义、后结构主义和解构主义倾注了很大的心血,但却没有制定一条哲学路线。近些年来,它与女性主义和后现代主义有了更多的联系。它一直反对大学机构的局限,并批判了正统哲学得以维持

and Marxist philosophy, structuralism, post structuralism and deconstructionism. Recently, it has been more associated with feminism and post-modernism. It has been hostile to the constraints of university institutions and has criticised the academic and social environments in which orthodox philosophy is maintained. Radical philosophy should not be confused with philosophical radicals.

"What radical philosophy objects to is not the investigation of language and concepts but rather the assumption that for philosophers such study means professional isolation from the world of material reality and acceptance of the ordinary language criterion of meaningfulness."—Edgley and Osborne (eds), *Radical Philosophy Reader*, 1985, p. x.

Radical translation

The translation of an alien language which has no links to familiar ones, where the translator cannot appeal to any dictionary, compare other translations, or consult any studies of that language. The only place he can begin is with the sentences which seem to be directed immediately on to stimulus conditions. A rabbit runs by and the speaker says "gavagai". The translator guesses from observation that this might refer to the rabbit, and then he subjects his guess to tests relating to further cases. He tries to ascertain whether the native speaker assents, dissents or does neither. What he gets from this process is at best a working hypothesis, and he can never be sure that his translation is the only correct one. Radical translation is a device designed by Quine for his discussion of the indeterminacy of translation and is a model for all attempts to understand the language of another.

"What is relevant to our purposes is radical translation, i. e. translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people." —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 28.

Ramsey sentence

Also called a Ramsey sentence of a theory. The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey claimed that the whole empirical content of a theory can be cast in the form of one sentence by conjoining sentences expressing the content of theory and by replacing all theoretical terms in the sentence by existentially bound variables. By replacing theoretical terms with bound variables, theories cease to be committed to specific kinds of entities and are rendered neutral concerning what entities will turn out to satisfy them. This approach to theories can support an instrumentalist view about what a scientific theory should be. It suggests that only observational terms are cognitive, while theoretical terms, as formal and non-descriptive symbols, should be eliminated. This account of theory is close to Craig's theorem and drew much attention in the 1950s and 1960s when the distinction between theoretical terms and observation terms and their relationship became a major topic in the philosophy of science.

的学术和社会环境。激进哲学不应与哲学激进分子相混淆。

“哲学激进主义反对的不是对语言和概念的探究,而是这样一种假定:对哲学家而言,这种研究意味着与现实物质世界的专业性的脱离和承认富有意义的日常语言标准。”——埃德雷和奥斯本(编):《激进哲学读本》,1985年,第x页。

彻底的翻译

对一种完全无知的外国语的翻译,译者无法借助于词典、参照其他的翻译或者参考对这种语言的研究。他惟一可以着手的是当下直接指向刺激条件的句子。一只兔子跑过去,土著人会说“gavagai”。译者从这个现象中可以猜测,这可能是指“兔子”,然后,他把这种猜测用于证明其他相关的情形。他试图弄清土著人是否同意或不同意他的猜测。他从这个过程中得到的,最多是一种有效的假设,但他却无法肯定他的翻译就是惟一正确的。彻底的翻译是奎因在讨论“翻译的不确定性”时提出的方法,也是试图理解其他语言的一种模式。

“与我们的目的相关的是彻底的翻译,即翻译一种先前从未接触过的人们使用的语言。”——奎因:《词与物》,1960年,第28页。

拉姆塞语句

也称作“关于理论的拉姆塞语句”。剑桥哲学家F. 拉姆塞认为理论的全部经验内容可以用一个语句的形式来表示,即通过连接所有表达理论内容的句子,并用存在约束变量取代句中所有理论术语。通过以约束变量取代理论术语,理论便不再承诺于特定种类的实体,而对什么实体能满足它们持中立立场。这种对待理论的态度,能支持对于科学理论应当是什么这一问题上的工具主义观点。它认为,只有观察术语是认知的,而理论术语仅仅是形式的和非描述性的符号,应当被消除。这种理论观接近于“克雷格定理”,在理论术语和观察术语的区分及其二者的关系成为科学哲学主题的50年代和60年代,引起许多人的兴趣。

“一般而言,关于理论的拉姆塞语句是这样构成的:构成足以表达理论内容的一组陈述的合取,然后用适当内容的存在量词变量取代每

"In general, the Ramsey sentence of a theory is formed as follows: Form the conjunction of a set of statements sufficient to express the content of the theory, and then replace each theoretical term by an existentially quantified variable of appropriate type, making the scope of each quantifier the entire conjunction." —Maxwell, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. iv, 1970, p. 187.

Range

The set of a formula, such that the members of the set are the values of the formula. The range of a quantifier is the collection of things from which values of the quantified variable can be drawn. In this case, range is synonymous with domain. The domain of a relation is a collection of things which stand in the relation to something else. The set of these related things constitutes the range or counterdomain of this relation. The domain and the range together constitute the field of the relation. A range of a function is the set of things that define the function, that is that serve as possible arguments for this function. A range or universe of discourse is the collection of things talked about during the discourse.

"We take the range of the formula E_i to be the class of those value-assignments at which E_i comes to be true. The class of all possible value-assignments for E_i (i.e. for the value-bearing signs that occurs in E_i) we call the total range of E_i ; the empty class of such value-assignments we call the null range." —Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications*, 1958, p. 17.

Ratio

[Latin, corresponding to the Greek *logos*, and sharing the complicated and wide usage of the latter] *Ratio* can be used for the objective meaning of a thing (in a sense close to form), to the power to discern such meanings (in a sense close to mind), to the capacity to draw what is true from the premises when we pursue truth, and to the capacity to determine what to do when we plan action. In English, *ratio* can be translated by terms such as reason, argument or description. Generally, *ratio* is contrasted with emotion and appetite, which it is normally supposed to control in us. In the philosophy of Spinoza, *ratio* is the second way of knowing, in contrast to imagination (sense-perception) and scientific intuition. *Ratio* is exemplified in the thinking of scientists, who begin with common and evident truths and proceed to draw general conclusions from them. The model of this type of thinking is Euclidean geometry.

"The Ratio expressed in a word is something the intellect [*intellectus*] conceives from things and expressed in speech." —Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 5, 2.

个理论术语,使每个量词的辖域覆盖整个合取”。——麦克斯威尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第4卷,1970年,第187页。

值域

值域为一公式的集,例如集的成员为这公式的值。一个量词的值域为物的聚合,从中可得出这个量词变量的值。在这种情况下,值域与“域”是同义的。关系的域为处于与他物关系中的各物的聚合。这些相关物的集合构成了这个关系的值域或“后域”。域和值域一起构成这个关系的“场”。一个函项的值域为定义这个函项的事物集,即它们作为对这函项的可能论证。话语的值域或论域,为这话语中所论及事物的聚合。

“我们把公式 E_i 的值域看做是那些其赋值使 E_i 为真的类。对 E_i 的所有可能的赋值的类(即所有使 E_i 有意义的记号值),我们称为 E_i 的总值域。这种赋值的空类我们称为空值域。”——卡尔纳普:《符号逻辑及其应用导论》,1958年,第17页。

理智

[拉丁词,相当于希腊语的“逻各斯”(logos),并同样具有后者复杂而广泛的用法]它能指一物的客观意义(在这层含义上,它接近“形式”),指发现这些意义的力量(在这层含义上,它接近“心智”),指在我们追求真理时从前提中引出真东西的能力,也指在我们计划行动时决定做什么的能力。在英语中,它能被译为“理性”、“论证”、“论述”等等。一般而言,理智与激情和欲望相对应,并被认为在正常情况下对我们起控制作用。在斯宾诺莎哲学中,理智是认识的第二种方式,对应于想像(感知)和科学的直觉。理智在科学家的思维中得到例证,他们从共同而明显的真理出发,层层推进,从中引出一一般结论。这种思维模式的典型是欧几里德几何学。

“用语词表达的理智是智力从事物中想出来并用言语表述的某种东西。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia, 5, 2。

Ratio decidendi

[Latin: the reason for deciding, a principle of judicial decision] A ruling on a point of law which a judge provides because he conceives it to be necessary to the justification of his particular decision. Such a ruling is the *ratio* of the case. It can be the rule of law laid down in a precedent or the rule of law which others regard as having binding authority. It can also be a material evidential fact. In contrast, an *obiter dictum* is any statement about the law made by the court which was not necessary to the decision. How to identify a *ratio decidendi* in a case is a fundamental issue. There is much debate about what the *ratio* is and about how to find it. Different judges in different courts are likely to hold different views so that a *ratio decidendi* in an original court will be considered as an *obiter dictum* in an appeal court or vice versa.

"The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or implicitly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or as a necessary part of his direction to the jury." —Cross, *Precedent in English Law*, 1977, p. 76.

Rational cosmology, see cosmology

Rational egoism, see egoism, ethical

Rational explanation

Also called rational reconstruction. Developed by Collingwood and William Dray as an alternative mode of historical explanation to the covering law model. It claims that historical explanation does not consist in bringing an event under a covering general causal law, but rather explains by establishing a relation between an action and the rationality of its agent. We should explain an action by reference to the reasons presented as contained in it. A historian should re-think and re-construct the rationality of the agent when the agent decided to do act. Among others, these factors include the agent's knowledge of the actual situation, the agent's purpose and the agent's deliberation concerning the means appropriate to his end. If we discover an agent's reason for performing an action, we achieve an understanding of that action. Certainly, if an agent is rational, the considerations issuing in action must have conformed to some general standards of rationality, but it does not follow that the action is caused or determined by those standards. Some critics argue that irrational and non rational behaviour, in which actors misunderstand their actions, are more important than rational action in understanding history.

"When the historian can see that the agent's beliefs, purposes, principles, etc., give him a reason for doing what he did, then he can claim to understand the action. The kind

判决理由

[拉丁文: 判决的理由, 司法判决的一个原则] 对法官提供的法律要点的裁定, 因为在法官看来, 法律要点对于证明他的特定判决的公正是必要的。这样的裁定是判案所依据的理由。它可以是在以前的案例中制定的法律规则, 或被其他人视为具有约束力的法律规则。它也可以是物证事实。相比之下, 附带意见是由法庭做出的与判决没有必然关系的有关法律的陈述。如何确认一个案件中的判决理由是一个根本性的问题。对于什么是理由以及如何发现它, 人们存在很大的争议。不同法庭的法官可能会持有不同的观点, 以致一个原判法庭中的判决理由可能被上诉法院视为附带意见, 反之亦然。

"一个案件的判决理由是被法官明确地或暗含地视为做出结论必经的一种法律规则, 判决理由与法官所接受的推理的方式有关, 或被视为他对陪审团的说明的一个必要部分。"——克罗斯:《英国法律中的判例》, 1977年, 第76页。

理性宇宙论

见“宇宙论”条。

理性利己主义

见“伦理利己主义”条。

合理的说明

也称合理的重建。由柯林伍德和 W. 德莱发展的一种与覆盖律模式不同的历史说明模式。这一模式主张, 历史说明不在于把一个事件置于覆盖的一般因果律之下, 而在于通过确立行为和行为者的理性之间的关系做出的解释。〔由于理由包含在行为之中, 因而〕我们解释一个行为应联系呈现在其中的理由。历史学家应重新思考和重新建构一个行为者决定行动时的合理性。这种合理性还存在于其他因素中, 这些因素包括行为者对实际情况的了解, 行为者的目的和行为者对适合于其目的的手段的考虑。如果我们发现行为者采取行动的理由, 我们也就获得了对这一行动的理解。当然, 如果一个行为者是有理性的, 引起行为的那些考虑肯定要符合理性的某些一般规范, 但由此不能得出行为是由那些规范引发或决定的。一些批评家争论说, 在理解历史中, 行为者误解其行为的非理性和无理性行为比理性行为更为重要。

"当历史学家能够发现行为者的信念、目的、准则等等给其以行为的理由时, 他就可以说理解了这一行为。人们也许争辩说, 这样获得的理解在思想的形成上不同于以自然科学模型为基础的探索, ……前者——我们或许可以称之为‘合理的’说明, ——试图弄清行为的目的或

of understanding thus achieved, it might be argued, is different in *concept* from that sought on the scientific model... The former which we might perhaps call 'rational' explanation—tries to make clear its *point* or *rationale*." —William Dray, *Philosophy of History*, 1964, p. 12.

Rational number

A real number is any number which can be expressed as an infinite decimal. It can either rational or irrational. A rational number is any number which can be expressed as a ratio x/y , where x is a positive or negative integer or 0 and y is a positive integer, although the same rational number can often be represented by more than one ratio of integers. An irrational number is any real number which is not rational, such as π or the square root of 2.

"The irrational numbers, such as the square root of 2, were supposed to find their place among rational fractions, as being greater than some of them and less than the others, so that rational and irrational numbers could be taken together as one class, called 'real number'." —Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 63.

Rational psychology

In Christian Wolff's division of metaphysics, one branch of special metaphysics (along with cosmology and rational theology). Its subject matter is the soul or mind, and its major task to prove the immortality of the soul. In contrast to modern empirical psychology, which is based on observation and experiment, rational psychology is purely speculative. Rational psychology is also called pneumatology (from Greek; *pneuma*, spirit), a study of the spirit or soul.

"The second branch of the metaphysical system was rational psychology or pneumatology. It dealt with the metaphysical nature of the soul—that is, of the Mind regarded as a thing. It expected to find immortality in a sphere dominated by the law of composition, time, qualitative change, and qualitative increase or decrease." —Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 34.

Rational reconstruction, another expression for rational explanation

Rational self-interest, see self-interest

Rational theology, another expression for natural theology

Rationalism

In an epistemological sense, rationalism is a philosophical tradition developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, represented mainly by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Epistemological rationalism claimed

理性。”——德莱：《历史哲学》，1964年，第12页。

有理数

实数是能表示为无限小数的任何数。它可以是有理数，或是无理数。有理数是能表示为 x/y 的比的任何数，这里 x 是正整数，或负整数，或 0，而 y 是正整数，虽然同一个有理数能常常以大于 1 的整数比来表示。无理数是任何一个不是有理数的实数，如 π 或 2 的平方根。

“无理数，如 2 的平方根，通常也假定和有理分数排在一起，它大于一些有理分数，同时小于其他有理分数，这样，有理数和无理数可以合成一类，即所谓‘实数’。”——罗素：《数理哲学导论》，1919年，第63页。

理性心理学

按 C. 沃尔夫对形而上学的划分，它是特别形而上学的一个分支（与它一道的还有宇宙论和理性神学）。它的主题是灵魂或心智，它的主要任务是证明灵魂不朽。与建立在观察和实验基础之上的现代经验心理学不一样，理性心理学是纯粹思辨的。理性心理学也被称作“圣灵论”（pneumatology 源自希腊语 *pneuma*，意为精神、精气），即对精神或灵魂的研究。

“形而上学体系的第二个分支是理性心理学或圣灵论。它研究灵魂，即认作一物之心智的形而上学本性。它期待着在被合成、时间、质变、量的增减规律所支配的领域中发现不朽。”——黑格尔：《小逻辑》，第34节。

合理的重建

“合理的说明”的另一种说法。

合理的私利

见“自我利益”条。

理性神学

“自然神学”的另一种表述。

理性主义

在认识论的意义上，理性主义是 17、18 世纪在欧洲发展起来的一个哲学传统，主要以笛卡尔、斯宾诺莎和莱布尼茨为代表。认识论的理性主义断言，知识是由于运用理性或理智官能

that knowledge is due to the exercise of the faculty of reason or intellect and that sensory experience cannot establish certainty. The way of reason is the road to true knowledge. Rationalism took mathematics as the model of knowledge and admired the axiomatic method. It proposed that the method of philosophy should be the same as the method of mathematics. It held that all knowledge is connected and can be deduced from certain self-evident first principles. It also accepted the existence of *a priori* knowledge or truths of reason. Rationalism tried to construct a rational science of nature and attempted to solve certain metaphysical problems such as the general structure of the world, the relation of mind to body and immortality. As a tradition, it stood in contrast to the empiricism represented by the British philosophers Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, which claimed that all knowledge is derived ultimately from experience. Kant synthesised rational and empirical traditions by giving both reason and experience crucial roles in the acquisition and justification of knowledge. Nevertheless, the tension between these two epistemological approaches can still be perceived in the contemporary philosophy of language and other areas. In the post-Kantian period, the continental rationalist tradition, while holding that reason is the supreme cognitive faculty, has held that its exercise should go beyond the scope of natural science. It has extended the exercise of reason to politics, history, art, religion, and in general to the *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences) and has tried to establish universal knowledge in these areas.

In its general sense, rationalism refers to all theories and practices which appeal to human rationality and rational principle, and is in contrast to positions which emphasise religious faith, moral sentiment, emotion and other irrational elements. In this sense, empiricism is also rationalism, and rationalism is in contrast to irrationalism.

"Traditional rationalism, observing that any principles which should serve as ultimate criteria or determine categorical interpretation must be prior to and independent of the experience to which it applies, has supposed that such principles must be innate and so discoverable by some sort of direct inspection." — C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World-Order*, 1929, p. 25.

Rationality

The exercise of human reason, the ability exhibited in deduction, induction, calculation and other less formal intellectual processes. According to Plato's tripartite analysis of the human soul, rationality contrasts with emotion (passion) and the appetites. He held that persons must subject their emotion and appetites to the rule of reason in order to find truth and to have a happy and harmonious life. Aristotle put forward a function-based argument, claiming that reason is the peculiar function which distinguishes human beings from

带来的,感觉经验不能达到确定性。理性方法是通往真知之路。理性主义把数学当做知识的模型,赞赏公理化方法。它认为哲学方法应当与数学方法是一样的。它认为一切知识都是相联系的,可以从某个自明的第一原理推演出来。它还承认先天知识或理性真理的存在。理性主义试图构筑一个理性的自然科学,试图解决某些形而上学的问题,像关于世界的普遍结构、心身关系、灵魂不死等问题。作为一个传统,理性主义与以英国哲学家F. 培根、霍布斯、洛克、巴克莱、休谟所代表的经验主义相对。经验主义主张一切知识最终来自于经验。康德赋予理性和经验两者在知识的获得和正当性证明中至关重要的作用,以此将两个传统综合起来。不过在当代语言哲学和其他领域中仍然可以看到这两种认识论探讨的对立。在后康德时期,由于大陆理性主义传统认为理性是最高认识官能,所以它仍然认为理性的运用应当超出自然科学的范围之外。它将理性的运用扩展到政治、历史、艺术、宗教,并一般用于人文科学,试图在这些领域中建立普遍的知识。

一般而言,理性主义指诉诸于人类理性能力和理性原则的一切理论和实践,它与强调宗教信仰、道德情感和情绪以及其他非理性成分的见解相对立。在这个意义上,经验主义也是理性主义,理性主义是相对于非理性主义而言的。

"传统的理性主义看到,如果任何原则应当作为终极的标准,或者对范畴的解释有决定作用,那么它必定先于并独立于它所用于其上的经验,所以,理性主义料想这样的原则一定是天赋的,因而可以被某种直接的检查所发现。" — 刘易斯:《心灵和世界秩序》,1929年,第25页。

理性能力

人类理性的运用,人类在演绎、归纳、计算和其他较少形式要求的智力活动中显示出的能力。根据柏拉图对人类灵魂的三重分解,理性能力是与情绪(感情)和欲望相对立的。他认为,如果一个人想要发现真理,想要有幸福和谐的生活,他就必须将他的情绪和欲望服从于理性的规则。亚里士多德进一步提出了一个以功能为根据的证明,认为理性是使人类与其他种类的动物相区别的特殊功能。人类的长处就在于

other kinds of animals. Human virtue rests in the performance of this function. He even suggested on this basis that pure rational activity, that is contemplation, is the happiest life. Aristotle made practical reason and moral virtue interdependent, but also acknowledged the possibility of the weakness of the will, that is knowing what is right but doing the contrary. To be rational in this sense is opposed to being emotional or acting according to appetite and intuition, which he described as irrational. Both rationalism and empiricism support the values of rationality. Their difference lies only in the fact that rationalism emphasises the role of the faculty of reason, while empiricism places emphasis on observation and experiment.

Hume claimed that only deductive and mathematical reasoning is rationally sound and that induction is not rationally justified. This has given rise to the long-standing dispute about the nature of inductive reasoning and the problem of induction. Hume also denied that reason plays a fundamental role in moral life and hence denied the existence of practical reason except as reasoning about means to obtain ends given by the passions. This position is also controversial, and some philosophers consider ends and passions to be within the scope of rationality.

In another sense, to call something rational or reasonable means that it conforms to general rules, laws and acknowledged aims and also adheres to certain qualities of thinking such as consistency, coherence and completeness. Being rational in this sense means, for example, being appropriate, making sense or being understandable. This sense is concerned with the correct exercise of human reason, as opposed to its invalid exercise. Creative thought and activity that does not fall within the scope of formal systems can also be assessed for rationality.

"Rationality is a matter of seeking to do the very best we can (realistically) manage to do in the circumstances." — Rescher, *Rationality*, 1988, p. 87.

Rationes seminales

[Latin, from the Greek: *logoi spermatikoi*, germinal principles or original factors] A notion employed by the Stoics, Neo-platonists and Augustine. It is usually translated as seminal reason or seminal virtue. By this term Augustine meant the seeds, potential powers or causes of the subsequent developments in the physical order after God's creation. Change is simply the realisation of what already exists virtually. These seeds were themselves created by God when he created the world. The view was intended to reconcile the tension between the belief that God created all things and the evident fact that new things are constantly developing, for according to this view, the development of every new thing is simply the unfolding of what has been in the world from the beginning. It is a metaphor, derived from the growth of a

运用这个功能。他甚至在此基础上提出,纯粹的理性活动,即思辨,是最幸福的生活。亚里士多德虽然使实践理性和道德美德互相依赖,但也承认意志薄弱的可能性,即知道什么是对的,但却反其道而行之。在此意义上,有理性的与有情绪的、或根据欲望和直觉来行动是相反的,他把后者说成是非理性的。理性主义和经验主义都赞成理性能力的价值。它们的区别只在于如下事实:前者强调理性官能的作用,后者强调观察和实验。

休谟主张,只有演绎推理和数学推理具有理性的可靠性,归纳不能从理性上证明是正当的。这一观点引起了关于归纳推理的性质和归纳问题的长期争论。休谟还否认理性在道德生活中起重要作用,并因而否认实践理性的存在,但这里不包括对达到情感目的的方法的推理在内。这个观点也引起了争论,有些哲学家认为目的和情感也属于理性能力的范围。

在另一种意义上,说某物是有理性的或合理的是指,它与普遍的规则、规律和公认的目标相一致,而且它也坚持思维的某些性质,诸如一致性、连贯性、完整性等等。在此意义上,有理性的意味着(例如)恰当的、有道理的、可理解的等等。这个含义涉及到正确运用人类理性,反对理性的无效运用。不属于形式系统范围内的创造性思维和创造性活动也可以被看做是理性能力。

“理性能力是指力图尽最大能力做我们在该情况下(实际)能设法做到的。”——雷谢尔:《理性》,1988年,第87页。

种源理性

[拉丁词,源自希腊语 *logoi spermatikoi*,意为“初始原则”或“原始要素”] 斯多亚派、新柏拉图主义者及奥古斯丁的术语。通常译为“种源理性”或“种源德性”。奥古斯丁用这个术语,指上帝创世之后物理秩序中后续发展的种子、潜力或原因。变化只不过是已经实际存在着的东西的实现。这些种子本身是上帝在创造世界时一并创造的。该观点的意图在于,调和相信上帝创造了万物的信念和新事物不断发展起来这种明显事实之间的紧张关系,因为按照这个观点,每一新事物的发展,只不过是从一开始就已存在于世的东西的展现。它是一个比喻,源于植物的生长是种子潜伏状态的实现。这个术语也被认为是受了柏拉图回忆说的影响,按照这个

plant which is the realisation of the seed's latencies. The term is also believed to be influenced by Plato's theory of recollection according to which knowledge involves remembering what one already knew. This term was later developed by the Franciscans to oppose the Aristotelian naturalistic theory.

"Augustine aptly termed *rationes seminales* all those active and passive powers that are the originative sources of the coming into being of natural things and of their changing." — Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, 115, 2.

Ravens paradox, another expression for Hempel's paradox

Ready-to-hand

Heidegger's term for entities within-the-world which we make use of as equipment or as instruments. The Being possessed by this kind of entity is called readiness-to-hand, which Heidegger contrasts to presence-at-hand, that is the Being of the determinate and isolable entities investigated by science. The same entity can be ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, depending upon our attitude or relationship to it. The attitude which determines an entity as ready-at-hand is concern (German: *Besorgen*). Concern leads us to emphasise practical meaning and the use of an entity instead of focusing on the entity itself. Presence-at-hand is the object of a theoretical attitude, for which an entity is encountered in its own right, independent of its relations with other entities and with their purposes. Taking an entity as ready-to-hand is a pre-theoretical attitude; taking an entity as present-at-hand is a theoretical attitude. In contrast to both, the ontological attitude rejects taking *Dasein* as another object in the world.

"When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environment Nature is ready-to-hand along with it." — Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 161.

Real definition

A definition which reveals the meaning of a concept or the essence of the thing being defined, a definition based on the real property of the definiendum. A real definition involves some sort of a discovery. It is contrasted to nominal definition, which determines what a word means on the basis of arbitrary convention and which is popular when a new term or word is introduced. In this context, the word "real" (Latin, *reale*) means "to apply to a thing", while "nominal" (Latin, *nominales*) means "to apply to a word". Real definition is also called essentialist definition. All definitions *per genus et differentium* are real definitions.

"All definitions are either *nominales* or *reale* definitions.

学说,知识包含在对已知东西的回忆中。该术语后来被弗兰西斯科学派发展,与亚里士多德的自然主义理论相对立。

“奥古斯丁很机敏地把作为自然事物生成和变化原初根源的一切主动的和被动的力量称作种源理性。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia, 115, 2。

渡鸦悖论

“亨佩尔悖论”的另一种表述。

用得称手〔或译“应手”〕

海德格尔的一个词〔德文为 *zuhanden*〕,用来指我们当做仪器或工具来使用的那样一些世界内的存在者。这种存在者所具有的存在就被称为“用得称手状态”,海德格尔将其与“现成在手状态”相对而置;后一种状态指的是科学研究中的那种被确定和孤立的存在者的存在。同一个存在者既可以用得称手的,也可以是现成在手的,就看我们的态度和与它的关系如何了。使一个存在者处于用得称手状态的态度是牵念(德文为 *Besorgen*)。牵念使我们关注实践的意义和对一个存在者的使用,而不是只盯住此存在者本身。现成在手状态是理论态度中的对象,在这种态度中,一个存在者只就其自身被遭遇到,独立于它与其他存在者及其目的的关系。将一个存在者当做用得称手的是—种前理论的态度,而将之当做现成在手的则是一种理论的态度。与这两者相对,存在论的态度拒绝将缘在当做此世界之中的另一个对象。

“当我们使用钟表装置——它处于切近的、不显眼的用得称手的状态之中——时,这世俗化的自然就一同处于用得称手的状态之中了。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第101页。

真实定义

该定义揭示了概念的意义或被定义事物的本质,它基于被定义者的真实特性。真实定义包含了某种发现。与之相对的是“名义定义”,它决定了语词基于任意的约定而具有的意义。当一个新的术语或语词被引入时,名义定义就是很普遍的了。在这种语境中,“真实的”(拉丁文 *reale*)意味着“用于一个事物”,而“名义的”(拉丁文 *nominales*)意味着“用于一个词”。真实定义也被称作“本质主义定义”。所有种加属差定义都是真实定义。

“一切定义都或者是名义定义或者是真实定义。名义定义是这样一种定义,它包含了等于

Nominales definitions are ones that contain everything that is equal to the whole concept that we make for ourselves of the thing. *Reale* definitions, however, are ones that contain everything that belongs to the thing in itself."—Kant, *Lectures On Logic* (ed. by Young), p. 215.

Real distinction

For Descartes, a distinction between two things where each thing can exist without the other and we can conceive of one without being logically compelled to conceive of the other. Descartes claimed that such a distinction occurs between mind and body, for the doubt reveals that I have, on the one hand, a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thing that thinks and is not extended, and on the other hand, a clear and distinct idea of my body as a thing which is extended and does not think. Hence my mind is truly distinct for my body, and each can exist without the other. Such a real distinction is, besides the existence of God, the major claim that *Meditations* purports to prove. Real distinctions contrast with modal distinctions between a substance and its modes, for example between a body and its size. The size cannot exist apart from the relevant body.

"Two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can exist apart from the other."—Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham et al.), II, p. 54.

Real essence

Locke distinguished between real essence and nominal essence. The real essence is the real but unknown constitution of each thing, upon which depends all the properties of the particulars that make up the world. The real essence perishes when the object ceases to exist or undergoes radical change. The nominal essence, on the other hand, is the set of qualities that we construct out of observed existing qualities, or collect under one idea or name, and is, in effect, a nominal definition provided by a description of the common properties of a thing. Nominal essence depends on real essence. Real essence individuates particulars, while nominal essence groups those particulars into a class for our use. For example, the nominal essence of Gold is a complex idea that the word "gold" stands for, including features such as being a body, yellow in colour, of a certain weight and malleable. The real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body upon which those qualities and all other qualities of Gold depend. Locke believed that this distinction avoids Aristotle's mistake of confusing the meaning of an expression with the nature of the object which the expression characterises. This distinction is influential in modern philosophy, for it leads to phenomenalism which drops the unknown essence, and also leads to the characteristic emphasis on the study of meaning in contemporary philosophy.

是我们对事物所做的所有概念。然而,真实定义则是另一种定义,它包含了属于物自体的一切东西。"—康德:《逻辑讲义》(杨编辑),第215页。

实在的区别

在笛卡尔那里指两事物之间的这样一种区别:每个事物可以不需另一个事物而存在,而且我们可以构想一个事物而逻辑上没有必要去构想另一个事物。笛卡尔声称这样的区别存在于心灵和身体之间,因为怀疑向我揭示出,一方面我有一个清楚明晰的自我的观念,这个自我纯粹是思想而非广延的东西;另一方面,我有一个清楚明晰的我的身体的观念,这个身体是广延的而非思想的东西。因此,我的心灵确实与我的身体截然不同,它们可以各自不需对方而存在。除了上帝的存在以外,这一实在的区别是《沉思》一书要证明的主要之点。实在的区别与样式的区别相对照,后者存在于实体和它的样式之间,物体和它的大小之间的区别即是其例。物体大小不能离开相关的物体而存在。

"当两个实体中的一个可以离开另一个实体而存在,我们就说这两个实体有实在的区别。"—笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,第54页。

实在的本质

洛克区分了实在的本质和名义的本质。实在的本质是每一事物的实在的然而未知的结构,它们乃是构成世界的各种特殊物的全部特性的基础。当对象不再存在,或者发生了根本的改变时,实在的本质便消逝了。与此不同,名义的本质是一组性质,这组性质是我们从各种已观察到的现存性质中构造出来的,或者是在一个观念或名称之下收集来的;名义的本质实际是根据对一事物共同特性的描述作出的名义定义。名义的本质依赖于实在的本质。实在的本质使特殊的事物个体化,名义的本质将那些特殊的事物归集成我们所用的类。例如,金子的名义本质是"金子"一词所代表的复杂观念,它包括这样一些特征:它是一物体,它是黄色的,有一定重量,可以延展等等。实在的本质是那个物体各不可感部分的结构,金子的那些性质以及其他一切性质就依赖于这个结构。洛克相信,这个区分避免了亚里士多德将一个表达式的意义同这个表达式所刻画的对象性质混淆起来的错误。这个区分在近代哲学史上很有影响,因为它导致了放弃未知本质的现象论,还导致了当代哲学特有的对意义研究的重视。

"虽然我们所知道的、或者借以将各种自然实体区分为各个类的,都是自然实体的本质,但

"This, though it be all the essence of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal essence, to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence."—Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III, vi, 2.

Real / logical opposition, see logical / real opposition

Real number, see rational number

Real variable, another term for free variable

Realism

Realism is a family resemblance notion, referring to the objective existence of various objects and properties, such as the external world, mathematical objects, universals, theoretical entities, causal relations, moral and aesthetic properties and other minds. The central idea of realism is that things of a certain problematic sort exist independent of our minds and whether or not we know or believe them to exist. In general terms, realism is opposed by anti-realism, another family resemblance notion which is expressed, for example, as nominalism, subjective idealism or semantic anti-realism. Hence, in different areas the opposition between realism and anti-realism is presented in different forms. It must be noted that the distinction between realism and anti-realism does not correspond to the distinction between materialism and idealism, for Platonic objective idealism and Hegelian absolute idealism are also forms of realism.

One of the most popular forms of realism concerns the ontological status of universals and claims that universals have real existence and are objects of knowledge. There are two major versions of this form of realism. First, Platonic realism argues that universals exist in a realm of their own and are more real than sensible objects which are never fully instantiated in everyday experience. Secondly, Aristotelian realism argues that a universal has no separate existence of its own, but is a structure embedded in things (a universal *in re*). Realism regarding universals contrasts both with nominalism, which claims that a universal is only a common name, and with conceptualism, which claims that a universal is concept produced by the mind.

See entries for different kinds of realism, such as naive realism, direct realism, critical realism, moral realism, legal realism, mathematical realism and quasi-realism.

"Realism is most compelling when we are forced to rec-

我仍用一个特殊的名称‘名义的本质’称呼它，以便将它同实体的实在结构区分开来；名义的本质和那类实体的全部性质都依靠于实在的结构，因此，如前所说，可以将实在的结构称作实在的本质。”——洛克：《人类理智论》，第三卷，第六章，第2节。

实在的/逻辑的对立

见“逻辑的/实在的对立”条。

实数

见“有理数”条。

真实变元

“自由变元”的另一术语。

实在论

实在论是一个家族相似的观念，指承认种种对象和属性的客观存在的各种理论。这些对象和属性包括外在世界、数学对象、共相、理论实体、因果关系、道德与美学属性、他人的心等。实在论的中心思想是，某些或全部这些事物存在，独立于我们的心灵，且不论我们是否知道或相信它们存在。一般而言，实在论与反实在论相对立。反实在论是另一个家族相似的观念，表达为（例如）唯名论、主观唯心主义和语义学上的反实在论。在不同的领域中，实在论与反实在论的对立表现为不同的形式。应当注意到，这一对立并不对应于唯物主义与唯心主义的对立。因为柏拉图的客观唯心主义与黑格尔的绝对唯心主义都是实在论的不同形式。

实在论的最为普通的形式之一是有关共相的本体论地位的。它认为，共相是真实的存在，是知识的对象。这一形式的实在论主要有两种类型。首先，柏拉图的实在论认为，共相存在于自身的领域之中。它们比可感对象更真实，但又绝对不会在日常经验中得到充分的展现。其次，亚里士多德的实在论认为，共相没有自己分离的存在，而是呈现于物中的结构（物中之共相）。关于共相的实在论既相对立于唯名论（它认为共相只是一个共名），又相对立于概念论（它把共相看做是由心灵产生的概念）。

请参见有关不同种类实在论的条目，如“素朴实在论”，“直接实在论”，“批判的实在论”，“道德实在论”，“法律现实主义”，“数学实在论”和“准实在论”。

“我们不能完全描绘或知道某些事物，因为它们处于语言、证明、证据或经验理解所能达到的范围之外。当我们被迫承认这种事物的存在时，实在论是最不可抗拒的。”——纳格尔：《出

ognize the existence of something which we cannot describe or know fully, because it lies beyond the reach of language, proof, evidence, or empirical understanding.” —T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, p. 108.

Reality

A frequently used but ambiguous term. Sometimes it means what there is in contrast to appearance. One aspect of the realism and anti-realism debate concerns how much we can count as reality. Reality is a synonym for the world or the sum total of all that there is. Wittgenstein's claim that the world is a world of facts, not of things. Some philosophers distinguish between objective reality, to which our language and perception refer, and formal reality, which is the mode of our language or thought. Sometimes reality is used for objective existence which is independent of our consciousness and will. The question of reality arises also in a wide variety of realist doctrines.

“It will be enough, for our purposes, to define ‘reality’ as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot ‘wish them away’).” —Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 1969, p. 13.

Reason

An ability to move from the truth of some beliefs to the truth of others. Some philosophers consider this capacity to be more or less sufficient to determine a single correct and systematic account of reality, while others argue that such an account, if possible at all, must be based primarily upon experience. Kant, following Aristotle, saw reason divided into two parts: theoretical and practical, the latter issuing in actions rather than beliefs, but held that at a deep level the two capacities were the same. Hegel saw reason and much else altering at different stages of historical development. Hume restricted practical reason to finding means to obtain the ends set out by the passions, but others have rejected the means-ends account. Reason enters the account of institutions through models of the interaction of the choices of individuals and through the direct assessment of practices and societies.

“Reason is the faculty of the derivation of the particular from the universal or cognition a priori.” —Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 442.

Reason and understanding

[German: *Vernunft*, reason; *verstand*, understanding, associated with to stand] The distinction between reason and understanding was first discussed in Kant's philosophy. Kant claimed that understanding applies its own categories to experience and generates scientific knowledge, while reason goes beyond the limits of experience. Reason tries to apprehend the unconditional, but ends with antinomies, in which

自无处的观点》，1986年，第108页。

实在

一个经常使用但含义模糊的术语。有时，它指存在之所是，与“现象”对立。实在论和反实在论进行争论的一个方面是，我们能够算作实在的究竟有多少。有时，它用作世界的同义语，或指一切存在的总体。维特根斯坦就是在这个意义上断言，世界是事实的世界，而不是事物的世界。有些哲学家把我们的语言和感知所指涉的客观实在和意指我们的语言或思想模式的形式实在区别开来。有时，它也用来指独立于我们的意识和意志的客观存在。在各种各样的实在论学说中，也提出了关于实在的问题。

“就我们的目的而言，把‘实在’界定为与现象相关的一种性质就足够了，我们承认它独立存在于我们自己的意志之外（我们不能‘希望它们走掉’）。”—柏格和卢克曼：《实在的社会建构》，1969年，第13页。

理性

一种从一些信念的真达到另一些信念的真的能力。有些哲学家认为这种能力多少已足以确定对于实在的单一正确的和系统的描述，而其他人则论证这种描述如果是可能的，必须首先立足于经验。康德追随亚里士多德，把理性分为理论的和实践的两部分，后者是关于行动而非信念的，但认为在更深的层次上二者是同一的。黑格尔认为理性和其余许多东西在历史发展的不同阶段是变化着的。休谟把实践理性限于找到获得为激情所设定的目的之手段，而其他人则反对这种手段—目的的描述。理性通过个体选择的相互作用模型、通过实践和社会评价而进入对制度的表述。

“理性是从全称命题或先验认识推导特称命题的能力。”——康德：《逻辑学讲义》（杨编辑），1992年，第442页。

理性和知性

[德文: *Vernunft*, 理性; *verstand*, 知性, 与“站着”有关] 理性和知性之间的区别第一次在康德哲学中讨论。康德主张，知性把它自己的范畴应用于经验，产生了科学知识，而理性则超越经验的界限。理性企图理解无条件的东西，但导致二律背反，理性便陷入与自身的冲突中。黑格尔对理性和知性的区别作出不同的说明。他

reason falls into conflict with itself. Hegel offered a different account of the distinction. He considered understanding to be a fixed or mechanical way of thinking, which produces clear analysis and is in general the first stage of logic and science. But it isolates things from one another and is partial, finite and without fluidity. Reason stands in contrast to the absolute fixation of the understanding. It is associated with inference and argument and tries to discover connections among truths. Reason has two forms. Negative reason uncovers and collapses the contradictions implicit in the abstractions of understanding. Positive reason draws positive conclusions from the work of negative reason. The final purpose of reason is to resolve all conflicts and to grasp totality. For Hegel, reason and understanding are immanent in the absolute idea and govern its processes and hierarchies. Human reason and understanding can be genuine only by conforming to this inherent and objective reason and understanding.

"The abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just consists in embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 82.

Reason / cause

When a person performs an act, it is appropriate to seek an explanation or justification for it in terms of some reason. In the philosophy of action, this raises questions of continuing dispute whether a reason is a cause and whether an explanation by reason is a causal explanation. Some philosophers do not believe that a reason is a cause, on the grounds that a reason bears an internal relation to the action it explains and that the logical relation between reason and action differs from the external contingent relation between events or other items which are causally related. Others, represented by Davidson, reject the argument from internal relation: the descriptions "the cause of x" and "x" are also internally related without destroying the possibility of external contingent relations under different descriptions. Davidson also claims that many reasons are actually dispositional states such as wanting, believing and intending. Such states are causally connected with the actions they explain. Accordingly, they reject a clear-cut distinction between reasons and causes.

"Two ideas are built into the concept of acting on a reason (and hence, the concept of behaviour generally): the idea of cause and the idea of rationality. A reason is a rational cause." — Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 233.

Reasoning

The cognitive process, close to inferring, of arguing and giving reasons for or against a judgement or an act. It con-

把知性作为思维的固定的、机械的方式,它作出清晰的分析,一般是逻辑和科学的第一阶段。但它使事物相互分离隔绝,是部分的、有限的和没有流动性的。理性则与知性的绝对固定性相对比,它与推理和证明相关,努力揭示各真理之间的联系。理性有两种形式。否定的理性揭露知性的抽象所蕴含的矛盾并使之崩溃。肯定的理性从否定理性的工作中得出肯定的结论。理性的最终目的是要解决一切冲突和把握全体。对黑格尔来说,理性和知性是绝对理念中内在固有的,并支配它的过程和体系。人类理性和知性只有遵从这种内在的和客观的理性和知性才是真实的。

"知性的抽象思维并不是终极的,固定不变的东西,它表明了使自身融解的永恒趋向并过渡到它的对立面。反之,思辨理性在于把这种对立包含于自身之内,作为观念性环节,"——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第82节。

理由/原因

当一个人完成一个行为时,往往要试图用某种理由来解释它或为它辩护。在行为哲学中,这就引出了这样一些争论不休的问题,即一个理由是否是一个原因以及一个通过理由的解释是否是一个因果解释。某些哲学家不相信理由就是原因,因为一个理由与它解释的行为之间有一种内在关系,而这种内在的逻辑关系不同于事件之间或其他有因果关联的东西之间的外在偶然的关系。以戴维森为代表的另一些哲学家则拒绝内在关系的论点。其理由是:摹状词"x的原因"和"x"也是内在相关的,同时并不破坏在不同的摹状词或描述式之间的外在偶然关系的可能。戴维森还认为许多理由实际上是一些倾向性的状态,比如需求、相信和意向。这些状态与它们所解释的行为之间就有因果关系。因此,持这第二种看法的哲学家们就不认为理性与原因之间有截然不同的区别。

"依理由而行动的概念,因此也就是一般的行为概念包含两个观念:原因的观念和理性的观念。一个理由就是一个合乎理性的原因。"——戴维森:《关于行动与事件的论文集》,1980年,第233页。

推理

为支持或反对一个观点或行为而作出论证或提供理由的认知过程,与推断(inferring)相

trasts to a direct appeal to experience or authority. Discursive reasoning proceeds from premises to a conclusion. It is either deductive (reasoning from the universal to the particular) or inductive (reasoning from the particular to the universal). Analogical reasoning argues by comparing similarities and dissimilarities of different things. If the conclusion of a piece of reasoning is about how things are, it is theoretical reasoning. If the conclusion is about what we ought to do, it is practical reasoning. Logic is the study of the rules of reasoning. If a piece of reasoning follows logical rules, it is good. Otherwise, it is bad or invalid in that the conclusion is not supported by the premises. Consistent reasoning is the essential feature of philosophising.

"Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a judgement, the conclusion, is determined by another judgement or judgements, the premises, according to a general habit of thought, which he may not be able precisely to formulate, but which he approaches as conclusive to true knowledge." —Peirce, *Collected Works*, 2 : 773.

Recognition statement

Dummett's term for a statement of the form "this is a" which identifies some concrete or ostensible object as the bearer of a proper name. Issuing such a statement depends on the recognition of the relevant criterion of identity.

"In general, the sense of any proper name 'a' of an ostensible object (an object that can be pointed to) will consist in the criterion for the truth of what we may call 'recognition statements' of the form 'that is a'." —Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, p. 232.

Recollection

[Greek; *anamnesis*] Plato separated the Forms from the particulars. How can we acquire knowledge of the Forms if they are outside the particulars? The theory of recollection is one of Plato's answers to this question. The soul is eternal, and has seen the realm of Forms in heaven. But when the soul comes into a body, this knowledge is forgotten and needs to be recollected. Recollection is the process of learning, and because the particulars are imperfect copies of the Forms, they can only act as reminders. Since this doctrine depends on hypotheses about the immortality and transmigration of the soul which cannot be proven, Plato adopted it only in a few earlier middle dialogues (*Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*) and later quietly dispensed with it. However, he continued to hold that universal knowledge cannot come directly from experience and that there must be some inner functions that make knowledge possible. This belief was inherited and developed by the rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz as well as by Kant and Chomsky.

"Seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection." —Plato *Meno*, 81d.

近。它不同于直接诉诸经验或权威。推论的推理是从前提出发进到结论。它不是演绎推理(从普遍到个别的推理)就是归纳推理(从个别到普遍的推理)。类比推理根据对不同事物的相似和不相似的比较来论证。如果一段推理的结论是关于事物是怎样的,它就是理论推理。如果一段推理的结论是关于我们应当做什么,它就是实践推理。逻辑是对推理规则的研究。如果一段推理遵循逻辑的规则,它就是恰当的,否则就是不恰当的或无效的,因为结论不被前提所支持。连贯一致的推理是哲学研究的本质特征。

"推理是一个过程,在这个过程中,推理者意识到,一个判断,即结论,是被另一个或一些判断,即前提,根据普遍的思想习惯所确定的,对于这个思想习惯,他可能无法精确地阐述,但他认为它对真知识具有决定意义。"——皮尔士:《文集》,第二卷,第773页。

认识陈述

达米特的术语,是指把某个具体的或可实指的对象确认为专名承担者的陈述,其形式为"这是a"。要得到这样的陈述,取决于对有关确认标准的认识。

"一般来说,一种可实指对象(即可以被指出的对象)的专名'a'的意义,就在于我们可以称作'认识陈述'的形式'那是a'的真值标准。"——达米特:《弗雷格:语言哲学》,第232页。

回忆

[源自希腊文 *anamnesis*] 柏拉图将形式与殊相相分离。可是,如果形式在殊相之外,我们怎能获得关于它们的知识?回忆说乃是柏拉图对这一问题的一种回答。灵魂是永恒的,在天上已经见过了形式世界。但当它进入身体时,这种知识被遗忘了,需要通过回忆恢复。回忆是一个学习的过程。因为殊相是对形式的不完善的摹仿,因而它们只能作为提醒物。由于这一学说必须依靠一个未被证明的假设,即灵魂不朽并且轮回,柏拉图只在中期对话中较早的少数几篇(也就是,《美诺篇》、《斐多篇》、《费德罗篇》)中采用了它,后来便悄悄地放弃了。不过,他仍然相信,普遍知识不能直接来自经验。我们必有一些内在功能使得知识成为可能。这种信念被理性主义者,如笛卡尔、莱布尼茨、康德以及今天的乔姆斯基所继承和发展。

"寻求和学习事实上只是回忆而已。"——柏拉图:《美诺篇》,81d。

Rectificatory justice

Also called corrective justice or remedial justification. A kind of justice which Aristotle contrasted to distributive justice. Injustice can arise in transactions between persons if one party gains at the expense of another. Such transactions include both those which are voluntary, such as buying, selling or lending, and those which are involuntary, such as stealing, bearing false witness or assaulting. In rectificatory justice, a judge redresses or rectifies this injustice by awarding compensation to the injured party. The compensation is not a punishment, although in modern times injuries caused by involuntary transactions might be subject to criminal prosecution. According to Aristotle, a judge must establish an arithmetic proportion to achieve justice through rectification. The two parties, A and B, are originally equal. If A unjustly takes a part C from B, they become $A+C$ and $B-C$ respectively. The judge restores the balance by taking C from A and giving it back to B.

"Rectificatory justice is what is intermediate between loss and profit."—Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1132a19.

Recursive definition

[from Latin: *recurrere*, run back] Recursion is a procedure applied to a first instance and then applied to the result of the first application and so on for each successive application. Recursive definition, or definition by induction, defines the result of an operation for 0 and then defines the result of the operation for any number $n+1$ in terms of the result of the operation for n . For classes, a recursive definition first defines one subclass of a term and then defines other subclasses in accordance with their relations to the first subclass. A typical example defines "Smith's ancestors" as follows (1) Smith's parents are Smith's ancestors and (2) any parents of Smith's parents are Smith's ancestors. In a recursive definition, the *definendum* appears in a sense in the *definiens*, but this does not entail a circularity. Recursive function theory, also called computability theory, is a branch of mathematical logic that studies functions in terms of recursive procedures. Recursive functions depend on recursive definitions. A recursively enumerable set has a recursive function which enumerates its members. This is equivalent to decidability or completeness. Hence if a set of theorems, like those of predicate calculus, is not recursively enumerable it is not decidable.

"The recursive definition comprises two sentential formulas; the first formula specifies the value at zero of the functor being defined (or the truth value at zero of the predicate being defined), and the second formula specifies the value at $x+1$ in terms of the value at x ."—Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications*, 1958, p. 164.

矫正的正义

也称改正的正义或纠正的正义。它是亚里士多德相对于分配的正义而提出的一种正义。在人们之间的交往中如果一方在损害另一方的情况下获利,那不公平就会出现。这种交往既包括那些自愿的行为,如买卖或借出,也包括那些非自愿的行为,如偷盗、作伪证或攻击。在矫正的正义中,一个法官通过给受害一方以补偿来矫正或纠正这种不公平。这种补偿不是一种刑罚,虽然在近代由非自愿的交往引起的不公平也许常会受到刑事起诉。按照亚里士多德的主张,一个法官必须确立一种计算的比例以通过矫正来实现正义。A和B双方最初是平等的。如果A不公平地从B那里拿走了部分C,那他们的情况就分别成了 $A+C$ 和 $B-C$ 。法官通过从A那里取回C并把它还给B来恢复平衡。

"矫正的正义是损失与获益之间的调解人。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1132a19。

递归定义

[源自拉丁文 *recurrere* 一词,意为“回溯”]递归指这样一种程序,它应用于第一个实例,然后再应用于这第一次应用的结果,依此对每一接续应用如法炮制。递归定义,或归纳定义,定义对0的操作结果,然后按对 n 的操作结果定义对任意数 $n+1$ 的操作结果。对于类,递归定义,首先定义一个项的子类,然后再依据它们与第一个子类的关系来定义其他子类。一个典型的例子是如此来定义“史密斯的先辈”: (1) 史密斯的父母是史密斯的先辈,而 (2) 史密斯父母的任何父母是史密斯的先辈。在递归定义中,被定义项在某种意义上出现在定义项中,但这并不蕴涵着循环。“递归函数论”也称“可计算性理论”,是依据递归程序研究函数的一个数理逻辑分支。递归函数依赖于递归定义。一递归式可数集合有一种可计数其成员的递归函数。这等同于可决定性或完备性。因此,如一组定理,如谓词演算定理,不是递归式可数的,就不是可决定的。

"递归定义包含两个句式,第一式限定被定义的函子在零点的值(或被定义谓词零点处的真值),而第二式用 x 处的值限定 $x+1$ 处的值。"——卡尔纳普:《符号逻辑及其应用导论》,1958年,第164页。

Red herring fallacy

A fallacy in which one ignores the original topic of an argument and subtly changes the subject, but still claims that the conclusion concerning the original subject is reached although the argument actually has little to do to the conclusion. The fallacy gets its name by analogy to the procedure of training hunting dogs to follow a scent. In this procedure a red herring with a particular scent is used to mislead the dog. This fallacy is similar to *ignoratio elenchi* and occurs when a reasoner is led off track.

"The red herring fallacy is committed when the arguer diverts the attention of the reader or listener by addressing a number of extraneous issues and ends by presuming that some conclusion has been established." — Hurley, *Logic*, p. 117.

Reductio ad absurdum

[Latin: reduction to absurdity, also called *reductio ad impossibile*: reduction to the impossible] A form of argument which draws out conclusions or entailments from some statement or theory to show that these conclusions are absurd because, for example, they clash with unshakeable beliefs, involve an infinite regress or are self-contradictory. Since the conclusions are absurd, the premises from which they are derived are to be rejected. According to Ryle, this argument is the paradigm of philosophical analysis, for philosophy does not test a theory or statement by observation or experiment, but by showing whether it create paradoxes or give rise to other logically intolerable results. A *reductio ad absurdum* can reveal that there is a misunderstanding about the logical form of the relevant propositions, and the theory or statement in question must be rejected or revised. Philosophers should work back from these paradoxes to locate their sources, and find the true logical form of the statement or theory underlying the paradox. This argument can also be used to prove that a theory is true by arguing that its denial or negation will involve absurd consequences.

"A pattern of argument which is proper and even proprietary to philosophy is the *reductio as absurdum*. This argument moves by extracting contradictions or logical paradoxes from its material." — Ryle, *Collected Papers*, vol. 2, p. 197.

Reductio ad impossibile, see *reductio ad absurdum*

Reductionism

Also called reductivism. A position based on the assumption that apparently different kinds of entities or properties are identical and claiming that items of some types can be explained in terms of more fundamental types of entities or properties with which they are identical. Reductionism has

熏青鱼谬误

指将原来的论证题目置之不顾,巧妙地改变主题,虽然所作论证实际上与原主题的结论没有关系,仍声称得出了那个结论,由此而造成的谬误。该谬误因类比于训练猎狗追踪气味的过程而得到此名。在这个过程中,常用一条带有特殊气味的熏青鱼来误导猎狗。这个谬误类似于 *ignoratio elenchi* [混淆论题,用歪曲对方论点的方法进行辩论],发生在推理者偏离正题的时候。

“当辩论者提出一大堆局外的论点来转移读者或听者的注意,最后又假定确立了某个结论,这时,辩论者犯了熏青鱼谬误。”——赫尔利:《逻辑》,第117页。

归谬法

[拉丁文,还原为荒谬,亦称 *reductio ad impossibile*,还原为不可能] 一种论证形式,它从某个陈述或理论引出结论或推定来表明这些结论是荒谬的,因为(例如)它们与我们的不可动摇的信念相冲突,包含一个无穷后推或自相矛盾。由于结论是荒谬的,这些结论所由导出的前提也就被拒斥。根据赖尔的观点,这一论证是哲学分析的范例。因为哲学并不通过观察和实验,而是通过表明一个理论或陈述是否产生谬论或其他逻辑上不能忍受的结果,来检验这个理论或陈述。归谬法可以揭示对相关命题的逻辑形式的误解,这里的理论或陈述因而就一定要被拒斥或修正。哲学家们应当由这些谬论出发,定位其来源并找到支持这一谬误的陈述或理论真正的逻辑形式。这个论证也可以用来论证一个理论为真,那就是论证对于这一理论的否认或否定将包含荒谬的结果。

“哲学的一个正当甚至专有的一个论证模式就是归谬法。这个论证通过由其材料中抽出矛盾或逻辑谬论来运作。”——赖尔:《文集》,第二卷,第197页。

不可能论证

见“归谬法”条。

还原论

又称“还原主义”。这个观点是建立在这一假设之上的:表面上不同种类的存在物或特性是同一的。它声称某一种类的东西能够用与它们同一的更为基本的存在物或特性类型来解释。还原论在不同的领域有不同的形式。在心的

different forms in different areas. In the philosophy of mind, behaviourism is reductionist through accounting for all mental phenomena in terms of behaviours. The identity theory of mind explains mental phenomena in terms of type-type or token-token identities with states of the central nervous system. Reductionism can have linguistic versions, according to which predicates or sentences of different sorts are shown to be equivalent. In metaphysics, phenomenalism reduces sentences about physical objects to basic sentences about actual or possible immediate experiences. In philosophy of science, the program to establish the unity of science is based on the reductionist premise that the theories of one science can be systematically explained by the theories of another more basic science or that the laws of complexes can be reduced to the laws of the parts of the complexes.

"Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are *analytic*, ... and truths which are *synthetic*.... The other dogma is *reductionism*: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience." — Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 20.

Reductivism, see reductionism

Redundancy theory of truth

A theory claiming that the predicate "true" is redundant, for to say that it is true that *p* is equivalent to saying that *p*. The assertion that a sentence is true is precisely the same as the assertion of that sentence. For instance, "It is true that grass is green" amounts to: "Grass is green". Hence "is true" or "is false" are predicates which matter only stylistically and rhetorically, and can be eliminated without semantic loss. The concept of truth is useless in giving a theory of meaning. Truth is essentially a shallow concept. The problem of truth is nothing but a linguistic muddle. This theory was developed by philosophers such as Frege, Ramsey, Wittgenstein, Prior, Ayer, Mackie and Grover. However, although the truth predicate is redundant, there are still many philosophical problems about the nature of truth. Asking what makes "It is true that grass is green" true will lead to admitting an extra-linguistic reality. The truth-predicate enables us to move from talk about language to talk about the world. Hence, the redundancy theory does not cover all meanings of truth. Nevertheless, this theory of truth is also a starting-point for Tarski's semantic theory of truth.

"The forms '*p*' and 'It is true that *p*' yield the same sense no matter what English sentence is substituted for '*p*'. This is appropriately referred to as 'the redundancy theory of truth'." — Horwich, *Truth*, 1990, p. 39.

哲学中,还原论的行为主义用行为来说明所有的心的现象。心的同一论用神经中枢系统状态与类型—类型的同一或殊型—殊型的同一起来解释心的现象。还原论还可以有语言学的形式,据此,不同种类的谓项或语句可以被表明是等价的。在形而上学中,现象论将关于物理对象的语句还原为关于实际的或可能的直接经验的基本语句。在科学哲学中,建立统一科学的纲领正是基于这样的还原论前提:一种科学的理论可以用另一种更为基本的科学的理论来进行系统的解释,或者复合体的定律可以还原为关于构成复合体的部分的定律。

“现代经验论大部分由两个教条所制约,其一是关于“分析”真与“综合”真之分野的信念,另一个教条则是“还原论”:相信每一个有意义的陈述都等同于某种基于直接经验术语的逻辑建构。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,第20页。

还原主义

见“还原论”条。

真理冗余论

这一理论断言,“真”谓词是多余的,因为说“*p*是真的”等于说“*p*”。“某语句是真的”这一断定与断定该语句完全是一回事。例如,“‘草是绿的’为真”等效于“草是绿的”,所以“是真的”或“是假的”只是在风格和修辞上起作用的谓词,去掉它们并不会造成语义损失。真概念在给出意义理论上是没有用处的。真本质上是一个肤浅的概念。真理问题只不过是一个语言泥潭。这一理论是由弗雷格、拉姆塞、维特根斯坦、普赖尔、艾耶尔、麦基、格罗弗等人所发展的,不过,尽管真谓词是多余的,仍然存在许多与真的本性相关的哲学问题。问是什么使得“‘草是绿色的’是真的”是真的,这将导致承认一个语言之外的实在。真谓词使我们从谈论语言进到谈论世界。所以,冗余论并没有包含真的所有意义。不过,这种真理论也是塔斯基的语义真理论的出发点。

“形式‘*p*’和‘*p*是真的’产生同样的意义,无论用什么样的英语句子替换‘*p*’。这被恰如其分地称之为‘真理冗余论’。”——霍维奇:《真理》,1990年,第39页。

Re-embodiment, see disembodiment

Reference

The relation between a name or other referring expression and its referent, although sometimes the term is used for the referent itself. Philosophical problems arise over how expressions can point beyond themselves to their referents or be about something. Traditionally, a term is a referring expression if it picks out a particular object and thereby enables the sentence in which it occurs to be true or false. Frege distinction between sense and reference initiated the modern examination of reference. According to Frege, two terms having the same reference or extension can differ in sense or intension. Sense and reference are related for Frege because the reference of an expression is determined by its sense. A name picks out a referent which the rest of a sentence describes to provide a claim to knowledge. Russell rejected Frege's distinction between sense and reference and replaced it by a single notion of "standing for" to explain reference. He distinguished sharply between logically proper names, which pick out objects of immediate experience, and definite descriptions. Definite descriptions are quantified expressions which can be intelligible even if they fail to pick out anything.

Strawson argued that Russell's account of definite descriptions wrongly conflates reference and assertion, leading to the mistaken claim that a sentence like "The present King of France is bald" upon analysis asserts that there is a present King of France and is therefore false. Strawson's positive account depends on distinguishing sentences or expressions, their use and their utterance.

Donnellan criticises both Russell and Strawson for ignoring a crucial distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. A referential use picks out a particular individual even if the description is mistaken, whilst an attributive use fits whatever satisfies the description.

The Fregean tradition regarding names and referents has been recently challenged by Kripke in *Naming and Necessity*. Kripke accounts for names as rigid designators, that is designators which apply to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. He argues against the use of descriptions as the way to determine a relation between names and their referents. Our current descriptions might be mistaken and other things might satisfy correct descriptions. There are similar problems with natural kind terms, such as water or gold. Kripke ties reference to the essence of individuals or kinds, even if these essences are unknown to us, and to a causal account which fixes reference by providing a chain from an initial use to the present. This is sometimes called the causal theory of reference.

再入壳

见“无壳”条。

指称

名称或其他指称表达式与其所指者的关系,有时也用于所指物本身。哲学问题就在于,表达式如何能够超越自身而指向它们的所指物或谈论某物。传统上,一个词是一个指称表达式,是由于它选择了一个特殊的对象,因而能够使它所在的句子为真或为假。弗雷格对意义与指称的区分,开创了对指称的现代考察。根据弗雷格的观点,具有相同指称或相同外延的两个词可能在意义或内涵上是不同的。在弗雷格看来,意义与指称相联系,是由于表达式的指称是由它的意义决定的。名称选出了一个指称物,而句子的其他部分则把它描述为对知识做出了陈述。罗素抛弃了弗雷格对意义与指称的区分,而代之以单个的“代表”概念去解释指称。他严格地区分了指向当下经验对象的逻辑专名与限定的摹状词。限定的摹状词是一些量化的表达式,即使它们并没有指向任何东西,也可以得到理解。

斯特劳森认为,罗素对限定摹状词的论述错误地混淆了指称与断定,导致了这样的错误推论,即认为如“当今法国国王是秃子”这个句子,经过分析可以断定为,存在一个法国国王,因而是假的。斯特劳森的正面论述是区分了句子或表达式、它们的用法与它们的说出。

唐纳兰批评了罗素与斯特劳森,认为他们都忽略了限定摹状词在指称性用法与归属性用法之间的关键区分。指称性用法是指向特殊的个体,即使这个摹状词是错误的,而归属性用法则适合于满足这个摹状词的东西。

弗雷格关于名称与指称的传统观点最近在克里普克的《命名与必然性》中受到了挑战。克里普克把名称看做严格的指示词,它在个体存在的每种可能世界中都用于指称相同的个体。他反对把摹状词用于确定名称与其所指的关系。我们眼下的摹状词可能是错的,而其他的東西则可以滿足正确的摹状词。这在自然种类的词中也有相似的问题,诸如水或金。克里普克把指称与个体或种类的本质联系起来,即使我们并不知道这些本质,他还把指称与一种因果描述联系起来,这种描述通过提供从最初用法到现在用法的链条而确定指称。有时这就被称作指称的因果理论。

“专名的指称就是我们用其名称所指的對象本身……”——弗雷格:《G. 弗雷格哲学著作文集》,吉奇和布莱克(编),第60页。

"The reference of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means..." - Frege, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, P. Geach and M. Black, eds, p. 60.

Referent, see reference

Referential contradiction, see referential tautology

Referential tautology

David Pears' term in relation to the problem of whether "exists" is a predicate. If the subject term of a singular existential statement implies existence, then if the verb asserts existence, the resulting statement will be a referential tautology. If the statement denies existence, it is a referential contradiction. For example in the statement "This room exists", the subject "this room" implies that there is a room and adding "exists" reasserts the existence of the room. This is a tautology. The statement "This room does not exist" denies the existence of the room which is implied by the subject. This is a referential contradiction. Accordingly, "exists", although it says something about the subject, is not a genuine predicate, because it adds nothing new, especially nothing which has not been implied by the subject.

"So perhaps we could say that the thesis that existence is not a predicate at least means that the verb "to exist" produces referential tautologies and referential contradictions in this way." — D. F. Pears, in Strawson (ed.) *Philosophic Logic*, 1967, p. 98.

Referential theory of meaning

A theory that is based on the assumption that language is used to talk about things outside language and claims that the meaning of a word (except a syncategorematic word) is the object it denotes, and the meaning of a sentence is the proposition it expresses. Every meaningful expression has meaning because there is something which it refers to, designates, signifies or denotes. It is a symbol that stands for something other than itself. The theory is also called the denotative theory of meaning. A naive version of this theory claims simply that the meaning of an expression is that to which the expression refers. But a sense-reference distinction shows that two expressions can have different meanings but the same referent. A more sophisticated version of this theory, such as that developed by Russell, claims that meaning is a referring or denoting relation between a term and the object it picks out. This theory is the most influential one in the modern discussion of meaning and reference, but it has been challenged because of its metaphysical requirement that there is something or other to which a word refers. Such a meta-

所指物

见“指称”条。

指称矛盾式

见“指称重言式”条。

指称重言式

D. 皮尔斯的术语，与“存在”是不是一个谓词这个问题有关。如果单称存在陈述的主词蕴涵存在，那么，如果该动词断定了存在，由此导致的陈述将是一指称重言式。如果该陈述否定了存在，则它就是一指称矛盾式。例如，在“这个房间存在”这一陈述中，主词“这个房间”蕴涵着有一个房间，增加“存在”就是重新断定该房间的存在。这是同语反复（重言式）。陈述“这个房间不存在”，否定了在该主词中所蕴涵的该房间的存在，所以这是指称上的矛盾。相应地，尽管“存在”述说了有关它的主词的某种东西，但它并不是一真正的谓词，因为它并没有增加任何新东西，特别是未被其主词所蕴涵的东西。

“于是我们也许可以说，存在不是一个谓词这一论题至少意味着：‘存在’这一动词以这种方式产生指称重言式和指称矛盾式。”——皮尔斯，见斯特劳森编：《哲学逻辑》，1967年，第98页。

意义的指称论

这一理论基于下述假定：语言是用来谈论语言之外的事物的；它断言，词语（除“助范畴词”之外）的意义是它所指示的对象，语句的意义是它所表达的命题。每一个有意义的表达式有意义，是因为存在着某种它指称、命名、意谓、或指示的东西。它是一个代表它自身之外的某物的符号。这一理论亦称“意义的指示论”。这一理论的素朴形式简单地宣称，一表达式的意义就是该表达式所指称的对象。但意义一指称的区分表明，两个表达式可以有不同的意义却有同样的所指。这一理论的一个更精致的形式，如由罗素提出的形式，断言意义是一词项和它所指的对象之间的指称关系或指示关系。这一理论在现代关于意义和指称的讨论中是最有影响的，但由于它的下述形而上学断言而受到挑战，即存在着一词项所指称的某物或他物。这样一种形而上学总是有争议的，而且，并非所有有意义的表达式都指称某物。

“[意义的]指称论把表达式的意义等同于

physics is always controversial, and furthermore not all meaningful expressions refer to something.

"The referential theory [of meaning] identifies the meaning of an expression with that to which it refers or with the referential connection." —Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, 1964, p. 11.

Referentially opaque

Quine's term, in contrast to referentially transparent. If a context conforms to the principle of intersubstitutivity *salve veritate*, that is if two co-referential terms like "Shanghai" and "the largest city of China" are interchangeable without changing the truth value of the sentences formed by the terms and their context, then the context is referentially transparent or purely referential. For example, given the context, "— is beautiful", "Shanghai" and "The largest city of China" can be substituted for one another without changing the truth value of the sentences. Hence "— is beautiful" is a referentially transparent context.

However, if substituting co-referential terms for one another within a context can change the truth-value, the context is referentially opaque. Such opacity occurs in the contexts of quotation, propositional attitudes such as belief and modality. For example, "Tony believes that Shanghai is beautiful" need not have the same truth value as "Tony believes that the largest city of China is beautiful" because Tony might not know that Shanghai is the largest city in China.

"What is important is to appreciate that the contexts 'Necessarily...' and 'Possibly...' are, like quotation and 'is unaware that...' and 'believe that...', referentially opaque." —Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 144.

Referentially transparent, see referentially opaque

Referring expression, see reference

Reflect (Hegel)

[German: *Nachdenken*, literally after-think] An important term in Hegel's philosophy for thinking over what is immediately present to one's mind and producing thought about it. Hegel's notion differs from the notion of reflection used by empiricist philosophers such as Locke, for whom reflection is limited to what is present to the mind. For Hegel, reflection starts from the immediately given, such as a perception or feeling, but proceeds to find behind the given what is essential and what is significant. Hence, to reflect involves thinking of the thinking. The main principles by which a mind can reflect what is essential include the principles of identity, difference, non-contradiction and sufficient reason.

它所指称的某物，或等同于那种指称关系。”——阿尔斯通：《语言哲学》，1964年，第11页。

指称上的隐晦

奎因的术语，与“指称上的清晰”相对应。如果一个语境确实符合主体间性原则，即两个具有相同指称的词，如“上海”和“中国最大的城市”，它们可以相互交换而不会改变由这些词及其语境构成的句子真值，那么，这个语境就是在指称上清晰的，或纯指称。例如，给定一种语境，“……是美丽的”，“上海”和“中国最大的城市”可以相互替换而不会改变这些句子的真值。因而，“……是美丽的”就是在指称上清晰的语境。

然而，如果在一种语境中相互替换具有相同指称的词而会改变真值，那么这个语境就是在指称上隐晦的。这种隐晦出现在引语，诸如信念之类的命题态度以及样式的语境之中。例如，“托尼相信上海是美丽的”与“托尼相信中国最大的城市是美丽的”这两个句子并不需要具有相同的真值，因为托尼可能并不知道上海是中国最大的城市。

“重要的是要认识到，‘必然地……’和‘可能地……’这种语境，就像引语和‘没有意识到……’、‘相信……’一样，在指称上是隐晦的。”——奎因：《从逻辑的观点看》，第114页。

指称上的清晰

见“指称上的隐晦”条。

指称表达式

见“指称”条。

反思（黑格尔）

[德语词: *Nachdenken*, 字面的意义是“在……之后思考”] 黑格尔哲学的重要术语，指反复思考直接呈现在心灵中的东西，并产生关于它的思想。黑格尔的概念不同于经验论哲学家如洛克所使用的反思概念，对于经验论者来说，反思限于呈现于心灵的东西。对于黑格尔来说，反思从直接给予的东西如知觉或感觉开始，但进展到发现在给予的东西背后本质的东西和有意义的东西。因此，反思涉及对思维的思维。心灵按照它来反思本质的东西的主要原理包括同一性、差别、非矛盾和充足理由的原理。然而，反思是局部的，只提供关于对立面的知识，而非

However, reflection is partial and provides knowledge of the opposite, but not knowledge of origins. Reflection, for Hegel, is distinguished from speculation, which is holistic and can uncover the underlying unity of opposites.

"Those who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually have before their minds the sort of thought that may be styled after-thought. They mean 'reflective' thinking, which has to deal with thoughts as thoughts." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 2.

Reflection (Locke)

For Locke, one of the two sources along with sensation of material for ideas and knowledge. Analogous to the perception of sensible objects, reflection is the perception of our own mental operations, the operations perceived and reflected on by our selves. Hence, Locke also called reflection inner sense. In today's terminology it is introspection. The difference between reflection and sensation arises mainly because reflection is not directly stimulated by objects external to us. Ideas provided by reflection include perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the various other actions of our own minds. Locke's account of reflection is criticised as over-simplified.

"By 'reflection' then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be IDEAS of these operations in the understanding." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II. 1, 4.

Reflective equilibrium

A method of reconciling judgements and principles in moral philosophy through a two-way accommodation between them. There is always the possibility of a discrepancy between general principles and judgements about particular cases. A rational response to these differences requires a process of mutual adjustment of principles and judgements. We revise principles to adjust to judgements or alter judgements to conform to principles until an equilibrium is reached with principles and judgements fitting together or coinciding. The equilibrium is reflective because it yields insight into the relations between our judgements and principles and into their rational grounds. The equilibrium is temporary and can be upset by further reflection or by new cases, but this difficulty also arises, although less transparently, if one tries to determine principles by other procedures. The term gained its currency from Rawls, who traced its origin to Goodman.

"This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgements coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our judgements conform and the premises of their derivation." — Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 20.

本源的知识。对黑格尔来说,反思不同于思辨,思辨是整体的,能揭示对立的根本统一。

“那些坚持宗教和思维分离的人,心目中所习惯的那种思维,可表示为后思,即反思,它把思想本身作为它的内容。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第2节。

反省(洛克)

在洛克那里,反省是观念的材料和知识的材料的两个来源之一(另一个来源是感觉)。类比于对可感对象的知觉,反省是对我们自己内心活动的知觉,我们的自我对这些活动进行知觉和反省。因此洛克也称反省为“内部的感觉”。用现在的术语说,它是内省。反省和感觉的差别主要在于,前者不是由我们之外的对象直接刺激起来的。反省所提供的观念的例子是知觉、思维、怀疑、相信、推理、认知、意愿,以及我们自己心灵的其他全部各种活动。洛克对反省的说明因过于简单化而遭到批评。

“所以,应当理解到,在下面的讨论中用到‘反省’一词时,我的意思是指心灵对它自己的活动和活动方式的注意,由于这种注意,这些活动的观念才出现在理智中。”——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第一章,第4节。

反思的平衡

道德哲学中通过判断与原则之间的双向适应使它们一致起来的方法。在一般原则和关于特殊情况的判断之间总会有不一致的可能。对这些差异的合理反应,要求一个原则和判断相互调整的过程。我们修正原则以适应判断或改变判断来符合原则,直到实现原则和判断彼此适合或一致的平衡。平衡是反思的,因为它洞察到我们的判断和原则之间的关系和它们这种关系的合理依据。这种平衡是暂时的,它可被进一步的反思或新的情况所打破,但如果一个人试图以其他的程序来决定原则,困难也会随之出现,虽然不那么明显。这一术语是从罗尔斯开始流行的,他把它的起源追溯到古德曼。

“我把这种情况称为反思的平衡。它是一种平衡,因为我们的原则和判断最后达到了和谐;它又是反思的,因为我们知道我们的判断符合什么样的原则和它们分离的前提。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第20页。

Reflective judgement, see *Critique of Judgement*

Reflexive

A relation is reflexive if and only if for all objects X , X can have the relation to itself. $(\forall x) Rxx$. For example, because X must be the same age as himself, "... the same age as ..." is a reflexive relation. A relation is irreflexive if and only if for all objects X , it is not the case that X can have the relation to itself. For example, X cannot be a father of himself. Hence "... is the father of ..." is an irreflexive relation. A relation is non-reflexive if it is neither reflexive nor irreflexive. For example, regarding "A loves B". We have no idea from the relation whether B loves A. Hence "... loves ..." is a non-reflexive relation.

"A relation is said to be reflexive if any individual a has that relation to itself if there is something b such that either Rab or Rba ." —Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, 1967, p. 153.

Reformer's paradox

A paradox raised by moral conventionalism concerning reform. Imagine that a reformer sees that his fellow citizens are lazy, selfish and leading meaningless lives. Because he believes that they are this way because of the morality they accept, he advocates the need to reform the existing morality. His motive is to elevate the moral consciousness of his fellow citizens. However, the reformer must begin his reforms in a world that he did not create, but which has shaped him. He is bound by the customs and conventions of the society in which he grew up. According to moral conventionalism, an act is morally right if and only if it conforms to the conventions of the society. Hence, if the reformer wants to change the conventions, he becomes immoral, yet if he keeps the conventions his fellows remain morally inadequate. The same problem applies to the reformer of the system of distribution.

"Justice limits utility at exactly the point of the 'reformer's paradox': Given an imperfect existing initial distribution, any redistribution in the interests of arriving, from the standpoint of justice, at a superior distribution runs headlong into the pattern of existing claims that cannot in the interests of the very justice that provides the rationale for the entire enterprise —be brushed aside as an irrelevant obstacle." —Rescher, *Distributive Justice*, 1966, p. 121.

Refutation, see conjecture

Regularity theory of causation

The causal theory generally held by phenomenalism in

反思的判断力

见“判断力批判”条。

自返的

一关系是自返的，当且仅当，对所有对象 X ， X 与自身能够有那种关系，即 $(\forall x) Rxx$ 。例如， X 必定是与他本人同龄的，所以“与……同龄”是一自返关系。一关系是反自返的，当且仅当，对所有对象 X ，并非 X 能与自身有那种关系。例如， X 不能是他自身的父亲，所以“是……的父亲”是一反自返关系。一关系是非自返的，如果它既不是自返的也不是反自返的。例如，关于“ A 爱 B ”，我们从该关系本身一点也不知道 B 是否爱 A 。所以“爱”是一非自返关系。

“一关系称作是自返的，如果对任意个体 a 都存在某物 b 使得或者 Rab 或者 Rba ，则 a 与它自身有这种关系。”——柯比：《符号逻辑》，1967年，第153页。

改革者的悖论

道德约定主义提出的关于改革的一个悖论。设想一个改革者看到他的同胞懒惰、自私并过着毫无意义的生活。由于他认为他们这样是因为他们所接受的道德所致，他提倡需要改革现存的道德。他的动机是提高他的人民的道德意识。然而，这个改革者必须从并非由他创造的而且是塑造他的世界开始他的改革。他被由以成长的社会的风俗习惯所束缚。按照道德约定主义，一个行为只要而且仅仅只要同社会习俗相适应，它在道德上就是正确的。因此，如果改革者想要改变这一习俗，他就是不道德的，然而，如果他保持这些习俗，那他的同胞在道德上就仍是不适宜的。同样的问题也适用于分配制度的改革者。

“正义恰恰在‘改革者的悖论’这一点上限制了功利：假设一种不完善的现存的初次分配，根据正义的观点，任何再分配为了达到优越的分配都会直接与现在所主张的模式发生冲突，而为了给整个事业提供基本原理的那种正义，这一模式不能作为一种不相干的障碍被扫除。”——雷谢尔：《分配上的公正》，1966年，第121页。

反驳

见“猜想”条。

因果规则论

现象主义一般持有的一种因果理论，是为

order to reject common sense realism about the existence of material things with causal properties. The theory is a sense-data version of Hume's theory of causation. It claims that when we say "A causes B", the statement can be analysed into sequences or correlations of sense-data. Since we observe that whenever A occurs, B occurs, and this succession is regular, we assert that this is a law. Beyond these sequences of sense-data, we have no reason to believe that the causes exert a compelling power or that there is a necessary but unobservable relation between cause and effect. The main difficulty is that it is hard to account for the fact that the causal regularity exists when unobserved by us without relying on a theoretical apparatus involving necessity. In order to account for this, phenomenologists usually appeal to the notion of possible sense-data.

"Above all, the suggested analysis of unobserved causes, even granted the Regularity Theory of Causation, makes actual effects depend on a cause whose existence is only possible." — Hirst, *The Problem of Perception*, 1959, p. 110.

Regulative principles, see constitutive principles

Reification, an alternative term for hypostatization

Reincarnation

The belief that the soul is immortal and that a person's life is reborn after the death of one body in another body. Death is thus merely the death of the body, and the soul can take residence in different bodies, either human or animal. In contemporary philosophy, reincarnation is not merely a topic of theology, but also an issue regarding personal identity. The problem concerns the conditions under which the reincarnated self would retain its former identity. If it does retain its identity, then according to what criterion of personal identity does it do so? If it does not, reincarnation does not seem to be a rebirth of the same life. Reincarnation is synonymous with transmigration or metempsychosis (from Greek; *meta*, beyond + *en*, in + *psyche*, soul), the term used by Pythagoras.

"The affirmation that there is life after death in another world or reincarnation on earth is wide-spread." — Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, 1977, p. 123.

Reism

A term introduced by the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski in 1929 for the position that only things exist. All statements about abstract objects can be reduced to the statements about things. The term "things" covers both organic and inorganic things. There are no objects other than things. Propositions which appear to imply the existence of

了拒斥关于具有因果特性的物质东西存在的常识实在论。这个理论实际上是休谟的因果理论的感觉材料形式。它声称,当我们说"A导致B"时这一陈述可以被分析为感觉材料的序列或相互关联。因为我们总是观察到,每当A发生时,B就发生,而且这个相继顺序是规则的,所以我们就肯定这是一个定律。除了这些感觉材料的序列以外,我们没有理由相信原因实施一种强制性的力量或原因与结果之间存在必然而又看不到的关系。这一理论的主要困难在于,它难以说明这样一个事实:因果规则性在不依赖于包含必然性这样的理论装备的情况下而没有被我们观察到的时候也依然存在。为了说明这一点,现象主义者通常借助于可能的感觉材料这一概念。

"最重要的是,即便承认因果规则论,所提议的对于未观察到的原因的分析也使得实际结果依赖于其存在只是可能的原因。"——赫斯特:《知觉问题》,1959年,第110页。

规范性原理

见“构成性原理”条。

具体化

“实体化”的另一个词。

再生

一种信念,相信灵魂不朽,人的生命在一个肉体死后会在另一个肉体中再生。因此,死仅仅是肉体之死,灵魂能够留驻在人或动物的不同肉体中。在当代哲学中,再生不仅是个神学论题,也是关于人格同一的一个争论点。这个问题关涉到再生的自我保留它以前同一性的条件。如果保留它的同一性,是根据人格同一的什么标准才如此的?如果不保留,它就似乎不是同一个生命的再生。再生也是“轮回”或“灵魂转生”的同义语。“灵魂转生”(metempsychosis,源自希腊语 *meta* (在……之外) 和 *en* (在……之中) 和 *psyche* (灵魂)) 一词是毕达哥拉斯使用的。

“死后在另一个世界有生命,或在地上再生,这种主张散布很广。”——斯文布勒:《有神论的融贯性》,1977年,第123页。

实有论

这是由波兰哲学家T. 柯塔宾斯基于1929年引入的一个词,它是指只有事物存在的立场。一切关于抽象对象的陈述都可以还原为关于事物的陈述。这里的“事物”一词既包括了有机物,也包括了无机物。不存在不同于事物的对象。表面蕴涵了这种或那种抽象实体存在的命题,可

abstract entities of one kind or another either can be rephrased without any loss of relevant content or must be rejected as false. Since the term "reism" is easily confused with "realism", Kotarbinski proposed that it be replaced by "concretism".

Brentano was an earlier reist, for he claimed that only individuals (*entia realia*) exist and can be thought of, and that non-individuals (*entia irrelia*) such as possibilities, concepts and propositions do not exist. Kotarbinski held an even more radical view. He proposed that an entity can be a thing if and only if it is extended in time and space. Accordingly, nothing other than material things exist. This position is in sharp contrast to Platonism, which allows the existence of abstract objects. To distinguish his position from that of Brentano's, Kotarbinski calls his own doctrine somatism or panosomatism (from Greek: *pantos*, all + *soma*, body).

"So much for the reduction of categories of objects to the category of things. The stand taken in favour of such a reduction might be called reism." —Kotarbinski, "Franz Brentano as Reist", in McAlister (ed.) *The Philosophy of Brentano*, 1976, p. 194.

Relation

Although Aristotle classifies relation as one of his ten basic categories of being, it is not until Leibniz that relations become a major focus of metaphysics. Leibniz puzzles over the nature and location of relations, since they can be identified with neither one of the related terms nor with the void between them. In addition, propositions of a relational form cannot be reduced to those of single subject-predicate form. He claims that relations, in contrast to one-place properties, are unreal and hence declares that his basic entities, the monads, are windowless, with none of the features of one monad requiring a reference to other monads and their features. His view gives rise to many debates, one of which is whether relations are internal or external. Absolute Idealism believes that all relations are internal, that is, part of the essential nature of the related terms. Russell rejects this thesis and claims that all relations are external, that is, accidental to the related terms. Modern formal semantics considers relations to be predicates of *n* tuple individuals. A two-place predicate is a relation between two individuals, a three-place predicate is a relation among three individuals, and so on. The main kinds of relation include reflexive, symmetric, transitive, ordering and equivalent relations. Modern mathematics takes relations as classes of ordered pairs.

"Any entity which can occur in a complex, as 'precedes' occurs in 'A precedes B' will be called a relation." —Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. VI, p. 80.

Relation of ideas, see knowledge of relations of ideas

以得到重新解释而不会失去相关的内容,否则,它们就必定是假的,应该加以抛弃。由于“实有论”一词容易与“实在论”混淆,因此柯塔宾斯基建议把它替换为“具相论”。

布伦塔诺也是一个早期的实有论者,因为他认为只有个体(*entia realia*)存在和可以被思考,而非个体(*entia irrelia*)之物如可能性、概念、命题等等是不存在的。柯塔宾斯基采取了一种更为极端的看法。他提出,当且仅当实体在时空上得到扩延时,它才能是事物。因此,物质事物之外无物存在。这种立场与允许抽象对象存在的“柏拉图主义”针锋相对。为了与布伦塔诺的立场区分开来,柯塔宾斯基把他自己的主张称作“实物论”或“泛体论”(源自希腊文:*pantos* (全部)和 *soma* (身体))。

“完全是把对象范畴还原为事物范畴。赞成这种还原所采取的立场可以称作实有论。”——柯塔宾斯基:《实有论者F. 布伦塔诺》,载麦克阿里斯特(编):《布伦塔诺的哲学》,1976年,第194页。

关系

虽然亚里士多德把“关系”划分为存在的十个基本范畴之一,但是一直到莱布尼茨,关系才成为形而上学的焦点。莱布尼茨对于关系的性质和所处的位置感到困惑,因为它们既不等同于一个关系项,又不等同于关系项之间的空位。此外,关系形式的命题不能被还原为单一的主谓词形式的命题。他认为,关系与一位性质相反,是不真实的,并因此宣称,他的基本实体,既单子,是没有窗户的,单子决无这样的特性,即要与其他单子及其性质发生关系。他的观点引发了许多争论,其中之一是,关系是内在的还是外在的。绝对唯心主义认为一切关系都是内在的,即是说,是关系项本性的一部分。罗素驳斥了这种论点,认为所有的关系都是外在的,即是说,并不是关系项的本质属性。现代形式语义学认为关系是 *n* 元个体的谓词。二位谓词是两个个体之间的关系,三位谓词是三个个体之间的关系,等等。关系的主要种类包括自反、对称、传递、有序、等等关系。现代数学把关系当做有序对的类。

“任何能够出现于复合物中的东西,如像‘先于’出现在‘A先于B’中一样,将被称为关系。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第七卷,第80页。

观念的联系

见“有关观念关系的知识”条。

Relations of production

In Marxist philosophy, relations between productive forces and their owners, in which the owner has power to use the productive forces, and between owners and others in the society. The power of the owners implies the exclusion or alienation of others from employing the same productive forces. Hence, relations of production are basically ownership relations. According to Marx, property relations are a legal expression of relations of production. He did not give a formal definition of this term, and there is controversy about how to use his various remarks to formulate a coherent account by which relations of production are explained as a social factor distinct from any item of the superstructure. For Stalin, relations of production defined ownership relations, relations of persons in production and relations of distribution. In Marxism, relations of production are called the form or base of all historical human society. They involve power rather than rights and hence are more basic than political and legal relations. Relations of production are related to the division of labour and is independent of the will of individuals. The totality of relations of production in a society forms its economic structure, also called its economic base, which is determined by productive forces but in turn determines the superstructure. The essential principle of the economic structure in a class society is the pattern of the ruling class, by which a small ruling class owns most of society's means of production, while the majority owns few or none of the means of production. According to Marx, relations of production vary from age to age, and their development corresponds to the development of the productive forces from primitive communism to a slave-owning system, feudalism and capitalism and will proceed to communism. Communism, it is claimed, will abolish private ownership and eliminate the alienated nature implied in capitalist relations of production. To assess Marx's concept of the relations of production it is necessary to assess the theoretical structure in which the concept plays a fundamental role.

"In the social production of their lives men enter into relations that are specific, necessary and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a specific stage of development of their material productive forces." -- Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*.

Relative identity

The sentence "a is identical with b" is traditionally understood as equivalent to "a is the same as b". Peter Geach calls this notion absolute identity, but claims that it is incomplete. He argues that "a is identical with b" means "a is the same x as b", with "x" being an unstated kind term that is understood from the context of utterance. He calls this notion relative identity and believes that it fits into our ordinary

生产关系

在马克思主义哲学中,生产关系是指生产力和它们的所有者的关系,在此关系中所有者拥有使用生产力的权力;还指所有者与社会中的其他成员的关系。所有者的权力意味着他人被排除在或异化于使用同一个生产力之外。因此,生产关系基本上是所有权关系。按马克思的观点,财产关系是生产关系的法律表现。他没有对这个术语作出正式的定义,因而关于如何用他的各种说法来构成连贯的说明,从而把生产关系解释为不同于上层建筑的社会因素,对此存在着争论。在斯大林看来,生产关系规定所有权关系、人们在生产中的关系和分配关系。在马克思主义中,生产关系被称为一切历史的人类社会的基础或形式,它们所涉及的是权力而不是权利,因而比政治和法律的关系更为基本。生产关系与劳动分工有关,并独立于个人的意志。一个社会的生产关系的总和形成它的经济结构,也称为经济基础,它被生产力所决定,但它反过来又决定上层建筑。阶级社会中的经济结构的实质性原则就是统治阶级的模式,按照这种模式,一小撮统治阶级拥有绝大部分的社会生产资料,而大多数人拥有极少或根本没有生产资料。按马克思的观点,不同的时代有不同的生产关系,它们的发展适应于生产力的发展,它们经历了从原始社会到奴隶所有制、封建主义和资本主义,并将达到共产主义的发展。马克思主义主张,共产主义将废除私有制,根除包含于资本主义生产关系的异化本性。评价马克思的生产关系概念必须要评价这个概念在其中起着基本作用的理论结构。

"人们在自己生活的社会生产中发生一定的、必然的、不以他们的意志为转移的关系,即同他们的物质生产力的一定发展阶段相适合的生产关系。"——马克思:《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》。

相对同一性

语句"a同一于b"在传统上被理解为等同于"a与b相同"。P. 吉奇将此定义为"绝对同一性",但他声称这是不完全的。他论辩说,"a同一于b"意味着"a是与b相同的x",其中"x"是未明确说明的类型术语,需要根据说话的语境来理解。他将这一概念称为"相对同一性",并且相信它适合我们关于自然语言的日常

use of natural language. On his view, all identity is relative to a kind, and two things cannot be identical if there is not some kind term under which they both fall. Geach's position is disputed by others, including David Wiggins, who in *Sameness and Substance* defends absolute identity based on Leibniz' law. Some philosophers suggest that relative identity is a qualitative notion, while absolute identity is numerical identity.

"Identity statements in natural language come in two syntactic varieties. Some are of the form 'a is the same as b' or 'a is identical with b'. These are absolute identity statements. Others have the form 'a is the same so-and-so as b'. These are relative identity statement." — Griffin, *Relative Identity*, 1977, p. 12.

Relative product

The combination of two relations. Suppose there is a relation R such that xRy , and a relation S such that ySz , then we can combine these two relations R and S (called relative multiplication) and get a relation between x and z . The obtained relation is called the relation product of R and S . Russell symbolises it as R/S .

"By the relative product of the relation R by the Relation S is meant that relation which exists between x and y if and only if there is a u such that x bears the relation R to u and u bears the relation S to y ." — Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications*, 1958, p. 114.

Relativity theory

The special theory of relativity is a modern physical theory proposed by Einstein in 1905, according to which neither space nor time has an independent absolute value or existence but is each relative to the other. Thus, the classical view of space and time is replaced by a theory in which the two are aspects of the same underlying reality: space-time. The general theory of relativity extended the special theory from considering frameworks in uniform relative motion to one another to considering frameworks in arbitrary relative motion to one another. The general theory resulted from combining the principle of relativity, that all laws of nature must have the same form in any relatively moving frame of reference, with Mach's principle, that the fundamental description of any realistic physical system must be closed. It replaced Newton's theory of universal gravitation and is currently the accepted basis for our theory of gravitation. Relativity theory introduced a revolution in twentieth century physics and greatly advanced our understanding of the structure of the universe. Its space-time theory gives rise to a variety of important methodological, metaphysical and epistemological problems.

"The theory of relativity takes the view that there are purely objective (non-relative) features of the world that are independent of any individual who might look in." — Sachs,

用法。根据他的观点,所有的同一都是相对于一个种类的,而两个事物之间如果没有它们共同具有的类型术语,它们就不可能是同一的。古奇的观点遭到其他人的反驳。D. 威金斯在其《同一与本体》一书中基于莱布尼茨定律来维护绝对同一性陈述。有的哲学家则提出,相对同一性是一个性质概念,而绝对同一性则是数的同一性。

"自然语言中的同一性陈述有两种句法形式。有些是'a与b相同'或'a同一于b'这样的形式,这些是绝对同一性陈述。另有一些则是'a是与b相同的某种东西'。这些是相对同一性陈述。"——格里芬:《相对同一性》,1977年,第12页。

关系积

两个关系的结合。假定有一关系 R , 即 xRy , 和一关系 S 即 ySz , 那么我们可以把这两个关系 R 和 S 结合起来(称为关系乘法)从而得出 x 和 z 的关系。所获得的关系称为 R 和 S 的关系积。罗素用符号表示为 R/S 。

"所谓关系 R 乘关系 S 的关系积是指那种存在于 x 和 y 之间的关系,当且仅当存在着 u , 即 x 具有 R 对 u 的关系,而 u 具有 S 对 y 的关系。"——卡尔纳普:《符号逻辑及其应用导论》,1958年,第114页。

相对论

狭义相对论是爱因斯坦在1905年提出的现代物理学理论,按照这种理论,空间和时间都没有独立的绝对价值或存在,相反,它们每一个相对于另一个而存在。这样,古典的空间时间观便由这种理论所取代,即这两者是同一基本实在的不同方面:空间—时间。广义相对论把从考察相互间的均匀相对运动机制的狭义相对论扩大到考察相互间的任意相对运动机制。广义相对论产生于把相对性原理与马赫的原理相结合,前者认为一切自然规律在任何相对运动的参照系框架中都具有同一的形式,而后者认为任何实在论的物理体系的基本描述都必定是封闭的。它取代了牛顿的万有引力理论,并成为我们的引力理论的广泛公认的基础。相对论引发了20世纪物理学的革命,极大地推进了我们对宇宙结构的理解。它的时空理论产生了许多方法论的、形而上学的和认识论的重大问题。

"相对论采取的观点是,存在着世界的纯粹客观的(非相对的)特征,它们独立于任何可随时进来观望的个人而存在。"——沙赫斯:《相对论的观念》,1974年,第2页。

Ideas of the Theory of Relativity, 1974, p. 2.

Relevance logic

A non-classical formal logic which proposes that the premises and conclusion of a valid argument must be relevant to one another. The notion of relevance is defined as the sharing of a variable (that is content) and dependency. This suggests a new conception of entailment or deducibility, according to which q is deducible from p only if p is used in the derivation of q . If q is deducible from p in this sense, p relevantly implies q . This puts a restriction upon classical logic, in which a contradiction entails any statement whatsoever, that is $(p \wedge \sim p)$ implies q , no matter whether or not q has anything to do with p . Such a notion of implication leads to the paradoxes of material implication and of strict implication. The avoidance of these paradoxes of implication is one of the most important reasons for the development of relevance logic. Relevance logic was first established by Wilhelm Ackermann in a paper of 1956, and was developed by A. Anderson and N. Belnap. It has not been widely accepted or applied.

"Someone who rejects the table as an account of the meaning of 'if ... then' therefore owes us a new account of 'if ... then' introduction, presumably involving a requirement that the antecedent be non-redundantly used in deriving the consequent. There is a branch of logic known as relevance logic which develops this approach." —Forbes, *Modern Logic*, p. 97.

Relevant implication, see relevance logic

Reliabilism

An externalist approach to epistemic justification with various forms. David Armstrong proposes that the truth of a justified belief is guaranteed by the lawlike connection in nature. The most influential version of reliabilism is called process reliabilism, claiming that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable psychological process. In other words, a justified belief is one produced by an appropriate cognitive process, while an unjustified belief is produced by an inappropriate process. Such things as standard perception and good reasoning are reliable, while wishful thinking, emotional reaction and guesswork are unreliable. The reliability of such a cognitive process is linked to whether what is believed is true in the actual world. Hence knowledge is identified with true belief obtained as a result of law-like connection between us and the world. This form of reliabilism is associated with Alvin Goldman, and it has the advantage of connecting cognitive psychology with epistemology. It is open to counterexamples, for in some cases such as the brain-in-a-vat case, beliefs thus formed are unjustified, but

相干逻辑

一种非经典形式逻辑,它提出:有效论证的前提和结论必须是相互关联的。“相干”概念被定义为共享一个变元(即内容)和相互依赖性。这显示了一个新的“衍推”或“可演绎性”概念,根据这一概念,只有在推出 q 的过程中使用过 p , q 才可从 p 演绎得到。如果 q 在这种意义上可从 p 演绎得到,则 p 相干蕴涵 q 。这对经典逻辑施加了一个限制,后者承认矛盾衍推无论什么陈述,即 $(p \wedge \sim p)$ 蕴涵 q ,无论 q 是否与 p 有任何关联。这样一种蕴涵概念导致了“实质蕴涵悖论”和“严格蕴涵悖论”。避免这些蕴涵悖论是相干逻辑发展最重要的理由之一。相干逻辑最初是由W.阿克曼在1956年的一篇论文中创立的,并为A.安德森和N.伯尔纳普所发展。它们未被广泛承认或应用。

“某些人拒绝承认该表是对‘如果……则’的一种说明,所以给我们提出了有关‘如果……则’引入的一种新说明,后者预先包含一个要求:前件在推导出后件的过程中并非多余地被使用了。有一个以相干逻辑知名的逻辑分支从事这一探索。”——福布斯:《现代逻辑》,第97页。

相干蕴涵

见“相干逻辑”条。

可靠论

以各种形式探讨认知辨明的外在论方法。D.阿姆斯特朗提出,得到辨明的信念就是由自然界中类似法则的联系所认可的真理。最有影响的一种可靠论被称作过程的可靠论,它认为,一个信念得到阐明,当且仅当它是由可靠的心理过程产生的。换句话说,得到辨明的信念就是由恰当的认识过程产生的信念,而没有得到辨明的信念则是由不恰当的心理过程产生的信念。标准的知觉、恰当的推理等都是可靠的,而迫切的愿望、情绪的反应和猜想则是不可靠的。这种认知过程的可靠性,是与我们所相信的东西在现实世界中是否为真有关。这样,知识就被确定为包含了作为我们与世界之间类似法则的联系之结果的真信念。这种形式的可靠论与A.哥尔德曼有关,它的优点在于把认知心理学与认识论联系起来。但它仍然可能招致反对,因为在缸中之脑的情形中,这样构成的信念是没有得到辨明的,而根据可靠论,它们则是必须得到辨明的。

according to reliabilism they must be justified.

"The theory of epistemic justification that has received the most attention recently is reliabilism. Roughly speaking, this is the view that epistemologically justified beliefs are the ones that result from belief-forming processes that reliably lead to true beliefs."—Feldman and Conee, "Evidentialism", *Philosophical Studies*, 48, (1) 1985.

Religious experience

The feeling of powers of mystery, awe, wonder and fascination, generally occurring in a context of religious expectation, which is beyond ordinary rational explanation. Religious experience is claimed to be an inner self-attestation of supernatural reality. Theology claims that this sort of feeling is produced by the agency of God, and it generally describes this sort of experience as a sharing in eternal life or being in touch with the Holy, with a consequent sense of joyfulness. Various kinds of religious experience are recorded in the Bible. Many Theologians and metaphysicians try to prove the existence of God by appeal to religious experience, although the changes brought about in us by such experience should perhaps be understood in terms of conversion rather than of rational persuasion.

"We may now lay it down as certain that in the distinctively religious sphere of experience, many persons... possess the objects of their belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect accepts as true but rather in the form of quasi-realities directly apprehended."—James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 63.

Religiousness A

Kierkegaard distinguished three stages of existence: aesthetic, ethical and religious. He further sub-divided the religious stage into Religiousness A and Religiousness B. In Religiousness A, God is thought to be immanent, and the eternal truth to be rationally accessible. The transition from the ethical level to Religiousness A is marked by resignation, suffering, guilt and humour. In this stage, conventional morality no longer appears as an adequate means of bringing the individual into harmony with the whole of existence. In seeking this harmony, the individual must have recourse to the Deity. Hence, a finite individual retains an essential relationship to the eternal. In Religiousness B, this relationship no longer holds. The individual ceases to believe that by virtue of some specific exercise of thought or action he is capable of realising some latent kinship with the eternal. The individual tries to relate himself in time to the eternal in time, that is to become the eternal itself. Religiousness B is Christianity, in which God is incarnated as a human being as an ethical example. This stage is to account of how to become a Christian. According to Kierkegaard, one can progress from overcoming objectivity, to achieving subjectivity

"近来得到极大关注的认知辨明理论是可靠论。大致地说,这种观点认为,在认识论上得到辨明的信念,就是来自能够可靠地达到真信念的信念构成之过程的信念。"—弗尔德曼和科尼:《证据主义》,载《哲学研究》,第48卷,第1期,1985年。

宗教体验

对神秘、敬畏、惊异和魅惑力量的感受,一般发生在宗教期待的满足中,超越于通常的理性解释之外。宗教体验被认为是对超自然实在的内在证明。神学断言,这类感受由上帝的作用产生。一般把这类体验描述为分有永恒生命,或伴随有快感的与神的接触。在《圣经》中,记载着不同种类的宗教体验。许多神学家和形而上学家企图诉诸宗教体验来证明上帝存在,尽管这种体验给我们造成的变化或许应根据皈依而非理性劝导来理解。

"现在,我们可以肯定地断言:在显而易见的宗教体验领域中,许多人……拥有的信仰对象,不是仅以他们的理智接受为真的概念形式获得,而是以对类似实在的东西直接领悟的形式获得。"—詹姆斯:《宗教经验种种》,1902年,第63页。

第一种宗教状态

克尔凯郭尔将人的生存分为三个阶段:美学阶段、伦理阶段和宗教阶段。他进一步将宗教阶段分为第一种宗教状态和第二种宗教状态。在第一种宗教状态中,上帝被看做是内在的,永恒的真理被认为是从理性上可接近的。从伦理层次向第一种宗教状态转变的标志是放弃、受苦、罪感和谦卑。在这个阶段中,传统的道德不再被当做使个人与整个生存取得和谐的充分途径。要达到这种合谐,个人必须求助于神。这样,一个有限的个人就与永恒者保持了一种根本的关系。在第二种宗教状态中,这样一种关系不再成立。个人不再相信,凭借某种特殊的思想或行为,他就能实现出与永恒者的潜在亲缘关系。个人试图将时间中的他自身与时间中的永恒者(它将成为永恒者本身)关联起来。第二种宗教状态就是基督教的状态,神在其中道成肉身而为人,以作为一个伦理的榜样。这个阶段说明了成为一个基督徒的途径。按照克尔凯郭尔的观点,人可以从克服客体性中取得进步,达到主体性(或真理),并在此基础上通过信仰的一跃而成为一个基督徒。

(or truth) and on that basis to become a Christian through a leap of faith.

"Religiousness A is the dialectic of inward deepening; it is the relation to an eternal happiness that is not conditioned by a something but is the dialectical inward deepening of the relation, consequently conditioned only by the inward deepening, which is dialectical." --Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (trans. by Hong and Hong), 1992, I, p. 556.

Religiousness B, see Religiousness A

Reluctant desire, see embraced desire

Renaissance

[from French; rebirth] Historians dispute the distinctive characteristics and limits of the period of the Renaissance. A narrow sense was formulated by the Swiss art historian Jacob Burckhardt, who used the term for the revival or rebirth of learning and arts initiated in Italian Culture. In a wider sense, it concerns European history from the early fourteenth to the early seventeenth century, involving a disparagement of the Middle Ages, yet the chronological term is closely related to the development of culture and art. This period is also called the age of adventure, represented by voyages of exploration and the discovery of new lands. It witnessed the religious Reformation, sparked by Martin Luther and John Calvin. This period is admired because of the huge progress of science and technology, represented by the Copernican heliocentric theory.

This period was also notable for its achievements in classical learning, the arts and literature, which were products of its humanism. The humanist movement was stimulated by the discovery of large amounts of previously unknown literature from ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotelianism was still influential, but people read his work in Greek rather than in Latin translation. Platonism underwent a resurgence, especially in the Florentine school directed by Ficino, and Plato's complete works were translated into Latin for the first time. Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism all exerted great influence. The revival of different schools of ancient philosophy created different schools in the humanist movement and became the major contents of Renaissance philosophy. The philosophy of nature also developed greatly in this period, and indeed philosophy at that time also covered many subjects which now belong to different areas of natural science. The major thinkers include Ficino, Pico, Nicholas of Cusa, Lorenzo Valla, Erasmus, More, Machiavelli, Giordano Bruno.

"By the 'Renaissance' I understand that period of West-

"第一种宗教状态是内在深化的辩证法,是与永恒至福的关系。这种关系并不受到某个东西的限制,而是此关系的辩证的内在深化,因此只以这辩证的内在深化为条件。"——克尔凯郭尔:《关于〈哲学片断〉的非科学的最后附言》,(洪夫妇英译),1992年,第1卷,第556页。

第二种宗教状态

见“第一种宗教状态”条。

不情愿欲求

见“情愿欲求”条。

文艺复兴

[源自法语,“再生”]对文艺复兴时期的明显特征和时间界限,历史学家们有争议。瑞士艺术史家J. 布克哈德特阐明了文艺复兴的狭义,指在意大利文化中肇始的学术和艺术的复兴或再生。在广义上,它则指从14世纪早期到17世纪早期的欧洲历史,涉及到对中世纪的轻蔑,但这个编年学上的术语依然与文化 and 艺术的发展密切相关。这个时期也被称为“冒险时代”,以探险航海和新大陆的发现为代表。它目睹了被M. 路德和J. 加尔文引发的宗教改革。这一时期由于科学和技术的巨大进步(以哥白尼的日心说为代表)而受人赞美。

这一时期之所以著名,也因为作为该时期人文主义的产物,在古典学术、艺术和文学中取得的成就。人文主义运动是由以前未知的古希腊罗马文献的大量发现而被激发起来的。亚里士多德主义依然有影响,但人们更愿读他的希腊原文著作,而不是拉丁译本。柏拉图主义获得了一次实实在在的复活,尤其是在费其诺领导的佛罗伦萨的柏拉图学园,他的全部著作第一次被译成拉丁文。斯多亚派、伊壁鸠鲁派和怀疑派,全都产生了很大影响。不同的古代哲学流派的复兴,在人文主义运动中产生出了不同的学派,并成为文艺复兴时期哲学的主要内容。在这一时期,自然哲学也有很大发展,况且在那个时代,哲学也的确涵盖了现在属于自然科学不同领域的许多主题。主要的思想家包括费其诺、皮科、库萨的尼古拉、L. 瓦拉、爱拉斯谟、莫尔、马基雅维利、G. 布鲁诺。

“所谓‘文艺复兴’,我理解为大约是从1300年延续到1600年的西欧的那一段历史,至于那个时期,或在它之前和之后的另一些时期的特征或功过,我不作任何假定。”——克里斯特勒尔:《文艺复兴思潮及其根源》,1979年,第17页。

ern European History which extends approximately from 1300 to 1600, without any presupposition as to the characteristics or merits of that period, or of those periods preceding and following it.” —Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources*, 1979, p. 17.

Representation

In general, an item in the mind, picture, model, copy or other thing which stands for something else because of a likeness or on some other grounds. Kant distinguished between representation with consciousness and representation without consciousness. Under the heading of conscious representation, he placed all the elements of experience and knowledge. For Kant, representation is crucially involved in perception, which is divided into subjective perception or sensation and objective perception or cognition. The representations of cognition are further divided into intuitions and concepts, a duality which is fundamental to Kant's philosophy through his claim that knowledge requires both kinds of representation through the application of concepts to intuitions.

With the development of cognitive science, representation has become a prominent term in the philosophy of mind, but many philosophical problems relating to the notion of representation remain.

“We have representations in us, and can become conscious of them. But however far this consciousness may extend, and however careful and accurate it may be, they still remain mere representations, that is, inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time.” —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A197/B242.

Representational form

[German: *Form der Darstellung*] Wittgenstein's term, also called form of representation. These forms enable us to describe or represent reality and are a necessary condition for understanding and truth. For Wittgenstein, representational forms are determined by grammar, which lays down rules or norms of description and guides us in making intelligible statements about the world. The necessity involved in using these forms is logically or grammatically based and cannot be justified by the reality it represents.

“A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form).” —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.173.

Representational theory, another expression for imitation theory

Representationalism

Also called the causal theory of perception, the representative theory of perception or the two world theory. A major theory of perception, which contrasts with direct or

表象

它通常指在心灵、图像、模型、复本等事物中的要素。它代表了由于相似性或基于其他理由而存在的他物。康德区分了有意识的表象和无意识的表象。他把经验和知识的一切要素都归属于意识表象。在康德看来,表象主要与知觉有关,而知觉又进而分为主观的知觉或感知,和客观的知觉或认识。认识表象又进一步分为直观和概念,这种二重性是康德哲学的基本特征,体现了他的这种主张:知识需要两类表象,即把概念应用于直观。

随着认识科学的发展,表象已成为心的哲学中的主要术语。但是许多有关表象概念的哲学问题依然存在。

“我们在自身内部具有表象,并能意识到它们。但不管这种意识所及范围有多么深广,它可能是多么地细致和准确,它们仍然只是表象,即我们心灵在这种或那种时间关系中的内部规定而已。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A197/B242。

表现形式

[源自德文: *Form der Darstellung*] 维特根斯坦的术语,又叫表现的形式。这些形式使我们能够描述或表现实在,它们是理解和真理的必要条件。对维特根斯坦而言,表现形式由语法决定,它制定描述的规则或标准,并指引我们作出关于世界的可理解的陈述。使用这些形式所涉及的必要性是基于逻辑和语法,不能由它们所表现的实在证明为合理。

“图像从外面表现其对象。(它的观点就是它的表现形式)。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,2.173。

再现说

“模仿说”的另一表述。

表征主义

又称知觉的因果理论,知觉的表征理论或两个世界理论,是关于知觉的一个主要理论,与朴素或直接实在论和现象论相对。直接实在论

naïve realism and phenomenalism. While direct realism takes what we immediately perceive to be physical objects, representationalism claims that perception is the result of the operation of nerves and brain and that we are directly aware of subjective private sensations, that is sense-data or ideas which cannot exist independent of perception. While phenomenalism holds that physical objects are constructions out of sense-data and cannot exist independently, representationalism claims that sense-data are representations or symbolisations of the physical objects, which are inferred as the causes of the sense-data. Thus, physical objects exist in their own right, and we may indirectly know them through sense-data. Such a theory is scientifically inspired and is widely held by neurophysiologists. The main difficulty faced by the theory is that if private sensations are the only things to which we can have direct access, it is not clear how we can compare them with the features of the physical world that they are supposed to represent. This problem gives rise to scepticism about the external world and leads to phenomenalism. Nevertheless, the representative theory is perhaps the best available explanation of the uniformity of sequences of sensations.

"Representationalism is the view that a percept is veridical only when it is caused by its correspondent object." — Danto, *Analytic Philosophy of Action*, 1973, p. 45.

Representative theory of mind

A theory holding that a proposition token is a token mental representation. Although there are no general type correlations between propositional attitudes and physical properties, there are token correlations. An organism having a propositional attitude bears a functional relation to a mental representation. Representations are real and physically realised entities. Mental processes are causal sequences of token mental representations. The properties of a belief are explained in terms of the properties of its associated representations. The only properties of a representation which could influence its causal behaviour are its syntactical properties. Hence, a representation's syntactic properties must mirror its semantic properties in order to preserve the match between the semantic content of a belief and its causal role. For Fodor, the representational theory is the same thing as the language of thought hypothesis, but others argue that one can believe in the representational theory of mind without believing in the language of thought hypothesis.

"What I am selling is the representational theory of mind ... At the heart of the theory is the postulation of a language of thought; an infinite set of 'mental representations' which function both as the immediate objects of propositional attitudes and as the domains of mental processes." Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, 1987, p. 11.

把我们直接知觉到的东西看做是物理对象,而表征主义则声称知觉是神经和大脑操作的结果,我们所直接意识的是主观的私人感觉,亦即不能独立于知觉而存在的感觉材料或观念。现象论认为物理对象是由感觉材料建构而成的,因而不能独立存在,而表征主义则认为,感觉材料是关于物理对象的表征或符号象征,这些物理对象被推断为感觉材料的原因。这样,物理对象是因其自身而存在,我们可以通过感觉材料而间接了解它们。这样一个理论受到了科学的启发,并为神经生理学家所广泛接受。这一理论所面临的主要困难在于,如果私人感觉是我们直接获知的惟一的東西,那么我们怎样将之与它们被假定表征的物理世界的特征相比较呢?这个问题引起关于外部世界的怀疑论并导致现象论。然而表征理论或许是迄今对感觉序列之一致性的最好说明。

"表征主义是这样一种观点:一个知觉只有当由相应的对象所引起时,才是真实的。"——丹托:《分析的行动哲学》,1973年,第45页。

心的表征理论

这一理论认为一个命题单例是一个单例的心的表征。尽管在命题态度和物理特性之间不存在普遍的类型关联,但却存在单例关联。具有一个命题态度的机体与一个心的表征具有一种功能关系。表征是真实的、以物理的方式实现的存在物。心的过程是心的表征单例的因果序列。一个信念的特性用与其相关联的表征的特性来解释。一个表征的惟一能够影响其因果行为的特性是其句法特性。因此,为了保持一个信念的语义内容与其因果作用之间的匹配,一个表征的句法特性必须反映其语义特性。对福多而言,表征理论就是思维语言假设。但另有其他人论辩说,一个人可以相信心的表征理论而不相信思维语言假设。

"我所兜售的是心的表征理论……这一理论的核心是思维语言假设:一个无限系列的'心的表征',既作为命题态度的直接对象,又作为心的过程的领域。"——福多:《心理语义学》,1987年,第11页。

Representative theory of perception, another term for representationalism

Repression

The term Freud used for the force or forces in the mind which are the causal factors of unconscious processes. Repression turns unacceptable or painful parts of reality or impulse away from consciousness and confines them to the unconscious system through a variety of mechanisms. According to Freud, the process of repression does not annihilate these ideas, but prevents them from becoming conscious. Repression is a species of psychic defence, and we can be aware of the repressive forces in the form of resistance, that is the patient's rejection of allegedly correct psychoanalytic interpretations. Sometimes "repression" is employed interchangeably with "suppression". However, repression is claimed to be an instinctual and unconscious denial, rather than a voluntary or conscious restraint upon unwanted desires. Freud claims that repressed instincts can turn to creative forces in sublimation. The basic goal of psychoanalysis is to make those repressed impulses conscious both for therapeutic benefit and for intellectual insight.

"The neuroses are the expressions of conflicts between the ego and such of the sexual impulses as seem to the ego incompatible with its integrity or with its ethical standards. Since these impulses are not ego-syntonic, the ego has repressed them: this is to say, it has withdrawn its interests from them and has shut them off from becoming conscious as well as from obtaining satisfaction by motor discharge." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 18, p. 248.

Republic

[Greek: *politeia*, the public and political life of a community, Latin: *res publica*, public business] The English translation of the title of Plato's most important dialogue. The translation comes from the Latin *res publica* which originally had the same meaning as *politeia* and only later came to be used for a particular form of constitution. For Plato, *politeia* was simply any constitution of a Greek *polis* (city-state), and Plato's book is about the state and society. *Politeia* might better be translated as political system. In the *Republic*, Plato set up an ideal state and within that context examined many topics such as the theory of Forms, the role of art, the structure of society, the parts of the soul, the best sort of education, the nature of morality and religion, and the place of women in society. The *Republic* is one of the great books in human history and has inspired and perplexed generations of its readers. Many western students began their philosophical education with the *Republic*.

In its modern sense, a republic is a form a society governed by the people, protecting rights and promoting civic

知觉的表征理论

“表征主义”的别名。

压抑

弗洛伊德使用的一个词，用来表示引起无意识过程的一种或多种心灵力量。压抑使得现实或冲动中的那些令人无法接受的或痛苦的部分从意识中隐退，并通过各种机制而将其限制在无意识的系统之中。按照弗洛伊德的想法，压抑过程并没有消灭这些观念，而只是使它们不被意识到。压抑是一种心理的防卫，我们能够感受到以抵抗形式出现的压抑力量，表现在病人对于被认为是正确的心理分析解释的拒绝之中。有时，“压抑”这个词与“压制”互换混用。然而，压抑被认为是本能的和无意识的拒斥，并非对于不想要的欲望的主动自觉的抑制。弗洛伊德认为被压抑的本能可以在升华中变为创造性的力量。心理分析的基本目标是使那些被压抑的冲动进入意识，既有益于治疗〔精神神经病〕，又可导致理智上的洞察。

“神经病是自我与某些性冲动之间冲突的表现，对于自我来说，这些性冲动危及到了人格的完整或伦理的规范。由于这些冲动与自我不协调，这自我就压抑了它们。这也就是说，它们不再有兴趣，将其关在意识之外，而且不通过自动的发泄去得到满足。”——弗洛伊德：《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》，第十八卷，第248页。

《国家篇》

[希腊文: *politeia*, 一个社会的公共生活和政治生活, 拉丁文 *res publica*, 公共事务] 对柏拉图最重要对话的英译名, 译文来自拉丁文 *res publica*, 后者最初具有与 *politeia* 同样的含义, 只是到后来才被用于一种特殊的政体形式。在柏拉图看来, *politeia* 只是希腊 *polis* (城邦国家) 的政体, 柏拉图的书涉及的是国家和社会。 *Politeia* 也许被翻译为政治制度更好。在《国家篇》中, 柏拉图建立了一个理想城邦, 在此背景下考察了许多问题, 如形相论、艺术的作用、社会的结构、灵魂的组成部分、教育的最好类型、道德和宗教的本质以及妇女的社会地位。《国家篇》是人类历史上的伟大著作之一, 启发并困扰了它的代代读者。西方很多学生是以《国家篇》开始他们的哲学教育的。

就其现代意义而言, republic (共和政体) 是一种由人民管理、保护权利和提倡公民美德的社会形式。由于允许在政体内改换管理者, 共和政体既不同于世袭的君主政体, 也不同于独裁

virtue. By allowing change of rulers within the constitution, a republic contrasts with both a hereditary monarchy and a dictatorship.

"The Republic is the centre around which the other dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the highest point to which ancient thinkers ever attained." Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, II, introduction, p. 1.

Republicanism

[from Latin: *res publica*, public business] The theory of the institutionally organised realm of public affairs in a commonwealth or state in which the people or citizens have a decisive say in its organisation and conduct. Republican theory and practice can be traced to the Roman republic and Renaissance Italian city states. Traditionally, republics have linked citizenship to property, and citizens have tried to arrange government to avoid domination by one individual or group and to provide institutions that would protect liberty. Contemporary republicanism criticises liberal democratic theory and society on the grounds of their juridical formalism, their emphasis on rights rather than on virtue and civic duty and their failure to provide the protections that a commonwealth should offer its citizens. As part of its attack on liberal democracy, it controversially reinterprets modern political history as developing initially from republican thought before being subverted by a democratic revolution.

"The opposition between liberalism and republicanism, which is a source of inspiration for the recent revival of the latter, is more an invention of this revival than ascertainable historical fact." —Haakonssen, "Republicanism" in Goodin and Pettit (eds), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, p. 571.

Res cogitans

[Latin: *res*, thing + *cogitan*, to think, thinking thing] Descartes' term for thinking substance, in contrast to *res extensa* (Latin: extended thing), Descartes' term for extended or corporeal substance. According to Descartes, I can doubt anything. But when I doubt, I am thinking, and as long as I am thinking, I exist. Thinking is inseparable from me. Thus I have a clear and distinct idea that I am a mind, or intelligence, and my nature is a thinking thing. On the other hand, I have also a clear idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. He concludes that *res cogitans* and *res extensa* are two independent entities. This dichotomy is the foundation of Descartes' dualism.

"For all that I am a thing that is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? ... A thinking thing (*res cogitans*)." —Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham et al.), II, p. 18.

政体。

"《国家篇》是使其他对话能够汇集在一起的核心部分,在这里,哲学达到了古代思想家取得的最高成就。"——乔维特:《柏拉图的对话》, I, "导言", 第1页。

共和主义

[源自拉丁语: *res publica*, 公共事务] 关于共和政体或国家中制度组织上的公共事务的理论,在这样的共和政体或国家中,人民或公民对其组织与行为有决定性的发言权。共和主义的理论与实践可追溯到罗马共和国和文艺复兴时期的意大利城邦。从传统上看,共和政体已使公民权与财产相联,公民力图安排政府以避免为一个人或一个小集团所统治,并力图建立保卫自由的机构。当代共和主义批评自由主义的民主理论和社会,其理由是后者在司法上的形式主义、强调权利而不是德性和公民义务以及未能提供一个共和政体应提供其公民的保护。作为对自由主义民主的攻击,共和主义颇有争议地把当代政治史重新解释为最初始于未被民主革命破坏的共和主义思想的发展。

"自由主义与共和主义的对立是激励后者近来复兴的一个源泉,可这种对立更多地是这种复兴的创造,而不是可以弄清的历史事实。"——赫孔森:《共和主义》,见高定及彼底(编):《当代政治哲学指南》,第571页。

思维的东西

[拉丁文,由 *res* (东西) 和 *cogitan* (思维) 结合而成,字面意思是"思维的东西"] 笛卡尔用这个词指思维的实体,它与 *res extensa* (拉丁语,字面意思是"广延的东西") 相对,笛卡尔用后一个词指广延的或有形的实体。根据笛卡尔的观点,我可以怀疑任何东西,但是,当我怀疑的时候,我正在思维,而只要在思维,我就存在。思维与我是不可分的。于是我就有了我是一个心灵或理智的清晰明晰的观念,我的本质就是一个思维的东西。另一方面,我还有一个广延的非思维的身体的清晰观念。他作出结论说,思维的东西和广延的东西是两个独立的东西。这一两分法是笛卡尔二元论的基础。

"尽管我是实在的、真实存在的东西,但是,是何种东西呢?……是一个思维的东西 (*res cogitans*)."——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,第18页。

Res extensa see, *res cogitans*

Research programme

Lakatos' term in the philosophy of science for a set of methodological rules for the conduct of research. These can be divided into two kinds; rules that prohibit certain kinds or methods of research, which are called the negative heuristic; rules which advocate certain kinds of research, which are called the positive heuristic. Each research programme has a hard core that is surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. When the research programme encounters problems or needs to be revised, scientists characteristically change some part of the protective belt rather than its core. This explains the continuity in the growth of science. This account of science is related to Popper's falsificationism. Testing leads to the falsification of hard core and auxiliary hypotheses, but we alter the auxiliary hypotheses in order to protect the hard core. A research programme is the unit by which the nature and direction of scientific growth is analysed. If a programme can continue to anticipate and solve new problems and to determine new facts, it is progressive; and if it ceases to do this, it is degenerating. We can account for scientific progress in terms of the replacement of a degenerating programme with a progressive one, although these are relative notions and some degenerating programmes can become progressive. Such progress is not linear, but a complex process involving a proliferation of different theories at the same time. According to Lakatos, Newton's gravitational theory serves as a classic example of a research programme.

"A research programme is successful if all this leads to a progressive problem shift; unsuccessful it is leads to a degenerating problem shift." —Lakatos, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, 1970, p. 133.

Resemblance, theory of, see resemblance nominalism

Resemblance nominalism

All things which fall under the same predicate resemble one another. Realists claim that they resemble one another because they are all instances of the same universal. According to resemblance nominalism or the theory of resemblance, however, the resemblance, instead of being derived from a universal, is itself ultimate or fundamental. The features by which things resemble one another have different degrees of intensity in the different individuals. The common character of things falling under the same predicate can be analysed simply in virtue of a resemblance among particulars. We might say that A has some property P if and only if A suit-

广延的东西

见“思维的东西”条。

研究纲领

拉卡托斯在科学哲学中用以指一组进行研究的方法论规则的术语。这些规则可分为两类：那种禁戒某种研究方法的规则，称作“反面助发现法”，那种提倡某些研究方法的规则，称为“正面助发现法”。每个研究纲领都有一个“硬核”，它为一条辅助假设的“保护带”所环绕。如果研究纲领遇到了问题或需要修改时，科学家总是改变“保护带”的某一部分而不是其硬核。这可以说明科学成长中的连续性。这种科学主张与波普的证伪主义相关。检验导致对硬核和辅助假说的证伪，但我们改变辅助假说以保护硬核。研究纲领是用以分析科学成长的性质和方向的单位。如果一个研究纲领能继续预期和解决新问题，确定新的事实，它就是进步的；如果它不再能这样，它就是退步的。我们可以用退步的纲领为进步纲领所取代来说明科学进步，当然这些概念都是相对的，某些退步的纲领也可以变成进步的。这种进步是非线性的、复杂的过程，包含着同一时刻不同理论的增殖。在拉卡托斯看来，牛顿引力理论可作为研究纲领的一个经典范例。

“如果所有这些导致进步的问题转换，则这个研究纲领是成功的；如果它导致退步的问题转换，则为不成功的。”——拉卡托斯，见拉卡托斯和马斯格雷夫(编)：《批判与知识的增长》，1970年，第133页。

相似理论

见“相似唯名论”条。

相似唯名论

所有从属于同一谓词的事物彼此相似。实在论者认为，它们彼此相似是因为它们都是同一共相的个例。但根据相似唯名论(也叫相似理论)，相似自身才是根本重要的，而不是派生于同一共相。那使得事物彼此相似的特征在不同个体中具有不同的强度。从属于同一谓词的事物的共同特征，其实就可以从殊相之间的相似去分析。我们可以说当且仅当A适当地相似于一个范例F时，A具有某一特性P。可是范例F是另一个殊相，因此F与A都具有P并不要求引入一个共相。我们不需要为红的事物设一个

ably resembles a paradigm case of F. But the paradigm F is another particular, and for F and A both to have P does not require the introduction of a universal. There need not be a universal "redness" for things to be red; all that is needed is a resemblance to a certain tomato. Resemblance nominalism can be traced back to Hume, and is articulated in detail by H. H. Price, *Thinking and Experience* and R. Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World*. Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblance" can be seen as a variant of resemblance nominalism. Resemblance nominalism faces some major difficulties. First, resemblance itself might be a universal. Secondly, two things might need an element in common in order to resemble each other. Both criticisms attempt to introduce items of a sort which resemblance nominalism tried to banish.

"Despite the many difficulties which can be raised against Resemblance Nominalism it is by far the most satisfactory version of Nominalism." — Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism*, 1978, p. 57.

Resentment

A frustrated emotion or attitude in which one, for example, feels offended, injured, oppressed, humiliated or ignored in reaction to others or their actions. It is the emotion of victims toward their offenders. According to Nietzsche, resentment is related to revenge; as a mark of slave morality it is an essential feature of Judaeo-Christian morality. Rawls believes that resentment in contrast to envy is based on a sense of inequality and injustice. In *Freedom and Resentment*, Strawson examined situations in which we do or do not feel resentment toward others to provide a new perspective on freedom and determinism.

"Resentment, or what I have called resentment, is a reaction to injury or indifference." — Peter Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment*, 1974, p. 14.

Resolution, see partition

Responsibility

[from Latin: *respon-do*, I answer] The accountability of persons, primarily for actions and their consequences but sometimes for other items as well. A person who is held responsible or answerable for an action is subject to responses such as blame, praise, punishment or reward on account of the action. One is legally responsible if one is subject to a legal obligation and is morally responsible if one is subject to a moral obligation. Because of the difference between law and morality, moral responsibility and legal responsibility do not coincide. Normally, a person is responsible for an action because he does the action or brings it about either directly or indirectly. We are responsible for some, but not all, of the

共相的红;只要它们相似于某个西红柿就足够了。相似唯名论可溯追至休谟。H. H. 普赖斯在其《思想与经验》和卡尔纳普在其《世界的逻辑结构》中对这一理论作了详尽阐发。维特根斯坦的“家族相似”观念也可以看做是相似唯名论的一个变种。相似唯名论面临若干困难。首先,相似自身可能即是一个共相。其次,两件事物需要另一共同因素才会彼此相似。两种反对意见都力图引入相似唯名论希望排斥的类项的东西。

“尽管对相似唯名论可以提出许多疑难,迄今为此,它仍是唯名论的最令人满意的形式。”——阿姆斯特朗:《唯名论和唯实论》,1978年,第57页。

愤恨

一种受挫后的情感或态度,例如,一个人在对其他人或他们的行为的反应中感到受到冒犯、伤害、压抑、羞辱或忽视。这是对冒犯者的一种受害情感。按照尼采的说法,愤恨与报复相联系;作为奴隶道德的一个标志,它是犹太教—基督教道德的一个本质特征。罗尔斯认为愤恨与嫉妒不同,它是基于一种不平等、不公正的感觉。在《自由与忿恨》中,斯特劳森考察了我们对别人感到或不感到愤恨的境遇,对自由和决定论提出了一个新观点。

“愤恨,或我称之为愤恨的东西,是对伤害或不关心的一种反应。”——斯特劳森:《自由与忿恨》,1974年,第14页。

分解

见“划分”条。

责任

[源自拉丁文: *respon-do*, 我作答] 人们负有的责任,主要是对行为及其后果的责任,但有时也包括对其他问题的责任。一个对一种行为负有责任或应负责任的人,要因这一行为而承受诸如责备、赞扬、惩罚或奖赏等反应。如果一个人受法律义务束缚,他就负有法律责任,如果一个人受道德义务束缚,他就负有道德责任。因为法律与道德不同,道德责任和法律责任是不一致的。在正常情况下,一个人对一个行为负有责任是因为他直接或间接地做了这一行为或造成了这一行为。我们对我们行为的某些后果负有责任,而不是对全部后果负有责任。不能预先

consequences of our actions. Not all responsibilities presuppose a causal link. We are responsible for some of our omissions, and moral luck also play a role in ascribing responsibility to an agent. With important exceptions, the conditions of responsibility require that persons know what they are doing and that they have at least a certain degree of freedom to control the acts that they perform. Accordingly, freedom and responsibility are closely related, and responsibility is central to the question of freedom and determinism. The discussion of responsibility can be traced to Aristotle's consideration of voluntary and involuntary actions in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It was carried forward through medieval discussions of human evil to investigations of action, deliberation, motivation, choice, intention, weakness of will and diminished responsibility in contemporary ethics, political philosophy and legal philosophy.

"The central core of the concept of responsibility is that I can be asked the question, 'why did you do it?' and be obliged to give an answer." —Lucas, *Responsibility*, 1993, p. 5.

Retributive justice, see justice

Retroduction, another name for abduction

Retrospection

The mental process of looking back or recalling one's own past items of consciousness or past actions, for example for the purpose of finding patterns amongst them. Such a process need not be private. It is more or less the same process as discerning such patterns in the behaviour of others. Retrospection is thus not as mysterious as introspection. Ryle, when attacking introspection, argues that since the operation of retrospection can provide whatever information we do have about our own mental states, we do not need to posit the existence of mysterious processes such as introspection and self-consciousness.

"Part, then, of what people have in mind, when they speak familiarly of introspecting, is this authentic process of retrospection." —Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 160.

Revealed theology

The positive justification of theistic beliefs from the contents of some supernatural revelation accepted by faith. A revelation is mediated through a sacred book, through the words of a prophet, or through the authoritative teachings of a church. Revealed theology is also called supernatural theology. It contrasts with natural theology, which employs the standard norms of reasoning and empirical data in attempting to prove the existence of God. Revealed theology claims that

假定所有的责任都有一种因果联系。我们对我们的某些疏忽负有责任，在把责任归咎于当事者时道德上的运气也起一定作用。除了重大的例外，负有责任的条件要求人们知道他们在做什么，要求他们至少有一定程度的自由去控制他们的所作所为。因此，自由和责任是紧密相联的，责任是自由与决定论问题的核心。对责任问题的探讨可以追溯到亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》中对自愿和非自愿行为的思考。通过中世纪有关人的罪恶的讨论，对行为、慎思、动机的形成、选择、意图和意志的软弱等问题的研究得到推进，这种研究缩减了当代伦理学、政治哲学和法哲学中所讲的责任。

“责任概念的核心是，人们可以问我这样一个问题，‘你为什么要做它？’而且可以迫使我做出回答。”——鲁卡斯：《责任》，1993年，第5页。

惩罚的正义

见“正义”条。

再入

“假说推理”的另一个名称。

反省

回顾或回忆一个人自己的过去意识或活动的心的过程，例如，为了找到其中的模式。这样一个过程不需要是私人的。它多少是与在其他人的行为中察觉到这样的模式相同的过程。因此，反省并不像内省那样神秘。在对内省的攻击中，赖尔论辩说，因为反省操作可以提供关于我们的心的状态的所有信息，因此，就无须假设像内省和自我意识这样的神秘过程的存在。

“因此，当人们惯熟地说起内省时，他们心中所想的東西部分地是这个真正的反省过程。”——赖尔：《心的概念》，1949年，第160页。

启示神学

从信仰接受的某种超自然的启示内容出发，为有神论信条作肯定辩护，启示的传达或通过圣书，或通过先知者的言词，或通过教会的权威教义。启示神学亦称“超自然神论”。它与“自然神学”相对应，因为后者是用标准的推理规范和经验材料力图证明上帝存在。启示神学认为，为了推理，我们需要有前提，因为以它们为基础，推理才得以进行；但是，推理的前提不

to reason we need to have premises on the ground of which the reasoning proceeds. But the premises of reasoning cannot be obtained through reasoning and can only be found through revelation.

"In revealed theology, ... reason is confined to systematising and drawing conclusions from premises which natural reason cannot discover ... They have to be learned through revelation alone and held on faith." — Penelhum, *Problems of Religious Knowledge*, 1971, p. 10.

Revelation

In theology, the disclosure through the agency of God of fundamental truths which would be otherwise inaccessible to human beings. God is the agent who reveals, and human beings receive the revelation. While natural theology claims that human reason unaided by revelation can know God's nature, revealed theology insists that the eternal knowledge about God can only be acquired through revelation. It is through revelation that human beings learn about the existence, attributes and purposes of God, and about the moral and other directives that they have to follow. The revelation can be through nature, visions, dreams, in God's words and activity. Sometimes it needs to be communicated through prophets. It claims that in revelation the human being enters into a self manifesting encounter with God.

"We speak of revelation wherever the unconditional import of meaning breaks through the form of meaning. Faith is always based on revelation." — Tillich, *What is Religion*, 1969, p. 105.

Revenge

The deliberate infliction of a wrong in return for a wrong suffered by oneself, one's family or one's friends. In ancient Greek, justice and revenge were closely associated, with *dikaosunê* (justice) also meaning a fair deal. The *Old Testament* suggested that we should exact an eye for an eye. But Socrates argued that returning evil for evil is morally wrong, and the *New Testament* also advocates forgiveness. Mainstream Western philosophers generally argue that while retribution is rational and justified, revenge should be rejected as an emotional indulgence in which an individual usurps the role of the law. However, it is unclear that we can draw a clear-cut distinction between retribution and revenge.

"A man who has been injured by another and then revenges himself upon him is not authorised to act as he does. That is, he is not empowered by generally accepted rules, as a judge is empowered by the law to fix and enforce penalties." — Honderich, *Punishment*, 1989, pp. 14-5.

Reverse discrimination

A proposal or an actual policy in many Western countries which holds that members of oppressed groups in a soci-

能通过推理获得, 只有通过启示才能发现。

"在启示神学那里,……理性被限制在系统化和从前提得出结论的范围内,而这些前提,是自然理性不能发现的。……它们只有通过启示才能学到,也才能支撑信仰。"——培纳休姆:《宗教知识疑难》,1971年,第10页。

启示

神学中的根本真理是通过上帝的作用而对人类显露,否则难以达到。上帝是启示的动作者,人类接受启示。当自然神学主张人的理性无需启示相助就能知道上帝的本性时,启示神学则坚持,关于上帝的永恒知识只有通过启示才能获得。正是通过启示,人类才懂得上帝的存在、属性和目的,也才懂得他们必须遵守的道德和其他命令。启示存在于上帝的圣谕和活动中,能够通过自然、视觉和梦幻实现。有时,它也需要由先知者来传达。它主张,正是在启示中,人进入一种与上帝的自明的遭遇状态。

"无论在何处,只要我们谈到启示,意义的无条件性就突破意义的形式。信仰总是建立在启示的基础之上。"——蒂利希:《宗教是什么》,1969年,第105页。

报复

以一种错误的故意伤害解决本人、家庭或朋友受到的冤屈。在古希腊,正义和报复是密切联系的,*dikaosunê* (正义)也意味着公平的交易。《旧约全书》提出我们应以眼还眼。但苏格拉底争论说以罪恶回报罪恶在道德上是错误的,《新约全书》也提倡宽恕。主流的西方哲学家一般认为,虽然惩罚是合理的和正当的,但报复作为一种个人取代法律作用的情感上的放纵却应被拒绝。不管怎样,我们能否在惩罚和报复之间划一明确的界线还不清楚。

"一个人受到别人伤害,然后为自己而向别人报复,他这样行为是不允许的。这就是说,他没有得到为人们普遍接受的法规的授权,而法官是由法律授权去确定和执行惩罚的。"——洪德里奇:《惩罚》,1989年,第14-15页。

反向歧视

许多西方国家中的一种提议或实际政策,认为过去一直受到系统歧视的被压迫团体的成

ety which have suffered from systematic discrimination in the past should receive preferential treatment to correct the consequences of that discrimination. On this view, we should deliberately make policies to grant such groups privileges in areas such as employment, education, health care and housing. The policy aims to restore a fair balance in society and is called compensatory justice. However, opponents argue that this practice is unjust because reverse discrimination is still discriminatory. It does not conform to the principle of equal competition, but still treats people differently according to certain external features such as race or gender. Furthermore, it is also uncertain whether injustice regarding an earlier generation should be compensated by the treatment of a later generation.

"We may begin by defining reverse discrimination as preferential treatment for minority-group members or women in job hiring, school admissions or training-program policies." (Goldman, *Justice and Reverse Discrimination*, 1979, p. 4.

Revisionary metaphysics, see descriptive metaphysics

Revisionism, see Marxism

Rhetoric

[from Greek; *rhein*, to flow and *rhetor*, orator | The art of making elegant speeches in order effectively to persuade or influence an audience. In contrast, grammar is the art of using language correctly. Rhetoric was one of the main subjects taught in ancient Athens to the youth who were enthusiastic about politics. Plato attacked rhetoric as an art which is interested in victory in debate by appeal to emotion rather than being interested in truth. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a systematic examination of the argumentative form of rhetoric. This rendered rhetoric a part of logic in relation to dialectic and a suitable subject of philosophy. Rhetoric was one of the seven liberal arts in medieval universities. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics and post-modernism have led to a revival of interest in rhetoric.

"Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." - Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1355b26.

Right

[from Latin; *rectus*, straight, in contrast to Latin; *tortuos*, twisted, wrong] As an adjective, "right", like "good", has a wide application. We may say "right road" or "right answer". When it is applied to moral acts (the moral "right"), different moral theories, according to their understanding of morality, vary in their account of what a right act

员。现在应该受到优待，以纠正以往歧视的后果。根据这一观点，我们应该有意地制定政策来赞同这些团体的人在雇用、教育、医疗、住房等方面的优先权。这个政策是为了恢复社会的公正平衡，它被称为“补偿性正义”。不过，反对者认为，这个实践是不公正的，因为反向歧视仍然是歧视性的。它与平等竞争的原则不一致，仍然根据外在的特征如种族或性别来区别地对待人。此外，是否对上一代的不公正应由善待下一代来补偿，也是个问题。

“我们可以首先把反向歧视定义为在就业、入学或培训政策上偏向对待少数团体成员或妇女。”——哥尔德曼：《正义与反向歧视》，1979年，第4页。

修正形而上学

见“描述形而上学”条。

修正主义

见“马克思主义”条。

修辞术

[源自希腊语 *rhein* (流动) 和 *rhetor* (雄辩家)] 以优美的演说去有效地说服或影响听众的艺术。相比之下，语法学是正确运用语言的艺术。修辞术是在古代雅典教授青年人的主要学科之一，这些年轻人都对政治很热心。柏拉图抨击修辞术是一门对求助于感情的辩论的胜利感兴趣而不是对真理感兴趣的艺术。亚里士多德的《修辞学》一书系统地检验了修辞术的论证形式。这使得修辞术成为与辩证法相关的逻辑学的一部分，成为哲学的一个适宜的学科。在中世纪的大学中，修辞术是文科的七个学科之一。在20世纪，解释学和后现代主义导致了对修辞术兴趣的复活。

“修辞术可以定义为在每一给定的事例中发现可行的说服方式的能力。”——亚里士多德：《修辞学》，1355b26。

正当

[源自拉丁词 *rectus*，意为“身体直立”，相对的拉丁词是 *tortuos*，意为“弯曲的”、“错的”] 作为一个形容词，“正当”与“善”一样，有着广泛的运用。我们可以说“正确的路”或“正确的回答”。当它被运用于道德行为时（即道德上的正当），不同的道德理论，根据它们对于道德

is. For what is morally right is the same question as what is moral, and so the aim of ethics to find the right thing to do. The relation between the good and the right is complicated. Utilitarianism defines "good" in terms of utility, and then defines "right" as being that which maximises the good. Deontology, on the other hand, argues that the good consequences of an action do not guarantee that it is the right thing to do. It suggests that an action is right if it is something one ought to do or if it is a duty. For intuitionism, the right, like the good, is a primitive unanalysable concept.

"Most of the words in any language have a certain amount of ambiguity; and there is special danger of ambiguity in the case of a word like 'right', which does not stand for anything we can point out to one another or apprehend by one of the senses."—Ross, *The Right and the Good*, 1930, p. 2.

Right (Kant)

For Kant, right concerns the limitation of each person's action so that it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else. Although he distinguished various kinds of rights, his primary distinction is between innate rights and acquired rights, roughly corresponding to the distinction between natural and statutory rights. Innate rights, also called internal properties, belong to everyone by nature, independent of any juridical acts. Acquired rights, also called external properties, are established by legal acts. The notion of innate right is the ultimate basis of moral rights. Kant held that there is only one innate right, namely the right to lawful freedom, which is based on the harmony of one's freedom with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with universal law. Accordingly, human freedom is the supreme moral value. An action is right insofar as its freedom can subsist with the freedom of everyone.

"Rights, considered as (moral) capacities to bind others, provide the lawful ground for binding others." Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, I, Introduction.

Rights

The idea that a man can have certain natural, inalienable and infeasible rights emerged in the seventeenth century and played a crucial role in modern bourgeois revolutions and in the production of such documents as the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, and the American *Bill of Rights*. Rights are also a central ethical notion in contemporary moral theory. Many major arguments, especially those in applied ethics, are conducted in terms of rights and their violations. The chief characteristic of the rights approach to ethics is that it views questions from the point of view of victims or the oppressed, rather than from the perspective of those with power.

的各自理解,对于正当的行为是什么有多种多样的解释。因为什么在道德上是正当的等同于什么是道德的,因此,伦理学的目标在于发现什么是要做的正当的事情。善与正当的关系很复杂。功利主义依据功利定义“善”,然后,将“正当”定义为可把善最大化的东西;道义论则认为,一个行为的善的后果并不确保它就是可做的正当的事。它建议,如果一个行为是某人应当做的,或它是一种责任,这个行为就是正当的。对于直觉主义而言,正当与善一样,是一个原始的不可分析的概念。

“在任何语言中的大多数词汇有一定程度的模糊性,在类似于‘正当’这词的情形中,特别容易模糊,因这样的词并不代表我们能向他人指出的任何东西,或为某感官所把握的任何东西。”——罗斯:《正当与善良》,1930年,第2页。

权利(康德)

对于康德来说,权利是一个人行动的限度,所以它可与他人的自由形成对比。他区分了各种权利,首要的是天然的权利和获得的权利之间的区分;这一区分大略相当于自然的权利和法定的权利的区别。天然的权利又称为内在所有权,生来属于每一个人,独立于任何法律的行为。获得的权利也称为外在所有权,是由法律行为建立的。天然权利的概念是道德权利的最终基础。康德认为,只有一种天然的权利,即合法自由的权利;这是基于符合普遍法则而与一切他人的自由相和谐的。因此,人类自由是最高的道德价值。一种行为只有在它的自由与任何人的自由共存的范围内,才是正当的。

“权利被视为约束他人的(道德)能力,为约束他人提供了合法的基础。”——康德:《道德形而上学》,1,导言。

权利

认为一个人具有某些自然的、不可转让的和不可取消的权利。这个观念出现于17世纪,在现代资产阶级革命中,在诸如《法国人权宣言》和《美国权利法案》这种文献的产生中,起了关键性的作用。在当代道德理论中,权利也是一个中心的伦理概念。许多主要论证,尤其是在应用伦理学中,是依据权利和对权利的侵犯而进行的。伦理学中的权利方法论的主要特征是,它从受害者或被压迫者的观点,而不是从有权势者的观点提出问题。

对于权利概念已有许多精细的分析。最有影响的分析框架是W.E. 霍费尔德所提供的。

The notion of rights has been subjected to much subtle analysis. The most influential framework of analysis is provided by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld who classifies a fourfold distinction of rights: (1) as claim-rights which are enforceable claims to someone's action or inaction. If one has a right to X, then one can demand X as one's due; (2) as privileges or liberties which do not involve claims against others, but are simply an absence of an obligation on one's part; (3) as normative power, that is as a legal capacity for altering the juridical relations of another person; i. e. the power to make a will; (4) as immunities, which enable a person to be protected from the actions of another.

Of these (1) is the dominant sense. This sense of rights pairs with the notion of obligation or of duty. If one has a right to have or to do X, then another person, or group of persons, has a correlative duty or obligation to respect this entitlement. Claim-rights can be sub-classed in many ways. One way is to divide them into personal rights which one holds against determinate or special persons (for example, the right of the landlord to collect rent from his tenants) and *in rem* rights which one holds against people generally (for example, the right not to be killed). Another way is to divide claim-rights into positive rights, which demand other persons' positive actions, and negative rights, which merely require other persons' non-action or forbearance. Negative rights can further be divided into active rights to be free from the interference of others and passive rights which are claims not to have certain things done to us.

Rights are also categorised into natural rights, legal rights, moral rights and human rights, all of which have separate entries.

"We can locate the place of rights within the ethics of responsiveness to value, by noticing that (generally) a right is something for which one can demand or enforce compliance." — Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 499.

Rights, absolute

Absolute rights are those rights that are universal and inherent. They cannot be overridden under any conceivable circumstances. They are imprescriptable, inalienable and are not subject to any rational constraint. Persons possessing such a right are justified in demanding and exercising it no matter what kind of situation they are in, while other moral agents must respect it. Human rights are generally regarded as absolute rights. Absolute rights are contrasted to *prima facie* rights, which a person possesses with respect to a given circumstance.

"For an absolute right is a right that human beings have qua human beings and not, as in the case of special rights, rights that they have only if certain conditions, which pertain to their social relations and the transactions in which they en-

他对权利进行了四重区分:(1)作为一种要求的权利,它是一种对某人的活动或不活动而言的可实行的要求。如果某人对X有一种权利,那么他能要求X做他所应得的。(2)作为不涉及到他人的特权或自由,只有自己这方面缺少某种义务。(3)作为规范权利,即改变与另一个人的法律关系的一种合法能力,例如立遗嘱的权利。(4)作为豁免权,即能使一个人免受他人行为伤害而得到保护的权力。

在这些权利中,(1)具有支配性的意义。权利的这种意义是与义务或职责的概念相配的。如果一个人有权拥有或做X,那么,另一个人或团体,就有尊重这种权利的相关职责或义务。要求的权利也可作多方面的区分。一是把它区分为个人权利和反对权利。个人权利是一个人所持有的针对确定的或具体的人的权利(例如地主所有的从他的佃户收租的权利),反对权利是一个人所持有的针对一般人的权利(例如不得被杀害的权利)。另一种是把它划分为积极的权利和消极的权利,积极的权利要求他人的积极行动,消极的权利只要求他人不做什么或自制。消极的权利可进一步划分为主动的权利或被动的权利,主动的权利是免于他人干涉的权利,被动的权利是要求不对我们做某事的权利。

权利也可类分为自然权利、法权、道德权利和人权,本辞典对每一个都分别列有条目。

"通过注意到(一般而言)一种权利是一个人能要求某种东西或迫使遵从的某种东西,我们可以把权利置于伦理学中价值相回应的位上。"——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第499页。

绝对权利

绝对权利是那种具有普遍性和内在性的权利。它们在任何可想像的环境下都是不能被凌驾的。它们不可侵犯、不可让渡和不屈服于任何理性的约束。拥有这样一种权利的人,不论他身处哪种处境,都有资格要求和实施它,而其他的道德行为者都必须尊重他的这种权利。人权被普遍地看做是绝对权利。与绝对权利相对的是当下的权利,它是一种人们在一种既定的环境下拥有的权利。

"绝对权利是一种人作为人而具有的权利,与具体权利不同。具体权利只有当某种属于有关社会联系及人类所从事事务的条件得到满足时,人们才具有。"——米尔登:《权利与人》,1977年,第13页。

gage with one another, are satisfied." —Melden, *Rights and Persons*, 1977, p. 13.

Rights, animal

A notion appearing in the animal liberation movement, and articulated by Tom Regan in *The Case for Animal Rights*. Animals are, according to him, subjects-of-a-life which have inherent value, that is value independent of their usefulness to others. They therefore have rights related to the protection of this value. These rights are not legal rights, such as the right to vote, but moral rights to be respected as an ends in themselves. However, Regan explains that when the rights to life of humans and animals conflict, human rights have a heavier claim than animal rights, for animals rights are *prima facie* rather than absolute rights and can be justifiably overridden under certain circumstances. The notion of animal rights is part of an attempt to base animal ethics on an objective ground rather than merely as an expression of human decency. If the extension of rights to animals is justified, hunting, trapping, indifference towards endangered animals, the use of animals in scientific experiments and other human activities which treat animals merely a means for some human interests are all morally wrong. Yet it is much disputed whether animals have rights in a proper sense. Many philosophers argue that rights involve reciprocal relationships, and moral autonomy and that there is no reason to ascribe rights to animals. But this argument is challenged on the grounds that although children and mentally retarded persons lack these features, we never deny that they have rights.

"[A]nimals have certain basic moral rights including in particular the fundamental right to be treated with the respect that, as possessors of inherent value, they are due as a matter of strict justice." —Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 329.

Rights, human

A conception of the necessary conditions which constitute the full dignity of a human being and which societies have obligations to accord. People possess these rights simply because they are people, regardless of such characteristics such as their race, gender, social position, culture, or customs. All people everywhere have these rights. Hence, human rights are generally regarded as universal. According to Kant, the fundamental right of a human being is to be treated as an end in oneself, not merely as a means. An extensive list of the basic rights which a human being should have is proposed by the United Nation's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), and its core includes the recognised natural rights proposed by the eighteenth century political philosophers, such as the right to life, to freedom of expression, and to property, and the four freedoms asserted

动物的权利

这个概念是随着“动物解放运动”而出现的,并由里根在他的《动物权利问题》一书中得到详尽阐发。根据他的看法,动物是有着内在价值的“一种生命的主体”,即他们具有独立于他们对其他物类的用处的价值。所以他们有保护这种价值的权利。当然,这种权利不是像选举权那样的法权,而是应把他们自己作为目的而受到尊重的道德权利。不过,里根认为,当人类生命权和动物生命权发生冲突时,人权比动物的权利更有分量。因为动物的权利是一种当下的权利而不是绝对的权利,在一定的条件下能被合理地摒弃。动物权利的概念是力图把一种动物伦理学放在一客观基础上,而不希望只是把动物伦理学当做人类正当行为的一种表达。如果把权利扩展到对动物是正当的,那么,狩猎、捕捉、对待濒危动物漠不关心,在科学实验中使用动物,以及把动物仅仅作为某种人类利益工具的其他人类活动,在道德上都是错的。但对动物是否具有本来意义上的权利,一直就是很有争议的问题。许多哲学家争论道,权利涉及到交互关系、道德自主权。因此,没有理由把权利归之于动物。但这种论证受到如下理由的挑战,即儿童和有心智残障的人都缺乏理性,而我们决不否定他们有权利。

“动物有一定的基本道德权利,尤其包括被尊重对待的基本权利,作为内在价值的拥有者,他们应作为一种严格的正义问题来讨论。”——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第329页。

人权

构成一个人的完整尊严并且社会有义务满足的必要条件。人们拥有这些权利仅仅因为他们是人,而无关乎他们的种族、性别、社会地位、文化、习俗等特征。任何地方的人都有这种权利。因此,人权一般被认为是普遍的。根据康德的观点,一个人的基本的权利是他应把自己尊为目的而不是手段。一个人应当有的基本权利的一览表为《联合国人权宣言》(1948年)所提出,核心人权包括:18世纪的政治哲学家所提出的公认的自然权利,诸如生命权、言论自由权、财产权,为罗斯福所主张的作为同盟国战争目的的、即在他1941年的演说中提出的四重自由:言论和表达的自由,每个人都有以自己的方式信仰上帝的自由(即宗教自由),免于匮乏的自由,免于恐惧的自由。人权的概念预定一个标

in 1941 by F. D. Roosevelt as the war aims of the Allied nations: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. The conception of human rights presupposes a standard below which human beings lose their dignity, rendering their life intolerable.

There are various theoretical debates surrounding this notion. The central point is to justify the universal and absolute existence of rights of this kind. For philosophers who accept the notion of absolute rights, human rights are a conception related to the notion of an inner person independent of social context. But cultural relativists claim that it is improper to apply a fixed set of rights to diverse cultures and traditions. Another issue is whether human rights may ever be violated. While many philosophers insist that these rights are supreme and cannot be violated under any circumstances, others propose that they are *prima facie* rights and that sometimes a basic human right has to be sacrificed in a given context.

"They are 'human rights' in that they are rights that all humans have as human agents ... It is these rights that directly enter into the supreme principle of morality." — Gewirth, *Reason and Morality*, 1978, p. 64.

Rights, inalienable

The natural, innate rights, which cannot be relinquished, forfeited, or waived under any circumstances and which cannot be handed over or transferred to another person. Fundamental inalienable rights include rights such as the right to life and the right to liberty. These rights are essential for a human being as a human being. Inalienable rights in some cases can conflict with free will and hence render many practical moral problems difficult to solve. For instance, if the right to life is inalienable, it must be immoral to permit voluntary euthanasia, although it should be permitted if we have an obligation to respect the will of the patient.

"These rights are inalienable because, being necessary to all action, no agent could waive them or be deprived of them and still remain an agent." — Gewirth, *Reason and Morality*, 1978, p. 77.

Rights, legal

The rights which are ascribed by the law of a society and which vary from society to society. Within the limit of legal rights persons are free to do as they please. Correspondingly, the same legal system imposes a legal duty on others, to oblige them to act or to refrain from acting in some way with regard to the things about which a person possesses legal rights. Those violating this duty will be punished by law.

"To say that I have a legal right to do something is not to say I must do it. I am merely given a liberty to do so, if I wish." — Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 435.

准,如处于这个标准之下,一个人失去了他的尊严,他的生活将变得无法忍受。

围绕着这个概念,有不少理论争论,中心点在于证明这种权利的普遍绝对存在。对于接受绝对权利概念的哲学家来说,人权是一个与独立于社会背景的内在的人的概念相关联的。但文化相对主义者宣称把一套固定的权利用于多样性的文化和传统,是不适当的。另一个问题是,是否人权可以被侵犯。当许多哲学家坚持说,权利是至上的,在任何情况下不能受到侵犯,其他人则主张,它们是当下的权利,有时在一定的背景条件下不得不牺牲某个基本的人权。

"它们是人权,是所拥有人作为人类行为者所拥有的权利……正是这些权利,直接进入道德的至上原则。"——杰沃斯,《理性与道德》,1978年,第64页。

不可让渡的权利

指自然、天赋的权利,它们在任何情况下都是不可让与、丧失、舍弃的,也不可移交、转让给他人。这种基本的不可让渡的权利包括诸如生命权和自由权。这些权利对一个人作为人来说是本质性的。在某些情况下,这个概念是与自由意志相冲突的,因此使得许多实际的道德问题难以解决。例如,如果生命权是不可让渡的,那允许自愿安乐死就是不道德的,即使如果我们义务尊重病人的意愿,它也是应该允许的。

"这些权利是不可让渡的,因为它们对于任何行为都是必要的,没有一个行为者能舍弃它们或为他人所剥夺而仍然作为一个行为者。"——杰沃斯,《理性与道德》,1978年,第77页。

法权

一个社会的法律所赋予的权利,并且从一个社会到另一个社会是不同的。在法权的范围内,一个人可自由地做他所高兴做的事。相应地,同一个法律制度也把一种合法的职责加于人们身上,要求他们在对一个人享有法权的那些事情上,有所行动或约制行动,否则,人们将受到法律的惩罚。

"我说我有法权要做某事,并不是说我非做它不可,我只是被赋予了一种如果我愿意便可做它的自由。"——布朗特,《伦理理论》,1959

Rights, moral

To have a moral right a person is entitled to perform certain acts which are supported by good moral arguments. Although there can be substantial overlap, legal rights and moral rights are distinct. This difference allows moral rights to be a platform for criticising the legal system. Generally, but not always, possession of a moral right entails that somebody else has a corresponding moral obligation or duty. Many legal positivists define a moral right as a right that one possesses if one's acts conform to the standard regulations of society and if its violation is sanctioned by public opinion rather than by law. But this is problematic, for slavery in Rome was a standard practice, but we can at least argue that slaves have a moral right to freedom.

"We can say, roughly, that to have a moral right to something is for someone else to be morally obligated (in the objective sense) to act or to refrain from acting in some way in respect to the thing to which I am said to have the right, if I want him to." —Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 436.

Rights thesis

A theory about the nature of law developed by Ronald Dworkin. He argues that law is not merely a body of rules laid down by statute, for there are many hard cases, that is cases which cannot be solved by the application of valid rules. In these cases, judges must be guided to their decisions by non-rule standards such as policies and principles. Dworkin distinguishes between an argument of principle, which seeks to solve hard cases by appeal to the rights an individual possesses, and an argument of policy, which seeks to settle hard cases by taking into consideration the good of the community. It is generally believed that arguments of policy dictate the solutions to hard cases. But Dworkin argues that arguments of principle should govern the judges' decisions. This is what his right thesis means. Each person has an equal right to equal concern and respect. These rights originate from the need of members of society to protect certain interests which they collectively regard as valuable. They are political trumps which protect individuals from interference by society for the purpose of advancing social goods. They should have a certain threshold weight against the consideration of the welfare of the community. The specification and guarantee of these rights is a fundamental requirement for justice in society. Dworkin thus rejects the basic assumption of legal positivism that there is a sharp distinction between law and morality. He also claims that judges are not law-makers, for they need to find deeper moral principles embedded in written laws to solve hard cases. But Dworkin also concedes that the operation of certain rights may be restricted in situations where they conflict with cer-

年, 第 435 页。

道德权利

有一种道德权利意味着, 一个人有权从事某些为充分道德论证所支持的行为。虽然法权和道德权利有实质性的重叠, 但它们是不同的。这个差别使得道德权利成为批评法律制度的一个基点。握有一种道德权利一般不总是意味着他人也有相应的道德义务或职责。许多法学实证主义者把道德权利界定为这样一种权利: 如果一个人的活动与一个社会的标准规则一致, 他就握有这样一种权利, 而对它的侵犯则会受到公众舆论而不是法律的制裁。但这是有问题的, 奴隶制在罗马是一种通行的实践, 而我们至少认为奴隶也有自由的道德权利。

"大致上可以说, 对某事有道德权利, 在某种意义上考虑到我所说的那种有权利的事情, 也就是他人(在客观意义上)有道德义务去做某事或制止某事, 如果我要求他的话。"——布朗特:《伦理理论》, 1959 年, 第 436 页。

权利论

由 R. 德沃金提出的有关法的本质的理论。他论证说, 法律不仅仅是由法令制定的一组规则, 因为存在着很多疑难案件, 这就是说, 存在着不可能通过应用有效的规则而解决的案件。在这些案件中, 法官必须以非法律规则的准则, 如政策和原则为指导做出判决。德沃金对原则的理由和政策的理由做了区分, 认为前者试图通过求助于个人拥有的权利去解决疑难案件, 后者试图通过对共同体利益的考虑去解决疑难案件。一般认为, 政策的理由支配着疑难案件的解决。但德沃金争论法官的判决应以原则的理由为指导。这就是他的权利论的含义。每个人都拥有同样受到关怀和尊重的平等的权利。这些权利来源于社会成员保护某些他们共同认为是重要的利益的需要。它们是保护个人免受来自社会的、为促进社会利益而进行的干涉的政治保证。它们应具有某种最终的力量以对抗对共同体福利事业的照顾。对这些权利的详述和保证是社会正义的根本要求。因此, 德沃金拒绝法学实证主义提出的法律和道德是截然不同的基本假定。他还声称, 法官不是法律的制定者, 因为他们需要发现体现在成文法中的更深刻的道德原则以解决疑难案件。不过, 德沃金也承认, 在某些权利的作用与能为所有社会成员获得的某些重要利益发生冲突的情况下, 这些权利的作用也许会受到限制。法官是否应完全无视社会的或共同体的利益, 这是一个引起很大争议的问题。

"同任何一种赋予政策以更重要地位的理论

tain major benefits that can be acquired for all the members of the society. It is highly controversial whether judges should ignore completely social or community goods.

"The rights thesis ... provides a more satisfactory explanation of how judges use precedent in hard cases than the explanation provided by any theory that gives a more prominent place to policy." —Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, 1977, p. 87.

Rigid designator

Kripke's term. Names or descriptions are designators, but rigid designators are proper names which refer to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. In contrast, accidental or nonrigid designators do not always designate the same thing. A proper name, such as "Socrates" simply designates a specific individual, and since it does not describe that individual, its designation is not in virtue of the individual having a certain nature, but simply because it is that individual. Whether or not the individual satisfies some list of commonly associated descriptions, the proper name will always designate that individual. All natural kinds terms are rigid designators. The conception is devised to challenge the traditional theory of proper names, such as Russell's view that a name designates a thing by describing properties usually attributed to it.

"Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if this is not the case." — Kripke, *Name and Necessity*, 1980, p. 48.

Role

A basic term in the theory of social behaviour and society. As a theatrical term, a role was originally related to persona, mask and character and was the prescribed pattern of behaviour for an actor in a given part in a play. Later, the notion of a role was extended by analogy to a social position that carries with it a repertoire of expected behavioural regularities. These regularities are normative and reflect the demands of the society, and hence any person occupying a given role is required to conform to them. Sanctions may be used to discipline a person who fails to satisfy the rules or norms constituting or regulating his role. Roles typically belong to patterns of role relations which determine the structure of society or its component groups. Roles govern human interactions in social relations and can be conceived without reference to particular persons. Roles can be described in relation to things such as family, occupation, nationality, class membership, gender, age or religion. Since a person may assume a multitude of roles, it is inevitable that sometimes his different roles will conflict with one another. Such conflicts may pose serious moral problems, especially for theories which have no moral standpoint beyond the fulfilment of the duties

论所提供的解释相比,权利论对法官在疑难案件中如何使用先例提供了一种更为令人满意的解释。”——德沃金:《认真对待权利》,1977年,第87页。

固定指示词

克里普克的术语。名称或摹状词都是指示词,但固定指示词是在一个体存在的每一个可能世界中都指示这同一个个体的专名。相反,偶然的或非固定的指示词并不总是指称同一事物。专名,如“苏格拉底”,简单地指称一特定的个体,并且由于它不描述那个个体,它指称该个体并不是根据后者具有何种性质,而只是因为它是那个个体。无论该个体是否满足通常与之关联的某些摹状词,专名都将总是指称那个个体。所有的自然种类词都是固定指示词。提出这一看法是为了向罗素等人所主张的传统的专名理论挑战,在后者看来,名称是通过描述具有通常归属于它的那些属性来指称这个事物。

“我们称某物为固定指示词,如果它在每一个可能世界中都指称同一对象;如果情况并非如此,则称它为非固定的或偶然的指示词。”——克里普克:《命名与必然性》,1980年,第48页。

角色

有关社会行为及社会的理论的一基本术语。作为一个理论术语,角色最初和人物、面具及剧中人物有关,是演员在剧中既定部分的规定的表演方式。后来,角色概念被类推扩展为具有各种预期行为规则的社会身分。这些行为规则是规范的,是社会要求的反映,因此,要求充当既定社会角色的人必须与它们一致。法令也许会用来惩戒一个没能达到构成或控制其角色的规定或标准的人。角色典型地属于那些决定社会结构或其组成集团的角色关系的方式。角色支配社会关系中人们的相互作用,它无须参照特殊的人也可想像得出。对角色可以联系这样一些事物如家庭、职业、民族、阶级关系、性别、年龄或宗教而加以描述。由于一个人可以承担大量的角色,因此有时他的不同角色的相互冲突是不可避免的。这样的冲突会造成严重的道德问题,特别是对于那些除了履行与一个人的角色相关的责任以外,不具任何道德标准的理论。角色必须是可变的和具有开放性结构的,从而使社会能够应付预想不到的环境并为个人留有余地。由于这些理由,一些理论家认为,无

attached to one's roles. Roles must be flexible or open-textured to allow a society to cope with unexpected circumstances and to leave room for individuality. For these reasons, some theorists hold that however important roles are for understanding social action, the explanations offered by roles have limits.

"Social roles, ... are bundles of expectations directed at the incumbents of positions in a given society." —Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society*, 1968, p. 36.

Role-reversal test

A thought experiment, involving an imaginative or hypothetical identification of oneself with others in making ethical decisions. It requires that one think oneself into someone else's position and imagine how one would be affected if one were that person. Such a test is the basis for the universalizability of moral judgements, not only in the ethical positions of Kant and Hare, which emphasise in particular moral universality, but also generally.

"In doing this, I apply a 'role-reversal', and think what I would want or prefer if I were in their positions." —Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 82.

• **Rule of generalisation**, see generalisation

Rule of law

A technical term credited to A. V. Dicey's *An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1885) for a system in which the powers of government and of state officials are limited by law. Rule of law contrasts with despotic or arbitrary rule. Under the rule of law, political power is generally divided into several branches, such as the legislative, executive and judicial, and its exercise in each branch is restrained in order to prevent it from being abused. The law lays down general standards of conduct, which are clear and are made known to all those to whom the law applies. The legislators themselves are subject to the law, which is reasonable and relatively stable. Civil liberty is guaranteed, and violations of legal rules are punished. The transference of political power is through fair elections. According to its proponents, the rule of law is a political ideal of liberalism and is an essential aspect of various forms of democracy.

"In a purely formal sense, the ideal of the rule of law is none other than what I have just described: the ideal of laws clearly delimiting citizens' duties and officials' powers, under which every abusive exercise of public or private power against the legal liberty of any person is suppressed or penalised, and with no one going in peril of coercion for anything other than breach of a pre-announced law." —Neil MacCormick, *Legal Right and Social Democracy*, 1982, pp.

论角色对理解社会行为有多重要, 角色提供的解释仍是有限的。

“社会角色……是在一既定社会中对担任各种职务的人的众多的期望。”——达伦多夫:《社会理论论文集》, 1968年, 第36页。

角色逆反试验

在作伦理决定时的一种思想试验, 一种想像性或假设性的自我与他人的等同。它要求, 一个人把他自己设想为处于他人的位置上, 想像如果我们处在他人的位置上, 将怎样受影响。这样一种试验是道德判断普遍化的基础, 不仅在专门强调特殊道德判断的普遍性的康德伦理学和黑尔的伦理学中是如此, 而且一般来说也是如此。

“在这样做时, 我运用了‘角色逆转’, 想像如果我处在他人的位置上, 我将想要什么或偏爱什么。”——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》, 1985年, 第82页。

概括规则

见“概括”条。

法治

A. V. 迪斯的《宪法研究导论》(1885年)中的一个专门术语, 指一种政府和国家官员的权力受到法律限制的制度。法治与专制暴君的或专横的统治相对立。在法治下, 政治权力一般被划分为立法、行政、司法这样几个部门, 它在每一部门的运用都受到约束以防止被滥用。法律制定一般的行为规范, 这些规范是明确的, 并且为所有适用于法律人所了解。立法者本人要服从法律, 法律是合理的和相对稳定的。公民的自由受到保障, 违反法规要受到处罚。政治权力的转移通过公正的选举。在它的倡导者看来, 法治是自由主义的政治理想, 是各种形式的民主的一个本质方面。

“从纯粹形式意义上讲, 法治观念就如同我刚刚描述的那样: 法的观念明确地界定了公民的责任和官员的权力, 在此情况下, 每一滥用公共或私人权力以反对任何人的法定自由的行为都将受到禁止和处罚, 除非是违反事先宣布的法律, 否则没有人会因什么事而受到强制的危险。”——麦考密克:《法律权利与社会民主》, 1982年, 第46-47页。

46-7.

Rule of quality

Two rules for categorical syllogism which determine the valid inference of qualitative connection between premises and conclusion: (1) From two negative premises nothing can be inferred; (2) if one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative; and to prove a negative conclusion, one of the premises must be negative. The first rule is sound because in the case where there are two negative premises, the middle term does not establish any connection between the major term and the minor term. Violation of this rule will lead to the fallacy of exclusive premises. The second rule is sound because one negative premise determines that the relation between the major term and the minor term must be exclusive. Violation of this rule will lead to the fallacy of drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise. Only from two affirmative premises can one infer an affirmative conclusion.

"[They] are called rules of quality because they refer to the ways in which the negative quality of one or both premises restricts the kinds of conclusions that validly may be inferred." -Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, p. 220.

Rule of recognition

Hart claimed that a developed legal system is a union of primary rules and secondary rules. Primary rules are rules of obligation which regulate conduct and impose duties, while secondary rules are power-conferring rules to regulate the identification, modification and adjudication of primary rules. If a law has only primary rules, it has three major defects: (1) uncertainty, because all rules are merely a set of separate standards with no common identification; (2) inflexibility in rule-changing; (3) inefficiency in the face of the complex social situations. Hence, a set of secondary rules must be introduced to remedy these defects, and this is the step from the pre-legal to the legal world. For improving the defect of uncertainty, we need to introduce a set of rules which stipulate some identifying marks and criteria of the validity of primary rules and which decide their scopes. These are called rules of recognition. For improving the defect of inflexibility, we need to introduce rules of change which allow individuals or groups to introduce new primary rules and to eliminate old ones. Finally, for improving the defect of inefficiency, we need to introduce rules of adjudication which enable individuals to determine when a primary rule has been broken. This conception of law has provoked vigorous discussion in the philosophy of law. In particular, rules of recognition have provided a focus for debate, for they provide a new ground for legal validity in place of Austin's command of the sovereign.

"The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the

质的规则

直言三段论中确定前提和结论之间质的联系的有效推理的两条规则:(1)从两个否定的前提不能得出结论;(2)如果一个前提是否定的,那么结论也必定是否定的;如果要证明否定的结论,两个前提之一必须是否定的。第一条规则是可靠的,因为在有两个否定前提的情况下,中项未在大项和小项之间建立任何联系。违反这个规则将导致“不相容前提”谬误。第二条规则是可靠的,因为一个否定的前提决定了大项和小项的关系必定是不相容的。违反这个规则将导致“从否定的前提引出肯定的结论”的谬误。只有从两个肯定的前提出发,才能推出肯定的结论。

“它们被称作质的规则,因为它们涉及到一个或两个前提的否定性对可以有效推出的结论种类的约束方式。”——柯比,《逻辑导论》,1986年,第220页。

承认规则

哈特认为,一个发达的法律体系是主要规则和次要规则的结合。主要规则是规范行为和强加责任的义务的规则,而次要规则是控制对主要规则的承认、修改和裁定的授予权力的规则。如果一种法律只有主要规则,它会有三个重大缺陷:(1)不确定性,因为全部规则都仅仅是一批没有得到公众承认的分散的准则;(2)规则改变中的滞后性;(3)面对复杂社会情况的无效性。因此,必须提出一套次要规则以弥补这些缺陷,这是由前法律社会走向法律社会的一步。为了改变不确定性的缺陷,我们需要提出一批规则,这批规则要规定一些承认主要规则的有效性的标志和标准,并决定其范围。这些规则被称为承认规则。为了改变滞后性的缺陷,我们需要提出允许个人和集团提出新的主要规则和取消旧的主要规则的修改规则。最后,为了改变失效性的缺陷,我们需要提出能使个人决定主要规则在何时被违反的裁定规则。这一法律观念在法哲学界引起了激烈的争论。尤其是承认规则已成为争论的一个焦点,因为它为在法律的有效性问题上取代奥斯汀的统治者的命令提供了一个新的论据。

“解决主要规则的不确定性的最简单的方式是提出我们所要说的‘承认规则’。这样做要列举出为一个已提出的规则所具有的某一或某些特征,这一规则被视为一个最后的确定的表示,即它是一个受它所产生的社会压力所支持

regime of primary rules is the introduction of what we shall call a 'rule of recognition'. This will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts." Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 1961, p. 92.

Rule utilitarianism

In contrast with act-utilitarianism, a version of utilitarianism in which general rules rather than acts are assessed for utility, thus shifting concern from individuals to practices and institutions. Acts are endorsed not in their own right, but because they accord with practices or institutions which meet the test of maximising utility. Rule can be explained as a possible (ideal) rule or an actual (existing) rule. The rule-utilitarianism which considers possible rules is a position not far from deontology. According to this version of rule-utilitarianism, a moral action should follow a rule which if generally followed would have the maximum utility. The rule-utilitarianism which deals with actual and existing rules is developed by Toulmin and many others. According to this version, a moral action should be in accord with the existing moral code. This moral code yields greatest utility if it is generally accepted or universally complied with. The basic difficulty of rule-utilitarianism is that in many cases the rule it prescribes is not the most beneficial to obey on every given individual occasion. Rule utilitarianism is thus inconsistent with the basic moral motivation of utilitarianism, namely, beneficence.

"For rule-utilitarianism rules are morally binding because general adherence to them maximises, or would maximise, welfare, individual acts being right or wrong in virtue of their conformity to such rules." — Sprigge, *The Rational Foundations of Ethics*, 1988, p. 25.

Rule-consequentialism, see act-consequentialism

Rule-following

An important notion in later Wittgenstein, rule following is subject to different interpretations. Wittgenstein claims that language comprises games governed by sets of rules. Though we do not commonly think of rules when talking and cannot usually specify rules governing our usage, rules exist which determine the conditions for the correct application of what we say. Wittgenstein does not offer a linguistic definition what a rule is, but illustrates rules through many examples. Following a rule is not a matter of interpretation. The ability to understand existing rules rests upon a brute reaction to training, that is on repetition. By this view Wittgenstein is suggesting that the meaning of a term is its use. Meaning something is following a definite rule, otherwise us-

的集团的规则。”——哈特：《法的概念》，1961年，第92页。

规则功利主义

与行为功利主义相对立的一种功利主义。在这一形式中，用来评价功利的是一般规则而不是行为，从而将所关注的问题由个人转向习惯和风俗。行为被认可不是因为它们本身的权利，而是因为它们与满足最大化功利检验的习惯和风俗相一致。规则可被解释为可能的（理想的）规则或实际的（现存的）规则。重视可能规则的规则功利主义是一种与义务论相差不大的主张。按照规则功利主义的这一看法，一种道德行为应遵从这样一种规则，即对它的普遍遵从将会产生最大的功利。涉及实际的或现存的规则的规则功利主义是由图尔敏及其他一些人提出的。按照这一主张，一种道德行为应与现存的道德准则相一致，如果这一准则被普遍接受或普遍遵从，它将产生最大的功利。规则功利主义的基本的困难是，在很多情况下，它规定要遵从的规则在每一既定的个别场合并不是最有益的。因而，规则功利主义与功利主义的基本道德动机即善行不一致。

“规则功利主义的规则在道德上是有约束力的，因为对它们的普遍信奉会或将会最大限度地增加福利，因而个人行为正确与否取决于他们对这些规则的遵守。”——斯普莱格：《伦理学的理性基础》，1988年，第25页。

规则效果论

见“行为效果论”条。

遵守规则

维特根斯坦后期的重要概念，遵守规则受到了各种不同的解释。维特根斯坦认为，语言由受各种规则支配的游戏组成。虽然我们在交谈时一般并没有想到规则，通常也不能对支配我们使用语言的规则作出说明，但规则存在着，它们决定了对我们所说的东西正确运用的条件。维特根斯坦并未提供规则是什么的语言学定义，但通过许多事例对规则作出了解释。遵守规则不是一个解释的问题。理解现存规则的能力在于对训练做出并非出自理性的反应，即重复。根据这种观点，维特根斯坦提出，语词的意义在于其用法。意谓某事就是遵守某一确定的规则，不然的话，用词来说出某些事情就会是无目的

ing words to say something would be to string words together aimlessly. On the other hand, rules do not carry their own interpretation, and "going on in the same way" is settled practically by the context in which rules are followed rather than by the rules themselves. Understanding is reacting correctly, on the basis of training, to the rule-following application of words. The notion of rule-following is also a major point in Wittgenstein's private language argument. Since in a private language there is no way to distinguish between thinking that one is following a rule and actually following it, there is no language at all.

"Following a rule is analogous to an order. We are trained to do so." —Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, I. 206.

Rule-scepticism, another expression for legal realism

Russell's paradox

A paradox regarding the self-membership of classes formulated by Russell in *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903). Some classes or sets (for example the set of abstract objects) are members of themselves, while others (for example the set of cows) are not. Now consider the set which consists of all sets which are not members of themselves. Is this set a member of itself or not? If it is a member of itself, then it has the property which is shared by its members and is not a member of itself. If it is not a member of itself, then it is qualified as for membership in the set and is a member of itself. Either way involves self contradiction. This paradox is considered as a prime example of the set-theoretical paradoxes which are different in kind from the Liar paradox. Frege took Russell's paradox as a serious check for any arithmetic system. It undermined many axioms of set theory, especially the axiom of comprehension that for every property expressible in the notation of set theory, there is a set consisting of all and only those things which possess that property. Russell offered a formal solution for this paradox i.e. his theory of types, and a philosophical solution i.e. his vicious circle principle.

"Russell's paradox about classes, which he discovered in 1901, led to an enormous amount of work in the foundations of mathematics." —Sainsbury, *Paradoxes*, 1995, 2nd ed., p. 107.

地把语词串在一起。另一方面,规则并不连带其自身的解释,而“照样进行”是根据遵守规则的语境实践地解决的,而不是根据规则自身解决的。理解是基于训练对遵守用词规则的正确反应。遵守规则这个概念也是维特根斯坦私人语言论证中的要点。因为在私人语言中没有办法区分认为一个人在遵守规则和事实上遵守规则,所以就根本没有语言。

“遵守规则类似于服从命令。我们是被训练得这么做的。”——维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,第一部分,第206节。

规则怀疑论

“法律现实主义”的另一表述。

罗素悖论

由罗素在其《数学原则》(1903)一书中表述的与类是否是自身的元素相关的悖论。有些类或集合(例如抽象对象的集合)是自身的元素,而其他的类或集合(如牛的集合)不是。现在考虑由所有不是自身的元素的集合所构成的集合,这个集合是不是自身的元素?如果它是,那么它具有为它的元素所共享的性质,即它不是它自身的元素;如果它不是自身的元素,则它具有成为该集合中元素的资格,它是其自身的元素。两种方式都导致自相矛盾。这一悖论被认为是“集合论悖论”的主要例证,属于与说谎者悖论不同的另一类型。弗雷格把这一悖论看成是对任何算术系统的严格检验。它使许多集合论公理不再成立,特别是概括公理,后者的内容是:对于每一个可用集合论记法表达的属性来说,都存在一个由并且只由具有该属性的那些事物组成的集合。对于这一悖论,罗素提供了一个形式的解决方案,即他的类型论,并且提供了一个哲学的解决方案,即他的恶性循环原则。

“罗素于1901年发现的关于类的悖论,导致了对于数学基础方面工作的大量讨论。”——塞斯伯里:《悖论》,1995年,第2版,第107页。

S

Sacred, see holy

Salva veritate

[Latin: saving the truth] A term in logic that means “preserving without losing the truth-value”, in relation to the intersubstitutivity of co-referring expressions, that is expressions having the same reference. For a wide range of contexts, if two expressions A and B have the same reference, then A can be substituted for B in a sentence in which B occurs without changing the truth-value of the sentence. Frege was concerned to develop an extensional logic. Accordingly, just as with names, atomic co-referring sentences can be substituted for one another in molecular sentences truth-functionally compounded out of them, without changing the truth-values of the molecular sentences. This feature is related to the principle of substitutivity. However, intersubstitution *salva veritate* is not possible in other contexts, such as those involving propositional attitudes or modal terms, contexts which Quine calls referentially opaque.

“A natural suggestion, deserving close examination, is that the synonymy of two linguistic forms consists simply in their interchangeability in all contexts without change of truth value—interchangeability, in Leibniz’s phrase, *salva veritate*,” — Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, p. 27.

Salvation

In the *New Testament*, Jesus is regarded as our lord and saviour Jesus Christ, and the purpose of the incarnation is claimed to be for our purpose. It is one of the basic teachings of Christianity that human beings are sinful, and hence something must be done to heal or put right our sinful lives. Jesus was sent by God as the saviour of the world, to save people from their sins and to make the soul participate in all the glory of God. Christians believe that salvation cannot be won merely by human efforts and requires grace. It is the essential object of hope.

“For practical life at any rate, the chance of salvation is enough.” — James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1952, p. 63.

Sanctity of human life

A claim originating in the *Old Testament*, *Genesis* 1: 27:

至圣

见“神圣”条。

保留真值

[拉丁语:拯救真理] 逻辑中的术语,指“保留而不是失去真值”,与共指(即有相同指称)的表达式的相互替换有关。对于大范围的语境来说,如果A、B两个表达式有相同的指称,则在B出现的任何句子中可以用A替换B,而不会改变该句子的真值。弗雷格着眼于发展外延逻辑。相应地,正像名称一样,原子的共指语句可以在分子语句(后者是前者的真值函项复合物)中相互替换,而不会引起该分子语句中真值的任何改变。这个特征与置换原则相关联。不过,保留真值地相互替换不能在涉及命题态度、模态词等等的语境,也就是奎因所谓的指称隐晦的语境中进行。

“值得仔细考察的一个自然的意见便是:两个语言形式的同义性仅仅在于,它们在一切实境中可以互相替换而真值不变,用莱布尼茨的说法,就是保留真值的互相替换性。”——奎因:《从逻辑的观点看》,1953年,第27页。

拯救

在《新约全书》中,耶稣被认作“我们的主和救者耶稣基督”,道成肉身的目的被断言是为了我们。人类有罪,因此,必须做什么事情以求“医治”或矫正我们有罪的生活,这是基督教的基本教义之一。耶稣就是作为救世主而被上帝派来把人从他们的罪恶中拯救出来,并使其灵魂分有上帝的一切荣耀的。基督徒相信,拯救不能仅靠人的努力赢得,它需要恩典。它是希望的本质对象。

“无论如何,对于实际的生命来说,拯救的机会是足够的。”——詹姆斯:《宗教经验种种》,1952年,第63页。

人类生命的神圣性

它源自于《旧约·创世纪》(1:27):“上帝

"God created man in his own image" and claiming that human life is sacred and has a natural, inestimable, and transcendent worth or value. This value is equal for all of us, and is independent of any other values that can be ascribed to individual persons in virtue of such features as their efforts, accomplishments or talents. It implies that we have absolute duty to preserve and protect human life and that it is morally wrong to take human life as instrumental. The idea of the sanctity of life is the basis on which the right to life is established by Western philosophers and social theorists. However, this idea makes many moral phenomena, such as capital punishment, euthanasia and abortion, indefensible. It is therefore debatable whether this principle has paramount validity. Another issue of debate is whether this attitude implies that human life is superior to the lives of other species.

"... the view that it is always wrong to take an innocent human life. We may call this the 'sanctity of life' view." -- Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 1990, pp. 17-8.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

Also called linguistic determinism, a principle of linguistic relativity developed by the linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. It claims that, in addition to being a technique of communication, language is even more significantly a device that gives its speakers habitual modes of analysing experience into significant categories. Language functions more as a way of defining the speaker's experiences than as a means for reporting experience. The grammatical structure of the language we speak determines our way of understanding or thinking about the world. Consequently, metaphysics or ontology relies on grammar. Whorf attempted to prove this principle empirically by comparing modern European languages with the native languages of the American Indians. For example, he claimed that Hopi Indians do not have a notion of time, because their language lacks means of marking temporal distinctions. The thesis can be traced to Aristotle's *Categories*, Vico's *New Science* and the philosophy of W. von Humboldt. The thesis is controversial, and there are methodological disputes about what would count as evidence for or against it.

"Sapir-Whorf hypothesis ... claims that the form of our languages in some way determines the fundamental beliefs that we hold." -- Bird, *Philosophical Tasks*, 1972, p. 142.

Satisfaction

In a technical sense first used by Tarski in defining "Truth", a relation between an open sentence and ordered n-tuples of objects. Open sentences like Fx or Gx are neither true nor false. They are sentential functions rather than sentences because they contain free variables marking gaps into which suitable terms or expressions have to be substituted. If an open sentence is true of the objects which are substitut-

以他自己的形象造人。”其基本意思是，人类的生命是神圣的，有一种天然的、不可估价的超验价值。这个价值对于我们所有人来说都是平等的，是与那由于个人自己的努力、成就、才能等而归之于他或她的任何价值不相干的。它意味着我们有着保存和保护人类生命的绝对责任，意味着把人的生命作为工具在道德上是错误的。生命神圣的观念是西方哲学家和社会理论家确立生存权利观念的基础。不过，这个观念使许多道德现象诸如死刑、安乐死和堕胎完全无从辩护。因此，是否这个原则有至上的正当性是受到争议的。另一个争论的问题是，是否这种态度隐含着人类生命高于其他物种的生命。

“……毁掉一个无辜的生命始终是错的，我们把这一论点称之为‘生命神圣’的论点。”——辛格：《动物解放》，1990年，第17—18页。

萨丕尔—沃尔夫假说

也被称为语言决定论，由语言学家 E. 萨丕尔和 B. L. 沃尔夫提出的语言相关性原理。它认为，除了作为一种交流的技能以外，语言更重要的是提供给它的讲话者把经验分解为有意义的范畴的惯常方式的一种手段。语言的功能更多地是作为定义讲话者经验的方法，而不仅是作为报告经验的手段。我们所讲的语言的语法结构，决定了我们理解或思考世界的方式。因而，形而上学或本体论都依赖语法。沃尔夫试图通过对现代欧洲语言与美洲印第安人的土语的比较从经验上证明这一原理。例如，他认为霍皮印第安人没有时间概念，因为他们的语言缺少表明时间区分的手段。这一论题可以追溯到亚里士多德的《范畴》、维柯的《新科学》和 W. von 洪堡的哲学。这一命题是有争议的，对于什么可看做是拥护它或反对它的证据，存在着方法论上的争论。

“萨丕尔—沃尔夫假说……认为，我们的语言形式在某种程度上决定我们所坚持的基本信念。”——博德：《哲学的任务》，1972年，第142页。

满足

塔斯基在定义“真”时第一次使用了这一概念的专门含义。它是一开语句和对象的有序 n 元组之间的关系。像 Fx 或 Gx 这样的开语句是既不真也不假的，它们不是语句而是语句函项，因为它们含有自由变元，后者代表着不得不用适当的词项或表达式替换的空位。如果一开语句对于用来替换它的变元的那些对象为真，则

ed for its variables, the objects satisfy the open sentence. "X taught Y who taught Z" is satisfied by (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle), for it is true that Socrates is the teacher of Plato, and that Plato is the teacher of Aristotle. An interpretation satisfies a formula if and only if that formula is true under the interpretation. On this basis Tarski defined a sentence as true just in case it is satisfied by all members in an infinite sequence, and false just in case it is satisfied by none. For this reason his semantical theory of truth is regarded as one version of the correspondence theory of truth.

"A function satisfies an unstructured n -place predicate with variables in its n places if the predicate is true of the entities (in order) that the function assigns to those variables." —Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, 1984, p. 47.

Satisficing

A term introduced by the economist Herbert A. Simon for a model of rational choice which seeks to find a satisfactory solution rather than best solution to a problem. The model can also be conceived in terms of seeking a good enough outcome rather than the best outcome. In contrast, the maximising/optimising model of rationality seeks to achieve one's greatest good. The notion has been borrowed by ethics and rational choice theory, especially to formulate versions of consequentialism. Accordingly, one should seek to achieve morally satisficing behaviour because under many circumstances an optimal moral choice or action is too difficult to determine or to achieve. The actor is constrained not only by the external environment, but also by a limited access to information and by uncertainty about the value and probability of each of the alternative courses of actions. Hence, each human actor is subject to the limits of his cognitive capacities. Positively, a satisficing choice represents a reasonable sense of when one has enough. It corresponds to the idea of moderation in Greek ethics.

"Defenders of satisficing claim that it sometimes makes sense not to pursue one's own greatest good or desire fulfilment, but I think it can also be shown that it sometimes makes sense deliberately to reject what is better for oneself in favour of what is good and sufficient for one's purposes." —Slote, *Beyond Optimising*, p. 1.

Saturated, see unsaturated

Saving the phenomena

A type of empirical methodology initiated by Aristotle. It requires that a scientific discipline should start from phenomena and then develop hypotheses to explain the ground of the phenomena, rather than being satisfied solely with discovering the nature of things. The term phenomena should

那些对象就满足该开语句。"X 教过 Y, 而 Y 教过 Z" 被 (苏格拉底, 柏拉图和亚里士多德) 所满足, 因为确实地苏格拉底是柏拉图的老师, 而柏拉图是亚里士多德的老师。一个解释满足一个公式, 当且仅当该公式在该解释下为真。在此基础上, 塔斯基把语句之真定义为它被一无穷序列中的所有元素所满足, 把语句之假定义为它不被该序列中的任何元素所满足。由于这个原因, 他的语义真理论被看做是符合真理论的一个翻版。

"一函项满足在其 n 个位置上带变元的无结构的 n 位谓词, 如果该谓词对于该函项 (按次序) 指派给那些变元的实体为真。" ——戴维森:《真理与解释的探究》, 1984 年, 第 47 页。

满意解决

由经济学家 H. A. 西蒙提出的术语, 指的是这样一种理性的选择方式, 即试图寻求一种满意的而不是最佳的解决问题的方法。这一方法也可被说成是试图寻求一个足够好的结果而不是最好的目标。相比之下, 最大化和最优化的合理性模式则试图取得一个人的最大利益。这一见解已为伦理学和理性选择理论所借鉴, 特别是对于系统提出后果主义的看法。因此, 一个人应力图达到道德上令人满意的行为, 因为在很多情况下最优化的道德选择或行为太难决定或取得。行为者受到的限制不仅是外部环境, 而且还包括他对信息的有限的获得, 以及每一可选择的行为过程的价值和可能性的不确定。因此, 只要是人, 每一行为者都受到其认识能力的局限。从积极的方面来看, 一个满意的选择代表了当时一种已足够的合理的感觉。它符合古希腊伦理学中的适度的观念。

"满意解决的辩护者认为, 有时不去追求一个人本身的最大利益或最大愿望的实现是有意义的, 但我认为还可以表明, 有时故意拒绝那种对他本人是更好的事情以有利于那些对其目的而言是好的和满意的事情, 也是有意义的。" ——斯洛特:《超越最优化》, 第 1 页。

饱和的

见“不饱和的”条。

拯救现象

一种始于亚里士多德的经验主义方法论。它要求一门科学学科应当从“现象”出发, 然后提出假说以说明现象的缘由, 而不是仅满足于发现事物的本性。“现象”一词应理解为既包括观察事实, 也包括有关论题的共同假定。这种方

be understood to include both observed facts and common assumptions about the subject-matter. The methodology may apply to both natural and social sciences.

In Greek philosophy, the term also concerns the ground of the world of appearance in discussion developing from Parmenides' metaphysical claim that only the One is real being and that there is no real motion.

"Originally in Aristotle and his immediate successors the task is to give an account of phenomena in terms of basic physics which in turn must be constructed in such a way that the phenomena can be accounted for. Later on basic physics is taken for granted and phenomena must be explained in its terms. This is how the idea of saving the phenomena (rather than giving an account of them) arises." —Feyerabend, *Problems of Empiricism*, 1981, p. 224.

Saying and showing

Wittgenstein's distinction, also presented as a contrast between what can be said and what can be shown. Something can be said only if it could be passed on to somebody as a piece of information. To say something without knowing its truth-conditions is not really saying in this sense. Anything that can be said at all can be said in a proposition. All factual propositions say something about the world, but all pseudo-propositions (including logical and metaphysical propositions) attempt to say what can only be shown and are not really saying anything. Instead of specifying the precise meaning of "showing", Wittgenstein makes a list of what can be shown but not said. The only common point linking them as things that can be shown is a negative one, namely that they are things that cannot be expressed in factual language. In his *Tractatus* Wittgenstein examines them one by one to see why they are excluded from factual language.

"What can be shown, cannot be said." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4. 1212.

Scepticism

[from Greek; *skepsis*, investigation, enquiry] Also written skepticism, a critical philosophical attitude, questioning by systematic arguments the reliability of knowledge claims and our ability to establish objective truth. When ancient Greek philosophers called themselves sceptics, they probably meant that they were undogmatic investigators. The founder of Greek scepticism was Pyrrho of Elis, and scepticism is also called Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism is claimed to set up many modes of argument to show that the world of appearance is full of confrontations and that there is no guarantee that we apprehend things as they really are. Thus it is better to adopt an attitude of suspension of judgement and to achieve a state of tranquillity. Most arguments of Pyrrhonism are recorded in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Various versions of modern scepticism can be found in figures

法论既可用于自然科学,也可用于社会科学。

在古希腊哲学中,这个术语也涉及由讨论巴门尼德关于只有一是真实的存在和没有真正的运动的形而上学主张而来的现象界的基础问题。

“起初,亚里士多德及其直接后继者的任务是用基础物理来描述现象,而基础物理的构造方式也必须使现象能被说明。其后基础物理被认为是理所当然的,从而现象必须按它的术语来说明。这就是拯救现象(而不是给出它们的描述)的观念何以产生的原因。”——费耶阿本德,《经验主义问题》,1981年,第224页。

说与显示

维特根斯坦作出的区分,也表示为可“说”的东西与可“显示”的东西之间的不同。仅当某事可作为一条信息传递给某人时,它才是可说的。说某事而不知其真值条件,在这种含义上并不真正是在说。任何完全可说的东西都能在命题中说出来。所有的事实命题都对世界有所言说,但一切假命题(包括逻辑命题和形而上学命题)企图说出只能显示的东西,因此并不真正是在说什么。维特根斯坦不是具体指明“显示”的精确含义,而是列出可显示而不可说的东西的清单。把它们连成可显示东西的惟一共同点是否定性的,即它们是不能以事实语言表达的东西。维特根斯坦在其《逻辑哲学论》中对它们逐一作了考察,看它们为何要被排除于事实语言之外。

“能够显示的东西,不能说出。”——维特根斯坦;《逻辑哲学论》,4.1212。

怀疑主义

「源自希腊语 *skepsis*, 意为“探究”或“质问”」也写成 skepticism。一种批判的哲学态度,通过系统的论证,审问知识主张的可靠性以及我们建构客观真理的能力。当古代希腊哲学家称他们自己是怀疑者时,他们的意思可能是,他们是非独断的探究者。希腊怀疑主义的创始人是爱利斯的皮浪,正因如此,怀疑主义也被称作“皮浪主义”。皮浪主义被认为提出了许多论式,表明现象世界充满着对反,没有任何东西可以担保我们理解的事物就如它们的实际所是。因此,最好的办法是对判断采取悬置态度,以获得宁静的状态。皮浪主义的绝大多数论证都记载于塞克斯都·恩披里柯的著作中。在蒙田、伽桑狄、笛卡尔、休谟和逻辑实证主义等人那里,能够发现现代怀疑主义的不同说法。古代怀疑主

such as Montaigne, Gassendi, Descartes, Hume and the logical positivists. While ancient scepticism attacked both knowledge and belief and was a philosophy of life, modern scepticism is a challenge to knowledge only. This is why some philosophers hold that ancient scepticism is more serious. There is also a distinction of subject-matter between ethics and science in modern scepticism, and ethical or moral scepticism, which claims that there are no objective values, has become a separate concern. Scepticism is a negative but dynamic force in the history of philosophy. In attempting to attack and overcome scepticism, philosophers sharpen the formulation of philosophical problems and their attempts to solve them.

"Scepticism is an ability which sets up antitheses among appearances and judgements in any way whatever." —Sextus Empiricus, *Outline of Pyrrhonism*, 1. 8.

Schema (Kant), see schematism

Schematism

An important section of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* dealing with a procedure of judgement which adapts the categories or pure concepts of understanding to experience. Kant held that schematism is necessary because the categories do not have their origin in experience. He argued that an application of the categories in experience is possible because each category has an empirical counterpart or schema. It is not an image, but a rule for production of images. Each schema is a transcendental determination in times. For example, the schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, and the schema of necessity is existence of an object at all times. In a sense, a schema is just the category itself with the condition of temporality added. As universal and a *priori*, the schema is homogeneous with the category, but it is also homogeneous with appearance because it involves imagination, time and the empirical representation of the manifold contained in time. With these characteristics, the schema can mediate between the concept and intuition, which are otherwise heterogeneous, and enable judgements to take place. Without the schema, the concepts are insignificant because only with the aid of schema can they be applied to phenomena. Some critics argue that the schematism restates rather than solves the problem of applying concepts, especially the categories.

"This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B181.

义既抨击知识又抨击信念,是一种生活哲学,现代怀疑主义只对知识提出挑战。正因如此,许多哲学家认为,古代怀疑主义更为严重。在现代怀疑主义中,还存在着伦理学和科学之间的论题区别,而且,伦理的或道德的怀疑主义(它断言不存在任何客观价值)已成为一个特别受关注的领域。在哲学史上,怀疑主义是一种否定的但却是有推动作用的力量。在试图驳斥和克服怀疑主义的过程中,哲学家磨练了对哲学问题的公式化表述以及作出了解决它们的努力。

"怀疑主义是以任何方式在现象和判断中提出对反的能力。"——塞克斯都·恩披里柯,《皮浪主义纲要》,1.8。

图型 (康德)

见“图型论”条。

图型论

康德《纯粹理性批判》的重要部分,关于使范畴或纯粹知性概念适用于经验的判断过程。按照康德的观点,图型论是必需的,因为范畴没有它们的经验来源,他论证道,范畴在经验中的应用是可能的,因为每个范畴都有一个经验的对等物,即图型。概念的图型不是意象,而是产生意象的规则。每个图型都是时间的先验规定。例如,本体之图型是时间中实在的永恒性,必然性之图型是一对象在所有时间中的存在,如此等等。在某种意义上,图型只是加上了时间条件的范畴本身。因此它一方面是与范畴同质的,即是普遍的和先天的,另一方面又与现象同质,因为它包含想像力和时间以及包含于时间中的杂多的经验表象。图型由于具有这样的特性而成为本来是异质的概念和直观的中介,从而使判断产生。没有图型,概念就是无意义的,因为只有借助于图型,它们才能被应用于现象。有些批评者认为图型论只是重述而非解决了概念(尤其是范畴)应用的问题。

"我们知性的这种图型论,在其应用于现象和它们的单纯形式时,是潜藏于人心深处的一种技艺,其活动本性的实在方式,似乎永远使我们难以发现和窥测。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B181。

Scholastic philosophy, see scholasticism

Scholasticism

Also called scholastic philosophy, the dominant philosophy in the medieval intellectual world. It started in the fifth century with the influential commentary of Aristotle's logical works by Boethius, and lasted until the middle of the seventeenth century. The heyday of scholasticism was from the eleventh to the thirteenth century when the universities of Paris and Oxford were founded and the Western philosophical tradition reproduced itself through a process of reading the works of ancient authors, in particular of Aristotle (at that time the bulk of Aristotle's works were first translated into Latin), and of commenting on them. The most celebrated exponent of scholastic philosophy, who was also the greatest commentator on Aristotle, was Thomas Aquinas. Other prominent scholastics included Abelard, Buridan, Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suárez. The major characteristic of scholasticism is the attempt to reconcile the conflict between reason and faith, that is to render Greek thought, especially Aristotle's doctrines, consistent with Christian theology, and so to employ philosophy in support of the theology. The conjunction of faith and knowledge started with Boethius, and Ockham argued that the prospects of a marriage between them were not hopeful. For this reason, Ockham is said to be the last of the scholastics. Scholasticism was characterised by its disputation of contested points of detail. These formal disputes were conducted according to well-recognised rules derived from Aristotle's logic. In this way it contributed greatly to logic.

Scholasticism is so called because it was philosophy done in the universities (Greek: *schola*, leisure, also the origin of the terms school and scholar), for only when one has leisure time can one learn and contemplate. Scholasticism has had a bad reputation since the Renaissance, and was the major target of attack for modern philosophers such as Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes and Locke. Modern philosophy and science were initiated in contrast to it. However, in this century philosophers have renewed their appreciation of the contributions of scholasticism to logic, linguistics and metaphysics.

"What defined the great age of scholasticism? The fact that its leading minds, Thomas and Bonaventura, say, carried out that co-ordination between believing acceptance of revealed and traditional truth on the one hand and rational argumentation on the other hand with unfailing resoluteness although they knew just where to draw the line between the claims of reason and the claims of faith." —Pieper, *Scholasticism*, 1960, p. 38.

Schrödinger's cat

Suppose that a cat is locked in a box with a bottle of poi-

经院哲学

见“经院学派”条。

经院学派

亦称经院哲学，是中世纪知识界的主导哲学。它始于5世纪时波埃修斯对亚里士多德逻辑学著作的深有影响的评注，终于17世纪中叶。经院学派的鼎盛期在11至13世纪，当时建立了巴黎大学和牛津大学，通过解读古代著者的著作，尤其是对亚里士多德著作（正是在这一时期，亚里士多德的大多数著作第一次被译成拉丁文）的阅读和注释过程，西方哲学传统得以再现自身。经院哲学最著名的代表是T. 阿奎那，他也是亚里士多德著作的最大注释家。其他杰出的经院学者包括阿布拉、布里丹、邓斯·司各脱、奥康和苏亚雷斯等人。经院学派的主要特征是力图调和理性与信仰之间的冲突，即力图使希腊思想，尤其是亚里士多德的学说与基督教神学协调一致，并力图达到用哲学来支撑神学的目的。信仰和知识的关联开始于波埃修斯，奥康则论证道，它们之间婚姻的前途是没有希望的。正因如此，奥康被说成是最后一位经院学者。经院学派以善于争论有争议之点的细节为特色。这些形式的争论按照源出于亚里士多德逻辑学的一些公认的规则进行。在这种意义上，它对逻辑学作出了很大贡献。

经院学派之所以得到如此称谓，乃因为它是在大学中做成的哲学（希腊语的 *schola* 意即“闲暇”，它也是“学校”和“学者”一词的起源），因为只有在一个人有闲暇时间时，他才能学习与沉思。从文艺复兴时期以来，经院学派的声誉不好，是诸如笛卡尔、培根、霍布斯、洛克等近现代哲学家抨击的主要靶子。近现代的哲学和科学是作为它的对立物而开始的。但是，在本世纪，哲学家们更新了他们的评价，意识到经院学派对逻辑学、语言学和形而上学作出的贡献。

“怎样界定经院学派这个大时代？事实是，它的领导性人物托马斯和鲍拉文多拉坚定不移地断言，完成了信仰接受的启示的传统真理和理性的论证这两个方面之间的和合，虽然他们确切地知道理性主张和信仰主张之间的界限该划在哪里。”——庇柏尔：《经院学派》，1960年，第38页。

薛定谔猫

假设一只猫和一个毒气瓶一起关在盒中，

sonous gas which will break if a device connected to it registers that an atom in a radioactive substance in the box decays. The chance of decaying in the next hour is fifty-fifty. If the bottle breaks, the cat will be killed. According to quantum mechanics, the cat, gas and device form an superposition of states that is indeterminate until a measurement or an observation is made. That means that the issue of the cat's being alive or being dead in the box is indeterminate until we look inside the box. Although it sounds paradoxical, before then it is not true that the cat is alive and it is not true that the cat is dead. This thought experiment was introduced in 1935 by one of the founders of quantum mechanics, Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger. It indicates how difficult it is to conceive quantum indeterminacy in terms of daily language.

"Schrödinger's cat thought experiment did not show that quantum mechanics is logically false, but it did show that it is wildly counter-intuitive, perhaps to the point of being absurd." - Brown, *The Laboratory of the Mind*, 1991, p. 67.

Scientia media, see middle knowledge

Scientific determinism

The success of Newtonian physics led many scientists and philosophers to believe that there is a natural order governed by the laws of nature. Given the initial state of a system, we can determine any future state by applying the laws of nature and the information about the initial state. Phenomena are necessary outcomes of the operation of laws in the situations which produce them. The future occurrence of an event is predictable. Chance is a name for our ignorance of the laws of nature or of the antecedent conditions of the event. The association of determinism and scientific predictability was established by Laplace and has been widely echoed. Determinism was widely accepted as a fundamental principle of science and as the very essence of scientific understanding. The truth of science seemed to prove that the whole universe must indeed be a vast and intricate mechanism. In spite of its great prestige, scientific determinism was challenged by the theory of relativity, chaos theory and quantum mechanics. As a result, the debate between determinism and indeterminism has generated major tensions in the philosophy of science. Traditionally, this debate has occurred mainly in physics, but biological determinists have gained support for the claim that the development of a person is determined by his genetic inheritance.

"Science is inconceivable without determinism, but the latter is taken in a purely phenomenalist sense; in order to formulate any laws at all, we have to assume that identical conditions produce identical phenomena." - Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason*, 1968, p. 74.

当与毒气瓶相连的一个装置记录到盒中放射性物质衰变的一个原子时,毒气瓶就被击碎。在下一小时中,衰变的几率为一半对一半。如果瓶被击碎,猫就会被毒死。按照“量子力学”,猫、气体和装置形成状态的迭加,它是不确定的,除非进行一次测量或观察。这意味着猫在盒中的是死是活问题是不确定的,直到我们打开盒子时才能确定。这听起来是悖理的,就是说在那之前,猫还活着不是真的,而猫死了也不是真的。这个思想实验由量子力学的奠基人之一、奥地利物理学家E. 薛定谔于1935年提出。它表明用日常语言来想像量子不确定性是多么困难。

“薛定谔猫思想实验并未证明量子力学在逻辑上是错误的,但它的确证明量子力学与人们的直觉是极不相符、甚至达到荒唐的地步。”——布朗:《心灵实验室》,1991年,第67页。

中间知识

见“中间知识 (middle knowledge)”条。

科学决定论

牛顿物理学的成功使很多科学家和哲学家相信存在着一个由自然规律统治的自然秩序。一个系统的初始状态给定后,我们可以通过应用自然规律和有关初始状态的信息而确定其未来的状态。现象是在产生它们的条件下规律起作用的必然结果。事件的未来出现是可以预见的。偶然性是我们对自然规律或事件的前提条件无知的一个说法。决定论和科学的可预见性之间的联系是由拉普拉斯确立的,并得到了广泛的赞同。决定论作为科学的基本原则和科学理解的真正本质被广泛接受。科学的真理似乎是要证明整个宇宙实际上很可能是一个庞大复杂的机械装置。尽管科学决定论有巨大的声望,它还是受到相对论、混沌论和量子力学的挑战。这导致科学哲学中决定论和非决定论之间的争论大幅升温。从传统上看,这一争论主要发生在物理学界,但生物决定论者得到了一个人的发展是由他的遗传因素决定的这种主张的支持。

“科学没有决定论是不可想像的,但后者只能从纯现象论意义上理解,即只是为了系统地提出规律,我们必须假定相同的条件引起相同的现象。”——科拉科夫斯基:《理性的异化》,1968年,第74页。

Scientific experience, see lived experience

Scientific image, see manifest image

Scientific method

A central concern of the philosophy of science. Various positions regarding method may be distinguished in terms of answers to the following questions: (1) How are scientific hypotheses formulated and how is scientific truth discovered? These questions focus on the nature of scientific reasoning, including the method of induction initiated by F. Bacon and J. S. Mill. (2) How is knowledge accepted as being scientific? This problem has been the subject of intensive debate, especially since Popper's criticism of verifiability and his proposal to use falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. (3) How does science develop? Logical Positivism attempted to establish a unified method for all sciences, but its programme has been rejected by others. Traditionally, the method of physics has been accepted as the paradigm of scientific method, but this has been challenged by the development of biology. Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions challenged the picture of science as developing smoothly within the framework of a single methodology in which all theories are commensurable and scientific change is rational. Imre Lakatos understood the progress of science in terms of the relative success of progressive research programmes in generating problems and their solutions. Some philosophers see science as a patchwork of different methods in which local successes do not depend on a coherent integrated system.

"The practice of scientific method is the persistent critique of arguments, in the light of canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are obtained, and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on which conclusions are based." — Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, 1961, p. 13.

Scientific realism

A position claiming that scientific postulates or theoretical entities, such as electrons and quarks, have real existence independent of our minds and that scientific universals are abstractions of the facts. It therefore represents the commonsensical view that there is a world that exists independent of our experiences. It holds that any scientific theory has ontological implications. Correct scientific theories describe and explain real features and objective structures of the external world. There is an intrinsic connection between how a theory depicts nature and its other features, including its power to explain. Scientific realism contrasts with many other positions in the philosophy of science such as operationism

科学的经验

见“活生生的体验”条。

科学的影像

见“明显的影像”条。

科学方法

科学哲学的主要领域之一。关于方法的不同立场依据对下述问题的回答而得以区分：(1) 科学假说是如何形成的，科学真理是如何发现的？这些问题集中在科学推理的性质，包括起始于 F. 培根和 J. S. 密尔的归纳方法上。(2) 知识如何被接受为是科学的？这个问题是集中争论的主题，尤其是自波普对可证实性的批评和提倡用可证伪性作为科学与非科学之间的分界标准以来。(3) 科学是如何发展的？逻辑实证主义试图确立一种对于所有科学的统一方法，但其纲领为许多哲学家所反对。物理学的方法曾被传统地认为是科学方法的典范，但却遭到了生物学发展的挑战。T. 库恩的科学革命理论挑战那种科学是在一单方法论框架中平和发展的科学图像，在其中一切理论都是可通约的，科学变化是理性的。拉卡托斯以进步性研究纲领在产生问题和找到答案方面的相对成功来理解科学的进步。有些哲学家把科学看做是不同方法的杂烩，其中局部的成功并不取决于一个一致整合的系统。

“科学方法的实践，就是对于准则的持久批判，这些准则用以判定获取证据资料的程序的可靠性及用以评估由此而得出结论的证据的检验力。”——内格尔：《科学的结构》，1961 年，第 13 页。

科学实在论

这个术语指这么一种立场，它主张科学假定或理论实体，例如电子、夸克等具有独立于人心的真实存在，科学的共相是对事实的抽象。因此，它代表了存在一个独立于我们经验世界的常识观点。它认为任何科学理论都有本体论意义。正确的科学理论描述和说明外部世界的真实特征和客观结构。在一个理论如何描述自然与它的其他特征（包括它的说明力）之间有着内在的联系。这种观点与科学哲学中的许多其他立场，如“操作主义”或“工具主义”等相对立，这些观点一般主张理论实体仅仅是虚构。

“科学实在论认为由正确理论所描述的实

or instrumentalism which commonly claim that theoretical entities are merely fictions.

"Scientific realism says that the entities, states and processes described by correct theories really do exist." --Hacking, *Representing and Intervening*, 1983, p. 21.

Scientism

The view that science is the only knowledge and that scientific methodology is the only proper method for obtaining knowledge. Everything should be understood and explained by the employment of scientific theories. Other fields of inquiry, including philosophy, art, history, religion, morality and the social sciences, either are assimilated to science or are excluded as a source of knowledge. Scientism denies that any of these fields has a distinct methodology and in many versions rejects claims that there is aesthetic, moral or religious knowledge. Philosophers who maintain that there is an autonomous field of humanistic knowledge to which scientific methodology is inapplicable reject scientism and often use the term pejoratively.

"Scientism is actually a special form of idealism, for it puts one type of human understanding in charge of the universe and what can be said about it." Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, p. 9.

Scope

Scope is attributed to syntactical operators, and affects the part of a sentence upon which the operator has immediate effect. An operator is an expression which alters the logical properties of another expression to which it is attached. In the expression " $(A \wedge B) \supset C$ ", the scope of A is " $A \wedge B$ ". In ordinary language, it is often the case that the scope is not clearly demarcated. Hence the same sentence might be interpreted in alternative ways, depending on how one understands the context in which the sentence occurs. This gives rise to structural ambiguities, such as *de re / de dicto* ambiguities. For example, "I shall go to London and race if the weather is good". It means either "I shall go to London anyway, but race only when the weather is good" or "If the weather is not good, I will not go to London and race". Arguments proceeding on the basis of this sort of ambiguity are said to commit the fallacy of scope. Artificial languages have been invented with the aim of preventing scope ambiguity. The scope of the quantifier is generally the whole formula. An operator attached to a sentence to produce a new sentence is a sentential operator and has the original sentence as its scope. Brackets are conventionally used to indicate the scope of the scope of the various operators. Russell's theory of descriptions essentially gives an explicit indication of the scope of a definite description.

"The sentence to which an operator is attached is called a scope of the operator." —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960.

体、状态和过程的确真实地存在着。” 哈金：《表征与干预》，1983年，第21页。

科学主义

指一种认为科学是惟一的知识，科学方法论是获取知识的惟一正确方法的观点。每一件事都应当用科学理论来理解和解释。其他研究领域，包括哲学、艺术、历史、宗教、道德和社会科学，要么被同化为科学，要么就作为知识的来源而被排除在外。科学主义否认这些领域具有独特的方法论，并且在许多形式中拒斥美学知识、道德知识或宗教知识的存在。那些坚持认为存在一个自主的人文知识领域，科学方法论不适用于这领域的哲学家反对科学主义并经常贬义地使用这一术语。

“科学主义实际上是一种特殊形式的理想主义，因为它把宇宙和关于它可说及的托付给一种类型的人类认识。”——内格尔：《出自无处的观点》，1986年，第9页。

范围

范围是被赋予句法算子的，影响着这个算子直接作用的句子的组成部分。算子这种表达式改变了它所依附的另一个表达式的逻辑属性。在“ $(A \wedge B) \supset C$ ”这个表达式中， A 的范围就是“ $A \wedge B$ ”。在日常语言中，范围往往并没有得到清楚地划定。因而，同一个句子可能会用不同的方式得到解释，这取决于人们如何理解这个句子出现的语境。这就产生了结构上的模糊性，譬如对象与事实的模糊性。例如，“如果天气好的话，我会去伦敦参加比赛”。这或者意味着“无论如何我都会去伦敦，但只有当天气好的时候才会参加比赛”，或者意味着“如果天气不好的话，我就不会去伦敦参加比赛了”。基于这种模糊性的论证被认为是犯了一种“范围错误”。人工语言的引入一直被看做是为了禁止这种范围的模糊性。量词的范围通常就是整个公式。把一个算子加在一个句子上而产生新的句子，这个算子就是语句算子，它把原来的句子作为其范围。括号通常被用做标明各种算子的范围。罗素的事状词理论实际上就是清楚地表明了限定摹状词的范围。

“算子所在的句子就被称作这个算子的范围。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第165页。

p. 165.

Scotism

A form of scholastic philosophy and theology developed by Duns Scotus and his followers, especially among the Franciscans. Scotism was accepted by the Catholic Church as authoritative in 1633, and was taught widely in the universities around the world from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century. Scotism and Thomism are two main trends in scholasticism. Other famous Scotists include Francis Mayron, John de Bassolis, Peter of Aquila, and Luke Wadding, who in 1639 edited the first edition of the complete works of Scotus.

Scotism accepted the Aristotelian view that metaphysics is concerned with being as being and with various connected transcendental conceptions, rather than with the essence of material things, as Aquinas maintained. The purpose of metaphysics is to demonstrate God as infinite and as the First Being. In demonstrating the existence of God, Duns Scotus developed several arguments of Thomas Aquinas. God created the world *ex nihilo*, and all created things are finite and contingent. Other than the common nature shared by particular things, there is also an individual form (*haecceitas*) which is peculiar to each particular. This doctrine differs from the doctrine of Aristotle and Aquinas because they believed that in a composite of matter and form, matter is the principle of individuation. Among various entities which are not really the same but which cannot be separated from one other, there is a formal distinction. Scotism opposed the Augustinian theory of divine illumination and claimed that being is the primary object of intellect. It also appealed to intellectual intuition in explaining our experience of God. In ethics, Duns Scotus attempted to reconcile the divine will with the rationality of moral law and claimed that human freedom lies in our ability to move from desire to justice. Scotism presented the most sophisticated metaphysics in later medieval philosophy, and has been admired by Heidegger and Peirce.

"If one looks on Scotism in its position as a stage in the development of medieval thought, it would be idle to deny that de facto it helped to stimulate the critical movement of the fourteenth century." - Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 1950, vol. II, p. 485.

Scottish philosophy

Education in Scotland has long placed great emphasis on the importance of philosophy. The earliest important Scottish philosophers were Duns Scotus and John Mair. The golden age of Scottish philosophy was the eighteenth century, which contained major figures such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart. These philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment were commonly opposed to the orthodox

司各脱主义

由 D. 司各脱及其追随者, 尤其是在圣方济会徒中间发展起来的经院哲学和神学的一种形式。司各脱主义在 1633 年曾被天主教会接受为官方学说, 并从 16 至 18 世纪在周围世界的大学中被广泛讲授。司各脱主义和托马斯主义是经院学派中的两个主要倾向。其他著名的司各脱主义者有 F. 麦依农、J. 德·巴索里斯、阿库依那的彼得和在 1639 年编纂了司各脱全集第一个版本的 L. 瓦丁。

司各脱主义接受亚里士多德的形而上学观点, 即形而上学是研究作为“是”的“是”, 以及各种相关的超验概念, 而不是如阿奎那所主张的那样研究物质事物的本质。形而上学的目的是要论证作为无限的和“第一存在”的上帝。在论证上帝存在时, D. 司各脱发展了 T. 阿奎那的几个论证。上帝 *ex nihilo* (无中生有地) 创造了世界, 一切受造物都是有限的、偶然的。特殊事物除了分有共同的本性之外, 也有每一殊相固有的个体形式 (*haecceitas*)。这种学说既区别于亚里士多德, 也不同于阿奎那, 因为他们相信, 在一个质料和形式的合成物中, 质料是个体化的原则。在实质并不相同但又不能彼此分离的各种实体中, 存在着形式上的差异。司各脱主义反对奥古斯丁主义的神之光照理论, 主张存在是理智的第一对象。它也诉诸理智直觉来解释我们对上帝的体验。在伦理学中, D. 司各脱企图调和神圣意志与理性道德法则, 主张人的自由在于我们有能力从欲望过渡到公正。司各脱主义提出了中世纪晚期哲学中最成熟的形而上学, 得到了海德格尔和皮尔士的称赞。

“如果人们把司各脱主义作为中世纪思想发展的一个阶段来看它的见解, 那么, 要否认它事实上有助于刺激 14 世纪的批判运动就是没有根据的。”——柯普莱斯顿:《哲学史》, 1950 年, 第二卷, 第 485 页。

苏格兰哲学

苏格兰教育一直非常强调哲学的重要性。最早的重要哲学家是 D. 司各脱和 J. 梅尔。苏格兰哲学的黄金时代是 18 世纪, 这一时期包括的主要人物有 F. 哈奇森、D. 休谟、A. 斯密、T. 里德、A. 弗格森和 D. 斯图尔特。这些苏格兰启蒙运动的哲学家共同反对当时支配苏格兰教会和社会的正统的加尔文派。他们的工作促进了作为一个整体的欧洲启蒙运动的形成。哈

Calvinism which dominated Scottish church and society at that time. Their work helped to shape the European enlightenment as a whole. Hutcheson's account of 'moral sentiments', Hume's scepticism and Reid's philosophy of common sense have all influenced the later development of philosophy. Smith's philosophical work is valued as well as his foundation of modern economics in *Wealth of Nations*. Scottish philosophy has generally been empirical, anti-rationalistic and closely connected with psychology, as it reflected the fact that in Scottish universities the study of philosophy traditionally included logic (or general philosophy), moral philosophy, psychology and natural philosophy (or physics).

"The philosophy of common sense became 'the Scottish philosophy' and schooled several generations of Scotsmen."—Grave, *The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense*, 1960, p. 1.

Sea-battle

Aristotle's example to illustrate the problem of future contingents in *De Interpretatione* ix. Either there will be or there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow; so the statement "There will be a sea-battle" is either true (and its negation false), or false (and its negation true). However, if the sea-battle has not yet happened, how can we claim that a statement about it is true or false? If it is already true or already false, what will happen happens of necessity. Aristotle concluded that statements in the future tense, though potentially either true or false, are actually neither. There has been much discussion about whether Aristotle's argument is sound and whether he pointed to a need to modify logic. Lukasiewicz developed Aristotle's thoughts on the sea-battle as the basis for three-valued logic.

"For example, it would be necessary that a sea-battle should neither take place nor fail to take place tomorrow."—Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 18b24-6

Secession

The dismemberment of a state into two or more new sovereign states, typically in response to problems of national, religious, ethnic or cultural conflict within the state. There are several different reasons for secessionist movements. For example, some attempt to restore a nation which was forcibly and unjustifiably annexed by a larger state, as in the case of some of the republics in the former Soviet Union. Some attempt to escape the consequences of discrimination and genocide, as in the formation of Israel. Although there are significant objections, many commentators argue that secession can be justified in these two cases. There have been attempts to justify other secessionist movements by distinct ethnic groups asserting a right to self-determination to protect their language, traditions, religion, culture or nationality or to avoid losing their majority in their own area through

奇森对道德情感主义的说明、休谟的怀疑主义和里德的常识哲学都对后来哲学发展产生了影响。斯密的哲学著作与其《国富论》中的现代经济学基本原则一样有价值。苏格兰哲学通常是经验主义的和反唯理论的，并与心理学联系密切，这反映了这样一个事实：在苏格兰大学中，哲学研究传统上包括逻辑学（或一般哲学）、道德哲学、心理学和自然哲学（或物理学）。

“常识哲学成为‘苏格兰哲学’并培养了几代苏格兰人。”——格雷夫：《苏格兰的常识哲学》，1960年，第1页。

海战

亚里士多德在《解释》第九章中用来说明未来偶然性问题的一个例子。明天或者将发生海战或者不会发生海战；于是“将发生海战”这一陈述或者为真（它的否定为假）或者为假（它的否定为真）。不过，如果海战并非已经发生，我们怎么能够断言有关它的一个陈述是真的还是假的呢？如果它已经是真的或已经是假的，则将要发生的事情就会是必然发生的。亚里士多德作结论说：将来时态的陈述，尽管潜在地或者为真或者为假，而实际上是既不真也不假。亚里士多德的论证是否可靠，他是否指出了需要修改逻辑，关于这些问题存在许多讨论。卢卡西维茨发展了亚里士多德关于海战的思想，并以此作为三值逻辑的基础。

“举例来说，明天海战将既不发生也不不发生，这是必然的。”——亚里士多德：《解释》，18b24-26。

脱离

一个国家肢解为两个或更多新的主权国家。它是对这一国家内民族、宗教、伦理或文化冲突问题的典型反应。脱离主义运动有各自不同的原因。例如，一些是以前被一个大国强行无理吞并的国家试图复国，前苏联一些共和国的情况就是这样。一些是试图避免受歧视和种族灭绝的后果，如以色列的形成。虽然存在重大的反对意见，但很多评论家认为在上述两种情况下脱离可以认为是正当的。还有一些人一直在为其他的脱离主义运动做辩护，其根据是独特的少数民族集团坚持自决权以保护他们的语言、传统、宗教、文化或民族性，或避免由于强行的人口再分配而失去他们在所在地区人口中的多数。这些支持脱离的理由是否是道义上的结论还不清楚，自决权没有政治上的完全独立

imposed population redistribution. It is unclear whether these reasons are morally conclusive in favour of secession. Self-determination is possible without full political independence and cannot justify secessionist claims to territory or sovereignty. Secession on this basis would undermine the existence of any state containing groups distinguished in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, culture or nationality and would lead to political fragmentation. As an alternative to secession, some political philosophers are exploring the possibilities of satisfying the legitimate demands of different groups within an altered conception of a sovereign state.

"The problem of secession arises only in cases where an established state houses two or more groups with distinct and irreconcilable national identities." —Miller, *On Nationality*, 1995, p. 1.

Secondary matter, see primary matter

Secondary qualities, see primary and secondary qualities

Secondary rules, see rule of recognition

Second-level concept, see first-level concept

Second-level predicate, see first level concept

Secondness, see firstness

Second-order logic, see first-order language

Second-order predicate, see predicate

Seeing in

A term introduced by the British philosopher Richard Wollheim with regard to the nature of representation. There have been various attempts to understand the nature of the relation of representation. Different philosophers have claimed respectively that representation is an illusion; that it is the arousal of sensation; that it is a character of a symbol system satisfying certain formal requirements; that it is resemblance; or that it delivers the information found in what is represented. Wollheim finds that none of these accounts is satisfactory and instead argues that pictorial representation, at least, is best understood in terms of seeing in, according

也是可能的,它并不能表明脱离主义者对领土或主权的要求是正当的。对由在种族、语言、宗教、文化或民族方面相互区别的集团构成的国家而言,以此为根据的脱离会削弱这种国家继续存在的基础,并会导致政治上的分裂。作为对脱离的一种替代,一些政治哲学家正在探索在一个改变了的主权国家的概念内满足不同集团合法要求的可能性。

“只有在一个已建立的国家里存在两个或更多的、有独特的和势不两立的民族性集团的情况下,脱离的问题才会出现。”——米勒:《论民族》,1995年,第1页。

次级的物质

见“初级的物质”条。

第二性的质

见“第一性的质和第二性的质”条。

次要规定

见“承认规则”条。

二阶概念

见“一阶概念”条。

二阶谓词

见“一阶概念”条。

第二性

见“第一性”条。

二阶逻辑

见“一阶语言”条。

二阶谓词

见“谓词”条。

从中观出

该术语由英国哲学家 R. 沃尔海姆首创,旨在揭示表象的本质。为了搞清表象关系的本质,哲学家们进行了各种尝试。不同的哲学家分别提出不同的见解,有人认为表象是一种幻象;有人宣称表象旨在唤起感觉;有人断言表象是满足某些形式要求的符号系统的特征;有人坚信表象就是相似;也有人建议表象旨在传达包含在表象对象中的信息等等。而沃尔海姆则发现所有这些说法都不尽如人意,于是提出如下论点:最起码就绘画表象而言,依据“从中观出”的原理来理解是最好不过的,据此,x的表

to which a representation of x is a configuration in which x could be seen. As one and the same simultaneous perceptual experience, seeing in contains two aspects in virtue of our psychological capacity both to attend to the marks on painted surface present to the eyes and to see in them the figurative effects of those marks.

"I shall simply offer, in a necessarily crude version, what seems to me the best available theory of representation. . . . The theory is stated in terms of 'seeing-in'. For at least central cases of representation, a necessary condition of R representing x is that R is a configuration in which something or other can be seen and furthermore one in which x can be seen." —Wollheim, *The Mind and its Depths*, 1993, p. 165.

Self

The subject or bearer of mental attributes such as experience, consciousness, thoughts, beliefs, emotions, intentions and sensations. It is the human agent which deliberates and initiates actions, and which bears responsibility for one's action. It is the referent of the first-person pronoun. It is sometimes used as a synonym for person. However, person is associated in different ways with bodily form and with public or social role, while the self is more related to the inner part of a person. Sometimes the term is used interchangeably with terms such as the pure ego, unity of consciousness, subject and, in a loose sense, soul or mind. The self is a unity which integrates all experiences, beliefs and feelings of an individual and which enables an individual to have identity as the same person at different times. The self is characteristically taken to be the subject of self-consciousness, which includes itself or its states among the objects of its own consciousness. The nature of the self has been a contentious issue in the their history of philosophy, starting with the Greek injunction to know oneself. Many philosophers consider the self as an inner entity, but Hume objected to this, claiming that the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions.

"It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, throughout the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable." —Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Book 1, Part 4, Sect. vi.

Self-alienation, see alienation

Self-awareness, another expression for self-consciousness

象是一个可以从中观出 x 的构形。作为一种相同而共时的感知经验，从中观出过程包含着涉及我们心理能力的两个方面，一是注意眼前绘画表象上所有标志的心理能力，二是发觉这些标志之象征作用的心理能力。

“在一种肯定粗浅的论述中，我只是提出了在我看来是目前最佳的表象学说。……这一学说通过‘从中观出’予以表述。起码就表象的重要情况而言， R 表现 x 的必要条件在于 R 是一种构形，从中可以看出某物或他者，另外从中还可以看出 x 。”——沃尔海姆：《心智及其深处》，1993 年，第 165 页。

自我

像经验、意识、思维、信念、情绪、意向、感觉这样的心的属性的主体或所有者。它是思考和发起活动并对自己的活动负有责任的人类主体。它是第一人称代词所指的对象。它有时被用作个人的同义语。然而，个人以不同的方式与身体形式及公共的或社会的角色相联系，而自我却与一个人的内部有更多的联系。有时，它被与像纯自我、意识统一体、主体这样的术语互换使用，并在宽松的意义上，与灵魂或心通用。自我是一个整合个人所有经验、信念、感觉等的统一体，这使得一个人在不同的时间仍是同一个人。自我特别被认为是自我意识的主体，这包括自我意识的对象本身或状态。自我的本质在哲学史上从希腊人有关于认识自己的要求以来，就是一个持续不断的议题。许多哲学家将自我看做是一个内部的存在物，但休谟反对这样的看法，他声称自我只是一束知觉。

“它一定是引起每个真实观念的某一个印象。但自我或个人不是任何一个印象，而是我们的几个印象和观念所要指称的东西。如果某个印象引起关于自我的观念，那个印象一定要终生持续不变地存在下去，因为自我被认为是以那种方式存在的。但并不存在持续不变的印象。”——休谟：《人性论》，第一卷，第四部分，第六节。

自我异化

见“异化”条。

自我意识

“自我意识 (self-consciousness)”的另一个

Self-consciousness

Also called self-awareness, including the distinctive properties of the self; first, the subject's awareness of itself as a subject, expressed by the pronoun "I"; secondly, the awareness that one has consciousness, through experiencing the contents of one's consciousness, such as sensations, thoughts or feelings; and thirdly, the reflexivity of consciousness, which allows consciousness to be an object of knowledge. Different senses of self-consciousness raise various philosophical problems concerning the certainty and logical structure of our awareness of ourselves as an "I", introspection and the nature and character of self-knowledge.

"The expression 'self-consciousness' can be respectably explained as 'consciousness that such-and-such holds of oneself'." —Anscombe, in Guttenplan (ed.), *Mind and Language*, 1975, p. 50.

Self-contradiction

A proposition that states or implies a proposition of the form P and not P. If a proposition contains or implies its own negation and effectively asserts and denies the same thought, it is self-contradictory. Such a proposition cannot be true and must be false, because it involves self-refutation. Some self-refutation can be pragmatic. Descartes claimed that the proposition "I am not a thinking being" is self-contradictory because saying "I am not a thinking being" shows that one is a thinking being. In this case the content of the utterance does not imply its negation, but asserting the content ensures that the content is false. Self-contradiction is a crucial objection to any mathematical or logical principle or axiom. Philosophers are sometimes puzzled how one and the same proposition can contradict itself. The discussion of self-contradiction is related to the problem of self-deception, in which a person believes what he knows or believes to be false.

"The philosophical critic does not always restrict himself to pointing out inconsistencies or to showing that a certain theory leads to contradictions; he frequently alleges that certain propositions—propositions, often enough, which have been put forward by his fellow philosophers—are self-contradictory in themselves." —Passmore, *Philosophical Reasoning*, 1970, p. 59.

Self-control

[from Greek: *enkratia*, controlling or mastering oneself over irrational desires, as opposed to *akrasia*; incontinence or weakness of will, the lack of control] An ability enabling oneself to pursue what one believes to be right whilst resisting temptations to do something else. It is strength of will. In Plato's tripartite division of soul, self-control means the

名称,

自我意识

又称自我意识,包括自我的一种独特特性。首先主体将自己意识为一个用代词“我”来表达的主体;其次,通过意识到自己的像感觉、思维、感情这样的意识内容来意识自己具有意识;第三,意识的内省或反省,亦即,容许意识作为知识的一个对象。不同意义上的自我意识引起不同的哲学问题。这些问题是关于我们对于自己作为一个“我”的意识的确定性和逻辑结构、内省、自我知识的本质与特征的。

“‘自我意识’这一表达可以大致地解释为‘一个人对于自己如此这般的意识’。”——安斯康,见古顿普兰(编):《心与语言》,1975年,第50页。

自相矛盾

当一个命题陈述或蕴涵有形式为P和非P的命题时。如果一个命题包含或蕴涵着它自身的否定,及它实际上断言和否认同一思想,它就是自相矛盾的。这种命题不可能是真的且必然为假,因为它包含着自我反驳。有些自我反驳是实用的。笛卡尔认为命题“I am not a thinking being”(我不是一个思维着的存在)是自相矛盾的,因为说“我不是一个思维着的存在”表明他是一个思维着的存在。在这种情况下,说话的内容并不隐含着它的否定,而对内容的确定则肯定了其内容是假的。对于任何数学或逻辑的原理或公理而言,自相矛盾是一个很关键的缺陷。哲学家有时会困惑于同一个命题如何能与自身相矛盾。这个问题的讨论与自我欺骗有关,即一个人相信他所知道或相信的是假的事。

“哲学批评并非总限定自身于指出不一致,或表明某个理论导致矛盾;他经常断言某些命题——相当经常地是那些其同辈哲学家提出的命题——其本身就是自相矛盾的。”——帕斯摩尔:《哲学推理》,1970年,第59页。

自我控制

!源自希腊文 *enkratia*, 控制或驾驭自己的非理性欲求,与 *akrasia* (意志薄弱或缺乏控制)相反]一种使得一个人追求自己相信正确的东西并抵制做其他事情的诱惑的能力。它是意志的力量。在柏拉图关于灵魂的三分法中,自我控制意味着理性对于情绪和欲望的控制。一个

mastery of reason over the emotions and appetite. A self-controlled person can pursue greater and longer-term goals without being corrupted by immediate gratification, and can adhere to the principles he endorses in the face of temptation to deviate from them. Such a person, according to Plato, is a free man rather than a slave of his desires. Different from temperance which means not to have excessive desires, self-control is the capacity to overcome the influences of desires.

"This is so when we describe it as calling for a kind of self-mastery, which consists in reason ruling over desires, a self-control which contrasts to being dominated by one's appetites and passions." — Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 1989, p. 124.

Self-deception

Deliberate blindness to what is true or believing what one knows or believes to be false on the basis of a certain motivation. Sartre's account of self-deception as bad faith [French: *mauvaise foi*] is closely focused on his existentialist claim that we seek to evade our freedom by attempting to take on the character of a thing. He analyses self-deception in terms of lying to oneself on the model of deceiving others, but this gives rise to the so-called paradox of self-deception. In deceiving another, the deceiver knows the truth and conceals it from the one to be deceived. But how can deception occur if the deceiver and the one to be deceived are the same? A person deceiving himself must already know the truth. Hence a self-deceiver knows that he is deceiving and this seems to rule him out as a victim of his deception. A successful self-deceiver would believe both *p* and not-*p*, but this seems to be impossible. Various proposals concerning the structure of the mind, the scope of the will, the nature of knowledge and belief and their logic have been made to avoid the paradox, but each proposed solution is open to dispute. The analysis of self-deception is closely connected with the attempts to understand the problem of incontinence [Greek: *akrasia*, lack of self-control] or the weakness of will. The incontinent person does what he knows or believes to be wrong or fails to do what he knows or believes to be the best.

"The paradox of self-deception was formulated in the following way: 'how can the self-deceiver believe that something is not so and yet persuade himself that it is so'." — Pears, *Motivated Irrationality*, 1984, p. 31.

Self-determination

A moral characteristic by which a moral agent is the source or cause of his own actions. A self-determining agent can exercise rational will without being determined by anything else. Self-determination is viewed as synonymous with autonomy and opposed to the fatalism of determinism. In modern ethics, especially in Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre and

自我控制的人能够追求更大更长远的目标, 而不被眼前的满足所收买, 并且能够在相反的诱惑面前坚持他所认可的原则。在柏拉图看来, 这样的人就是一个自由的人, 而不是其欲求的奴隶。与意为不具有过多欲求的节制不同, 自我控制是克服欲求影响的能力。

"当我们将它描述为要求一种包含理性统治欲求的自我驾驭, 一种与为一个人的欲望和冲动所支配相反的自我控制时, 情况就是这样。"——泰勒:《自我的起源》, 1989年, 第124页。

自欺

由于某种动机对于真的东西, 或者相信某人知道或相信为假的东西故意装做不知。萨特把自欺解说为坏的相念[法语: *mauvaise foi*], 这与他的存在主义主张密切相关, 即我们力图通过接纳事物的特征而极力逃避我们的自由。他借助于欺骗他人的模式而把自欺分析为对自己说谎, 但这产生了所谓自欺的悖论。在欺骗他人时, 欺骗者知道真相并对被欺骗者掩盖真相。但如果欺骗者和被欺骗者是同一个人, 那么欺骗又如何能发生呢? 一个欺骗自己的人必定已经知道真相。因此自欺者知道他正在受骗, 这看来是把他作为他的欺骗的牺牲品而把他排除掉了。成功的自欺应当既相信 *p* 又相信非 *p*, 但看来这是不可能的。各种关于心的结构、意志的范围、知识和信念的本性及其逻辑的方案都提出来以避免这个悖论, 但每一种所提出的解决方案都仍有争论。对自欺的分析与理解意志软弱[希腊词: *akrasia*, 缺乏自制]问题之企图密切相关。意志软弱的人去干他知道或相信是错误的事情, 或未能做他知道或认为是最好的事情。

"自欺悖论以下列方式形成: '自欺者如何能相信某件事不是如此, 然而却劝说自己, 事情就是如此'。"——皮尔斯:《促动的非理性》, 1984年, 第31页。

自决

一种道德的特性, 据此, 道德行为者就是他自己行动的根源或原因。自决的行为者可以运用理性意志而不为任何其他东西所决定。自决被视为与自主同义, 而与决定论的宿命论相反。在近代伦理学中, 尤其是在康德、尼采、萨特和黑尔那里, 自决作用是作为我们尊重人的基础

Hare, self-determining agency is the principle that is basic to our respect for persons. Self-determination has been viewed as a basic moral right of persons and as the basis for human freedom.

In political theory, a right to self-determination allows a people to form and live under autonomous political institutions without undue outside interference.

"The balance or see-saw between self-determination and external determination is the form in which moral experience presents itself." —Hampshire, *Morality and Conflict*, 1983, p. 56.

Self-evident

That which is intuitively true, generally referring to the principles of logic and axioms of mathematics whose truth cannot be doubted and which do not require a proof. A proposition is self-evident if its truth can be derived from the meaning of the terms it includes, so that anyone who knows the meaning of the words knows that the proposition is true. Such a proposition must be analytic. Being self-evident is generally used as a synonym for *a priori*. But the discovery of logical paradoxes shows that faith in self-evidence of logical and mathematical axioms is not secure. Self-evidence is not the same as being obvious, for a thing might be obvious, but not true. On the other hand, a truth can be self-evident without being immediately obvious. Reasoning may still be required in order to grasp it.

"In calling anything self-evident we mean not that it is evident without need for understanding, but that we need consider nothing but the terms of the judgement, to see its necessity." —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 193.

Self-fulfilment

Also called self-realisation, fulfilment or actualisation of one's best capacities or potentialities. The capacity or potentiality must be defined to be good for a person as a rational being, and the fulfilment concerned must be linked with achievement. Self-fulfilment has been taken by many ethical systems to be the highest good, although these systems might differ over what is the best potentiality to realise. For Aristotle, the potentiality to realise is the human faculty of rationality, and in some texts he saw contemplation of eternal truth as the greatest happiness. Generally, the fulfilment or actualisation of one's best capacity is held to lead to of a successful life and the achievement of a true or real self.

"The goal of self management is often called self-fulfilment or self-actualisation." —Skinner, *About Behaviourism*, 1974, p. 178.

Self-identity, see personal identity

的原则。自决被视为人的基本道德权利,以及人类自由的基础。

在政治理论中,自决的权利使人可以形成自主的政治体制并生活于其下,而免受外界的非非法干涉。

“自决和外部决定之间的平衡或拉锯是道德经验呈现自己的一种形式。”——汉普舍:《道德和冲突》,1983年,第56页。

自明的

直观上为真的,一般涉及到逻辑原理和数学的公理,它们的真毋庸置疑且无需证明。一命题是自明的,如果它的真能够从它所含词语意义推出来,使得任何知道那些词语意义的人都知道该命题是真的。这样一个命题必定是分析的。自明的通常被用作是先验的同义语。但逻辑悖论的发现表明,相信逻辑和数学公理的自明性并不安全,自明的与明显的并不是一回事,因为一事物可以是明显的,却不是真的。另一方面,一真理能够是自明的却不是直接明显的,要掌握它可能仍然需要进行推理。

“当称任何东西为自明的时,我们并不是指它是显然的而无需领悟,而是指为了领悟其必然性,我们除了该判断的词项之外而无需考虑任何东西。”——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第193页。

自我实现

又称“自我完成”,指完成或实现一个人的最佳能力或潜力。这个能力或潜力必须被定义为有益于一个理性的人的东西,而且这个实现必须关乎成就。自我实现曾被许多伦理体系视为最高的善,尽管每一体系对于所要实现的最佳潜力是什么都有不同的理解。对于亚里士多德来说,要实现的潜力是人类的理性官能,而在某些论著中,他将思索永恒的真理视为最大的幸福。而人们通常认为,一个人的最佳能力的完成或实现会带来一个成功的生活并使人达到一个真的或现实的自我。

“自我管理的目标通常被称为自我完成或自我实现。”——斯金纳:《关于行为主义》,1974年,第178页。

自我等同

见“人格的同一性”条。

Self-interest

Interest in one's own well-being or in the advantages that one can gain for oneself. According to psychological egoism, everyone's actions are consciously or unconsciously motivated by the pursuit of self-interest. Even seemingly altruistic actions are held to be egoistic at their roots. Ethical egoism allows that actions can be motivated by factors other than self-interest, but advocates the pursuit of self-interest as morally leading to the best outcome. Because morality often seems to require sacrifice of one's own interests, moralists advocating the pursuit of self-interest try to harmonise moral considerations with self-interest. According to Adam Smith, the individual pursuit of self-interest promotes the common good through the mechanism of the invisible hand, which balances and reconciles interests in a more effective way than the commands of the state. Although extreme ethical egoism is widely rejected, many moral philosophers propose that we should pursue enlightened or rational self-interest, according to which altruism and benevolence are compatible with one's deeper self-interest over a longer term. They claim that people will satisfy their own interests through seeking the best interest of others.

"Since the time of Glaucon's challenge to Socrates, moral philosophers have attempted to show it is in our rational self-interest to act morally." —R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 405.

Self-intimation

The truth of a self-intimating statement entails that it is known by someone. If there are any true self-intimating statements, they could exist either without further implications or as the foundation of a more extensive system of knowledge. Some philosophers hold that statements about some of my own mental states, such as my pain, are self-intimating because their truth entails that I know them to be true. Self-intimation is therefore offered as one major ground for our alleged first person authority.

"Philosophers have not distinguished carefully between incorrigibility and another supposed property of statements of a closely similar and related kind, self-intimation. By this I mean a statement's truth entailing its being known." —Anthony Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, 1973, p. 147.

Self-love

The desire to maximise one's own well-being. Aristotle distinguished two types of self-love. The noble type seeks to satisfy the rational part of one's soul by pursuing virtue. The base type seeks to satisfy the appetitive part of one's soul. The British philosopher Joseph Butler also drew a distinction between two kinds of self-love. Cool self-love, which is long-term, deep-seated and compatible with benevolent ac-

自我利益

关心自己的幸福或自己能得到的利益。根据心理学的利己主义,每个人的行为都自觉地或不自觉地受对自我利益的追求所驱使。即使看上去是利他主义的行为也被认为从根本上讲是利己的。伦理学的利己主义承认行为可以由不是私利的因素所驱使,但提倡在道德上导致最好结果的对自我利益的追求。由于道德似乎常常要求牺牲一个人的自我利益,倡导追求自我利益的道德学家便试图将道德的考虑与自我利益二者协调起来。在A. 斯密看来,通过看不见的手的机制,个人对自我利益的追求会促进共同利益,这一机制平衡和调解利益的方式比国家命令更有效。虽然极端的道德利己主义遭到普遍的反,很多道德哲学家仍提出我们应当追求开明的或合理的私利,按照这一主张,利他主义和慈善是与人长期的、深层的自我利益不一致的。他们声称,人们通过寻求他人最大利益将会满足他们自己的利益。

"从格劳孔非难苏格拉底那时起,道德哲学家一直试图表明道德的行为就在我们合理的自我利益之中。"——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第405页。

自我告知

由一个自我告知的陈述为真可以推定它为某人所知。如果有任何为真的自我告知陈述,那么它们的存在或者没有另外的含意,或者是作为一个范围更为广泛的知识体系的基础。有的哲学家认为,关于我自己的像疼痛这样的心的状态的陈述是自我告知的,因为由其为真可以推定我知其为真。自我告知因此被作为我们所谓的第一人称权威的主要基础。

"哲学家没有仔细区分不可纠正和关于另一极为相似而密切相关的陈述的另一假定特性:自我告知。我用这个词汇来指一个陈述之为真推定其被知。"——奎因顿:《事物之本性》,1973年,第147页。

自爱

把个人幸福最大化的要求。亚里士多德区分了两种类型的自爱。崇高型通过追求美德而寻求对人的灵魂的理性部分的满足。基本型追求对人的灵魂的欲望部分的满足。英国哲学家J. 巴特勒也在两种类型的自爱之间做了区分。冷静的自爱是长期的和根深蒂固的,是与仁慈的行为相一致的,与它相对应的自爱则是肉欲

tions is contrasted with self love as sensual selfishness. Rousseau distinguished between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*, but both can be translated as self-love. *Amour de soi* is the desire of a person in the state of nature to preserve himself, while *amour-propre* presupposes a comparison between oneself and others in civil society. It aims to achieve superiority over others and is the source of our desires and motivations.

"Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way." — Butler, *Fifteen Sermons*, 1726, no. iii.

Self-ownership

The central libertarian principle that each person is the rightful owner of his own person and powers. Each person is therefore free to use these powers as he wishes, as long as he does not direct them to harm others. Other individuals and groups cannot restrict one's freedom without one's consent, and one may not use one's powers to force anyone else to supply products or services. Self-ownership is moral sovereignty, similar to human autonomy. This idea is proposed by Nozick in his influential book *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. It prohibits treating a person as a mere means rather than as a being of ultimate value and also prohibits reducing a person, in any particular, to the condition of a slave. A consequence of this view is that the action of the state to redistribute wealth in favour of badly off people violates the rights of individuals over themselves and represents a form of partial enslavement. These views are controversial, and other philosophers seek to reject the notion of self ownership or to show that it is compatible with concerns excluded by Nozick's argument.

"The libertarian principle of self-ownership says that each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply." —Cohen, *Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality*, 1995, p. 12.

Self-predication, see third man argument

Self-presenting

A term introduced by Meinong for the capacity of mental states to present themselves directly to thought. Chisholm used this notion as a source of certainty. For him, a self-presenting state is self-justifying. A proposition is self-presenting if it constitutes its own justification. Certain first-person intentional mental states, such as believing, thinking and feeling, are justified by the fact that to be in these states is to be aware of being in them. Hence these mental states are

方面的自私。卢梭对 *amour de soi* 和 *amour-propre* 做了区分,两者都可译为“自爱”。*Amour de soi* 是自然状态下一个人保护自己的那种要求,而 *amour-propre* 则是以市民社会中自己与他人的比较为前提的。后者的目的是获取对他人的优势,它是我们的要求和动机的根源。

“如果我们懂得我们的真正幸福的话,良心和自爱总能引导我们走上同一路。”——巴勒特:《十五篇宣讲》,1726年,第三篇。

自我所有

自由主义的核心原则,即每个人都是其自身及其权力的合法所有者。因此,每个人都可依自己的意志自由运用这些权力,只要他不用这些权力去伤害别人。未经一个人同意,其他人和集团不得限制他的自由,一个人不可以运用自己的权力强迫其他任何人提供产品和服务。自我所有是道德主权,类似人的自律。这一思想是由诺齐克在他的颇有影响的著作《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》一书中提出的。它禁止把人仅仅看做工具而不是看做具有终极价值的存在物,它还禁止在任何特殊情况下把人降至奴隶的境况。这一观点的一个结论是,有利于穷人的对财富再分配的国家行为,侵犯了个人对他们自身拥有的权利,并体现了一种不公平的奴役形式。这一观点是有争议的,其他哲学家力图拒绝自我所有的概念,或表明它是与为诺齐克所排斥的利害关系一致的。

“自由主义的自我所有原则提出,每个人都享有对她本人和她的权力的充分而惟一的控制和使用权利,因此,如果她没有与他人签订提供产品和服务的合同,她没有必要向他们提供这些东西。”——柯亨:《自我所有、自由和平等》,1995年,第12页。

自我主谓

见“第三人论证”条。

自我呈现

迈农所引进的术语,指心的状态直接向思维呈现其自身的能力。齐硕姆以它作为确定性的根源。在他看来,自我呈现意味着自明。一个命题如果构成了它的辩明,它就是自我呈现的。某些第一人称的意向状态,像相信、思维、感觉等等,是由这样的事实来辩护的:处于这些状态中就是意识到处于这些状态。因此这些心的状态是自我呈现的。当一个像“我在思想”这样的

self-presenting. When a proposition such as "I am thinking" is true for a person S at time t, S is justified in believing it at t. This proposition is self-presenting because it is evident to S even though the only things that make the proposition evident to S are things that entail it. But it is a matter of controversy whether self-presenting or evidence is enough for justification.

"H is self-presenting for S at t = def h is true at t; and necessarily, if h is true at t, then h is evident for S at t." — Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 1977, p. 22.

Self-realisation, another expression for self-fulfilment

Self-reference

The phenomenon whereby a sentence refers to itself, and hence leads to paradox. For example, a person says, "I am lying". If what he says is true, then he is lying and it is false. If what he says is false, then he is not lying and it is true. Russell devised the theory of types in order to rule out this kind of paradox. According to Russell's theory, we need to distinguish first-order sentences which represent objects, and second-order sentences which concern first-order sentences rather than objects. There have been other attempts to deal with this and other paradoxes involving self-reference.

"It is true that self-reference is a general feature of logically paradoxical utterances and if it is ruled out as senseless they cannot be formulated." — A. Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, 1973, p. 151.

Self-regarding

J. S. Mill drew a distinction between self-regarding actions, which involve only one's own interests, and other-regarding actions, which affect the interests of other people or of the community. Self-regarding actions are private and should be immune from interference by society. Other-regarding actions, on the other hand, are the stuff of morality and of social regulation. There is also a distinction between self-regarding virtues such as prudence, fortitude, elegance and other-regarding virtues such as generosity and consideration. Contemporary virtue ethics has criticised modern ethical theories for limiting their concern to other-regarding actions or virtues while ignoring self-regarding actions and virtues. The distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions or virtues is not always clear cut, and some actions or virtues can be both self-regarding and other-regarding in different perspectives.

"I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social." — Mill, *On Liberty*, IV.

命题对于一个人 S 在时间 t 为真时, S 就被辩护为在时间 t 相信它。这个命题是自我呈现的,因为它对于 S 是明显的,尽管使这一命题对于 S 明显的惟一的東西就是那个推定它的東西。但关于自我呈现或明显性对于辩明是否充分的问题还存在争议。

"H 在时刻 t 对于 S 是自我呈现的在定义上等同于 h 在时刻 t 为真;而且必然地,如果 h 在时刻 t 为真,那么 h 在时刻 t 对于 S 是明显的。"——齐硕姆:《知识论》,1977 年,第 22 页。

自我完成

“自我实现”的别名。

自我指称

一个句子指称自己因而产生悖论的现象。例如,一个人说:“我在撒谎。”如果他所说为真,则他在撒谎且此句为假。如果他所说为假,则他不在撒谎而此句为真。罗素设计出类型论以清除这种悖论。根据罗素的理论,我们需要区分表征对象的一阶语句和与一阶语句而不是对象有关的二阶语句,还曾有其他尝试来处理这种以及其他涉及自我指称的悖论。

“自我指称确实是在逻辑上悖谬的话语的一个普遍特征,而如果它们被作为无意义的东西而排除,它们就不能被系统地阐述。”——奎因顿:《事物之本性》,1973 年,第 151 页。

自我相关

J. S. 密尔区分了自我相关活动和他人相关活动。前者只涉及一个人自己的利益,而后者则影响他人或社会的利益。自我相关活动是私人的,因而应当不受社会的干预。而他人相关活动,则是道德和社会规则的东西。还存在像谨慎、坚忍、优雅这样的自我相关德性与慷慨、体贴这样的他人相关德性的区分。当代德性伦理学批评现代伦理学理论只关心他人相关活动或德性而忽视自我相关活动和德性。自我相关和他人相关活动或德性之间的区分并不总是清晰明确的,因为有的活动或德性从不同的角度看既是自我相关的又是他人相关的。

“我是轻视自我相关德性的最后一人;它们较之社会德性只是第二重要的,如果它们可以被看做是第二重要的话。”——密尔:《论自由》,IV。

Semantic ambiguity

Sometimes, different senses or references are associated with a single word, and it is not clear in the given context which is meant. The ambiguity of this sort arises from the multiplicity of senses of a word and is called lexical or semantic ambiguity. For example, the statement "I will wait for you at the bank in an hour", is ambiguous because the word "bank" can be understood either as a financial institution or as a place at the riverside.

"A constituent C is semantically ambiguous just in case the set of readings assigned to C contains two or more members." —Katz, *Semantic Theory*, 1972, p. 5.

Semantic anti-realism, see anti-realism

Semantic ascent

A term introduced by Quine for the shift in which the language we use to refer to the world becomes something we talk about in its own right. It is a shift from questions about objects to questions about words. For example, we can move from the proposition "Shanghai is a city" to the proposition "'Shanghai' is a name ascribed to a city", or from the proposition "Socrates is wise" to the proposition "'Socrates is wise' is true". This is actually a change from what Carnap called the material mode of speech to the formal mode. The shift is an ascent because at the new level expressions deal with the semantic properties of words or sentences in a language and thus become a higher meta-language. This strategy tends to reduce all questions of philosophy to questions about language.

"The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz. words) and on the main terms concerning them." —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 272.

Semantic holism

Also called meaning holism, the view that meaning is holistic rather than atomistic. The unit of meaning is not the word or the sentence, but rather the theory or language of which the word or sentence is a component. The meaning of an expression lies in its relations with other expressions of the language in which it is embedded. It is nonsense to speak of a linguistic component abstracted from the linguistic whole to which it belongs. It might be divided into content holism, in which the meaning or content of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all the other sentences in the language, and translation holism which claims that a translation of a sentence can preserve its meaning only if its associative or inferential relations with other sentences in the home language are preserved in the targeted language. The position is derived from epistemic holism, which claims that whole theo-

语义的模糊性

有时, 单个的词可能有着不同的意义或指称, 而在给定的语境中它究竟意味着什么也并不清楚。这种模糊性出自词义的多样性, 被称作词义的或语义的模糊性。例如, “我将于一个小时内**在 bank 等你**”, 这个陈述是模糊的, 因为“bank”这个词既可以理解为“银行”, 也可以理解为“河边”。

“一个组成部分 C 在语义上是模糊的, 这是因为在对 C 的各种理解中包括了两个或更多的成分。”——卡兹:《语义学理论》, 1972 年, 第 5 页。

语义学的反实在论

见“反实在论”条。

语义上行

奎因引入的词, 是指我们用于指称世界的语言转变为我们谈论的话题, 即从关于对象的问题转变为关于语词的问题。例如, 我们可以把“上海是一个城市”这个命题变为“‘上海’是一个城市的名称”, 或把命题“苏格拉底聪明”变为命题“‘苏格拉底聪明’是真的”。这实际上是像卡尔纳普所说的从“实质的方式”变为“形式的方式”。这个转变之所以被称作“上行”, 是因为语言表达式是在新的水平上讨论语言中句子或语词的语义属性, 因而成为更高一级的“元语言”。这种方法是试图把一切哲学问题都还原为关于语言的问题。

“语义上行的方法是, 它把讨论引入这样一个领域, 即讨论双方都在对象(即语词)以及关于它们的主要用语上达成了一致。”——奎因:《词与物》, 1960 年, 第 272 页。

语义整体论

也称作“意义整体论”, 这种观点认为, 意义是整体的, 而不是原子的。意义的单位不是语词或句子, 而是构成语词或句子的理论或语言。表达式的意义在于它与自身所在的语言中其他表达式的关系。脱离自身所属的语言整体抽象地谈论语言的成分, 是毫无意义的。这可以分为“内容的整体论”和“翻译的整体论”。根据前者观点, 一个句子的意义或内容是由这个语言中其他所有句子的意义决定的, 而后者认为, 对一个句子的翻译, 只有当这个翻译与母语中其他句子的连接或推论关系在对象语言中得到保存时, 它才能保存原句的意义。这种立场来自“认识的整体论”, 这种整体论声称, 只有整个理论才是确证的单位。语义整体论的主要倡导者包括了奎因、戴维森、普特南等人。这种观点引起

ries are units of confirmation. The leading advocates of semantic holism include Quine, Davidson and Putnam. The view is highly controversial, in part because we use sentences not theories to say things. Semantic holism does not say much about the meaning of any particular sentence.

"Semantic holism is a doctrine about the metaphysically necessary conditions for something to have meaning or content." — Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 1.

Semantic meaning, another term for descriptive meaning

Semantic paradox

Semantic paradoxes are represented by the Liar paradox, Berry's paradox, Richard's paradox and Grelling's paradox. These paradoxes cannot be explained in logical terms alone. They contain some empirical reference to thought, language or symbolism and arise as a result of a some peculiarity of semantic concepts such as truth, falsity and definability. Their occurrence shows that there must be flaws in our thought and language. Hence, semantic paradoxes are distinguished from logical paradoxes, which indicate that there must be something wrong with our logic and mathematics. The distinction between semantic and logical paradoxes was made by Ramsey, although he himself calls semantic paradoxes "epistemic paradoxes". The general approach to avoiding semantic paradoxes requires the distinction between object language and meta-language rather than appealing to Russell's ramified theory of types.

"It is our choice whether to keep our old familiar semantic concepts, and continue to live with the semantic paradoxes; or whether to search for a brave new world of stability, from which the savagery of contradiction is banished." — Read, *Thinking about Logic*, 1994, p. 150.

Semantic theory of truth

A theory developed by Tarski and originally intended to solve semantic paradoxes, especially the liar paradox. It suggests that a truth definition cannot be adequately provided in the object language, that is in the language that describes the world and does not contain the truth-predicate. It has to be formulated in a metalanguage, that is the language which talks about the object language. According to this theory, " 'p' is true if and only if p", where "p" is the name of the sentence and P is the sentence itself. For example, "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. A sentence is true in a given language if its elements are so combined as to state what is the case. The theory has two parts: adequacy conditions on definitions of truth and a definition of truth in terms of satisfaction. Tarski thought that this complicated theory is only suitable for certain artificial and formal languages but not for natural languages. Donald Davidson has developed a

了极大的争议,这部分是因为我们是用句子而不是用理论去说事情。语义整体论对单个句子的意义并没有说出更多的东西。

"语义整体论是一种关于某物具有意义或内容的形而上学必然条件的主张。"——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第1页。

语意学意义

"描述意义"的另一个名称。

语义悖论

语义悖论以说谎者悖论、贝里悖论、理查德悖论、格里林悖论为代表。这些悖论不能仅由逻辑术语来解释。它们包含对思想、语言或符号系统的经验关联,并作为某些如真、假和可定义性等特殊的语义学概念的结果而出现。它们的发生表明在我们的思想和语言中必定存在缺陷。因此,语义悖论不同于逻辑悖论,后者表明在我们的逻辑和数学中必定出了某些差错。语义悖论和逻辑悖论之间的区别是由拉姆塞作出的,虽然他把语义悖论称为"认识的悖论"。避免语义悖论的一般方法需要区别对象语言和元语言,而不是诉诸于罗素的分支类型论。

"或者保持我们原本熟悉的语义学概念,并且与语义悖论一起继续存在;或者研究稳定性的美好新世界,从而抛弃矛盾的原始状态,这就是我们的选择。"——里德:《关于逻辑的思维》,1994年,第150页。

真理语义论

由塔斯基所发展的一种理论,本意是用来解决语义悖论特别是说谎者悖论的。它认为,在对象语言即描述世界且并不包含真谓词的语言内,不能提供适当的真定义,后者只能在元语言即谈论对象语言的语言内才能表述出来。根据这种理论," 'p' 是真的,当且仅当 p",这里 "p" 是该语句的名称, p 则是该语句本身。例如, "雪是白的" 是真的,当且仅当雪是白的。一语句在一给定的语言内真,如果它的元素是如此结合的以致于陈述了实际的情形。这一理论有两部分:真定义的"实质充分性"条件,以及根据"满足"作出的真定义。塔斯基认为,这一复杂理论只适用于某些人工的形式语言,而不适用于自然语言。D. 戴维森在这一理论的基础上发展了关于意义的真值条件探索,他试图把一特定语言内的语句与其"真值条件"关联起来。

truth-conditional approach to meaning on the basis of this theory by relating sentences in a particular language with their truth conditions. This theory has become very influential in contemporary philosophy.

"Tarski's so-called semantical theory of truth is essentially the view that 'S is true' assigns a property—truth—to the sentence named by 'S'." — Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge*, 1963, p. 249.

Semantically closed language

A language containing not only its expected stock of expressions, but also the names of these expressions and semantic terms like "true" that refer to the sentences of the language. According to Tarski, the source of the semantic paradoxes lies in the self-reference of the sentences expressing the paradoxes. He held that the possibility of such self-reference belongs to semantically closed languages. Such a language has a tacit assumption that all sentences which determine the use of "true" can be asserted in the language itself. To avoid this fault, Tarski distinguished between an object language and a metalanguage.

"We have implicitly assumed that the language in which antinomy is constructed contains, in addition to its expressions, also the names of these expressions, as well as semantic terms such as the term 'true' referring to sentences of this language. A language with these properties will be called 'semantically closed'." — Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics*, 1956.

Semantics

[from Greek: *sema*, sign] A term that pertains to the meaning of a sign or set of symbols. Semantics is a discipline dealing with the meaning of linguistics signs or symbols, that is, the words, expressions and sentences of a language. It belongs to semiotics, the study of signs, and contrasts with the other two branches of semiotics, that is syntax or syntactics (the study of logical or grammatical form) and pragmatics (the study of the contribution of contextual factors to the meaning of what is said). In semantics, the language whose meaning is discussed is called the object language, while the language which is used to talk about the object language is the metalanguage. For example, in the sentence " 'Snow is white' is true", "snow is white" is in the object language, while the whole sentence is in the metalanguage.

Formal semantics discusses the meaning of linguistic signs by appeal to formal and logic method. Its main representative is truth-conditional semantics, developed by Tarski and Davidson on the basis of Frege's logic, which ascribes semantic values to the basic symbols of the language, takes them as elements of structure, and then derives the semantic values of complex expressions from these elements in accordance with formation rules. In truth-conditional semantics,

这一理论在当代哲学中非常有影响。

"塔斯基所谓的语义真理论实质上是这一观点,即'S是真的'把真这一属性指派给由'S'所命名的那个语句。"——丹托:《分析的知识哲学》,1963年,第249页。

语义封闭的语言

指不仅包括它希望保存的表达式,而且包含这些表达式的名称,以及与它的语句有关的像“真的”这样的语义词项的语言。根据塔斯基的看法,语义悖论的根源在于表达悖论的语句的自我指称。他认为,这种自我指称的可能性属于语义封闭的语言。这种语言有一个暗含的假定:确定“真的”用法的所有语句都能在该语言本身内得到断定。为了避免这一缺陷,塔斯基作出了“对象语言”和“元语言”的区分。

"我们已暗中假定,其中构造出悖论的语言除了包含它的表达式之外,还包含这些表达式的名称,以及涉及该语言内的语句的像'真的'之类的语义词项。具有这些要素的语言将称作'语义封闭的'。"——塔斯基:《逻辑、语义学与元数学》,1956年。

语义学

[源自希腊文 *sema*, 意味“记号”] 这个词包含着关于一个记号或一套符号的意义。语义学是关于语言记号或符号,即语言的语词、表达式和句子的意义的一门学科。它属于“符号学”,即对记号的研究,与之相对的符号学另外两个分支是句法或句法学(研究逻辑形式或语法形式)和语用学(研究语境因素对语言使用者所说内容之意义的贡献)。在语义学中,被讨论其意义的语言称作“对象语言”,而用于谈论对象语言的 language 就是“元语言”。例如,在“‘雪是白的’是真的”这个句子中,“雪是白的”用的是对象语言,而这整个句子则用的是元语言。

形式语义学借助形式的或逻辑的方法讨论语言记号的意义。其主要代表是真值条件语义学,这是由塔斯基和戴维森基于弗雷格的逻辑发展起来的,它把语义值赋予语言的基本符号,把它们看做是结构的成分,并根据构成规则从这些成分中派生出复合表达式的语义值。根据真值条件语义学,每个句子的意义都是由其从句的真值条件决定的。

语义学与语言哲学密切相关,因为两者都使用了相同的核心概念,诸如“指称”、“论断”、

the meaning of every sentence is determined by the truth-conditions of its component sentences.

Semantics is closely related to the philosophy of language, for both employ the same central notions such as reference, predication, meaning, synonymy and truth. These key notions and their relations form the subject-matter of meta-semantics which can be treated as a part of the philosophy of language.

“Semantics is concerned with linguistic expressions in two respects: reference and meaning.” — Quine, *From Stimulus to Science*, 1995, p. 59.

Seminal reason, English translation of *rationes seminales*

Semiology, an alternative name for semiotics

Semiotics

[from Greek: *seme*, sign] The general study of signs, also called theory of signs or, by the Swiss linguist Saussure, semiology. Charles Morris takes semiotics as a study of linguistic signs, that is words, expressions and sentences. In his *Foundations of the theory of Signs*, he divides it into three subdisciplines: syntax, which deals with relations between linguistic signs or sentential structures; semantics which deals with relations between linguistic signs and the objects they are talking about; and pragmatics which deals with relations between linguistic signs and the ways they are used. More broadly, semiology can be viewed as a general inquiry into every sign, both verbal and non-verbal, both human and natural. The extension of “sign” is not confined to linguistic symbols. Peirce defined “sign” as, “something that stands for something in some respect or capacity”. This broad sense is preferred by French structuralists.

“The entire theory of an object language is called the semiotic of that language; this semiotic is formulated in the mental language” — Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications*, 1958, p. 164.

Sensa

A term (singular: *sensum*) introduced by Broad to refer to things that are directly perceived, such as colour patches, sounds, shapes, smells and tactile feelings. As objects of perception, they are contrasted to material or physical objects. *Sensa* are usually taken to be private and known directly with a special certainty. Material objects are public and known indirectly with less certainty. The existence of *sensa* is mind-dependent. For Broad, they cannot exist independent of acts of sensing. They are objective constituents of sensations and are a part of a sensible field. Many names have be-

“意义”、“同义”、“真理”等等。这些关键概念以及它们的关系，构成了可以看做语言哲学组成部分的元语义学的主题。

“语义学关心语言表达式的两个方面：即指称和意义。”——奎因：《从刺激到科学》，1995年，第59页。

种源理性

对“种源理论 (*rationes seminales*)”的英语翻译。

记号学

“符号学”的另一个名称。

符号学

[源自希腊文 *seme* (记号)] 指对记号的一般研究，也称作“记号理论”，瑞士的语言学家索绪尔把它称作“记号学”。C. 莫里斯把它看做是对语言记号的研究，即语词、表达式和句子，所以他在《指号论基础》中把它分为三种子学科：讨论语言记号或句子结构之间关系的句法学；讨论语言记号与它们所谈论的对象之间关系的语义学；讨论语言记号与使用它们的方式之间关系的语用学。宽泛地说，记号学可以看做是对语言的或非语言的、人类的或自然的每种记号的一般性研究。“记号”一词的外延并不限于语言符号。皮尔士把“记号”定义为“在某些方面或能力上代表某种东西的某种东西”。这种宽泛的意义受到了法国结构主义的欢迎。

“关于对象语言的整个理论被称作这种语言的符号学；这种符号学是用心的语言构造起来的。”——卡尔纳普：《符号逻辑及其应用导论》，1958年，第164页。

感觉材料

布劳德提出的术语(单数为 *sensum*)，指直接被感知到的东西，诸如色斑、声音、形状、气味以及触觉。作为知觉的对象，它们与物质的或物理的对象不同，感觉材料一般被当做私人的，以特别的确定性直接为人所知。物质对象是公共的，以较小的确定性间接地为人所知。感觉材料的存在有赖于心灵。布劳德认为，它们不能独立于感知行动而独立存在。它们是感官知觉的客观构成成分，是可感域的一部分。对于布劳德所称为感觉材料的东西，人们给出了许多名称，

ing given to what Broad calls *sensa*, the commonest being sensations and sense-data. Others terms include ideas of sense (Locke), sensible qualities (Berkeley), impressions (Hume) and sense-contents (Ayer).

"Whenever I truly judge that X appears to me to have the sensible quality Q, what happens is that I am directly aware of a certain object Y, which (a) really does have the quality Q, and (b) stands in some particularly intimate relation, yet to be determined, to X. Such objects as Y I am going to call *sensa*." Broad, *Scientific Thought*, 1969, p. 240.

Sensation

[From Latin *sensatus*, gifted with sense] The mental state aroused in a subject in perceiving, a primitive level of mental existence. When we see something, visual sensations are produced in us; when we hear something, auditory sensations are produced. There are also sensations of taste, smell and touch. Sensations arise not only through senses, but also through the body, such as the bodily sensations of cold, pain and hunger. Sensations are generally distinguished from experiences and perceptions, but are part of these more complex states, which involve such additional capacities as judgement and inference and are subject to error. Sensations must be owned by some subject. However, it is generally believed that sensations are independent of the conceptual capacities of the subject and hence can also be possessed by animals and young children. A major question is whether sensations are purely private or can be known by others. This is related to the problem of private language and the problem of alleged first-person authority concerning accounts of what we experience. Another major problem concerns the relation between sensations and sense-data. Some philosophers identify them, which leads to the question of whether what we perceive directly are sensations or external objects. Others distinguish them by claiming that while sensations are the subjective aspect of perception as the experience itself, sense-data are the objects of experience or perception.

"Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; ... This great source of most of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 1, 3.

Sensationalism

A view which claims that sensations are the only sources of knowledge; that all ideas can be traced to an origin in sensation; that all statements can be reduced to statements concerning the relations between sensations and that nothing can

最普遍的有感官知觉和感觉材料。其他名称包括感觉观念(洛克)、可感性质(巴克莱)、印象(休谟)以及感觉内容(艾耶尔)。

"每当我正确地判断 X 对我显现为具有可感性质 Q 时,所发生的事情是我直接知道某个对象 Y, 它 (a) 确实具有性质 Q, 并且 (b) 处于与 X 的(尚待确定的)某种特别密切的关系中。我打算把像 Y 这样的对象称为感觉材料。"——布劳德:《科学思想》,1969 年,第 240 页。

感觉

[源自拉丁文: *sensatus*, 意为“感官得到的东西”] 一个主体在感知中唤起的心的状态,一种心的存在的原初层次。当我们看某物时,视觉在我们心中产生;当我们听某种东西时,听觉产生了。也有味、嗅及触摸等感觉。感觉不仅通过感官产生,而且通过身体,诸如冷、痛、饥饿等等身体的感觉。感觉一般与经验和知觉相区分,但却是这些更为复杂状态的内容,后者包括了诸如判断和推理这种附加的能力,而且容易出现错误。感觉必定是属于某个主体的。不过,一般认为,感觉是独立于主体的概念能力的,因此,它也为动物和幼儿所具有。关于感觉的另一个主要问题是,它是纯粹私有的还是能为他人知道的。与这相关的是私人语言问题和对我们的经验叙述的第一人称的权威问题。另一个主要问题是关于感觉与感觉材料的关系。一些哲学家把这两者等同起来,这导致了是否我们直接感知到的是感觉或外部对象的问题。另有人通过如下主张而区分它们:感觉是作为经验自身的感知的主观方面,而感觉材料则是经验或知觉对象。

"我们的感官,接触具体的可感觉的对象,依据对象影响感知的不同的方式,把对于事物的这些不同的感知传送至心灵,……我们所有的多数观念的这个最大来源,完全依赖于我们的感官,源自于它们而进入理解,我称为‘感觉’。"——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第 1 章,3。

感觉主义

指这样一种观点,主张感觉是知识的唯一源泉;所有的观念都可在感觉中找到根源;所有的陈述都可以还原为关于感觉之间关系的陈述,除了感觉之外,别无可说;感觉也是证实所

be said beyond sensations; and that sensations are also the ultimate criteria of verification of all knowledge. In all, sensationalism can be summarised into one sentence: "the world is my sensations". This view may be traced to Protagoras in ancient Greece, and is classically derived from the British empiricist tradition from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. In this century, its major representation is Ernst Mach. Sensationalism is opposed to rationalism and the theory of innate ideas. A sensationalist theory of mind believes that all mental events can be analysed in terms of having of sensations. Sensationalism also draws a distinction between perception and sensation, according to which perception, unlike sensation, involves judgement and is open to error. However, its notion of sensation is very ambiguous, including not only sensible qualities, bodily affections, but also desires, emotions and the feelings such as anger and jealousy. It is difficult to see how science could be derived from such an ambiguous notion of sensation or from such an austere basis.

"Sensationalism is the theory that all ideas or concepts are derived from sense perception." --Arthur Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 92.

Sense and reference

For Frege, every complete sign expresses a sense (German: *sinn*) and designates something we call its reference (German: *Bedeutung*). Frege introduced this distinction by consideration of the statement "The morning star is identical with the evening star". While the two phrases "the morning star" and "the evening star" are designations of the same object, that is the planet Venus, they obviously have different senses. Hence the sentence "The morning star is the morning star" provides nothing new, while the sentence "the morning star is the evening star" is informative.

This distinction is closely related to the distinction between connotation and denotation and between intension and extension. It shows that the meaning or sense of an expression and its reference do not always vary together, a point which had considerably influenced the subsequent development of analytic philosophy. For Frege, a basic sentence consists of a referring expression as subject and a predicate as function or concept. Frege called the sense or meaning of a sentence, which is composed of the senses of the components of the sentence, a thought and said that the reference of a sentence is its truth value. Russell rejected Frege's two basic notions of sense and reference and proposed to deal with meaning using a single basic notion of standing for.

"A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference." Frege, "On Sense and Reference", in his *Philosophical Writings* (ed. Geach and Black), 1966, p. 61.

有知识的最终标准。总而言之,感觉主义可以归结为一句话:"世界是我的感觉。"这种观点可以追溯到古希腊的普罗泰戈拉,按经典的方式说,得自于从17世纪到19世纪的英国经验主义传统。在本世纪,其主要代表为E. 马赫。感觉主义与理性主义及先天观念论相反。关于心的感觉主义理论认为,所有心的事件都可以用具有感觉来分析。感觉主义还区分了知觉和感觉,据此,知觉与感觉不同,它涉及到判断,有可能出错。但是,它关于感觉的概念是相当含混不清的,不仅包括可感性质、肉体感情,而且包括诸如愤怒和妒忌之类的愿望、激情和感触。很难看出科学何以能够从如此含混不清的感觉概念中或如此简约的基础上产生出来。

"感觉主义是这样的理论,它认为一切观念或概念都得自于感官知觉。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第92页。

含义和指称

在弗雷格看来,每一个完全的记号表达一个含义(德语: *sinn*),并指涉我们称为它的指称的某物(德语: *Bedeutung*)。弗雷格通过考虑"晨星等于暮星"这一陈述而引入了这一区分。尽管两个短语"晨星"和"暮星"指称同一对象即金星,它们显然有不同的含义。所以,语句"晨星是晨星"没有提供任何新东西,而语句"晨星是暮星"却是有信息的。

这一区分是与内包(connotation)和所指(denotation)以及内涵(intension)和外延(extension)的区分紧密相关的。它表明,表达式的意义(涵义)和它的指称并不总是同时变化的,这一看法对分析哲学后来的发展造成了相当大的影响。对弗雷格来说,基本语句由一指称表达式(作为主词)和一个谓词(作为"函项"或"概念")组成。弗雷格把语句的含义或意义叫做"思想",后者是由该语句的各构成要素的含义复合而成的,并且说语句的指称是真值。罗素拒绝弗雷格的含义和指称这两个基本概念,并提议用单独一个基本概念"代表"(standing for)来处理意义。

"专名(词、记号,记号组合,表达式)表达它的含义,代表或指涉它的指称。凭借一个记号,我们表达它的含义并指涉它的指称。"——弗雷格:《论含义和指称》,见他的《哲学文集》(吉奇和布莱克编),1966年,第61页。

Sense field, see visual field

Sense/force

An influential distinction in modern philosophical semantics. Each sentence can be divided into a descriptive content and a force-indicator. The sense or descriptive content is the state of affairs the sentence is describing, and its meaning. It is the bearer of a truth-value. The force is the assertive, interrogative, or imperative or other way in which the content is conveyed. Force has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of a sentence. Sentences with the same sense can occur with different forces, and a force can be attached to any given sense. This distinction is generally believed to be based on Frege's distinction between assertion (judgement) and thought (content). It is on this basis that Austin develops his "speech-act theory", for it is the force which determines what speech-act is performed by an utterance of a sentence. It is also the basis for the emotivist distinction between descriptive meaning and evaluative meaning. R. M. Hare's distinction between phrastics and neustics corresponds to it as well. Dummett makes use of this distinction to criticise Wittgenstein's theory that philosophy of language is an investigation of how language is used in particular language games. The same linguistic expression certainly has different forces in different games, but that does not mean that the expression does not have a persistent sense. It is because of that sense that we can learn language.

"Adopting Frege's terminology, we may call this ingredient of meaning the sense of the expression; ... Force, or, more properly, the indication of force, is the significance possessed by a linguistic element which serves to indicate which type of linguistic act is being performed." —Dummett, *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics*, 1991, p. 114.

Sense qualia

[from Latin *qualia* (singular *quale*), quality, nature, state] Both the qualities of sensations considered in abstraction, such as redness or sweetness, and the qualities sensed in association with specific objects such as the redness of a red car or the sweetness of a sweet fruit. For many empiricists, the physical object is an idealisation of sense qualia, from which the object directly derives its perceptual properties. In this latter sense, the concept of sense qualia is similar to that of sense-data. Attempts to explain relations between qualia and objects quickly become complex.

"It is of course possible to designate a sense-quale and ask how it is related to the physical object to which it corresponds." —Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, 1982, p. 67.

感觉域

见“视域”条。

意义/力量

现代哲学语义学中的一种有影响的区分。每个句子都可以被分为描述的内容和力量的表征。意义或描述的内容是句子正在描述的事态及其意义,是真值条件的承担者。而力量则是传递这个内容的方式(陈述句、疑问句或祈使句或其他类似的东西)。力量与句子的真假无关。具有相同意义的句子可以用不同的力量出现,而一种力量可以被赋予任何给定的意义。这种区分通常被认为是基于弗雷格对断定(判断)和思想(内容)的区分。正是在这个基础上,奥斯汀提出了他的“言语行为理论”,因为正是这种力量决定了说出一个句子是否完成了言语行为。这同样是情感主义者区分描述意义与评价意义的基础。与之对应,R. M. 黑尔也区分了“内含”与“语调”。达米特用这种区分来批评维特根斯坦的理论,即认为语言哲学是研究如何在特殊的语言游戏中使用语言。相同的语言表达式在不同的游戏中肯定具有不同的力量,但这并不意味着,它不具有某种连贯的意义。正是由于这种意义,我们才能学习语言。

“采纳弗雷格的术语,我们可以把意义的这种成分称作表达式的意义;……力量,或更恰当地说,力量的表征是语言成分所拥有的意义,它用于表明正在履行的究竟是哪一类言语行为。”——达米特:《形而上学的逻辑基础》,1991年,第114页。

感觉性质

[源自拉丁文 *qualia* (单数为 *quale*), 意为“性质”、“本性”、“状态”]既是抽象地考虑的性质,例如红或甜,也是与特定对象相关而被感知的性质,如红色小汽车的红或甜水果的甜。对许多经验主义者来说,物理对象是感觉性质的理想化,对象从它们之中直接获得自己的知觉性质。在这后一种含义上,感觉性质的概念与感觉材料的概念近似。说明性质和对象之间关系的企图很快就变成了复杂问题。

“当然有可能指明感觉性质,并问它如何与它所对应的物理对象相联系。”——艾耶尔:《20世纪的哲学》,1982年,第67页。

Sense-contents

Ayer's term which he introduces to replace the notion of idea used by Locke and Berkeley. For Locke, ideas are related to a single unobservable underlying substratum, and Berkeley insists that they are necessarily mental. Arguing that both Locke and Berkeley were mistaken, Ayer considers that "sense-contents" is a neutral word which is neither physical nor mental, and refer to sense data provided by both outer and introspective sensations. Following Berkeley, however, Ayer believes that material things are constituted out of actual and possible occurrences of sense contents and can be defined in terms of them. He also suggests that it is misleading to say that sense-contents exists, because this carries the danger of treating them as if they were material things. Instead we should say that they occur.

"We define a sense-contents not as the object, but as a part of a sense-experience." — Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1946, p. 122.

Sense-impression, another term for *sensa*

Senseless

[German: *sinnlos*] Senseless propositions are tautologies and contradictions. A tautology is unconditionally true (true whatever way the world is), and a contradiction is unconditionally false (false whatever way the world is). Senseless propositions should be distinguished from nonsense (German, *Unsinn*). Like nonsensical propositions, senseless propositions say nothing about the world and can be neither confirmed nor rejected by how things are in the world. They do not give pictures of reality. But unlike nonsensical propositions, they show the logical or structural properties of their components. Since they do not say truly or falsely that the world is such-and-such, as genuine contingent propositions do, they are senseless, but are not nonsense because they show the logical structure of language and the world and do not violate any principles of logical syntax.

"Tautologies and contradictions are senseless." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4. 461.

Sensibilia

Russell's term for entities which are exactly like sense data, but with which one is not acquainted. Once sensibilia enter into the relation of acquaintance, they become sense-data. Russell uses the notion of sensibilia to replace the notion of matter or physical objects, which he construes as logical constructions out of sensibilia, although the existence of sensibilia themselves is a mere metaphysical hypothesis.

"I shall give the name sensibilia to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind." — Russell,

感觉内容

艾耶尔提出的术语,用以代替洛克和巴克莱使用的“观念”这个概念。对洛克来说,观念与单一而不可观察的根本基质相联系,而巴克莱坚持它们必定是精神性的。艾耶尔争辩说,洛克和巴克莱都错了,他认为“感觉内容”是一个中性词,它既不是物理的,也不是精神的,指由外部和内省感觉提供的感觉材料。但艾耶尔和巴克莱一样,认为物质事物是由感觉内容实际和可能的出现构成的,并可以用它们来定义。他还认为,说感觉内容存在是误导人的,因为这具有将其当做物质事物的危险。我们倒是应该说它们发生。

“我们不把感觉内容定义为对象,而定义为感觉经验的一部分。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1946年,第122页。

感觉印象

“感觉材料”的别名。

无意义的

[源自德文 *sinnlos*] 无意义的命题是重言式和矛盾式。重言式是无条件地真(不论世界如何均为真),而矛盾式则为无条件地假(不论世界如何均为假)。无意义的命题应与胡说(德文为 *Unsinn*) 相区别。无意义的命题和胡说命题一样,对于世界无所言说,既不能从世界上的事物是怎么回事中得到证实,也不能得到否定。它们没有给出实在的图像。但与胡说命题不同,它们显示了其组成部分的逻辑的或结构的特性。因为它们没有正确地或错误地说出世界是如此这般,就像真正的偶然命题所作的那样,因此它们是无意义的,但它们不是胡说,因为它们显示了语言和世界的逻辑结构,没有违反逻辑句法的原则。

“重言式和矛盾式是无意义的。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,4.461。

可感物

罗素用来说明这种东西的术语,它们完全和感觉材料一样,但人们尚未对其有亲知。一旦可感物进入亲知关系,它们就成了感觉材料。罗素用可感物这概念来代替物质或物理对象的概念,把它们解释为可感物的逻辑结构,虽然可感物本身的存在只是一种形而上学的假设。

“我将把可感物这名称用于这样一些对象,它们具有和感觉材料一样的形而上学与物理学的地位,而并不必然是任何心灵的材料。”——罗素:《神秘主义和逻辑》,1918年,第148页。

Mysticism and Logic, 1918, p. 148.

Sensibilism. see sensibilia, phenomenalism

Sensibility

Kant took sensibility and understanding to be two fundamental and related capacities of the human mind. Objects are given to us through sensibility but thought by understanding. Sensibility is the capacity to have representations through being affected by objects, and operates in two ways. As outer sense, sensibility produces sensory states of things outside us; as inner sense, sensibility produces sensory states of our own representations. For Kant, sensibility is receptive but not passive, for there is a formal aspect as well as a material aspect. The forms of sensibility are space and time, which are *a priori* intuitions, not derived from the independent properties of objects as they are in themselves. Space and time set the order for matter, and hence matter received in sensibility is spatially and temporally organised. Kant intended to reconcile rationalism and empiricism by emphasising both the rational character and the receptive character of sensibility. Sensibility must be supplemented by understanding if experience is to be possible. Traditional metaphysics is wrong because it used the concepts of understanding without any corresponding evidence of sensibility.

"Sensibility is the faculty of intuition; (a) sense, faculty of intuition in the present; (b) imagination, faculty of intuition in the absence of the object." - Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (ed. by Young), 1992, p. 443.

Sensory illusion

The perception of external objects which leads to a false belief about the world. Different persons perceiving the same object will sometimes see it differently. In some cases this will result from different perspectives or conditions of perception but not produce false beliefs. The perceptions are sensory illusions if they produce or tend to produce false beliefs. The existence of sensory illusion is cited as a proof of the existence of sense-data which are different from physical objects. It is a challenge for naive or direct realism, which holds that we perceive nothing but the physical object itself.

"To suffer sensory illusion is to acquire a false belief or inclination to a false belief in particular propositions about the physical world by means of our senses." - Armstrong, *Perception and the Physical World*, 1961, p. 106.

Sentence

A grouping of words (symbols, signs) in any natural or artificial language. A sentence must be well-formed grammatically, but not all sentences are meaningful. A sentence may have different meanings, and the same sentence may be

感觉主义

见“现象主义”条。

感性

康德把感性和知性作为人类心灵具有两种相关的基本能力。通过感性,对象“给予”我们,再由知性来“思想”。感性是由于我们被对象所作用而感知表象的能力。它以两种方式运行:作为外感,感性产生了对我们之外事物的感觉状态;作为内感,感性产生了关于我们自身表象的感觉状态。对于康德来说,感性是接受性的,但不是被动的,因为存在着形式的方面以及质料的方面。感性形式是空间和时间,它们是先天的直观,而不是来源于对象的独立的性质,正像它们在自身中一样。空间和时间为质料安排秩序,因此在感性中所接受的任何质料已经在空间和时间上被组织起来。以这种方式,康德的意图在于通过强调理性的特点和感性接受性的特点而把唯理论和经验论协调起来。如果经验要成为可能,感性必须由知性来补充。传统形而上学之所以是错误的就是因为使用了没有相应的感性证据的知性概念。

“感性是直观的官能:(a)感知,当下的直观官能;(b)想像力,对象不在当场的直观官能。”——康德:《逻辑学讲义》(杨编辑),1992年,第443页。

感觉错觉

引起关于世界的错误信念的关于外部对象的知觉。知觉同一对象的不同人有时会以不同的方式来看这个对象。在有些情况下,这只是视角不同或知觉条件不同的结果,但并不产生错误的信念。如果知觉产生和倾向于产生错误信念,它们就是感觉错觉。感觉错觉的存在被引用作存在不同于物理对象的感觉材料的证据。这是对朴素实在论或直接实在论的挑战,后者认为我们所知觉到的只是物理对象本身。

“体验感觉错觉是通过我们的感官获得一个用关于物理世界的特定命题来表达的错误信念或一个错误信念的倾向。”——阿姆斯特朗:《知觉与物理世界》,1961年,第106页。

语句

任意自然语言或人工语言内词语(符号,记号)的组合。语句必须是语法上合式的,但并非所有语句都是有意义的。一语句可以有不同的意义,同一语句可以以多种方式使用。于是,在

used in a variety of ways. Thus, a sentence is distinguished in modern logic from a proposition or statement. A proposition or a statement is what is expressed by a sentence that asserts or denies something, for example a sentence which states that some predicate holds of some subject or that certain items are related in a certain way. A proposition rather than a sentence is ordinarily recognised as the bearer of truth-value. Logical relations exist among propositions or statements, but not among sentences.

"So it will not do to identify the statement either with the sentence or with the meaning of the sentence." P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 4.

Sentence-token

To apply the token/type distinction to sentence, we have the distinction between sentence-tokens and sentence-types. A sentence-type is grammatically complete, while a sentence token is a concrete and actually experienced occurrence, that is an actual inscription or utterance. "I am thirsty" is a sentence-type. However, this sentence can be uttered by particular people on particular occasions. These particular utterances of the same sentence-type are sentence-tokens. This distinction is philosophically meaningful because it is believed that only sentence-tokens can be either true or false.

"A sentence token is just the physical sentence resulting from someone's speaking or writing at a particular time; a sentence type, in contrast, is the abstract class of all such sentence utterances or inscriptions that, roughly speaking, have the same form."—Moser and Nat, *Human Knowledge*, 1987, p. 6.

Sentence type, see sentence-token

Sentential calculus, another term for propositional logic

Sentential function

An expression containing one or more free variables, such as "X is wise". This is also called an open sentence. Once the free variable is replaced by a constant, an actual or closed sentence is formed. For instance, if we substitute "Socrates" for "X" in the above sentential function, we get the closed sentence "Socrates is wise". Obviously, various sentences of the same type can be formed from such a function. A sentential function can be generalised both existentially ("There is at least one X such that X is wise") and universally ("For every X, X is wise"). A sentential function is sometimes distinguished from a propositional function, which is what a sentential function denotes, but more often these two expressions are treated as synonymous.

现代逻辑中语句被区别于命题或陈述。命题或陈述由肯定或否定某物的语句表达，也就是由陈述某个谓词对于某个主词成立或某些项以某种方式相互关联的语句表达。命题而不是语句通常被看做是真值载体。逻辑关系存在于命题或陈述之间，而不是存在于语句之间。

“因此把陈述等同于语句或等同于语句的意义，都将是不成立的。”——斯特劳森：《逻辑理论导论》，1952年，第4页。

殊型句子

当我们把殊型与类型的区分用于句子，我们就是在殊型句子与类型句子之间做出了区分。类型句子在语法上是复合的，而殊型句子则是具体的，是实际经验中的话语，例如一个实际的标题或一句话。“我渴了”就是一个类型句子。但是，这个句子是只能由某个具体的人在具体的场合中说出的。而具体说出相同类型句子的话就是殊型句子。这种区分在哲学上是有意义的，因为据信只有殊型句子才能或真或假。

“一个殊型句子只是某人在某个特殊的时间说出或写下的一个物理句子；相反，一个类型句子则是说出或写下所有这种句子的抽象的类，大致地说，被说出或写下的这种句子都具有相同的形式。”——莫泽和纳特：《人类知识》，1987年，第6页。

类型句子

见“殊型句子”条。

语句演算

表示“命题逻辑”的另一术语。

语句函项

含有一个或多个自由变元的表达式，如“X是聪明的”。这也叫做“开语句”。一旦其中的自由变元被常项所替代，一个实际的语句或闭语句就形成了。例如，如果我们用“苏格拉底”去替换上面语句函项中的X，我们就得到闭语句“苏格拉底是聪明的”。很明显，可以从这样一个函项形成同一类型的多个不同语句。对一语句函项既可以实施存在概括（“至少有一个X使得X是聪明的”），也可以实施全称概括（“对每一个X而言，X是聪明的”）。语句函项有时被区别于命题函项，后者被认为是一语句函项所指示的东西；但更为经常地这两个表达式被看做是同义的。

"A sentential function, as this technical term is used by logicians, is an expression containing a variable such that a sentence which is either true or false results when a constant is substituted for the variable." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 55.

Sentience

The capacity to experience pleasure and pain. Since the basic moral principle of utilitarianism is to maximise pleasure and minimise pain, Bentham suggests that the basis for moral consideration should be sentience rather than reason or language. In our moral considerations, we should ask whether the living entity has the ability to suffer. Since not only human beings but also animals are sentient, that is have the ability to suffer, Peter Singer argues in his animal ethics that we should extend moral consideration to animals. The suffering of animals should be a matter of ethical concern no less than that of our fellow human beings. Pain is an evil. If an animal feels pain, it has its own interests, and so we must treat it equally. Sentience hence becomes the passport to the moral community.

"The humane moralists, for their part, insist upon sentience as the only relevant capacity a being need possess to enjoy full moral standing." —Callicott, *In Defence of the Land Ethic*, 1989, p. 19.

Sentiment

The immediate reactive feeling and sense about other people and their actions. According to Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith, human sentiment is the ground of moral attitudes and moral actions. The rules of morality are formed because in a variety of instances one type of conduct constantly pleases in a certain manner, and because in a variety of instances another type of conduct constantly displeases in a certain manner. Sentiment is the basis of moral approval and disapproval. This is the notion that Hutcheson called moral sense, Hume called approbation or sympathy, and Adam Smith calls sympathy. By holding this position they were in opposition to the view that morality is a matter of reason or that moral action is determined by rational deliberation. Since their position grounds ethics on sentiment, it is also called sentimentalism. This is a type of non-cognitivism. While for Hutcheson, moral sense is a single moral faculty, Smith held that there are a plurality of moral feelings. Accordingly Smith referred to this type of moral theory as the theory of sentiments.

"All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us *after a certain manner*, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us *after a like manner*, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it." —Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, III, ii, 5.

"语句函项,作为逻辑学家们所使用的的一个专门术语,是含有一个变元的表达式,当用常项替换这个变元之后,由此导致一个或真或假的语句。"——帕普:《分析哲学原理》,1949年,第55页。

感受性

是指体验快乐和痛苦的能力。由于功利主义的基本道德原则是将快乐最大化和将痛苦最小化,所以边沁建议,道德考虑的基础应是感受性而不是理性或语言。在我们的道德思考中,我们应该问生命体是否有能力受苦。由于不仅人类而且动物也有感受性,即有受苦的能力,P. 辛格在他的“动物伦理学”中主张,我们应该把道德考虑扩展至动物。动物受苦也同我们人类一样,是一个伦理问题。痛苦即是恶。如果一个动物感到痛苦,它就有它自己的利益,所以我们必须平等地对待它们。因此感受性成了一个通向道德共同体的通行证。

"仁慈的道德学家,坚持感受性是一个存在物享有完全的道德地位的惟一相关的能力。"——卡利科特:《为土地伦理学辩护》,1989年,第19页。

情感

对他人及其行为直接反应出的感受和感觉。根据哈奇森、休谟和A. 斯密的观点,人的情感是道德态度和道德行为的根据。在各种情况下,有一类行为总是以某种方式使人愉快,在各种情况下,另一类行为总是以某种方式使人不快,道德规则因此而形成了。情感是道德赞成和不赞成的基础。这就是哈奇森所说的“道德感”概念、休谟所说的“赞许”或“同情”概念、A. 斯密所说的“同情”概念。由于持有这种看法,他们反对道德是理性之事的观点,反对道德行为由理性的思考所决定的观点。由于他们的观点将伦理学建立在情感的基础之上,所以又被称作“情感主义”。它是非认知主义的一种类型。虽然在哈奇森看来道德感是单一的道德官能,但斯密认为有多种道德感受。据此斯密把这类道德理论称作“情感论”。

"一切道德都依赖于我们的情感;当任何行为或心灵的性质“以某种方式”使我们愉快时,我们就说它是善的;当忽略或未做那个行为“以同样方式”使我们不快时,我们就说我们有做那个行为的义务。”——休谟:《人性论》,第三卷,第二章,第5节。

Sentimentalism

see sentiment

Separation

[Greek: *chorismos*; *choristos*; separable] For Plato, separation was a mark of division, severance or disjunction. He held that Ideas or Forms are separated from the individuals participating in them. This separation is a symmetrical relationship; if Ideas are separated from individuals, individuals are separated from Ideas. Aristotle claimed that Socrates sought the definition of the universal but did not separate it from the individuals, while Plato did separate the universal from the individuals and as a consequence committed many errors in his Theory of Ideas, especially relating to the third man argument.

In Aristotle's own doctrine of substance in the *Metaphysics*, separation became a criterion for primary substance. Here, separation means independent existence and is an asymmetrical relationship. Separation applies to the relation between the category of substance and other categories. According to this relation, substance can exist separately from other categories, but other categories cannot exist independent of substance. Separation also applies to the relations among form, matter and the composite of form and matter, in which form satisfies the criterion of separation in the strongest sense and is therefore primary substance.

"The separation is the cause of the objections that arise with regard to the ideas." Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1086b6-7.

Serial theory of the mind, see bundle theory of mind

Set

A collection of distinct entities, classically determined by means of a property or principle which sharply distinguishes members from non-members. For many purposes sets and classes are the same, but restrictions were introduced on what is allowed to be a class in order to avoid logical paradoxes. Classes with infinite members may not be treated as completed totalities. Not all classes are capable of being members of sets. There are ultimate classes which cannot be members of a further class. However, set theory ignores these distinctions and covers all types of classes and sets. A fuzzy set does not have sharp boundaries between members and non-members and can allow different degrees of belonging to the set. There is disagreement between an account of classes and sets as real entities and the view that they are devices which lack ontological implications.

"Basically, 'set' is simply a synonym of 'class' that happens to have more currency than 'class' in mathematical con-

情感主义

见“情感”条。

分离

[源自希腊文: *chorismos*, 其形容词为 *choristos* (可分离的)] 在柏拉图哲学中, 分离表示区分、隔离、不相连。他认为形相或形式与分有它们的个别物相分离。这种分离是一种对称性的关系; 如果形相与个别物相分离, 则个别物也与形相相分离。亚里士多德认为, 苏格拉底寻求对共相的定义可未将其与个别物相分离, 而柏拉图则将它们相分离, 结果在其形相论中犯了许多错误, 尤其是关于第三人的论证。

根据亚里士多德《形而上学》中的本体学说, 分离变成了第一本体的一个标准。在这里, 分离意味独立存在, 是一种不对称的关系。分离应用于本体范畴与其他范畴间的关系。根据这种关系, 本体可与其他范畴相分离而存在, 而其他范畴则不能独立于本体而存在。分离也应用于形式、质料及形式与质料的复合物之间的关系。形式在最强的意义上符合分离标准, 故而是第一本体。

“分离是导致对形相提出种种反对意见的原因。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1086b6-7。

心的序列理论

见“心的捆束理论”条。

集合

集合是一些独特事物的汇聚, 这些事物由某一可将其成员与非成员明确区分开来的属性或原则在类上加以区分。在许多意义上, 集合与类是相同的, 但有时也将限制引入那可作为类的事物中, 以避免逻辑悖论。具有无穷成员的类不可以被看做是完全的整体。并非所有的类都可作为集合的成员。有一些最终的类不能作为更进一步类的成员。然而, 集合论忽略了这些区别而包含所有类型的类和集合。一个模糊集合在其成员与非成员间无明确界限, 也允许属于集合的不同程度。在把类与集合看做真实实体, 还是把它们看做缺乏本体论含义的工具, 在这两种观点之间存在分歧。

“‘集合’基本上完全同义于‘类’, 并且在数学语境中比‘类’更为通用。”——奎因:《集合论及其逻辑》, 1963年, 第3页。

texts.” —Quine, *Set Theory and its Logic*, 1963, p. 3.

Set theory

Classically, a set or class is a collection of things taken as a whole, with a determining property that distinguishes the collection from things in other sets, although this condition is relaxed in the theory of fuzzy sets. A set can be divided into subsets and subsets can in turn be divided into members. Set theory is the study of relationships within a set and among sets and the nature of sets themselves. Its pioneer is Cantor, and other major contributors include Zermelo, Russell, Fraenkel, Gödel, Skolem and von Neumann. Set theory is essential for mathematics, for many kinds of pure mathematics can be formulated within set theory. It is crucial for logical deduction. However, naive set theory often leads to paradoxes, such as Burali-Forti's paradox, Cantor's paradox and, most famously, Russell's paradox. Russell sought to avoid these paradoxes by formulating an axiomatic set system in which sets are arranged in a hierarchy of types. Various axiomatic set systems have been proposed, but each has some difficulties.

“Set theory is the mathematics of classes. Sets are classes.” —Quine, *Set Theory and its Logic*, 1969, p. 1.

Set-theoretical paradox, another term for logical paradox

Seven deadly sins, see sin

Sex, see gender

Sexism

The attitude holding that one's own sex is superior to the other and leading in practice to limited respect for the rights, needs and values of the other sex. The term is analogous to racism, which regards one's own race to be superior to others. Both sexism and racism are thought to be major social evils. In contemporary environmental ethics, speciesism, the claim that the human species should dominate other species, is controversially held to be a third evil of this sort. Men are more likely than women to be called sexist because historically women generally have been dominated by men. A main aim of feminism is to criticise sexism by revealing its root, showing the forms it takes in various areas and suggesting ways of correcting its practices and ideology. Some feminist theorists claim that overcoming sexism will change both women and men and establish social practices that are free from male dominated gender relations.

“The choice can only be whether animals benefit from our practices or are harmed by them. This is why speciesism

集合论

从经典上讲,一个集合或类是这样一些事物作为总体的聚合,这些事物带有使自己区别于其他集合中的事物的确定特征。尽管这一条件在模糊集合论中已不再那么严格了,一个集合可以划分为子集,而子集又依次可划分为成员。集合论是对于一个集合和多个集合之间的关系以及集合自身性质的研究,其先驱者是康托尔,其他作出过主要贡献的包括策梅罗,罗素,弗兰克尔,哥德尔,司寇伦,冯·纽曼等。集合论本质上是数学的,因为许多种纯数学可以在集合论中表述。它对于逻辑演绎是决定性的。然而,素朴的集合论经常导致悖论,例如“布拉里-福蒂悖论”、“康托尔悖论”和最著名的“罗素悖论”。罗素为了避免这些悖论,构制了一个集合论公理系统,集合在其中被安排于一类型等级中。人们已经提出了各种集合论公理系统,但每一种都有若干困难。

“集合论是关于类的数学。集合就是类。”——奎因:《集合论及其逻辑》,1969年,第1页。

集合论悖论

表示“逻辑悖论”的另一个名称。

七恶

见“罪恶”条。

性

见“性别”条。

性别主义

这种态度认为自己的性别优于另一性别,这导致在实际行动中有限地尊重另一性别的权利、需要和价值。这一术语与认为自己的种族优于其他种族的种族主义相类似。性别主义与种族主义都被视为主要的社会罪恶。在当代环境伦理学中,认为人类应当统治其他物种的物种主义,被有争议地视为这类问题的第三种罪恶。男人同女人相比更可能被称为性别主义者,因为从历史上看,女人一直普遍为男人所统治。女性主义的一个主要目的就是通过揭露性别主义的根源、表明它在各个领域采取的形式和提出纠正它的实践和思想的做法,来批判性别主义。

一些女性主义思想家提出,克服性别主义将使女人和男人都得到改造,并将确立不受男人统治的性别关系影响的社会习惯。

“选择只能是或者动物从我们的实践受益,或者受到我们的实践的伤害。这就是为什么物种主义者是对种族主义和性别主义的错误模仿

is falsely modelled on racism and sexism, which really are prejudices. To suppose that there is an ineliminable white or male understanding of the world, and to think that the only choice is whether blacks or women should benefit from 'our' (white, male) practices or be harmed by them; this is already to be prejudiced." — Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, pp. 118-9.

Shame, see guilt

Shared name, another expression for sortal

Sheffer function

Also called a Sheffer stroke or stroke function. There are five primitive logical constants or functions, namely negation (\sim), conjunction (\wedge), disjunction (\vee), implication (\supset) and equivalence (\leftrightarrow). Logicians showed that they can be reduced to two, that is to negation and disjunction. In 1913, the American logician H. M. Sheffer proposed obtaining all of them from a single binary truth-function, which he symbolised by a vertical stroke ($|$). With this notation, $p|q$ is read as not both p and q . Accordingly, negation ($\sim p$) can be defined as $p|p$; disjunction ($p \vee q$) can be defined as $(p|p) | (q|q)$, and so on. The truth table for the Sheffer stroke function is:

p	q	$p q$
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	T

"A function from which all others may be obtained is called a Sheffer function, after the discoverer of the stroke function." — R. L. Goodstein, *Development of Mathematical Logic*, 1971, p. 7.

Sign and symbol

Both Peirce and Wittgenstein drew a distinction between sign and symbol. A sign is an expression perceptible by senses, while a symbol is an expression's meaningful use and the rules for its application. A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol, while a symbol is a mode of signification of a sign. The same sign may be used in different symbols, or, in other words, different symbols may have their sign in common. For example, the sign "bear" in English can be used either as a verb (to carry) or as a noun (a mammal). Wittgenstein makes use of this distinction to criticise Russell's theory of types. Other than this, the distinction is not always observed. Signs are widely taken to include their symbols.

"In order to recognise a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense." — Wittgenstein, *Tracta-*

的原因,这种选择实际上是偏见。先假设白人或男人对世界的理解是不能消除的,然后设想惟一的选择是或者黑人或妇女从'我们'(白人,男人)的实践受益,或者他们(黑人,妇女)为我们的实践所伤害;这便已经有偏见了。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第118—119页。

羞愧

见“负罪”条。

共名

“类”的另一种说法。

谢弗函项

亦称“谢弗竖”或“竖函项”。有五个初始的逻辑常项或函项,即否定(\sim),合取(\wedge),析取(\vee),蕴涵(\supset)和等值(\leftrightarrow)。逻辑学家们表明,它们能够归约为两个,即否定和析取。1913年,美国逻辑学家 H. M. 谢弗提出,所有这些函项可以从单独一个二元真值函项得到,他把这个二元函项符号化为垂直的一竖($|$)。 $p|q$ 读作“并非既 p 又 q ”。相应地,否定 $\sim p$ 可以用 $p|p$ 来定义;析取 ($p \vee q$) 可以用 $(p|p) | (q|q)$ 来定义等等。谢弗竖函项的真值表是:

p	q	$p q$
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	T

“所有其他函项由之得出的函项,根据竖函项的发现者的名字来命名,叫做谢弗函项。”——古德斯坦:《数理逻辑的发展》,1971年,第7页。

记号和符号

皮尔士和维特根斯坦都区分了记号和符号。记号是可由感官知觉到的表达式,而符号则是表达式的有意义的用法和运用它的规则。记号是一个符号可被知觉到的东西,而符号是记号含义的样式。同一记号可以用于不同的符号,或换句话说,不同的符号可以有其共同的记号。例如,英语中“bear”这个词既可用作动词(承担)也可用作名词(一种哺乳动物)。维特根斯坦用这种区分来批评罗素的类型论。除此之外,这种区分并非总是可见的。记号用得更广泛,包括了其符号。

“为了根据其记号来认识符号,我们必须观察是如何有意义地使用它的。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,3.326。

tes, 3. 326.

Significant form

An elusive and abstract term introduced by the British art critic Clive Bell, referring to the formal structure or unity common and peculiar to all visual works of art. This formal structure is the source which provokes aesthetic emotion. For Bell, the existence of this form and its capacity to arouse aesthetic emotion are the only criteria for being a work of art. The artist sees objects as pure forms, distinct from any associations they may have or ends that they may serve. This form is independent of any everyday human significance of objects in the world and is an end in itself. We cannot recognise significant form in cognitive terms, and it is not open to empirical confirmation or falsification. But it can be felt, and it is refined and intensified by artists in their work. In seeing the significant form of things, the artist somehow glimpses 'ultimate reality'. The essence of artistic creation is to express the aesthetic emotion which the artist feels before such forms by re-creating them in a work of art. Correspondingly, to appreciate a work of art is to contemplate and feel this form.

"Line and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of form stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations are combinations of line and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call 'significant form'; and 'significant form' is the one quality common to all works of visual art." (Bell, *Art*, 1914, p. 6.

Simple nature

[Latin: *naturae simplices*] For Francis Bacon, the ultimate qualities, such as red, white and hard, out of which the whole natural world is constituted. For Descartes, simple natures were the starting-point for the constitution of knowable objects and also for human knowledge of these objects. Simple natures are all self-evident, never contain any falsity and are grasped by intuition or the natural light. These things are simple because they are known so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into further items which can be known more clearly and distinctly. Descartes distinguished three kinds of simple nature: (1) pure material natures that are recognised to be present only in bodies, such as shape, extension and movement; (2) pure intellectual natures which the intellect recognises by means of a sort of innate light and which do not involve any corporeal substance, such as knowing and doubting; (3) common simple natures, including common concepts which can be ascribed both to the physical and to the mental, such as existence, duration, and the fundamental laws of logic that are called common notions. The first two kinds of simple natures are the building blocks of human knowledge and which can be

有意味的形式

这一难以捉摸和抽象的术语是由英国艺术批评家C. 贝尔提出的, 意指所有视觉艺术作品共有的和特有的形式结构或统一性。这种形式结构是激发审美情感的源泉。在贝尔看来, 这种形式的存在与其激发审美情感的能力是衡量艺术作品的惟一标准。艺术家将对象视为纯粹的形式, 有别于对象可能产生的种种联想或者可能达到的种种目的。这种形式与世界上各种对象的日常人生意义无关, 它就是目的本身。我们从认知的角度是认识不到有意味的形式的, 因为这种形式既不易受经验肯定的左右, 也不易受经验证伪的影响。但是, 人们能够感觉到这种形式, 而且艺术家在其作品中可以完善和强化这种形式。在观照事物之有意味的形式过程中, 艺术家在某种程度上也会窥视到“终极的实在”。艺术创造的本质就在于表现审美情感, 表现艺术家在艺术作品中再创造眼前那些形式时所感受到的审美情感。相应地, 欣赏一件艺术作品就是凝神观照和感受这一有意味的形式。

“线条与色彩以某种特殊的方式组合, 某些形式与形式关系唤起我们的审美情感。这些关系是线条与色彩的组合, 这些审美意义上感人的形式, 我称之为‘有意味的形式’, 而‘有意味的形式’是所有视觉艺术作品的共有特征。”——贝尔:《艺术》, 1914年, 第6页。

简单性质

[拉丁文 *naturae simplices*] 对F. 培根来说, 简单性质指最终的性质, 像“红”、“白”、“硬”之类, 整个自然界都是由这些性质构成的。在笛卡尔那里, 简单性质是构造可知对象的起点, 因而也是人类关于这些对象的知识起点。简单性质全都是自明的, 不包含任何虚假, 人通过直觉或自然之光来把握它们。这些性质被称作“简单的”, 是因为它们被非常清楚明白地认识到, 以致心灵无法把它们进一步分为可以更清楚明白认识到的内容。笛卡尔区分了三种简单性质: (1) 纯粹物质的性质, 它们被认为只出现在物体中, 如形状、广延、运动; (2) 纯粹理智的性质, 理智借助一种天赋之光而认得的性质, 而且这些性质不涉及任何有形的实体, 这些性质如认知、怀疑; (3) 共同的简单性质, 包括既可以划入物又可以划入心的那些共同概念, 像“存在”、“绵延”以及被称作“共同概念”的基本逻辑规律等。前两种简单性质是人类知识的建材, 它们可以反复结合成各种各样的复杂性质。共同的简单性质既适用于物理的东西, 又适用于心的东西, 是将两者结合在一起的粘合

combined again and again into various complex natures. The common simple natures, applicable to both the physical and the mental, are the cement which binds them together.

"These simple natures are all self-evident and never contain any falsity." —Descartes, *the Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham *et al.*) 1985, 1, p. 45.

Simplicity, principle of

One theory is simpler than another if it postulates fewer entities and explanatory principles. The principle of simplicity generally means the same thing as the principle of parsimony, or Ockham's razor. Simplicity is generally taken as one, although not the only, criterion for determining the acceptability of rival theories. The competing theories might be chosen in terms of consistency, scope, precision and predictive power. However, everything else being equal, a simpler theory, that is, the theory which makes the fewest assumptions, is more acceptable than its complex rivals. The philosophical problem is whether it is possible to justify this preference for simplicity as something beyond a mere consideration of convenience. The traditional belief is that nature itself is simple. "Nature does nothing in vain". But the principle of the uniformity of nature itself is a problematic notion. Contemporary philosophy of science takes simplicity as a part of methodology. Quine connects it with high probability. Popper connects it with his criterion of falsifiability by claiming that simple statements are highly desirable because they have richer empirical content and because they are more testable. The dispute about the validity of the principle of simplicity as a sign of truth has yet to be resolved.

"The principle of simplicity (also referred to as the principle of parsimony) ... affirms that other things being equal, the simpler theory should be chosen." —Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 146.

Simulation theory

An account of how we know about the propositional attitudes of others. It claims that our knowledge of other people's beliefs comes not from the application of a theory, but as a result of using our own psychological processes to simulate those of others. It is an extension of our capacity to know our own beliefs. We imagine that we are in someone else's position and then imagine what we would think or do in that situation. Simulation is used in explaining the meaning of intentional terms such as believe and desire. The proponents of this theory include Gordon, Goldman, Stich and Nichols.

"Simulation theory suggests an account of the mechanisms underlying our capacity to predict and explain people's behaviour, and that explanation makes no appeal to an internalised theory or knowledge structure." —Stich, *Deconstructing the Mind*, 1996, p. 134.

剂。

"这些简单性质全都是自明的,不包含任何虚假。"——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),1985年,第一卷,第45页。

简单性原则

如果一个理论假设了很少的实体和解释原则,那么这个理论就是比较简单的。"简单性原则"通常指的就是"节俭原则"或"奥康剃刀"。简单性通常被看做是决定接受相互竞争的理论的一个标准,尽管不是惟一的标准。选择某种理论是根据一致性、范围、精确度和预见能力。但对于在其他方面相同的每种理论而言,更简单的理论,即最少做出假设的理论,就比复杂的理论更能得到接受。哲学上的问题在于,如果不只是考虑便利的因素,那么是否还能够证明简单性对某个理论来说是优先的。传统的信念是,自然本身就是简单的。"自然不做徒劳之功"。但自然本身的齐一性原则是一个成问题的概念。当代科学哲学把简单性看做认识论的一部分。奎因把它与高度概率联系起来。波普则把它作为可证伪性的标准,认为简单陈述是完全有望得到的,因为它们具有丰富的经验内容,因为它们更能得到验证。关于把简单性原则看做真理标志的可靠性的争论,尚需得到解决。

"简单性原则(也指节俭原则).....断定,如果在其他方面相同,应该选择更简单的理论。"——里根:《动物权利问题》,1983年,第146页。

模拟论

一种关于我们如何知道他人的命题态度的理论。它声称,我们关于他人的信念的知识并非来自对于一个理论的应用,而是使用我们自己的心理过程来模拟他人的心理过程的结果。它是我们对于自己的信念的了解能力的延伸。我们想像自己处于其他某个人的位置,并想像自己在那样的情境下会怎么说或怎么做。模拟被用来解释像"相信"、"欲求"这样的意向语汇的意义。这一理论的支持者包括高顿、哥尔德曼、斯迪席、尼可尔斯。

"模拟论提议一种对于我们预测和解释他人行为的能力的说明,而这一说明并不借助于一个内化的理论或知识结构。"——斯迪席:《心的解构》,1996年,第134页。

Sin

A theological term for the severe wrongdoing or faults of moral character due to disobedience of a Divine command or a violation of natural law. A person's sense of sin is one paradigm of religious experience. According to the *New Testament*, all men are sinful, because we inherited original sin from Adam, the common father of humankind. Christians believe that the death of Jesus was a sacrifice for human sins. A person after death will be sent to hell if judged by God to be an unrepentant sinner. In a loose sense, sin is synonymous with evil, but strictly speaking, sin is an evil committed towards God, rather than to other persons. Only God may be asked to pardon sins. On some interpretations, sin results from our following of our sensory nature against our rational nature. It is committed when we do not do the good we know that God requires of us. Persons who believe that they have sinned often feel that they are cut off from God, the vision of God or God's grace. The origin of sin is generally ascribed to human free will, but this point is rather controversial. In medieval philosophy and theology, pride, covetousness, envy, gluttony, anger, sloth, and lust are listed as the seven deadly sins.

"By his sin a sinner cannot really injure God, and yet, for his own part, he acts contrary to God in two ways. First, he despises God and his commandments and secondly, he does in fact harm someone, either himself or someone else." — Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia2, 147, 2.

Sincerity

Frankly and plainly presenting oneself to oneself and others, rather than hiding or adding something in order to present oneself as different from what one actually is. Sincere people say and do what they really believe. Insincerity to oneself is a form of self-deception, while insincerity to others is lying or hypocrisy. Sincerity has been regarded as a virtue, but it is controversial whether any form of insincerity counts as an evil. Academics who modify their views to avoid serious political consequences are only sometimes judged to have acted immorally. The sincerity of sceptics has been a matter of debate because such a person has difficulties in carrying out his belief in his daily life.

"Real sincerity implies that all the contradictory facets of the self are given free expression." — Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens*, 1979, p. 175.

Sine qua non

[Latin; without which not, also written *conditio sine qua non*, a condition without which not, in law a necessary condition] If an event B would not have happened if a prior event A had not happened, then A is a *conditio sine qua non* of B. This is generally viewed as a factual cause independent

罪恶

一个神学术语,意指由于不服从神的命令或违背自然法则所犯的严重错误或道德品性的罪过。一个人有罪恶感是宗教体验的典型情形。根据《新约全书》,所有人都是有罪的,因为我们都从人类的共同祖先亚当那里承袭了原罪。基督徒相信耶稣之死就是为人的罪恶所作的牺牲。如果一个人被上帝判定是没有忏悔的罪人,死后就会被送入地狱。在宽泛的意义上,罪恶是邪恶的同义语,但严格说来,罪恶是对上帝,而不是对其他人犯下的邪恶。同样,也只有请求上帝,才可宽赦罪恶。按某些解释,罪恶是我们违背理智本性,放任感官本性的结果。如果我们不做我们知道上帝会要求我们做的善事,就是犯罪。相信自己已经犯了罪的人们经常感到他们被上帝、上帝的关注或上帝的恩典所抛弃。一般把罪恶的根源归咎于人的自由意志,但这一点是有相当争议的。在中世纪哲学和神学中,傲慢、贪婪、妒嫉、贪食、忿怒、懒惰和好色被列为“七恶”。

“虽然一个罪人的罪恶实际上并不能损伤上帝,但是,就他自己这方面而言,他在两种意义上与上帝背道而驰。首先,他藐视上帝和他的戒律;其次,他事实上伤害了某人,要么是他自己,要么是其他某人。”——阿奎那:《神学大全》,Ia2, 147, 2。

真诚

坦白而直率地展现自己于他人,而不是隐藏或添加某些东西以把自己展现为与实际情况不同的人。真诚之人的言行是他们真正相信的事情。对自己不真诚是一种形式的自欺,对别人不真诚是欺骗或虚伪。真诚一直被认为是一种美德,但对是否任何形式的不真诚都是罪恶这一问题存在争议。为避免严重的政治后果而不得不修改其观点的学者,只是在有些时候被认定其行为是道德的。怀疑论者的真诚始终是一个争论的问题,因为这样一个人在其日常生活中是很难贯彻他的信念的。

“真正的真诚意指的是对自身所有矛盾的方面予以自由的表达。”——爱尔斯特:《尤利西斯和海妖》,1979年,第175页。

绝对必需

[拉丁文:无它不行,也写作 *conditio sine qua non*, 无它不行的条件,指法律中一种必要的条件] 如果前一个事件 A 不发生,后一个事件 B 就不会发生,那么, A 就是 B 的必要条件。这通常被看做是独立于政策或法规的事实上的

of policy or rule. A detailed examination of the relationship between this kind of condition and causally relevant factors in human action can be found in Hart and Honoré, *Causation in the Law*.

"When a negative answer is forthcoming to the question 'Would Y have occurred if X had not?' X is referred to not merely as a 'necessary condition' or *sine qua non* of Y but as its 'cause in fact' or 'material cause'." —Hart and Honoré, *Causation in the Law*, 2nd ed., 1985, p. 110.

Singular term

The distinction between singular terms and general terms has been drawn since Mill, and receives much discussion in contemporary analytic philosophy. A singular term is a term which denotes or ostensively refers, under a given circumstance, to an individual object. Terms which belong to the categories of proper names, indexicals, definite descriptions and so on are all singular terms. A singular term can replace, or be replaced by, an individual variable in an open sentence. It can only be the grammatical subject of a subject-predicate sentence and can never be a predicate. In contrast, a general term introduces a kind or a type of individual thing. While a singular term can only be a subject, a general term can serve either as a subject or as a predicate. The distinction between singular and general terms is widely supported, but it has been criticised by Peter Strawson in *Individuals*.

"Semantically the distinction between singular and general term is vaguely that a single term names or purports to name just one object, though as complex or diffuse an object as you please; while a general term is true of each, severally, of any member of objects." —Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, pp. 90-1.

Sittlichkeit, see ethical life

Situation ethics

A anti theoretical position that flourished among Christian religious moralists after the second world war, influenced by American pragmatism, and operated with the slogan: be loving and do as you please. It claims that ethics is essentially a matter of reacting to the contexts or situations one confronts and that moral choice must be situational, particular, determined by case-to-case analysis. It proposes that there is only one moral principle, that is *agape* or love. Other than this, there should be no packaged moral judgements for Christians. To build an ethical system is meaningless, and the rigid application of universal moral principles and rules should be rejected. The ethical maxims of the community in which one lives can serve as illuminators, but we should always be prepared to compromise in the situation where love seems better served by doing something else. The

原因。对这种条件和人的行为中的因果相关的因素之间的关系的详细考察可以在哈特与哈诺来合著的《法的因果性》中找到。

“当对‘如果X不发生Y会发生吗?’这一问题即将出现否定性的回答时，X指的就不仅仅是一种‘必要条件’或Y的必要条件，而是指Y的‘实际中的原因’或‘物质原因’。”——哈特和哈诺来，《法的因果性》，第二版，1985年，第110页。

单称词

“单个词”与“类词”自密尔以来就做了区分，这在当代分析哲学中得到了广泛的讨论。单称词是在给定的情况中指称或实际指向单个对象的词。属于“专名”、“索引词”、“限定摹状词”等等范畴的词都是单称词。单称词可以替换或被替换为开语句中的单个变元。它为主谓句子中只能作为语法主语，而决不能作为谓语。相反，类词引入了单个事物的类或种，单称词只能做主语，而类词则既可以做主语也可以做谓语。单称词与类词之间的这种区分已经得到普遍承认，但P. 斯特劳森在《个别物》中对此提出了批评。

“在语义学上，单称词与类词的区分是含混不清的，即认为单称词命名或试图命名单一的对象，尽管这个对象是你所能想像的那样复杂或庞大；而类词则适用于几个各种对象的总和。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第90—91页。

伦理性

见“伦理生活”条。

情境伦理学

一种反神学的见解，流行于第二次世界大战后的基督教宗教道德主义者的圈子之内，受美国实用主义的影响，奉行的格言是“按你喜欢的去爱和行”。它认为，伦理学本质上是对人所遭遇的环境或情境的反应，道德选择必定是情境性的、特殊的，是由对相关情形的分析决定的。它提出，只有一条道德原则，即 *agape* 或爱。除此之外，不应有任何包装好的道德判断适于基督徒。建构道德体系毫无意义，硬性推行的普遍道德原则和规律应被废除。人生活于其中的社会伦理准则能作为照明器来使用，但我们总是准备着在情境中妥协，因为在情境中，通过做其他的事情，爱似乎有着更好的效用。这种伦理学的系统化代表人物是J. 弗莱特席，他指出，情境伦理学不是相对主义的，因为它主张大写

systematic exponent of this ethics is Joseph Fletcher who claims that situation ethics is not relativistic, for it holds that Love is the ultimate judge of the norm of action. Hence situation ethics is a middle approach between legalism, which emphasises systematic rules and regulations, and antinominism, which rejects all principles whatever. This position has similarities with act-utilitarianism and casuistry.

"Situation ethics goes part of the way with natural law, by accepting reason as the instrumentalist of moral judgements, while rejecting the notion that the good is 'given' in the nature of things, objectively. It goes part of way with Scriptural law by accepting revelation as the source of the norm while rejecting all 'revealed' norms or laws but the one command—to love God and thy neighbour."—Fletcher, *Situation Ethics*, 1966, p. 26.

Situational semantics

Developed in the late 1970s by J. Barwise and J. Perry and intended as an alternative to Tarski's formal truth-conditional semantics. A situation in this account is the part of reality that agents find themselves in and about which they exchange information. Situational semantics claims that the meaning of a sentence is not given merely through its truth-conditions, but should also be determined by the relations of the sentence to the situation in which it is uttered and information about its speaker. The meaning of an expression cannot be described independently of the use of the expression. It involves a relation between the circumstance that the expression describes and the circumstance in which it is uttered because rational speakers or agents must use information extracted from their situation in order to reason and communicate effectively.

"In this book I have been urging the development of a theory of meaning and information content, one rich enough to give a semantics for English that can account for the way language users handle information, and suggesting a shape for this general theory. We call this situation theory, and the applications to natural language situational semantics."—Barwise, *The Situation in Logic*, 1989, p. 177.

Skolem-Löwenheim theorem

Löwenheim and Skolem established that in set theory for any class of formulas of predicate calculus, if there is an interpretation which suits all of them, there is also an interpretation whose domain consists of natural numbers which suits all of them. This Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implies that if first-order set theory is consistent and has a model, it must also have a denumerable infinite model whose continuum is a countable set and is thus apparently non-standard. This result is called Skolem's paradox because it conflicts with Cantor's theorem according to which within set theory we can establish that there is a set of real number which is not

的爱是行为规范的终极判断。因此,情境伦理学是唯法主义和反法律废弃主义之间的中间道路,因为前者强调系统化的法则和规则,后者否认一切原则,无论这些原则是什么。这种见解与行为功利主义和决疑论相似。

“情境伦理学的路线与自然法则部分一致,因为它把理性当做道德判断的工具来接受,同时又否认善是在事物的本性中客观地‘给定的’观念。它的路线与圣经法则也是部分一致的,因为它把启示当做规范的源泉接受,但同时又否认这一条命令之外的其余一切‘启示的’规范或法则——爱上帝和邻人。”——弗莱特席:《情境伦理学》,1966年,第26页。

情景语义学

由J. 巴维希和J. 培里在20世纪70年代后期提出,旨在取代塔斯基的真值条件形式语义学。“情景”一词在这里意味着一种现实,即相关者在其中能够找到自己的处境,并且能够交换有关的信息。情景语义学声称,句子的意义不仅是通过其真值条件得到的,而且是用它与说出这个句子的情景和有关说话者的信息之关系加以定义的。我们无法独立于表达式的用法而描述表达式的意义。这涉及到这个表达式所描述的情况与在说出它时的情况之间的关系,因为理性的说者或相关者只能使用从他们的情景中得到的某个信息,以便能够有效地进行推理和交流。

“我在本书中一直在竭力推进一种关于意义和信息内容的理论,这种理论非常丰富,足以得到一种能够描述语言使用者掌握信息方式的英语语义学,而且我还为这种普遍的理论建立了一种形式。我们把这称作情景理论,而把它对自然语言的应用称作情景语义学。”——巴维希:《逻辑情景》,1989年,第177页。

司寇伦-勒文海姆定理

勒文海姆和司寇伦确立的定理,即在集合论中,对于任何类谓词演算公式,如果存在一个适合于它们全部的解释,则也存在一个其域由自然数组成的解释且也适合于它们全体。这个“勒文海姆-司寇伦定理”意味着,如果一阶集合论为一致的且有一模型,则它必然有一可枚举的无穷模型,其连续统为可数集,因而显然是非标准的。这一结论称作“司寇伦悖论”,因为它与康托尔定理相冲突,按照这个定理,在集合论系统中,我们可以确定存在一个不可枚举的实数集。为避免司寇伦悖论,我们应假设可枚举

denumerable. To avoid Skolem's paradox, we should suppose that the distinction between denumerable and non-denumerable models is relative to an axiom system rather than absolute. Others believe that the paradox indicates that standard first-order predicate calculus is not sufficient for revealing the structure of the continuum.

"There is a remarkable theorem in classical logic, the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem, which says that any consistent set of sentences (whether a finite or infinite set of sentences) has a model in the natural numbers." —Smart, *Our Place in the Universe*, 1989, p. 57.

Skolem's paradox, see Skolem-Löwenheim theorem

Slave / master, see master / slave

Slave morality, see master morality

Slave of the passions

Hume's term for the role of reason in action. The traditional ethical belief was that morality is a matter of rationality and that we act according to the dictates of reason. Hume claimed that this is wrong. Reason is useful and can direct our judgement concerning good and evil, but it is impotent with respect to motivating action. Reason is not a causal factor in promoting moral actions. What directly impels us to act is passion or emotion. In contrast to the traditional view that emotion should be subjected to reason, Hume believed that reason is the slave of the passions in the genesis of action. This does not mean that there is a conflict between reason and passion. For Hume, that which is opposed to reason can only be reason itself rather than passion.

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." —Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, II, iii, 3.

Slippery slope argument

An argument seeking to persuade an audience not to take the first step on the grounds that it will lead to further steps having disastrous consequences. The argument can be formulated in many ways, but its central version is the one that is also called the wedge argument. According to the argument, some actions are like the first step on a slippery slope. Although they can be justified, their performance will inevitably lead to further actions with bad consequences. Hence, it is better not to permit the first action. This argument has a wide application in moral discussions. For example, some argue that if active euthanasia is legalised terrible

和不可枚举模型之间的区别是相对于公理系统的而不是绝对的。另一些人认为这个悖论表明,标准的一阶谓词演算不足以揭示连续统的结构。

“古典逻辑中有一个引人注目的定理,司寇伦—勒文海姆定理,它认为任何无矛盾的语句集合(无论有限或无限的语句集合)都有一个自然数模型。”——斯马特:《我们在宇宙中的位置》,1989年,第57页。

司寇伦悖论

见“司寇伦—勒文海姆定理”条。

奴隶/主人

见“主人/奴隶”条。

奴隶的道德

见“主人的道德”条。

情感的奴隶

休谟的用语,指理性在行为中的作用。传统的伦理学相信,道德是理性能力的问题,我们根据理性的命令行动。休谟声称这个观点是错误的。虽然理性是有用的,它能够指导我们判断善恶,但是它对于激发行为是无能为力的。在引发道德行为时,理性不是原因因素。直接推动我们行动的是情感或情绪。与情绪应当服从于理性的传统观点相反,休谟认为,在行为的发生过程中,理性是情感的奴隶。这并不意味着理性和情感有冲突。在休谟看来,与理性相对的只能是理性本身,而不是情感。

“理性是,而且也只应是情感的奴隶,除了服务和服从于情感之外,它不能有任何其他的职务。”——休谟:《人性论》,第二卷,第三章,第3节。

滑坡论证

这一论证力图以采取第一步会导致其他具有灾难性后果的步骤为由劝阻听众不要采取第一步。这个论证以许多方式来表述,但这种论证是其中心说法,也称作“楔子论证”。据此,某些行为就如同是在滑坡上的第一步,虽然它们本身是合理的,可是它们将不可避免地导致一系列有着糟糕后果的行为。因此,最好不要允许有这第一步。这个论证在道德讨论中有着广泛的运用。例如,它被用来论证,如果把主动安乐死合法化,某些可怕的后果将随之而来。因为社会一旦公然允许在一定的条件下有意地杀人,

consequences will follow. For once societies openly allow deliberate killing under some circumstances, such as when dying persons are suffering intolerable pain, we will move to allow involuntary euthanasia and even the killing of old people who become a burden to society. Thus, we move from mercy killing to non-merciful killing and from justified killing to unjustified killing. Life, which should be valued, will become cheap. Slippery slope arguments are generally taken to be unconvincing, for there is no rational ground for claiming that we cannot firmly draw the line between justified and unjustified acts, although initial steps might alter the context in which subsequent steps are judged.

"A slippery slope argument is a kind of argument that warns you if you take the first step you will find yourself involved in a sticky sequence of consequences from which you will be unable to extricate yourself, and eventually you will wind up speeding faster and faster towards some disastrous outcome."—Walton, *Slippery Slope Arguments*, 1992, p. 1.

Social action

Actions of social groups, such as a rebellion, and actions conducted within a framework of social relations, such as marriage or holding a conversation. Social actions can be ritualised, with fixed sequences of correct behaviour, or flexible and diverse, so long as the action of one individual takes account of the behaviour of others. For methodological individualists, social action can be reduced to the actions of individuals, but this account is rejected by methodological holists, who claim that social actions have collectively determined meaning and intentions which cannot be analysed in terms of individual action. While all actions are contingent on the external world, social action is also contingent on the interdependency of choices and orientations among rational agents. This double contingency is a characteristic feature of social action. Any social action must follow rules represented, for example, by cultural frameworks, communication systems or value systems. A main task of sociology is to understand social action by understanding the social practices and the institutions that embody it.

"Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course."—Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1, 1978, p. 4.

Social choice, another expression for public choice

Social contract

A contract providing the legitimate basis of sovereignty and civil society and of the rights and duties constituting the role of citizen. According to the social contract theory that flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a so-

例如当垂死的人们正在遭受不可忍受的痛苦时,这就是具有决定性意义的第一步,我们将进一步地把不自愿安乐死合法化,甚至把成为社会负担的老人杀死合法化,等等。因此,我们从仁慈杀人到非仁慈杀人,从合理地杀人不合理地杀人,最后,应当得到重视的生命将变得很便宜。这个论证一般被认为不是令人信服的,因为主张我们不能确切地在合理杀人和不合理杀人之间划线,是没有任何合理根据的,尽管最初的步骤也许会改变对随后的步骤加以判断的背景。

"一个滑坡论证是这样一种论证:它警告你,如果你采取第一步,你将发现你自己陷入了一系列令人讨厌而你无法自拔的后果,最后你将越来越快地趋于某种灾难性的后果。"—沃尔顿:《滑坡论证》,1992年,第1页。

社会行为

社会群体的行为,如叛乱,以及在社会关系结构内进行的行为,如婚姻,或举行会谈。社会行为可以是仪式化的,具有恰当行为的固定程序,或者是灵活多样的,只要是一个人的行为考虑到其他人的行为。对方法论的个人主义而言,社会行为可以归结为个人的行为,但这一见解遭到方法论的整体主义的反对,后者认为社会行为具有集体决定的意义和目的,而这些意义和目的是不能根据个人行为来分析的。虽然所有行为都有赖于外部世界,但社会行为还有赖于理性的人的相互依存的选择和定向。这种双重偶然性是社会行为的一个特征。任何社会行为都必须遵循由例如文化结构、交往方式、价值体系所体现的规则。社会学的一个主要任务是通过理解社会实践和体现它的社会制度来理解社会行为。

"行为是'社会的',是就其主观意图考虑到其他人的行为并因而在过程中被调整而言。"—韦伯:《经济与社会》,第一卷,1978年,第4页。

社会选择

"公众选择"的另一种表述。

社会契约

为主权和市民社会,以及构成公民角色的权利和义务提供合法根据的契约。根据兴盛于17-18世纪的社会契约理论,以个人同意为基础的社会契约,允许人们从自然状态,无论是从

cial contract based on individual consent permits men to enter civil society from the state of nature, whether from the brutal world of Hobbes or the relatively self-sufficient world of Locke. The move to civic society was accomplished by giving up certain natural rights in return for the protection, rights and advantages offered by the state. For Hobbes, the contract is agreed between people and a proposed sovereign who received absolute authority. For Locke and Rousseau, the contract is agreed among the people themselves to vest power in a government. For Locke, persons in the state of nature are very much like ourselves, but for Rousseau they become persons by entry into civic society. In Rousseau's view, the social contract is the condition through which the will of all, the aggregation of individual wills, becomes the general will which wills the common good. It has been a matter of controversy whether classical accounts of the social contract are meant to present an actual or hypothetical contract. Some critics hold that before employing this theory to justify the legitimacy of political authority and the grounds of political obligation, we must provide independent justification for the theory itself. Social contract theory has been employed in his theory of justice by the contemporary political philosopher John Rawls. For Rawls, a contract between rational self-interested actors who are ignorant of their own positions in society determines principles of justice, but this hypothetical contract offers only one aspect of Rawls' justification of his theory.

"What man loses by the social contract... is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social contracts is civil liberty and the legal right of property of what he possesses." --Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, I, VIII.

Social Darwinism

A theory resulting from the application of Darwinism to human society. By deducing norms of human conduct directly from evolutionary biology, it attempted to deal with ethical, economic and political problems on the assumption that society is a competitive arena and that the evolution of society fits the Darwinian paradigm in its most individualistic form. According to social Darwinism, the fittest climb to dominant social positions as a consequence of social selection, just as natural selection determines the survival of the fittest. Because on this view human possession of consciousness does not have any moral implications, social Darwinism held that social inequality and the exploitation of lower classes, suppressed races and conquered nations by the stronger were morally acceptable. It opposed any plan of social reform or welfare system to protect the weak or poor by claiming that such measures disturbed the natural order and hindered the progress of the human species. Altruism was held to be nothing more than hypocrisy. Social Darwinism flourished at

霍布斯的残忍的世界还是从洛克的相对自我满足的世界,进入市民社会。走向市民社会是通过放弃某些自然权利以换取国家提供的保护、权利和好处而完成的。在霍布斯看来,这种契约是由人民和--推选出的获得绝对权力的主权者之间商定的,而洛克和卢梭则认为,赋予政府权力是人民自己商定的。在洛克看来,自然状态中的人非常类似我们自己,但在卢梭看来,他们是由于进入市民社会才成为人的。卢梭认为,社会契约是一种条件,通过它众意、即个人意志的集合,变成了为了共同利益的公意。对社会契约的古典说明是否就是要提出一个实际的或假设的契约,这一直是个有争议的问题。一些批评家认为,在运用这一理论论证政治权力的合法性和政治义务的根据之前,我们必须对这一理论本身提供独立的辩护。社会契约理论被当代政治哲学家J. 罗尔斯运用于他的正义理论。在罗尔斯看来,对自己社会地位一无所知的、合理自利的行为者之间的契约,决定了正义原则,但这一假设的契约提供的只是罗尔斯为其理论辩护的一个方面。

"人类由于社会契约所丧失的,乃是他的天然的自由以及对于他所企图得到和所能得到的一切东西的那种绝对的权利;而他通过社会契约所获得的,则是市民的自由以及对他所拥有的财产的合法权利。"--卢梭:《社会契约论》,第一卷,第8章。

社会达尔文主义

这一理论是通过将达尔文主义应用于人类社会而产生的。通过直接从进化论生物学推出人的行为规范,它试图以社会是一个竞争的场所、以极端个人主义形式表现出的社会进化符合达尔文的范例这样的假设为基础,来论述道德、经济和政治问题。根据社会达尔文主义,最适合爬到社会统治地位的人是社会选择的结果,这就如同自然选择决定了适者的生存。根据这一观点,因为人拥有的意识没有任何道德含义,社会达尔文主义认为社会不公平以及对下层阶级的剥削、种族压迫和大国对弱小国家的征服在道德上都是可以接受的。它反对保护弱者和穷人的社会改革或福利制度的计划,认为这种做法会打乱自然的秩序并阻碍人种的进化。它认为利他主义不过是虚伪的。随着作为其最重要的理论表达的H. 斯宾塞的政治理论的问世,社会达尔文主义在19世纪末和20世纪初曾一度兴盛。人们现在对它的兴趣主要是历

the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, with Herbert Spencer's political theory as its most important theoretical expression. It is now mainly of historic interest, with its science and its ethics both seen to be deeply flawed.

"A purely biological perspective will give no grounding to individual rights, and might tend to a sort of social Darwinism, in which individuals would be seen in terms of their contribution to the survival and improvement of the species or society." —O'Hear, *Experience, Explanation and Faith*, 1984, p. 77.

Social democracy

A term originally used for the Marxist approach to socialism, in contrast to revisionist forms of socialism. Since the Russian revolution, Marxist socialism has been called communism. The term social democracy has lost its relationship with Marxist socialism, and has been employed in revisionist and liberal thought. In contrast to classical market liberalism which emphasises the primacy of classical civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religious and ideological beliefs, and freedom to pursuing one's own happiness, social democracy holds that these fundamental rights can be qualified to secure a fair and just distribution of resources and opportunities. Consequently, it allows or requires state agencies to play an active role in many areas of life in order to maintain a just society.

"After 1920, and up to the present, the term social democracy has had its strongest links with the related reformist socialism and social liberal tradition." —Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies*, 1995, p. 222.

Social fact

A fact about a social institution or group of people such as a family, school, class or religious community. In contrast, individual facts concern individual agents and their psychological states. A social fact is unobservable, but can be determined through statistical generalisations about certain kinds of social interaction within a given society. Durkheim claimed that the existence of social facts enables the social sciences to conduct studies as objective as those of the natural sciences, which deals with things. For methodological holists, the existence of social facts must be presupposed in interpreting individual behaviour, whereas for methodological individualists, social facts can be reduced to individual behaviour.

"A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own rights independent of its individual manifestations." —Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, 1939, p. 13.

史的, 因为它的科学性和道德观都被看做是很有问题的。

"纯粹的生物学看法不会为个人的权利提供根据, 而且会走向一种社会达尔文主义, 在这种看法中, 个人是以他们对物种或社会的生存和改善的贡献来理解的。"——奥赫尔:《经验、说明和信仰》, 1984年, 第77页。

社会民主主义

该术语最初用于马克思主义的社会主义, 以区别于修正主义的社会主义。自俄国革命以后, 马克思主义的社会主义就被称为共产主义。社会民主主义这一术语已同马克思主义的社会主义无关, 并被用于修正主义和自由主义的思潮中。与强调古典的公民权利, 如言论自由、结社自由、宗教和意识形态信仰自由和追求个人幸福的自由的首要性的古典市场自由主义不同, 社会民主主义认为, 这些基本权利都可说成是保证在资源和机会分配上的公平与公正。因而, 它允许或要求国家机构为维持一个公正的社会而在生活的众多领域里发挥积极的作用。

"从1920年以后到如今, 社会民主主义这一术语一直与相关的改良主义的社会主义和社会自由主义传统有着最为牢固的联系。"——文森特:《现代政治意识形态》, 1995年, 第222页。

社会事实

有关社会制度或人的群体如家庭、学校、阶级、宗教团体的事实。相比之下, 个人事实涉及的是个体行为者及他们的心理状态。社会事实是不可观察的, 但可通过对一定社会中某些社会方面的相互作用的统计概括加以确定。杜克海姆认为, 社会事实的存在使社会科学能够进行如同自然科学研究事物一样的客观研究。在方法论的整体主义看来, 社会事实的存在无疑是解释个人行为的先决条件, 而方法论的个人主义则认为, 社会事实可以归结为个人的行为。

"一个社会事实是在每一个方面都起作用的, 无论这种作用是固定的还是不固定的, 并能对个人施加一种外在的强制力, 或者说, 它在每一方面都起的作用是普遍贯穿一个既定社会的, 虽然它同时存在于不依它的个人表现形式为转移的自身的权利之中。"——杜克海姆:《社会学方法的规则》, 1939年, 第13页。

Social philosophy

The philosophical examination of substantive social issues, such as the relations between society and the state; the relations between society and its members; social equality; morality and law; and issues of health care and child protection. Social philosophy critically assesses political ideologies and societal arrangements and tries to discern clearly what a good society would be like, and how it might be achieved. Plato's *Republic*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, and Rousseau's *Social Contract* can be regarded as classical works in the area of social philosophy. Social philosophy is normative in character and overlaps with political philosophy concerning many issues. It is distinguished from the neutral, methodologically orientated versions of the philosophy of social science, which are mainly concerned with the logic of justification of social scientific theories. It is closer to those versions of philosophy of social science which allow room for value and social criticism within social science.

"Social philosophy ... is concerned with the varying view about the nature of desirable social systems or societies, and sometimes it puts forward its own proposals about what constitutes a good or desirable society." —Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science*, 1966, 2.

Sociobiology

A study inspired by Darwin's theory of natural-selection and attempting to explain human social behaviour by human biological features, particularly genes. Sociobiology focuses on the shared features of genetic design among human beings rather than on cultural and historical dimensions of human life. It claims that genes play a fundamental role in determining human behaviour and that like the social behaviour of animals human social behaviour is informed by its evolutionary purposes. The field emerged as a separate discipline with Edward O. Wilson's *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* in 1975. Many of its claims provoke heated debates. Some critics reject sociobiology as a modernised version of social Darwinism, while others reject its genetic determinism and claim that much human behaviour is culturally formed and open to modification. Nevertheless, sociobiology has raised important questions with its emphasis on the evolutionarily determined genes and their role in human consciousness, behaviour and institutions. Sociobiologists believe that humans might recognise that cooperation is a better strategy than purely egoistic pursuits in the search for survival. Accordingly, biological evolution might lead to a type of altruism and form a biological basis for a social contract, because biological altruism suggests that we will more willingly cooperate with our close kin rather than with strangers. However, even at its most morally acceptable version sociobiology denies equality of obligation. Sociobiology suggests that biology and

社会哲学

对独立存在的社会问题的哲学探究, 如对社会和国家的关系、社会和其成员的关系、社会平等、道德和法律、医疗服务和儿童保护问题的探究。社会哲学批判地评估政治思想和社会安排, 并力图表明一个好的社会该是什么样和如何才能实现这样的社会。柏拉图的《国家篇》, 霍布斯的《利维坦》和卢梭的《社会契约论》可以认为是社会哲学这一领域的经典著作。社会哲学有规范性的特点, 并在不少问题上与政治哲学交叉。它区别于具有中性和方法论倾向的社会科学哲学的研究形式, 后者主要涉及的是社会科学理论的论证逻辑。它较接近那些为社会科学中的价值和社会批评留有余地的社会科学哲学的研究形式。

"社会哲学……涉及的是变化着的、有关合乎需要的社会制度或社会的本质的观点, 它有时还就如何组成一个好的或合乎需要的社会提出自己的建议。" ——冉德: 《社会科学哲学》, 1966年, 第2页。

社会生物学

受达尔文的自然选择理论的启发, 试图根据人的生物特征, 特别是基因解释人的社会行为的学科。社会生物学的兴趣所在是人类共同的基因设计而不是人类生活的文化和历史方面。它认为, 基因对决定人的行为起着根本的作用, 如同动物的社会行为一样, 人的社会行为是由其进化的目的传递的。随着 E. O. 威尔逊的《社会生物学: 一种新综合》于 1975 年的出版, 这一领域成为一门独立的学科。它的很多主张引发了激烈的争论。一些批评家否认社会生物学是社会达尔文主义的现代变种, 另一些人则拒绝它的基因决定论, 并认为人的很多行为是通过文化形成的, 并且是可以改变的。然而, 由于社会生物学强调由进化决定的基因及其在人的意识、行为和制度中的作用, 它引发了一些重要的问题。社会生物学家相信, 人们也许会认识到, 在寻求生存的活动中, 合作是比纯粹利己的追求更好的策略。因此, 生物的进化会导致一种利他主义, 并会构成社会契约的生物基础, 因为生物利他主义暗示我们将更愿意与我们的亲属而不是与陌生人合作。但是即使是它的在道德上最可接受的社会生物学理论也否认义务的平等。社会生物学提出生物学和道德密切相关, 尽管这些主张既是推测的又是有争议的。

"社会生物学是关于社会行为的起因和稳定性的进化理论。一旦得到充分发展, 它也许能

morality are closely related, although many of these claims are both speculative and contested.

"Sociobiology is the evolutionary theory of the origin and stability of social behaviour. When fully developed, it may account for the evolution of ethics." — von Schilcher and Tennant, *Philosophy, Evolution and Human Nature*, 1984.

Sociology of knowledge

On the assumption that knowledge is not merely the result of the meeting of the individual mind with the physical world, but is socially and historically conditioned, there is a discipline which studies the social facts or elements that shape and condition the acquisition, justification, change and growth of knowledge. Knowledge is more than the outcome of experimental procedures and hypothetico-deductive reasoning. This discipline is called the sociology of knowledge, and it is claimed to have enriched traditional epistemology by adding a social dimension to it. Although it appears as a separate discipline only in this century through Karl Mannheim's *Ideology And Utopia*, many of its ideas can be traced to Plato; and Max Scheler and Karl Marx are also among its advocates. Its basic assumption is that in every society there exists a fabric of meaning which is conveyed to us in childhood as a set of lore. The social elements considered include such things as the social status and the interests of the subject (either as a group or as an individual), tradition and convention and the process of socialisation. In its early stage, sociology of knowledge was confined to investigating the general conditions surrounding the emergence, modification and the shift of the body of institutionalised beliefs a group accepts and the social sources of prejudices and distortions. This is called the "weak programme". It presupposes that knowledge cannot be objectively valid but reflects the interests of a certain social class. Knowledge is historically relative. Nowadays this discipline also suggests that social factors can be adequate grounds for objective knowledge.

"We have witnessed the rebirth of the notion of the 'sociology of knowledge', which suggests that not only our methods but our conclusions and our reasons for believing them, in the entire realm of knowledge, can be shown to be wholly or largely determined by the stage reached in the development of our class or group, or nation or culture, or whatever other unit may be chosen." — Isaiah Berlin, "Determinism and Responsibility", in *Four Essays on Liberty*.

Socrates' question

A term that is used in two different ways. First, it is a question about how one ought to live or about what is a life worth living, which Socrates raised several times in the Platonic dialogues. Its classical expression is at *Gorgias*, 500b: "Do not either take what I say as if I were merely playing, for you see the subject of our discussion — and on what sub-

够说明道德的进化。”——冯·希谢尔和坦南特：《哲学、进化和人的本质》，1984年。

知识社会学

基于知识不仅仅是个人心灵遭遇物理世界的结果，而且是受到社会的和历史的条件限制这种假定，存在一个学科，专门研究形成和限制知识的获得、辨明、变化和增长的社会因素或成分。知识不只是实验步骤和假设与演绎推理的结果。这门学科就被称作知识社会学，它被认为是由于增加了社会方面而发展了传统认识论。虽然它只是在本世纪由于K. 曼海姆的《意识形态和乌托邦》一书才作为一门独立的学科出现，但它的许多观念却可以追溯到柏拉图，M. 舍勒和卡尔·马克思也是它的先驱者。它的基本假设是，每个社会都存在着一种意义的结构，它是作为一套学问而从孩提时代就传给我们的。这里所说的社会因素包括社会地位与主体的（团体的或个人的）兴趣，传统与约定，社会化的进程等等。在初级阶段，知识社会学还限于研究周遭环境的一般条件，团体所接受的组织化信念本身的修正和变化，以及偏见和歪曲的社会来源。这被称作是“弱的纲领”。它假定，知识在客观上不可能是可靠的，它只是反映了某种社会阶级的兴趣。知识在历史上是相对的。如今，这门学科也认为，社会因素可以为客观知识提供恰当的基础。

“我们已经证明了‘知识社会学’概念的再生，它认为，不仅我们在整个知识领域的方法，而且我们的结论和相信它们的推理，都表明完全是或大部分是由在我们这个阶级或团体，或国家或文化，或可以选择的其他任何单位的发展中所达到的阶段决定的。”——柏林：《决定论与责任》，载《自由四论》。

苏格拉底的问题

这一术语用于两种不同的方式。首先，它是指我们应当如何生活，或什么是值得过的生活这一问题。苏格拉底在柏拉图的对话中几次提出这一问题。其经典的表述见《高尔吉亚篇》，500b：“不要认为我是在说着玩，因为你明白我们讨论的主题是‘一个人应当过什么样的生

ject should even a man of slight intelligence be more serious? — namely, what kind of life one should live". It is a general question about what to do for one's whole life, not a question about whether to do this or that action. The question invites one to reflect about one's own life, for Socrates held that an unexamined life is not worth living. It provides an adequate starting-point for moral theories, and any serious moral theory must answer the question in some way.

The term is also used in relation to various questions posed by Socrates in the earlier Platonic dialogues in the form: "what is ...?", such as "what is piety?", "what is justice?", "what is courage?" and "what is temperance?". These questions sought to determine general conceptions which give what is the same in many different particulars. Socrates did not offer conclusive answers to these questions, but they led philosophers to deal with the problem of universals, the relation between the general and the particular and the nature of predication. The methodology implied by these questions, which was essential for the later development of Western philosophy, led directly to the birth of Plato's Theory of Forms.

"In Socrates' question the general as such is discovered." — Martin, *An Introduction to General Metaphysics*, 1961, p. 27.

Socratic elenchus

[from Greek; *elencheir*, to refute, to examine, to test] Although Socrates himself did not use this term, it is widely used for his characteristic method of inquiry and his central daily activity. Also called the Socratic method, *elenchus* involved Socrates in a cross-examination of an interlocutor through a sequence of questions by which Socrates sought to expose conflicts in the views held by the interlocutor and to reconstruct these beliefs as a result of reflections on the conflicts and on their possible resolution. The earlier Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates showed various *elenchi*, are called elenctic dialogues. Since this kind of cross-examination always ended without reaching any definite conclusion, these dialogues are also called aporetic dialogues. Socratic *elenchus* is neither purely negative nor merely for the purpose of exposing confusions in his interlocutors. It was thus distinguished both from Zeno's method and from sophistry, although it was similar in form to them. Socrates employed his *elenchus* in an attempt to get people to see things themselves. The questions by which he conducted his *elenchus* were not trivial, but rather had to do with the concepts and principles by which the Athenians lived. By this method Socrates questioned the morality of his time. Influenced by Vlastos' work, scholars have recently examined the logical form of *elenchus* and its implication for understanding Plato's earlier dialogues

"Socratic elenchus is a search for moral truth by adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as

活'; 对于任何一个稍稍具有理智的人来说, 还有什么主题比这更为严肃呢?" 这是一个关于你的整个生活应当怎么办, 而不是如何做这个或那个行为的问题。这一问题邀请人去反思自己的生命, 因为苏格拉底相信一种未经考察的生活是不值得过的。它也为道德理论提供了适当的出发点。任何严肃的道德理论必须以某种方式回答这一问题。

这个术语还用于指苏格拉底在柏拉图早期对话中以“什么是……?” 的形式提出的种种问题, 例如, “什么是虔诚?” “什么是正义?” “什么是勇敢?” “什么是节制?” 等等。这些问题寻求得到一般的看法, 即众多不同殊相中的相同之物。苏格拉底并未为这些问题提供结论性答案, 但它们引导哲学家们去处理共相、一般与特殊的关系、主谓关系的性质等问题。隐含在这些问题中的方法论对以后的西方哲学的发展是至关重要的, 它直接导致柏拉图形式论的产生。

“在苏格拉底的问题中, 这种一般被发现了。”——马丁:《一般形而上学导论》, 1961年, 第27页。

苏格拉底问答法

[源自希腊词 *elencheir* (反驳、考察、测验)] 尽管苏格拉底本人并没有使用该词, 但它却被普遍用于指苏格拉底特色的研究方法以及他的主要日常活动。它也被称作“苏格拉底方法”。它是通过一系列问题与对话者进行相互质问, 苏格拉底由此寻求暴露对话者的各种观点中的冲突, 并在反思这些冲突及关于它们的可能答案的基础上重建这些信念。在许多柏拉图的早期对话中苏格拉底展现了众多的问答, 这些对话因而也叫做“问答性对话”。由于这类相互质问总是在结束时没有达到任何明确的结论, 这些对话也叫“疑难性对话”。苏格拉底问答法既不纯粹是否定的, 也不只是为了揭示他的对话者的观念混乱。它不同于芝诺的方法, 也不同于诡辩, 虽然它们在形式上彼此相似。苏格拉底采用问答法, 目的在于让人们看到事物的本身。他应用问答法的问题都不是琐碎的, 而是关涉到雅典人所据以生活的概念和原则。运用这一方法, 苏格拉底责问他那个时代的道德。受弗拉斯托斯著作的影响, 学者们近年来一直在争论问答法的逻辑形式和它对于我们理解柏拉图早期对话的意义。

“苏格拉底问答法是通过敌对论证来寻求道德真理, 在这一论证中, 一个命题只有在被断定为是回答者本人的信念时, 才会受到争论; 而当且仅当回答者的命题的反题从他自己的信仰

the answerer's own belief, who is regarded as refuted if and only if the negation of his thesis is deduced from his own beliefs." Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus", in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 1 (1984), p. 30.

Socratic method, another term for Socratic *elenchus*

Soft data, see data

Solipsism

[from Latin: *solus*, alone — *ipse*, self] A metaphysical theory which claims that only I and my experience exist. The argument for solipsism asserts that every claim about what exists and what I know is grounded in experience and cannot transcend it, but that experience is immediate and private to me; therefore nothing beyond myself and my experience exists. The world is my presentation. Solipsism is closely associated with the claim of traditional British empiricism that immediate perception is the source of all knowledge, and also with Descartes's *cogito ergo sum*. Like scepticism, solipsism is criticised as logically incoherent and unintelligible, but a complete refutation is difficult to find. Russell believes that there is something true in it, though he himself chooses not to accept it. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* thinks that since the limit of language means the limit of my world, there is something correct about solipsism, although it cannot really be expressed in factual language. He sees the temptation to solipsism as related to the metaphysical subject.

"Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it." — Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.64.

Somatism, see reism

Sophia, Greek term for wisdom

Sophism, see fallacy of ambiguity

Sophist

[Greek: *sophistes*, from *sophos*, wise and *sophia*, wisdom] Initially, any wise man like a poet, seer or sage, but in fifth-century BC, a special term for a professional teacher who wandered from city to city to teach many non-traditional courses, including rhetoric and linguistics, which young Greeks needed to pursue political careers. Sophists charged

推得时,才被认为是驳倒了。”——弗拉斯托斯:《苏格拉底问答法》,载《牛津古代哲学研究》,第1卷(1984),第30页。

苏格拉底方法

“苏格拉底问答法”的另一名称。

软资料

见“予料”条。

唯我论

[源自拉丁文: *solus* (单独) 和 *ipse* (自我)] 一种形而上学理论,主张只有我和我的经验存在。支持唯我论的论证断言,每一种关于存在什么和我知道什么的主张都是基于经验,不能超越经验,但经验对我而言是直接和私有的;因此在我和我的经验之外别无他物存在。世界就是我的表象。唯我论与传统的英国经验主义的下述主张密切相关:当下知觉是一切知识的来源,也与笛卡尔的“我思故我在”密切相关。就像怀疑论一样,唯我论被批评为在逻辑上不一致和不可理解,但很难找到彻底的批驳。罗素认为其中含有正确的成分,虽然他自己的选择不接受它。维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中认为,既然语言的界限意味着我的世界的界限,因此唯我论中有正确的东西,虽然实际上它不能用事实语言表达出来。他把唯我论的诱惑看成是与形而上学的主体有关。

“这里可以看到,当唯我论的含义一贯到底时,它与纯粹的实在论是一致的,唯我论的自我缩至一个无广延的点,而仍然有与之相合的实在。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,5.64。

实物论

见“实有论”条。

智慧

“智慧 (wisdom)” 的希腊词。

诡辩

见“歧义谬误”条。

智者

[源自希腊文 *sophistes*, 该词出自 *sophos* (智慧的) 和 *sophia* (智慧)] 起初是指任何聪明人,如诗人、先知、圣哲等,但在公元前5世纪的希腊,它变成了一个特别称呼,指这样一种专门教师,他们从一个城邦游到另一个,教许多非传统的课程,包括修辞学和语言学;这些课程是

their students for this service. At that time the term did not have a derogatory sense. The sophists did not form a sect or school, and many of them were not philosophers at all. Among the most famous sophists were Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Prodicus and Hippias. Only in the next generation did *sophist* acquire the unfavourable sense which it still bears today. This change largely resulted from the hostile propaganda of Plato and Aristotle, who accused the sophists of making money for their teaching and of neglecting higher values by teaching techniques aimed merely at winning debates. Many sophists are targets of irony in Plato's dialogues, where they are distinguished from the practitioners of serious intellectual pursuits. However, from the scant information we possess, it seems that the sophists together formed a loose movement which was sceptical in tradition and having some features of an enlightenment. They made important contributions to the history of thought in fields such as grammar and linguistic theory, moral and political doctrine, and the theory of the nature and origin of man and society. Because no writings survive from any of the sophists, it is difficult to correct the traditional prejudice against them.

"A sophistes writes or teaches because he has a special skill or knowledge to impart. His sophia is practical, whether in the fields of conduct and politics or in the technical arts." — Guthrie, *The Sophists*, 1971, p. 30.

Sorites paradox

[from Greek: *soros*, a heap and *sorites*: a heaper] Also the paradox of the heap, a paradox that concerns how a series of small changes does not affect the possession of a property when taken individually but does affect the possession of the property when the changes are taken together. One grain of sand does not make a heap. Adding a further grain does not make a heap. We can go on adding grains without making a heap, and there is no particular number of grains which will make a heap. Yet many grains of sand certainly do make a heap. If no addition of a single grain can turn a non-heap into a heap, it is difficult to understand how a heap can emerge. The problem can be stated conversely. Removing one grain of sand from a heap does not make the heap disappear. Nor does removing a second grain make the heap disappear, and so on. There seems no point at which the heap disappears, yet it does disappear. A variant of the sorites paradox is the bald man paradox. A man with a full head of hair will not become bald if he loses one hair. Nor will the loss of a second hair make him bald, and so on. There appears to be no point at which the removal of an additional hair will make him bald, but the man does become bald.

The problem for all versions of the sorites paradox is the same: how can a series of changes, each of which does not make a difference, make a difference eventually when taken together? Attempted solutions deny the claim that if the first

希腊青年在寻求政治生涯时所需要的。智者们向他们的学生收费。在那时这一名称并无贬义。智者们并不构成一个宗派或学派，他们有许多根本不是哲学家。比较有名的智者包括普罗泰戈拉、高尔吉亚、塞拉叙马库斯、普罗狄科斯及希庇亚斯。只是在大约一个世纪后，“智者”这一名字才获得了一种贬义，并一直延续至今。这种变化主要是由于柏拉图、亚里士多德的敌对宣传。他们指责智者从教书活动中赚钱，并只教那些可在论辩中取胜的技术而忽略更高的价值。许多智者在柏拉图对话中都是讥笑的对象，不被当做是从事严肃的理智探求事业的人。不过，从我们所拥有的不多的材料看，智者们似乎共同构成了一个松散的运动，其主要特征是怀疑传统，多少有点像启蒙运动。他们对思想史贡献良多，如在文法和语言理论方面，在道德和政治学说方面，关于人和社会的起源与性质等。由于没有一个智者的作品留传至今，这一事实使得我们很难纠正对他们的传统偏见。

“一个智者写作和教育，因为他有专门的技能和知识可以传授。他的智慧是实践的，无论是在行为和领域，还是在专门技术领域。”——格思里：《智者》，1971年，第30页。

累积悖论

[源自希腊文 *soros* (一堆) 和 *sorites* (一个堆者)] 也叫堆的悖论，该悖论是关于当单个考虑时不影响特性拥有的微小变化，何以当这些变化加在一起时确实影响到特性的拥有。一粒沙子不能成堆。再加一粒也不成堆。我们可以持续加下去而不成堆，没有哪一个特殊的沙粒由它而构成了堆。然而许多的沙粒确实组成了堆。如果没有一个单个沙粒的添加使非堆成为堆，那么堆何以出现的呢？这个问题也可以反过来说。从沙堆上取走一粒不会使堆消失，取走第二粒也不会使其消失，如此等等。似乎没有沙堆在此消失的那点，但它却的确消失了。另一种累积悖论称作秃顶人悖论。一个满头是发的人如果失去一根头发不会秃头，失去第二根也不会使他秃头，如此等等。似乎没有这么一点，再去掉一根他会成为秃头，然而他确实成了秃头。

对于各种形式的累积悖论，相同的问题是：一连串的变化中每一个都没有产生影响，何以最后加在一起就产生了影响？尝试的解决方法否认如下观点，即如果第一变化不能对属性拥有造成不同，则后面的变化也不会造成区别；它们使用关于该特性拥有的真理度概念，或是使用模糊逻辑处理属性，此种逻辑认识到谓项的可应用性程度。

“……累积悖论，古老的堆悖论，如果从一

change does not make a difference in the possession of the property, then no subsequent change makes a difference, use the notion of degrees of truth regarding the possession of the property, or deal with the property using fuzzy logic which recognises degrees of applicability of predicates.

"...the sorites paradox, the ancient paradox of the heap: If removal of a single grain from a heap always leaves a heap, then, by mathematical induction, removal of all the grains leaves a heap." — Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 32.

Sortal

Although the idea can be traced to Aristotle's notion of secondary substance, the word "sortal" was introduced by John Locke from sort, on analogy with the derivation of "general" from genus. For Locke, a sortal was a type of abstract idea which denotes the essence of a sort or a kind. Frege introduced sortals into contemporary discussion for a type of predicate by which we know the sort of object to which it applies; sortals delimit that object from other objects. Terms such as "cat" and "person" are sortals. A sortal predicate contains a criterion of identification and distinction. It provides a principle of countability and can be used with a definite or indefinite article. A sortal predicate applies to an object but does not apply to the parts of that object because the object it applies to does not permit arbitrary division. The term "cat" does not apply to a part of a cat, because the part is not itself a cat. On the other hand, a general but non-sortal predicate such as "a red thing" may apply to both the object itself and its parts. For a part of a red thing might itself be red. The use of sortals in considering various topics of contemporary philosophy owes much to Peter Strawson's discussion in *Individuals* and to the views that all scientific laws require sortal predicates and that identity claims are sortal-relative. If a particular is an instance of a universal, it is said to be sortally tied to the universal. There are alternative expressions for "sortal". Strawson used the expression "individuate term" but later reverted to the standard term in his *Individuals*. Geach used the term "count noun", and Quine used the expression "divided reference". Sortals are also called shared names.

"A sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars which it collects." — Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 168.

Sortal predicate, see sortal

Soul

[Greek: *psyche* and Latin: *anima*, originally the breath of life] An entity, the presence of which in a body causes the body to possess life and in the absence of which the body is

堆中取走一粒剩下的总是一堆,那么按照数学归纳,取走所有的粒仍剩下一堆。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第32页。

类

尽管这个词可以追溯到亚里士多德的“第二实体”概念,但“类”这个词却是由J. 洛克从“种类”一词中引入的,类似于“一般”来自“属”。在洛克看来,它是指一类指称种类本质的抽象观念。弗雷格把它引入当代的讨论中,指一类谓词,我们用这类谓词知道了它所适用的对象,确定了这个对象与其他对象的不同。像“猫”和“人”这样的词都是类。因而,一个类谓词就包含了一种确认和区分的标准。它提供了一种可数性原则,可以使用定冠词或不定冠词。一个类谓词可以用于对象,但不能用于这个对象的组成部分,因为它所应用的对象不允许随意地加以细分。“猫”这个词不是用于猫的某个部分,因为这个部分本身并不是一只猫。另一方面,一个普遍的但不是类的谓词,诸如“一个红色的东西”,就既可以用于对象本身,也可以用于它的组成部分。因为这个红色东西的一部分本身也可能是红色的。类的用法构成了当代哲学中的许多话题,这主要归功于P. 斯特劳森在《个别物》中的讨论,也归功于这样一种观点,即认为一切科学规律都需要类谓词,而同一性主张是相对于类的。如果一个殊相是一个共相的单例,那么它就会被说成是在类上与这个共相相联。对“类”有各种不同的说法。斯特劳森的说法是“个体化的词”,但他后来在《个别物》中又回到了标准的用法。吉奇称它为“可数名词”;而奎因用它指“分离的指称”。类也被称作“共名”。

“一种普遍类提供了区分和计算它所收集的单个殊相的原则。”——斯特劳森:《个别物》,1959年,第168页。

类谓词

见“类”条。

灵魂

[希腊语为 *psyche*, 拉丁语为 *anima*, 原本的意思指生命的气息]它是这样的实体:在躯体中时就使该躯体具有生命,不在时就意味着躯

dead. The soul gives the body the faculty of cognition and, in the case of man, thought. The soul gives body the power of self-motion. By analogy, the changing world is sometimes claimed to be a living thing and to have a world soul. Pythagoras introduced the notion that the soul is immortal and transmigrates between many bodies. This idea was reinforced by Plato and led to a perennial topic in philosophy covering identity, survival, resurrection and disembodiment. Materialists claim that the soul cannot exist independently of the body. Aristotle said that the soul is the actuality of an organic body and in this sense cannot be separate from body, but he also claimed that there is an imperishable and separate active soul or reason.

Plato made a tripartite division of the soul into rational, emotional and appetitive parts, and believed that only human beings have the rational part. He believed that these three parts are in a state of constant conflict, and that a just person should make use of his reason to control the appetitive part, with the aid of emotion. This tripartite division has framed much later discussion in the history of Western philosophy. Psychology, which studies the operations and relations of these three parts is derived from *psyche*, the Greek term for soul.

Descartes preferred to use the term mind (from Latin: *mens*) rather than soul. The mind is the consciousness or the thinking part of the soul, although there are difficulties in giving a conceptually unified account of all that might belong to thinking and the mind. Other philosophers, such as Locke, used mind as a synonym for understanding. Descartes argued that the mind is an independent and incorporeal substance. This thesis gives rise to the mind-body problem, which is the most fundamental problem of the philosophy of mind. Soul is also taken as a synonym of spirit.

"It is the soul by or with which primarily we live, perceive and think." Aristotle, *De Anima*, 414a12.

Sovereign

The agent with supreme power who is habitually obeyed in a political society, but who does not habitually obey others. In a monarchy, the sovereign is an individual person; in an aristocracy, the sovereign is a group of people; and in a democracy, the sovereign is the population of its majority. The sovereign has the power to inflict punishment. For Hobbes, a sovereign should have absolute power and be able to control all areas of life and behaviour. Its power is a unity and is irrevocable. John Austin maintained that the sovereign is a pre-legal political fact and must be assumed as a basis for explaining and defining all other legal concepts. In his legal philosophy, the command of the sovereign, like Kelsen's basic norm or Hart's rule of recognition, is the ground of legal validity.

"If, following Austin, we call such a supreme and inde-

体死亡。灵魂给人的躯体赋予认知力,尤其是思想。灵魂也给躯体赋予自我运动的力量。类比地讲,变化着的世界有时被认作是一个活生生的事物,具有世界灵魂。毕达戈拉斯引入了灵魂不死且在多个躯体之间转生的观念。这种观念经过柏拉图的补充,成为哲学的一个永久性论题,包括同一、生存、复活、解脱等问题。唯物主义者主张,灵魂不能独立于躯体而存在。亚里士多德说,灵魂是有机体的现实性,在这个意义上,它不能与躯体分离。但是,他又认为,存在着一种不灭的、分离的主动灵魂或理性。

柏拉图把灵魂三分为理性、激情和欲望,并坚信只有人类具有理性部分。他相信,这三个部分处于不断冲突的状态之中,公正的人应当在激情的帮助下,用理智控制欲望的部分。在西方哲学史上,这种三分构造出后来的许多讨论。研究这三个部分的作用及其相互关系的“心理学”,其名称就是源出于希腊文灵魂(*psyche*)一词的。

笛卡尔不爱用“灵魂”一词,更喜欢用“心灵”(源于拉丁语 *mens*)。心灵指灵魂中的意识或思维部分,虽然对于可能属于思维和心灵的一切东西,难以从概念上给予统一的说明。其他一些哲学家,譬如洛克,也把心灵用作理解的同义语。笛卡尔相信,心灵是独立的、非形体的实体。这个命题,引发了“心身问题”,而这正是心的哲学最主要的问题。灵魂也被当成“精神”的同义语。

“灵魂的首要意义,乃是我们据以或赖以生活、感觉和思维的东西。”——亚里士多德:《论灵魂》,414a12。

统治者

拥有最高权力的人,在一个政治社会中,他习惯被服从,但却不习惯服从别人。在君主政体中,统治者是一个个人;在贵族统治的政体中,统治者是一组人;在民主政体中,统治者是人口中的大多数人。统治者拥有实施处罚的权力。在霍布斯看来,统治应拥有绝对的权力,并能控制生活和行为的所有领域。统治者的权力是一个整体,而且是不可改变的。J. 奥斯汀坚持认为,统治者是一个先于法律的政治事实,并且必须被假定为说明和定义所有其他法律概念的基础。在他的法哲学中,统治者的命令,就如同凯尔逊的基本规范或哈特的承认规则一样,是法的有效性的根据。

“遵循奥斯汀的观点,如果我们把这种最高的和不受约束的人或人的群体称作统治者,那

pendent person or body of persons the sovereign, the laws of any country will be the general orders backed by threats which are issued either by the sovereign or subordinates in obedience to the sovereign." — H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, p. 25.

Sovereignty

Supreme legal authority. A concept originating in the Medieval conflicts between church and state and now a feature of independent states, their people or their rulers. External sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state regarding its relations with other states or international authorities. It is a state's right to the integrity of its territory and its right to join or withdraw from any international treaty or organisation as an independent party. External sovereignty is a major factor in modern international relations and can be limited or augmented by international law. Internal sovereignty concerns the body of laws and rules by which a state conducts its affairs. Within its territory, a sovereign state has final legal authority, with which external forces may not legitimately interfere. Because law and morality differ, there can be tension between internal sovereignty and recognised individual rights. External sovereignty is threatened by foreign invasion and interference, while internal sovereignty is threatened by usurpation and secession.

"To say that the State is sovereign is to say that the State has supreme or final authority in a community, that its rules override the rule of any other association." — D. D. Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy*, 2nd edition, 1990, p. 52.

Space

The nature of space, along with the nature of time, is a fundamental question in philosophy. Space is viewed as a continuum which gives form to the possible relations in which things and events stand in the world. It is constituted by all spatially related places. In ancient Greece, the Eleatics denied the possibility of empty space. They also denied that space is material, for otherwise space itself would have to be in another kind of space. Atomists argued that a void exists which separates atoms. Zeno's paradoxes show the puzzling nature of space and time, especially with regard to the problem of infinity. Kant, echoing Zeno, claimed that antinomies result if we think of space and time as objectively real and argued that space and time are forms of intuition by which sensibility organises sensibly given materials into experience. Space is not a concept, because unlike the different instantiations of concepts, all spaces are parts of one space.

A major dispute about space concerns whether it is substantial or relational. Plato defined space as a receptacle which does not have any characteristic itself. Aristotle did not distinguish space from place, which he defined as the ad-

么任何国家的法律都是以威胁为支撑的普遍命令,而这种威胁是由统治者或顺从这一统治者的下属发出的。”——哈特:《法的概念》,第25页。

主权

最高的法律权力。一个起源于中世纪教会和国家之间冲突的概念,现在是独立的国家、它们的人民或统治者的一个特征。一个国家的对外主权是它与其他国家或国际组织关系的最高权力。它是一个国家对其领土完整和作为独立的一部分参加或退出任何国际条约或组织的权利。对外主权是当代国际关系中的一个主要因素,并能为国际法所限制或扩大。对内主权涉及一个国家据以处理其事务的法律和法规的主体。一个主权国家在其领土内拥有最终的法律权力,因此外部力量不能合法地加以干涉。由于对法律和道德的看法不同,在对内主权和所承认的个人权利之间会出现紧张的关系。对外主权受到外来侵略和干涉的威胁,对内主权受到篡夺和脱离的威胁。

“说这一国家是主权国家,也就是说这一国家在一个社会中有最高和最终的权力,它的规定超越任何其他团体的规定。”——拉菲尔:《政治哲学问题》,第二版,1990年,第52页。

空间

空间的性质与时间的性质一样,是哲学中的基本问题。空间被看做给出了事物和事件在世界中所处的可能关系之形式的连续,它由所有空间上相关的场所构成。在古希腊,埃利亚学者否认空的空间的可能性。他们也否认空间是物质的,因为否则空间自身也必须在另一种空间中。原子论者论证使原子相分离的虚空的存在。芝诺悖论表现了空间和时间令人困惑的性质,尤其是关于无限的问题。康德回应芝诺,宣称如果我们把空间和时间认为是客观实在的,就会导致二律背反,并论证空间和时间是直观形式,感性藉此把特定的可感材料组织为经验。空间不是概念,因为不像不同的概念的实例,所有的空间都是一个空间的部分。

关于空间的一个主要争论,涉及它是实体的还是关系的。柏拉图定义空间为自身不具有任何特性的容器。亚里士多德没有区分空间和他定义为容纳物体的相邻边界的处所。两人似乎都把空间看做为客观的容器。笛卡尔提出了把空间表述为实体的标准形式,他主张物质的

jacent boundary of a containing body. Both seem to take space as an objective container. A standard version of the account of space as substantial is offered by Descartes, who claimed that the essence of matter is extension and thus identified space with matter. In his account of absolute space, Newton insisted that space would remain similar and immovable even if it lacked relations to anything else. Radically opposed to Newton account is Leibniz's relational view of space. Leibniz argued that, rather than being a substance, space is a system of relations in which indivisible monads stand to one another. The power and attraction of the positions in the dispute are captured in the famous Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, in which Samuel Clarke defended Newton. The dispute still goes on today, especially in light of the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"A space, in the literal sense of the term, is that in which material objects are situated, and move or remain still. They change their place by moving through space." Swinburne, *Space and Time*, 1968, p. 31.

Space, absolute

Newton maintained that space has its own nature, without dependence on anything else. The three-dimensionality of space is an intrinsic, essential property of space. Mathematicians can describe spaces having other dimensions, but these are not our space. If one part of space is different from another part, this is not because of differences in space itself, but because of the things that occupy space. Absolute space is also separate from time. In contrast to absolute space, relative space depends for its character upon the nature of the things it relates. It would vanish were there no spatially related entities, and in principle it is subject to change.

"Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable." —Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*.

Space-time

The theory of relativity uses a unified notion of space-time to replace the separate notion of space and time. Within its framework, space and time can be traded, like mass and energy. As a result, it has become common practice in physics to view the world as a manifold of four dimensions: length, width, height and interval. Space-time can also be considered a four-dimensional tenseless space in contrast to our ordinary conception of space as something which endures through time. Many issues, such as infinity, continuity and their absolute or relational nature are common to space and time and can be dealt with to our advantage in a unified theory. On the other hand, it is not clear in what contexts space-time replaces space and time in other aspects of our thought. Some philosophers argue that we could not have spatio-temporal

essence is extension, therefore, space is equivalent to matter. Newton in his account of absolute space,坚持空间应保持相似的和静止的,即使它缺乏与其他任何事物的联系。与牛顿的表述截然对立的是莱布尼茨关于空间的关系观。莱布尼茨论证空间不是实体,而是不可分的单子在其中彼此相对的关系系统。这种观点在争辩中的力量和吸引力在著名的莱布尼茨-克拉克通信中引起了人们的注意,克拉克在其中捍卫牛顿的观点。这种争论今天仍然在继续,尤其是随着广义相对论和量子力学的发现。

"空间从其字面意思上讲,就是物质对象处于其中、并在其中运动或保持静止的东西,对象由通过空间的运动而改变它们的位置。"——斯文布勒:《空间与时间》,1968年,第31页。

绝对空间

牛顿主张空间具有自己的性质,不依赖于任何其他事物。空间的三维性是空间固有的本质特质。数学家可以描述具有不同维度的空间,但那些不是我们的空间。如果空间的一部分不同于另一部分,那不是由于空间本身的不同,而是由于占据空间的事物。绝对空间也是与时间相分离的。与绝对空间相对立,相对空间的特性依赖于与其相关的事物的性质。如果不存在空间上相关的实体,它将会消失,它原则上是可以变化的。

"绝对空间,其自身性质与一切外在事物无关,处处均匀,永不移动。"——牛顿:《自然哲学的数学原理》。

空一时

相对论用统一的空一时定义取代空间和时间的独自定义。在这一框架中,空间和时间是可以交换的,就像质量和能量一样。其结果是,在物理学中通常把世界看做是一个具有长宽高和时间间隔的四维体。空一时也可以看做是一个四维无时态空间,以对比于我们日常的把空间看做持续于时间中的某种东西的观念。许多问题,例如无限性、连续性和绝对或相对性质等,对于空间和时间都是共同的,可以用一种我们所喜欢的统一理论来处理。另一方面,尚不清楚在什么条件下空一时可取代我们思想中其他方面的时间和空间。有些哲学家争辩说,我们不能有依据空一时而非依据空间与时间的关于世界的时空经验。其他人则认为我们的经验是依据

poral experience of the world in terms of space-time rather than in terms of space and time. Others reply that our experience is in terms of space-time or of any theory that proves to be true.

"We must not forget that space-time is a space in the mathematical sense of the word." — J. J. C. Smart (ed), *Problems of Space and Time*, p. 12.

Species, see genus, form

Species chauvinism, another term for speciesism

Speciesism

A term invented by the English writer Richard Ryder in *Victims of Science* (1975), but popularised by the Australian Philosopher, Peter Singer. It refers to the discrimination which human beings exercise over non-human animals. Racism is a prejudice on the basis of race. Sexism is a prejudice on the basis of sex. Speciesism, then, is a prejudice on the basis of species. Human beings have been using animals as means, and exploiting them ruthlessly on the assumption that human beings as rational beings are morally more valuable than animals. However, many members of the human species such as children and mentally retarded persons, although not rational, are still entitled to moral consideration, simply because of their membership of the human species. Singer contends that if racism and sexism are wrong, speciesism must also be wrong. The animal liberation movement which he helped to initiate has as its main goal the removal of speciesism. Speciesism is called by other authors, species chauvinism or human chauvinism.

"Speciesism—the word is not an attractive one, but I can think of no better term, —is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species." — Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 1990, p. 6.

Specious present

Our awareness of now or the present as a momentary time interval between past and future. E. R. Clay believed that this experience of a present is not real and is actually a period of time ending at the present. The concrete individual time that we perceive is not strictly instantaneous and is never co-present with our consciousness. It is rather a recent past instead of a real present. Clay called what we perceive the specious present. James borrowed this term and used it extensively to express his view that consciousness of time is indeed a stream or a continuant. Earlier events are temporally extended and are still present in our experience of later events. The specious present includes the recent past and

空一时或其他任何证明为真的理论的。

"我们必须记住空一时是在这个词的数学意义上的空间。"——斯马特(编):《空间和时间问题》,第12页。

属

见“种”、“形式”条。

物种沙文主义

“物种主义”的另一个名称。

物种主义

为英国作家 R. 莱德在他的《科学的受害者》(1975 年)中所造的一个名词,不过,是澳大利亚的哲学家 P. 辛格使它得以流行。它指的是人类对于非人类的动物的歧视。种族主义是基于种族的偏见,性别主义是基于性别的偏见,那么,物种主义是基于物种的偏见。人类把动物用作工具,野蛮地剥夺它们,这是基于人类有理性,所以在道德上比动物更有价值这一假定。然而,人类这一物种中的许多成员诸如儿童和有精神障碍的人,虽然没有理性,但仍享有道德考虑,仅是因为他们是人类这一物种的成员。辛格争辩说,如果种族主义和性别主义是错的,物种主义也必定是错的。他所帮助倡导的动物解放运动,其主要目标就是去掉物种主义。物种主义也被其他作者称为物种沙文主义或人类沙文主义。

“物种主义——这词不那么漂亮,但我想不到更好的词——是一种袒护自己的物种成员的利益,贬损其他物种成员的利益的意见或偏见态度。”——辛格:《动物解放》,1990 年,第 6 页。

似现在

我们对于作为过去与将来之间的瞬间的“现在”或“当前”的意识。E. R. 克雷认为,这个对于当前的体验是非真实的,实际上是中止于当前的一段时间。我们所知觉的具体单个时间并非是严格瞬间的,并且从不与我们的意识同时出现。它是一个最近的过去,而不是一个真正的当前。克雷将我们所知觉到的东西称为“似现在”。詹姆斯借用这一术语,并宽泛地用它来表达这样一个思想:对时间的意识实际上是一个流或连续。过去的事件在当前延伸并且仍然呈现于我们关于后来事件的经验中。似现在包括最近的过去甚至一点点将来。过去、现在和将

even a bit of future. Past, present and future are nothing but our conceptual ascription. The term specious present is also employed by Russell and Broad, but is criticised by H. J. Paton.

"The time-series, then, of which any part is perceived by me, is a time-series in which the future and the past are separated by a present which is a specious present." —Mc Taggart, *The Nature of Existence*, sect. 344.

Speculative philosophy

[from Latin: *speculatio*, contemplation, in turn derived from *specere*: to see, to look; equivalent to Greek: *theoria*, contemplation, derived from the verb to see] Etymologically, what is speculative is theoretical, in contrast to the practical and empirical. Kant connected speculative philosophy with metaphysics, and believed that it resulted from mistakenly applying concepts to things-in-themselves rather than to empirical objects. For Kant, speculative philosophy has a pejorative sense through being concerned with the transcendent and with reality as a whole in spite of lacking the proper support of sense experience. Hegel described speculative philosophy in this sense as dogmatism, but called his own system a speculative system in another sense because it dealt with conceptual process and not because it dealt with the supersensible. It is a dialectical process in which the opposition between objectivity and subjectivity is sublated, and in which all branches of human knowledge are systematically unified to reveal the true meaning of reality and of humankind. In general, speculative philosophy employs the results of various sciences and religious and ethical experiences to derive general conclusions regarding the nature of the universe and our position in it. Although its holism and sense of system have attractions, most analytic philosophers regard speculative philosophy as purely conjectural and as being close to poetry and mysticism.

"Speculative philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." —Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 1929, p. 5.

Speculative philosophy of history, see philosophy of history

Speech act

A sophisticated form of the use theory of meaning elaborated by Austin in *How to Do Things with Words*. In an account of the meaning of an expression, one main factor is what the expression is used to do, and this is the speech act aspect of language use. A speech act involves actually saying in contrast to merely thinking, and in this sense to say something is to do something, to perform a linguistic act. A speech act is hence also called a linguistic act. Austin divided

来只是我们的概念描述。“似现在”这一术语也为罗素和布劳德所使用，但遭到 H. J. 帕顿的批评。

“任何部分都被我所知觉的时间系列是一个将来和过去被一个似现在的现在所分割的时间系列。”——麦克塔加特：《存在的本性》，第 344 段。

思辨哲学

[源自拉丁词: *speculatio* (沉思), 是从 *specere* (看) 这个词引申出来的; 等同于希腊词: *theoria* (沉思), 由动词“看”引申而来] 从词源学来看, 思辨的东西就是理论的东西, 相对于实践的和经验的东西而言。康德把思辨哲学与形而上学相联系, 并认为它来源于把概念误用于物自身而不是经验对象。对于康德来说, 思辨哲学具有贬义, 因为它研究那些超验之物和整个实在, 虽然它们没有感觉经验的有力支持。黑格尔把这种意义的思辨哲学描述为独断论, 但在另一种意义上, 他又把自己的哲学称为思辨体系, 因为它论述概念的过程, 而不是因为它论述超感性之物。这是一个辩证的过程, 在此过程中客观性和主观性的对立被扬弃, 所有的人类知识部门都系统地统一起来以揭示实在和人类的真实意义。一般说来, 思辨哲学应用各种科学的成果和宗教的、伦理的经验来引出关于宇宙的本性和人类在宇宙中的地位的结论。虽然它的整体主义和体系感具有吸引力, 绝大多数分析哲学家仍把思辨哲学视为纯粹猜测的东西, 接近于诗和神秘主义。

“思辨哲学是一种构造连贯的、逻辑的、必然的一般观念体系的努力, 以此体系使我们经验的每一个元素都能得到解释。”——怀特海: 《过程与实在》, 1929 年, 第 5 页。

思辨的历史哲学

见“历史哲学”条。

言语行为

奥斯汀在《如何以言行事》中阐述的意义使用论的一种精致形式。在说明一表达式的意义时, 一个主要的因素就是看该表达式是用来做什么的, 这就是语言用法的言语行为方面。言语行为实际上包含说, 以区别于单纯的思, 在这种意义上说话就是做事, 就是从事某一语言行为。言语行为因此亦称“语言行为”。奥斯汀把言语行为分成三类: (1) 以言表意的行为, 即说出某

speech acts into three kinds. First, a locutionary act is an act of saying something, which is further divided into three kinds: the phonetic act which is merely the act of uttering certain noises, the phatic act which makes a grammatical sentence, and the rhetic act which utters something with a certain sense and with a certain reference. Secondly, an illocutionary act is an act done in saying something, for example promising, questioning, suggesting or ordering. Thirdly, a perlocutionary act is an act done by saying something, saying something which will produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience. Austin claimed that by clearly distinguishing these acts we may get rid of many traditional philosophical problems. Searle has examined and developed this doctrine on the hypothesis that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour. Most studies of speech acts focus on illocutionary acts. Speech act theory characterises the nature of communicative intentions. It is opposed to an account of meaning exclusively based on semantics and can be seen to be a branch of pragmatics.

"The form that this hypothesis will take is that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on." —Searle, *Speech Acts*, 1969, p. 18.

Speech act fallacy

An analysis which reduces the basic meaning of a statement to what a speaker does in using it. For instance, it uses the speech acts of prescribing or commending to explain moral terms, the speech act of re-asserting to explain the meaning of the word "true", and the speech act of expressing belief or giving guidance or partial assurance to explain the meaning of "probable". According to John Searle, this is a fallacy because it ignores the locutionary speech act which must precede the illocutionary act. Many words have a literal occurrence in some sentences, and understanding their meaning need not require us to consider the performance of speech acts beyond locutionary acts. This fallacy, which is similar to what Peter Geach calls ascriptivism, is linked by some philosophers to the use theory of meaning.

"The general nature of the speech act fallacy can be stated as follows, using 'good' as our example. Calling something good is characteristically praising or commending or recommending it, etc. But it is a fallacy to infer from this that the meaning of good is explained by saying it is used to perform the act of commendation." —Searle, *Speech Act*, 1969, p. 139.

Sphere of existence, an alternative expression for stage of existence

种意思的行为, 它进一步被分成三类: 发音行为, 即仅仅发出某种声音的行为; 出语行为, 它造出合乎语法的句子; 表意行为, 它说出具有某种含义和某种所指的话语。(2) 以言行事的行为, 即在说某事时所做的行为, 例如允诺, 提问, 提建议, 发命令等。(3) 以言取效的行为, 通过说话而做的行为, 说话将对听众的感情、思想和行动产生某种间接的影响。奥斯汀宣称, 通过清楚地区分这些行为, 我们可以摆脱许多传统的哲学问题。塞尔考察和发展了这一学说, 他假定: 说一种语言就是在从事某种受规则支配的行为。关于言语行为的绝大多数研究集中在以言行事的行为。言语行为理论刻画了交际意图的性质, 它反对只根据语义学来说明意义, 可以把它看做语用学的一个分支。

"这一假设将要采取的形式是: 说一种语言就是在从事言语行为, 像作陈述, 发命令, 提问, 作承诺之类的行为。" —塞尔: 《言语行为》, 1969年, 第18页。

言语行为错误

一种把陈述的基本意义还原为说者在使用该陈述时所做事情的分析。譬如, 它用规定或命令的言语行为去解释道德用语, 用重述的言语行为去解释“真”这个词的意义, 用表达信念或提供指导或部分保证去解释“可能”的意义。根据约翰·塞尔的观点, 这是一种错误, 因为它忽略了必须在以言行事的行为之前出现的“以言表意的言语行为”。许多词只是在句子的字面上出现, 但理解它们的意义并不需要我们考虑完成以言表意行为之外的言语行为。这种错误类似于P. 吉奇所说的“归属主义”, 一些哲学家把它看做与“意义的用法理论”有关。

"言语行为错误的共性可以这样来表述: 我们用‘好的’做例子, 把某个东西说成是好的, 显然就是在赞扬它、夸奖它或推荐它等等。但由此推出, 好的意义可以解释为它是被用来完成赞扬的行为, 那就错了。" —塞尔: 《言语行为》, 1969年, 第139页。

生存境界〔或译“生存领域”〕

对“生存阶段”的另一表达。

Spirit, see soul

Spirit of seriousness

Sartre's term for the belief that there is something intrinsically good in itself, which is inherent in the world as absolute value and is discoverable by men. Such a belief leads to bad faith. According to Sartre, people fall into the spirit of seriousness because they forget that values are contingent and are chosen and assigned by our own subjectivity.

"The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of 'desirable' from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution." —Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (tr. Barnes), 1957, p. 626.

Spiritualism

Spiritualism claims that spirit or soul rather than matter is the ultimate substance of the world. Body has only a phenomenal existence and as an expression of the reality of spirit has spirit or mind as its sole ground. In this sense, spiritualism is a synonym for idealism and is opposed to materialism. Various versions of spiritualism differ regarding how they characterise the fundamental role of spirit in the world.

"Spiritualism says that mind not only witnesses and records things, but also runs and operates them." —James, *Pragmatism and Selections from the Meaning of Truth*, 1937, p. 93.

Spontaneity

In Kant's philosophy, the theoretical aspect of freedom, corresponding to autonomy which is the practical aspect of freedom. Spontaneity is reason's active capacity, in contrast to passive receptivity. It is the absence of external determination which legislates rules for itself to synthesise appearances. Pure forms of intuition and pure concepts of understanding are all produced by the spontaneity of human reason. Kant held that spontaneity and receptivity must be combined for knowledge to be possible. Fichte's and Schelling's development of Kant's idea of spontaneity into a conception of an absolute spontaneous subject was criticised by Hegel.

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity of impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts)." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A50/B74.

Spontaneity / indifference

A Scholastic dichotomy involving two kinds of liberty which was also employed by Locke and Hume in discussing

精神

见“灵魂”条。

严肃的精神〔或译“假正经”〕

萨特使用的一个词，用来表示这样一种信念，即有某些东西其本身就是内在善的，它作为绝对价值而内在于世界之中，可被人发现。这样一种信念就导致“自欺”〔伪劣信念〕。在萨特看来，人们之所以产生严肃的精神，是因为他们忘记了，价值是因事而变的，是被我们自己的主体性所选择和安排的。

“严肃的精神有两个特点：它将价值视为独立于人类主体性的超验的被给予者；此外，它转变了‘值得向往者’的性质，即从事物的存在论结构转变为单纯的物质构造。”——萨特：《存在与虚无》（巴奈斯英译），1957年，第626页。

唯灵论

唯灵论宣称，世界的最终本质是精神或灵魂而不是物质。肉体只是一种现象的存在，作为精神实在的一种表现，它把精神或思想作为它的惟一基础。从这种意义上讲，它是唯心主义的同义语，并且是反对唯物主义的。唯灵论各种形式的不同在于它们是如何刻画精神在世界中的根本性作用的。

“唯灵论认为，精神不仅证明和记录事情，而且还启动和操作它们。”——詹姆斯：《实用主义和真理的意义选辑》，1937年，第93页。

自发性

在康德哲学中，它指自由的理论方面，相应于作为自由的实践方面的自律。它是与被动的接受性相对立的理性的主动性能力，即没有外部的规定，并且它自为地立法以综合现象。直观的纯形式和知性的纯概念都是人类理性的自发性所产生的。康德认为，自发性必须与接受性相结合以使知识成为可能。费希特和谢林把康德的自发性观念发展为一个绝对自发性主体的概念，这一点受到黑格尔的非难。

“我们的知识发自心灵的两种根本源泉，第一是接受表象的能力（印象的接受性），第二是通过这些表象来认识对象的能力（概念〔产生的〕自发性）。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A50/B74。

自发性和无差别性


经院哲学对两类自由的二分法，洛克和休谟在讨论自由意志问题时也采用了。自发性的

the problem of free will. Liberty of spontaneity is doing what one wants or chooses to do while free from the constraints and violence of others. Liberty of indifference is having the power to do A and the power not to do A, given that the necessary conditions of each is satisfied. It is generally believed that the contradictory of spontaneity is compulsion, while the contradictory of indifference is being determined. Spontaneity is therefore compatible with determinism and according to some philosophers is not real freedom. Indifference, on the other hand, can choose between alternative courses of action and is seen by critics of spontaneity as the basis for moral responsibility. Other philosophers, however, reject the liberty of indifference and argue for the compatibility of the liberty of spontaneity with freedom and responsibility.

"There are traditional names for these two contrasting concepts of freedom: freedom defined in terms of wanting is liberty of spontaneity; liberty defined in terms of power is liberty of indifference." —A. Kenny, *Will, Freedom and Power*, 1975, p. 122.

Square of opposition

In traditional logic there are four basic propositions; A (universal affirmative, "All X are Y"), E (universal negative, "All X are not Y"), I (particular affirmative, "Some X are Y"), and O (particular negative, "Some X are not Y"). There are various logical relationships among these propositions. (1) A and E are contraries; they cannot both be true, but can both be false. (2) I and O are subcontraries; they cannot both be false, but can both be true. (3) A and O are contradictories, and so are E and I; of each pair, if one is true, the other must be false. (4) A implies I; if A is true, I must be true. Also, E implies O. The relationship of implication is also called subalternation. All these logical relationships can be presented in terms of the following diagram which is called the "square of opposition":



"The formal relations of propositions with identical terms of four forms, A, E, I, O, were represented by traditional logicians by a diagram called the square of opposition." — Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 32.

St. Petersburg paradox


A paradox of probability theory. Imagine gambling on the toss of a coin. If heads appears first time, you win \$1. If it does not appear until your second toss, you win \$2.

自由是指一个人做他想要做或选择做的事情, 不受其他事情的制约或妨碍。无差别性的自由是指在做 A 和不做 A 的必要条件都得到满足的情况下, 一个人有能力做 A, 也有能力不做 A。一般认为, 与自发性相矛盾的是强迫; 与无差别性相矛盾的是被决定。因而自发性与决定论相容, 有些哲学家认为它不是真正的自由。而另一方面, 由于无差别性可以在两个行动方针中做出选择, 所以被自发性的批判者看成是道德责任的基础。不过, 另一些哲学家拒斥无差别性的自由这一概念, 认为自发性自由与自由和责任是相容的。

"这两个相对照的自由概念各有传统名称: 根据愿望来界定的自由是自发性的自由; 根据能力来界定的自由是无差别性的自由。"——肯尼:《意志、自由与力量》, 1975 年, 第 122 页。

对当方阵

传统逻辑中有四种基本命题: A (全称肯定, "所有 X 是 Y"), E (全称否定, "所有 X 不是 Y"), I (特称肯定, "有些 X 是 Y") 和 O (特称否定, "有些 X 不是 Y")。在这些命题之间存在不同的逻辑关系。(1) A 和 E 是反对关系: 它们不能同真, 但可以同假。(2) I 和 O 是下反对关系: 它们不能同假, 但可以同真。(3) A 和 O 是矛盾关系, E 和 I 也是如此: 对于每一对命题来说, 如果一个为真, 另一个必定为假。(4) A 蕴涵 I; 如果 A 真 I 必真。同样, E 蕴涵 O。蕴涵关系亦称差等关系。所有这些逻辑关系都可以用下述图解来表示, 这个图叫做"对当方阵":



"传统逻辑学家用一个叫做对当方阵的图来表示具有相同词项的四类命题 A, E, I, O 之间的形式关系。"——米切尔:《逻辑导论》, 1962 年, 第 32 页。

圣彼得堡悖论

概率论的一个悖论。猜测硬币抛掷的赌博。如果头像第一次出现, 你赢 1 美元。如果在你第二次抛掷时它又出现, 你赢 2 美元。除非反面向

Your potential winnings double each time tails turns up and you do not win. Your gamble will stop only when heads appears. How much should you expect to win by gambling according to these simple rules and how much should he be willing to pay for a chance to play? The surprising answer, an infinite amount, is derived from the series of $(1/2) + (2 \times 1/4) + (4 \times 1/8) \dots$ which has an infinite sum. But this expected return seems unreasonable and has been used to argue against using infinite utilities in decision theory. The paradox is so called because it first appeared in a memoir by Daniel Bernoulli in the *Commentarii of the St. Petersburg Academy*.

"The St. Petersburg paradox arises out of a game in which Peter engages to pay Paul one shilling if a head appears at the first toss of a coin, two shillings if it does appear until the second, and, in general, a $r-1$ shillings if no head appears until the r th toss."—Keynes, *A Treatise of Probability*, 1929, p. 316.

Stage of existence

Also called sphere of existence. A stage is generally a phase of development or a moment in an evolutionary process. But for Kierkegaard, a stage is a view about the possibility of life or of a way of life. He mainly distinguishes three kinds of stages: the aesthetic stage, in which one is self-centred and considers life to be a matter of sensuous pleasure; the ethical stage, in which one becomes conscious of being a part of a community; and the religious stage, in which one recognises that one's life has a relation to the absolute. The religious stage is in turn divided into Religiousness A and Religiousness B. Each stage is an enclosed world, an independent sphere of life. An aesthetic individual concentrates on enjoying life. An individual in the ethical stage takes a sense of responsibility and duty as the meaning of life. In Religiousness A, an individual assumes an essential relationship to the eternal, and in Religiousness B, the individual becomes eternal. Kierkegaard believed that in moving from the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage and from the ethical stage to the religious stage, there is an ascent. Each stage in turn aims at something higher in humanity. However, he did not think that one stage will inevitably develop into another stage, although it is possible for one to leap from one to another. The relationship between the aesthetic and ethical stages is discussed in *Either / Or*, while the relationship between the ethical and religious stages is most clearly explicated in *Fear and Trembling*.

"The different existence-stages rank according to their relation to the cosmic in proportion to their having the cosmic inside or outside themselves, yet not in the sense that the cosmic should be the highest."—Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (trans. by Hong and Hong), 1992, I, p. 520.

上时你不赢,你可能的赢额每次都会是翻倍。而只有在头像出现时你才会停止赌博。那么,按照这些简单的规则,你期望通过赌博赢多少钱?应赢多少钱才足以胜算?答案是“一个无限的量”,这个惊人的结果来自 $(1/2) + (2 \times 1/4) + (4 \times 1/8) \dots$ 这样一个系列,这是一个无限的总量。但是,这种期望的赢额似乎是不合理的,而且也被用于反对在决定论中使用无穷功利。之所以如此称谓这个悖论,是因为它第一次出现在D.伯努利在《彼得堡学院评论》所写的一篇回忆录中。

“圣彼得堡悖论源出于一个游戏:彼得允诺,如果保罗第一次抛掷硬币时头像出现,就付他一先令,如果第二次出现就付两先令,总而言之,如果直到第 r 次抛掷时头像才不出现,就付 $r-1$ 先令。”——凯恩斯:《论概率》,1929年,第316页。

生存阶段

也叫作“生存境界”。一般说来,一个阶段指发展中的一个状态或进化过程中的一个时期。但对于克尔凯郭尔来说,一个阶段是对于生活可能性或生活方式的一种看法。他区分了三种主要的阶段:感性的(aesthetic,一些人译为“美学”的,在这里似乎欠妥)阶段,在其中人以自我为中心,将生活视为一桩追求感性快乐的事情;伦理的阶段,在其中人意识到自己是社团的一部分;宗教的阶段,在其中人认识到自己的生活与绝对者有关系。宗教阶段又被分为第一种宗教状态(Religiousness A)和第二种宗教状态(Religiousness B),每一个阶段都是一个封闭的世界和一个独立的生活境界。感性的个人只知享受生活。伦理阶段的个人则将责任与义务感作为生活的意义。在第一种宗教状态中,个人承担着与永恒者的根本关联,而在第二种宗教状态中,个人成为永恒的。克尔凯郭尔相信,从感性阶段到伦理阶段,从伦理阶段到宗教阶段,是在上升。每个阶段都各自以某种更高的人性为目标。然而,他并不认为一个阶段会不可避免地发展到另一个阶段,尽管人从一个阶段跳跃到另一个阶段是可能的。《非此即彼》讨论了感性与伦理阶段的关系,《恐惧与战栗》则最清楚地阐释了伦理与宗教阶段的关系。

“不同的生存阶段按其喜剧因素的关系而排成序列,即按它们本身的内部和外部所具有的喜剧因素的比例而排序;但这并不意味着喜剧形态是最高级的。”——克尔凯郭尔:《关于(哲学片断)的非科学的最后附言》(洪夫妇英译),1992年,第一卷,第520页。

Standing sentence, see occasion sentence

State

A set of organised institutions operating in a territory with a substantial population composed of its citizens or subjects. It has a legal system to regulate the activities of society and to reconcile conflicting claims of individuals and groups belonging to it. The legal system is backed by a monopoly of legitimate coercion. In its positive functions, a state promotes welfare and justice for its citizens. In its negative functions, a state defends the integrity of its territory from foreign invasion, keeps order and maintains the security of its citizens. A state recognises the equal sovereignty of other states and enters inter-state relations subject to international law. There are various theories about the origin and nature of the state. Anarchism denies the need for the coercive power of the state and argues for the limitation of the state's functions. Social contract theorists justify the state in terms of the benefits of security and freedom offered by civil society in contrast to the impotence and misery of an actual or hypothetical state of nature. Communitarians claim that individuals are moulded by the state. Individualists and holists disagree whether the existence, nature and actions of the state can be reduced to those of its individual members.

"We should say that a state is a group of persons who have supreme authority within a given territory or over a certain population."—Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, 1970, p. 3.

State of affairs

[German: *Sachverhalt*] Wittgenstein's term for the combination of objects or things in a determinate way. Its structure is determined by the possible ways in which the objects can be combined. States of affairs are independent of one another, and facts comprise their existence or non-existence. The totality of states of affairs constitutes the world. States of affairs are on the side of the world rather than on the side of language. They are the fundamental picturable items corresponding to elementary propositions in language.

"In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.03.

State of nature

In social contract theory, the actual or hypothetical natural human condition prior to entry into organised civil society. The concept has been a powerful analytical tool in modern political philosophy in justifying political authority and in explaining human rights. Different philosophers make different use of the state of nature. For Hobbes, it is a brutal state of continual of war of all against all. There is neither peace

标准句子

见“场合句子”条。

国家

在一拥有由它的公民或臣民构成大量人口的领土内运行的一套有组织的机构及其制度。它有一个法律体系控制社会的活动和调解属于它的个人和集团的冲突的要求。这一法律体系受到独占的合法强制的支持。就国家的积极功能而言,它为它的公民促进福利和公正。就国家的消极功能而言,它保卫其领土完整不受外来侵犯、维持秩序和维护它的公民的安全。一个国家承认其他国家的平等的主权,并加入受国际法约束的国与国的关系中。有关国家的起源和本质有各种理论。无政府主义否认需要国家强制的权力,并争论说要限制国家的功能。社会契约论者论证国家合理性的依据的是市民社会提供的安全和自由的益处,这种益处与实际或假设的自然状态的无能和苦难形成对照。社群主义者声称个人是由国家塑造的。个人主义和整体主义在国家的存在、本质和行为是否能归结为它的个体成员的存在、本质和行为这一问题上存在分歧。

“我们应该说,国家是在既定的领土内或对于一定的人口拥有最高权力的一群人。”——沃尔夫,《为无政府主义辩护》,1970年,第3页。

事态

[源自德文 *Sachverhalt*] 维特根斯坦用来说明对象或事物以一定方式结合的术语。它的结构由诸种可能将对象结合起来的方式确定。事态是彼此独立的。它们的存在或不存在构成了事实。事态的总体构成世界。事态处在世界的一边,而不是处在语言的一边,它们是对应于语言中基本命题的基础性的可描绘的东西。

“对象在事态中像链环一样相互连接。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,2.03。

自然状态

在社会契约论中,实际或假设的人类的自然状况先于进入有组织的市民社会。在近代政治哲学中,自然状态这一概念一直是论证政治权力的合理性和解释人权的强有力的分析工具。不同的哲学家对自然状态有不同的用法。在霍布斯那里,它是连绵不断的、一切人反对一切人的战争的野蛮状态。既不存在和平,也不存在

nor any reasonable way of solving conflicts. To escape, human beings contract with an all-powerful sovereign to give up their natural right to whatever they want in return for stability and protection. For Locke, the state of nature is governed by the law of nature and is more inconvenient than brutal. It lacks established law and has neither impartial judges nor the use of legitimate force in enforcing the law. Our rational desire to seek better protection and impartial enforcement of natural rights leads human beings to form a political or civil society through a unanimous contract and to entrust a government with legislative, executive and judicial powers. Rousseau claimed that human beings in the state of nature are noble savages, whose nature is perfected, and possibly corrupted, by the formation of civic society. For Hegel, society constitutes the nature of human beings rather than human being constituting the nature of society.

"The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone. And reason, which is the law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or permission."—Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, II, 2, 5.

Statement / proposition

Statements are usually defined as sentences which state (that is assert or deny) something. "Statement" and "proposition" are widely treated as synonyms, with both distinguished from "sentence". But logical positivists draw a distinction between statements and propositions. Suppose that a proposition must be both meaningful and the bearer of truth and falsity and that the verification principle can only be used to test propositions (not sentences which are neither true nor false). There would be no point in employing the principle to distinguish meaningful from meaningless propositions because propositions are by definition verifiable and meaningful. To cope with this, Logical positivists claim that although all indicative sentences are statements, not all of them are propositions. Unlike propositions, indicative sentences might be meaningful or not meaningful. All indicative sentences are statements, but only those which are meaningful according to the verificationist theory of meaning are propositions. Thus, propositions become a sub-class of statements, namely, those statements which are meaningful. The principle of verification is a criterion for determining whether an indicative sentence expresses a propositional or a non-propositional statement.

"To say that indicative sentences mean propositions is indeed legitimate, just as it is legitimate to say that they express statements."—Ayer, *Language, Logic and Truth*, 1946, p. 9.

解决冲突的合理的方法。为了摆脱这种状态,人们与一个最强大的主权者订立契约,放弃他们想要的不管是什么样的自然权利以换取安定和保护。在洛克看来,自然状态由自然法所支配,它比野蛮状态更不方便,它缺少制定的法律,而且既没有公正的法官,也没有使用合法的力量来执行法律。我们寻求更好的保护和公正实施自然权利的理性要求,导致人们通过一致同意的契约形成一个政治的或市民的社会,并赋予政府以立法、行政和司法权。卢梭认为,自然状态下的人是高尚的未开化的人,其本性是完美的,并有可能被市民社会形态所腐蚀。在黑格尔看来,社会构成人的本质,而不是人构成社会的本质。

"自然状态有自然法支配它,自然法束缚着每一个人。而理性,也就是自然法,告诉所有意欲遵从而不是与它协商的人,所有的人都是平等和独立的,任何人都不应伤害他人的生命、健康、自由或意愿。"—洛克:《政府论两篇》, I, 2, 5。

陈述/命题

陈述通常被定义为陈述了(即肯定或否定了)某事的语句。"陈述"和"命题"被广泛地当成同义词,都与"语句"有区别。但逻辑实证主义者在陈述和命题之间作出了区分。假设一命题必须既是有意义的,又要承载真和假,证实原则只能用来检验命题(而不是语句,它们既非真又非假)。若要使用此原则来区分有意义和无意义的命题,那是不得要领的,因为命题按定义就是可证实和有意义的。与此相应,逻辑实证主义者认为,虽然所有的指示性语句都是陈述,但并非它们全都是命题。与命题不同,指示性语句可能是有意义的或无意义的。所有的指示性语句都是陈述,但只有那些根据意义的证实理论为有意义的陈述才是命题。因此,命题成了陈述的一个子集合,即是说,它们是有意义的陈述。证实原则是确定指示性语句表达了命题性陈述还是非命题性陈述的标准。

"说指示性语句意指命题确实是合理的,就像说它们表达了陈述是合理的一样。"—艾耶尔:《语言、逻辑和真理》, 1946年,第9页。

Stimulus meaning

For Quine, the stimulus meaning of a sentence is given when we describe the kind of stimulus which would prompt assent to it. If all speakers assent to a sentence in any circumstance in which it arises, that sentence is stimulus analytic; if two sentences are assented to in just the same circumstances, they are stimulus synonymous. Generally, the stimuli that prompt people's assent to an occasion sentence are the same, but they vary from person to person in the case of standing sentences. This is one major argument by which Quine claims that the facts about stimulus meaning do not determine a unique correct translation manual, and hence that translation is indeterminate.

"The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a subject sums up his disposition to assent to or dissent from the sentence in response to present stimulation."—Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 33.

Stipulative definition

A definition which gives a particular meaning to a new expression, or a new meaning to an established term. It is provided to indicate how one intends to use the term in order to improve clarity and precision of communication or discussion. It is generally expressed in something like the following form: "By the term X what I mean here is...". or "I shall use this word to mean so-and-so". It does not imply that the word has been used by anyone else to mean this, in contrast to lexical definition which reports what people in general mean by the word. Sometimes it is necessary for scholars and scientists to characterise the meanings of words suit the task at hand.

"By 'stipulative definition' I mean establishing or announcing or choosing one's own meaning for a word." —R. Robinson, *Definition*, 1950, p. 19.

Strategic action

For Habermas, a model of action, in contrast to communicative action, in which the participants direct their actions through egocentric calculation of utility. Each agent seeks appropriate means to achieve an end with a favourable outcome for himself. Strategic action is not reciprocal and is not performed on the basis of mutual understanding. In communicative action, participants harmonise their respective plans on the basis of having a common understanding of the situation and make claims that all concerned can accept as valid. The distinction between strategic action and communicative action provides the framework by reference to which Habermas seeks to explain a wide range of social phenomena.

"Strategic action is distinguished from communicative actions under common conditions by the characteristic that deciding between possible alternative choices can in principle be made monologically: that means, *ad hoc* without reaching a

刺激意义

在奎因看来,当我们描述一种赞同某个句子的刺激时,我们就得到了这个句子的刺激意义。如果所有的说者都同意在任何情况中出现的某个句子,那么这个句子就是分析性刺激;如果两个句子在同样的情况中得到了赞同,那么它们的刺激就是同义的。一般来说,促使人们赞同某个场合句子的刺激是相同的,但它们在标准句子的情况中却是因人而异的。这就是奎因提出的主要论证,他认为,有关刺激意义的事实并不能确定惟一正确的翻译手册,因而翻译是不确定的。

"句子对主体的刺激意义,根本在于他在对目前刺激的反应中赞同或不赞同这个句子的态度。"——奎因:《词与物》,1960年,第33页。

规定定义

给一新表达式以特定的意义,或给一已有词项以新意义的定义。它旨在表明:人们打算使用该词项以改善交流或讨论的明晰性和精确性。它通常以类似下述形式的方式表达:"所谓词项X,我这里是指……"或"我将用这个词意指如此这般的情形",这并不意味着该词已被任何其他入用来意指这一点。规定定义与字典定义形成对照,后者是对人们通常所理解的该词意义的报道。对于学者和科学家来说,有时有必要限定词语的意义以适应手边工作的需要。

"所谓'规定定义',我是指为一个词语确立或宣布或选定一个人自己的意义。"——罗宾逊:《定义》,1950年,第19页。

策略行为

哈贝马斯用来表示一种行为模式的词,与"交往行为"相对而言;在这种行为中,参与者通过以自我为中心的利益计算来指导其行为。每一个行为者都寻求达到某个目标的合适手段,以产生对自己的最大利益。策略行为不是相互需要的,也并不基于相互理解的基础之上。在交往行为中,参与者对于形势有共识,并在此基础上协调各自的计划,使所有相关者都能接受之。策略行为与交往行为的区别为哈贝马斯提供了一个解释广泛的社会现象的构架。

"在一般情况下,"策略行为"与"交往行为"的区别在于,面对不同的选择可能,前者的决定能够在原则上以独白的方式作出,即以无需取得一致的方式作出;实际上也只能以这种方式作出决定,因为选择规则和束缚每个个别参与者的准则已达到了先在的和谐。"——哈贝

greement, and indeed must be made so, because the rules of preference and the maxims binding on each individual partner have been brought into prior harmony.” —Habermas, *Theory and Practice* (tran. Viertel), 1974, p. 151.

Straw man fallacy

An argument against a position which substitutes another view for the opponent's actual stance and gives the impression that the actual position has been refuted. The position that is misleadingly ascribed generally sounds more unlikely than the actual position and is hence more easily exposed to criticism. Because the alleged position is not what the opponent holds and is weaker than the actual position, it is like a straw man that can be far more easily overcome than a real man.

“The best and purest cases of the straw man fallacy ... go like this. I argue for a certain position, ... you then try to refute me, not by arguing against my conclusion, but against an exaggeration.” —Richards, *The Language of Reasons*, 1978, p. 43.

Stream of consciousness

A metaphor introduced by William James to describe the character of consciousness. Consciousness is not made out of units, but is a streamlike process. Past, present and future are our conceptual ascription. Because any awareness of “present” is seen as an awareness of a recent past, the stream of consciousness is associated with the notion of a specious present.

“Consciousness ... does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. ... a ‘river’ or ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described.” —W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1.9, 239.

Strict conditional, see strict implication

Strict identity

Butler initiated a distinction between two meanings of identity, that is, identity in the strict sense, and identity in a loose and popular sense. That A is strictly identical with B means that whatever can be said of one can be said of the other. That is, A and B are identical in all possible worlds. Identity or sameness in our daily conversation only requires that two things are identical in certain parts or aspects. A man yesterday is identical with this man today. But this is not a strict identity, for the man today has some characteristics which were not possessed by the same person yesterday. For instance, yesterday the person was sick, while today he is well; yesterday he was single, but today he is married.

“Strict identity is governed by a principle that is called the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This says that if a is strictly

马斯:《理论与实践》(菲尔泰英译), 1974年, 第151页。

稻草人谬误

反对某种见解的论证, 用该见解替换论敌实际主张的另一种见解, 并给人们留下印象, 似乎论敌的实际见解已被驳倒了。诱使人错误地归属于论敌的见解比论敌实际主张的见解通常听起来更不可能成立, 因此更易受到批评。既然所提到的见解并不是论敌所主张的, 并且比论敌的实际主张更弱, 于是该见解就像一个稻草人, 打倒它要比打倒一个真正的人容易得多。

“稻草人谬误最好和最纯粹的情形……是这样: 我论证某种见解, ……你然后试图反驳我, 但并不是反驳我的结论, 而是反驳某种言过其实的夸张说法。”——理查兹:《理性的语言》, 1978年, 第43页。

意识流

由W. 詹姆斯引入的一个隐喻, 用来描述意识的特点。意识并不由众多单位组成, 而是一个像流一样的过程。过去、现在和未来是我们的概念归类。由于任何对“现在”的意识都被看做是对最近过去的意识, 意识流就与一个似现在观念联系起来。

“意识……并不对自身呈现为被切开的碎片。……一条‘河流’或‘水流’能够最自然地描述意识的隐喻。”——詹姆斯:《心理学原理》, 第一卷, 第9章, 第239页。

严格条件句

见“严格蕴涵”条。

严格同一性

巴特勒区分了两种意义上的同一性, 亦即严格意义上的同一性和宽松或通俗意义上的同一性。A 严格同一于B 意味着可以对其中一个所说的东西, 也可以对另一个说。也就是说, A 与B 在所有的可能世界都是同一的。我们在日常谈话中所谈论的同一性或“相同性”只要求两个事物在某些部分或方面同一。昨天的一个人同一于今天的这个人。但这并不是一个严格同一性, 因为今天的这个人可能具有某些昨天的同样一个人所不具有的特征。例如, 昨天这个人可能生病了, 而今天他又好了; 昨天他是单身, 而今天他结婚了。

“严格同一性被一个称为等同物的不可分辨性原则所支配。这就是说, 如果a 严格同一于

identical with b, then a and b have exactly the same properties.” —Armstrong, *Universals*, 1989, p. 3.

Strict implication

In order to avoid the paradoxes of material implication, C. I. Lewis introduced the notion of strict implication. One proposition implies another (If p then q) in the strict sense of the word if and only if it is impossible that p should be true and q false, that is if the statement “p is true and q is false” is inconsistent. Lewis claimed that strict implication was the relation which justified inference from the premises to a conclusion in a deductive argument. Hence it can avoid the paradoxes of material implication and does justice to our ordinary notion of implication. He therefore developed a propositional calculus on the basis of the notion of strict implication in order to replace Russell's propositional calculus which was established on the basis of the notion of material implication. However his definition of strict implication also implies paradoxes; an impossible proposition implies every proposition; and a necessary proposition is implied by every proposition. Hence, just as the term material conditional was proposed to replace the term material implication, it has been suggested that strict conditional should replace strict implication.

“If p implies q, then it is not the case that p is true and q false... this is the main distinction between strict implication and material implication.” —Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, 1932, p. 134.

Strife and love

[Greek: *neikos*, strife; *philia*, love or friendship] Two principles of movement in the cosmology of the Greek philosopher Empedocles. By analogy with human emotions, Strife is the power to dissolve or separate the four basic elements: fire, air, water and earth, and Love is the power to form and maintain their union. Both principles are eternal. They have no perceptible qualities of their own, but are detectable by their effects. They alternately dominate the cosmos as a whole, making the cosmic system a never-ending cycle. When Love is in control, all elements are fused uniformly, but when Strife rules, the elements are at war with each other. These two principles were meant not only to account for process and change in the natural world, but also to work in social relationships.

“These things never cease from continual shifting, at one time all coming together, through Love, at another each borne apart from the others through Strife.” —Simplicius, *Physics*, 158. 7.

Structural ambiguity

Also called syntactical ambiguity. The ambiguity arises from the grammatical structure of a language, that is, from the different ways in which words in a sentence of that lan-

b, 则 a 与 b 具有完全相同的特性。”——阿姆斯特朗:《普遍》, 1989 年, 第 3 页。

严格蕴涵

为了避免实质蕴涵悖论, C. I. 刘易斯引入了严格蕴涵概念。一命题在蕴涵一词的严格意义上蕴涵另一命题(如果 p 则 q), 当且仅当不可能 p 真而 q 假, 即陈述“p 真 q 假”是不一致的。刘易斯断言, 严格蕴涵是确证演绎论证中从前提到结论的推理合法的那种关系。所以它能避免实质蕴涵悖论, 并且公正对待我们日常的蕴涵概念。他由此发展了以严格蕴涵概念为基础的命题演算, 以便代替罗素建立在实质蕴涵概念基础上的命题演算。不过, 刘易斯的严格蕴涵定义也蕴涵着悖论: 不可能命题蕴涵每一个命题; 必然命题被每一命题所蕴涵。所以, 正像有人提议用“实质条件句”一词替换“实质蕴涵”一样, 一直有人认为应该用“严格条件句”去代替“严格蕴涵”。

“如果 p 蕴涵 q, 那么并非 p 真而 q 假……这是严格蕴涵与实质蕴涵之间的主要区别。”——刘易斯和兰根福特:《符号逻辑》, 1932 年, 第 134 页。

恨与爱

[源自希腊文 *neikos* (恨); *philia* (爱或友谊)] 希腊哲学家恩培多克勒宇宙论中的两个运动原则。与人类情感相似, 恨是分解或分离四元素(火, 气, 水, 土)的力量, 而爱则是构成和维持它们统一的力量。两个原则都是永恒的。它们自身并无可感的性质, 但可从它们作用的结果上去分别。它们交替主宰宇宙整体, 使宇宙系统成为一个永不停止的循环。当爱处于控制地位时, 一切元素都协调一致; 当恨统治时, 各元素彼此争斗。这两种元素不仅叙述了自然界的进程和变化, 而且也在社会关系中起作用。

“这些事物从未停止过变化, 某一时它们由于爱而走到一起, 另一时它们又通过恨而彼此分开。”——辛普里丘:《物理学》, 158. 7。

结构模糊性

也称作“句法的模糊性”。这种模糊性出自语言的语法结构, 即出自这种语言的句子中语词之间有意义地相互联系的不同方式。这种模

guage can be related meaningfully to each other. This sort of ambiguity is ascribed to a sentence or statement, and is in contrast to semantic or lexical ambiguity which is ascribed to a word and arises from the multiplicity of senses associated with a single word. The grammatical relations which most often produce structural or syntactical ambiguity include misplaced modifiers, loosely applied adverbs, elliptical constructions and omitted punctuation. For instance, the statement that "The fat businessman's son is nice" is structurally ambiguous for the adjective "fat" can be taken to modify either "businessman" or "the businessman's son"

"A denoting expression is called structurally ambiguous if there is a model with respect to which it is ambiguous." — Montague, *Formal Philosophy*, 1974, p. 209.

Structural linguistics

The school of modern linguistics which holds that language is a system or structure of elements that happen to occur in a single speech community at a particular time. Each language is a unique system without any presumption about other languages. The job of linguists is to describe the structure of a given language, namely, to analyse the relations between elements which compose the structure, such as phonemes, morphemes and phrases. The founder of structural linguistics was Ferdinand de Saussure, who had great influence through his posthumously published *Cours de Linguistique Generale*, although he used the word "system" rather than "structure". In criticising the diachronic perspective of nineteenth century comparative grammar, Saussure claimed that language has a systematic aspect. It embodies laws of equilibrium which operate on its elements and which yield a synchronic system. Structural linguistics separates linguistics from other disciplines and renders it a special science. Other major expositors of structural linguistics include Bloomfield (*Language*, 1931) and Zellig Harris (*Methods in Structural Linguistics*, 1952). Through criticism of structural linguistics, Chomsky developed his transformational-generative linguistics. Chomsky believes that the wholeness of linguistic structures is based on the laws of transformation. Hence, linguistics should study the "creative" aspect of language, together with its synchronic aspect.

"It is extremely interesting that, despite the very strong arguments for keeping linguistic structuralism within synchronic confines, present-day linguistic structuralism, as represented by the work of Zellig Harris, and above all, his pupil Noam Chomsky, has, as regards syntax, a clearly 'generative' orientation." — Piaget, *Structuralism*, 1971, p. 81.

Structural property

A property of a thing which results from the structure of the thing or a system. If a relation R is symmetric, then ev-

糊性与句子或陈述有关,这相对于“语义的”或“指示的”模糊性而言,后者与语词有关,出自与单个语词有关的意义的多样性。最常产生结构的或句法的模糊性的语法关系,包括误换修饰词,随意地运用副词,省略的结构,省去的标点符号等等。例如,“胖商人儿子很好”就是结构上模糊的,因为形容词“胖”既可以用于修饰“商人”也可以用于修饰“商人的儿子”。

“如果某个指称表达式在模型上是模糊的,那么这个表达式就被称作是在结构上模糊的。”——蒙塔古:《形式哲学》,1974年,第209页。

结构语言学

当代语言学的一派,它认为语言是由一些因素组成的系统或结构,这些因素碰巧在某个时间出现于一个单独的语言共同体之中。每一个语言都是一个独特的系统,并不预设其他的语言。语言学家们的工作就是去描述一个既定语言的结构,也就是去分析组成结构的众因素之间的关系,比如音素、词素和词组。结构语言学的创立者是F. de 索绪尔。他死后出版的《普通语言学教程》具有极大的影响,尽管他使用的是“系统”而不是“结构”这个词。在批判19世纪语法比较研究的历时性观点时,他提出语言具有系统的方面。语言体现了因素之间的平衡法则,而这些法则产生出了共时的系统。结构语言学把语言学家与其他学科区分开来,使语言学成为一门专门的科学。结构语言学的其他阐述者包括布龙菲尔德(《语言论》,1931年)和Z. 哈里斯(《结构语言学方法》,1952年)。通过对结构语言学的批判,N. 乔姆斯基发展出了他的转换—生成语言学。乔姆斯基相信整个语言结构基于转换或变形规则。因此,语言学应该研究语言的“创造性的”方面,当然也包括语言的共时的方面。

“极为有趣的是,尽管有将语言学的结构主义保持在共时性范围内的强有力的论证,当今以Z. 哈里斯、特别是他的学生N. 乔姆斯基为代表的语言学结构主义却在句法研究方面有了清晰可见的‘生成的’倾向。”——皮亚杰:《结构主义》,1971年,第81页。

结构特性

来自事物结构或系统的一种事物特性。如果一种关系R是对称的,那么每种具有与R相

ery relation having the same structure as R will also be symmetric. This property of being symmetric is a structural property because it relies only on the structure of the relation and is not affected by a change in the items within the structure. The structure itself is a structural property.

"In general we say a property of n -place relations is a (n -place) structural property provided it depends simply on the structure, i. e. provided it is preserved under isomorphism." —Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications*, 1958, p. 141.

Structural violence

A term for social and institutional injustice, such as apartheid, rather than conflict and injury caused by force. Structural violence is exemplified by unfair laws or entrenched customs which deny certain groups in the community fair access to the available social, economic, political or cultural opportunities. Structural violence does not necessarily involve physical force. It is called violence, which ordinarily means the illegal use of physical force, to justify rebellion against it by appeal to the right to self-defence. Structural violence and institutional violence are sometimes used interchangeably, but the latter is more properly restricted to legal violence. Institutional violence has often been used to maintain structural violence.

"Structural violence is a name for what would more correctly be called social injustice." —Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 1986, p. 2.

Structuralism

The basic claim of structuralism is that all social phenomena, no matter how diverse their superficial appearance, are internally connected and organised according to some unconscious patterns. These internal relations and patterns constitute structures, and uncovering these structures is the object of human studies. Generally, a structure is characteristically whole, transformational, and self-regulatory. Structuralism is a methodology which emphasises structure rather than substance, and relation rather than things. It holds that things exist only as elements of a signifying system. Structural methodology originated in Saussure's structural linguistics, which describes language as a rule-governed social system of signs. In the 1960s, the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss extended this methodology not only to anthropology (anthropological structuralism), but indeed to all signifying systems. Lévi-Strauss is generally regarded to be the founder of modern structuralism. Through his work, structuralism became a major intellectual trend in Western Europe, especially France, and greatly influenced the study of the human sciences. Foucault was influenced by this methodology in his radical reconstruction of intellectual history. Lacan relied on both Saussure and Freud in his development of

同结构的关系,也同样是对称的。这种对称的特性就是结构特性,因为它只是依赖于这种关系的结构,并不受这个结构中内容变化的影响。这个结构本身就是一个结构特性。

"我们通常说,一种 n 位关系特性就是仅仅依赖于结构的 (n 位) 结构特性,即它保存着一种同型性。"——卡尔纳普,《符号逻辑及其应用导论》,1958年,第141页。

结构性暴力

这一术语指的是社会和制度的非正义,例如种族隔离,而不是指由暴力引起的冲突和伤害。结构性暴力是以不公正的法律或顽固的习俗为例证的,而它们否认社会中某些群体可以公平得到那些可以得到的社会、经济、政治或文化方面的机会。结构性暴力无须包括人身暴力。它被称为暴力(这通常意指非法使用人身暴力)是要表明以要求自卫权利去反抗它是正当的。结构性暴力有时与"制度性暴力"这一术语交替使用,但后者被更严格地限于法律方面的暴力。制度性暴力常常被用来维护结构性暴力。

"结构性暴力是一个应更正确地称之为社会非正义的名词。"——泰西曼,《和平主义和正义战争》,1986年,第2页。

结构主义

结构主义的基本主张是,所有的社会现象,不管其表面显得如何多样,它们都是内在相关联的,按照某些未被意识到的样式组织起来的。这些内在关系和样式构成了结构,而揭示这些结构就是人文研究的目的。一般说来,一个结构具有整体、转换和自身调整的特性。结构主义是一种方法论,强调结构而非实体、关系而非事物。它主张事物仅作为一个意指系统的元素而存在。结构主义的方法论源于索绪尔的结构主义语言学,这种语言学将语言描述为服从于规则的社会符号系统。60年代,法国人类学家C. 列维-斯特劳斯不仅将此方法运用到人类学(人类学的结构主义),而且延伸到所有的意指系统。列维-斯特劳斯被普遍看做是当代结构主义的创立者。通过他的工作,结构主义成为西欧、特别是法国的主要思潮,极大地影响了人文科学的研究。福柯彻底重建思想史的努力受到了这一方法论的影响。拉康在他对于心理分析的发展(心理结构主义)中既依据索绪尔,也依靠弗洛伊德。阿尔杜塞将这个方法论用于对马克思主义的分析(结构的马克思主义)。此方法也用于数学。相对于以分离化的方式来研究数学

psychoanalysis (psycho-structuralism). Althusser applied the methodology to the analysis of Marxism (structural Marxism). The method is also applied to mathematics. In contrast to the compartmentalisation characteristic of other approaches to mathematics, structuralism claims to recover unity through isomorphisms in different branches of mathematics. Structuralism became a major methodological movement, although its doctrines and interpretations of its crucial term "structure" varied in different fields. In many areas, structuralism has been superseded by post-structuralism.

"Structuralism is essentially a method, with all this term implies: it is technical, involves certain intellectual obligations of honesty, views progress in terms of gradual approximation." — Piaget, *Structuralism*, 1971, p. 137.

Structured violence

Bernard Williams drew a distinction between structured violence and unstructured violence among official violent acts in his paper "Politics and Moral Character". Only the state can be justified in performing acts of structured violence, such as judicial execution, regular military operations and the application of legal force by the police. No private citizen is lawfully allowed to do them, and it would not even make sense to say that a private person performed some of them. Acts of unstructured violence may be done by a political leader, but in accordance with law and for the sake of defending the national interest. Acts of this sort especially appear in international relations, which generally are less structured than relationships within a society. Unstructured violence is the topic of public morality.

"It may be said that structured violence constitutes acts which none but the state could even logically perform." — Williams, in Hampshire (ed.), *Public and Private Morality*, 1978, p. 71.

Style

The manner in which a thing is made or done. Style is generally ascribed only to artefacts rather than to nature. The style of a work of art is a complex consisting of ways of creating, modifying, selecting, and interpreting the material. Style manifests the peculiarity and personality of an artist, and directs the audience to the salient features of the work they are appreciating. The same content can be presented with different styles, and different artists are identified by their different styles. Styles can characterise works of a period, tradition or school as well as those of an individual artist. Some philosophers are puzzled why in some cases critics can articulate the complex character of a style only in retrospect.

"A style is a way of doing things; but what we have in nature is just the way things happen. The arts are means of expression, and style in art plays the part in expression that

的其他方法。结构主义要通过不同数学分支之间的同型性来重现其统一性。结构主义成为了一个重要的方法论运动, 尽管它的学说和对于关键词“结构”的解释依不同领域而不同。在许多领域中, 结构主义已被后结构主义顶替。

“结构主义从根本上讲是一种方法, 具有‘方法’这个词所包含的一切含义; 它是技术性的, 要求理智上的诚实负责, 通过逐步的接近来看进步。”——皮亚杰:《结构主义》, 1971年, 第137页。

有组织的暴力

B. 威廉姆斯在他的论文《政治与道德特性》中对官方暴力行为中有组织的暴力和无组织的暴力做了区分。只有国家执行的有组织的暴力, 例如, 司法的实施、常规的军事演习、警察对法律力量的运用, 才能是正当的。任何平民做这些事都是非法的, 而且说一个平民执行某些有组织的暴力甚至都是没有意义的。无组织的暴力行为也许是由一个政治领袖实施的, 但是是依法行事的, 并且是为了保护国家的利益。这类行为尤其是表现在国际关系中, 它同一般社会内的关系相比一般更少组织性。无组织的暴力是公共道德的一个论题。

“也许可以说, 有组织的暴力规定了只有国家才能合法执行的行为。”——威廉姆斯, 载汉普舍(编辑):《公共道德和个人道德》, 1978年, 第71页。

风格

一种制作东西或做事的方式。风格一般仅仅用于人工制品而非自然界。艺术作品的风格是由创造、修饰、选择和解释素材等方式构成的复合体。风格展现艺术家的独创性和人格, 同时还引导观众发现其鉴赏作品的突出特征。同一内容可用不同风格予以表现, 因此不同的艺术家是由他们不同的风格来辨别的。风格可以显示出某一时期、某一传统、某一流派与个体艺术家之作品的基本特征。令有些哲学家感到迷惑的是, 为什么批评家有时只能以回顾的方式阐述一种风格的复杂特征。

“风格是做事的一种方式; 然而, 我们在自然界所看到的東西是以其自发的方式出现的。艺术是表现的手段, 艺术风格在表现中发挥着作用, 而这种作用在交流沟通中是凭借语言来实现的。”——斯帕肖特:《美学的结构》, 1963

is played in communication by language.” —Sparshott, *The Structure of Aesthetics*, 1963, p. 99.

Subaltern

In traditional logic, a universal proposition implies a particular proposition of the same quality. Hence A (All S are P) implies I (Some S are P), and E (All S are not P) implies O (Some S are not P). Logicians call I the subaltern of A, and O the subaltern of E. Correspondingly, A is called the superaltern of I, and E the superaltern of O. The whole relationship between a universal proposition and its corresponding particular proposition (which has the same subject and predicate terms and the same quality as the universal) is subalternation and is represented in the square of opposition. A subaltern is also termed a subimplicit, while a superaltern is also termed a superimplicit. If the universal proposition is true, so is its corresponding particular proposition, but not vice versa.

“Subaltern ... is a particular proposition which follows by an immediate inference from its corresponding universal to which it is said to be subaltern.” —Peirce, *Collected Papers*, II, p. 459.

Subcontraries

If two propositions cannot both be false but may both be true, they are subcontraries. Hence we may infer from the falsity of one that the other is true, but cannot infer the truth-value of the other from the truth of one of them. In traditional logic this logical relationship occurs between the particular affirmative proposition I (Some S are P) and the particular negative proposition O (Some S are not P).

“Two propositions are said to be subcontraries if they cannot both be false, although they might both be true.” —Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, 7th ed., p. 179.

Subjective knowledge, see objective knowledge

Subjective-objective distinction

The subject contributes what is subjective to such things as perceptual, moral and aesthetic judgement and experience; the objects of such judgements and experience contribute what is objective. The subjective seems prone to variation among subjects, while the objective appears to provide a basis for universal agreement. There is disagreement over the contribution of the subject and the object to such judgements. The subjective view is also called the internal view, and is that in which the situation of the agent itself is involved. The objective view is also called the external view, and is that in which agent-related factors are abstracted or surpassed. The subjective is not always private, and the objective is not identical with what can be touched or sensed.

年, 第99页。

下位命题

在传统逻辑中, 全称命题蕴涵同质的特称命题。所以 A (“所有 S 是 P”) 蕴涵 I (“有些 S 是 P”), 并且 E (“所有 S 不是 P”) 蕴涵 O (“有些 S 不是 P”)。逻辑学家把 I 叫做 A 的下位命题, 把 O 叫做 E 的下位命题。相应地, A 叫做 I 的上位命题, E 叫做 O 的上位命题。全称命题和它相应的特称命题 (与全称命题有相同的主词和谓词以及相同的质) 之间的全部关系被称作“差等关系”, 并表示在对当方阵中。下位命题亦称“下涵命题”, 上位命题亦称“上涵命题”。如果全称命题是真的, 则相应的特称命题也是真的, 但反之不然。

“下位命题……是一特称命题, 它通过一直接推理从相应的全称命题推出, 正是相对于这一全称命题, 才说它是下位命题。” —皮尔士: 《文集》, 第二卷, 第459页。

下反对〔关系〕

如果两个命题不能同假却可以同真, 则它们是下反对关系。所以我们可以从一个的假推出另一个的真, 但不能从其中之一真推出另一个的真值。在传统逻辑中, 这种逻辑关系出现在特称肯定命题 I (“有些 S 是 P”) 和特称否定命题 O (“有些 S 不是 P”) 之间。

“如果两个命题虽可以同真但不能同假, 则称它们是下反对关系。”——柯比: 《逻辑导论》, 1986年, 第7版, 第179页。

主观知识

见“客观知识”条。

主客区分

主体对诸如知觉、道德和美学判断与经验提供主观的东西; 这种判断与经验的对象则提供客观的东西。主观的东西似乎倾向于各种主体的不同, 而客观的东西则表现为提供普遍一致的基础。关于主体与客体对这种判断的贡献, 还存在着一种分歧。主观的看法也被称作“内在的看法”, 即它涉及到了主体本身的状态。客观的看法也被称作“外在的看法”, 即抽去了或超越了与主体有关的因素。主观的东西并不总是私人的, 而客观的东西也并不等于可以接触或感觉的东西。不同的客观性概念可以适用于不同的领域。例如, 历史的判断可以是客观的, 只要做出这些判断的历史学家没有任何偏见, 而

Different notions of objectivity might be suitable in different domains. Historical judgements, for example, might be objective if the historian making them is unbiased and has not come to his conclusions as a result of having a favoured relation to the relevant objects.

"The distinction between subjective and objective is relative. A general human point of view is more objective than the view from what you happen to be, but less objective than the view point of physical science." — Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, 1979, p. 206.

Subjectivism, see objectivism

Subjectivity

A term correlated with objectivity. Ontologically, subjectivity is a mode of existence, in which a thing exists in virtue of being sensed or experienced by a subject. Epistemologically, a knowledge claim is subjective if determining its truth-value requires offering priority to someone having a first-person standpoint regarding the claim. Such priority, however, is unjustifiably claimed on behalf of personal opinions, biases and arbitrary preferences which are not related to objective facts. If a theory or a judgement is subjective in this sense, it obstructs the achievement of truth and validity, and should be rejected along with other forms of partiality, arbitrariness and bias. On the other hand, the priority of the subjective need not be restricted to individual experience and perhaps can be justified by the perspectives carried by a person as an historical and cultural being or as a result of special education and training. But it is difficult to determine how to treat the subjectivity of personal and social cultural horizons, social presuppositions, and moral, religious and aesthetic attitudes. Too great an emphasis on them will lead to relativism or extreme subjectivism, but eliminating them is impossible, for they are basic conditions for our inquiry. Admitting a place for subjectivity allows that there are alternative and reasonable views, perhaps by using subjective claims as a starting point which can then be incorporated into a structure of objective knowledge. Executing such a plan has been a central concern for many philosophers.

"We often speak of judgements as being 'subjective' when we mean that their truth or falsity cannot be settled 'objectively', because the truth or falsity is not a simple matter of fact but depends on certain attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and the hearers of the judgements." — Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 1995, p. 8.

Subject-of-a-life

A term introduced by Tom Regan for individuals who are more than merely alive and conscious. Subjects-of-a-life

他得出的结论并不是由于他与相关的对象具有某种偏好。

"主观与客观的区分是相对的。一种普遍的人类观点就比你偶然得到的观点更为客观, 但却没有物理学的观点那样客观。" —— 内格尔: 《人的主要问题》, 1979 年, 第 206 页。

主观主义

见“客观主义”条。

主观性

与客观性相关的术语。从本体论上讲, 主观性是一种存在的方式, 在这种方式中, 一个事物的存在是由于它为一个主体所感知或体验。从认识论上讲, 一种知识陈述, 如果确定其真值需给对这一见解具有第一人称观点的人以首要性, 它就是主观的。可是, 如果这种首要性代表的是与客观事实无关的个人的看法、偏见及专横的偏好, 那就被认为是不合理的。从这种意义上讲, 如果一种理论或一个判断是主观的, 它就阻碍对真理和效力的获得, 并应与其他形式的偏好、专断和偏见一起被抛弃。另一方面, 主观性的首要性不需限于个人的经验, 它也许能通过作为历史和文化人物或作为特定教育和训练的结果的个人的观点而得到证明。然而, 确定如何对待个人或社会文化的见识, 社会的希求及道德的、宗教的和审美的态度等方面的主观性却是困难的。过分强调它们会导致相对主义或极端个人主义, 而消除它们又是不可能的, 因为它们是我们进行探究的基本条件。承认主观性占有一席之地就是允许有其他合理的观点的存在。这种允许也许是通过使用作为出发点的主观性的断言, 这种断言而后又可合并到一种客观性的知识结构中。贯彻这样一种计划已成为许多哲学家关注的问题。

"我们常常把判断说成是‘主观的’, 这时我们是意指它们的对或错不能被‘客观地’决定, 因为对或错不是一个简单的关于事实的问题, 而是要取决于判断者和听判断的人的一定的态度、感觉和观点。" —— 塞尔: 《社会现实的构造》, 1995 年, 第 8 页。

生命主体

这词为 T. 里根首次采用, 指那种不仅仅活着的和有意识的个体。一个生命主体有一系

are characterised by a set of features including having beliefs, desires, memory, feelings, self consciousness, an emotional life, a sense of their own future, an ability to initiate action to pursue their goals, and an existence which is logically independent of being of utility to anyone else's interests. Such an individual has inherent value, that is the value it possesses independent of its utility for others. Because of this inherent value, a subject-of-a-life has rights to protect this value and the right not to be harmed. Other subjects have a duty to respect these rights. Regan then argues that all mature normal mammals fit the conditions for a subject-of-a-life; so they have inherent value and have rights. We have natural duties towards these animals, and should treat them equally and not interfere with their normal life course. Being a subject of-a-life is his criterion for inclusion of an individual in the moral community.

"Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value- inherent value -and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles." -Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 1983, p. 243.

Sublation

[from Latin; *sublatus*, (1) to raise, to lift up or (2) to remove, to destroy. German: *aufheben*, has an additional meaning; (3) to keep, to preserve.] In Hegel's philosophy, the three senses of sublation are used together, rather than as three separate meanings. Sublation is the negation of the negation, a negation that has a positive consequence. What is sublated is not reduced to nothing, but has a result which originated in what has been negated. For Hegel, a thing is negated by its opposite, and both are removed from their immediacy but also preserved as items by a higher whole. This higher whole is an improvement over the original thing and its negation and an elevation of them, although the higher whole is itself open to further sublation. For Hegel both concepts and things can be sublated. The term is also translated as supersede, supersession and sublimate.

"To sublate has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to... Thus, what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated." -Hegel, *Science of Logic*, I, i, 3.

Sublimation

[from Latin; *sublimare*, to elevate] For Freud, a process of adapting the libidinal instinct, directing it away from its sexual aim and discharging it in areas other than sexuality. Through sublimation, the claims of the ego can be met without repression and libidinal energy can fuel social and creative efforts. On Freud's account, sublimation is thus contrasted with repression.

列的特征, 包括有信念、有欲望、记忆、感觉、自我意识、一种情感生活、对自己未来的感知, 能够开始行动去追求自己的目标, 及在逻辑上独立于其他人的利益和功利的存在。这样一个有着内在价值, 即他所具有的价值独立于其他人的效用性。因为这个内在价值, 一个生命主体有保护这个价值的权利和不受伤害的权利。其他的主体有责任来尊重这些权利。里根认为, 所有成年的正常的哺乳动物都具有作为一个生命主体的条件, 故它们具有内在价值, 有权利, 我们对这些动物有自然的职责, 应该平等地对待他们, 不干涉他们的正常的生活过程。作为一个生命主体, 他是把一个个体包括进道德共同体中的标准。

"那些满足了生命主体标准的人和动物本身, 有一种与他物不同的价值——内在价值——他们不应被看做是或仅仅作为物件来对待。"——里根:《动物权利问题》, 1983年, 第243页。

扬弃

[源自拉丁词; *sublatus*, (1) 升起, 扬起, (2) 移走, 毁灭。德语词; *aufheben*, 有另外的意义; (3) 保持, 保留]在黑格尔哲学中, 扬弃的三种意义共同使用, 不是作为三种分开独立的意义。扬弃是否定之否定, 一种有肯定结果的否定。被扬弃的东西不是归结为虚无, 而是具有来源于被否定的东西的结果。对黑格尔来说, 一事物被它的对立面所否定, 两者都去掉了它们的直接性, 但也作为环节被更高的整体所保留。这个更高的整体对原初的事物和它的否定有所改变, 是对它们的提高, 虽然这个更高的整体自身也面向进一步的扬弃。在黑格尔看来, 概念和事物都可被扬弃。这个术语也翻译为“取代”、“接替”和“升华”。

"扬弃在语言中有双重意义: 它既意指保存、保持, 又意指停止、终结。……因此, 被扬弃的东西同时即是被保存的东西, 只是失去了直接性而已, 但它并不因此而化为无。"——黑格尔:《逻辑学》, I, i, 3。

升华

[源自拉丁词 *sublimare* (意味着“提升”)]对于弗洛伊德说来, 它指一个调整里比多本能、引导它脱开性的目的, 并在性之外的领域中得到发泄的过程。通过升华, 自我的要求能够不被压抑地得到满足, 里比多的能量也就可以用于趋动适应社会的和创造性的努力。因此, 在弗洛伊德的解释中, 升华是与压抑相对立的。

"The most important vicissitude which an instinct can undergo seems to be sublimation; here both object and aim are changed, so that what was originally a sexual instinct finds satisfaction in some achievement which is no longer sexual but has a higher social or ethical valuation." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 18, p. 256.

Sublime

The feeling of awe, respect, majesty, astonishment and even horror aroused by vastly great and overwhelmingly powerful objects, such as the starry sky at night, huge mountains, towering cliffs, volcanoes or raging seas. The concept can be traced to the Greek rhetorician Longinus. The Latin translation *De Sublimitate* (1674) of his book *Peri Hupsos* (*On the Impressiveness of Style*) made the sublime a central notion for eighteenth century aesthetics. J. Addison, E. Burke and Kant all distinguish sublimity from beauty as a basic species of artistic excellence. While the beautiful arouses pleasure and inspires love, the sublime commands respect and inspires the elevation of the soul. How, then, can we enjoy what causes us to feel horror and fear? Kant claimed that the sentiment of the sublime shows us that we are rational beings who transcend nature and legislate over sense. The sublime is the triumph of reason and is the bridge which enables us to turn from the vulgar and common to our real moral freedom. But others suggest that the feeling engendered by the vast spectacle of nature makes us feel that we are insignificant parts of nature. The post-modern aesthetics revives the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime and claims that while the beautiful is associated with the apprehension of form and rule, the sublime is associated with the formless and the resistance to rule.

"The sublime moves, the beautiful charms... The sublime must always be great; the beautiful can also be small. The sublime must be simple; the beautiful can be adorned and ornamented." — Kant, *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime* (tr. by Goldthwait), 1960, pp. 48-9.

Substance (Aristotle)

[The usual translation of the Greek *ousia*. Like *on* (being), *ousia* comes from *ousa*, the singular feminine normative participle of *einai*, to be] Plato used *on* and *ousia* synonymously. Aristotle classifies different kinds of being, and substance is being in its first sense, namely, the ultimate reality. In the *Categories*, Aristotle defined substance as the ultimate subject which underlies everything else, and he also distinguished between primary substance (the sensible individual) and secondary substance (species and genus). In the *Metaphysics*, substance is the focal meaning of being. However the category of substance is divided into form, matter and the composite of matter and form. If substance is still

"本能可以经历的最重大变化似乎是升华。这里对象和目的都改变了,使得原本是性的本能在非性的、具有更高的社会和伦理价值的成就中找到了满足。"——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第十八卷,第256页。

崇高

由体积和力量巨大的对象激发的一种敬畏、崇敬、宏伟、惊讶、乃至恐惧的感受,此类对象有黑夜星空、崇山峻岭、悬崖、火山或怒海等等。崇高的概念可追溯到希腊修辞学家朗古努斯。其著作 *Peri Hupsos* (《论风格的表现性》) 的拉丁译文为《论崇高》(*De sublimitate*, 1674), 此书使崇高成为18世纪美学的重要概念。J. 阿狄森、E. 博克与康德等人都将崇高与美这个艺术美的基本种类加以区别。美的事物唤起愉悦并激发爱情,而崇高的对象则唤起崇敬和激发心灵的升华。那么,人们如何能够欣赏使人感到恐怖与可怕的东西呢?康德认为,崇高的情感向我们表明我们是理性的存在者,不仅能够超越自然,而且能够为我们的感觉立法。崇高的对象是压倒理性的,是让人们从庸俗普通走向真正的道德自由的桥梁。但是,其他有些人建议,由宏伟的自然景观所激发的这种崇高感受使人们觉得我们是自然界里无足轻重的组成部分。后现代美学重新探讨优美与崇高的区别,认为优美与人们对形式和法则的感悟有关,而崇高与无形式的对象以及抵制法则的做法有关。

"崇高的对象感人,优美的事物迷人……崇高的对象必须是大的;而优美的事物可能是小的。崇高的对象必须是单纯的;而优美的事物则是装饰过的。" 康德:《论美感与崇高感》(高德韦特译),1960年,第48—49页。

本体 (亚里士多德)

[希腊词 *ousia*, 也译作“实体”,与“是”(希腊词 *on*) 相似, *ousia* 来自于 *einai* (存在) 的阴性单数规范分词 *ousa*] 柏拉图把 *on* 和 *ousia* 用作同义。亚里士多德将存在分为不同的种类,本体是第一种意义上的存在,即终极的实在。在《范畴》中,亚里士多德把本体定义为支撑其他一切东西的终极主体,他还区分了第一本体(可感的个体)和第二本体(种和属)。在《形而上学》中,本体是存在的中心含义。不过,他将本体范畴又分为形式、质料以及质料和形式的合成体。如果本体仍然指主体,质料就将是第一本体。但是亚里士多德认为,如果本体是互相分开

subject, matter will be primary substance. But Aristotle held this to be impossible, with separation and *tode ti* (a this) presented as more important criteria to decide what is substance. According to these new criteria, form is substance in its primary sense, and the composite is substance in a derivative sense. Species and genus, which are secondary substances in the *Categories*, are rejected as substances. This has given rise to the problem of explaining the relation between form and the universal.

Substance as a translation of *ousia* gained its currency historically because of the medieval philosopher Boethius' influential commentary on the *Categories* in which substance and subject coincide, but the word 'substance' has no etymological connection with *ousia*, and is not a precise translation of the notion of *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*. Alternative English translations of *ousia* include essence, entity and reality.

"It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (b) that which, being a 'this', is also separated—and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing" —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017b23-5.

Substance (Descartes)

Descartes' criterion for substance is virtually the same as Aristotle's subject criterion. He defined substance as that whose existence does not depend on other things and claimed that there is, strictly speaking, only one substance, namely God. However, although God is the only uncreated substance, created substances may be recognised because, although they need the concurrence of God in order to exist, they are independent of any other created things, such as accidents or modes. Instead, created substances are the bearers of properties, modes and accidents.

A created substance for Descartes can be a thinking thing (*res cogitans*) or mind or it can be an extended thing (*res extensa*) or body. All other modes are reducible to these two orders of existence. For thinking substance, thought is its principal attribute, because a thinking substance without thought is unintelligible. For corporeal substance, extension is its principal attribute, because a corporeal substance without extension is unintelligible. Thought and extension are the only two principal attributes which constitute, respectively, the essence of thinking and corporeal substances. Where there are two principal attributes there are two substances. This is to say, no existent substance can be a substance of more than one kind of attribute. This is the dualism of Descartes.

"By substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist." —Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, 1.51.

的,而且“这一个”(*tode ti*)成为确定何者是本体的更重要的标准,那么,质料是第一本体是不可能的。按照这些新标准,形式在其原始意义上是本体,在派生的意义上是合成本体。在《范畴》中是第二本体的种和属,在此被拒绝当做本体。这就引出了如何说明形式和普遍概念之间关系的问题。

以“substance”去译 *ousia* 一词得到流行,从历史上看是由于中世纪哲学家波埃修斯对《范畴》的影响深远的评注,在这个评注中,本体和主体是一致的。但“substance”一词与 *ousia* 没有词源关系,而且不是《形而上学》中 *ousia* 概念的准确译法。*ousia* 的可选的英文译法包括“本质”、“存在的东西”、“实在”。

“于是得出,‘本体’有两个意义:(1)最终的基质,它不再用于断定其他任何东西;(2)由于是“这一个”,因而亦是被分离的东西——这一本质乃是每一物的形状或形式。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1017b23—25。

实体〔或译“本体”〕(笛卡尔)

笛卡尔关于实体的标准实际上与亚里士多德关于主体的标准是一样的。笛卡尔把实体定义为其存在不依赖于其他东西的东西,并声称,严格而言,只有一个实体存在,即上帝。不过,虽然上帝是唯一非被造的实体,但我们仍可以承认各种被造的实体,这是因为,虽然这些实体需要上帝的同意才能存在,但是它们不依赖于任何其他的被造物,像偶性或样式之类。相反,被造的实体是这些性质、样式或偶性的承担者。

笛卡尔认为被造的实体有两类。一是思维的东西 (*res cogitans*),即心灵;另一是广延的东西 (*res extensa*),即物体。一切其他样式都可以归结为这两类存在。对于思维实体,思想是其主要属性,因为没有思想的思维实体是不可理解的。对于物质实体,广延是其主要属性,因为没有广延的物质实体是不可理解的。思想和广延分别是构成思维实体和物质实体之本质的唯一两种主要属性。凡是有两个主要属性之处,就有两个实体。这就是说,任何存在着的实体都不可能是具有一种以上属性的实体。这就是笛卡尔的二元论。

“对于实体,我们可以理解为无非是那样存在着的这个东西,以致它不需要任何其他东西就能存在。”——笛卡尔:《哲学原理》,第一部分,第51节。

Substance (Hegel)

Influenced by Spinoza, Hegel claimed that there is only one substance, that is the absolute. In contrast to Spinoza, Hegel's absolute as substance is also subject. For Descartes, individual subjects are thinking substances, and for Leibniz, monads as substances have self-consciousness. Hegel developed these ideas and held that substance as subject is the movement of positing itself and of developing into its contrary and is further unified by the movement to a higher unity. By repeating such a movement, substance generates and dissolves its attributes, that is its appearance. Substance and attributes are mutually inclusive, for substance can be substance only through revealing itself in its attributes. The development of substance is the reflection into self of the subject, and the subject makes itself what it becomes.

"Substance is accordingly the totality of the accidents, revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity (that is to say, as absolute power) and at the same time as the wealth of all content." — Hegel, *Logic*, sect. 151.

Substance (Leibniz)

Starting with the traditional Aristotelian claim that substance is the ultimate subject of predicates, Leibniz claimed that all the predicates of a given subject are contained within the concept of that subject, including every past and future state of that subject. He then proceeded to ask what it is for a substance to have an attribute, that is what is the foundation of and reason for all the predicates that can truly be asserted of that substance. In answering this question, he reverted in some sense to the pre-Cartesian view of hylomorphism, arguing that because a substance is a being which subsists in itself it has a principle of action within itself. It has a substantial form analogous to the soul which organises and systematises all the functions and activities. The essence of a substance is its primitive force of action. Later Leibniz called his substances monads. Since a substance as a subject contains all its predicates, changes in monads are not due to the effect of external causes but rather to the unfolding of their own internal natures. Each monad is completely self-contained, and perfect, although there is a pre-established harmony among monads giving the impression of interaction.

"This being promised, we can say it is the nature of an individual substance or complete being to have a concept so complete that it is sufficient to make us understand and deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which the concept is attributed." — Leibniz, *Discourse of Metaphysics*, 8.

Substance (Locke)

The notion of substance that Locke inherited was the Aristotelian notion, from the *Categories*, of an underlying subject (substratum). Locke believed in the real existence of

实体〔或译“本体”〕(黑格尔)

受斯宾诺莎影响,黑格尔主张,只存在着一个实体,那就是绝对。与斯宾诺莎相对比,黑格尔的绝对作为实体也是主体。对笛卡尔来说,个人主体是思维的实体,而对于莱布尼茨来说,单子作为实体具有自我意识。黑格尔发展了这些思想,并极力主张,实体作为主体是设定自身的运动,并且是发展为它的对立面并被更高的统一运动所进一步联结的过程。通过这样的运动,实体产生和分化它的属性,那是它的现象。实体和属性是相互包含的,因为实体只有通过在其属性中显露自身才能作为实体。实体的发展就是主体对自身的反思并达到自身,主体使自身成为它所成为的东西。

“因此,实体是各个偶性的全体,它在诸偶性中启示自身而作为它们的绝对否定性(这就是说,作为绝对的力量),同时作为全部内容的丰富性。”——黑格尔:《小逻辑》,第151节。

实体〔或译“本体”〕(莱布尼茨)

传统的亚里士多德的主张,实体是属性的最终主体。莱布尼茨从这一观点出发,声称,“给定主体的一切属性,包括它过去和将来的每一个状态,都包含在那个主体的概念中。于是他进而问,使一个实体具有属性的东西是什么,也就是,对于能够真实用来给那个实体作断言的一切属性,它们的根据和理由是什么。他在回答这个问题时,在某种意义上回到了前笛卡尔的形式论的观点,他论证说,因为实体是自存的存在,所以它自身内具有活动的原则。它具有一个实体形式,这个形式与组织协调一切功能和活动的灵魂相似。实体的本质在于它原始的活动力。后来莱布尼茨将他的实体称作“单子”。既然作为主体的实体包含了它的一切属性,那么,单子的变化就不是由于外因的影响,而是由于它自己内因的显露。虽然各单子之间有前定和谐,给人一种它的相互作用的印象,但实际上每个单子都是完全自足和完善的。

“既然情况可以如此,于是我们可以说,——单个实体或完整存在物的性质是:它具有一个十分完整的概念,以致足以使我们理解它,并从它之中推出该概念所归属的那个主体的全部属性。”——莱布尼茨:《形而上学论》,第8节。

实体〔或译“本体”〕(洛克)

洛克所继承的实体概念是出自亚里士多德《范畴》中的基质(substratum)概念。洛克相信实体确实存在于世界中。我们所知觉到的性

substance in the world. For the perceived qualities and properties carry the supposition of a substratum and cannot be thought to exist by themselves. Hence, as a matter of necessity of thought we must infer a substance as the ground of the qualities. We find in nature certain groups of simple ideas in constant and uniform conjunction and tend to believe that there is a substratum behind them. As long as there is any sensible quality, substance cannot be dismissed. However, the real essence of such a substance is unclear. Our ideas are limited to sensation and reflection, and do not reach sufficiently far to provide knowledge of the nature of substance. The ideas we have of substance are complex ideas; they are nothing but the collection of simple ideas of qualities, products of our mental operations. In all, substance has no positive content but only a supposition that it supports qualities. We know nothing about this supposition itself. Locke's criticism of the concept of substance paves the way for Berkeley and Hume to deny the existence of material substance and was a crucial step in the development of empiricism.

"Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do exist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance." — Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II, 23, 1.

Substance (Spinoza)

The standard definition Spinoza offered for substance is something which is "in itself" and "conceived through itself". The former part of this definition is similar to Aristotle's definition of substance as subject, and the determination of the latter part means that the concept of substance is formed without need to think about anything else. For otherwise the knowledge of substance would have to be dependent on the knowledge of something else, which would be another substance. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza did not refer to created things as substances. For him, substance was *causa sui*, its own cause. Extension and thought are attributes which constitute the essence of substance. But two attributes do not constitute two beings or two different substances. One substance can instantiate more than one attribute. There cannot be two distinct substances of the same nature. Substance is necessary, infinite, eternal, unique and all-inclusive. Spinoza called substance God or nature. Substance for Spinoza was therefore identical with a wholly self-sufficient, all-embracing reality. This notion of substance made Spinoza a pantheist and enabled him to challenge Descartes' dualism, although the relation between substance and attributes in Spinoza is much disputed.

"By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself." — Spinoza, *Ethics*, 1, 3.

质和属性使我们设定有一个基质,而且我们无法想像这些属性和性质独自存在。于是,由于思想的必然,我们必定推出一个作为这些性质之基础的实体。我们发现某些简单观念在性质上总是恒常一贯地结合在一起,我们倾向于相信在它们后面有基质存在。只要有任何可感的性质存在,实体就不可能被消除。不过,这样一个实体的实在本质是不清楚的。我们的观念不超出感觉和反省,达不到足够深远的程度以提供关于实体本性的知识。我们所具有的实体观念是复杂观念;它们无非是各种性质的简单观念的集合,是我们内心活动的产物。总之,实体没有实证的内容,只是假定它支撑着各种性质。我们对于这个假定本身毫无所知。洛克对实体概念的批判为巴克莱和休谟否定物质实体的存在铺平了道路,并成为经验论发展中至关重要的一步。

"如我已说过,因为无法想像这些简单观念怎样能独自存在,于是我们就习惯于假定出某个基质,这些简单观念存在于它之中,而且确实由它所引起,因此我们称它为实体。"——洛克:《人类理智论》,第二卷,第二十三章,第1节。

实体〔或译“本体”〕(斯宾诺莎)

斯宾诺莎为实体提出的标准定义是:“在自身内”,并“通过自身被认识”的东西。这个定义的前面部分与亚里士多德关于实体是主体的定义相似,后面部分断定的意思是,实体概念的形成不需要对任何它物的思考。否则,实体的知识就不得不依赖于有关它物的知识,这个它物又会是另一个实体。与笛卡尔不同,斯宾诺莎不把被造的东西称作实体。在他看来,实体是自因,是它自己的原因。广延和思想是构成实体本质的属性。但是两个属性并不构成两个存在物或两个不同的实体。一个实体可以表现出不止一种属性。不可能有具有同样性质的两个不同的实体。实体是必然的、无限的、永恒的、独一无二的、包括一切的。斯宾诺莎将实体称作上帝或自然。因而斯宾诺莎的实体与完全自足、包括一切的实在等同。这一实体概念使斯宾诺莎成为泛神论者,也使他能够对笛卡尔的二元论发出挑战,尽管人们对斯宾诺莎所说的实体和属性的关系仍然有很多争论。

"我把实体理解为在自身内,通过自身被认识的东西。"——斯宾诺莎:《伦理学》,第一部分,定义3。

Substantial chain, see *vinculum substantiale*

Substantial form

A notion originating in Aristotle's metaphysics and fully developed by the Scholastics. It is the internal principle of a thing which accounts for its being a substance of that kind. The substantial form of a thing is the goal of its behaviour and its explanatory principle. The term became abused during the early period of modern philosophy when scientists and philosophers rejected it, preferring to explain the phenomena of nature in terms of size, figure and motion alone. However, Albinos believed that this mechanistic philosophy is not sufficient, for it fails to account for the inner action and the organic unity of a thing. Hence Leibniz rehabilitated the notion of substantial form, and took it as a principle of change and a principle of unity. It is the true unity or real entity. A corporeal substance is composed of indeterminate and passive matter and determining form which acts as the cause and explanation of its properties. This determining form is its substantial form, and it corresponds to the soul in human beings. Nevertheless, Leibniz differed from the Scholastics in his use of the term, for he claimed that this form is a general explanatory principle which supplies nature with organic activity and did not use it to account for particular natural phenomena. For Leibniz, a form is an activity or entelechy, while a substantial form is also called a primitive force and first entelechy.

"In order to find these real entities I was forced to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both material and, at the same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity. Hence, it was necessary to restore, and, as it were, to rehabilitate the substantial forms which are in such disrepute today." —Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (tr. by Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 139.

Substantive universal

A sort of linguistic universal which belongs to the description of the substantive universal properties of a language, in contrast to a formal universal which gives the abstract universal properties of language. Accordingly, substantive universals contribute to determining the vocabulary for the description of language. According to this notion, all languages must have certain substantive phonetic elements for phonetic representation, certain specific central features of syntax and certain semantic features to provide a universal framework for semantic description.

"A study of substantive universals claims that items of a particular kind in any language must be drawn from a fixed class of items." —Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 28.

实体链

见“实体链 (*Vinculum substantiale*)”条。

实体形式

这个概念出自亚里士多德的形而上学, 经院学家对之作了充分的发展。它指一物的用以说明该物何以为该类实体的内在原则。一物的实体形式是该物的行为目标和说明原则。在近代哲学早期, 该词被滥用了。所以, 科学家和哲学家将这个词抛弃了, 代之以用大小、形状和运动来说明自然现象。不过, 阿尔宾诺认为这种机械论哲学是不充分的, 因为它不能说明一物的内在活动和有机统一。因此, 莱布尼茨复兴了实体形式的概念, 把它当做一个变化的原则, 一个统一的原则, 它是真正的统一体或实在的东西。一个有形实体是由不确定的、被动的物质和对它的性质起原因和说明作用的确定的形式构成的。这个确定的形式是它的实体形式, 它相当于人类的灵魂。不过, 莱布尼茨对这个词的使用与经院哲学家不同, 因为他主张, 这个形式是为自然提供有机能动性的普遍说明原则, 它不用于说明个别的自然现象。在莱布尼茨看来, 一个形式就是一个能动性或隐德来希, 而实体形式也被称作“原始的力”和“第一隐德来希”。

“为了发现这些真正的存在物, 我被迫求助于形式的原子, 因为一个物质的东西不可能既是物质的, 同时又是完全不可分、即具有真正统一性的。因此, 有必要也可以为当今名声不佳的实体形式恢复名誉。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989年, 第139页。

实质共相

一种“语言共相”, 它描述了语言实质的普遍特性, 与之对应的是赋予语言抽象的普遍特性的“形式共相”。因此, 实质共相是用于确定描述语言的词汇。它认为, 一切语言都必定具有某些表现语音的实质性语音成分, 句法的某些特别核心的特征, 以及能够对语义描述提供一种普遍框架的某些语义特征。

“对实质共相的研究认为, 每种语言的个别词项都必定来自某类确定的词项。”——乔姆斯基:《句法理论的若干方面》, 1965年, 第28页。

Substitutional quantifier, see objectual quantifier

Substratum (Aristotle)

[Greek: *hypokeimenon*, that which underlies, hence the subject or bearer of properties] In the *Categories*, Aristotle defined substance as the substratum because it underlies the other categories, and he used substance and substratum virtually interchangeably. In the *Metaphysics*, he divided the category of substance into form, matter and the composite of form and matter. While the composite is the substratum of properties, matter is the substratum of form. If substance still meant mainly "that which underlies", matter would be the ultimate subject and therefore primary substance. But Aristotle now claimed that instead of being a substratum, (primary) substance is that which is separate and a this. Thus, although matter is the subject of form, this does not give matter a better claim than form to being substance.

"The substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028b36-7.

Subsumption theory of explanation, another expression for covering law model

Success verbs, see achievement verbs

Such

[Greek: *toionde*] For Aristotle, a kind, common nature or common predicate. Form, as *toionde*, is a universal form. Such, which is general, contrasts with a this (*tode ti*), which is individual. Aristotle claimed that by separating an idea (*toionde*) from the things exemplifying it and thus making the idea a this, Plato made many mistakes in his Theory of Forms or Ideas. Aristotle tried to keep a clear distinction between a this and such by claiming that substance is a this and that an idea, as a universal, is not a substance.

"... no common predicate indicates a 'this', but rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man'." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1038b36.

Sufficient and necessary condition, see necessary condition

Sufficient condition

A condition in the presence of which a specific thing must exist or a specific event must occur: if A, then B. The condition can also be stated at a formal level: if A is true,

替换量词

见“对象量词”条。

基质 (亚里士多德)

[出自希腊文: *hypokeimenon* (那躺在下面的东西), 意为属性的主体或承受者] 在《范畴》中, 亚里士多德把本体定义为基质, 因为它承受其他范畴。他把“本体”与“基质”几乎当做同义词使用。在《形而上学》中, 他把本体的范畴分作形式、质料和形式与质料的复合物。复合物是属性的基质, 而质料则是形式的基质。如果本体的主要意义仍为“那躺在下面的东西”, 质料便是终极主体, 并因而是第一本体。可亚里士多德现在认为, (第一) 本体更是那分离的东西, 是“这一个”, 而不是基质。这样, 尽管质料是形式的主体, 但它并不因此而比形式更有力量去声称具有第一本体的身份。

“基质是那其他一切事物都属于它, 而它自身却不述说于其他任何事物的东西。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1028b36-37。

说明的归类理论

“覆盖律模型”的另一种表述。

成功动词

见“成就动词”条。

这一类

[源自希腊文 *toionde*] 亚里士多德使用该词来指类、共同性质或共同谓词。作为“这一类”的形式是一个普遍形式。“这一类”是—般的, 相比较于“这一个” (*tode ti*), 即个别。亚里士多德认为, 柏拉图把作为“这一类”的形相与体现它的特殊事物相分离, 而使得形相变成“这一个”, 这使得柏拉图在他的形式论或形相论中犯了许多错误。而亚里士多德自己力图清楚地保持“这一个”和“这一类”之间的区分。他认为, 本体是“这一个”, 而形相作为共相不是本体。

“普通谓词都不表示‘这一个’, 而是表示‘这一类’。不然的话, 许多困难就会产生, 尤其是‘第三人’。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1038b36。

充分必要条件

见“必要条件”条。

充分条件

此条件出现将使得一特定的事物存在或一特定的事件发生: 如果 A, 则 B。这一条件也可以在形式的层次上陈述为: 假定 A 是真的, 那

then B is true. If one is seriously ill, then one will be weak. Hence, being ill is a sufficient condition for being weak. In contrast, a necessary condition must be present for a thing to exist or for an event to occur, but does not guarantee that the thing will exist or the event occur. If A is a sufficient condition of B, then B is a necessary condition for A. A condition can be necessary and sufficient, unnecessary and sufficient or necessary and insufficient. If it is unnecessary and insufficient, it is not a condition. Conditions can be parts of other conditions, so that as in Mackie's account of causation we can have an insufficient but necessary part of a necessary but insufficient condition.

"A sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose presence the event must occur." — Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 1986, p. 429.

Sufficient reason, the principle of

A law which can be traced to the medieval philosopher Abelard, but is usually associated with Leibniz. In its most common formulation, it is the proposition that there is nothing without a reason for being thus and not otherwise. Leibniz formulated the principle in a number of ways, and applied it freely, depending on how he defined sufficient reason at a given time. Sometimes he took it, together with the principle of non-contradiction, as one of the two great principles used in reasoning. Sometimes sufficient reason was a form of a *priori* proof founded on the nature of the subject and predicate terms in every true proposition, no matter whether it is necessary or contingent. Sometimes sufficient reason meant efficient cause and in particular final cause. In this case, the principle is not concerned with the logical relation between subject and predicate, but with the cause of events and the existence of things. It is the basis of Leibniz's rejection of Newtonian absolute space and time. Sometimes the principle of the best or perfection is also said to be a version of the principle of sufficient reason.

"The principle of sufficient reason, namely, that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise." — Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 321.

Suicide

Deliberately and voluntarily ending one's life with the aim of self-destruction. Suicide is distinguished from sacrificing one's life as a means to achieve another end and from engaging in actions or a way of life which risk one's life. From Plato and Aristotle, there has been controversy whether suicide is morally justified. On one view, suicide should be morally prohibited on the grounds that life is divine, that suicide causes harm to one's family and community and that suicide is an offence to God who created life. In contrast, suicide is claimed to be a self-regarding act that lies outside the

么 B 是真的。如果一个人得了重病, 则他将会很虚弱。所以, 生病是虚弱的充分条件。相比之下, 对于一事物存在或一事件发生来说, 其必要条件必须具备, 但这一点并不能保证该事物将存在或该事件将发生。如果 A 是 B 的充分条件, 则 B 是 A 的必要条件。一个条件可以是充分必要的、充分而不必要的或必要而不充分的。如果它是不必要而不充分的, 它就不是一个条件。条件可以成为其他条件的部分, 于是正像在麦基关于因果性的说明中指出的那样, 我们可以有一必要但不充分条件的不充分却必要的部分。

"一事件发生的充分条件是这样一种情形: 该条件的出现使得该事件必定发生。" —— 柯比: 《逻辑导论》, 1986 年, 第 429 页。

充足理由律

这条定律可以追溯到中世纪哲学家阿布拉, 不过一般与莱布尼茨相联系。对它的最通常的阐述是如下命题: 任何东西都有它之所以是此而非彼的理由。莱布尼茨以多种方式阐述这条规律, 依据在某一时候他对“充足理由”如何规定而随意运用它。有时他把它当做推理中使用的两个主要原理之一, 另一个原理是不矛盾律。有时充足理由指一个先天的证明形式, 该形式以每个真命题的主词和谓词的性质为根据, 不论该命题是必然的还是偶然的。有时充足理由指动力因, 尤其指终极因。在此情况下, 这个原理与主项和谓项的逻辑关系无关, 而与事件的原因和事物的存在有关。根据这个原理, 莱布尼茨驳斥了牛顿的绝对时空。有时最好世界或最完善世界的原理也被说成是充足理由律的翻版。

"充足理由律, 即任何事情发生都有它为什么应当这样而不是那样的理由。" —— 莱布尼茨: 《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989 年, 第 321 页。

自杀

以自我毁灭为目的而故意地、自愿地结束自己的生命。自杀不同于作为实现另一目的的手段而牺牲自己的生命, 也不同于从事冒生命危险的活动或生活方式。从柏拉图和亚里士多德起, 就一直存在自杀在道德上是否是正当的争论。一种观点认为, 自杀在道德上应被禁止, 其根据是生命是神圣的, 自杀对一个人的家庭和公众造成伤害, 自杀是对创造生命的神的冒犯。相对立的观点则提出, 自杀应被认为是一种自尊的行为, 它不违反禁止伤害他人的禁令。有

prohibition on harming others. It is claimed that without stronger objections, the right should be recognised to determine when to terminate one's own life. Aquinas and Kant argued against suicide, while Hume argued in favour of tolerating it. These different attitudes lead to controversy whether we should intervene if somebody has the intention of committing suicide. If suicide is immoral, then we are obliged to prevent it. If suicide is morally justifiable, the intervention beyond advice will be paternalistic interference which violates the agent's rights. Suicide has become a frequently discussed topic in contemporary applied ethics through its relations with the issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide.

"Let us here endeavour to restore men to their native liberty, by examining all the common arguments against suicide, and showing that that action may be free from every imputation of guilt or blame, according to the sentiments of all the ancient philosophers." —Hume, *On Suicide*.

Summum bonum

[Latin: the highest or supreme good] A good without any qualification and an absolute end in itself. All other goods are pursued for its sake, for they are good because of this supreme good. Hence, the concept of a supreme end unites all other ends and is the crown for any system of ends. Ethically, the *summum bonum* is the moral ideal of a possible state of affairs in which a morally perfect being is supremely happy and also worthy of being supremely happy. Different moral theories offer different accounts of what constitutes the *summum bonum*, such as pleasure, happiness, self actualisation, contemplation, a good will, fulfilment of duty or obedience to God. Metaphysically it is regarded as the ultimate principle and the source of value and being. Critics question whether a system of ends requires a highest good to be intelligible.

"And I wish to point out certain conclusions which appear to follow, with regard to the nature of the Summum Bonum, or the state of things which would be the most perfect we can conceive." —G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 205.

Sun, simile of the

A device used by Plato in the *Republic* to illuminate the nature of the Form of the Good, knowledge of which the Guardians must attain. The simile is based on the distinction between the visible world and the world of the Forms. As the source of light in the visible world, the sun enables both the eye to see and the object of sight to be seen. Furthermore, it causes the process of generation and growth. The roles played by the Good in relation to the world of the Forms correspond to the roles played by the sun in relation to the visible world. The Good enables both the mind to know and the Forms to be known. Furthermore, it is the cause of

人主张,在没有强烈反对意见的情况下,决定什么时候结束自己生命的权利应当被承认。阿奎那和康德都反对自杀,而休谟则赞同容忍自杀。这些不同的态度导致了如果有人有自杀的企图我们是否应干涉的争论。如果自杀是不道德的,我们就有责任去阻止它。如果自杀在道德上是正当的,那超出建议范围之外的干涉将是侵犯自杀者权利的家长式的干预。由于自杀与安乐死和协助自杀的争论相关,自杀已成为当代应用伦理学中的一个热门问题。

"通过检验所有通常的反对自杀的论据,并表明按照所有古代哲学家的意见这种行为可以解脱每一有罪或有责任的非难,现在让我们尽力归还给人们他们生来的自由。"——休谟:《论自杀》。

至善

[拉丁文:最高的或至上的善]它是没有任何条件的善,是绝对目的自身。一切其他的善都是为了它而被追求,因为它们之所以是善,是因为这个至善。因此它是一个联结了所有其他目的的最高目的,是任何目的体系的顶点。在伦理学上,这是道德的理想;一种这样的可能状态,在此状态中一个道德上完满的存在者极其幸福,也配得上享有这极度的幸福。不同的道德理论对什么是至善作出不同的回答,诸如:愉快,幸福,自我实现,静观,善良意志,履行职责或服从上帝。在形而上学中,它被作为最终的原理、价值和存在的源泉。批评家们提出,一个目的体系要求最高的善是否合理是有疑问的。

"我希望能指出一些似乎可以得出的结论:它们是关于至善的本性,或我们能设想的最完满的事情的状态。"——摩尔:《伦理学原理》,第205页。

太阳之喻

柏拉图在《国家篇》中所用的方法,旨在说明善的形式的性质。对善的知识是护卫者必须获得的。这一比喻是在可见世界与形相世界的区分的基础上作出的。在可见世界中,太阳作为光的源泉使得眼睛可以看,使得视觉对象能够被看见。进一步,它还引起生成和成长的过程。善在与形式世界的关系中所起的作用相应于太阳在与可见世界的关系中所起的作用。善使得心灵能知,使得形式能够被知。而且,善也是形式的存在和实在的原因。如同太阳在力量上超越了视力、光和过程,善也在力量和尊严上高于

being and reality of the Forms. As the Sun is beyond sight, light and process in its power, the Good is beyond truth, knowledge and being in its power and dignity. The sovereignty of the Good illustrated in this simile is obscure and its interpretation remains a subject of dispute, but as a metaphysical attempt to establish a fundamental principle for any explanation, the simile has exerted a great influence on many subsequent metaphysical systems. In the *Republic*, the simile of the Sun is complemented by the simile of the Line and the simile of the Cave.

"What the Good itself is in the world of thought in relation to the intelligence and things known, the sun is in the visible world, in relation to sight and things seen." Plato, *Republic*, 508b.

Superego, see ego

Supererogation

[from Latin *super*, beyond + *erogare*, to pay out.] The category of good actions which go beyond the requirements of common morality, such as risking one's own life to save another. Supererogatory deeds are often arduous and costly. They are encouraged by morality as meritorious and are worthy of praise or honour. Nevertheless, one is not obliged to do them, and their omission is neither morally wrong nor subject to moral blame. Supererogation aims at a moral ideal rather than the standard of common morality. Chisholm classifies supererogation as one of five kinds of morally appraised actions, along with actions which are morally obligatory, in different, forbidden and offensive. Some versions of utilitarianism eliminate the possibility of supererogatory acts, because the need to maximise happiness leaves no room to distinguish between the requirements of ordinary morality and acts which go beyond them. Some claim that such positions demand too much from ordinary moral agents, who do not aspire to the moral lives of saints or heroes.

"Supererogatory virtue is shown by acts of exceptional sacrifice for the benefit of others. Such acts are praiseworthy and not regarded as irrational, but they are not thought either morally nor rationally required." —Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, p. 203.

Superman, see übermensch

Supernatural theology, another name for revealed theology

Socratic elenchus

真理、知识和存在。在这一比喻中提出的善的主宰是含混的，对它的解释一直有争议，但作为一个形而上学尝试，它力图为一切实解释建立一个根本原则。它对后来的许多形而上学系统都有巨大的影响。在《国家篇》中，太阳之喻为线段之喻和洞穴之喻所补充。

“善在思想世界中与理智和已知物的联系，正是太阳在可见世界中与视力和所见物的联系。”——柏拉图：《国家篇》，508b。

超我

见“自我”条。

分外之事

[源自拉丁文 *super* (超出) 和 *erogare* (付出)] 指超出通常道德要求的好行为的范畴，例如冒着自己的生命危险去救另一个人。分外之事常常是费力的而且代价很高。作为值得称赞的行为，它们应在道德上受到鼓励，并值得表扬或尊敬。然而，一个人不是非做它们不可，即使他没有做，那也不是道德上的错误，也不会受到道德上的谴责。分外之事的目的在于一种道德理想而不在于通常的道德水准。齐硕姆把分外之事与道德上必须履行的行为、道德上无关紧要的行为、道德上被禁止的行为和道德上令人厌恶的行为一起并列为道德评价的五种行为之一。一些功利主义的看法排除了分外之事的可能性，因为最大快乐的需要没有给区分普通道德要求和超出它们以外的行为留有余地。一些人认为分外之事对普通的道德主体要求过高，这些人并不渴望过圣人或英雄的道德生活。

“分外之事的美德是通过为了他人利益的特殊的牺牲行为表现出来的。这种行为值得赞扬，而且不被视为是非理性的，但它们既不被看做是道德所要求的，也不被看做是理性所要求的。”——内格尔：《出自无处的观点》，1986年，第203页。

超人

见“超人 (*Übermensch*)”条。

超自然神论

对“启示神学”的另一种称呼。

Superstructure

The metaphor of base and superstructure or the foundation and superstructure is of fundamental importance to the methodology of historical materialism. The economic structure is said to be the foundation on which the state, including the police, army, courts and bureaucracy, and ideology are built. The state is called legal and political superstructure, while the ideology is called the ideological superstructure. The superstructure arises because of the conflict of interests of different classes inherent in the economical base and is thus determined by the base. The function of the superstructure is to keep the base intact by keeping the collective interests of the ruling class intact. This is accomplished by the sanctioned and coercive regulation of the legal/political superstructure and by the persuasive force of the ideological superstructure. When the development of the productive forces brings changes in the relations of production, Marx claims that the superstructure will consequentially be transformed. The distinction between base and superstructure depends on there being an explanatory priority given to the base in its relations with the superstructure, but this priority need not be absolute. Writers disagree concerning the autonomy of the superstructure in its own affairs and the power it has in shaping the base.

"The totality of these relations of production forms the economic structure of society, the real basis from which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond specific forms of social consciousness." —Marx, *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*.

Supervenience

A term which can be traced to G. E. Moore, but which gained wider use through the work of R. M. Hare. Hare used it for the claim that moral or evaluative properties such as goodness must supervene upon natural properties such as intelligence, health and kindness. If something has the moral property in virtue of having the natural property and if anything having the natural property would in virtue of having it also have the moral property, then the moral property supervenes upon the natural property. If two things are alike in all descriptive respects, the same evaluative properties must be applied to both of them. On this view, good is supervenient upon underlying natural properties, although it is not reducible to them. Davidson extended this notion to the philosophy of mind, and claims that mental properties are supervenient upon physical properties. If two things are alike in all physical properties, they cannot differ in mental properties, but the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. Supervenient physicalism offers an alternative to reductionist identity theory. Supervenience is an irreducible relation of dependence upon base properties by supervenient properties. The term has a wide application. In ontology, mereological su-

上层建筑

基础和上层建筑的比喻对于历史唯物主义的方法论具有头等的重要性。经济结构被说成是基础，而国家（包括警察、军队、法庭和官僚）和意识形态建立于其上。国家被称为法律的和政治的上层建筑，同时意识形态被称为意识形态上层建筑。上层建筑的产生是由于经济基础所固有的不同阶级利益的冲突，因而被经济基础所决定。上层建筑的作用就是要通过保持统治阶级的共同利益不受损害而使经济基础保持完好无损。这要通过法律的和政治的上层建筑的确认的和强制的规章制度，以及意识形态上层建筑的说服力量才能实现。马克思认为，当生产力的发展促使生产关系发生变化时，上层建筑就随之而发生变革。基础和上层建筑的区别主要在于基础对于上层建筑而言具有解释的优先性，但这种优先性不必是绝对的。作家们对于上层建筑在它自己事务上的自主性和在形成基础中所具有的力量，意见不一。

“这些生产关系的总和构成社会的经济基础，即有法律的和政治的上层建筑竖立于其上并有一定的社会意识形式与之相适应的现实基础。”——马克思：《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》。

伴随性

这一术语可以追溯至 G. E. 摩尔，但通过 R. 黑尔而被更为广泛地使用。黑尔使用它来指这样一种主张：像“好”这样的道德的或评价的特性一定依赖于自然的特性，诸如智力、健康和善意。如果某物由于拥有一自然属性而具有一个道德属性，如果具有该自然属性的任何事物都会由于这一自然属性而具有该道德属性，则该道德属性伴随于该自然属性。如果两个事物在所有的描述方面都是一样的，那么同样的评价特性也一定对它们都适用。因此，好伴随于支持它的自然特性，尽管并不还原于它们。戴维森将这一概念延伸至心的哲学，声称心的特性伴随于物理特性。如果两个事物在所有的物理特性上都一样，它们在心的特性上就不会有所不同。但心的东西不能被还原为物的东西。伴随物理主义提供了还原论的同一论之外的另一选择。伴随性是伴随特性对于基础特性的非还原的依赖关系。这一术语具有广泛的应用。在本体论中，部分论的伴随性可以用来描述部分与整体的关系。在认识论中，像“可辩护的”、“合理的”这样的特性被认为是伴随性的。最近，基姆

pervenience can be used to describe the relation between part and whole. In epistemology, properties such as being justifiable or reasonable are said to be supervenient properties. Recently, weak, strong and global supervenience have been introduced by J. Kim. For the actual world or a given possible world, property A weakly supervenes on property B, if anything in that world having B also has A. Across different possible worlds, A strongly supervenes on B if any individual having B will also have A across all of those worlds. For global supervenience, if the histories of two worlds agree in all of their subvening respects, the worlds will also be indiscernible in their supervening respects. Supervenient properties are also called consequential characteristics or tertiary qualities. The latter notion was introduced by Bonsanquet for the aspects of beauty and sublimity which we recognise in nature but which are not features of nature at all.

"Entity Q supervenes on entity P if and only if every possible world that contains P contains Q." — Armstrong, *Universals*, 1989, p. 56.

Supposition

[from Latin: *suppositio* and the verb *supponere*, to put something under] The signification of a term in a proposition. The doctrine of *suppositio*, one of the most significant parts of medieval logic, was developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Through recognition of the ambiguity of a term, medieval logicians devoted themselves to classifying the various types of *suppositio* a term may have in the context of a proposition. A distinction between simple supposition (*suppositio simplex*) and personal supposition (*suppositio personalis*) was drawn. The former signifies a common nature, and the latter signifies an individual. This corresponds somewhat to the distinction between *suppositio discreta*, which directly refers to an individual, and *suppositio communis*, which refers to many. *Suppositio personalis* was further divided by Ockham into *suppositio determinata*, which can be explained by reference to one individual, and *suppositio confusa*, which involves all or many individuals of the species. *Suppositio confusa* has two main types: *mobile* and *distributiva*. There is also a kind of material supposition, *suppositio materialis*, by which a word refers to itself. Different logicians vary about the types and the relations among the types. This difficult doctrine is of contemporary interest through its relevance to issues of meaning and reference.

"Supposition is the signification that a certain kind of term has in the context of a proposition." — Broadie, *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, p. 28.

Surface structure. see deep structure

又将伴随性分为不同的种类：弱、强与完全的。对于真实世界或一个给定的可能世界，特性 A 弱伴随于特性 B，如果在那个世界中，任何具有 B 的事物都具有 A。跨越不同的可能世界，A 强伴随于 B，如果在所有那些世界里，所有具有 B 的个体也会具有 A。对于完全伴随性而言，如果两个世界的历史在所有的支持方面都相同，那么它们在其伴随的方面也将是不可区分的。伴随特性也被称为“结果特性”或“第三特性”。其中后一个概念由鲍桑葵引进用以指我们在自然中认识到的“美”和“庄严”这样的事实上并非自然的特征的方面。

“当且仅当每个包含 P 的世界都包含 Q 时，存在物 Q 伴随于存在物 P。”——阿姆斯特朗：《普遍》，1989 年，第 56 页。

指代

[源于拉丁语 *suppositio*，动词是 *supponere*，意为“把什么放在下面”] 指一个术语在命题中的意思。指代学说是中世纪逻辑学最有意义的部分之一，在 13 至 14 世纪得到发展。通过对术语歧义的认识，中世纪逻辑学家们致力于区分术语在命题语境中可能具有的不同类型的指代。于是，抽引出了“单一的指代”和“个人的指代”之间的区别，前者表示共同的本性，后者表示个别的本性。在某种意义上，这相当于直接指个体的具体指代和指众多的共同指代之间的区别。个人指代被奥康进一步划分为规定的指代（它能被论及的一个个体所解释）和混同的指称（它涉及的是该种之内的所有个体或许多个体）。混同的指代有两种主要类型：运动的和分布性的。还有一类实质指代，意为语词指它自身。不同的逻辑学家对指代的类型以及类型之间的关系看法不同。这个学说是困难的，但当代人对它有兴趣，因为它与意义和指称的争论有关。

“指代是某类术语在命题语境中所具有的意思。”——波罗德：《中世纪逻辑学导论》，第 28 页。

表层结构

见“深层结构”条。

Surprise examination paradox

A semantic paradox, also called the examination paradox or prediction paradox. A teacher announces that there will be a surprise examination next week. Then a student claims that such an examination cannot occur. The examination cannot be on Friday (the last working day of the week), for at that time it would not be a surprise at all. It cannot be on Thursday. For if there is no examination given on Wednesday, we will know that it will come either on Thursday or Friday, but since Friday has been ruled out, Thursday will be the only day left, and then the examination will not be a surprise. The other days can also be eliminated in the same manner. Hence there can be no surprise test next week. Some critics argue that if the student calculates that the surprise examination cannot take place on Friday (or any other given day), it would be a surprise if it were to take place then and that it therefore could take place on any day of the week. The paradox was originally observed by a mathematics teacher in Stockholm during the second world war, when he heard a declaration from the authorities that, as an exercise, there would be a surprise air-raid alarm some day during the next week during which people should go to an air-raid shelter.

"The class's argument falls into two parts; one applies to whether there can be an unexpected examination on the last day, Friday; the other takes forward the negative conclusion on this issue, and purports to extend it to the other days" Sainsbury, *Paradoxes*, 1988, p. 94.

Survival, problem of

Traditionally the problem of immortality, concerning whether the self or soul can survive bodily death and also concerning the form that survival might take. Some philosophers argue that the soul could exist on its own after death, with a continuation of its earthly identity and with mental capacities very much like those of its embodied state. Others argue that preserving one's identity and capacities would require either the resurrection of one's earthly body or its replacement by a special body. Others argue that survival is unintelligible without a continuing relationship with a living body and that survival of bodily death is therefore impossible.

A different problem of survival is extensively discussed by Derek Parfit and distinguished by him from the problem of personal identity. Imagine that my brain is divided into two halves and that each half is transplanted into the skull of a new body. If character and memories were related to both sides of the brain, the result of successful transplantation would be that two persons would have my character and my apparent memories. To which of them am I identical? Not to one of them alone, because the other would have equally good claim to be me. Not to both of them, because then two

意外考试悖论

一个语义学悖论, 亦称“考试悖论”或“预告悖论”。一位老师预告, 下星期将有一次意外的考试。这时, 有位学生断言, 这样的考试不能发生。考试不能在星期五(即该星期的最后一个工作日), 因为若在此时, 完全不是意外的事情。它也不能在星期四, 因为如果星期三还没有进行既定的考试, 我们将知道, 它会在星期四或星期五来临, 但是, 既然星期五已被排除, 星期四就成了所剩的唯一一天, 那么, 考试也就不意外了。以同样的方式, 也能逐一排除其他几天。因此, 下星期能有一次毫无意外的考试。有些批评家认为, 如果这位学生推算出意外的考试不能在星期五(或给定的另外某天)发生, 那么, 假如它在那时发生了, 就会是意外的, 所以, 它能在下周的某一天发生。这个悖论最初是由二次世界大战期间斯德哥尔摩的一位数学教师发现的。当时, 他听到官方发布的一则告示, 声称: 作为演习, 下星期的某一天将有一次意外的防空警报, 在警报期间, 人们应该躲到防空所里去。

“这类论证分成两个部分: 一部分用于是否能有一次意料不到的考试发生在最后一天, 即星期五; 另一部分提出关于这个争论的否定结论, 并意欲将其扩展到其余各天。”——塞斯伯里: 《悖论》, 1988年, 第94页。

续存问题

是传统上的不朽问题, 关乎自我或灵魂能否在身体死后继续存在的问题, 也关乎那种存活所可能采取的形式。有些哲学家论辩说, 灵魂在身体死后自己仍然能够存在, 继续其尘世的同一性, 并有与其有躯壳状态十分相似的心的能力。另有人论辩说, 保持一个人的同一性和能力要求其尘世躯体或者复活, 或者为另一个特定的躯体所代替。还有人论辩说, 离开与一个有生命的躯体的持续关系的存活是不可理解的, 因此躯体死后灵魂的续存是不可能的。

关于续存的另一个问题由D. 帕菲特作了广泛的讨论, 他并且将这一问题与个人同一性问题相区分。想像我的大脑被分为两半, 每一半都被植入一个新的身体的脑壳中。如果性格和记忆与大脑的两个半球都有关系, 成功移植的结果就将是两个具有我的性格和明显记忆的人。我究竟同一于他们中的哪一个? 不是单单与他们当中的一个, 因为另一个也同样可以声称是我。但也不是与他们都同一, 那样的话, 存在于同一时间的两个不同的个体就会彼此同一, 而我们的同一性概念使这成为不可能。然而我却的确活着。有赖于此, 帕菲特论辩说, 续存

distinct individuals existing at the same time would be identical to each another, and our notion of identity makes this impossible. Nevertheless I do survive. On this basis Parfit argues that the problem of survival and the problem of identity should be distinguished. While identity cannot be settled in this case, we can answer the question of survival. Identity is a one-one relation, while survival can be a one-many relation. While identity is an all-or-nothing relation, that is, either X and Y are identical or X and Y are completely distinct, most of the relations which matter in survival are relations of degree. I can survive as two persons who share a common past in me without being either or both of them. If survival is what matters to me, I can give up my concern for identity. Parfit's separation of these two problems attempts to end the long-standing debate about personal identity, and it also has moral consequence regarding how I conceive of myself and how I value my future happiness as compared to the happiness of others. Since what matters in our continued existence is constituted mainly by relations of degree, Parfit believes that we have reason to diminish our self-absorption and our self concern.

"'Will I survive?' seems... equivalent to 'Will there be some person alive who is the same person as me?.'" —D. Parfit, "Personal Identity", in *Philosophical Review*, 1971, p. 9.

Survival of the fittest

The central idea of social Darwinism. A trait is fitting if it helps its species to survive. Fitness is a key concept in Darwin's explanation of differential reproduction. According to his theory of evolution, the various species evolved as the result of the action of an environment that favoured the survival of some organisms while destroying others. Social Darwinism applies this idea to the explanation of the development of society and claims that economic competition produces human progress. The idea is fully expressed by Herbert Spencer, who claimed in *Social Statistics* that just as competition in the natural world ensures that only the fittest survive, so free competition in the economic world ensures that only the most capable individuals survive and rise to the top. Society favours those who both understand the conditions of existence and are able to meet their requirements. He thought that competition and its outcome are necessary for the development of the human race. Social Darwinism and the notion of the survival of the fittest are now widely rejected on the grounds that they are bad science and bad morality.

"The phrase 'survival of the fittest' has been used, even since Herbert Spencer first coined it, to describe an individualistic law showing such... as co-operation, love and altruism to be unreal, a law which (somewhat mysteriously) both demands and predicts that they should always give way to self-interest." —Midgley, *Evolution as a Religion*, 1985, p. 2.

问题和同一性问题应当加以区分。在这一案例中,同一性问题不能得到解决,但我们却可以回答续存问题。同一性是一一对应的关系,而续存则可以是一对多的关系。同一性是一个全或无的关系,亦即,或者X与Y是同一的,或者X与Y是完全不同的,而续存中的大多数关系则是一个程度问题。我可以作为共有—一个共同的过去的两个人而续存却并不是他们中的任何一个或是他们两个。如果续存是对我重要的东西,我就可以不关心同一性问题。帕菲特将这两个问题分离是试图结束关于个人同一性的长期争论,并且它对于我如何想像我自己以及我如何相对于他人的幸福来评价我自己将来的幸福,都具有道德后果。由于我们的持续存在主要是一个程度问题,所以帕菲特认为我们有理由降低自我专注和自我关心。

"'我会存活吗?'似乎……等同于'会有一个与我完全相同的人活着吗?'"——帕菲特:《个人同一性》,载《哲学评论》,1971年,第9页。

适者生存

社会达尔文主义的核心思想。一种特性如果有助于其物种的生存,它就是适合的。适合是达尔文解释各种不同繁殖的关键概念。根据他的进化理论,各类物种的进化是环境作用的结果,因为环境有利于某些有机体的生存,同时毁灭另一些有机体。社会达尔文主义运用这一思想解释社会的发展,认为是经济的竞争导致了人类进步。H. 斯宾塞对这一思想做了充分说明,他在其《社会统计学》一书中声称,正如自然界的竞争使得只有适者才能生存一样,经济世界的自由竞争使得只有最具能力的人才能生存并升至最高职位。社会偏爱那些既了解生存条件又能满足其需求的人。他认为竞争及其结果对人类发展是必需的。社会达尔文主义及适者生存的观念现在普遍受到拒斥,因为它们是错误的科学和道德。

"自从H. 斯宾塞首创'适者生存'这一用语,它就一直被用来描述一种个人主义的法则,这一法则表明诸如合作、爱及利他主义都是假的,它(多少有点神秘地)要求并且预言它们将总是让位于自我利益。"——米古勒:《作为一种信仰的进化》,1985年,第2页。

Suspension of judgement

[Greek: *epoche*, also translated as suspension of belief] A key term in ancient scepticism for the epistemological stance which does not deny or affirm anything. It is an attitude of indifference to the nature of a thing, arising from the modes of scepticism. Since our sensations tell us neither truth nor falsehood, we should be uncommitted and resist any temptation to hazard opinions. According to the sceptics, suspension of judgement may lead to tranquillity and therefore to happiness.

"Broadly speaking, suspension of judgement comes about because of the setting of things in opposition" Sextus Empiricus, *Outline of Pyrrhonism*, 1, 31.

Syllogism

[from Greek: *sullogismos*, argument] Aristotle's famous logical achievement, described in his *Prior Analytics* and *Posterior Analytics*. A syllogism is a formally valid inference to a conclusion from two premises (a major premise and a minor premise). The premises and the conclusion all have subject-predicate forms. The premise containing the predicate of the conclusion is the major premise, and the premise containing the subject of the conclusion is the minor premise. The term which appears in both premises but does not appear in the conclusion is the middle term. The subject-predicate relation is either affirmative or negative and is either universal or particular, yielding four kinds of propositions in syllogism: all X is Y, no X is Y, some X is Y and some X is not Y, symbolised in traditional logic by the letters A, E, I, O respectively. Syllogisms can be divided into four figures according to the different positions of the middle term in the premises, although Aristotle only describes the first three, with the fourth figure added by medieval logicians. In each figure the different possible combinations of forms of premise result in different moods, but not all moods are valid. An example of the first mood of the first figure (called Barbara) is: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. Syllogism was the core of the first abstract and rigorous system of logic, and dominated logic until the nineteenth century. However, since it only deals with subject-predicate relations, its scope of application is limited, and even as an account of predication it has been superseded by modern predicate calculus.

"A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so." --Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 24b18-20.

Symbol, see sign and symbol

中止判断

[源自希腊词 *epoche*, 也认作“中止信念”] 古代怀疑论的主要术语, 指一种既不否定也不肯定任何事物的认识论立场。它是一种从怀疑论的模式中产生的对事物性质的漠然态度。由于我们的感觉并没有向我们表明真理和错误, 我们不应投入到某一方, 应当克服任何作出轻易结论的欲望。对于怀疑论者而言, 中止判断会导向心灵平静, 从而获得幸福。

“大略地说, 中止判断是在事物中建立对立面的结果。” 塞克斯都·恩披里柯:《皮浪主义纲要》, 1, 31。

三段论

[源自希腊语 *sullogismos*, 意为“论证”] 亚里士多德的著名逻辑学成就, 其系统阐述在他的《前分析》和《后分析》中。三段论是从两个前提(一个为大前提, 一个为小前提)得出结论的形式上有效的推论。前提和结论全都具有主语—谓语形式。包含结论谓语的那个前提是大前提, 包含结论主语的那个前提是小前提。在两个前提中都出现但在结论中不出现的那个词是中项。主语—谓语的关系或是肯定的或是否定的, 或是全称的或是特称的, 由此形成三段论中的四类判断, 即: 所有 X 是 Y, 没有 X 是 Y, 有些 X 是 Y, 有些 X 不是 Y, 在传统逻辑中, 用字母 A、E、I、O 来分别表示。根据中项在前提中的不同位置, 三段论能被分成四个格, 虽然亚里士多德只阐述了前三个, 第四格是由中世纪的逻辑学家们添加的。在每个格中, 前提的不同可能组合形式导致不同的式, 但是, 并非所有的式都有效。第一格第一式(称为 Barbara)的例证是: 所有人都有死, 苏格拉底是人, 所以, 苏格拉底有死。三段论是第一个抽象的、严密的逻辑体系的核心, 它支配着逻辑学一直到 19 世纪。然而, 既然它仅仅处理主语—谓语的关系, 其适用范围必定是有限的, 即使是对谓语的说明, 它也被现代的谓词演算所替代。

“三段论是一种论证, 其中, 某些论断只要被确定, 另一个不同于它们的论断就可以必然地从如此确定的论断中推出。” ——亚里士多德:《前分析》, 24b18-20。

符号

见“记号和符号”条。

Symbolic logic, another term for mathematical logic

Symmetric relation

A relation R between two terms, x and y , is symmetric if and only if xRy entails yRx . For example, from Smith is the brother of John, we can infer that John is the brother of Smith. A relation R is asymmetric if xRy entails $\neg yRx$. For example, from Smith is the father of Peter, we can infer that Peter is not the father of Smith. "The brother of ..." is symmetric, while "the father of ..." is asymmetric. A relation R between two terms can also be non-symmetric, that is, neither symmetric nor asymmetric. For example, from John likes Jane, we cannot tell whether or not Jane likes John.

"What all cases of equivalence have in common, is mainly the mark of a symmetrical relation, namely, the two axioms: If $A = B$, then $B = A$; If $A = B$, and $B = C$, then $A = C$." — Russell, *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, II, p. 191.

Sympathy

[from Greek *sym*, together — *pathos*, passion] A general disposition or propensity to feel what others around us are feeling and to be affected or moved by this feeling. We are delighted if we observe others who are delighted, and feel sorrow if we observe others in pain. For Hume, sympathy is a part of human nature. In contrast to reason, it is the basis for forming what we regard to be virtues and vices. According to Adam Smith's further development of Hume's idea in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, sympathy is an analogous emotion which arises in spectators from imaginatively putting themselves in the situation which causes the feeling in the agent. Sympathy is what Hutcheson called moral sense and what Hume called approbation. All of these are different expressions for sentiment. For British theorists of moral sentiments, sympathy is our ground for making moral judgements and moral rules.

"Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever." — Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1976, p. 10.

Syncategorematic

[from Greek: *syn*, with — *kategoria*, category] A term introduced by medieval logicians. Categorematic terms were originally those falling under Aristotle's ten categories to denote entities of ten different kinds, with each forming an independent meaningful unit as an expression. Later any term which stands for something and which can serve as a subject

符号逻辑

“数量逻辑”的另一个名称。

对称关系

两个项 x 和 y 之间的关系 R 是对称的, 当且仅当 xRy 衍推 yRx , 例如, 从“史密斯是约翰的兄弟”, 我们可以推出“约翰是史密斯的兄弟”。关系 R 是反对称的, 如果 xRy 衍推并非 yRx 。例如, 从“史密斯是彼得的父亲”, 我们能够推出“彼得不是史密斯的父亲”。因此“是……的兄弟”是对称的, 而“是……的父亲”则是反对称的。两项之间的关系 R 还可以是非对称的, 即是说, 既不对称也不反对称。例如, 从“史密斯喜欢珍妮”, 我们不能分辨珍妮是否喜欢史密斯。

“所有等值的情形所共同具有的东西, 主要是对称关系的标记, 即两个公理: 如果 $A=B$, 则 $B=A$; 如果 $A=B$ 并且 $B=C$, 则 $A=C$ 。”——罗素:《罗素文集》, 第二卷, 第191页。

同情

[源自希腊文: *sym* (共同) 和 *pathos* (感情)] 指的是一种普遍的性情或性格上的倾向, 即感觉到我们周围其他人在感觉什么并为这种感觉所影响或感动。如果我们看到其他人高兴我们会高兴, 如果我们看到其他人疼痛我们会难过。休谟认为, 同情是人的本性的一部分。与理性不同, 它是形成我们把什么看做善和恶的基础。A. 斯密在《道德情感论》进一步发展了休谟的思想, 在他看来, 同情是在旁观者身上产生的一种类似的感情, 这种感情来自他们想象地把自己置身于引起当事者感表的处境中。同情也是哈奇森所说的道德感受和休谟所说的认可。所有这些都是思想感情的不同表示。在英国道德情操论者看来, 同情是我们做出道德判断和制定道德规范的根据。

“怜悯和同情是适于表示我们为其他人感到遗憾的两个词。尽管同情的含义最初可能是指相同的内容, 但现在可被用来表示我们对无论什么样的感情的同情, 这没有什么不合适的。”——斯密:《道德情感论》, 1976年, 第10页。

助范畴词

[源自希腊语 *syn* (随着) 和 *kategoria* (范畴)] 由中世纪逻辑学家引入的术语。范畴词本来是指亚里士多德的十范畴, 后者指十种不同类型的实体, 所以其中每一个都作为一个表达式构成一个独立的意义单位。后来, 代表某物或能在直言命题中用作主词或谓词的任何词项都

or predicate in a categorical proposition was considered to be categorematic. In contrast, syncategorematic terms are those words which cannot function to refer to anything but have to be used together with categorematic terms. They are words such as and, or, not, if, every, some, only and except. Because they do not stand for anything, they do not have meaning in isolation. Although they need other terms to make a meaningful unit of language, they have special logical importance because they show the form of a statement. The notion of a syncategorematic term has now been replaced in modern logic by the notion of a logical constant or topic-neutral expression.

"Such words are called syncategorematic because they are only capable of being used along with others in predication" —Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1916, p. 19.

Syndicalism

[from French; *syndicat*, trade union] A socialist theory based on the experiences of the French trade union movement. Syndicalism claimed that the working-class should adopt direct action against capitalism through trade unions or other working-class organisations. The general strike was regarded as the most important weapon. Militant syndicalism advocated class war and the destruction of capitalism by armed violence. Classical syndicalism distrusted political and state activity and rejected all state-orientated politics. It envisaged the reconstruction of society according to a federal formation of local workers' units after the abolition of the state.

"The term 'syndicalism' has two meanings. It can denote simply trade unionism in a neutral sense. On the other hand, it signifies revolutionary or militant trade unionism, devoted to the overthrow of capitalism and the state. The usually mechanism of overthrow was the general strike."

Plant, *Modern Political Thought*, 1991, p. 87.

Synonym

A relation between things or expressions. Two things are synonymous if they share the same expression, and the expression applies to them for the same reason. For instance, both a man and a horse are called "animal", in the sense that both of them are living things which can move themselves. Thus both a man and a horse are synonymous with regard to the expression "animal". Synonymity today is more likely to be ascribed to expressions than to things. Two expressions are synonymous if they have the same meaning. Usually, an expression in a proposition can be replaced with its synonym without affecting the truth value of the whole sentence, although this does not apply to propositional attitudes or other opaque or non-extensional contexts.

"A word is synonymous to a word or phrase if the substitution of the one for the other in a sentence always yields

被认作范畴词。相比之下,助范畴词是不能作为指称某物的词起作用、而不得不与范畴词共同使用的词语。它们是像“并且”,“或者”,“并非”,“如果”,“每一个”,“有些”,“仅有”和“除……外”之类的词语;因为它们并不代表任何东西,孤立起来看没有意义。尽管它们需要其他词项才能成为有意义的语言单位,但它们具有特殊的逻辑重要性,因为它们显示了陈述的形式。在现代逻辑中,助范畴词这一概念已被“逻辑常项”或“题材中立的表达式”概念所代替。

“这些词语叫作助范畴词,因为它们只能与谓述中的其他成分一道使用。”——约瑟福:《逻辑导论》,1916年,第19页。

工联主义

[源自法文 *syndicat*, 工会] 一种以法国工会运动的经验为基础的社会主义理论。工联主义主张工人阶级应通过工会或其他工人阶级的组织采取直接反对资本主义的行动。总罢工被认为是最重要的武器。富于战斗性的工联主义提倡阶级斗争和用武装的暴力消灭资本主义。传统的工联主义不相信政治的和国家的能动性,拒绝所有适应于国家的政治活动,它设想在废除国家后依照地方工人组织的联邦形态重建社会。

“‘工联主义’这一术语有两个含义。它可以仅指中性意义上的工联主义。它也可表示致力于推翻资本主义和国家的革命的或战斗的工联主义。通常的推翻的途径是总罢工。”——普朗特:《当代政治思想》,1991年,第87页。

同义词

事物之词或表述之间的一种关系。如果两个事物分有相同的表述,而这个表述又是由于相同的理由而适于它们,那么,它们就是同义的。例如,人和马都被称作“动物”,是在它们两者都是能自我运动的生物这个意义上。因此,就“动物”这个表述而言,人和马是同义的。在当今,同义词更被归于表述,而不是归于事物。如果两个表述具有相同的意思,它们就是同义的。在通常情况下,命题中的表述能被它的同义中替换,不影响整个句子的真值,尽管这并不适于命题态度或其他不明确的或非存在性的语境。

“如果一个词被另一个词或短语替换,总能产生出一个等值句,那么,该词与另一个词或短语就是同义的。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第71页。

an equivalent sentence." - Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 71.

Syntactical ambiguity, an alternative expression for structural ambiguity

Syntactical sentence, see pseudo-object sentence

Syntax

[from Greek *syn*, together + *taxis*, order or arrangement] The rules of sentence construction, which indicate how sentences may be formed out of diverse kinds of words. The syntactic rules for each language distinguish those combinations of words which are acceptable from those which unacceptable. Syntactics is the study concerned with the formal aspects of sentence-formation, that is the structural relationships among symbols in a language, in contrast to semantics which studies questions of meaning or truth in a language. According to Russell, Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists, the syntax or grammar of ordinary languages like English is ambiguous and allows the same grammatical form to be used for both meaningful and meaningless utterances. For instance, "Caesar is a prime number" is grammatical correct but logically meaningless. On this view, the grammar of ordinary language becomes a central source of metaphysical nonsense masquerading as intelligible discourse. Consequently, these philosophers suggest that a major task of philosophy is to construct a logical syntax in which grammatical and logical structures coincide.

Syntax is also discussed in recent philosophy as a result of the work of N. Chomsky. He argues for the existence of an innate universal grammar in part from the impossibility of children acquiring the complex syntax of natural language on empiricist principles.

"If grammatical syntax corresponds exactly to logical syntax, pseudo-statements could not arise." - Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language", in Ayer (ed.) *Logical Positivism*, 1959, p. 68.

Syntax words see object words

Synthesis

[from Greek: *syn*, with, together + *tithenai*, put, place, literally, putting together] A mental process of drawing together separate items or ideas and combining them in some way as a whole. In general, it is a process which moves from the simple to the complex, in contrast to analysis which breaks up a whole into its constituents and its manner of combination. Kant made sophisticated use of the notions of *synthesis and analysis* in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In

句法上的模糊性

“结构模糊性”的另一种说法。

句法语句

见“伪对象语句”条。

句法

[源自希腊文 *syn* (一起) 和 *taxis* (顺序或排列)] 语句结构的规则, 指明语句如何可以由多种不同的语词构成。每种语言的句法规则把可接受的和不可接受的语词的结合区别开来。句法学研究有关语句形成的形式方面, 即一种语言中符号之间的形式关系, 这与语义学不同, 后者研究语言中的意义和真理问题。在罗素、维特根斯坦和逻辑实证主义看来, 像英语这种日常语言的句法或语法是含混不清的, 允许同一语法形式既用于有意义的说话, 也用于无意义的说话。例如, “凯撒是个质数”在语法上正确, 但在逻辑上无意义。照这种观点, 日常语言的语法成了伪装成可理解话语的形而上学胡说的主要来源。因此, 这些哲学家认为, 哲学的主要任务是建构一种逻辑句法, 在它那里语法结构和逻辑结构是一致的。

由于 N. 乔姆斯基的工作, 句法在当代哲学中得到讨论。乔姆斯基主张存在先天普遍语法, 部分理由是, 按照经验主义原则, 儿童不可能获得关于自然语言的复杂句法。

“如果语法句法严格对应逻辑句法, 伪陈述就不会出现。” - 卡尔纳普: 《通过语言的逻辑分析清除形而上学》, 载于艾耶尔编: 《逻辑实证主义》, 1959 年, 第 68 页。

句法词

见“对象词”条。

综合

[源自拉丁文: *syn* (与……一起, 共同) 和 *tithenai* (置、放), 从字面上说, 即是“放在一起”] 一种将分散的东西或观念聚集在一起, 以某种方式将它们结合为一个整体的理智过程。一般而言, 这是个从简单到复杂运动的过程, 分析则与此相反, 它将整体分解为其组成部分及其结合的方式。康德在《纯粹理性批判》中对综合和分析的概念作了精致复杂的使用。在黑格

Hegel's dialectics, synthesis is the third stage of a triadic process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. It reconciles both thesis and antithesis by preserving what is rational in them and rejecting what is irrational through what Hegel calls sublation. Synthesis also means the outcome of such a mental process.

"Synthesis may be defined as the discovery of a complex consisting of given constituents combined in a given manner." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VII, p. 119.

Synthesis (Kant)

The act of unifying or combining the manifold representations in intuition into one consciousness or one cognition. It is the act of combining intuition and concepts. The forms of sensible intuition, space and time, organise appearances in experience to a certain extent, but this is not enough. The intuited manifold still needs to be connected and put together. This is the job of synthesis, which is the main act of the understanding or the unity of apperception. Since this act is logical, not physical, Kant calls it intellectual synthesis. Since acts of synthesis take place *a priori*, not in the empirical time-series but rather added to experience, Kant also calls it transcendental synthesis. Synthesis plays an essential role in knowledge by allowing intuition to enter into concepts and providing them with contents that they would otherwise lack. Without synthesis, nothing can be thought or known. Some critics argue that Kant's elaborate account of synthesis provides an unnecessary transcendental psychology to deal with important logical or metaphysical problems.

"By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting together different representations, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one knowledge" — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B103.

Synthetic *a priori* judgement

Judgements may be divided into analytic judgements, in which the predicate adds nothing new to the subject, and synthetic judgements, in which the predicate cannot be extracted from the analysis of the subject. *A priori* judgements are independent of experience and are hence universal, necessary and immune to rejection by experience, while *a posteriori* judgements require empirical justification. Kant claimed that there is a kind of judgement that is at once synthetic and *a priori*. Such judgements do not derive their truth solely from the meanings of the words in the sentences expressing them, but express something that cannot be refuted by experience. They are universally agreed by reason and apodictically certain. Kant argued that not all *a priori* truths are analytical and that certain fundamental truths of mathematics, science and philosophy are synthetic *a priori*. He then pro-

尔的辩证法中,综合是正、反、合三过程的第三阶段。通过黑格尔所谓的否定,它保留正题和反题中合理的东西,抛弃其中不合理的东西,将二者调和起来。综合也意味着这种精神过程的结果。

“综合可以定义为发现一个复合物,它由按特定方式结合的特定构成成分组成。”——罗素:《罗素文集》,第七卷,第119页。

综合(康德)

综合在康德那里是把直观中的杂多表象统一或结合为一个意识或一种认识的活动。简言之,它是把直观和概念结合起来的活动。感性直观形式、空间和时间,在经验中把现象组织到某种程度,但这是不够的。直观杂多的需要联系起来并且结合在一起。这就是综合的工作,它是知性的主要活动或统觉的统一。既然这种活动是逻辑的而非物理的,康德也用它来意指“理智的综合”。因为它是先天地发生的,不存在于经验的时间系列,而是添加到经验之中的,康德也把它标作“先验的综合”。综合在知识中起着根本性的作用,因为它清楚地表明直观如何进入到概念,并把内容提供给概念,否则概念就是空的。没有综合,就没有任何事物可思想或认识。某些批评家争辩说,康德对综合的精心论述提供了一个不必要的先验心理学来讨论重要的逻辑问题或形而上学问题。

“所谓综合,在它的最广泛意义上,我理解为这样一种活动,它联结种种不同表象,并将它们的所有杂多把握为一种知识。——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B103。

先天综合判断

判断可划分为分析判断和综合判断,在分析判断中,谓词没有给主词增加什么新内容,在综合判断中,谓词不能从对主词的分析而推导出来。判断也可划分为先天和后天判断。先天判断独立于经验,因而是普遍的、必然的,并不会为经验所否决;后天判断则要求经验的证实。康德注意到有一种判断,它同时既是综合的又是先天的。这样的判断不能单独从句子中的词的意义而推断它们的真,但又表达了某种不能由经验所否定的东西。它们是由理性所普遍同意和必然地确定的。康德的观点是,并非所有的先天真理都是分析的;而数学、科学和哲学的某些基本真理都属于先天综合判断。接着他开始探究“先天综合判断如何可能”这个问题,这将同时决定“形而上学如何可能”这个问题的解决。

ceeded to ask how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible and through their possibility how metaphysics is possible. He saw this question as setting the central task of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In order to answer this question, he established the existence of *a priori* intuitions (space and time) and *a priori* concepts (the categories) and related them to possible empirical knowledge.

The notion of synthetic *a priori* judgement was held to be self-contradictory by logical positivists, who argued that the analytic-synthetic distinction and the *a priori*-*a posteriori* distinction are identical. Quine has also rejected this notion on the grounds that we cannot draw the analytic-synthetic distinction without circularity. Kripke has accepted Kant's distinctions, but has introduced the notion of the necessary *a posteriori* in his essentialism. Some critics argue that the achievements of the first *Critique* can be detached from Kant's account of synthetic *a priori* judgements.

"We can confidently say that certain pure synthetic knowledge *a priori* is real and given, namely, pure mathematics and pure natural science; for both contain propositions which are everywhere recognised, partly as apodictically certain by mere reason, partly by universal agreement from experience, and yet as independent of experience" — Kant, *Prolegomena*, preamble, sec. 3.

Systematic ambiguity

A term introduced in Russell's theory of types. An expression is systematically ambiguous if it seems to be applicable to objects of different types. It is similar to the way that a common noun may be used to label either a thing of a given kind or a picture of such a thing or the way that a word may be used to refer to itself. Such an expression has to be differently interpreted according to the order of the propositions in which it occurs. But without the theory of type, the different meanings would not have been noticed. The word "class" is systematically ambiguous because it has different meanings when used at different levels in the hierarchy of types. This is the case for all existential propositions with the expression "there are". The expression has come to refer to a property which a term has if it means different things in different applications. We need special signs such as particular modifying words or quotation marks to remove this sort of ambiguity.

"The word 'there is' is a word having 'systematic ambiguity', i. e., having a strictly infinite number of different meanings which it is important to distinguish" — Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 268.

他把这个问题看做《纯粹理性批判》的中心任务。为了解答它,康德证明了先天直观(空间和时间)和先天概念(范畴)的存在,并把它们与可能的经验知识相联系。

先天综合判断这个概念被逻辑实证主义认为是自相矛盾的,因为他们相信分析判断和综合判断的二分对立与先天判断及后天判断的二分对立是相等的。奎因也抛弃了这个概念,因为我们无法做出分析与综合的区分而不陷入循环论证。而克里普克接受康德的区分,但他在他的本质主义中引入了后天必然判断的概念。有些评论者则认为第一批判的成就可与康德对先天综合判断的论述区分开来。

"我们能自信地说,某种纯粹先天的综合知识是实在的和给予的,即纯粹数学和纯粹自然科学;因为两者包含任何地方都可认识的命题,部分是由于理性本身的必然确定性,部分是按照普遍地与经验一致,可又独立于经验。"——康德:《未来形而上学导论》,绪论,第三部分。

系统模糊性

罗素类型论中引入的词。如果一个表达式似乎可以用于不同类型的对象,那么这个表达式就是在体系上模糊的。这类似于一个普通名词,既可以用来标志某个种类的事物,也可以用来标志这种事物的图像,或者类似于一个词可以用来指这个词本身。根据这种表达式所在的命题排列,这种表达式可以得到不同的解释。但没有类型论,这些不同的意义就不会被注意到。"类"这个词在体系上是模糊的,因为当它用于结构的不同层次时具有不同的意义。带有"存在着"这个表达式的所有存在命题就是这种情况。如果它在不同的用法中意味着不同的事物,那么它最终是指一个词具有的一种特性。我们需要诸如特殊的修饰词或引号等这种专门的记号来避免这类模糊性。

"'存在着'这个词带有'系统模糊性',即具有必须做出重要区分的无限多的不同意义。"——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第268页。

T

Tabula rasa

[Latin: blank tablet] A metaphor for the soul or mind as a blank or empty tablet at birth. The phrase comes from the Latin translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* 429b30-430a3 where Aristotle said that the soul is like a writing tablet which is potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought. The phrase was widely used in Scholasticism to express the basic idea that there is nothing in intellect which was not first in the senses. The phrase has been especially associated with Locke, although he adopted this expression not in his *Essay*, but in other works. Instead Locke used some associated metaphors: mind is a white paper, a dark room or an empty cabinet. His point is that there are no innate moral and logical principles inscribed on the mind before birth and that at the beginning of cognition the mind is a void and passive entity, a receptacle awaiting ideas from experience. The mind, however, has the potential to acquire ideas and knowledge. This is the cornerstone of his empiricism.

"There is the question whether the soul in itself is completely blank like a writing tablet on which nothing has as yet been written—a tabula rasa—as Aristotle and the author of the *Essay* maintain." —Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Preface, p. 48.

Tacit belief

A person may have an unlimited number of beliefs at any time. Some of them he explicitly assents to. Others figure in his internal soliloquy. These can be called his explicit beliefs. But there are many others that are implied by these explicit beliefs but which are not themselves explicit because, for example, he has not drawn the necessary inferences at that moment. These are called tacit beliefs. Some tacit beliefs play a causal role in behaviour. It has become a major problem in the philosophy of mind how to distinguish tacit beliefs that have a real causal role from tacit beliefs that do not have a causal role.

"Call 'tacit' any belief that one really has but has not explicitly entertained." —Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, 1988, p. 390.

Tacit knowledge

In addition to explicit knowledge-how and knowledge-that, Chomsky introduced another sort of knowledge, that is

白板

[拉丁语: 白板] 一个比喻, 把灵魂或心灵比作天生的白板。这个用语来自亚里士多德的《论灵魂》429b30—430a3 的拉丁译文, 在那里亚里士多德说, 灵魂像一块写字板, 虽然它潜在地是可想像的任何东西, 但是在它有了思想之前, 它实际上什么也不是。经院哲学广泛用这个用语来表达“理智中的东西无不首先在感觉中”这一基本思想。这个用语特别与洛克联系在一起, 尽管他本人在《人类理智论》(除其他一些著作外)中实际并未采用这个表述。他使用了其他一些相关的隐喻: 心灵是一张白纸, 或一间黑屋, 或一间空室。他的观点是: 心灵在生前并没有任何天赋的道德原则和逻辑原则印在上面, 在认识开始时, 心灵是一个空的、被动的东西, 一个容器, 它等待着由经验而来的观念。不过, 心灵仍然有获得观念和知识的潜力。这个观点是洛克的经验主义的基石。

“问题是, 灵魂本身是否像亚里士多德和《人类理智论》的作者所主张的那样, 是完全空白的, 好像一块尚未写上任何字迹的写字板 (a tabula rasa)。”——莱布尼茨: 《人类理智新论》, “前言”, 第 48 页。

静默信念

在任意时刻, 一个人的心中可能有无数的信念。有些是他明确认可的, 另有一些出现于他内部的自言自语中。这些可以被称为他的明确信念。但还有许多信念为这些明确信念所暗示但其本身却是不明确的, 因为(例如)他在那一刻没有作必要的推理。这些被称为静默信念。有些静默信念在其行为中起因果作用。心的哲学中的一个主要问题是, 如何区分有真正的因果效应的静默信念和没有因果效应的静默信念。

“一个人真正具有却未曾明确持有的任何信念可称为‘静默的’。”——丘奇兰德: 《神经哲学》, 1988 年, 第 390 页。

静默知识

在明确的知道如何和知道如此之外, 乔姆斯基又引入了另一种知识, 亦即, 说话者关于其

the speaker's unconscious knowledge of the grammatical rules of his language. This type of tacit knowledge is the basis for linguistic competence. Chomsky argues that a child does not know the rules, but he can easily master the intricate set of specific rules that distinguish what is grammatical from what is not grammatical. This suggests that the child already has a knowledge of the language, knowledge which is not learnt and which cannot be explained in empiricist terms such as stimulus control, conditioning or analogy. He claims that tacit knowledge must belong to an innate faculty and that the study of language should provide insight into human psychology. The idea of tacit knowledge is the core of Chomsky's Cartesian linguistics.

"Chomsky suggested that we might have tacit knowledge—propositional knowledge which we are unaware of having and cannot report having, which nevertheless guides our behaviours." —D'Agustino, *Chomsky's System of Ideas*, 1986, p. 69.

Taste

Sensitivity to the aesthetic properties of objects and the aesthetic intuition and response which enable one to tell, for example, what is beautiful or elegant. Taste is a major conception of eighteenth century aesthetics. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson regarded taste as a quasi-perceptual inner sense, akin to "moral sense", but for Kant it is simply a special operation of our normal cognitive faculties. There exist vast differences of taste among different cultures and different individuals. This makes taste appear to be purely subjective and a matter of personal preference. However, for some aesthetic objects there seems to be widespread—even cross-cultural and timeless—agreement in taste. Hence, Hume sought to ascertain the grounds of this intersubjective agreement. For Kant, the "judgement of taste" is subjective, but since it addresses the formal features of an object rather than its content, it is universally valid. Others believe that taste is a product of cultivation, demanding training and upbringing. People with the same social and educational background are more likely than people with diverse backgrounds to have shared taste regarding the same objects.

"Taste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or a disliking devoid of all interest. The Object of such a liking is called beautiful." —Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Part 1, division 1, book 1, sect. 5.

Tautology

[from Greek, *tauto*, the selfsame — *logos*, word or expression, literally, repetition of what has been said] A logical formula which is true whatever the truth-possibilities of its constituent propositional variables. Thus, a tautology

语言的语法规则的无意识知识。这种静默知识是语言能力的基础。乔姆斯基论辩说,一个孩子并不知道这些规则,但他可以轻易地掌握一系列复杂的规则来区分合乎语法的和不合乎语法的。这表明那个孩子已经具有了关于这个语言的一种知识,一种非习得的、且不能用像刺激控制、条件反射、类比等等这样的经验主义语言来解释的知识。乔姆斯基声称静默知识一定属于一个先天的官能,而且语言研究应当有助于理解人类心理学。关于静默知识的思想是乔姆斯基的笛卡尔式语言学的核心。

"乔姆斯基提出我们可能具有静默知识——我们没有意识到自己具有并且也不能报告自己具有但却指引我们的行为的命题知识。"——德阿斯廷诺:《乔姆斯基的思想系统》,1986年,第69页。

鉴赏力

欣赏对象审美特性的敏感性,能使人识别譬如优美或优雅对象的审美直觉与审美反应。鉴赏力(或趣味)是18世纪美学的主要概念。沙夫茨伯利与哈奇森认为,鉴赏力是一种半感性的内在感觉,近似于"道德感",但在康德看来,鉴赏力只是我们正常认知感官的特殊运作形式。在不同的文化之中与不同的个体身上,鉴赏力有着天壤之别。这便使鉴赏力显现为一种纯然主观的或个人爱好的东西。尽管如此,对有些审美对象来说,在鉴赏力方面依然存在着广为流传的——甚至是跨文化的与超越时间的——共同认识。因此,休谟试图确定这些主体间认同的基础。康德认为,"鉴赏力判断"是主观的,然而,由于这种判断强调的是某一对象的形式特征而非其内容,所以是普遍有效的。另一些人认为,鉴赏力是文化修养的产物,需要训练和培育。具有同样社会和教育背景的人,要比背景不同的人更有可能在观照相同对象时享有共同的鉴赏力。

"鉴赏力是凭借没有任何利害关系的好恶情绪来判断一个对象的能力或表现一个对象的方式。令人喜爱的对象便是美的。"——康德:《判断力批判》,第一卷,第一部,第一部分,第五节。

重言式

[源自希腊文, *tauto* (自我相同) 和 *logos* (语词或表达),从字面上说,意为"重复已经说过的东西"] 一个逻辑公式,不论其组成部分的命题变项为真的可能性怎么样,它总是为真。这

takes the truth-value "true" for every truth-combination in a truth-table. Its truth cannot be established by experience and need not be so established. The denial of a tautology will be a contradiction. A tautology is not concerned with any subject-matter, and "says nothing" about the world, but exhibits the logical properties of genuine propositions or restates the same idea in different words. The study of tautology is of great importance in logic.

"In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological." —Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.46.

Techné

[Greek: craft or art, normally meaning skill] A skill in contrast to a natural capacity. Plato regularly asked whether virtue is *techné* and so teachable. Aristotle took *techné* to be a rational discipline concerned with production (*poiesis*). He held that as productive science it contrasts both to demonstrative science (*theoretikos*) and to practical reason (*phronesis*), which is concerned with action. In this sense, *techné* is skill in producing plus knowledge of the nature of relevant things. Despite Aristotle's distinction between practical reason and *techné*, his examples of practical reason often turn out to be illustrations of *techné*.

"A *techné* is the same as a state involving true reason concerned with production." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a10.

Teleological argument for the existence of God

[from Greek; *telos*, end] Also called the argument from design, an argument seeking to derive the existence of God from the teleological order of the world, resting on an analogy with the relation between an intelligent craftsman and human artefacts. Aquinas' fifth way of proving God's existence is a teleological argument. According to this argument, since everything in the world shows some order, regularity or purpose in its behaviour, there must be a supreme intelligence, namely God, outside the universe and directing natural things toward their ends. A classical version of the argument from design was formulated by William Paley. The various parts of a watch cooperate in complex ways to produce the result of keeping time because the watch is designed by a watch-maker. The universe resembles a watch in the sense that it is a system of adaptations of means to ends. The only way to explain the complex and pervasive adaptation to ends in the universe is to postulate a supernatural designer. For the teleological argument, what is at stake is not merely that the universe displays order or regularity, but also that the order and regularity is directed toward ends. In *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hume formulated a similar version of the argument by comparing the world to a ma-

样,对真值表上每一真值的结合,重言式所取的真值都为“真”。它之为真不能得自于经验,也毋须得自于经验。对重言式的否定将会是一矛盾式。重言式不关心任何主题,对于世界“无所言说”,但展现了真正命题的逻辑性质,或对同一观念以不同的语词作了重述。研究重言式在逻辑中有极大的重要性。

“在这些情况之一中,命题对于基本命题的所有为真的可能性均为真。我们说这样的真值条件是重言式的。”——维特根斯坦:《逻辑哲学论》,4.46。

技艺

[希腊词,指“技艺”或“艺术”,一般意思为“技能”]一种与自然能力相对的技能。柏拉图经常问,德性是否是技艺,是否因此而可教。亚里士多德把“技艺”看做是一种理性学科,关注于创制(*poiesis*)。他认为,它作为创制科学,既与证明科学(*theoretikos*)相对,又与实践理性(*phronesis*)相对,后者关心的是行为。在这种意义上,技艺是创制的技艺加关于有关事物的本性的知识。不过,虽然亚里士多德区分了实践理性与技艺,他为实践理性所举的例子常常就是技艺的例子。

“技艺等同于一种表现关于创制的真实理性的状态。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1140a10。

上帝存在的目的论论证

[源自希腊语 *telos*, 即“目的”]亦称设计论证。这个论证以智慧工匠和人工制品之间的关系类比为依据,试图从世界的目的论秩序推导出上帝的存在。阿奎那证明上帝存在的“第五法”就是目的论论证。根据这个论证的说法,既然世上的每一事物在其行为中都表现出某种秩序、规整或目的,那么,就必定有一个至上的智慧,即上帝,他存在于宇宙之外,并把自然事物引向它们的目的。设计论证的经典说法是由W. 培里系统论述的。钟表的不同部件之所以能以复杂的方式合力产生记时的结果,是因为它由钟表制造者设计。在它们都是手段适合目的的系统这个意义上,宇宙与钟表相似。要解释宇宙中复杂的、扩大了适合目的的情形,唯一的办法是假定一位超自然的设计者。对目的论论证来说,关键的问题不仅是宇宙呈现出秩序或规整,而且是秩序和规整被引向目的。在《自然宗教对话录》中,休谟通过比较世界和机器,系统阐述了与该论证相似的主张。但是,在这本书中,休谟把大量篇幅放在对该论证的批判上,他的依据是,设计论证试图解释的东西,能够以两种互不相容的方式加以解释,所以,目的论论

chine. However, Hume devoted much of this work to criticising this argument on the grounds that what the argument from design seeks to explain can be explained in alternative ways and that the teleological argument cannot conclusively show the existence of God. Kant held that adaptation of things to the needs of other things in nature can suggest but cannot prove the existence of a designer. Hume's view is supported by the development of the Darwinian theory of evolution, which provides natural explanations of purposiveness in the world.

"Linked with the notion of design and order is that of purpose (hence the name Teleological Argument — from *telos*, 'end')."—T. McPherson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1965, p. 75.

Teleological ethics, see consequentialism

Teleological explanation

To explain a property or a behaviour in terms of purpose (Greek: *telos*). This sort of explanation was initiated by Socrates, and fully developed by Aristotle with his notion of final cause (Greek: *to ou heneka*, for the sake of which a thing comes about). In medieval philosophy, teleological explanation presupposed a Divine and omniscient designer. Everything operates for a goal and the goal is predetermined by God. Because of this, teleological explanation was vehemently criticised when modern science began. However, Aristotle mainly applied his final cause interpretation to living or organic things, and accounts for the function of each part of an organism by appeal to its contribution to the perfect state of the organism as a whole. This sort of teleological functionalism is still applicable in contemporary biology and social science, although some philosophers try to reduce such explanations to efficient causality.

"The teleological form of explanation [is] an explanation in terms of reason rather than in terms of causes."—Ayer, *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays*, 1963, p. 259.

Teleological functionalism, see functionalism

Teleology

[from Greek: *telos*, the end or aim of a thing — *logos*, study] Aristotle assumed that everything that happens in the universe must be understood as the striving of something towards an end promoting its well-being or helping it to survive. He ascribes *telos* to plants and animals, believing that their behaviour serves their needs and preserves their life. In view of the regularity in the natural world, he claims that nature itself must have an internal end or purpose.

Aristotle did not admit a conscious, rational agent in his

证不能确切地表明上帝的存在。康德认为,在自然中,事物对其他事物需要的适合能够提议但不能证明设计者的存在。休谟的观点得到了达尔文进化论的支持,因为该理论对世界的目的性提出了自然的解释。

“把设计观念和秩序连结起来的是目的观念(因此,‘目的论论证’这个名称源于 *telos*, 即‘目的’)。”——麦克斐尔逊:《宗教哲学》,1965年,第75页。

目的论的伦理学

见“效果论”条。

目的论解释

以目的(希腊语 *telos*)为依据解释特性或行为。这种解释方式肇始于苏格拉底,充分发展于亚里士多德及其“目的因”(希腊语是 *to ou heneka*, 直译为“一物所为的东西”)观念。在中世纪哲学中,目的论解释预设一位神和全知的设计者。每物的行为都为—目标,而这目标被上帝预定。正因如此,当近代科学兴起时,目的论解释受到了猛烈批判。但是,亚里士多德主要是把他的“目的因”解释用于生命物或有机物,并通过论述有机体各部分对作为整体的有机体的完善状态的贡献,来说明各部分的功能。这种目的论功能主义,在当代生物学和社会科学中,依然是适用的,尽管有些哲学家力图把这样的解释归结为作用因果性。

“目的论形式的解释,与其说是依据原因,不如说是依据理性的一种解释。”——艾耶尔:《人的概念及其他论文》,1963年,第259页。

目的论功能主义

见“功能主义”条。

目的论

[源自希腊语 *telos* (—物的目的或目标)和 *logos* (研究)] 亚里士多德假定,必须把宇宙中发生的一切事物现象理解为努力追求激发其幸福或有助其生存的某种趋于目的的东西。他认为植物和动物也有 *telos*, 相信它们的行为是为它们的需要服务的,并维持自身的生命。由于自然世界是规整有序的,所以他主张,自然本身必定有一内在的终点或目的。

在亚里士多德的目的论解释中,他不承认

teleological explanation, but the Christian tradition infers from the regularity in nature that there is a supernatural designer and claims that everything in the world has been designed by God to be of service to man (The Teleological Argument or Argument from Design). The theory of evolution denies the existence of a purposive designer, but confirms that an adaptation serves a purpose of survival in natural selection. Since purposive and functional activities are observed universally, teleology is much discussed in the philosophy of science. Whether functional or teleological explanation is a distinctive kind of explanation or can be reduced to causal explanation is a matter of controversy.

"Questions about teleology are, broadly, to do with whether a thing has a purpose or is acting for the sake of a purpose, and if so, what that purpose is." —Woodfield, *Teleology*, 1976, p. 1.

Telishment

A term proposed by John Rawls to indicate a crucial problem of the utilitarian view of punishment. Utilitarianism claims that punishment is justifiable only by reference to its probable consequences with regard to promoting public good or preventing crime, rather than because the wrong-doing itself merits punishment. Rawls suggests that we can imagine a situation in which the authority knows that a suspected criminal is innocent, but it still imposes a harsh punishment on him because such an action can produce better social consequences. This practice should not be termed punishment, because the subject of suffering is not a wrongdoer. Rawls names it telishment. Telishment is intuitively wrong but seems to be justifiable according to the utilitarian view of punishment.

"Try to imagine, then, an institution (which we may call 'telishment') which is such that the officials set up by it have authority to arrange a trial for the condemnation of an innocent man whenever they are of the opinion that doing so would be in the best interests of society." —Rawls, "Two concepts of rules", in Acton (ed.), *Philosophy of Punishment*, 1969, p. 113.

Telos

[Greek: end, aim or goal] For Aristotle, one of the four causes: the final cause for the sake of which a process occurs or something is done. According to Aristotle's distinction between activity (*energeia*) and motion (*kinesis*), every action has an end, either an internal end in itself or an external end outside itself. By appealing to the *telos*, which is associated with the formal cause or even identical to it, Aristotle explained the generation of things and natural movement. He also called the characteristic function of a thing its end, because the benefit brought about by this function accounts for the existence of the thing and its aim. Thus out-

有意识的、理智的行为者。但是，基督教传统却从自然的规整有序出发，推出一位超自然的设计者存在，并断言，世上的每一事物都是上帝设计出来为人服务的（“目的论论证”或“设计论证”）。进化论否定了有意设计者的存在，但却确认了自然选择中的适者生存。因为有目的的、功能的活动是普遍可见的，所以，目的论在科学哲学中讨论颇多。功能的或目的论的解释是一种不同类型的解释，还是能被归结为因果解释，这是一个有争议的问题。

“大致说来，目的论所要研究的问题是，事物是否有目的，或是否为了追求目的而行动，如果是，那目的是什么。”——伍德菲尔德：《目的论》，1976年，第1页。

滥罚

J. 罗尔斯提出的一个术语，以表明功利主义处罚观的一个关键问题。功利主义主张，处罚之所以是正当的，只是由于涉及关于促进公共利益或防止犯罪这一可能的结果，而不是因为坏事本身应受处罚。罗尔斯提出，我们可以设想这样一种情况，在这种情况下，当权者知道嫌疑犯是无罪的，但仍对他处以重罚，因为这样做能产生更好的社会后果。这种做法不应称为处罚，因为受害的主体不是做坏事的人。罗尔斯把这叫做是“滥罚”。滥罚从直观上看是错误的，但根据功利主义处罚观来看似乎又是有道理的。

“尝试设想这样一种制度（我们可以把它称为‘滥罚’），由它任命的官员有权为了宣告一个无罪的人有罪而安排一次审判，无论何时他们都认为这样做是为了社会的最大利益。”——罗尔斯：《两种规则概念》，载于阿克顿（编辑）：《处罚哲学》，1969年，第113页。

目的

[希腊词，意为“终端”、“目的”或“目标”] 在亚里士多德看来，目的是四因之一，即一个过程为之发生或一件事情为之而作的最终因。按照亚里士多德关于现实（*energeia*）与运动（*kinesis*）的区分，每一活动都有一个目的，或者在自身之中（内在的），或者在自身之外（外在的）。通过诉诸于与形式因相连甚至等同于它的目的，亚里士多德解释了事物的生成及自然运动。他也把事物的特有的功能称作其目的，因为由这一功能引起的益处说明了该物的存在及其目的。这样，切割便是一把刀的目的。在他的

ting is the end of a knife. In his ethics, Aristotle connected *telos* with good, happiness and virtue. Every action is for an end, but happiness is the complete end (*telos*). *Telos* as function is a major, if controversial, conception in contemporary science, especially biology and social science. It is further discussed in the entry on teleology.

"It is for the sake of the end (*telos*) that everyone does the other things." -- Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a22.

Temperance

[Greek: *sophrosune*, self control or moderation in the satisfaction of bodily desire, from *phronēin*, sound mind] A virtue discussed by both Plato and Aristotle. A temperate man has a mind sufficiently sound to control desires. He knows his own limitations and practices restraint in action. Plato's dialogue *Charmides* sought a definition of temperance. In the *Republic*, temperance was described as a harmony between different classes in the ideal city and between different parts of the soul. In this harmony, the higher part controls the inferior part, with the consent of the latter. Aristotle understood temperance to be a mean state with regard to such desires such as eating, drinking and sex.

"Temperance is understood not to be carried away by the desires, but preserving a decent indifference toward them." -- Plato, *Phaedo*, 68c.

Temporal logic, another term for tense logic

Temporality

For Heidegger, *Dasein* exists in relation to three temporal dimensions at once. Its Being is constituted by taking the past with it, by being concerned with the present and by being the projection of the future. Hence, its Being is necessarily temporal. Temporality makes up the primordial meaning of *Dasein's* Being. The fundamental structures of *Dasein*, existentiality, facticity and fallingness, are modes of the temporalizing of temporality. They respectively correspond to three ecstasis of temporality: the past, the present and the future. Ecstasy literally means standing out, indicating that at each ecstasy *Dasein* stands out from the general flow of time and existence. Philosophers traditionally focus on the present and conceive time as a series of happenings or the occurrence of actual facts. In contrast, Heidegger claimed that temporality is an ecstatic unity which is independent of any chronological relations. Among the three ecstasis, the future is the primary phenomenon of the primordial authenticity of temporality. This ecstatic unity is also called the transcendence of time or the transcendence of *Dasein*.

"This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it

伦理学中,亚里士多德也把目的与善、幸福或德性相连结。每一行动都是为了一个目的,而幸福是完满的目的 (*telos*)。在当代科学,尤其是生物学和社会科学中,目的作为功能是一个虽有争议但却重要的概念。进一步的讨论请见“目的论”条。

“每一个人都是为了某一目的而做其他事情。” -- 亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1097a22。

节制

[希腊词为 *sophrosune*, 出自 *phronēin* (健全的心灵), 一般是指在满足身体欲望方面的自我控制或节制] 由柏拉图和亚里士多德讨论的一种美德。一个有节制的人有足够的心智控制自己的欲望。他知道他的界限,并在行动中约束自己。柏拉图的对话《查米德斯》是关于节制的定义的。在《国家篇》中,节制被描绘为理想国中各阶层间的和谐,是灵魂中不同部分间的和谐。在这种和谐中,较高的部分控制较低的部分,而较低的部分同意这种控制。亚里士多德把节制看做是跟诸如吃、喝、性等欲望有关的中庸状态。

“节制应被理解成是,不为欲望牵着鼻子走,而是对它们保持一种正直的冷漠。” -- 柏拉图:《斐多篇》, 68c。

时间逻辑

“时态逻辑”的另一术语。

时间性

对于海德格尔,缘在 [*Dasein*, 此在] 的生存同时与三个时间向度相关。它的存在由承担着过去、牵念着现在和是其未来的投射所构成。因此,它的存在必然是时间性的。时间性构成了缘在之存在的原初意义。缘在的基本结构,即生存状态、实际状态和沉沦状态,就是时间性进行时机化 (temporalizing, *Zeitigung*, 时间化) 的方式。它们相应于时间性的三种逸出状态或逸出态 (ecstasis, 出神态): 将来、过去和现在。逸出态从字面上意味着“站出去”,表示在每个逸出态中缘在从时间和生存的普遍之流中站出去。传统的哲学家们关注于现在,将时间当做一系列事件或实在事实的出现。与此相反,海德格尔认为时间性是逸出态的统一体,独立于任何年代学的关系。在这三个逸出态中,将来是时间性的真正切己的原初现象。这种逸出态的统一也被称作“时间的超越性”或“缘在的超越性”。

“我们称这样一个统一的现象,即在已经存在中当前化着的将来,为‘时间性’。” -- 海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译), 1962年,第437页。

as 'temporality'." —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 437.

Temporally neutral term, see past-referring term

Tender-mindedness, see tough-mindedness

Tense logic

A formal logic about tense and temporality, concerned with the systematisation of inference involving propositions containing tensed verbs or notions of change, process and time. This area is not covered by standard logic which presupposes that the relations of predicate expressions to their subjects is timeless and static. Tense logic holds that the world changes and that it is possible that the same thing has and has not a given property at different times. The truth-values of tensed statements about the past, present and future vary at different times. This part of logic holds that terms such as before, after, now, next, always and sometimes should match the formal patterns of modal logic. It introduces the operators P to stand for the past tense ("it was the case that"), T for the present tense ("it is now the case that") and F for the future tense ("it will be the case that"). It can also be presented as a many-valued system. The logic is said to have been heralded by J. N. Findley, but the first system was provided by A. N. Prior in *Time and Modalities* (1957) and was conceived as an alternative solution to the problem of future contingents. Rescher and von Wright are also important contributors to the development of tense logic. The logic is also called temporal logic, chronological logic and the logic of change.

"The object of chronological logic— 'tense logic', or 'change logic', as it has also been called by various logicians— is to systematise reasoning with propositions that have a temporal copula." —Rescher, *Topics in Philosophical Logic*, 1968, p. 196.

Term

Any word or phrase that denotes an individual or a class and functions as a single unit in expressing meaning. In Russell's theory of meaning, a term is also an object which is referred to by a word or expression. He divides terms into two kinds: terms as things indicated by proper names and terms as concepts indicated by all other words. Hence, a man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera and anything else that can be mentioned are all terms. In a broad sense, a word which does not have its own meaning but determines the meaning of the proposition containing it is also a term, and hence we have the concept of a syncategorematic term.

时间中立的用语

见“指称过去的用语”条。

喜爱空想

见“讲究实际”条。

时态逻辑

关于时态和时间性的形式逻辑, 研究包含时态动词或变化、过程、时间等概念的命题推理的系统化。标准逻辑预设了谓词表达式与其主词的关系是无时间性的和稳定的, 因而它未涉足这一领域。时态逻辑认为, 世界是变化的, 同一事物在不同时间内可能有并且没有一给定属性。关于过去、现在、未来的时态陈述的真值随时间的不同而变化。这部分逻辑认为, 由“在……之前”, “在……之后”, “现在”, “紧接”, “总是”, “有时”之类的词语所表示的概念应该适合模态逻辑的形式模式。它引入算子 P 代表过去时态 (“过去的情形是……”), T 代表现在时态 (“现在的情形是……”), 用 F 代表将来时态 (“情形将会是……”)。时态逻辑还可以展示为一个多值系统。据说 J. N. 费德利预示了这一逻辑的来临, 但它的第一个系统是由 A. N. 普赖尔在他的《时间与模态》(1957) 一书中提出的, 设想为有关未来偶然性问题的另一种解决方案。N. 雷谢尔和冯·赖特对时态逻辑的发展域也作出了重要贡献。这一逻辑亦称“时间逻辑”, “时序逻辑”或“变化逻辑”。

“时序逻辑——‘时态逻辑’或‘变化逻辑’, 如不同的逻辑学家所称呼的——的目标是把有关含时间系词的命题的推理系统化。”——雷谢尔:《哲学逻辑论集》, 1968年, 第196页。

词项

任何语词或词组, 它指示一个体或一类, 其作用是表达意义的单一单位。在罗素的意义理论中, 词项也是一语词或一表达式所指称的对象。他把词项划分为两类: 作为事物的词项, 由专名来指示, 以及作为概念的词项, 由所有其他语词来指示。因此, 一个人、一个时刻、一个数、一个类、一种关系、一怪物或任何其他可以提及的东西, 它们全是词项。在更宽泛的意义上, 一个没有自己的意义, 但决定了包含它的命题的意义的语词也是一词项, 我们因此而有“助范畴词”这个概念。

“让我们说, 任何由一表达式引入, 或能够

"Let us say that anything which is introduced, or can be introduced, into a remark by an expression is a term." — Strawson, *Individuals*, 1959, p. 146.

Tertiary quality, see supervenience

Tertium non datur

[Latin: there is no third] A way of expressing the law of excluded middle, that is the law that every proposition is either true or false and that there is no third possibility. In contrast, *tertium quid* means that there is some third.

"Either one might, or one might not, have been otherwise. *Tertium non datur*." — Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method*, 1970, p. 153.

Tertium quid, see *Tertium non datur*

Tertullian's paradox, see *fideism*

Thanatos, another expression for death instinct

Theism

[from Greek: *theos*, god] In opposition to atheism, the belief in the existence of God (monotheism) or gods (polytheism) as a personal being or beings. In contrast to deism, the belief that God transcends the world but is also immanent within it or within us; that God is perfect and is therefore omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good; and that God is the loving creator of the world who manifests himself to human beings through caring for us and communicating with us. In contrast to pantheism, theism claims that God exists independent of the world. Theism is the central feature in the monotheistic religious tradition of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Various arguments concerning the existence of God seek to establish theism, although critical responses are raised against each of its major claims.

"Theism, common to traditional Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is the view that the cosmos is created and kept in existence by an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, supremely good being. It preserves some distinction between God and the creation, according to which the two are not identical however interwoven." — C. Taliaferro, in Bunnin and Tsui-James (eds), *Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1996, p. 446.

Theodicy

[from Greek: *theos*, god + *dike*, justice, right, the jus

被引入谈论中的东西都是一词项。"——斯特劳森：《个别物》，1959年，第146页。

第三特性

见“伴随性”条。

无第三

[拉丁语，“没有第三”]表述排中律的一种方式。排中律是指：每一命题要么真，要么假，没有第三种可能性。与此对应的是 *tertium quid*，意为“有第三”。

“要么可能，要么不可能，没有其他选择。‘无第三’。”——哈特肖恩：《创造性综合与哲学的方法》，1970年，第153页。

有第三

见“无第三”条。

德尔图良悖论

见“信仰主义”条。

死亡

“死亡本能”的另一表达。

有神论

[源自希腊语 *theos* (神)]与无神论相对立，相信作为人格的上帝（一神论）或诸神（多神论）的存在。与自然神论不同，有神论认为，上帝超然于世界之上，但也内在于世界或我们之中；上帝是完满的，所以也是全能、全知和全善的；上帝是世界的仁慈创造者，他通过对我们的关心和与我们的沟通而将自己显现给人类。与泛神论不同，有神论主张，上帝独立于世界而存在。有神论是犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教的一神论宗教传统中的核心特征。关于上帝存在的各种论证，意在建立有神论，虽然对于它的每个主要观点，都有人提出批判性应答。

“作为传统的犹太教、基督教和伊斯兰教共同特征的有神论，指这样的观点：宇宙是由一位全在、全知、全能、至善的存在者创造出来并保持其存在的。它坚持上帝和造物之间的某种区别，根据这种见解，二者不同——但又是交织着的。”——塔里亚斐洛，见布宁和崔-詹姆斯（编）：《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》，1996年，第446页。

神正论

[源自希腊语 *theos* (神) 和 *dike* (公正、正

tification of God.] A term introduced by Leibniz in *Theodicy: Essays on God's Goodness, Man's Freedom and the Origin of Evil* (1710), but the basic problem was formulated by Boethius: *Si Deus justus-unde malum* (If God is righteous, why evil)? It is the part of theology that focuses on the reconciliation of the existence of God, as an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and loving absolute being, with the existence of evil in the world. The human experience of suffering and guilt makes faith in God's justice a problem. Either God is able to stop evil but he does not want to, in which case he is omnipotent but not good or just; or he wishes to prevent evil but fails to achieve this, in which case he is good but not omnipotent. The main task of theodicy is to provide positive reasons to justify God's permission of the existence of moral and natural evil and for seeking to prove that our world is the best of all possible worlds.

"A response must explain God's action, or lack of action, by presenting a suitable reason for the existence of the evil. This kind of response is traditionally called a theodicy, a vindication of God's goodness." —Prevost, *Probability and Theistic Explanation*, 1990, p. 26.

Theological determinism

A position initiated by St. Augustine holding that God is omnipotent and has determined everything that will occur. As a consequence, everything in this world depends on God for existence. In addition, God is omniscient and knows all truths from the beginning of time. All actions that men are going to perform are known by him in advance. One version also claims that because of God's absolute goodness, this world is the best possible world. Theological determinism faces major difficulties in reconciling God's foreknowledge with human self-determination and in reconciling God's goodness with the existence of evil.

"Theological determinism argues that since God is omniscient, he knows everything, the future included." —Lucas, *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970, p. 65.

Theological virtues, see charity

Theology

[from Greek: *theos*, god + *logos*, theory, study] For Aristotle, first philosophy as the contemplation of the fundamental principle or ultimate substance. In general, theology is a discipline which deals with the explanation and justification of the teachings, doctrines and practices that constitute a religion. Each religion has its own theology, but in European thought, Christian theology has the greatest historical prominence as the rational account of Christian faith, although Jewish and Islamic theological writings have also had great influence. Christian theology is divided into many sub-

确), 从字面上讲, 指神的公正] 这个术语由莱布尼茨在他 1710 年的著作《神正论: 论神的善、人的自由和恶的起源》中引入, 但是, 基本的问题却是由波埃修斯提出的: *Si Deus justus-unde malum* (如果神是公正的, 为什么有恶)? 它是神学的一个部分, 集中于协调作为全能、全知、全善和爱而绝对存在的上帝存在与世上邪恶存在的关系。人遭难与犯罪的经历使得对上帝公正的信仰成了一个问题。要么是上帝能够阻止邪恶但却不想阻止, 要么是他愿意阻止邪恶但却无力实现; 在前一情形下, 他是全能的但却不善, 或不公正, 在后一情形下, 他是善的但却不是全能的。神正论的主要任务, 是要提供肯定的理由来为上帝允许道德和自然邪恶的存在作辩护, 并试图证明我们的世界是一切可能世界中最好的。

“通过对邪恶的存在提出充足的理由, 解释上帝的行为或无行为, 这种类型的应答传统上称之为神正论, 即对上帝之善的一种辩护。”——波列沃斯特:《或然性与有神论解释》, 1990 年, 第 26 页。

神学决定论

这一观点始于圣·奥古斯丁, 认为上帝是全能的并决定了将要发生的一切事物。因而, 世上的一切事物都依赖上帝而存在。此外, 上帝是无所不知的, 知道从创世以来的全部真理。人们所要进行的所有活动上帝预先都知道。它的一个变种还声称, 由于上帝的绝对仁慈, 这个世界是最好的世界。神学决定论面临的主要困难在于调和上帝的先知与人的自决, 以及调和上帝的仁慈与罪恶的存在。

“神学决定论论证说, 由于上帝是无所不知的, 他知道一切, 包括将来。”——鲁卡斯:《意志的自由》, 1970 年, 第 65 页。

神学德性

见“慈爱”条。

神学

[源自希腊语 *theos* (神) 和 *logos* (理论、研究)] 在亚里士多德那里, 它是沉思第一本原或终极实体的第一哲学。在一般意义上, 神学指一门学科, 即涉及对建构一个宗教的那些教义、学说和实践活动的解释和辩护。每个宗教都有自己的神学, 但在欧洲思想中, 作为对基督教信仰作出理性说明的基督教神学具有最重要的历史地位, 虽然犹太教和伊斯兰教的神学著作也有很大影响。基督教神学进一步分成多个二级学科, 譬如: 企图提供包含在不同的圣经文献中的

disciplines, such as biblical theology, which tries to provide the precise ideas contained in the various Biblical documents; historical theology, which traces the historical development of Christianity and the Christian Church; systematic theology, which aims at integrating into a coherent whole a wide array of fundamental religious beliefs; practical theology, which deals with the interaction of belief and behaviour; and philosophical theology, which applies philosophical methods in order to clarify religious concepts and presuppositions. While the philosophy of religion exists to criticise these doctrines and to assess their philosophical implications, theology assesses a religion from within and acts as a spokesman rather than as a critic. There are nevertheless various debates among theologians about how to explain certain religious elements. Theology presupposes faith and tries to acquire a knowledge of God by employing scholarly methods. It is faith seeking to understand itself. In Christianity, its goal is to serve salvation.

"Theology is 'the science of God'." —T. McPherson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 1965, p. 142.

Theoretical construct

Also theoretical term, a term for something which is unobservable and postulated, such as force, atoms, field or electrons. According to logical positivism, these postulated items do not really exist, and these concepts are merely economical devices or constructs that are used to explain observable phenomena. It has been a matter of dispute in the philosophy of science whether they can be eliminated or replaced by observational terms. Scientific realists reject the notion of a theoretical construct as an interpretation of theoretical terms and accept that theoretical entities in true theories really exist.

"... [T]heoretical constructs'... cannot be mentioned in observation statements." —Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, 1963, p. 26.

Theoretical entity, see theoretical term

Theoretical language, see observation language

Theoretical pluralism, see anarchism (scientific)

Theoretical sentence

In contrast to an observation sentence, a theoretical sentence is one whose meaning cannot be determined by itself as a single sentence. It has meaning only within a theory to which it belongs. It makes sense only together with its theo-

恰当观念的“圣经神学”；追溯基督教及基督教教会历史发展的“历史神学”；以把内容广泛的一系列基本的宗教信条整合成连贯整体为目标的“系统神学”；涉及信条与行止相互作用的“实践神学”；运用哲学方法以澄明宗教概念和假定的“哲学神学”。如果说宗教哲学的存在是批评这些学说，并评估它们的哲学意蕴，那么，神学则是从内部评判宗教，但扮演的角色与其说是评判者，不如说是发言人。然而，在如何解释某些宗教成分的问题上，神学家们存在着各种争论。神学以信仰为前提，并力图通过运用学术研究方法，获得对上帝的知识。它是寻求理解自身的信仰。在基督教中，它的目标是服务于拯救。

“神学是‘神的科学’。”——麦克斐尔逊：《宗教哲学》，1965年，第142页。

理论构造

也叫“理论术语”，指不可观察的和假定的事物，如力、原子、场、电子等等。依照逻辑实证主义，这些设定的东西并不真实存在，这些概念不过是用来说明可观察现象的经济的手段或构造。它们是否可以被消除或为观察术语所取代，成为科学哲学中争论的话题。科学实在论者否认作为理论术语解释的理论构造的观念，并接受理论实体在真的理论中是确实存在的。

“所谓‘理论构造’……在观察陈述中不能提及。”——帕普：《科学哲学导论》，1963年，第26页。

理论实体

见“理论术语”条。

理论语言

见“观察语言”条。

理论多元论

见“无政府主义（科学的）”条。

理论句子

与观察句子相反，理论句子是这样一种句子，它的意义不能由自身作为单个句子来决定。它只能在它所属的理论中才有意义。它只有与理论语境在一起时才能产生意义。除了观察句

retical context. Most sentences, apart from observation sentences, are theoretical. This term is central for Quine's epistemological holism.

"Theoretical sentences in general are defensible only pragmatically; we can but assess the structural merits of the theory which embraces them along with sentences directly conditioned to multifarious stimulations." — Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, p. 271.

Theoretical term

Carl Gustav Hempel divided the vocabulary of empirical sciences into two classes: observational terms which denote an observable entity or property and theoretical terms which denote an unobservable entity or property. Observational terms are terms such as long and red, whose applicability to a given situation can be determined through direct observation. Theoretical terms are terms such as electron and quark, which are intended to establish an explanatory connection among observables and to construct a scientific system. Theoretical terms denote theoretical entities, which are postulated hypothetically by a theory. It is not clear where to draw the distinction between the theoretical and observational, for the term "observable" can refer either to what can be observed merely by the unaided senses or to what can be observed by using sophisticated scientific instruments, the operation of which is understood in terms of a theory. In addition, there have been challenges to the empiricist account of theory and observation underpinning Hempel's distinction and his claim that the principal role of theories is to explain empirical generalisations. There are important disputes concerning the real existence of theoretical entities.

"Theoretical terms, ... usually purport to refer to not directly observable entities and their characteristics; they function ... in scientific theories intended to explain empirical generalisations." — Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, 1965, p. 179.

Theoretician's dilemma

A dilemma formulated by Hempel, involving the ontological status of theoretical terms. It reflects the empirical tradition that the theoretical terms of modern sciences such as atom, field and force are merely "convenient myths". Theoretical terms either serve their purpose or do not. If they serve their purpose, they are unnecessary, because that purpose is to organise experiential data, and that can be done by laws that link observational antecedents to observational consequents without theoretical terms. If they do not serve their purpose, they are obviously unnecessary. Therefore theoretical terms are unnecessary. To escape this dilemma and avoid eliminating theoretical terms, philosophers normally reject or modify the first branch of the dilemma. Theoretical terms can have other functions which cannot be reduced

了之外的大多数句子都是理论句子。这个词是奎因认识论整体论中的核心概念。

“理论句子通常只有在实际使用中才能得到捍卫：我们只能评价这个理论所包含的结构优点，而这个理论只是伴随着直接规定了各种刺激的句子。”——奎因：《词与物》，1960年，第271页。

理论术语

C. G. 亨佩尔将经验科学的词汇分成两类：表示可观察的实体或性质的观察术语和表示不可观察的实体或性质的理论术语。观察术语是指诸如长、红这样的术语，其对特定情况的适用性可通过直接观察而确定。理论术语则是指电子、夸克这样的术语，它们是用在可观察的事物之间建立一种说明性联系和构建科学体系。理论术语表示理论实体，而这些实体是由理论假设提出的。理论术语和观察术语二者之间的界线并不清楚，因为“可观察的”这一术语既可指仅凭无助的感官本身观察到的东西，也可指用复杂的科学仪器观察的东西，观察进行的方式是根据理论来理解的。此外，对理论和观察的经验主义的说明，始终存在着挑战，这种说明支持亨佩尔的上述划分及他的这个主张，即认为理论的首要作用是解释经验的概括。在关于理论实体的真实存在问题上人们有着重大的分歧。

“理论术语……通常是指非直接观察得到的实体及其特性；它们在科学理论中的功能……是要解释经验的概括。”——亨佩尔：《科学说明的诸方面》，1965年，第179页。

理论家困境

一个由亨佩尔提出的困境，涉及理论术语的本体论地位。它反映经验主义的传统，即认为近代科学的理论术语，例如原子、场、力只不过是“方便的神话”。理论术语或者能达到其效用，或者不能。如果它们能起到其效用，则它们是不必要的，因为这个效用是组织经验材料，而这可由连接观察前提和观察结论的定律所完成，无需理论术语。如果它们起不到其效用，则显然是不必要的。因此理论术语是不必要的。为了摆脱这一困境，避免排除理论术语，哲学家们通常拒斥或修改困境中的第一支。理论术语具有不能被还原为观察术语功能的其他功能。这些被提出的功能包括说明、对结果的观察和经济的概括。理论术语被认为是科学成长的必要条件，是

to those of observational terms. These proposed functions include explanation, observation of results and economical summary. It is claimed that theoretical terms are a prerequisite of scientific growth and of certain forms of inductive reasoning.

"If the terms and principles of a theory serve their purpose they are unnecessary, as just pointed out, and if they don't serve their purpose, they are surely unnecessary. But given any theory, its terms and principles either serve their purpose or they don't. Hence, the terms and principles of any theory are not necessary. This argument ... will be called the theoretician's dilemma." —Hempel, in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. ii, 1958, p. 49.

Theoria

[Greek: vision of the real in the mind, hence contemplation or speculation, from *theorein*: to contemplate and *theasthai*: to gaze on, giving contemplation visual associations] In Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *theoria* is the activity that involves no change. It can provide the eternally and supremely happy life which is ascribed to the unmoved mover or God and is available only occasionally to men.

In Aristotle's ethics, *theoria* is distinguished from practical activities. This is the origin of the contrast between theory and practice, though *theoria* does not actually mean theory. *Theoria* is about eternal and unchanging objects and is the highest and best activity of which a human being is capable. A man engages in contemplation not *qua* man but in virtue of the divine intellect (*nous*) in him. Contemplation is higher than practical reason and is the supremely valuable life, providing complete human happiness. A tension between Aristotle's claim that contemplation is the highest good and his commendation of practical virtue has been the subject of much dispute.

Aristotle also distinguished between theoretical or contemplative sciences, including theology, physics and mathematics, from practical and productive sciences. Theoretical sciences have their end in themselves and are not pursued for practical purposes or utility.

All of those senses of *theoria* are connected, but they are not in complete harmony with one another.

"Complete happiness will be its activity expressing its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is activity of contemplation." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a17-8.

Theory of knowledge, another name for epistemology

Theory of sentiments, see sentiment

某种形式的归纳推理。

“如果理论的术语和原理起到作用,它们是不必要的,如刚才所指出的,而如果它们起不到作用,则它们无疑是不必要的。然而给定任何理论,其术语和原理或者能起到其效用,或者不能。因此任何理论的术语和原理是不必要的。这一论证……被称作理论家困境。”——亨佩尔,见《明尼苏达科学哲学研究》,第2卷,1958年,第49页。

思辨

[希腊词,心灵中关于真实的影像,得自 *theorein* (沉思或思辨) 和 *theasthai* (注视),赋予沉思以视觉上的联系]在亚里士多德的《形而上学》中,思辨是一种不涉及变化的活动。它可以提供永恒的和至高的幸福生活;这种生活属于不动的推动者或神,只是偶然地为人所具有。

在亚里士多德的伦理学中,思辨与实践活动相区分。这乃是理论与实践这一对立的起源,虽然思辨实际上并不等同于理论。思辨是关于永恒不变的事物,是一个人所能做的最高级最好的活动。当一个人从事思辨时,他不是作为人,而是由于在他之中的神圣的理智(*nous*)。思辨高于实践理性,是最有价值的生活,它提供了完满的人类幸福。可是,亚里士多德一方面认为思辨是最高的善,另一方面又推荐实践德性;这构成了一对一直被争论不已的矛盾。

亚里士多德也区分了理论的或思辨的科学(包括神学、物理学和数学)与实践的或创制的科学。理论科学的目的在于自身,而不是为了实践的目的或功用。

思辨的所有这些意义都是互相联系的,但彼此间并不完全相一致。

“完满的幸福是表现其适当德性的活动;而我们已经说过,这种活动是思辨的活动。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1177a17-18。

知识论

“认识论”的另一个名称。

情感论

见“情感”条。

Theory of value, see axiology

Theory-laden

A term introduced by Hanson in 1959. A concept, term or statement which is theory-laden makes sense only in the light of a particular theory or set of principles. Even experience is always shaped by theoretical traditions and expectations. Every observational term and sentence is alleged to carry a theoretical load. This position challenges the view of logical positivism that a protocol statement is a theoretically neutral report of experience and denies reducibility of theory-laden terms to a purely factual level of knowledge. The term implies a rejection of the influential dichotomy of theoretical terms and observational terms.

"There is a sense, then, in which seeing is a 'theory laden' undertaking. Observation of *x* is shaped by prior knowledge of *x*." — Hanson, *The Patterns Of Discovery*, 1959, p. 19.

Theory-theory

A theory of mind concerning how we come to know about the propositional attitudes of others. It tries to explain the nature of ascribing certain thoughts, beliefs or intentions to other persons in order to explain their actions. The theory-theory holds that in ascribing beliefs to others we are tacitly applying a theory which enables us to make inferences about the beliefs behind the actions of others. The theory which is applied is a set of rules embedded in folk psychology. Hence, to anticipate and predict the behaviour of others, one engages in an intellectual process moving by inference from one set of beliefs to another. This position contrasts with another theory of mind, the simulation theory, which holds that we need to make use of our own motivational and emotional resources and capacities for practical reasoning in explaining actions of the others.

"So called 'theory-theorists' maintain that the ability to explain and predict behaviour is underpinned by a folk-psychological theory of the structure and functioning of the mind—where the theory in question may be innate and modularised, learned individually, or acquired through a process of enculturation." — Carruthers and Smith (eds), *Theories of Theories of Mind*, 1996, p. 1.

Theosophy

[from Greek *theos*, god — *sophia*, wisdom, wisdom about God] A term first employed by the Neo-platonists for their own doctrine which emphasises the unity of religion and philosophy and for one's mystical acquaintance with the nature of God. The term was later used for several trends in German religious thought after the Renaissance, in particular

价值理论

见“价值论”条。

载有理论的

最初由汉森于1959年引入的术语。说一个概念、一个术语或一个陈述是载有理论的,是说它只在特定的理论中或某一系列原理中才是有意义的。甚至经验也总是由理论传统和期望来塑造的。每个观察术语和句子都被假定是载有理论的。这是对逻辑实证主义的挑战。后者认为一个记录句子是一个关于经验的理论中性的报告。这也否认了载有理论的术语可以被还原为纯粹事实水平的知识。这一术语因此意味着对颇有影响的理论术语与观察术语之区分的拒斥。

“因此在某种意义上,看见是一个‘载有理论’的任务。对于*x*的观察由关于*x*的先前知识所塑造。”——汉森:《发现的模式》,1959年,第19页。

理论论

一个关于我们如何知道他人的命题态度的心的理论。它试图解释将某些思维、信念或意向归于他人的本质,以便解释他人的行动。理论论认为,将信念归于他人实际上是静默地应用一个理论,这一理论能使我们就隐藏在他人活动之后的信念作出推理。所应用的理论是潜藏在常识心理学中的一系列规则。因此,要预测他人的行为,一个人就要从事一个智力过程,由一系列信念推导出其他的信念。这与另一心的理论——模拟论——相对。后者认为,我们必须以我们自己的动机和情绪为源泉,依靠我们实际的推理能力来解释他人的行动。

“所谓的‘理论论’认为,解释和预测行为的能力由一个关于心的结构和功能的常识心理学的理论来支持——这个理论可能是先天的和组件的、个别学习的或通过社会化过程习得的。”——克拉塞斯和司密斯(编):《关于心的理论的理论》,1996年,第1页。

神智学

[源自希腊语 *theos* (神) 和 *sophia* (智慧), 意为关于神的智慧] 这个术语被新柏拉图主义者第一次使用,用以指称他们自己的学说,即强调宗教和哲学的统一以及对神的本性的神秘相识。后来,这个术语用于指文艺复兴时期之后德国宗教思想中的几种倾向,尤其指瑞典自然哲

the thinking of the Swedish natural philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg, which tended to blend the natural and the spiritual world and to combine rationalistic cosmology and biblical revelation. The term was also associated with the Theosophical Society, a movement initiated in 1875 by Helena Blavatsky, which aimed to introduce Eastern religions and metaphysics into Western thought.

"[Theosophy] is the appropriate term for a theoretical cognition of divine nature and (God's) existence that would suffice to explain both the character of the world and the vocation of the moral laws." —Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, Part II, General Conclusion on Theology.

Theseus' ship

After the hero Theseus accomplished his mission to sail to Crete to kill the Minotaur, his ship (Ship 1) was put on display in Athens. As time went by, its original planks and other parts were replaced one by one with new materials until one day all of its parts were new, with none of its original parts remaining. Do we want to say that the completely rebuilt ship (Ship 2) is the same as the original or that it is a different ship? The case is further complicated. If all the original materials were kept and eventually used to construct a ship (Ship 3), would this ship be the same as the original? This example has inspired much discussion concerning the problem of identity and of individuation.

"To be something later is to be its closest continuer. Let us apply this view to one traditional puzzle about identity over time: the puzzle of the ship of Theseus." —Nozick, *Philosophical Explanation*, 1981, p. 33.

Thin theory of the good

For Rawls, primary goods are essential for pursuing any rational plan of life and are used to determine a thin conception of good. A thin theory of the good explains why these primary goods are what any rational person would desire and also gives insight into the notion of rationality which leads from these goods to the choice of principles of justice. Such an account is necessary to understand the motives and choices of participants in the original position. Once principles of justice are derived from the original position, we may develop a full conception of the good and therefore a full theory of the good.

"We need what I have called the thin theory of the good to explain the rational preference for primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality underlying the choice of principles in the original position." —Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 397.

Thing

In a general sense, a thing is any item which can be referred to or named. It can be any constituent of a metaphysi-

学家 E. 威斯登伯格的思想, 它倾向于把自然世界和精神世界混合在一起, 把理性主义宇宙论和圣经启示结合起来。这个术语也与“神智会”有关联, 该会是由 H. 布拉瓦茨基发起的一场运动, 其宗旨是把东方宗教和形而上学引入西方思想中。

“[神智学] 是对神的本性和(上帝的)存在的理论认识的恰当称谓, 它足以解释世界的特征和道德规律的命令。”——康德:《判断力批判》, 第二部分, “神学的一般结论”。

忒修斯之船

在英雄忒修斯完成他的航行到克里特岛杀死怪物米诺托的壮举后, 他的船(船1)在雅典展出。随着时间的推移, 这船原来的木板和其他部分逐一被新材料所取代; 直到有一天, 它的所有的部分都是新的, 没有旧的部分留存。我们说这一完全新建的船(船2)是与原来的一样, 还是一条不同的船? 事情还可以变得更复杂。如果原来的材料都被保存下来, 并最后被用来造了另一条船(船3), 这条船与原来的船(船1)是一样的吗? 这一事例促进了许多关于同一性和个体性等问题的讨论。

“一物的后来者乃是其最接近的继续者。我们可把这一观点应用于一个有关时间推移中的等同的传统疑难, 即忒修斯的船之谜。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》, 1981年, 第33页。

善的弱理论

在罗尔斯看来, 基本善对于寻求合理的生活计划是至关重要的, 并被用来确定善的弱概念。善的弱理论解释为什么这些基本善是理性的人所要求的东西, 并且还深入说明了导致从这些善到选择正义原则的合理性概念。这样的说明对于理解原初状态中参加者的动机和选择是很有必要的。一旦正义原则从原初状态中得出, 我们就可得出善的强概念, 并因而得出善的强理论。

“我们需要我称之为善的弱理论去解释人们对于基本善的合理的偏爱, 需要这种理论去说明原初状态下构成原则的选择基础的合理性这一概念。”——罗尔斯:《正义论》, 1971年, 第397页。

物

在一般意义上, 一件是指任何一项可以表示或命名的东西。它可以是形而上世界的组成

cal world, including substances and properties, essences and accidents, particulars and universals, concrete and abstract objects. A material body is a thing, and so is a number, a relation and an illusion. In this sense, "thing" is synonymous with "being" or "entity". Along with other questions about things, metaphysicians have asked why there are things ("Why is there something rather than nothing?") and what kinds of thing are fundamental.

In a narrower and more technical sense, things have their own identity and possess qualities and relations. This concept of a thing is close to the concept of a substance or of an object. In sentences, things are designated by subjects rather than by predicates, which in turn introduce properties ascribed to things. In different theoretical contexts, a thing is what Frege calls an object of a proper name, what Quine calls "the value of a bound variable", and what Strawson calls an individual. It is the nature of things in this latter sense which preoccupies contemporary metaphysicians.

"In its widest sense 'thing' can be applied to any object of reference whatever, to any possible subject of discourse... The kind of thing we are concerned with here is much more narrowly circumscribed. It is, essentially, an observable, spatio-temporal entity, a concrete object of perception." — Anthony Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, 1973, p. 41.

Thing-in-itself

[German *Ding an sich*] Kant's term, used interchangeably with *noumenon*, for things as they are independent of the conditions of possible experience and outside the legitimate application of the categories. A thing-in-itself contrasts with an appearance or *phenomenon*, which is a thing as it appears to us. Since the world of appearance is the only possible object of knowledge, the thing-in-itself is thinkable, but unknown. In using this term, Kant emphasised his claim that the thing-in-itself is the true correlate of sensibility. The central thesis of transcendental idealism holds that the objects given to us in experience are only appearances of things in themselves. Although things in themselves cannot be known through the representations of our sensibility, we must postulate them because there cannot be an appearance without anything that appears. This is a dogmatic point in Kant's philosophy which has been criticised by later philosophers. Other philosophers have asked whether appearances and things in themselves are meant to be the same objects taken differently or different objects. There are problems with both answers.

"The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder that nothing in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are unknown to us." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A30.

部分,包括本体与属性、本质与偶性、殊相与共相、具体与抽象的对象。一个物质性的物体是一件物,一个数、一种关系或者一幅幻象也是物。在此意义上,“物”与“存在”或“实体”同义。连同有关物的其他问题,形而上学家提出了“为什么有物存在?”(“为什么存在有而不是无?”)和“何种物是根本的?”这类问题。

在狭义和专门意义上,物具有自身的同一性,具有性质和关系。物的这种概念近似于实体或对象的概念。在句子中,物与其说是由谓语来表示,毋宁说是由主语来表示,这反过来又引导出赋予物的种种属性。在不同的理论语境中,物或是指弗雷格所谓的专名的对象,或是指奎因所谓的“约束变量的值”,或是指斯特劳森所谓的个体。后一种意义上的物之本性,正是当代形而上学家主要思考的对象。

“广义上的‘物’可以应用于指称对象,或者任何可能的话语主题。……我们此处所关注的这种物主要是指狭义上的物。从本质上说,这种物是可见的时空实体,是具体的感知对象。”——奎因顿:《事物之本性》,1973年,第44页。

物自体

[德文 *Ding an sich*] 康德的术语,可与“本体”交替使用,是指独立于可能经验的条件并超越合法地运用范畴的事物。物自体相对于表象或现象,后者是向我们呈现出的事物。既然现象世界是唯一可能的知识对象,物自体是可思维的,但不可知。康德在使用这个词时特别强调要把它作为感性的真实相关物。先验唯心主义的中心论题是:在经验中给予我们的对象只是物自体的现象。尽管物自体不能通过我们的感性表象而认识,但我们必须设定它们,因为如果没有东西在显现,也就没有现象。这是康德哲学的一个独断的论点,因此为后来的哲学家所批判。其他哲学家也问现象与物自体是否是同一事物,但受到不同处理,或者它们确实是不同事物。两种回答都有问题。

“空间现象之先验概念批判性地提醒我们,在空间中没有任何东西是物自体;空间不是属于物自体,作为其固有属性;对象自身对于我们是不可知的。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A30。

Thing-language

Carnap's term for the language that we use in speaking about the properties of observable things, such as "hot", "cold", "small", "large" "red" and "blue". It is the language to which all psychological statements and scientific statements are reducible. By introducing this term, Carnap intends to distinguish between the language of scientific theory and the language of ordinary things, and between a language requiring the use of instruments and a language not requiring it. He also claims that all statements in the thing-language about material objects can be reduced to statements about sense-experience.

"Terms like 'hot' and 'cold' may be regarded as belonging to the thing-language, but not 'temperature' because its determination requires the application of a technical instrument." —Carnap, in Hanfling (ed), *Essential Readings in Logical Positivism*, p. 121.

Thinking

A mental activity displaying a person's rationality, including theoretical contemplation and reasoning and practical deliberation. Traditionally, thinking is conceived to be an inner and conscious activity that is closely related to speech. For Plato and Aristotle, thinking (Greek; *noesis* or *dianoia*) inherently involves cognitive consciousness of a universal object and the application of the universal to the particular. For Descartes, thinking (Latin; *cogitatio*) comprises mental phenomena in general, and is the main attribute of the substance of mind. Along with many later rationalists and empiricists, Descartes considered that thinking is a process which brings concepts or ideas before the mind. For Hobbes, it is a dialogue in the soul involving the use of verbal images. For Berkeley and Hume, thinking is a sequential series of ideas or images in the mind. For Kant, thinking (German; *Denken*) is cognition by means of concepts, although it is empty if it does not also involve sensory intuition. Ryle initiated a new approach to the notion of thinking. He argued that thinking is a disposition rather than something that must be done silently in the soul. In his later period Ryle puts forward an adverbial account of thinking, claiming that it is an adverbial modification of activities and not itself an activity. Ryle's approach has given rise to much debate. Some critics claim that developing an adequate account of thinking requires a richer body of theory about the mind. Price suggested that cognition in absence is another distinguishing feature of thinking. Thinking is usually distinguished from sense-perception, imagination and emotion.

"We can all agree that thinking is rightly described as conceptual cognition." —Price, *Thinking and Experience*, 1969, p. 313.

事物语言

卡尔纳普用于这种语言的术语,即我们用它来谈论可观察事物的特性,诸如“热”、“凉”、“小”、“大”、“红”、“蓝”。这是所有的心理学陈述和科学陈述都可以向之还原的语言。在提出这个术语时,卡尔纳普是要区分科学理论的语言和日常事物的语言,要求使用工具的语言和不要求使用工具的语言。他还主张,事物语言中关于物质对象的全部陈述都可以还原为关于感觉经验的陈述。

“可以认为像‘热’和‘冷’这样的语词属于事物语言,但‘温度’则不属于,因为对它的确定要求使用技术性工具。”——卡尔纳普,载于汉弗林编:《逻辑实证主义基本读物》,第121页。

思维

表现一个人的理性(包括理论思辨、推理和实际策划)的心的活动。在传统上,思维被设想成一个与语言密切相关的内部意识活动。对于柏拉图和亚里士多德而言,思维(希腊文, *noesis* 或 *dianoia*)内在地包含着对普遍对象的认知意识以及共相之应用于殊相。对于笛卡尔,思维(拉丁文 *cogitatio*)包括一般的心的现象,并且是心的实体的主要属性。他和许多唯理论者和经验论者一样,将思维视为一个将概念或观念带到心的面前的过程。对于霍布斯而言,它是使用言语映象的灵魂对话。对于巴克莱和休谟而言,思维是心中的观念和映象的序列。对于康德来说,思维(德文, *Denken*)是借助于概念的认知,尽管没有感觉直觉的思维是空洞的。赖尔对于思维概念有一个新的提法。他认为思维是一个倾向性,而不是在灵魂中悄悄进行的活动。赖尔在后期又提出思维的副词主张,声称它是活动的一个副词修饰而本身并不是一个活动。赖尔的提法引起很多争论。有的批评认为,需要一个更为丰富的心的理论才能充分解释思维。普赖斯提出“认知缺场”是思维的另一独有特征。思维通常与感官知觉、想像和情绪相区别。

“我们都可以同意思维正确地描述为概念认知。”——普赖斯:《思想与经验》,1969年,第313页。

Thinking substance

The mind, Descartes' term, in contrast to extended substance or corporeal substance, that is body. This division is the main characteristic of Descartes' dualism. While the principal attribute of extended substance is extension, that of thinking substance is thinking. Descartes further divided thinking substances into those which possess and use a body and those which do not possess or use bodies. The former include animal and human minds, while the latter include God and angels. Thinking substance is also called thinking thing (*res cogitans*), while extended substance is also called extended thing (*res extensa*).

"A thinking substance is one which understands or wills or doubts or dreams or imagines or has sensory perceptions." — Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings* (tr. Cottingham et al.), II, p. 344.

Thinking thing, the English translation of *res cogitans*

Third man argument

Plato's argument in *Parmenides* 132a-b to show that his own Theory of Forms involves an infinite regress. Plato's own example concerns largeness, but following Aristotle scholars generally state the problem in terms of man. The basic principle to establish a Form is that when one sees a number of similar particulars, one will think that there must be something common to them all, and that thing is a Form. If, however, we consider the Form of man along with other particular men, there must also be something common to all of them, and that thing would be a third man in addition to particular men and the Form of man. But the process of adding something in common, begun with particular men, the Form of man and the third man, would go on indefinitely, leading to an infinite regress.

There has been much debate whether this is a valid argument, whether it is a valid objection to the Theory of Forms, and whether Plato himself believed it to be valid. Gregory Vlastos has argued that two implicit premises are needed for the Third Man Argument to succeed. The first premise, concerning self-predication, requires that what is predicated is itself a subject of that same predicate. The other premise, concerning non-identity, requires that what is predicated is something different from the subject of which it is predicated. The discussion that arose out of this interpretation has contributed greatly to our understanding of Plato and his relation to contemporary philosophy. It has also helped our understanding of Aristotle, who diagnosed the root of the problem of the Third Man as the separation of the Form from the particulars and Plato's confusion of *toionde* (such) and *tode ti* (a this), that is his confusion of the uni-

思维实体

即心灵。笛卡尔的用语,与“广延实体”或“有形实体”即身体相对应。这个划分是笛卡尔二元论的主要特征。广延实体的主要属性是广延,思维实体的主要属性是思维。笛卡尔进一步将思维实体分为拥有和使用身体的思维实体和不拥有或使用身体的思维实体。前者包括动物和人的心灵,后者包括上帝和天使。思维实体也称作“思维的东西”(*res cogitans*),广延实体也称作“广延的东西”(*res extensa*)。

“思维实体是从事理解、发生意愿、进行怀疑、做梦、形成影像、具有感性知觉的实体。”——笛卡尔:《哲学著作集》(科庭汉姆等译),第二卷,第344页。

思维的东西

“思维的东西”(*res cogitans*)的英译。

第三人论证

这是柏拉图在其对话《巴门尼德篇》132a—b中提出的一个论证,旨在说明他自己的形式论涉及到一种无穷后退。柏拉图自己的例证是“大”;可亚里士多德以后的学者们一般则以“人”来陈述这个问题。确立一个形式存在的基本原则是,当某人看到许多相似的殊相,他会想到必定有某物为它们所共有,那就是形式。但是,如果我们把人的形式与许多特殊的人放在一起考察,它们之间亦必有某种共同的东西,那就一定是特殊的人和人的形式之外的第三个“人”。但这种加上某个共同东西的过程(即始于特殊的人,然后是人的形式,最后是第三人)可不断重复,以至无穷。

学者们一直在争论,这是否是一个有效的论证,是否是对柏拉图形式论的一个有效反驳,柏拉图自己是否相信它有效等等。G. 弗拉斯托斯论证说,要得出“第三人”,必定要有两个隐含的前提。第一个是关于自我主谓关系,它需要作为谓词的事物本身就是同一谓词的主词。另一个前提是关于非等同性,它需要作为谓词的事物不同于它所述说的主词。从这一解释所引起的讨论极大地促进了我们对柏拉图本人及其他与当代哲学关系的理解。它也有助于我们对亚里士多德的理解。亚里士多德诊断说,“第三人”问题的根源在于形式与殊相的分离以及柏拉图混淆了“这一类”与“这一个”,也就是混淆了共相和殊相。

“普遍谓词都不表示‘这一个’,而是表示‘这一类’。不然的话,许多困难就会产生,尤其是‘第三人’。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,

versal and the particular.

"No common predicate indicates a this, but rather a such. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'Third Man'." —Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1038b36.

Third realm

Frege's term. Traditionally, philosophers contrast the realm of ideas or mental entities with the realm of material objects. Frege called mental entities the first realm and material objects the second realm. Based on his distinction between sense and reference, he claimed that there is a third realm of sense or thought. It is different from the realm of ideas because any idea needs a bearer (they are yours or mine), but the senses of words we use in communication exist independently of us. A true proposition is true no matter whether anyone takes it to be true or even entertains it. It is accessible to all in common, but its contents are immutable and immaterial. The third realm is also different from the realm of objective things we talk about or the realm of reference, for many names may have sense but lack reference. Thus senses or thoughts form a third realm between us and objects, and this realm leads us from the inner world of sense-impressions to the outer world of perceptible things.

"So the results seems to be: thoughts are neither things of the outer world nor ideas. A third realm must be recognised. What belongs to this corresponds with ideas, in that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but with things, in that it needs no bearer to the contents of whose consciousness to belong." —Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", in Strawson (ed.) *Philosophical Logic*, 1967, p. 29.

Thirdness, see firstness

Third-person perspective, see first-person perspective

Thisness, another expression for a this

Thomism

The philosophical tradition founded by Thomas Aquinas and developed by his followers in the Catholic tradition. It tried to combine Aristotle's philosophy with Christian teaching and claimed that all created things are a composition of existence and essence. It extensively applied the Aristotelian distinctions between form and matter and between actuality and potentiality to explain various relationships. Form is necessary being and matter is contingent being. God contains both essential being and contingent being. The soul is viewed as the substantial form of the body whilst also being regarded as immortal. Thomism represents a valuable contribution to

1038b36.

第三领域

弗雷格的术语。在传统上,哲学家们把观念或精神实体领域与物质对象领域相对应。弗雷格把前者称为“第一领域”,把后者称为“第二领域”。基于他对意义与指称的区分,他认为,还存在着一个意义或思想的第三领域。它与观念的领域不同,因为任何观念都需要承担者(即它们或者是你的或者是我的),但我们在交流中使用的语词的意义却是独立于我们而存在的。一个真命题之所以为真,是与人们把它看做为真或承认它无关的。这适用于一切具有共性的东西,而其内容是不可改变的,是非物质的。第三领域同样不同于我们所谈论的客观事物领域或指称领域,因为许多名称可能具有意义但没有指称。因而,意义或思想构成了我们与对象之间的第三领域。这个领域引导我们从内在的感官印象世界达到了外在的可知事物的世界。

“所以结果似乎是这样,思想既不是外在世界的事物,也不是观念。第三领域必须得到承认。属于这个领域的东西在它们不能被感官感觉到这一点上是与观念一致的,而在它们不需要属于其意识内容的承担者这一点上却又是与事物一致的。”——弗雷格:《思想:逻辑的探究》,载斯特劳森(编):《哲学逻辑》,1967年,第29页。

第三性

见“第一性”条。

第三人观点

见“第一人观点”条。

这一个

“这一个(a this)”的另一表述。

托马斯主义

由T.阿奎那建立,并由他的追随者在天主教传统中发展起来的哲学传统。它力图把亚里士多德哲学和基督教教义结合起来,宣称一切受造物都是存在与本质的合成。它广泛运用亚里士多德关于形式和质料、现实和潜能之间区别的思想,解释各种不同的关系。形式是必然存在的,质料是偶然存在的。上帝既包含本质存在,又包含偶然存在。灵魂被认作躯体的实体形式,同时又被当成是不朽的。托马斯主义对理性和信仰以及自由选择 and 决定论之间关系的分析,作出了有价值的贡献。我们是自由的,但这

the analyses of the relationship between reason and faith and the relationship between free choice and determinism. We are free not in spite of God's power, but because of it. Aquinas' doctrine was condemned after his death, but was soon rehabilitated and he was canonised in 1323. Since the thirteenth century, Aquinas has been the Common Doctor for all Catholic schools of thought. Hence, it is not merely a partial school in scholasticism. It is often used as a synonym of scholasticism. In the neo-Thomist movement of the nineteenth century, the Catholic authorities declared again that the philosophy of Aquinas must be studied by all Catholic clergy. Thomism is recommended as the norm for theological teaching. In the twentieth century there is a loose intellectual trend which applies the general framework of contemporary analytical philosophy to the issues and concepts of Thomism such as intentionality, action, freedom, being and essence, causation, virtue theory and so forth. This is sometimes called analytical Thomism, and is represented by figures such as Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny.

"The foundation of Thomism was that reason supplemented faith, not denied it." —Leff, *Medieval Thought*, 1958, p. 212.

Thought

Normally, what we are aware of within our mind. For Frege, a thought is the sense of a sentence which can be used to make an assertion or to ask a question that is answerable 'Yes' or 'No'. The contents of thoughts can be true or false. Thoughts in this sense are logical or conceptual rather than a matter of individual psychology. Different individuals may share the same thought, although they cannot share the same act of thinking. Thus, Frege called thought the third realm (the others being the physical and the psychological). If we take thought psychologically, the central tenet of traditional analytical philosophy is that the analysis of thought presupposes the analysis of language and that language is prior to thought. In contrast, philosophy of thought argues that this priority in the order of analysis should be reversed. Fodor's language of thought hypothesis holds that thought is a form of symbol manipulation with its own syntax and semantic properties.

"The thought, in itself immaterial, cloths itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought." —Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", in Strawson (ed.), *Philosophical Logic*, 1967, p. 20.

Thought experiment

An attempt to test an hypothesis through an imagined situation when an actual experiment is impossible in practice or perhaps even in theory. It conceives of the consequences of an intervention in the world without actually intervening.

不是无视上帝的权力，而恰恰是由于上帝的缘故。阿奎那的学说在他死后被判有罪，但不久就恢复了名誉，他也于1323年被追授为圣徒。从13世纪以来，阿奎那是一切天主教思想派别的“共同博士”。因此，在经院学派中，托马斯主义并不仅仅是一个分支流派。它经常被用作经院学派的同义语。在19世纪的新托马斯主义者运动中，天主教官方再次宣布，阿奎那的哲学必须被所有天主教牧师研究。托马斯主义被推荐为理论教旨的规范。在20世纪，有一种松散的思想倾向，即把当代分析哲学的一般框架运用于托马斯主义的论点和概念上，譬如意向、行为、自由、存在与本质、因果关系、德性理论等等。有时，把这种倾向称为分析的托马斯主义，其代表人物有P. 吉奇、A. 肯尼等人。

“托马斯主义的基础是：理性补充信仰，而不是否定它。”——列夫：《中世纪思想》，1958年，第212页。

思想

思想通常指我们心中意识到的东西。弗雷格认为，思想是一个句子的意义，这个句子可以用来作断定，或者用来问一个可以用“是”或“不”回答的问题。思想的内容可以是真的或假的。思想在此意义上是逻辑的或概念的，而不是个人心理的事情。不同的个人可以有共同的思想，尽管他们不可能有同样的思维活动。于是，弗雷格称思想是“第三领域”（其他两个领域是物理领域和心理领域）。如果我们对思想做心理学的理解，那么，传统分析哲学的中心原则是：思想的分析以语言的分析为先决条件，而且语言先于思想。与这一原则相对，思想哲学认为，分析的这个先后顺序应当倒过来。福多的“思想语言”假设认为，思想是符号操作的形式，具有自己的句法和语义特性。

“思想本身是非物质的，穿着句子的物质外衣，因此成为我们可理解的。我们说，一个句子表达了一个思想。”——弗雷格：《思想：逻辑的探究》，载于斯特劳森（编）：《哲学逻辑》，1967年，第20页。

思想实验

当真正的实验在实践上甚至理论上是不可能的时候，试图提供想像一个情境来检验一个假设。它设想对世界作出某种干预会产生什么结果，但并不真正实施这种干预。这一工具被哲

This device is employed widely by philosophers and theoretical scientists. It exercises the imagination in order to show what is possible or impossible. Thought experiments can be used either destructively or constructively. A destructive use is directed against a theory, typically through a *reductio ad absurdum* argument to show that a theory is internally inconsistent or conflicts with some well-entrenched belief. Constructive thought experiments proceed either from some unproblematic phenomena to a well-articulated theory or from a given background theory to a new conclusion.

"A thought experiment is an experiment that purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of execution." —Sorenson, *Thought Experiment*, 1992, p. 205.

Three-valued logic

The earliest presentation of a three-valued system was elaborated by Łukasiewicz in the 1920s, motivated by providing a solution to the problem of future contingents. This problem was put forward by Aristotle in his example of the sea-battle tomorrow. Łukasiewicz reasoned: my presence in Warsaw at a certain time in the future is not settled at the present moment either positively nor negatively; it is therefore possible but not necessary that I shall be present in Warsaw at the stated future time; according to this presupposition, that I shall be present in Warsaw in that future time is neither true nor false at the present time; to say either that this is true or that this is false will be contradictory to the presupposition; so we need to deny the principle of bivalence, that is that every statement is either true or false. He then argued that the possible should be an additional truth-value. If 1 is used to represent truth, 0 to represent falsity, the third value possible can be represented by 1/2. Hence we have more possible combinations of truth values from two component propositions. For instance, the truth-table of not P in three-valued logic is:

P	~P
1	0
1/2	1/2
0	1

Some logicians argue that bivalence does not necessarily entail determinism and that three-valued logic should have another basis, but this part of logic has been adopted and developed by Reichenbach, Putnam, Bochvar and others. It has been a model for many-valued logic in general.

"With a view to the future-contingency proposition of the third truth-value, Łukasiewicz introduced a modal operator of possibilities into his three-valued logic." —Rescher, *Topics in Philosophical Logic*, 1968, p. 65.

Ti esti, Greek term for what-it-is

学家和理论科学家所广泛使用。它发挥想像来表明什么是可能的、什么是不可能的。思想实验既可以是摧毁性的也可以是建设性的。摧毁性的思想实验用来反对一个理论。其主要工具是采用归谬法。也就是说,表明一个理论存在内部的不一致或与其他有根据的信念相冲突。建设性的思想实验或者从一个没有问题的现象出发得出一个表述清楚的理论,或者从一个给定的背景理论得出一个新的结论。

"一个思想实验是一个无须实施就达到其目标的实验。"——索伦森:《思想实验》,1992年,第205页。

三值逻辑

三值系统的最早展示是由卢卡西维茨在20世纪20年代精心制作的,目的在于给未来偶然性问题提供一个解决方案。未来偶然性问题是亚里士多德在明天的海战例子中提出来的。卢卡西维茨推理说,我在未来的某个时间出现在华沙,这在目前既不能肯定地确定也不能否定地确定;所以,我在所提到的那个未来的时间出现在华沙只是可能的而不是必然的;根据这一预设,我将在那个未来的时间出现在华沙,在目前既不真也不假;说这个命题或者真或者假将与那个预设相矛盾;所以我们需要否定二值原则,即每一陈述是或真或假的。他随后论证说:"可能的"应该是另外一个真值。如果用1表示真,用0表示假,则第三值"可能的"可以用1/2来表示。所以我们从两个支命题可以有多个可能的真值组合。例如,非P在三值逻辑中的真值表是:

P	~P
1	0
1/2	1/2
0	1

虽然某些逻辑学家争辩说:二值原则并不必然导致决定论,三值逻辑应该有另外的根据,但这部分逻辑还是为赖兴巴赫、普特南、鲍契瓦等人所采用和发展,并已成为一般多值逻辑的典范。

"由于注意到未来偶然命题具有第三真值,卢卡西维茨把可能性的模态算子引入到他的三值逻辑中。"——雷谢尔:《哲学逻辑论集》,1968年,第65页。

是什么

"是什么(what-it-is)"的希腊词。

Time

One of the most mysterious philosophical topics, but also one of the most richly discussed. Time concerns the progression and ordering of events in terms of before and after or in terms of past, present and future. Time is commonly conceived to be a passage or a flowing stream, but this gives rise to the criticism of the myth of passage. Time is generally thought to have one dimension and an irreversible direction, but it is unclear what gives time its direction, whether there can be a backward temporal order or how to account for the asymmetry between the past and the future. Zeno's paradoxes raise fundamental questions about time as an infinite continuum and similar problems arise concerning space. Even with contemporary developments in mathematics, it remains disputable whether time is infinitely divisible. Plato claimed that time is created and is the moving image of eternity. Philosophers continue to debate whether time has a beginning and whether we can make sense of a timeless existence. Aristotle in *Physics* expressed many puzzles about the existence of time. Kant argued that time, like space, is a form of intuition and understood mathematical knowledge to be determined in relation to these forms. Kant gave time a crucial role in his account of the categories and their application to experience. Bergson distinguished between intellectualised physical time and duration, which as the time of consciousness is the real essence of time. The validity of McTaggart's attack on the reality of time is still under debate. Another enduring dispute concerns whether time is absolute or relational. Heidegger's account of temporality is fundamental to his account of human being. In existentialism, time is more subjectively conceived through its connection with the problem of human experience.

"What then is time? If no one asks me, I know. If I wish to explain it to one that asks, I do not know."—Augustine, *Confessions*, XI, xiv.

Time, absolute

Newton maintained that time is absolute in virtue of being independent of physical events and having its own nature, flowing uniformly without regard and without relation to any external thing. Absolute time is mathematical time in contrast to the relative or external clock time in common use. Absolute time is real, and relative time is only apparent. Newton represents one radical position in a lasting dispute whether time and space are absolute or relational.

"Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another term is called duration." — Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*.

Time travel

Time is normally thought to be directed from the past

时间

最难以理解也讨论得最充分的哲学论题之一。时间牵涉到用以前和之后、或是用过去、现在和未来来谈论事件的进展和排序。时间通常被想像为一种迁移或流淌着的溪流，但是这引来了迁移神话的批评。时间一般被认为是一维的并且有不可逆的方向，但不清楚的是，究竟是什么给时间以方向，是否能有反向时序，或何以说明过去和未来的不对称性。芝诺悖论引发了关于时间作为无穷连续统的根本问题，以及关于空间的类似问题。即使数学发展到了今天，时间是否是无限可分的仍然是可争论的问题。柏拉图宣称时间是被创造出来的，是永恒的运动映象，哲学家们不断地争论，时间是否有一开端和我们是否能理解永恒的存在。亚里士多德在《物理学》中表达了许多关于时间存在的困惑。康德论证时间像空间一样，也是一种直观形式，认为我们的数学知识取决于与这些形式的关系。康德在他对范畴及其经验应用的论述中，给时间以一种关键的作用。柏格森区分了理智化的物理时间和绵延，后者作为意识时间是时间的真实本质。麦克塔加特对于时间实在性的著名攻击的有效性话题依然是争论的话题。另一个持久的争论涉及时间是绝对的还是关系的。海德格尔对于时间性的论述对他关于人类的论述是基本的。在存在主义中，时间通过其与人类经验问题的联系，被设想成更为主观的东西。

"那么何为时间？倘若无人问起，我还知道，如想向问者解释，我全不知晓。"—奥古斯丁：《忏悔录》，第十一卷，xiv。

绝对时间

牛顿坚持时间是绝对的，因为它独立于物理事件，具有自身的特性，均匀地流逝，与一切外部事物无关。绝对时间是数学的时间，对比日常使用的相对的或外部的钟表时间。绝对时间是真实的，而相对时间只是表象的。在时间和空间是绝对的还是相对的持续争论中，牛顿代表着一种激进的立场。

"绝对的、真实的和数学的时间，由其自身特性决定，均匀地流逝，与一切外部事物无关，又名持续。"—牛顿：《自然哲学的数学原理》。

时间旅行

时间通常被认为是从过去指向未来的，但

towards the future, but we can raise the question whether it is logically possible to travel backwards in time or to ascribe more than one direction to time. Travel into the past would necessarily involve backwards causation, with some later events causally affecting earlier events. Some claim that if this were true a traveller could travel back to murder his ancestors and prevent his own birth, but David Lewis argues that backward travel does not imply that the traveller could change the past.

We are normally thought to move at the same rate with everything else through time. The time elapsed from a traveller's departure to his arrival is the same as the duration of the journey. But it might be logically possible for a traveller to move from his departure to his arrival with the time spent on his journey not equal to the clock time from departure to arrival. Would there, then, be two unequal lengths of time depending upon how we measure the same journey? Would this allow us to travel into the future in the way that backward time travel would allow us to move into the past? In general, time travel is a thought experiment for inquiring into the nature of time.

"What is time travel? Inevitably, it involves a discrepancy between time and time."—David Lewis, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1, 1983, p. 67.

Time-gap argument, another term for time-lag argument

Time-lag argument

Also called the time-gap argument, an argument, put forward by Russell in *Human Knowledge* against the naive realist assumption that perception, such as seeing or hearing, is a matter of direct awareness. Science proves that light travels at a finite speed, with a time-gap between the transmission of light from an external object and the perception of the object. The light of the sun that strikes our eyes has taken a long time to reach us, so the sun that we see now is actually the sun that existed some time ago and that may have ceased to exist. Although its current non-existence would not affect the fact that we see it now, the immediate object of our visual experience is not actually identical with the sun which is being seen. The same case is applied to the hearing. If a gun is fired some distance from us, we first see the flash with a small time-lag and then hear the sound with a greater time-lag. Because there is time-lag in all perceptions, perception is not a direct confrontation, but a process. The object of experience is always internal. This denial of the immediacy of perception poses a threat to direct or naive realism which claims that perception is concerned only with immediate objects in the present and raises many problems about the nature of perception.

"I have in mind the famous 'time-lag' argument. Some

我们可以提出这样的问题：逻辑上是否可能在时间中反向旅行，或赋予时间以不止一个方向？去往过去的旅行必然包含逆向因果，随之以一些较迟的事件因果地影响较早的事件。一些人提出如果这是真的，旅行者就可以回到过去而去谋害其先辈以阻止他自己的出生，但 D. 刘易斯论证反向旅行并不意味着旅行者可以改变过去。

我们通常被认为以同样速率与其他一切事物通过时间运动。从一个旅行者出发到他到达所消逝的时间与旅行的持续一样长。但或许在逻辑上可能的是，旅行者从出发到抵达，他花在旅途上的时间不等于从出发到抵达的钟表时间。那么，会存在两个不相等的长度，它们有赖于我们如何度量同一旅程吗？这会像逆向时间旅行允许我们去往过去一样，允许我们去将来旅行吗？时间旅行一般作为探索时间本性的思想实验。

“什么是时间旅行？它不可避免地牵涉到对时间与时间之间的辨别。”——刘易斯《哲学文集》，第 1 卷，1983 年，第 67 页。

时间沟论证

“时间滞后论证”的别名。

时间滞后论证

又称“时间沟论证”，由罗素在其《人类的知识》一书中所提出的论证，用以反对朴素实在论关于知觉的如下假设：像听见和看见这样的知觉是一个直接意识。科学证明，光线以一定的速度传播，所以在外部对象发出光线与对对象的知觉之间有一个时间沟。射入我们眼睛的阳光花了好长时间才到达我们这里，所以我们现在看到的太阳是某个时间以前的太阳，可能现在已经不存在了。尽管其当前的不存在不会妨碍我们现在看到它这一事实，但我们视觉经验的直接对象与正被看到的太阳并不是同一个东西。这同样也适用于听觉。如果一支枪在远处开火，我们先以较短的时间滞后看到火光，然后以较长的时间滞后听到声音。由于在所有的知觉中都存在时间滞后，所以知觉不是一个直接的面对，而是一个过程。经验的对象永远是内部的。对于知觉直接性的这一否定对声称知觉只与当前的直接对象相关的直接实在论或朴素实在论构成威胁，也对知觉的本质提出许多问题。

“我所想的是著名的‘时间滞后论证’。有些哲学家……声称经验上的当前与时间上的当前之间的联系只是表面的。星球爆炸案例……表明，事物（事件）可以在停止存在以后呈现于经

philosophers ... claim that the connection between experiential and temporal presence is only apparent. The case of stellar explosions, ... shows that things (events) can be present in experience, after they cease to exist. "—Valberg, *The Puzzle of Experience*, 1992, p. 19.

Time-preference, another expression for principle of fractional prudence

Timocracy

[from Greek: *timo*, honour + *kratia*, strength, power, rule by those valuing honour] A type of state that Plato described in the *Republic* in contrast to the Ideal State. Because the rulers of a timocratic state value honour, the state is ruled by the spirited element instead of the rational element that governs the Ideal State. Consequently the unity of the state is undermined by timocratic rule. Parallel to the city, the timocratic man is also dominated by the spirited element in the soul. Self-interest diverts him from impartial ideals and causes inner instability. According to Plato, timocracy is the first stage in the degeneration of the Ideal State.

"There is only one thing which appears in timocracy most clearly under the rule of the spirited part, namely the love of victory and of honours." —Plato, *Republic*, 548c.

To be, see is or being

To be is to be perceived, see *esse est percipi*

To ti en einai, Greek term for essence

Tode ti, Greek term for a this

Toionde, Greek term for such

Token

Together with type, a pair of terms that was introduced by C. S. Peirce to classify different signs. A token is "an actual existent thing or event which is a sign", and type is "a law that is a sign" or "a definitely significant form". A token shares the feature that identifies a type but is an instance or example of that type. A type is instantiated by different tokens. Different tokens resemble one another if they belong to the same type. In a sense, a token of a type is an instance of the type. Walking is a type, and this particular act of walking is a token. Strawson's book *Individuals* is a type, while this copy of *Individuals* is a token. In a sense this distinction

验中。”——瓦尔伯格：《经验的难题》，1992年，第19页。

时间偏好

“分段审慎原则”的另一名称。

荣誉政体

[源自希腊语 *timo* (荣誉) 和 *kratia*, 由那些对荣誉的重视而产生的力量、权力和统治] 柏拉图在其《国家篇》中描述的与理想国形成对照的一类国家。由于荣誉城邦的统治者重视荣誉，这种国家是被勇敢因素所统治，而不是被支配理想国的理性因素所统治。其结果是国家的统一基础被荣誉统治所削弱。与城邦相应，以荣誉至上为原则的人也是由其灵魂中的勇敢因素所支配。自我利益驱使他离开公正的理想并造成其内心的不稳定。在柏拉图看来，荣誉政体是理想国退化的第一阶段。

“在勇敢要素统治下，荣誉政体中只有一种东西显现得最清楚，那就是好胜和爱荣誉。”——柏拉图：《国家篇》，548c。

是

见“是 (is)”或“是 (being)”条。

存在就是被感知

见“存在就是被感知 (*esse est percipi*)”条。

本质

“本质 (essence)”的希腊词。

这一个

“这一个 (a this)”的希腊词。

这一类

“这一类 (such)”的希腊词。

殊型

对应于“类型”。这对术语是由 C. S. 皮尔士引入的，用于划分不同的记号。殊型是“作为记号的一个实际存在物或事件”，而类型则是“作为记号的一种规则”或“确定的有意义的形式”。所有的殊型都具有确定一个类型的特征，但每一个殊型却又是这个类型的一个实例或例证。类型具体化为不同的殊型，而属于相同类型的不同殊型相互类似。在某种意义上，一个类型的殊型就是这个类型的一个实例。散步是一个类型，而具体的一个散步就是一个殊型。斯特劳森的《个别物》是一个类型，而一本《个别物》

is close to the distinction between the particular and the general. It has gained a wide currency in the philosophy of language, especially in the discussion of the relationship between a linguistic expression and an actual use of that expression, and also in the philosophy of mind. The identity theory of mind has been developed in two versions, respectively called type-type identity theory and token-token identity theory.

"A single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a single place at any one instant of time. Such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, ... I will venture to call a token." — *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 1933, 4: 537.

Token-reflexive

Also called indexical expressions, Hans Reichenbach's term for expressions involving a reference back, reflexively, to their own token utterance, that is to the speaker, place, time or context of utterance. For example, to say that A is past amounts to saying that A is earlier than this utterance. An understanding of such an expression involves understanding all the features of an utterance mentioned above and an ability to identify the utterance itself. Token-reflexive expressions indicate our confusions in talking of events as changing in respect of being past, present and future.

"A token-reflexive expression is one like 'I', 'here', 'now' whose essential occurrence in a sentence renders that sentence capable of bearing different truth-values according to the circumstances of its utterance — by whom, when, and where it is uttered, to whom it is addressed, with what gestures it is accompanied, and so forth." — M. Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, p. 353.

Token-token identity theory

One version of the identity theory of mind, according to which there is a token-token identity between mental and physical states or events. Each token instance of a mental event is as a matter of fact the same as some token instance of a physical event. The mental event is simply the physical event seen from the inside. This theory contrasts with another version of the identity theory, the type-type identity theory, which suggests that there is a type-type identity between mental states or events and bodily states or events. It is difficult to specify and prove this token-token identity, and the importance of the theory is questionable because it seems to exclude the provision of theoretical basis of mental-physical identity promised by the type-type theory.

"The thesis that for every token instance of a mental state, there will be some token neurophysiological event with which that token instance is identical. Such views were called 'token-token identity theory'." — Searle, *The Rediscovery of*

则是一个殊型。在某种意义上,这种区别与个别和一般的区别密切相关。这在语言哲学中得到了广泛的流传,特别是表现在讨论语言表达式与这个表达式的实际使用之间的关系上,也表现在心的哲学中。关于心的同一论发展为两种观点,分别称为“类型与类型的同一论”和“殊型与殊型的同一论”。

“只发生过一次的单一事件,它的同一性就限定在那个发生的事件或瞬间的单一地点。这种事件或事物只有在此时此刻出现时才有意义,……我贸然地把它称作殊型。”——《C. S. 皮尔士文集》,1933年,第4卷,第537页。

反身殊型

也称作索引式表达式。H. 赖兴巴赫的术语,表示涉及到转身指称到自身说出殊型的表达式,即回到说者说出的时间、地点或内容的指称表达式。例如,说A是过去的,等于是说A早于说出这个句子。理解这样一个表达式,就是理解上面提到的这个句子的所有特征以及确定这句话本身的能力。反身殊型的表达式表明我们在谈论事件的过去、现在与未来的变化时是混乱的。

“反身殊型的表达式就是像‘我’、‘这里’、‘现在’这样的表达式,它们真正出现在句子中,使得这个句子能够根据说出的不同情况——说者、说出的时间和地点以及它所强调的对象、它所伴随的手势等等——具有不同的真值。”——达米特:《真理与其他谜》,第353页。

殊型—殊型同一论

“心的同一论”的一种形式。根据这种观点,在心的和物的状态或事件之间,存在殊型—殊型同一性。任何一个心的状态的殊型或事例事实上都是一个物理事件的殊型或事例。心的事件只是从内部看到的物理事件。这一理论与同一论的另一形式“类型—类型同一论”相对,后者认为在心的状态或事件与身体状态或事件之间存在类型—类型的同一性。要详细说明并证明这种殊型—殊型同一论是很困难的,而且这一理论的重要性也是值得怀疑的,因为它似乎排斥了类型—类型同一论所允诺的心—物同一的理论基础的假定。

“任意心的状态的殊型都同一于一个神经生理事件的殊型,这样的观点被称为‘殊型—殊型同一论’。”——塞尔:《心的再发现》,1992年,第40页。

the Mind, 1992, p. 40.

Toleration

Refraining from acting against persons or things of which one disapproves for religious or political reasons, on the grounds that all persons have the right to their own religious beliefs and other opinions. Toleration has been a touchstone of a democratic state and society. Locke's *A Letter on Toleration* is the classic text on questions of toleration, especially with regard to religious toleration. Locke advocated extending toleration to all things lawful in the constitution, although his own tolerance did not extend to atheists. Locke's arguments for toleration included his view that a church has no right to persecute people and, more importantly, that human knowledge is so limited and open to error that we can never be sure that one religious opinion is right and another is wrong. Toleration supports a notion of liberty which is equal and impartial. It has, however, its own dilemma concerning tolerating the intolerant: if we tolerate an individual or group which lacks the spirit of tolerance, toleration will lead to its own destruction; if we refuse to tolerate the intolerant, we will sacrifice the principle of tolerance to expediency.

"The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion, is so agreeable to the gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind, as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it, in so clear a light."—Locke, *A Letter on Toleration*, in *The Works of John Locke*, 1824, Vol. 5, p. 55.

Topic-neutral

Originally, Ryle's term for the logical constants such as "of" "not", "every". They are not endowed with special meanings, and are applicable to discourse about any subject-matter. They do not refer to any external object but function to organise meaningful discourse. J. J. C. Smart calls a term topic-neutral if it is noncommittal about designating something mental or something physical. Instead, it simply describes an event without judging the question of its intrinsic nature. In his central-state theory of mind, Smart develops a topic-neutral analysis of mental expressions to the effect that it is possible to account for the situations described by mental concepts in purely physical and topic-neutral terms.

"In this respect, statements like "I am thinking now" are, as J. J. C. Smart puts it, topic-neutral, they say that something is going on within us, something apt for the causing of certain sorts of behaviour, but they say nothing of the nature of this process."—Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, 1968, p. 84.

宽容

根据每个人都有权采纳自己的宗教信念和其他观点,对出于宗教的或政治的原因而不赞成的那些人或事,容忍不加反对。宽容已经成为民主国家和民主社会的试金石。洛克的《论宽容》是宽容问题上的经典文献,尤其在宗教宽容方面。洛克提倡将宽容扩大到合乎宪法的一切事情上去,尽管他并未将自己的宽容推广到无神论者。洛克提出宽容时所依据的论证包括:教会无权迫害人民;更重要的是,人类的知识十分有限而易错,以至我们无法确定一个宗教观点是对的或另一个是错的。宽容与平等和无偏颇的自由相一致。不过,在是否宽容不宽容者问题上,宽容也有它自己的两难之处:如果我们对缺乏宽容精神的个人或团体实行宽容,宽容就会导致自身瓦解;如果我们拒绝对不宽容者实行宽容,我们就为权宜之计而牺牲了宽容原则。

"对那些在宗教事情上与其他人不同的人实行宽容,非常符合耶稣基督的福音,非常符合真正的人类理性,人们要是对于宽容的如此明显的必要性和益处视而不见,那似乎是极其荒谬的。"—洛克:《论宽容》,载《J. 洛克著作集》,1824年,第五卷,第55页。

话题中性的

从起源上讲,这是赖尔用来表示逻辑常项的词,比如“的”(of)、“不”(not)、“每个”(every)。这些逻辑常项并没有被给予特殊的意义,而是可以运用到关于任何题目的谈话中去。它们并不指谓任何外在的对象,而只发挥着组织有意义的谈话的功能。J. J. C. 斯马特称这样的词为话题中性的,即它不牵扯到对于某种心的或物的东西的指称,它只描述一个事件,而不对其内在本质是什么作出判断。在他关于心的中心状态的理论中,斯马特发展出了对于心的表达式的话题中性的分析,其结果就是可以用纯粹物质(或身体)的和话题中性的语词来说明那些由心的概念描述的情景。

"在这方面,如J. J. C. 斯马特所说,像‘我现在正在思考’这样的陈述就是话题中性的。它们说到有某个事情正在我们里边进行,它可能引起某种行为,但却丝毫未说到这个过程的本质。"—阿姆斯特朗:《唯物主义的心的理论》,1968年,第84页。

Topos

[Greek; place] For Aristotle, "a place in which arguments are to be found". A *topos* is a standard procedure, pattern or strategy for an argument, whatever its subject-matter. The logical work in which Aristotle deals with various *topoi* is accordingly called the *Topics*. This is a handbook for conducting arguments in disputes.

"One *topos* is to look and see if a man has described as an accident what belongs in another way." —Aristotle, *Topics*, 109a34.

Totalitarianism

[from Italian; *totalitario*: absolute, complete, all-embracing] A form of rule originally associated with Italian fascism which places every politically significant element under the control of a highly centralised government. A totalitarian state generally has an official ideology and suppresses the plurality of thought and opinion. It has one dominant party, typically under a single leader, and co-opts or destroys any opposition. Competitive interest groups and other previously independent organisations are either suppressed or brought into a corporatist structure to express populist support. The whole society is hierarchically and cohesively organised. The economy, military and mass media are tightly controlled, with a focus on alleged enemies used to maintain discipline and enthusiasm. There is no strict distinction between public and private or between party and state. Totalitarian rulers appear to organise their population into a disciplinary unity and can mobilise their resources to achieve one goal over a short time, but unacknowledged political conflicts beneath the surface and repression of public debate can have heavy costs, with some achievements more a matter of propaganda than efficiency. In the West, especially after the outbreak of World War II, totalitarianism became a pejorative term. Unlike authoritarian rule, a totalitarian regime not only denies individual freedom and human rights and requires order and stability, but also seeks to realise a specific ideology. As a doctrine, totalitarianism derives from older patterns of tyranny and despotism, but transforms them under the conditions of modernity. It is unclear to what extent a single theory of totalitarian rule can apply to regimes with different origins, formations and ideologies.

"Totalitarianism is a new form of dictatorship... It was characterised by the predominance of the leader of the victorious movement, who, with the aid of his subordinate elite and a manipulated ideology, aimed at total control over state, society and the individual." —Schapiro, *Totalitarianism*, 1972, p. 119.

Tough-mindedness

William James claimed that philosophy is first of all a kind of aesthetics for expressing some temperament or atti-

正位

「希腊词，指位置」在亚里士多德看来，是指“能找到论证的地方”。*Topos* 是论证（不管其主题是什么）的标准程序、模式或策略。亚里士多德在其中讨论各种 *topoi* 的逻辑著作因而被叫做《正位篇》。此书是一部如何在争论中构建论证的手册。

“一个正位是去看看，搞明白是否他人把本是以另一种方式归属的东西描绘为是偶性。”——亚里士多德：《正位篇》，109a34。

极权主义

「源自意大利文；*totalitario*，绝对的、完全的、无所不包的」一种最初与意大利的法西斯主义相联系的统治形式，这种法西斯主义把每一重要的政治因素都置于高度集中的政府控制之下。一个极权主义的国家一般有一种官方的意识形态并压制众多的思想和观点。它有一个占统治地位的政党，其典型的形式是在一个人的领导下，并且同化或摧毁任何反对派。竞争的利益集团和其他先前的独立的组织或者受到压制，或者被置于一个组合的结构中去表示大众的支持。整个社会是以等级制的形式严密地组织起来的。经济、军事和大众传媒被严格控制，集中注意力于所谓的敌人常被用来维持纪律和热情。在公众与私人之间、政党和国家之间不存在严格的区别。极权主义的统治者看上去是把他们的人口组织为一个有纪律的整体，并能调动他们的资源在短期内达到一个目的，但对深层政治冲突的否认和对公众争论的压制会带来沉重的代价，因为一些成就更是一种宣传而非实效。在西方，特别是在第二次世界大战爆发以后，极权主义已成为一个贬义词。与权威主义的统治不同，极权主义的政权不仅否认个人的自由和人权并要求秩序和稳定，而且还力图实现一种特定的意识形态。作为一种学说，极权主义起源于先前的暴政和专制，但对它们做了现代条件下的改造。单一的极权主义的统治理论在多大程度上可以应用于那些有着不同起源、不同形态和不同意识形态的政权，这个问题现在还不清楚。

“极权主义是一种新的专政形式，……它过去是以胜利的运动的领导者的支配地位为特征，这一领导者在他属下的精英和所操纵的意识形态的帮助下，来实现对国家、社会 and 个人的完全控制。”——夏皮罗：《极权主义》，1972年，第119页。

讲究实际

W. 詹姆斯主张哲学首先是一种用以表达对于世界的某种气质或态度的美学，而不是用

tude towards the world rather than a kind of logic for seeking solutions to a set of problems. Philosophy is decided by the temperament of the philosopher. He further suggested that the history of philosophy is to a great extent a clash of two kinds of human temperaments, namely tough-minded and tender-minded temperaments. Tough-minded philosophers hold on to facts and declare that everything else is false, while tender-minded philosophers set value on certain principles rather than on facts. This distinction can be seen in the conflict of empiricists like Hume and rationalists like Hegel. The tension between tender-minded and tough-minded philosophers is further represented through tensions between intellectualistic and sensationalistic views, idealistic and materialistic views, optimistic and pessimistic views, religious and irreligious views, belief in free-will and fatalism, monism and pluralism and dogmatism and scepticism. James himself attempts to reconcile both temperaments in his radical empiricism.

"The tough-minded are the men whose alpha and omega are facts." — James, *Pragmatism*, 1955, p. 170.

Tradition

The existing social customs, institutions, patterns of belief and codes of behaviour which are accepted by a community and form its culture. Every person belongs to at least one tradition and grows up through emulating or rebelling against what his traditions indicate. Tradition is inherited from previous generations and is transmitted, perhaps in an altered form, to future generations. It is the bond and continuity of a nationality, culture or religion. In political philosophy, liberal individualism stresses rationality and personal rights and rejects tradition as a force that hampers social progress and personal freedom. Conservatism, on the other hand, believes that we should respect tradition, and that large scale change, especially violent revolution, can only lead to calamity. This conservative view is shared by contemporary communitarian theory. In ethics, modern utilitarianism and deontology focus on interests, rights and duties, but virtue ethics respects the role of tradition in the cultivation of virtues. A general criticism of modern morality is that it isolates rationality from tradition.

"Self-contained traditions rarely raise questions of existence and reality. A member of such a tradition may ask whether a particular event has occurred and he may doubt a particular tale, but hardly anybody considers the 'ontological implications' of all terms, statements, and stories in a certain domain." — Feyerabend, *Problems of Empiricism*, 1981, p. 1.

Traditional logic

The logic in Aristotle's works, especially his syllogistic logic, including also contributions made by the Stoics to what

来寻求一组问题解答的逻辑。哲学取决于哲学家的气质。他进而提出哲学史在很大程度上是两种人类气质,即讲究实际的与喜爱空想的之间的冲突。讲究实际的哲学家立足于事实,宣布其余的一切都是虚假的,而喜爱空想的哲学家重视某些原理而不是事实。这种区别在像休谟这样的经验论者和像黑格尔这样的唯理论者之间的冲突中可以看到。这种讲究实际与喜爱空想之间的张力,可以进一步表现在理智主义与感觉主义、唯心论与唯物论、乐观主义与悲观主义、宗教的与不信教的观点、自由意志与宿命论、一元论与多元论、独断论与怀疑论等等之间。詹姆斯自己试图在他的彻底经验主义中协调这二者。

"讲究实际的就是把事实作为第一位的那些人。"——詹姆斯:《实用主义》,1955年,第170页。

传统

为一个社会所接受并形成其文化的现有的社会习俗、制度、信仰方式和行为准则。每个人都至少从属于一个传统,并通过对他的传统所指示的东西的效仿或反抗而成长。传统是从前代继承下来的并可能以一种改变了的形式传到后代。它体现了一种民族、文化或宗教的凝聚力和连续性。在政治哲学中,自由个人主义强调理性和个人的权利,并把传统作为阻碍社会进步和个人自由的力量而加以反对。保守主义则相反,它认为我们应当尊重传统,并认为大规模的变革,特别是暴力革命,只能导致灾难。当代社群主义也持有这种保守主义的观点。在伦理学中,现代功利主义和义务论关注的是利益、权利和责任,而德性伦理学则重视传统在德性培养方面的作用。对现代道德的总的批评是它使理性脱离传统。

"自我封闭的传统很少提出关于存在和现实的问题。这一传统的某一信奉者也许会问某一特定事件是否已发生,也许会怀疑一个特别的传说,但很少有人考虑某一领域的所有术语、陈述和故事的'本体论含义'。"——费耶阿本德:《经验主义问题》,1981年,第1页。

传统逻辑

亚里士多德著作中的逻辑,特别是他的三段论,也包括斯多亚派对目前所谓的命题演算

would now be called the propositional calculus, and the contributions by medieval logicians to problems such as reference and modality. It is also called Aristotelian Logic. Traditional logic has been superseded by modern symbolic or mathematical logic initiated in Frege's work, and is retained as a part of predicate logic. Modern logic holds that several basic assumptions in traditional logic, such as the claims that propositions are restricted to the subject-predicate form and that we must accept the principle of bivalence, are problematic. The core of traditional logic is the syllogism.

"The doctrine of the syllogism is the main achievement of traditional logic."—P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952, p. 158.

Tranquillity

[Greek: *ataraxia*, non-disturbance] A key term in ancient scepticism for a state which is free from disturbance and remains untroubled, both intellectually and in ordinary life. Tranquillity is both the outcome and reward of suspension of judgement. It emerges from a negative response to claims concerning the objectivity of values and accessibility of truth. Tranquillity is what scepticism calls happiness.

"As end the Sceptics name suspension of judgement, upon which tranquillity follows like a shadow."—Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, 9, 107.

Transcendent

[from Latin: *trans*, over, beyond + *scandere*, climb, being superior to, surpassing or separated from certain limits, in contrast to immanent] That which lies beyond certain crucial limits. In medieval philosophy, God was said to be transcendent because he goes beyond all the finite limits of this world and even beyond the scope of conceptual thinking. The scholastics also employed the term *transcendentia* for ontological predicates which go beyond Aristotle's classification of ten categories and which are coextensive with the whole world of being, such as things, one, true, good.

In Kant's philosophy, transcendence has two different senses. First, there are principles which go beyond the limits of possible experience, including the psychological, cosmological and theological ideas discussed in the Transcendental Dialectic. Secondly, things in themselves which exist beyond the limits of possible experience are transcendent. Kant also called this transcendent reality. When transcendental ideas are thought to be transcendent realities, we have what Kant calls transcendental illusions. However, the use of transcendental in these contexts is confusing, because the transcendent is carefully distinguished by Kant from the transcendental, which concerns the conditions for the possibility of experience. Husserl claimed that intentional acts have an immanent transcendence, by which they are related to objects of our awareness which are not parts of consciousness. Heideg-

所作出的贡献,以及中世纪逻辑学家对指称和模态等问题作出的贡献。它亦称“亚里士多德逻辑”。传统逻辑已被弗雷格所开创的现代符号逻辑或数理逻辑所取代,并作为谓词逻辑的一部分得以保留。现代逻辑宣称,传统逻辑中的几个基本假定,如命题局限于主谓式的,我们必须接受二值原则,都是成问题的。传统逻辑的核心内容是三段论。

“三段论学说是传统逻辑的主要成就。”——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》,1952年,第158页。

宁静

[源自希腊词 *ataraxia* (不受打扰)] 这是古代怀疑论的一个中心术语,是指一种在理智上和日常生活中都不受打扰,无忧无虑的状态。宁静是中止判断的结果和所获得的回报。它产生于对客观价值及获得真理的可能性持完全否定的立场。宁静正是怀疑论称为幸福的东西。

“怀疑论者把中止判断名为终端,而宁静则如同影子一般追随它。”——第欧根尼·拉尔修:《名哲言行录》,9,107。

超验的

[源自拉丁文 *trans* (超越) 和 *scandere* (攀登,上升),字义为胜过、超越,或与某种界限分离,相对于“内在的”] 超越某种决定性界限而存在的东西。在中世纪哲学中,上帝据说是超验的,因为他超越了这个世界的一切有限性,甚至超越了概念思维的范围。经院哲学家也用“超验”这个词来指那超出了亚里士多德十大范畴的分类和与整个世界的存在同样深远广阔的本体论谓词,诸如事物、一、真、善。

在康德哲学中,超验存在有两种不同的意义。一是指那些超越可能经验界限的原理,包括在“先验辩证论”中所讨论的心理学的、宇宙论的和神学的观念。另一个意义是指超越可能经验界限而存在的物自体。康德也把它称为“超验实在”。当先验观念被认作是超验实在时,我们就得到康德所说的“先验幻象”的东西。然而,“先验的”用法在这些行文中是含混的,因为“超验的”是康德精心地用来与“先验的”相区别,后者关心的是经验可能性的条件。胡塞尔主张,意向性活动具有“内在的超验性”,这些活动由此就与并非作为意识内容的我们的意识对象联系起来了。海德格尔使用超验概念来指人们对于整体作为整体的经验,相对于自身的和对整体的部分的经验。

“我们把那些其应用完全限于可能经验界

ger employed the notion of transcendence for man's experience of the whole as a whole, in contrast to the experience of oneself and parts of the whole.

"We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A296.

Transcendental

Kant contrasted the transcendental with the transcendent. Something transcendent goes beyond the limits of experience, while the transcendental is related to the conditions of the possibility of experience. It is the form of knowledge which is concerned not with objects themselves, but with the modes in which we are able to know these objects, namely, with the conditions of possible experience. Generally, the transcendental is distinguished from the empirical and is associated with the *a priori*. Thus a system of *a priori* concepts might be called transcendental philosophy. Kant used the term transcendental to qualify many other terms, such as logic, aesthetic, analytic, dialectic and deduction, in order to show that these topics are considered in terms of their role in establishing the conditions of the possibility of experience. These discussions use a type of reasoning which Strawson calls transcendental argument, the prime example of which is Kant's transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding.

"I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the modes of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A11/B25.

Transcendental aesthetic

[from Greek: *aisthesis*, sensibility] The first part of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Aesthetics is now associated with problems of art. Kant used the term in its root meaning concerning sensibility. The transcendental aesthetic is Kant's view of sensory knowledge and deals chiefly with space, time and mathematics. In contrast, the transcendental logic is concerned with the intellect. According to the traditional aesthetic, sensibility is passive receptivity, but Kant held that sensible perception has its own form and matter. In terms of his metaphysical exposition and transcendental exposition, he argued that space and time are *a priori* intuitions by which we structure the sensory. As *a priori* forms of sensible intuition, they are the forms of our sensibility and are not determinations that attach to the objects themselves. In other words, they are subjective conditions of sensibility. Through its account of the *a priori* construction of mathematical concepts in space and time, the transcendental aesthetic gives a preliminary answer to Kant's central question of how syn-

限内的原理命为‘内在的’，另外把那些宣称超越这些界限的原理命之为‘超验的’。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A296。

先验的

对于康德来说，“先验的”相对于“超验的”而言。某种超验之物是超越经验界限的东西，而“先验的”概念与经验可能性的条件相关。它指这种形式的知识：它不涉及对象自身，而是涉及我们据此能认识这些对象的方式，即可能经验的条件。一般地说，它与“经验的”相区分，而与“先天的”相关联。故一个先天概念的体系可称为先验哲学。康德使用“先验的”一词来限定许多名词，如逻辑、感性论、分析论、辩证论和演绎等，旨在表明所讨论的论题是按照它们在确定经验可能性的条件中的作用来考察的。这些讨论使用一种被斯特劳森称为先验论证的推理，它的典型例子就是康德的纯粹知性概念的先验演绎。

“所有知识，如果不是与对象相关，而仅仅与我们对对象的知识方式相关，就这种知识方式是先天地可能的范围内而言，我称这样的知识为‘先验的’。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A11/B25。

先验感性论

[源自希腊文, *aisthesis*, 感性] 康德《纯粹理性批判》的第一部分。感性论通常与艺术问题相关，在这里，康德是在这个词的字根意义上使用的。先验感性论是康德关于感性知识的学说，主要论及空间、时间和数学。这一部分相对于涉及理智的先验逻辑。按照传统的感性论，感性是被动的接受性。但康德认为，感知有它自己的形式和质料。他借助于他的形而上学阐明和先验阐明来证明：空间和时间是先天的直观，我们以它们来构造感知。作为感性直观的先形式，它们是我们感性的形式，而不是属于对象本身的规定。换言之，它们是感性的主观条件。通过论述数学概念在时空中的先天构造，先验感性论对康德的“先天综合判断如何可能”这个中心问题给出了初步的回答。这一直是此后对这一核心论题的许多论述的基础。

“一切先天的感性原理之学，我名之为先验感性论。”——康德：《纯粹理性批判》，A21。

thetic *a priori* judgement is possible. It has been the basis for many later accounts of its central topics.

"The science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A21.

Transcendental analytic

A division of the transcendental logic of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the other division being the transcendental dialectic. In the analytic, Kant sought to discover by analysis the concepts and principles of pure reason. The transcendental analytic contains the central arguments of the *Critique*. It is divided into the analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles. The analytic of concepts includes the metaphysical deduction, which shows the number and character of the categories, and the transcendental deduction, which seeks to justify the objective validity of the categories. The analytic of principles presents the principles under which the categories may legitimately be related to sensibility in general and includes discussions of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, the system of all principles of pure understanding and the distinction of all objects into phenomena and noumena. The transcendental analytic is the central part of Kant's critical philosophy and the core of his Copernican revolution.

"Transcendental analytic consists in the dissection of all our *a priori* knowledge into the elements that pure understanding by itself yields." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A64/B89.

Transcendental apperception

The term apperception was introduced by Leibniz for consciousness or reflective knowledge of an inner state which represents external things, but Kant argued that Leibniz's understanding of apperception was empirical and diverse, without relation to the identity of the subject. In contrast, Kant called his own version transcendental apperception, pure apperception or original apperception and used this notion as a crucial factor in the transcendental deduction. Transcendental apperception is the power to combine concept and intuition in knowledge, that is to introduce order and regularity in appearances and thus to achieve a synthetic unity in accordance with the categories. This involves the transcendental unity of apperception or unity of consciousness as a purely formal notion of the unity of the subject of experience. Apperception is different from intuition, for while intuition is receptive, transcendental apperception is a spontaneous act which brings intuitions to a subject and enables them to be combined into a judgement. The transcendental unity of apperception has the form of "I think", which can accompany all of one's representations, and has synthesis as its main function. In unifying appearances, it must act in ac-

先验分析论

康德《纯粹理性批判》中先验逻辑的一部分,另一部分是“先验辩证论”。康德在分析论中努力通过分析来发现纯粹理性的概念和原理。先验分析论包含《纯粹理性批判》的主要证明,它进一步划分为概念分析论和原理分析论。概念分析论包括表明范畴的数量和特点的形而上学演绎以及论证范畴的客观有效性的先验演绎。原理分析论提出了范畴可合法地联系于感性一般的原理,包括讨论纯粹知性概念的图型论、一切纯粹知性原理的体系和把一切对象分为现象与本体的区别。先验分析论是康德批判哲学的中心部分,是他的哥白尼革命的核心。

“先验分析论在于把我们一切先天知识分解为纯粹知性自身所产生的种种要素。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A64/B89。

先验统觉

“统觉”一词首先为莱布尼茨所采用,是指意识,或表象外部事物的内部状态的反思知识。但康德认为莱布尼茨对统觉的理解是经验性的、多样化的,与主体的同一性无关。与此不同,康德把自己对统觉的说法称为“先验统觉”、“纯粹统觉”或“本源的统觉”,并在先验演绎中用作关键的因素。它是把概念和直观结合为知识的能力,即把秩序和规则带入现象,按照范畴获得综合统一。因此它也称为“统觉的先验统一”或作为统一经验主体的纯形式概念的“意识的统一”。统觉不同于直观,因为直观是接受性的,先验统觉是自发的活动,它把直观带给主体,使它们能被结合为判断。统觉的先验统一具有“我思”的形式。“我思”伴随着我的一切表象而起作用,并以综合作为它的主要功能。在统一现象时,它必须按照范畴而进行。然而,它自身先于范畴,并且确实是范畴的源泉。先验统觉自身不能被进一步地规定,它是人类知识范围的最高原理。这个概念是费希特哲学的直接来源,并且对后来的德国唯心主义的发展产生了重大影响。在解释和证明康德对这个困难的概念的用

cord with the categories, but it is prior to the categories and is indeed their source. Transcendental apperception cannot be further determined and is the highest principle in the sphere of human knowledge. This notion is the direct source of Fichte's philosophy and exerted great influence on the later development of German idealism. There are many important problems in expounding and justifying Kant's use of this difficult notion.

"This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name *transcendental apperception* . . . The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 107.

Transcendental argument

An argument which starts from some accepted experience or fact to prove that there must be something which is beyond experience but which is a necessary condition for making the accepted experience or fact possible. The goal of a transcendental argument is to establish the truth of this precondition. If there is something X of which Y is a necessary condition, then Y must be true. This form of argument became prominent in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he argued that the existence of some fundamental *a priori* concepts, namely the categories, and of space and time as pure form of sensibility is necessary for making experience possible. In contemporary philosophy transcendental arguments are widely proposed as a way of refuting scepticism. Wittgenstein used this form of argument to reject the possibility of a private language which only the speaker could understand. Peter Strawson employs a transcendental argument to prove the perception-independent existence of material particulars and to reject a sceptical attitude toward the existence of other minds. There is disagreement about the kind of necessity involved in transcendental arguments, and Barry Stroud has raised important questions about the possibility of transcendental arguments succeeding.

"A transcendental argument attempts to prove q by proving it is part of any correct explanation of p, by proving it a precondition of p's possibility." —R. Nozick *Philosophical Explanations*, 1981, p. 15.

Transcendental deduction

For Kant, the argument to prove that certain *a priori* concepts are legitimately, universally, necessarily and exclusively applicable to objects of experience. Kant employed this form of argument to establish the legitimacy of space and time as the forms of intuition, of the claims of the moral law in the second *Critique* and of the claims of the aesthetic judgement of taste in the third *Critique*. However, the most influential example of this form of argument appeared in the

法中存在许多重要问题。

“这种纯粹的本源的不变意识我称之为,先验统觉,……这个统觉的数的统一因而是一切概念的先天根据,正如空间和时间的杂多性是感性直观的先天根据一样。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A107.

先验论证

这一论证始于某个公认的经验或事实,来证明必定存在某种超越了经验的东西,而这种东西是使这个公认的经验或事实得以可能的必然条件。它的目的在于确立这种先决条件的真。如果存在一个X,而Y是它的必然条件,那么,Y就必定为真。这种论证形式始于康德的《纯粹理性批判》,他认为,存在某些根本的先天概念亦即范畴,以及作为纯粹感性形式的时空概念,它们对于使经验成为可能是必然的。这在当代哲学中被普遍看做是反对怀疑论的一种形式。维特根斯坦用这种论证形式来证明只为说者理解的私人语言是不可能的。P. 斯特劳森用它证明物质个体独立于知觉而存在,反对怀疑他人心灵存在的态度。至于在先验论证中所涉及到的必然性是什么,人们有不同看法,B. 斯特罗德对先验论证成功的可能性提出了重要的问题。

“先验论证试图证明q,表明它是对p的正确说明,是使p成为可能的先决条件。”——诺齐克:《哲学说明》,1981年,第15页。

先验演绎

康德的术语,指证明某些先天概念可合法地、普遍地、必然地和唯一地应用于经验对象的论证。康德采用这种形式的论证来建立直观形式(空间和时间)的合法性,建立第二“批判”中的道德法则主张的合法性以及第三“批判”中鉴赏力的审美判断主张的合法性。但它最具影响的形式是在《纯粹理性批判》中的范畴的先验演绎。形而上学演绎确立了范畴的本源和特性,

Critique of Pure Reason as the transcendental deduction of the categories. The metaphysical deduction set out the origin and character of the categories, and the task of the transcendental deduction was to demonstrate that these *a priori* concepts do apply to objects of experience and hence to prove the objective validity of the categories. The strategy of the proof is to show that objects can be thought of only by means of the categories. In sensibility, objects are subject to the forms of space and time. In understanding, experienced objects must stand under the conditions of the transcendental unity of apperception. Because these conditions require the determination of objects by the pure concepts of the understanding, there can be no experience that is not subject to the categories. The categories, therefore, are justified in their application to appearances as conditions of the possibility of experience.

In the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), Kant extensively rewrote the transcendental deduction, although he held that the result remained the same. The first version emphasised the subjective unity of consciousness, while the second version stressed the objective character of the unity, and it is therefore possible to distinguish between a subjective and objective deduction. The second version was meant to clarify the argument, but remained extremely difficult to interpret and assess. The presence of the two versions of this fundamental argument makes interpretation even more demanding. Generally speaking, European philosophers prefer the subjective version, while Anglo-American philosophers prefer the objective version.

The transcendental deduction of the categories was a revolutionary development in modern philosophy. It was the main device by which Kant sought to overcome the errors and limitations of both rationalism and empiricism and propelled philosophy into a new phase.

"The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate *a priori* to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A85.

Transcendental dialectic

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the part of the transcendental logic that is concerned with reason, especially with certain kinds of malfunction of reason. In contrast, the other part of transcendental logic, the transcendental analytic, is concerned with understanding. For Kant, dialectic means "pertaining to error or illusion" or "uncovering judgments which bear a semblance of truth but are in fact illusory". These errors of human reason are natural, inevitable and incurable, for they are rooted in the human demand for completeness and unity. Pure reason commits these errors when it mistakenly applies the categories to things in themselves, that is things beyond the limits of experience, and mistakenly takes the Ideas of Reason to characterise

先验演绎的任务是论证这些先天概念确实可应用于经验对象,因而证明范畴的客观有效性。证明的目的旨在表明,对象只有借助于范畴才能被思维。在感性中,对象从属于空间和时间。在知性中,经验的对象必须合乎统觉的先验统一的条件。因为这些条件需要以纯粹知性概念确定对象,不可能存在任何不从属于范畴的经验。因此,范畴可以正当地应用于作为经验可能性条件的表象。

在第二版《纯粹理性批判》(1787)中,康德扩充地重写了先验演绎的论证,尽管他认为结果仍然相同。第一版强调意识的主观统一,第二版着重统一的客观性质。因而前者通常称为“主观演绎”,后者称为“客观演绎”。第二版的意图是想把观点表达得清楚些,但要解释和评价它依然极为困难。一般地说,欧洲大陆哲学家偏向于主观演绎的版本,而英美哲学家偏向于客观演绎的版本。

范畴的先验演绎是近代哲学的革命。它是康德用来克服唯理论和经验论的缺点的主要手段,并把哲学推向了新的阶段。

“对概念借以先天地联结对象的方式的说明,我名之为概念的先验演绎。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A85。

先验辩证论

在康德的《纯粹理性批判》中,它是先验逻辑的一部分,论述理性,或更准确地说,论述理性的某些失常机能,相对于先验逻辑的另一部分,即研究知性的先验分析论。在康德看来,“辩证论”在这里的意思是“关于谬误或幻象”,或“揭露那些貌似真理,实为幻象的判断”。这种人类理性的错误是自然的、不可避免的和不可救药的,因为它们植根于人类对完满性和统一性的要求中。纯粹理性犯下这些错误,是由于它把范畴误用于物自身,即超越经验的事物,并且误用理性观念,来刻画在经验中给予的事物。这些错误是传统形而上学的根源。因此,先验辩证法是康德对传统本体论、特别是沃尔夫讨论

something that is given in experience. These errors are the source of traditional metaphysics. The transcendental dialectic is Kant's criticism of traditional ontology, especially as discussed by Wolff. It chiefly addresses three metaphysical disciplines: rational psychology, which discusses the soul or thinking subject as an empirical entity and leads to paralogisms; rational cosmology, which discusses appearance as a whole and leads to antinomies; and rational theology, which attempts to prove the existence of God and leads to the ideal of pure reason.

"The transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendental judgements, and at the same time taking precautions that we be not deceived by it." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B354.

Transcendental ego

For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction leads to the discovery that whatever is in the world is only as object of our pure consciousness, that is an object of the transcendental ego. This ego is the unity of the empirical ego's stream of consciousness. It cannot be bracketed because it is essentially entailed by the *Cogito*. It is transcendental because it precedes the being of the world. This ego constitutes itself through its acts. It is self aware and announces itself in its conscious acts. The transcendental ego, according to Husserl, is also one's "ultimately constitutive subjectivity", "ego in its full concreteness", a "monad" and "the active subject of consciousness". It is the source of all mental operations and plays crucial roles in the organisation of experience and in the production of intentionality. This notion is intended to provide a starting-point for phenomenological reflection and to distinguish phenomenology from empirical sciences.

"As transcendental ego I am thus the absolutely responsible subject of whatever has existential validity for me. Aware of myself as this ego, thanks to the transcendental reduction, I stand now above all worldly existence, above my own human life and existence as man." —Husserl, *Shorter Works* (McCormick and Elliston, eds), 1981, p. 320.

Transcendental exposition

An argument in the transcendental aesthetic of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to the transcendental exposition of the concept of space, it is necessary for space to be an *a priori* intuition if synthetic *a priori* knowledge in geometry is possible. Although there is no mathematical discipline that is related to time as geometry is related to space, Kant claimed that it is necessary for time to be an *a priori* intuition if the body of *a priori* synthetic knowledge exhibited in the general doctrine of motion is possible.

"I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic knowledge can be understood." —

的本体论的批判。它主要讨论了三门主要的形而上学学科:理性心理学,它研讨了作为经验存在物的灵魂或思维主体,因而导致了谬误推理;理性宇宙学,它研讨了现象整体,因而导致二律背反;理性神学,它企图证明上帝的存在,因而导向纯粹理性的理想。

"先验辩证论满足于揭示先验判断的幻象,同时采取预防措施以不受其欺骗。"——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B354。

先验自我

对于胡塞尔说来,现象学的还原使人得以发现,世界上所有的东西都只是我们纯粹意识的对象,也就是先验自我的对象。这个自我是经验自我的意识流的统一所在。它不能被置于括弧之中〔即被悬置或还原掉〕,因为它是“我思”的必然产物。它是先验的,因为它先于这世界的存在。这自我通过其行为而构成自身。它是自我意识的,并在它的诸意识行为中表达出自身。按照胡塞尔的观点,先验自我也是人的“终极的构成主体性”、“具有充分具体性的自我”、“单子”和“意识的主动主体”。它是所有心智活动的源头,在组织经验和产生意向性方面起着关键作用。提出这个观念,是为了给现象学反思提供一个起点,并将现象学与经验科学区别开来。

“作为先验自我,我就是对任何在我这里有存在可靠性的东西都绝对负责的主体。凭借先验的还原,我意识到我自身就是此自我;因此,我就站在了一切世间存在之上,站在了我自己的人类生活和作为人的生存状态之上。”——胡塞尔:《短篇著作》(麦考密克和埃利斯頓编辑),1981年,第320页。

先验阐明

这种论证是康德《纯粹理性批判》中先验感性论的一部分。空间概念的先验阐明把“空间是先天直观”作为“几何学中先天综合知识是可能的”这个论点的必要条件。尽管并不存在像几何学与空间相关那样的、与时间相关的数学学科,康德仍然主张,如果一般运动学说所展示的先天综合知识是可能的,那么“时间是先天的直观”就是必要条件。

“所谓先验阐明,我理解为是对一概念的解释,作为原理,其他先天综合知识的可能性由之而能理解。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B40。

Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B40.

Transcendental ideal, see ideal (Kant)

Transcendental ideas, see ideas (Kant)

Transcendental illusion

Traditional metaphysics usually started from empirical or sensory illusions in order to show that the senses sometimes deceive us and that appearance is illusory. Kant claimed that traditional metaphysics was itself permeated by illusions, which arise from the deceptive extension of the concepts of pure understanding beyond the limits of experience or appearance to things in themselves. It takes regulative principles as knowledge of objects. These are transcendental illusions which are not generated by appearance, but are in contrast with it. They cheat us not by the senses, but by reason. Kant claimed that these illusions are natural and inevitable and result from the natural quest of reason for the absolute condition. The task of his critical philosophy was to determine the limits of human reason and to guard against the illegitimate transgression of these limits. His *Critique of Pure Reason* is divided into two parts: one is analytic and seeks to determine the legitimate sphere of pure reason; and the other is dialectic and seeks to show how transcendental illusions result once reason does not observe its proper limit.

"Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A297/B353.

Transcendental logic

The main part of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, including both the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. Breaking from the pattern of general or traditional logic, which dealt strictly with the form of thoughts, transcendental logic not only excluded modes of knowledge which have empirical roots, but also sought to trace the origin of *a priori* knowledge. Transcendental logic used the table of judgements of traditional logic as a clue to determine the pure concepts of understanding or categories and proceeded to determine how these *a priori* concepts have objective reference. Transcendental logic also sought to explain the inevitable illusions of reason by its tendency to employ the categories beyond the limits of experience.

"Such a science, which should determine the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic." — Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A57.

先验的理想

见“理想(康德)”条。

先验观念

见“观念(康德)”条。

先验幻象

传统形而上学通常从经验的或感觉的幻象开始,目的在于表明,感觉有时在欺骗我们,现象就是幻象。康德主张,传统形而上学自身充满了幻象,它从纯粹知性概念欺骗性地扩大到超越了经验或现象的界限,上升到物自体,即把范导性原理作为对象的知识。它们不是由现象产生的先验幻象,而是相对于现象而言的,在这种先验幻象中我们不是受感官的欺骗,而是受理性的欺骗。然而,康德主张,这些幻象是自然的和不可避免的,产生于理性对绝对条件的自然追求。因此,他的批判哲学的任务是要规定人类理性的界限和要防止理性的不合法的越界行为。他的《纯粹理性批判》划分为两个部分,一部分是分析论,试图确定纯粹理性的合法范围,另一部分是辩证论,意在表明,一旦理性不遵守它的严格界限,先验幻象将如何产生出来。

“先验幻象甚至在它已被发觉,以及它的无效性清楚地由先验的批判所揭示后,仍不会终止或消失。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A297/B353。

先验逻辑

康德《纯粹理性批判》的主要部分,包括先验分析论和先验辩证论。与严格地处理思维形式的一般或传统逻辑不同,先验逻辑不仅排斥具有经验来源的知识方式,它也追溯先天知识的来源。然而,先验逻辑利用传统逻辑的判断表作为确定纯粹知性概念或范畴的线索,并进而确定这些先天概念如何具有客观的指称。先验逻辑也力图通过理性应用范畴于经验界限之外的倾向来解释理性的不可避免的幻觉。

“规定这种知识的起源、范围和客观有效性的这种学问,应当称为先验逻辑。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A57。

Transcendental object

A concept which, like *noumenon* or thing-in-itself, seems to designate an unknown object outside the limits of experience. The concept is adopted to show that there is something which lies at the basis of appearances and is the intelligible cause of the latter. The transcendental object is the intelligible correlate of sensible appearances. The postulation of its existence is the theoretical consequence of Kant's belief that there can be no appearance without anything that appears. Although the transcendental object can be confused with the thing-in-itself, the two concepts have different functions.

"This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A251.

Transcendental paralogism, see paralogism

Transcendental philosophy

Kant's term for an exhaustive and systematic analysis of the whole of *a priori* knowledge. In this philosophy, he sought to answer the question of how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible and, more specifically, how the sciences are possible. Transcendental philosophy is distinguished from ontology because it is concerned only with the concepts and principles of understanding and reason and takes objects as something given and not in need of a philosophical account, although his actual discussion of objects is complex and puzzling. According to Kant, the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to lay down the fundamentals for the whole system of transcendental philosophy, but because the *Critique* was an essential but incomplete examination of synthetic *a priori* knowledge it was not the whole system itself.

"The critique of pure reason therefore will contain all that is essential in transcendental philosophy." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A14/B28.

Transcendental place, see transcendental reflection

Transcendental reflection

An operation of mind prior to the construction of any objective judgement which synthesises concepts and intuitions. This operation has the purpose of reflecting on or comparing the character of representations in order to decide whether they belong to understanding or to sensible intuitions. The act of comparison employs a list of so-called concepts of reflection or concepts of comparison, which have no reference to an object but are merely means for orienting judgement. These concepts include identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, matter and

先验对象

一个与本体或物自体具有相同含义的概念,指超越经验界限的不可知的对象。这个概念被用来表明,有某种东西存在作为现象的基础,并且是使现象变得可以理解的原因。它是可感现象的理智相关物。关于先验对象存在的设定是康德的这种信念的理论结果:如没有东西在显现,就不可能有现象。虽然先验对象这一概念与“物自体”概念可以相混使用,但这两个概念有着不同的功能。

“这种先验对象不能与感性资料相分离,否则,就没有任何可通过它而思维此对象的东西。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A251。

先验谬误推理

见“谬误推理”条。

先验哲学

康德的术语,是对整个先天知识的彻底的和系统的分析。在这种哲学中,他试图回答这个问题:先天综合判断如何可能?更具体地说,科学是如何可能的?先验哲学区别于本体论,因为它只涉及知性和理性的概念和原理,并把对象作为某种给予的东西,而不需要哲学上的说明,虽然他对于对象的实际讨论是复杂而令人困惑的。按康德的观点,《纯粹理性批判》的工作为先验哲学的整个体系打下了基础,但并不等于先验哲学,因为它是对先天综合知识的本质的而非完全的考察。

“因此纯粹理性批判包含先验哲学中一切本质的东西。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A14/B28。

先验的位置

见“先验的反思”条。

先验的反思

先于建构任何综合了概念和直观的客观判断的一种心灵活动,其意图是反思或比较种种表象的特性以决定它们是否属于知性或感性直观。在进行比较时,它应用一系列被称为是反思的概念或比较概念来进行。这些概念并不指称对象而仅是给判断定位的手段。这些概念包括,同一与差别,一致与相反,内部和外部,质料与形式。这些概念极易混淆,因为它们既被用于概念也用于直观。如果我们把它们作为对象的特性,就会产生本体论的错误。这些反思概念也称

form. These concepts are prone to amphiboly because they are applied both to concepts and intuitions. If we take them to be properties of objects, then ontological errors occur. These concepts of reflection are also called transcendental topics. According to the employment of these concepts in sensibility or in understanding, transcendental reflection assigns a place to a representation. This place is called the transcendental place.

"The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call transcendental reflection." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A261/B317.

Transcendental synthesis, see synthesis (Kant)

Transcendental topic, see transcendental reflection

Transcendental unity of apperception, see transcendental apperception

Transcendentalism

Also called New England transcendentalism, an early nineteenth century spiritual and philosophical movement in the United States, represented by Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. It was centred in the so-called Transcendental Club in Boston, and published a quarterly journal *The Dial*. Influenced by German idealism and Romanticism, it claimed that there is a spirit of the whole, the over soul, which is beyond the space and time of the everyday world but at the same time is immanent in it, and which forms a higher spiritual reality. It advocated an ascetic lifestyle, emphasised self-reliance and communal living and rejected contemporary civilisation. The eventual goal of life is to achieve a mystical unity with this spiritual reality, that is, with nature. Transcendentalism is viewed as a mixture of speculative philosophy and semi-religious faith. This philosophical movement had a deep influence upon existentialism, James' pragmatism and contemporary environmental philosophy.

In a broad sense, transcendentalism is any doctrine that emphasises the transcendental, and is taken as a synonym of transcendental philosophy. In this sense, all types of absolute philosophy, especially those idealist systems which emphasise the transcendence of the Absolute over the finite world, are considered examples of transcendentalism. Thus, transcendentalists had aims which differ from those of Kant's transcendental philosophy, which criticised those who wished to extend knowledge beyond experience and instead sought to use a transcendental argument to establish the conditions for

为“先验正位”。按照这些概念或在感性中或在知性中的应用,先验的反思确定表象的位置,这种位置称为“先验的位置”。

“通过它我把表象比较与表象所属的认知官能相对比,通过它我辨别那些要相互比较的表象是否属于纯粹知性或属于感性直观,这样的活动我称为先验的反思。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,A261/B317。

先验的综合

见“综合(康德)”条。

先验正位

见“先验的反思”条。

统觉的先验统一

见“先验统觉”条。

超验主义

19世纪早期发生在美国的一场精神的和哲学的运动,代表人物是R.W.爱默生和H.D.西奥鲁,也被称为“新英格兰超验主义”。它以设在波士顿的所谓“超验俱乐部”为中心,并出版季刊《日规》(*The Dial*)。由于深受德国唯心主义和浪漫主义的影响,它宣称,存在着一个整体的、超灵魂的精神,这精神处于日常世界的空间和时间范围之外,但同时又内在于世界之中,构成更高的精神实在。它倡导禁欲的生活方式,强调自我信赖和公共生活,拒绝当代文明。生命的最终目标是实现与这种精神实在,即与本性的神秘统一。超验主义被认作是思辨哲学和半宗教信仰的混合。这场哲学运动对存在主义、詹姆斯的实用主义和当代环境哲学都有很深影响。

从广义上讲,超验主义指强调超验性的任何学说,并被当做超验哲学的同义语。在这种意义上,一切类型的绝对哲学,尤其是那些强调在有限世界之上的绝对的超验性的唯心主义者们的体系,均被视为超验主义的范例。这样,超验主义者的目的便不同于康德超验哲学的目的。后者批评那些力图把知识伸展到经验之外的人,并寻求使用超验论证来建立经验可能性的条件。

“超验主义者相信,人有能力把握绝对的真理、绝对的正义、绝对的公正和绝对的善。他们把权力、真理和美说成是人在世界上所能发现

the possibility of experience.

"The transcendentalists believed in man's ability to apprehend absolute Truth, absolute Justice, absolute Rectitude, absolute Goodness. They spoke of the Right, the True, the Beautiful as eternal realities which man can discover in the world and which he can incorporate into his life. And they were convinced of the unlimited perfectibility of man." — Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*, 1949, p. 42.

Transformational grammar

The most powerful of the three kinds of grammar distinguished by Chomsky. The other two are finite-state grammar and phrase-structure grammar. Transformational grammar is a replacement for phrase structure grammar, which 1) analyses only the constituents in the structure of a sentence; 2) provides a set of phrase-structure rules which generate abstract phrase structure representations; and 3) holds that the simplest sentences are produced according to these rules. Transformational grammar provides a further set of transformational rules to show that all complex sentences are formed from simple elements. These rules manipulate elements and otherwise rearrange structures to give the surface structures of sentences. Whereas phrase-structure rules change only from one symbol to another in one sentence, transformational rules show that items of a given grammatical form can be transformed into items of a different grammatical form. For example, they can show the transformation of negative sentences into positive ones, question sentences into affirmative ones and passive sentences into active ones. Transformational grammar is presented as an improvement over other forms of grammar. It also provides a model for accounting for the ability of a speaker to generate new sentences on the basis of limited data.

"The central idea of transformational grammar is determined by repeated application of certain formal operations called 'grammatical transformations' to objects of a more elementary sort." — Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 1965, p. 17.

Translation holism

A type of semantic holism which claims that since the meaning of an expression is determined by its relations to many other expressions in its language, To translate the expression into another language can preserve its meaning only if its associative or inferential relations with other expressions in the home language are preserved in the expressions of the targeted language. To translate one sentence in isolation into another language will result in the distortion of its meaning. The thesis of translation holism puts a constraint on the expressive power of language.

"What we will call translation holism is the claim that

并能融入他生活的永恒实在。他们确信人的无限可完满性。"——韦克美斯特：《美国哲学观念史》，1949年，第42页。

转换语法

由乔姆斯基区分的三种语法中最重要的的一种（其他两种语法是“有限状态语法”和“短语结构语法”）。转换语法是短语结构语法的替代物，后者1）只是分析了句子结构的组成部分；2）提供了一系列短语结构的规则，它们产生了抽象的短语结构的表达方式；3）它认为，最简单的句子是根据这些规则产生出来的。转换语法提供了一套进一步的转换规则，用于表明一切复杂的句子都是由简单的成分构成的。这些规则变换着成分，进而重新调整结构，以达到句子的表层结构。短语结构规则只是从句子的一个符号变为另一个符号，而转换规则则表明，任何不同的语法形式都可以转换为某种给定的语法形式。例如，它们可以表明把否定句转换为肯定句，把疑问句转换为陈述句，把被动句转换为主动句。转换语法被看做是对其他语法形式的改进，它也提供了一种模式去说明说者根据有限的材料生成新句子的能力。

“确定转换语法的核心观念，在于把某些被称作‘语法转换’的形式操作，反复地用于某种更为基本的对象。”——乔姆斯基：《句法理论的若干方面》，1965年，第17页。

翻译的整体论

一种语义学的整体论，它主张，由于一个表达式的意义是由它与其所在的语言中其他许多表达式的关系确定的，因而，要把它翻译为另一种语言，就只能当把母语中与之相关的或有推论关系的其他表达式保留在所翻译的语言表达式时，才能保留这个表达式自身的意义。孤立地把一个句子译为另一种语言，就会产生意义的歪曲。这种翻译的整体论主张强化了语言的表达力量。

“我们称作的翻译的整体论是这样一种主张，它认为，像意义这种特性与L的某些公式

properties like meaning the same as some formula or another of L , are holistic in the sense that nothing can translate a formula of L , unless it belongs to a language containing many (nonsynonymous) formulas that translate formulas of L ." — Fodor and Lepore, *Holism*, 1992, p. 6.

Transmigration of the soul

A doctrine introduced into the western tradition by Pythagoras, who might have been influenced by oriental mysticism. It claims that soul, which has an essential kinship with the divine and immortal, is a temporary sojourner in the body and may live through successive incarnations in various animal and human bodies. If it keeps itself pure, not being polluted by bodily passions, it may eventually return to its true or godlike state. If it sins, it will be punished by prolonged suffering in more miserable incarnations. A soul must therefore do its best to keep apart from body. Plato's famous doctrine of Recollection is based on the transmigration of the soul. The transmigration of the soul is also called metempsychosis (Greek: *meta*, among, in company with + *en*, in + *psyche*, soul).

"First, that he [Pythagoras] maintains that the soul is immortal; next, that it changes into other kinds of living things, ... Pythagoras seems to have been the first to bring these beliefs into Greece." — Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker*, 14, 8a.

Transworld identity

Since Leibniz, it has been believed that each object exists in just one world. This is supported by the idealist doctrine of internal relations. Contemporary discussion of possible worlds is divided over this issue. Some philosophers insist that the same object cannot exist in more than one possible world, and is confined to only one world. Thus, each individual is a worldbound individual. Other philosophers claim that each individual exists in more than one world, not only in the actual world, but in a plurality of possible worlds. Accordingly, each individual, instead of being worldbound, becomes a transworld individual. A problem arises about how to identify such an individual. A thing X is thought to exist in more than one world, W_n and W_m . Since only when W_n differs in at least one aspect from W_m are they two worlds, X in- W_n has at least some properties distinct from X in- W_m . If this is so, X in- W_n and X in- W_m are discernible, and according to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, they are not identical. Some philosophers deny the existence of this problem, on the ground that each individual has its essence and is hence identifiable no matter how many worlds it is in. Other philosophers reject the idea of transworld identity as unintelligible. David Lewis developed a counterpart theory which claims that there is nothing that inhabits more than one world, but any inhabitant of this world might have

或其他特性一样,都是整体性的,也就是说,没有什么东西可以翻译 L 的公式,除非它属于一种包含了许多翻译 L 公式的(非同义的)公式的语言。”——福多和拉普:《整体论》,1992年,第6页。

灵魂轮回

由毕达戈拉斯引入西方传统的一种学说,而他又可能是受到了东方神秘主义的影响。这种学说主张,灵魂与神圣和不朽有着本质的亲缘关系,它只是暂时寄居在躯体中,可以在不同的动物和人的躯体内继续显现活力。如果灵魂保持自身的纯洁,没被躯体的激情玷污,最后就可以回到它的本真或似神的状态。相反,如果它犯了罪,就会在较为悲惨的肉身中受延长痛苦的惩罚。所以,灵魂必须尽力保持与躯体的分离。柏拉图著名的回忆说就是建立在灵魂轮回基础之上的。灵魂轮回也被称作“灵魂转生”[metempsychosis, 源自希腊语 *meta* (在……之后,与……相伴)、*en* (在……之中)和 *psyche* (灵魂)]。

“首先,他[指毕达戈拉斯]主张灵魂是不朽的;其次,它变成其他种类的生物,……毕达戈拉斯似乎是把这些信念引入希腊的第一人。”——第尔斯和克兰兹:《前苏格拉底哲学残篇》,14,8a。

跨世界的同一性

自莱布尼茨以来,人们相信每个对象只存在于一个世界中。这种观点得到了为唯心论所坚持的内在关系说的支持。当代关于可能世界的讨论在这个问题上产生分歧。有些哲学家坚持同一对象不可能存在于不止一个可能世界,而只能限定于一个世界中。这样,每个个体都是束缚于世界中的个体。然而,另一些哲学家认为每个个体存在于不止一个世界中,不仅在现实世界中,而且在多个可能世界中。相应地,每个个体并非束缚于世界中,而是跨世界的个体。这样,就产生了关于如何鉴别这种个体的问题。一事物 X 被认为存在于不止一个世界,即 W_n 和 W_m 中。由于 W_n 至少有一个方面不同于 W_m ,它们才是两个世界, W_n 中的 X 至少有某些性质区别于 W_m 中的 X 。如果这样, W_n 中的 X 和 W_m 的 X 就是可辨别的,而按照“等同物的不可辨别性”原理,它们就是不同一的。有些哲学家否认这个问题的存在,理由是每个个体都有其本质,因此无论它在多少个世界中都是可同一的。但是更多的哲学家则反对跨世界同一性观念,认为它是不可理解的。D. 刘易斯提出一种“对应物理论”,认为任何事物都不能居住于多于一个世界,但是这个世界的任何居住者都可能在其他世界有对应物。在重要的内在性质和

counterparts in other worlds which resemble it closely enough in important respects of intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations. He thus replaces transworld identity with transworld resemblance.

"What comes from trans-world resemblance is not trans-world identity, but a substitute for trans-world identity; the counterpart relation." -- Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, 1973, p. 39.

Trial and error

A method of scientific invention and thought. A scientist formulates a hypothesis or a theory and then uses it to attempt to solve some definite problem. This is the step of testing or trial. If the hypothesis fails the trial and is confronted by counter examples, it is generally rejected as erroneous. All theories are tentative hypotheses and trials. All experiments are performed in order to see whether theories work and to find where they go wrong. Then we formulate a new theory and test it by new observations and experiments. Popper viewed the development of empirical science as a continuous process of trial and error, which he calls conjecture and refutation. By utilizing this method, we learn from our mistakes and achieve progress. He believed that conjecture and refutation is also the basic method of philosophy.

"We must have a question before we can hope that observation or experiment may help us in any way to provide an answer or put in terms of the method of trial and error, the trial must come before the error." -- K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, 1957, p. 98.

Trinity

A Christian theological doctrine that God is one substance (Latin: *substantia*, Greek: *ousia*) consisting of three persons (Latin: *personae*, Greek: *hypostaseis*): Father, Son (Jesus Christ) and Holy Spirit. Each of them is God, but there are not three Gods but one. The doctrine is based remarks in the *New Testament* at 1 Epistles, 5: 7; "There be three that bear witnesses in heaven, the father, the word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are one". Such an idea was influenced by Plotinus's three hypostaseis. The knowledge of the existence of three persons is through revelation. In the Christian tradition, each person is ascribed one peculiar attribute: paternity to the Father, filiation to the Son, and procession to the Holy Spirit. Procession is explained in two ways: either the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, or it proceeds from the Father and from the Son. This difference of interpretation leads to the division between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Western Christianity.

There are also puzzles concerning the different persons of the Trinity. For example, the early Church also divided over the question of the nature of Jesus Christ. The monophysites

held that Christ's nature was too closely related to God's nature to be distinguished from it. He therefore used transworld similarity to replace transworld identity.

"来自于跨世界相似的不是跨世界同一性,而是跨世界同一性的替代物:对应物关系." -- 刘易斯:《反事实句》,1973年,第39页。

试错法

一种科学发明和思考的方法。科学家构思出一个假说或理论,然后用它来尝试解决某些确定的问题。这是检验或试验的一步。如果它不能通过试验,遇到了反例,一般就被看做是错误的而被抛弃。所有的理论都是试探性假说和试验。所有实验的操作都是为了看这些理论是否奏效,发现它们在哪儿出错。然后我们构造新的理论并用新的观察和实验检验它。波普把经验科学的发展看做是一种持续的试错过程。他称之为猜想与反驳。通过采用这种方法,我们能从错误中学习,从而取得进步。他认为猜想与反驳也是哲学的基本方法。

"在我们能希望观察和实验以任何方式帮助我们提供一个答案以前,我们必须先有一个问题,或者用试错法的方式来说,试验必须在错误之前。" -- 波普:《历史主义的贫困》,1957年,第98页。

三位一体

基督教神学的一种学说:上帝是由三个位格(拉丁词 *personae*, 希腊词 *hypostaseis*) 圣父、圣子(即耶稣基督)和圣灵构成的一个实体(拉丁词 *substantia*, 希腊词 *ousia*)。它们每一个都是上帝,但不是有三个上帝,而是只有一个。这种学说的依据是《新约全书》中《使徒一书》5:7的话:"作见证的原来有三,即父亲、儿子和圣灵;这三者也都归于一。"这种观念受了普罗提诺"三本在"的影响。只有通过启示,才能得到三位格存在的知识。在基督教传统中,每个位格都被说成有一种特定的属性:圣父是父道,圣子是嫡裔,圣灵是显现。显现有两种解释方式:或者是圣灵源于圣父经由圣子出现,或者是圣灵源于圣父也源于圣子。这种不同的解释导致了东正教和西方基督教之间的差异。

对三位一体中的三个不同的位格有种种疑问。例如,早期教会对耶稣基督的本性问题便有争议。单性论者认为,只有一个性质,既是人的,又是神的,而双性论者认为有两个分别的性质。单性论学说为东正教会支持,被批评为不可理喻。双性论学说为罗马教会所采用,也受到了批

held that there was one nature, which was both human and divine, and the dyophysites held that there were two separate natures. The monophysite doctrine, supported by Eastern Churches, was criticised for being unintelligible. The dyophysite doctrine, adopted by the Roman Church, was criticised because it allowed only the human Jesus to suffer. Without divine suffering, Christian narrative about salvation becomes incoherent.

"God, who has been represented (that is, personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the *Bible*." ---Hobbes, *Leviathan*, IV, 42.

Tripartite definition of knowledge

The traditional and also standard analysis of propositional knowledge, initiated by Plato's claim in *Theaetetus* (210c-292d) that knowledge is true belief plus *a logos*. It holds that knowledge is justified true belief and obtains when the following three conditions apply: A knows P if and only if (1) P is true, (2) A believes P and (3) A is justified in believing P. The definition shows that knowledge consists of truth, belief and justification. This definition is seriously challenged by the Gettier problem.

"Because there are three parts to this definition it is called the tripartite definition or the tripartite account." ---J. Dancy, *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, p. 23.

Trivium, see *quadrivium*

Trolley problem

An ethical problem put forward by Philippa Foot in her 1967 paper "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect". Suppose that it is possible to steer a runaway trolley only to move it from one track to another. One man is working on the first track, and five men are working on the other. Anyone working on the track the trolley enters will be killed. Most people would accept that the driver should steer the trolley to the track on which only one person is working because the death of five persons is worse than the death of one person. Now suppose that the trolley, left to itself, will enter the track on which five men are working and kill them. If you are a bystander who can change the course of the trolley, would it be morally required or morally permissible to interfere to switch the trolley to other track on which only one person would be killed? According to utilitarianism, you should switch the trolley. However, if you do not interfere, you have not done anything to make you responsible for the five deaths, while if you do interfere your act does make you responsible for one death. Your own integrity or moral rules about how to act might lead you to reject the utilitarian conclusion. The trolley problem touches

评,因为它只允许人的耶稣受难。没有神圣的受难,基督教关于拯救的叙述便不一致。

“被描述(即被表现)为三样的上帝,可以非常充分地被说成三位;虽然在《圣经》中,并没把位格这个词和三位一体这个词归于他。”——霍布斯:《利维坦》,IV,42。

知识的三分法定义

传统的也是标准的对命题知识的分析,最初由柏拉图在《泰阿泰德篇》中提出,他认为,知识是加上逻各斯的真信念。这个定义认为,知识是得到辨明的真信念,满足了以下三个条件就可以得到它:A知道P,当且仅当(1)P是真的,(2)A相信P,(3)A有充分的理由相信P。这个定义表明,知识是由真理、信念和辨明构成的。这个定义受到了盖梯尔问题的严峻挑战。

“由于这个定义有三部分,所以它被称作三分法定义或三分法主张。”——丹西:《当代认识论导论》,第23页。

三艺

见“四艺”条。

查道车问题

由P. 福特在她1967年的论文《堕胎问题和双重影响学说》中提出的一个伦理学问题。假设这样一种可能:对一失去控制的查道车只能将其从一条轨道转向驶入另一条轨道。有一个人正在第一条轨道上工作,有五个人正在另一条轨道上工作。任何一个在轨道上工作的人在查道车驶入时都将被轧死。绝大多数的人都会同意驾驶者应把查道车驶入只有一个人在工作的那条轨道,因为死五个人比死一个人更糟糕。现在假设这辆查道车没有人操纵,它将驶入有五个人工作的轨道并把他们轧死。假如你是一个能够改变查道车方向的旁观者,那你强行使查道车驶入另一条只有一个人会被轧死的轨道是道德所要求或道德所允许的吗?按照功利主义的观点,你应当使查道车转向。可是,如果你没这样做,你就没做对这五个人的死负有任何责任的事,而如果你这样做了,你的行为就使你对这一个人的死负有责任。你自己的正直或如何行为的道德准则也许会使你拒绝功利主义的结论。查道车问题既涉及到道德的本质,也涉及到具体的道德困惑。如果驾驶者将查道车驶入

both the nature of morality and concrete moral perplexity. If the driver is right to steer the trolley onto the track with one person in order to save the lives of five persons, why is it wrong to execute an innocent man to stop a riot in which five innocent people will be killed? Or why is it morally wrong to save five patients who would die without transplants at the cost of killing one healthy man for his organs? In dealing with the trolley problem and these related questions, some philosophers turn to the principle of double effect, according to which a moral distinction between the intended and unintended consequences of an action can help to decide when bad consequences of an action are acceptable.

"If what people who say 'killing is worse than letting die' mean by it is true, how is it that [the driver] may choose to turn that trolley? ... I like to call this the trolley problem, in honour of Mrs Foot's example." — Thomson, *Rights, Restitution and Risk*, 1986, p. 81.

Truth

While science seeks to determine what is true, philosophy asks what is the nature of truth. Traditionally, truth is contrasted with falsity. It is viewed as a property which has a bearer, although it is disputed what the bearer is. Some ascribe truth to sentences, others to propositions, statements or utterances. Consequently, some ask what renders a proposition true, while others ask what renders a sentence or an utterance of a sentence true. What then does truth consist in? Since truth involves a relation to features of reality, a natural answer is that if a belief corresponds to reality it is true. This correspondence theory is the most widely held account of truth. However, this theory has many difficulties and the attempts to remove them have led to many alternative theories of truth, including the coherence theory of truth and the pragmatic theory of truth. A new tendency in contemporary philosophy is to challenge the traditional assumption that truth is a property of something and to claim that truth neither has a bearer nor describes a proposition. This deflationary theory of truth has various versions. The best-known is the redundancy theory of truth, but there are other versions. The disquotational theory of truth claims that "p is true" means the same as "p". The performative theory of truth suggests that to say "p is true" amounts to performing a speech act of agreeing or repeating. Because it is like saying "ditto" after someone says that p, it is also called the ditto theory of truth. The minimalist theory of truth argues that saying "it is true that p" is necessarily equivalent to saying "p". The semantic theory of truth also belongs to this group, although it tends to defend the traditional notion of correspondence. Nowadays, a theory of truth can have various orientations. It can be a theory of truth itself, a theory of the meaning of the word "true", or a theory of the function of the truth predicate. Some theories might deal with all

有·一个人的轨道以拯救五个人的生命是正确的,那为什么处死一个无辜的人以制止会有五个无辜的人将被杀死的暴乱就是错的呢?或者说,为什么杀死一个健康的人以取其器官去救五个不做器官移植手术就会死的人在道德上是错的?在解决查道车问题及这些相关问题的过程中,一些哲学家转而求助双重影响原则,按照这一原则,一个行为有意的和无意的后果之间的道德区分,可有助于确定在什么时候一个行为的坏的结果是可以接受的。

"如果有人说是'杀人比让其去死更糟'这话是正确的,那[驾驶者]又怎能选择让那辆查道车转向呢?……我愿把这一问题称为查道车问题,以纪念福特女士的例子。"——汤姆逊:《权利、赔偿和风险》,1986年,第81页。

真理

科学寻求确定什么东西是真的,而哲学却在追问“什么是真理的本性”。传统上,真是与假相对而言的,它被视为一种性质,有一个载体。至于载体是什么,则是有争议的。有些人把真归属于语句,另一些人把真归属于命题、陈述或话语。结果,有些人问“是什么使得一命题为真?”而另一些人却问“是什么使得一语句或说出一语句为真?”那么真究竟在于何处?既然真涉及到与实在的特征的关系,自然的回答是:如果一信念符合于实在,则它是真的。这是大多数人所主张的对真理的符合论说明。不过,这一理论有许多困难。克服这些困难的尝试导致了許多供选择的真理论,包括“真理融贯论”和“真理实用论”。当代哲学中的一个新趋势是挑战下述传统假定:真是某种东西的性质,并断言真既没有一个载体,也不描述命题。这叫做“真理紧缩理论”,它有不同的形式。最著名的是真理冗余论,但还有其他形式。真理的去引号理论宣称,“p是真的”其意思与“p”相同;真的履行论认为,说“p是真的”等于做一个同意或重复的言语行为。这类似于在某人说p之后说ditto(即表示同意),所以这一理论又叫做“真的ditto理论”。真的最小理论认为,说“p是真的”必然等价于说“p”。“真理语义论”也属于这一组,尽管它倾向于捍卫传统的符合论观点。目前,真理论可以有不同的取向。它可以是关于真本身的理论,关于“真的”这个词的意义的理论,或者是关于真谓词的功能的理论。某些理论可能处理所有这些方面。

“真理为所有诚实的人所关注:他们试图只展示真的断定、断言、理论等等。这是真的外延方面。哲学家们还关注着真的内涵方面——也就是说,关注着真理概念或‘真’这个词的意

of these aspects.

"Truth is the concern of all honest men; they try to expound only true assertions, claims, theories, and so on. This is truth in extension. Philosophers worry also about truth in intension—that is about the concept of truth or the meaning of the term 'truth'." —Pitcher (ed.), *Truth*, 1964, p. 1.

Truth (Heidegger)

Truth is traditionally conceived to be an agreement between understanding and things. It is seen as a relationship between objects and judgements and to be located in judgements. However, the etymological sense of the Greek word for truth, *aletheia*, is unconcealment or unhiddenness. On this ground, Heidegger claims that truth in its most primordial sense is *Dasein's* disclosedness or uncoveredness, that is *Dasein's* openness to its possibilities. Being true means being uncovered. At this primordial level, untruth is the fallingness of *Dasein* being closed off. Truth is the basic constitution of *Dasein* and its *existential*. Truth in this sense is prior to language and judgement and is the ground of truth in the traditional sense. Heidegger held that it is possible to compare whether there is an agreement between understanding and things only after *Dasein* has shown itself.

"The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering." —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 261.

Truth conditions

More fully expressed as truth and falsity conditions, the conditions under which a statement is true or false. In standard logic, the truth conditions of a composite formula are determined by the truth conditions of its components and by the truth-functional connectives linking its components. This can be shown in a truth table. Many philosophers hold to know the truth condition of a statement amounts to knowing its meaning. For extensional contexts, if a statement in an argument is replaced by another statement with the same truth conditions, the validity of the original argument will not be altered.

"The truth conditions of a truth-functional formula are the ways in which the truth-value of any statement of the form of that formula is determined by the truth-values of its constituent statements." —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 70.

Truth of fact, see truth of reason

Truth of reason

Leibniz established a contrast between truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths of reason, which he used inter-

义。”——皮切尔(编):《真理》,1964年,第1页。

真理(海德格尔)

在传统的看法中,真理被看做是理解与事物的一致。它被视为对象与判断之间的关系,承载于判断之中。然而,希腊文中“真理”,也即 *aletheia* 这个词的词源学含义是除去蔽障或去掉遮蔽。在这个基础上,海德格尔认为真理的最原本的意义是缘在(*Dasein*)的开封或去蔽,也就是缘在向其可能性的开敞。真就意味着被揭开蔽障。在这个原发的层次上,不真(untruth)就是被封闭着的缘在的沉沦。真理是缘在的基本构成及其生存方式。在这个意义上,真理先于语言和判断,并且是传统意义上的真理的基础。海德格尔认为只有当缘在已经显现出自身之后,才可能去比较理解与事物之间的一致与否。

“陈述的‘是真’(又可译作‘在真理之中’‘真在’)(真理)必须被理解为在揭开蔽障之中。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第261页。

真值条件

更完整的表述是“真假条件”,即一陈述成真或成假的条件。在标准的逻辑中,复合公式的真值条件是由其支命题的真值条件以及联结这些支命题的真值函项联结词决定的,并且能显示在真值表中。许多哲学家认为,知道了陈述的真值条件就等于知道了该陈述的意义。在外延语境中,如果论证中的某个陈述被具有相同真值条件的另一陈述所代替,则原论证的有效性将不会改变。

“真值函项公式的真值条件是这样一些方式,具有该公式形式的任何陈述的真值都是由其成分陈述的真值所决定的。”——斯特劳森:《逻辑理论导论》,第70页。

事实的真理

见“理性的真理”条。

理性的真理

莱布尼茨将理性的真理与事实的真理相对照,他把理性的真理同必然真理互相换用,理性

changeably with necessary truths, are primary principles which themselves require no proof and propositions that can be established by analysis from primary principles. They are not established on the basis of empirical investigations, but are necessary and true in all actual and possible worlds, so that not even God can change them. Truths of fact, in contrast, are propositions that are established through experience. They are not necessarily and universally true, but just happen to be true of something. They are capable of change, and their contradictories are possible. According to Leibniz, truths of reason are engraved in our mind and only need to be discovered by reason, while truths of fact or contingent truths are gained through the senses.

"Truths of reason are necessary, and those of fact are contingent. The primary truths of reason are the ones to which I give the general names 'identities', because they seem to do nothing but repeat the same thing without telling us anything." -Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, IV, ii, 361.

Truth-function

A relationship that holds if the truth or falsity of a compound depends on the truth or falsity of its components. A compound of this sort, composed of propositional variables and truth-functional connectives, is a truth-functional formula. If propositions are substituted for the propositional variables in a truth-functional formula, we obtain a truth-functional statement, and its truth and falsity is determined entirely by the truth or falsity of its constituent statements and by the way in which the constituent statements are combined by truth functional connectives. If all of its constants are truth-functional, a system of logic is truth-functional.

"The whole meaning of a truth-function is exhausted by the statement of the circumstances under which it is true or false." - Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 1919, p. 24.

Truth-functional connective

Also called a truth-functional operator or truth-functional constant. These connectives are special signs for the various relations between propositions in a truth-functional system. They cannot be used in isolation. Truth-functional connectives include: \sim (negation), \wedge (conjunction), \vee (disjunction), \supset or \rightarrow (implication) and \equiv or \leftrightarrow (equivalence). The role of these connectives is to determine the truth-value (the truth or falsity) of a truth-functional statement by the truth or falsity of its constituent statements. In daily language \sim is expressed by not, \wedge by and, \vee by either ... or, \supset or \rightarrow by if ... then and \equiv or \leftrightarrow by if and only if. However, the logical connectives and their ordinary language counterparts can differ in implicature or even in meaning.

的真理是本身不需要证明的第一原理，是可以从第一原理出发进行的分析而建立起来的命题。它们不是建立在经验研究的基础上，而是在一切实际和可能的世界中都是必然和真实的，甚至上帝也无法改变它们。反之，事实的真理是根据经验确立的命题。它们不是必然和普遍真的，而只是碰巧适合于某事。它们是可以改变的，它们的矛盾是可能的。依莱布尼茨之见，理性的真理铭刻在我们的心中，只需用理性将它们发现出来，而事实的真理或偶然的真理是通过感觉得到的。

“理性的真理是必然的，事实的真理是偶然的。原始的理性真理是我们以‘同一性’这个普遍名词称呼的真理，因为它们似乎只重复同一件事情，而未告诉我们任何其他事情。”——莱布尼茨：《人类理智新论》，第四卷，第二章，第361页。

真值函项

如果复合命题的真假取决于它的支命题的真假，这种关系就成立。这类复合命题是由命题变元和真值函项联结词构成的，叫做“真值函项公式”。如果用命题替换真值函项公式中的命题变元，我们就得到真值函项陈述，它的真假完全由其成分陈述的真假以及用真值函项联结词联结各支陈述的方式所决定。如果它的所有常项都是真值函项性的，则该逻辑系统也是真值函项性的。

“将一真值函项真或假的各种情况叙述出来，就已穷尽该真值函项的全部意义。”——罗素：《数理哲学导论》，1919年，第24页。

真值函项联结词

亦称“真值函项算子”或“真值函项常项”。这些联结词是表示真值函项系统内命题之间各种关系的特殊记号，不能孤立使用。真值函项联结词包括： \sim （否定）， \wedge （合取）， \vee （析取）， \supset 或 \rightarrow （蕴涵）以及 \equiv 或 \leftrightarrow （等值）。这些联结词的作用是根据其成分陈述的真或假来确定真值函项陈述的真值（真或假）。在日常语言中， \sim 由“并非”表达， \wedge 由“并且”表达， \vee 由“或者……或者……”表达， \supset 或 \rightarrow 由“如果……则……”表达， \equiv 或 \leftrightarrow 由“当且仅当”表达。不过，逻辑联结词和它们的日常语言对应物在隐涵甚至在意义方面是有差别的。

“任何其意义可以用真值表来把握的语句

"Any sentential connective whose meaning can be captured in a truth-table is called a truth-functional connective and is said to express a truth-function." —Forbes, *Modern Logic*, 1994, p. 46.

Truth-functional constant, another term for truth-value connective

Truth-functional operator, another term for truth-functional connective

Truth-table

In the propositional calculus, the truth-value of a formula as a whole is determined by its components. This can be shown by a table which is called a truth-table. The application of a truth table to a logical problem is called the truth-table or matrix method. If p and q are propositional variables representing two constituent statements, the truth-tables of the formulae, $\sim p$ (not p), $p \vee q$ (p or q), $p \wedge q$ (p and q), $p \rightarrow q$ (if p then q) and $p \leftrightarrow q$ (p if and only if q) can be shown in the following matrix:

p	q	$\sim p$	$p \vee q$	$p \wedge q$	$p \rightarrow q$	$p \leftrightarrow q$
T	T	F	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	F	F	F
F	T	T	T	F	T	F
F	F	T	F	F	T	T

These are the basic formulae, and the truth-conditions of the more complicated truth-functional propositions can be decided by the systematic applications of these. The truth table lays down the truth-conditions of a truth-functional formula, and states the rule for the use of truth-functional constants. The truth table method is an easy way of establishing whether formulae are tautologies (logically necessary), self-contradictory (logically impossible) or contingent.

"... truth table ... determines the truth or falsity of the function for each combination of the truth values of the elements." —Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, 1932, p. 201.

Truth-table method, see truth-table

Truth-value

Classical logic assumes that every statement must be either true or false, and its truth or falsity is its truth-value. If the statement is true, its truth-value is truth; if it is false, its truth-value is falsity. That "Coal is white" is false, so we say that the sentence has the truth-value falsity. That "Snow is white" is true, so we say that the sentence has the truth-value truth. If two statements are identical, they have the same truth-value. The truth-value of a composite statement is calculated through the use of a truth-table. While the prin-

联结词叫做真值函项联结词, 并说它们表达了真值函项。"——福布斯:《现代逻辑》, 1994 年, 第 46 页。

真值函项常项

“真值函项联结词”的另一名称。

真值函项算子

“真值函项联结词”的另一个名称。

真值表

在命题演算中, 整个公式的真值是由其子公式决定的。这可以用所谓的“真值表”表示出来。把真值表应用于逻辑问题叫做真值表方法, 亦称矩阵方法。假设 p 和 q 是命题变元, 代表两个成分陈述, 公式 $\sim p$ (非 p), $p \vee q$ (p 或 q), $p \wedge q$ (p 且 q), $p \rightarrow q$ (如果 p 则 q) 和 $p \leftrightarrow q$ (p 当且仅当 q) 的真值表可以显示在下列矩阵中:

p	q	$\sim p$	$p \vee q$	$p \wedge q$	$p \rightarrow q$	$p \leftrightarrow q$
T	T	F	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	F	F	F
F	T	T	T	F	T	F
F	F	T	F	F	T	T

这些是基本公式, 更复杂的真值函项命题的真值条件可以由这些表的系统应用来判定。真值表规定了真值函项公式的真值条件, 并陈述了使用真值函项常项的规则。使用真值表方法容易确定公式是否是重言式(逻辑必然的)、自相矛盾式(逻辑不可能的)或偶真式。

"……真值表……对于其元素的真值的每一种组合, 确定该函项的真或假。"——刘易斯和三根福特:《符号逻辑》, 1932 年, 第 201 页。

真值表方法

见“真值表”条。

真值

经典逻辑假定, 每一陈述必定或者真或者假, 真或假就是它的真值。如果一陈述是真的, 它的真值就是真; 如果它是假的, 它的真值就是假。“煤是白的”是假的, 于是我们说该语句有真值假。“雪是白的”是真的, 于是我们说该语句有真值真。如果两个陈述是等值的, 则它们有同样的真值。复合陈述的真值可以用真值表计算出来。经典逻辑的二值原则只承认两个真值, 而某些形式的现代逻辑则否认这一假定, 引入

principle of bivalence in classical logic admits only two truth-values, some forms of modern logic deny this assumption and introduce three-valued or many-valued logic. Strawson argues that there can be statements which are truth-valueless, that is statements which are neither true nor false and for which there is a truth-value gap.

"The truth-value of a proposition is its truth if it is true, and its falsehood if it is false."—Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VI, p. 26.

Truth-value gap

The lack of truth-value of a sentence containing an expression which lacks reference. On some views, such a sentence is neither true nor false. This phenomenon arises because the truth-value of a sentence relies on the success or failure of the application to objects of the general terms it contains. But these general terms would be deprived of success or failure if a singular term in the sentence failed to have a reference. Other reasons that a sentence could lack a truth value include category mistakes, unsatisfied presuppositions, ambiguity and vagueness. The existence of truth-value gaps makes deductive reasoning unreliable. There is controversy whether this phenomenon counts as a defect of natural language.

"The claim that the radical failure of a definite singular term results in a truth-gap is in some cases more intuitively satisfactory, and in others less intuitively satisfactory, than the claim that it results in falsity."—Strawson, in Davidson and Hintikka (eds), *Words and Objections*, 1969, p. 107.

T-sentence

The basis of Tarski's proposal for an adequacy condition on definitions of truth. A theory of truth for a language is adequate if every instance of the schema "X is true if and only if P" can be derived within it. In this schema, "P" can be replaced by any sentence of the object language and "X" is replaced by a name of the sentence which replaces "P". "X" is in a metalanguage, that is a language for talking about the object language. The general form of the schema is "(T) X is true if and only if P". An instance of (T) would be " 'Snow is white' is true in English if and only if snow is white" where the object language sentence on the right-hand side is referred to by its "quotation-mark name" in the metalanguage on the left-hand side. According to Tarski, the T-sentence fixes the extension of the term "true" rather than its intension or meaning. The T-sentence is not a definition of truth, but any instance of it is a partial truth. Truth in general for a language will be a logical conjunction of all these partial definitions.

"A theory of truth entails a T-truth for each sentence of the object language, and a T-sentence gives truth conditions."—Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*,

了三值或多值的逻辑。斯特劳森论辩说,可以有真无真值的陈述,即是说它们既不真也不假。对于这些陈述来说,存在真值空缺。

"如果一个命题是真的,则它的真值是它的真;如果是假的,则它的真值是它的假。"——罗素:《罗素文集》,第六卷,第26页。

真值空缺

指一个语句由于包含了一个无指称的表达式而无真值可言。按照某些观点,这种句子既非真亦非假。这种现象的出现是由于一个句子的真值依能否成功地应用到它包含的普遍语词的对象而定。但是,如果句子中有一个单数词没有指称,这些普遍词也就无应用的成功与失败的可能。一个句子可以缺少真值的其他理由包括:范畴错误、前提未满足、歧义和含混。真值空缺的存在使得演绎推理成为不可靠的。关于这种现象是否应被视为自然语言的缺陷,还存在着争论。

"认为一个明确的单数词的根本失效导致真值空缺,这种看法在某种情况下从直观上看令人较为满意,在另一些情况下则从直观上看不那么令人满意;于是,在后一类情况中,有了这样的看法,即认为这种根本失效导致的是虚假。"——斯特劳森,载戴维森与辛提卡(编):《词与异议》,1969年,第107页。

T 语句

塔斯基对真值定义的合适条件的主张的基础。一种语言的真理理论是合适的,如果"X是真当且仅当P"这个格的一切事例都能从它之中推导出来。在这个格中,"P"能被对象语言的任何语句所代替,并且"X"被那代替"P"的语句的名称所代替。"X"存在于元语言中,元语言是谈论对象语言的语言。这个格的一般形式是"(T) X是真当且仅当P"。(T)的一个事例是" '雪是白的' 在英语中是真当且仅当雪是白的"在这里,右边的对象语言语句被它左边元语言中的"引号名称"所指称。按照塔斯基的观点,T语句确定"真"这个语词的外延而不是它的内涵或意义。T语句不是真值的定义,但它的任何事例都是部分的真值。一种语言的真理一般都是所有这些部分定义的逻辑合取式。

"真值理论蕴含对象语言的每个语句的T-真值,而T语句提供真值条件。"——戴维森:《真理与解释的探究》,1984年,第138页。

1984, p. 138.

Tu quoque fallacy

[from Latin: you are another or you too] An argument of the form “if I face this charge, you face it equally”. In logic textbooks this is considered a variant of the *ad hominem* fallacy, for it does not establish its conclusion according to relevant facts or rational arguments, but instead attacks one’s opponent. This sort of argument is especially popular in political debates. For instance, A says to B who accuses him of accepting illegal money in his election campaign: “If I use illegal money in my campaign, how about you? Your campaign money is illegal as well”.

“The *tu quoque* fallacy is committed when one tries to reply to a charge made by an opponent by making the same or a similar charge against him.” —Carney and Scheer, *Fundamentals of Logic*, 2nd edition, 1974, p. 24.

Turing machine

An imagined computer described by the British logician and mathematician Alan Turing. This computer would have a finite number of states $S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots, S_n$, and would operate by changing periodically from one state to another. In doing this it would interact with a paper tape of infinite length marked off into small squares. The machine would scan one square at a time and could “read” or “write” something. It could also erase what had been written. Furthermore, it could move the tape one square at a time to the left or right. When it reached a certain point and completed its task, it would stop itself. It would therefore be possible to give a complete description of each step of the machine. This is called a machine table. This result shows that the machine could do whatever other automata can. If a machine of this sort could fool us into believing that it was a human being in a Turing test (see Turing test), there would be no grounds for distinguishing between the mental attributes we ascribe to the machine and those we ascribe to ourselves. This idea has had a great influence on the philosophy of mind, especially on artificial intelligence, and in the philosophy of language.

“According to Turing, a Turing machine can carry out certain elementary operations ... It is controlled by a program of instructions and each instruction specifies a condition and an action to be carried out if the condition is satisfied.” —Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, 1992, p. 205.

Turing Test

A thought experiment proposed by the British logician and mathematician Alan Turing, who called it the imitation game, for showing that the abilities of digital computers are in principle indistinguishable from human intellectual capacities. In this test, a Turing machine and a human being are in

你也一样的错误

[源自拉丁文“你是另一个”或“你也一样”] 这种形式的论证“如果我面对指控，你也同样面对它”。在逻辑教科书中，这被看做是人身攻击谬误的变种，因为它并没有根据有关的事实或理性的论证建立它的结论，相反，而是攻击它的对手本人。这种论证在政治论战中特别普遍。例如，A 说 B 谴责他在选举活动中受贿：“如果我在选举中受贿，那么你又怎样呢？你用于选举的钱同样是不干净的。”

“当某人试图以牙还牙地回答对手对他的指控时，这就是犯了这种你也一样的错误。”——卡雷和施尔：《逻辑基础》，第 2 版，1974 年，第 24 页。

图灵机

由英国逻辑学家和数学家 A. 图灵所描绘的一个想像的计算机。这个计算机具有一定数量的状态 $S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots, S_n$ ，通过周期性地由一个状态转入另一个状态来操作。在操作过程中，它与一个划分成小方块的无限长的纸带相互作用。机器一次扫描一个方块并且可以“读”或“写”某些东西。它还可以把所写的东西擦掉。而且，它还可以一次将纸带向左或向右移动一个方块。当它达到某一点并完成其任务时，它会自己停下来。因此有可能对于机器的每一步给出一个完整的描述。这被称为一个机器表格。这一结果表明，一个机器能够做其他的自动机所能做的所有事情。如果这样的一个机器能够在图灵测验（见“图灵测验”条）中骗得我们相信它是一个人，那就没有理由把我们归结于机器的心属性与归结于我们自己的心的属性区别开来。这一思想已对心的哲学特别是人工智能和语言哲学产生了极大的影响。

“根据图灵的观点，一个图灵机可以进行某种初步的操作……它由一个指导程序所控制而且每个指示都确定一个条件以及如果这个条件得到满足要进行的活动。”——塞尔：《心的再发现》，1992 年，第 205 页

图灵测验

一个由英国逻辑学家和数学家 A. 图灵所提出的思想实验，他称之为“模拟游戏”，用以表明数字计算机的能力在原则上与人类的智能不可区分。在这个测验中，一个图灵机和一个人在一个关闭的屋子里，他们可以通过一个电传

a closed room but able to communicate with a human questioner outside the room via a teleprinter. Both the Turing machine and the human being answer the questions sent in by the questioner, who attempts to judge which answer is from the machine and which is from the man. Turing claimed that given a limited time for questioning the questioners would experience difficulty in distinguishing between the computer answers and the human answers. He predicted that at some point we will accept that machines can think. But critics argue that passing such a test is not a sufficient proof of intelligence.

"Consider how a zimbo might perform in the Turing test, Alan Turing's famous proposal (1950) of an operational test for thinking in a computer." D. C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 1991, p. 310.

Twin earth

A thought experiment concerning meaning and mental content, introduced by Putnam in his paper "The meaning of 'meaning'" (1975). Imagine that elsewhere in space there is a duplicate of our planet which is exactly like it, except that the chemical composition of what we call water is H_2O , but the chemical composition of what people on twin-earth call water is XYZ. Hence, although inner states of the inhabitants of twin-earth are like ours, when they utter the word "water", they are referring to a substance composed of XYZ, while when we utter the word "water", we are referring to a substance composed of H_2O . If meaning were determined by inner states, our word "water" and their word "water" would have the same meaning. But the two words do not have the same meaning because our word applies to H_2O and their word applies to XYZ. Thus the meanings of words in a language are not merely "in our head" but at least partly depend upon facts of the external world. This is to reject the traditional conception of meaning according to which meanings are "in the head" and the intension of a word determines its extension.

"One might hold that water is H_2O in all worlds (the stuff called 'water' in W2 is not water) but 'water' does not have the same meaning in W1 and W2. If what was said before about the Twin Earth case was correct, then [this] is clearly the correct theory." —Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, p. 237.

Two principles of justice

Rawls argues that the participants in the original position behind the veil of ignorance would choose two principles of justice to determine the permanent basic structure of their society, whatever their position in society turns out to be. The two principles assign rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economical goods. The first principle calls for equal systems of basic liberties for all. The sec-

打印机来与屋子外面的提问者对话。图灵机和人都回答提问者送进的问题，而提问者则试图判断哪一个回答来自机器以及哪一个回答来自人。图灵声称，在一个限定时间内，提问者会难以区分机器的回答和人的回答。他预测有一天我们将承认机器能够思维。但有人论辩说通过这样一个测验不足以证明智力的存在。

“想一想一个自动机在图灵测验中会怎样表现，图灵测验是 A. 图灵关于计算机思维的操作性测验的著名提议。”——丹奈特：《解释意识》，1991 年，第 310 页。

孪生地球

在关于意义和心的内容的理论中的一个思想实验，由普特南在其著名的《意义的“意义”》(1975) 一文中提出。想像在空间的另外一个地方有我们的行星的一个复制品，它与我们的地球在其他方面完全相同，只是我们称之为水的东西的化学成分是 H_2O ，而孪生地球上的人称之为水的东西的化学成分却是 XYZ。因此，尽管孪生地球上居民的内部状态是跟我们一样的，但当他们说出“水”这一词语时，他们指的是成分为 XYZ 的物质，而当我们说出“水”这一词语时，我们指的是成分为 H_2O 的物质。如果意义取决于内部状态，那么我们的词语“水”和他们的词语“水”应当具有相同的意义。但是这两个词语不具有相同的意义，因为我们的词语应用于 H_2O 而他们的词语应用于 XYZ。因此一种语言的语词的意义不仅仅“在头脑中”，而是至少部分地取决于外部世界的事实。这就否认了传统的意义观念。根据传统的观念，意义是“在头脑中”的，语词的内涵决定其外延。

“一个人可能认为，水在所有的世界都是 H_2O (世界 2 中被称为‘水’的东西不是水)，但‘水’在世界 1 和世界 2 中具有不同的意义。如果前面关于孪生地球的情形所说的那些是正确的，那么这显然是正确的理论。”——普特南：《心智、语言与实在》，1975 年，第 237 页。

正义的两条原则

罗尔斯论证说，原初状态中处在无知之幕后参加者会选择两条正义原则以确定他们社会的永久性的基本结构，而不管他们的社会地位结果将会如何。这两条原则分派权利和义务，并调整社会和经济利益的分配。第一条原则要求适于所有人的基本自由的平等制度。第二条原则应用于社会和经济利益的分配。与第一

ond principle applies to the distribution of social and economic goods. Unlike the first principle, it allows inequality, but this inequality is constrained by fair equality of opportunity and must benefit the least well off. Together these two principles form one conception of justice.

The two principles, according to Rawls, have a lexical order, in which the first principle has an absolute priority over the second in a just or nearly just society. If one situation P is better than another situation S according to the first principle, then P must be preferred even if S would be better than P according to the second principle. In a just society it would be irrational to trade basic liberties for social and economical gains. However, this priority applies only to societies with a highly developed civilisation and economy. Within the second principle, fair equality of opportunity has lexical priority over the difference principle concerning benefit to the least advantaged.

Critics claim that the rational actors of the original position would choose other principles of justice or that they could not choose any principles in the conditions specified. They also argue that Rawls' principles would come into conflict with one another, for example because the inequality of the second principle would undermine the worth of the equal liberty of the first principle for the least advantaged. Much useful debate has emerged from such criticism.

"I now wish to give the final statement of the two principles of justice for institutions. ... First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second principle: Social and economical inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just saving principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equalities of opportunity." ---Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 302.

Two space myth

Space is ordinarily seen to be a unique individual. All real things are contained in one and the same space, and all spaces are part of the one space. In principle, every place can be reached from every other place by travelling through intermediate places. The spatial relation is symmetrical. Anthony Quinton devised a thought experiment to challenge this picture. Suppose that we have richly coherent and connected experience in our dreams just as have in waking life, so that it becomes arbitrary to claim that our dream experience is not of an objectively existing world like the world of our waking experience. If the space of my waking world and my dream world are not mutually accessible, it is unlikely that we are justified in claiming to be living in a single spatially isolated world. Hence, space is not essentially singular. In assessing this account, we might distinguish between systematic and

条原则不同,它允许不平等,但这种不平等是受机会的公正平等所限制的,并且必须使最小受益者也受益。这两条原则合起来形成正义的观念。

按照罗尔斯的观点,这两条原则有一个词典式次序,在一个正义的或接近正义的社会里,第一条原则对第二条原则有绝对优先性。如果根据第一条原则情况P优于另一情况S,那么,即使根据第二条原则情况S将会优于情况P,也必须选择P。在一个正义的社会里,用基本的自由来交换社会和经济的利益是荒谬的,可是,这一优先性只能应用于文明和经济高度发达的社会。在第二条原则中,公正平等的机会比关系到有益于最小受惠者的差别原则具有词典次序上的优先性。

批评家们认为,原初状态的理性的行为者会选择其他的正义原则,或在特定的条件下不选择任何原则。他们还争论说,罗尔斯的原则会相互冲突,因为,例如,第二条原则的不平等会破坏适用于最小受益者的第一条原则的平等自由的价值基础。从这种批评中涌现出不少有益的争论。

"我现在要给出关于制度的两个正义原则的最后陈述。……第一个原则:每个人都对最广泛而完整的平等的基本自由体系拥有平等的权利,这一基本自由体系是与适于所有人的类似的自由体系相容的。第二条原则:社会和经济的平等应这样安排,使它们:(a)在与正义的储存原则一致的情况下,适合于最少受益者的最大利益,并且(b)与在机会公正平等条件下的职务和地位向所有的人开放联系在一起。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第302页。

两种空间神话

空间一般认为是独一无二的个体。所有真实事物都包容在同一个空间中,所有的空间都是一个空间的部分。每一处所原则上都能为其他任何处所经由相邻处所而到达。空间关系是对称的。A. 奎因顿设计了一个思想实验来改变这一图画。设想我们在梦中有跟醒着生活同样丰富的一致相联的经验。这样,说我们的梦的经验不是关于如同我们醒着的经验世界一样的客观现存世界,这便变得独断了。如果我醒着的世界空间与梦世界不是互相可达到的,则说我们生活在一个单一的空间上隔绝的世界中就是不对的。因而,空间在本质上不是单一的。在评价这一学说时,我们必须区分系统的和公共的物理空间以及局部的、私人的经验空间。两种空间神话提出了我们如何能说明从经验空间运动

public physical space and fragmentary and private experiential space. The two space myth raises questions about how we can justify moving from experiential space to objective space in the world as it is.

"We can at least conceive circumstances in which we should have good reason to say that we know of real things located in two distinct spaces." —Quinton, "Spaces and Times", *Philosophy*, 37 (1962), p. 147.

Two-factor theory

A theory of meaning based on Putnam's distinction between narrow content, which is entirely "in the head" of a subject, and wide content, which is at least partly individuated by the subject's environment. On this theory, the two kinds of content are components or aspects of meaning. The narrow contents or internal states of the subject contribute to the meanings of psychological states and remain constant across changes in the environment. Hence, we may develop a theory of cognition which focuses on the same cognitive system amidst radically different environments.

"This suggests a 'two-factor' semantic theory of psychological states; one factor, narrow content, is to be determined solely by nonrelational properties of the subject; the other factor, the truth condition, is to be determined in part by the subject's environment." —Baker, *Saving Belief*, 1987, p. 87.

Two-place predicate, see predicate

Two-valued logic, another term for traditional logic

Two-world theory, see representative theory of perception

Type and token

A distinction drawn by Peirce, corresponding to the distinction between a species and an individual which is a member of this species. A token is a particular and individual sign or a single object or event. A type is a pattern which similar tokens exemplify or a class of similar tokens. A type is not a single thing or event and can only exist through the tokens by which it is embodied. A sentence token is a series of marks on paper or sound waves constituting an inscribed or spoken sentence, occurring at a definite space or existing for a definite period. A sentence type is a class to which different sentence tokens belong or the class of the many sayings of the same sentence. For example if one writes or utters "Socrates is a snub-nosed philosopher", and again "Socrates is a snub-nosed philosopher", these are two sentence tokens, but one sentence type. However, the criteria of identity for a

至世界本来的客观空间的问题。

"我们至少可以想像这种情形,我们在其中有很好的理由说真实的事物处于两种不同的空间中。"——奎因顿:《空间与时间》,《哲学》,1962年第37期,第147页。

二因素理论

建立在普特南的主体“头脑中”的狭内容与至少部分地由主体的环境所区分的广内容之区分基础上的意义理论。根据这一理论,这两种内容构成意义的组成部分或方面,狭内容或主体的内部状态也决定心理状态的意义,并且它们不因环境的变化而改变。因此我们可以发展一个认知理论,专门研究完全不同的环境中的相同认知系统。

“这提示一个关于心理状态的‘二因素’语义理论:一个因素是狭内容,仅仅由主体的非关系特性所决定;另一个因素是真值条件,部分地由主体的环境所决定。”——贝克尔:《拯救信念》,1987年,第87页。

二位谓词

见“谓词”条。

二值逻辑

“传统逻辑”的另一术语。

两个世界理论

见“知觉的表征理论”条。

类型和殊型

由皮尔士作出的区分,相应于种类和个体之间的区分,这里个体是种类的元素。殊型是一个特殊的和个别的记号,一个单独的对象或事件。类型是相似殊型所体现的那个模式,或者是由相似殊型组成的类。类型不是单个的事物或事件,只能通过体现它的殊型才能存在。一个语句殊型是纸上的一系列笔画或声波,它们分别构成书写语句或口语语句,在确定的空间内出现或在确定的时期内存在。一语句类型是不同语句殊型所属于的那个类,或者是同一语句的许多说法构成的类。例如,如果人们写下或说出“苏格拉底是一位扁鼻子的哲学家”,再写或说一次“苏格拉底是一位扁鼻子的哲学家”,这是两个语句殊型,却是同一个语句类型。不过,把什么当做语句类型的同一标准是有争议的。某

sentence type are a matter of dispute. Some philosophers require typographical or auditory similarity, while others require sameness of meaning.

"In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an instance of the Type." — Peirce, *Collected Papers*, IV, p. 537.

Type-type identity theory

One version of the identity theory of mind, according to which every type of mental state or event is identical with some type of physical state or event. There are many views about what exactly is the correlation between the mental and the physical. The theory contrasts with another version of the identity theory, the token-token identity theory, which claims that each token mental event is identical with a token physical event. A problem for the type-type identity theory is that different people might have the same beliefs, but lack the same neural states. In addition, it is conceivable that non-humans have the same mental states as humans, but have different neural states. In spite of these difficulties, type-type identity might be needed if theoretical insight into the identity is to be achieved.

"Most advocates of a dual aspect theory assert a type-type identity between the mental and the physical; that the identity of mental events and physical events is associated with systematic correlations between types of mental events and types of physical events." — Hodgson, *The Mind Matters*, 1991, p. 61.

Types, theory of

Russell's influential solution to the problem of logical paradoxes. The theory was developed in particular to overcome Russell's paradox, which seemed to destroy the possibility of Frege's logical programme. Suppose we ask whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself. If it is, then it is not, but if it is not, then it is.

The theory of types suggests classifying objects, properties, relations and sets into a hierarchy of types. For example, a class of type 0 has members which are ordinary objects; type 1 has members which are properties of items of objects of type 0; type 2 has members which are properties of the properties in type 1; and so on. What can be true or false of items of one type cannot significantly be said about those of another type and is simply nonsense. If we observe the prohibitions against classes containing members of different types, Russell's paradox and similar paradoxes can be avoided.

The theory of types has two variants. The simple theory of types classifies different objects and properties, while the

些哲学家要求字形或声音的相似性, 其他哲学家则要求意义的同一。

“为了类型可被使用, 它不得不体现在殊型中, 殊型将是类型的记号, 所以是类型所意谓的对象的记号。我提议把类型的这种殊型叫做类型的例证。”——皮尔士:《文集》, 第四卷, 第537页。

类型—类型同一论

“心的同一论”的一种形式, 认为每一类心的状态或事件都同一于某一类物理状态或事件。关于心的东西与物的东西之间的确切关联有许多不同的观点。这一理论与同一论的另一形式即“殊型—殊型同一论”相对, 后者声称一个殊型的心事件同一于一个殊型的物理事件。类型—类型同一论的问题在于, 具有相同信念的不同的人并不总是具有相同的神经状态。而且可以想像, 非人类与人类具有相同的心状态, 但却具有不同的神经状态。尽管有这些困难, 若要在理论上理解同一性, 可能还是需要类型—类型同一论的。

“大多数双面理论的支持者肯定心的东西与物的东西之间的类型—类型同一性: 心的事件与物的事件的同一与心的事件类型与物的事件类型之间的系统关联相联系。”——霍奇逊:《心的作用》, 1991年, 第61页。

类型论

罗素对于逻辑悖论问题的很有影响的解决办法。这个理论的提出特别是用以克服罗素悖论, 这个悖论好像要清除弗雷格的逻辑计划的可能性。假如我们问所有不是自身成员的那些集合组成的集合是不是自身的成员。如果它是, 则它不是, 但如果它不是, 则它是。

类型论主张把对象、性质、关系和集合划分为一个类型的等级系统。例如, 0类的成员是日常对象; 1类的成员是0类对象诸项目的性质; 2类的成员是1类性质的性质; 如此等等。对一个类型的项目可以为真或为假的说法说到另一类的项目就不能有意义, 而只能是胡说。如果我们遵守对于包含不同类型成员的类的禁令, 罗素悖论及其他类似悖论就可以避免。

类型论有两个变种。简单类型论对不同的对象和性质分类, 而分歧类型论进一步把类型分为层次, 对类型的等级系统添加上层次的等级系统。在诸项目自身的类型中, 有些项目与次一类型或次一层次的项目有关, 通过对它们的谓词作出限制, 引起悖论的谓词就被排除了。简

ramified theory of types further sorts types into levels and adds a hierarchy of levels to that of types. By restricting predicates to those which relate to items of lower types or lower levels within their own type, predicates giving rise to paradox are excluded. The simple theory of types is sufficient for solving logical paradoxes, while the ramified theory of type is introduced to solve semantic paradoxes (those depending on such notions as reference and truth).

"Any expression containing an apparent variable is of higher type than that variable. This is the fundamental principles of the doctrines of types." —Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, p. 102.

单类型论对于解决逻辑悖论是充分的，而分歧类型论是用来解决语义悖论的（有赖于诸如指称和真理之类概念的悖论）。

“任何包含约束变项的表达式属于高于那个变项的类型。这是类型论的基本原则。”——罗素：《逻辑和知识》，1956年，第102页。

U

Übermensch

Nietzsche's superman or overman, the ideal of life he offers as a goal to human beings when their former ideal, namely God, is dead. *Übermensch* is a worldly antithesis of God, a union of the strongest mind and strongest body. For Nietzsche, it is the realisation of the profoundest human potentialities and gifts, the overcoming or negation of the mediocrities of the merely human. *Übermensch* involves no bifurcation of humanity. It is the creator of meaning of life and the full affirmation of life. It affirms the eternal recurrence, and in it the will to power attains its zenith. Human beings should transcend themselves and become supermen. They would thus be saved not by a divine Saviour, but by the glorification of the human species. The aim of culture should be to produce supermen. For Nietzsche, any culture which generates a multitude of mediocrities must be sick and should be condemned. Human life, which has value only as a means of producing supermen, stands between beast and superman. Superman is the ideal man. Nietzsche does not mention any single example, but denies that either he or Zarathustra is a superman.

"Behold, I teach you the *Übermensch*, the *Übermensch* is the meaning of earth. Let your will say, the *Übermensch* shall be the meaning of the earth." — Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Prologue, 3.

Ugliness

As beauty is a general term representing positive aesthetic value, ugliness is a general term representing negative aesthetic value or aesthetic disvalue. Ugliness is the property of an object of eliciting distaste and unappealing feeling. Corresponding to different modes of beauty, there are various modes of ugliness, such as the deformed, ill placed or disharmonious. Aesthetic evaluation of an object assesses its beauty and ugliness. Artists, however, can make beautiful depictions of ugly objects, thus using ugliness to reinforce the aesthetic value of the whole.

"Beauty, or ugliness, was defined as the character of an object which is such that, in aesthetic contemplation, it yields to the contemplation feelings that are pleasant, or, respectively, unpleasant." — Ducasse, *The Philosophy of Art*, 1929, p. 234.

超人

指尼采讲的“超人”，是尼采在人类先前的理想即上帝死后提供给人类的一种生活理想。超人是上帝的世间对应者，是最强壮的心灵和最强壮的身体的统一。对于尼采，它实现了最深刻的人类潜能和天赋，克服或否定了一般人类的平庸性。超人没有人性的分裂。它是生命意义的创造者和对生命的充分肯定。它肯定了永恒的轮回，在其中对于力量的意愿达到其最高点。人类应该超越其自身而成为超人。他们的拯救，将不来自神圣的救主，而是来自人类种群的荣耀。文化的目的应该是去产生超人。对尼采而言，任何产生一大帮平庸之辈的文化必定是病态的，应受到谴责。人类生活处于野兽与超人之间，其价值就在于去产生超人。超人是理想的人。尼采没举出任何一个超人的例子，只是否认他或查拉图斯特拉是超人。

“注意！我来教你们超人；这超人是这世界的意义。让你们的意志说：超人将是这世界的意义。”——尼采：《查拉图斯特拉如是说》，前言，第3页。

丑

美是表现正面审美价值的普通词，而丑则是表现负面审美价值或审美反面价值的普通词。丑是令人憎恶或反感之对象的特性。与各种美的模式相对应的是，也存在各种丑的模式，譬如畸形、误置与不和谐等等。对某一对象的审美评价就是对美与丑的评价。然而，艺术家可以对丑的对象进行美的描绘，藉此用丑来强化整体的审美价值。

“美或丑被界定为对象的特征，因此，在审美的凝神观照中，会产生诸如愉快或者不愉快的不同感受。”——杜卡锡：《艺术哲学》，1929年，第234页。

Unconscious

For Leibniz the unconscious comprises the appetitive intentions of a transcendental nature in the self, which subsequent German idealists called the blind will or the desire of which the mind is ignorant. Freud took over this term for a fundamental concept of his psychology. The unconscious is any mental item or process of which we are unaware, but which we must assume due to its indirect effect. A wide range of experience influences what we think and do although we are not conscious of it. The unconscious is dynamic in the sense that it is active in the determination of behaviour. According to Freud, its contents are repressed and could not become conscious. The unconscious contrasts with the preconscious, which comprises latent elements of mind waiting to be discovered. The preconscious is sometimes loosely equated with the unconscious. According to Freud, what is conscious is only a small part of the mind, with most mental contents in the unconscious. Unconsciousness is a wider concept than the repressed, for while everything that is repressed is unconscious, it is not the case that everything unconscious is repressed. In his early writing, Freud considered the opposition between the unconscious and the conscious to be a mental conflict. The unconscious has no organisation, lacks differentiation, has no sense of morality and is impersonal. Yet it is the fertile source of culture and civilisation. The dynamic unconscious is the defining preoccupation of psychoanalysis. In Freud's later writing, the id takes over the attributes of the unconscious, although the ego also has an unconscious part. The theory of the unconscious was further developed by Jung and Lacan.

"For the time being we possess no better name for psychological processes which behave actively but nevertheless do not reach the consciousness of the person concerned and that is all we mean by our 'unconsciousness'." — Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 9, p. 47.

Understanding (Heidegger)

[German: *Verstehen*] Traditional philosophy takes understanding to be one of the major cognitive abilities of the subject or mind and subordinates the question of the understanding to the problem of knowledge. Heidegger breaks with this tradition by claiming that understanding is a basic mode of *Dasein's* being. Rather than discovering or making assertions about the particular facts of the world, understanding is the awareness of possibilities, that is the disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of the for-the-sake-of-which of *Dasein's* being-in-the-world. Understanding operates in terms of projecting those possibilities which are tied to *Dasein's* worldly situation. It has a three-fold "fore" structure, that is fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. In this way understanding is *Dasein's* self-understanding. While

无意识的

对于莱布尼茨,无意识由自我的先验本质的诸欲望意向组成。后来的德国唯心论者 (Idealists, 理念论者) 称之为盲目的意愿或心灵所不知的欲望。弗洛伊德采用了这个词,作为他的心理学的一个基本概念。这种无意识是我们所没有意识到的任何心灵内容或过程,但由于其间接的效应而不得不承认其存在。许多经验影响到我们所思考的东西,但我们却不意识到它们。这无意识是动态的,因为它在决定行为时是主动活跃的。按照弗洛伊德的观点,它的内容被压抑着,不能进入意识。无意识与前意识很不同,前意识由心灵等待被发现的潜在因素构成。有时,前意识也在不严格的意义上被等同于无意识。照弗洛伊德看来,所谓意识只是心灵的一小部分;心灵的大多数内容都在无意识之中。“无意识”是一个比“被压抑者”更广的概念,因为虽然所有被压抑者都是无意识的,但并非所有无意识者都是被压抑的。在他早期的作品中,弗洛伊德将无意识与意识之间的对立看做是一种心灵的争斗。这无意识没有组织,缺少区别,没有道德感,而且是无人格可言的。但它却是文化和文明的丰沛源泉。这种动态的无意识是心理分析的明确前提。在弗洛伊德的后期作品中,伊底具有了无意识的各种属性,尽管自我也有无意识的部分。无意识的理论在荣格和拉康那里得到了进一步发展。

“眼下,我们对于那些活跃地起着作用但却达不到当事人的意识的心理过程还没有更好的名字,因而只能以‘无意识状态’来意指之。”——弗洛伊德:《S. 弗洛伊德心理学著作全集标准版》,第九卷,第47页。

领会 (海德格尔)

[德文为 *Verstehen* (又可译为“理解”)] 传统哲学将领会或理解当做主体或心灵的主要认知能力之一,并使领会或理解的问题从属于知识问题。海德格尔打破了这个传统,主张领会是缘在 (*Dasein*) 之存在的一个基本方式。领会并非指发现和形成关于世界中特定事实的判断,它是对于诸种可能性的意识,也就是对于缘在的“在此世界中存在”的缘故 (所为之故) 的开启。领会通过投射出 (筹划) 那些系于缘在的世间形势的可能性而运作。它有三重“先”结构,即先有、先见和先掌握。以这种方式,领会就是缘在的自身领会。缘在的另一个存在方式“处境情境”揭示出“实际性”,即缘在被抛投于世界的状态,而领会则是缘在对于它的不可逃避的

the state of mind, another mode of *Dasein's* being, discloses facticity, that is *Dasein's* thrownness into this world, understanding becomes aware of its inevitable freedom. For Heidegger, the traditional conception of the understanding is derived from the understanding as the existential awareness of possibilities. Working out the possibilities projected in understanding is interpretation. Heidegger's theory of understanding establishes the basis for the so-called hermeneutic turn.

"With the term 'understanding' we have in mind a fundamental existentials, which is neither a definite species of cognition distinguished, let us say, from explaining and conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically." —Heidegger, *Being and Time* (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), 1962, p. 385.

Understanding (Kant)

[German: *Verstand*, corresponding to Greek: *dianoia* and Latin: *intellection*] Kant distinguished understanding from sensibility and reason. While sensibility is receptive, understanding is spontaneous. While understanding is concerned with the range of phenomena and is empty without intuition, reason is directed beyond the limit of experience and generates many fallacious inferences. Kant claimed that the main act of understanding is judgement and called it a faculty of judgement. He claimed that there is an *a priori* concept or category corresponding to each kind of judgement as its logical function and that understanding is constituted by twelve categories. Hence understanding is also a faculty of concepts. Understanding gives the synthetic unity of appearance through the categories. It thus brings together intuitions and concepts and makes experience possible. It is a lawgiver of nature. Herder criticised Kant for separating sensibility and understanding. Fichte and Hegel criticised him for separating understanding and reason. Some neo-Kantians criticised him for deriving the structure of understanding from the act of judgement.

"Now we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgement." —Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B94.

Understanding (Locke)

The fact that one of Locke's two main works is entitled *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* indicates that understanding is one of Locke's chief areas of philosophical thinking. Understanding was taken by him to be a faculty of the mind and is called the most elevated faculty of the soul and a faculty that searches after truth. Understanding has a more fundamental importance than the other faculties, such as sensation, reasoning or memory. Locke divided the actions of the mind into two main parts; the power of thinking,

自由意识。对于海德格尔,传统的领会或理解的概念是从作为生存论的可能性意识的领会中衍生出来的。将被投射于领会之中的可能性整理出来就是解释。海德格尔关于领会或理解的理论为所谓“解释学的转向”奠定了基础。

“‘领会’这个词在我们这里意味着一个基本的生存方式;它既不是认知的一个特定种类,与(比如)解释和知觉相区别,又不是任何从主题上把握某物的认知。”——海德格尔:《存在与时间》(马库阿里和罗宾逊英译),1962年,第385页。

知性(康德)

[德文 *Verstand*, 相对应于希腊词 *dianoia* 和拉丁词 *intellection*, 又译为“悟性”] 康德把它区别于感性和理性。感性是接受性的,而知性则是自发性的。知性关涉现象领域,并且无直观则空,理性倾向于超越经验的界限,并产生许多谬误推理。康德主张,知性的主要活动是判断,因此也称它为“判断的官能”。他认为,由于存在着相应于每类判断的先天概念(范畴)作为它的逻辑功能,所以知性由十二个范畴构成。因此知性也是概念的官能。它按照范畴对现象给予综合统一。这样它把直观和概念结合在一起,并使经验成为可能。它是自然的立法者。后来,某些哲学家(如赫尔德)批评康德把感性和知性分离开,某些哲学家(如费希特和黑格尔)批评他把知性和理性分离开,其他哲学家(如新康德主义者)批评他把知性的结构从判断的活动中推导出来。

“现在我们能将知性的一切活动归结为判断,因此知性可视为判断的官能。”——康德:《纯粹理性批判》,B94。

理智(洛克)

洛克的两部主要著作之一的标题是《人类理智论》,这个事实表明,理智是洛克的哲学思维的主要领域之一。他把理智理解为心灵的官能,把它称作灵魂的最高级官能,把它称作追求真理的官能。理智比其他官能如感觉、推理或记忆等有更根本的重要意义。洛克把心灵的活动分为两个主要部分:被称作理智的思维能力和被称作意志的意志力。因而,他往往将理智与认知的心灵换用,而不只是作为后者的官能之一。

which is called understanding, and the power of volition, which is called the will. He often used understanding interchangeably with the cognitive mind, rather than as just one of its faculties. The purpose of his *Essay on human understanding* is to "inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent".

"Since it is the *understanding* that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into."

Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I, 1, 1.

Understanding / explanation

[German: *Verstehen*, understanding and *Erklären*, explanation] Ordinarily, the distinction between explanation and understanding is blurred, in part because explanation furthers our understanding. Yet in German philosophy of history and the social sciences and hermeneutics, the two terms are sharply distinguished. Explanation is the subsumption of individual cases under hypothetically assumed general laws of nature and is the method characteristic of the natural sciences. In contrast, understanding is a cognitive mode peculiar to the social sciences. It is an empathic or participatory understanding of a given subject's point of view by imaginatively putting oneself into the place of the subject. It is the reconstruction of the subject's purposes, values and meaning. The distinction was first drawn by Droysen, although he actually puts forward a trichotomy: philosophical method (knowledge), physical method (explanation), and historical method (understanding). Dilthey fully elaborated the distinction between *Verstehen* and *Erklärung*, claiming that it forms the fundamental difference between the social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and the distinction is the basis for the claim that the social sciences have a distinctive methodology. Max Weber believed that both *Verstehen* and *Erklärung* are necessary in the social sciences.

"The German historian-philosopher Droysen appears to have been the first to introduce a methodological dichotomy which has had great influence. He coined for it the names explanation and understanding, in German *Erklären* and *Verstehen*." — von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, 1971.

Undistributed middle

A logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term which appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism which commits this error is invalid. Consider "All philosophers are persons", and "Some persons are bad". No conclusion follows from these

Locke's *Human Understanding* is about human understanding, its purpose is "to examine the origin, certainty and extent, and the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent".

"It is understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into." — Locke, *Human Understanding*, I, 1, 1.

理解/解释

[德文: *Verstehen* (理解) 和 *Erklären* (解释)] 在日常用语中, 解释和理解之间的区分并不清楚, 这部分地因为解释促进我们对事物的理解。然而在德国的历史哲学、社会科学和解释学中, 这两个概念是截然不同的。解释是在假定的一般自然规律的前提下对个别事实的归类, 具有自然科学方法的特征。相比之下, 理解是社会科学特有的一种认识方式。它通过将自己想像地置身于一个主体所处的位置对这一特定主体的观点做强调性的或分享性的理解。它是对主体的目的、价值和意图的重建。这一区分首先是由德罗伊森提出的, 尽管他实际上提出了一种三分法: 哲学的方法(认识), 物理学的方法(解释)和历史学的方法(理解)。狄尔泰对 *Verstehen* 和 *Erklärung* 之间的区别做了充分而详细的说明, 认为它构成了社会科学 (*Geisteswissenschaften*) 和自然科学 (*Naturwissenschaften*) 之间的根本的差异, 这一区分是社会科学有独特的方法这一主张的基础。M. 韦伯认为, *Verstehen* 和 *Erklärung* 在社会科学中都是不可缺少的。

"德国历史哲学家德罗伊森看来是第一个采用这一颇具影响的方法论的三分法的人。为此他创造了解释和理解这两个词, 即德语中的 *Erklären* 和 *Verstehen*。" — 冯·赖特: 《解释与理解》, 1971 年。

中项不周延

传统三段论逻辑中的逻辑谬误, 由于违反了中项(该项在前提中出现两次)在前提中至少必须周延一次的规则而引起。任何犯此错误的三段论都是无效的。让我们考虑如下例子: "所有的哲学家都是人", "有些人是坏人"。从这两个前提中得不出任何结论, 因为第一个前提中

two premises because "persons" in the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is distributed.

"If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle." — Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 1906, p. 288.

Unexpected examination paradox, another name for surprise examination paradox

Unhappy consciousness

Hegel's term for a consciousness which desires complete knowledge of itself but cannot obtain it. Hegel believed that self-consciousness proceeded in history from pre-history (the struggle for recognition) to Greece and Rome (Stoicism and scepticism) and medieval Christianity (unhappy consciousness). At the stage of scepticism, consciousness claims that all knowledge is relative to the subjective point of view. However, to make this claim meaningful, it must be assured that there is a universal point of view to see that all knowledge is thus relative. As a result, a sceptic has to admit that he is unable to justify these beliefs outside of his own contingently held point of view. He has a divided form of consciousness, with a tension between its subjective and objective points of view. Here scepticism gave way to the stage of unhappy consciousness. Such a consciousness is internally divided, for it has to assume both points of view. It is the consciousness of separation between man and nature and between man and man. Christianity's message is a call to men to restore the lost unity of consciousness by bringing their subjective points of view into line with the impersonal eye of God. In general, the unhappy consciousness describes a form of life in which people's conception of themselves and of what they claim to know involves an enduring state of crisis. Such a mental state is later called by Kierkegaard "despair".

"Hence the unhappy consciousness, the Alienated Soul which is the consciousness of self as a divided nature, a doubled and merely contradictory being." — Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, B, iv, b.

Unified science

[German; *Einheitswissenschaft*] Logical Positivism believes that no essential differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other, and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a programme

的“人”是一肯定命题的谓词，第二个前提中的“人”是一特称命题的主词。两者都不周延。

“如果在一个三段论中，两个前提中的中项都不周延，我们就被认为犯了中项不周延的错误。”——凯恩斯：《形式逻辑》，1906年，第288页。

意外的考试悖论

“意外考试悖论”的另一个名称。

苦恼的意识

黑格尔的术语，指的是渴望对自身的完备的知识但又得不到的那种意识。黑格尔认为，自我意识在历史中的发展经历了由史前（为认识而斗争）到希腊与罗马（斯多亚哲学和怀疑论）和中世纪基督教（苦恼的意识）的历程。在怀疑论阶段，意识宣称所有的知识都相对于主观的观点。然而，要使这一说法富有意义，就必须保证有一种普遍的观点从而能看出所有的知识都是相对的。其结果是怀疑论者不得不承认，超出他自己偶然持有的观点，他无法证明这些信念。他有一个分裂的意识形式，其主观观点和客观观点之间处于对立之中。到这里，怀疑主义就让位于苦恼的意识阶段。这种意识是内在地分裂的，因为它必须假定那两种观点的存在。它是将人与自然和人与人分离开来的那种意识。基督教的启示是要人通过使他们的主观的观点与上帝的非人的眼光相一致来恢复失去的意识的统一。一般说来，苦恼的意识描绘了一种生活方式，在这种方式中人们对自身以及对他们宣称所了解的事物的想法陷入了持久的危机状态。这种精神状态后来被克尔凯郭尔称为“绝望”。

“因此，苦恼的意识，就是意识到自身作为一种分裂的本质，一种双重的并且仅是矛盾的存在物的那种异化了的精神。”——黑格尔：《精神现象学》，B, iv, b.

统一科学

[德文为 *Einheitswissenschaft*] 逻辑实证主义认为，在科学的各个分支之间不存在目标和方法上的差别。所有学科的科学都应该密切地相互合作，应该用逻辑分析的方法把科学词汇统一起来。按照这种观点，在自然科学和社会科学之间没有明确的分界线。特别是，在社会科学中要确立普遍定律可能在实际上有困难，但在原则上并不是不可能的。这种科学统一的理想通过 O. 纽拉特成了逻辑实证主义者的纲领。他们在维也纳以《统一科学》为标题出版了

for logical positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading *Unified Science*. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal *Erkenntnis* as *The Journal of Unified Science*, and planned to continue in the United States publication of a series of works under the general title *The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. He thought that the work would be similar in historical importance to the eighteenth century French *Encyclopedie* under the direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although some volumes originally prepared for it were published by Carnap and Morris under the title *Foundations of the Unity of Science*.

"We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science." —Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World*, 1967, p. 288.

Uniformity of Nature

A principle claiming that nature is uniform and that consequently the future will resemble the past and generalisations holding for observed cases will continue to be applicable to unobserved future cases as long as the background conditions remain sufficiently similar. In traditional epistemology, Francis Bacon and J. S. Mill assumed the principle to be the ground for the validity of inductive reasoning and scientific predictions. The aim of science is to find uniformity. But Hume argued that the principle can only be justified by induction and thus that justifying induction by appeal to it involves vicious circularity or question-begging. Popper also claimed that the uniformity of nature is a matter of faith.

"The belief in the uniformity of nature is the belief that everything that has happened or will happen is an instance of some general law to which there are no exceptions." — Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, 1912, p. 63.

Unity of consciousness, see transcendental apperception

Universal

"Universal" can be used as an adjective, meaning pertaining to all members of a class, unlimited or all-reaching, such as a universal law. In logic, universal statements (A and E statements in traditional logic) are contrasted with particular statements (I and O statements). As nouns, universals express abstract features, such as justice, beauty, wisdom and goodness. "Universal" used as a noun gives rise to many major and persisting problems in the history of philosophy.

The concept of a universal can be traced to Plato's idea and form (*eidos*) and Aristotle's *katholou*. Ideas or forms are the common characteristics which many particulars share and which are the object of knowledge. *Katholou* [Greek: *kata*,

一系列书籍。在维也纳小组解散之后,纽拉特把他们的代表性刊物《认识》重新命名为《统一科学杂志》,并计划在美国继续出版一系列著作,其总名称为《统一科学国际百科全书》。他认为这些著作在历史上的重要性会类似于18世纪在狄德罗指导下编纂的法国百科全书。不幸的是,这套著作并未完成,虽然原来为它准备的几卷由卡尔纳普和莫里斯以《科学统一的基础》为名出版了。

"我们一直反复指出,形成作为整体的建构性体系是统一科学的任务。"——卡尔纳普:《世界的逻辑结构》,1967年,第288页。

自然的齐一性

该原理主张自然是齐一的,因此未来将类似于过去,适用于观察到的事例的概括,将继续适用于未观察到的未来事例,只要背景条件保持足够相似。在传统认识论中,这被F. 培根和J. S. 密尔设定为归纳推理和科学预言的有效性的基础。科学的目的是发现齐一性。但是休谟论证了这个原理本身也只能由归纳来辩护,这样求助于它来给归纳辩护就包含着一种循环论证或窃取论题。K. 波普也认为自然的齐一性是个信仰问题。

"自然齐一性信念是这么一种信念,任何已发生或将发生的,都是某些普遍规律的事例,概莫能外。"——罗素:《哲学问题》,1912年,第63页。

意识的统一

见“先验统觉”条。

共相

“普遍的”作为形容词,意为“属于一个类中的所有成员的”,“无限制的”或“容包一切的”,如普遍法则。在逻辑中,普遍陈述(传统逻辑中的A与E陈述)相对于特殊陈述(I与O陈述)。作为名词,共相表示抽象特征,如正义、美、智慧和善。用作名词的共相在哲学史上引起了许多重大持久性的问题。

共相概念可追溯到柏拉图的形相和形式(*eidos*),以及亚里士多德的 *katholou*。形相或形式是许多殊相分有的共同特征,是知识的对象。*Katholou* [希腊语, *kata* (属于)和 *olou* (全部)]被定义作“述说于许多”,一个殊相则不述说于其他任何事物。柏拉图和亚里士多德都把

belonging to $\tau\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota$, the whole] is defined as being predicated of many, while a particular is predicated of nothing else. Both Plato and Aristotle contrasted universals with particulars. Plato's theory of ideas is regarded as the first and most penetrating discussion of the problems of the universal. Aristotle's treatment of the problem of universals from the point of view of predication is currently widely followed.

Since Plato and Aristotle, the debate about the nature and status of universals has run through the whole history of philosophy. Many rival theories have been proposed, the most important of which include realism, nominalism and conceptualism. Realism claims that universals are mind-independent objective entities, which can in principle be exemplified or instantiated by a number of different things. On the basis of this objective entity, predicate-expressions can be applied to many subjects. Nominalism holds that a universal is not an objective entity but is only a general name or word. Our ability to apply these general words is based on their linguistic function established by convention. The major representatives of nominalism include William of Ockham and Thomas Hobbes. Conceptualism, usually associated with the British Empiricists, suggests that universals are mind-dependent concepts or thoughts, constructed by the mind after experiencing particular things. Each position has its strength as well as famous weaknesses. There are many further versions under each general heading. Plato and Aristotle, for instance, are realists, but their doctrines have striking differences. Wittgenstein in his later philosophy proposed an account of family-resemblance as complicated networks of overlapping similarities to replace our false demand for properties which are common to all members of a class.

"By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual' that which is not thus predicated. Thus, 'man' is a universal, 'Callias' an individual."— Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 17a39-40.

Universal characteristic, another expression for universal symbolistic

Universal grammar

Also called general grammar or philosophical grammar. In contrast to particular grammar, which is the grammar peculiar to a particular language, universal grammar refers to the deep-seated regularities in linguistic categories, rules and processes which underlie the diversity of natural languages. It consists of a set of genetically determined rules and principles common to all natural languages. Universal grammar is rooted in human linguistic capacity and is the necessary and sufficient natural condition for any language to be possible. It is a basic biological endowment of the initial state of the human mind. Because of universal grammar, a child can ef-

共相与殊相相比较。柏拉图的形相论〔旧译作：理念论〕被认为是对共相问题的最初的最深入的讨论。而亚里士多德从主—谓关系角度讨论共相问题，这在现代有众多追随者。

在柏拉图和亚里士多德之后，关于共相的性质和地位的争论贯穿整部哲学史。哲学家们提出了各种互不相同的理论。其中最重要的包括唯实论、唯名论和概念论。唯实论认为，共相是独立于心灵的客观实在，在原则上能体现于或个体化于许多不同的事物中。根据这种客观实在，谓词表述可应用于许多主体。唯名论主张，共相不是客观实在，而只是一个通名或语词。我们应用这些一般语词的能力是基于它们为习俗所约定的语言功能。唯名论的主要代表包括奥康的威廉和 T. 霍布斯。概念论一般与英国经验论者相联。它主张共相是由心灵产生的概念或思想，是心灵在经验了特殊事物后构建出来的。每一立场都有其长处和短处。每一总立场下又有许多不同形式的理论。例如，柏拉图和亚里士多德都是实在论者，可他们的学说有着巨大的差异。维特根斯坦在其后期哲学中把家族相似描述为各种相似性相互重叠的复杂网络，以此来取代我们对一种相同于一个类中的任何成员的属性的虚假要求。

“所谓‘共相’，我是指有着这样性质的东西，即它可述说于许多主体；所谓‘殊相’，乃是指不能这样述说的东西。因而‘人’是一个共相，而‘加里阿斯’则是一个殊相。”——亚里士多德：《解释》，17a39-40。

普遍语言

“普遍符号语言”的另一表述。

普遍语法

也称作“一般语法”或“哲学语法”。与专门用于个别语言的个别语法相对，普遍语法是指在各种不同的自然语言背后的语言范畴、规则和过程等更深层次的规则。它是由一系列最初确定的、为一切自然语言共有的规则和原理构成的。普遍语法根植于人类的语言能力，是使语言成为可能的必要充分条件，它是人类心灵最初状态的基本生物学因素。由于拥有这种普遍语法，儿童才能毫不费力地学习语言。根据乔姆斯基的观点，普遍语法的观念在18世纪的语言学家诸如贝蒂和杜·玛萨等人那里是共同的

fortlessly acquire language. According to Chomsky, the idea of a universal grammar was common for eighteenth century linguists such as Beattie and Du Marsa, but was ignored by modern linguistics. He revived the notion and believes that without being supplemented by a universal grammar, a grammar of a particular language cannot provide a full account of the speaker-hearer's competence. The natural necessity of universal grammar as a condition of the possibility of language can be compared with the *a priori* intuitions and categories that are the transcendently necessary conditions for the possibility of experience in Kant.

"Such a 'universal grammar' (to modify slightly a traditional usage) prescribes a schema that defines implicitly the indefinite class of 'attainable grammars'; it formulates principles that determines how each such system relates sound and meaning; it provides a procedure of evaluation for grammars of the appropriate form"—Chomsky, *Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar*, 1972, p. 11.

Universal proposition

In traditional logic, propositions of the form "all S are P" or "all S are not P" are called universal propositions, in contrast to particular propositions, which have the form "some S are P" or "some S are not P". The form "all S are P", which is equivalent to "every S is P", is the form of a universal affirmative proposition and is symbolised as "A". The form "all S are not P", which is equivalent to "no S is P", is the form of a universal negative proposition and is symbolised as "E".

In the predicate calculus, a universal affirmative proposition "all S are P" is analysed as "for all x, if x is S then x is P". Unlike particular propositions, universal propositions do not contain referring expressions and therefore lack existential import.

"The grammatical subjects of universal propositions, however expressed, are not referring expressions." — Mitchell, *An Introduction to Logic*, 1962, p. 82.

Universal quantifier

Frege suggests that the universal categorical statements of traditional logic, that is, "All s are p", and "All s are not p", can be read respectively as "For all x, if x is s, then x is p", and "For all x, if x is s, then x is not p". The former can be symbolised as " $(x)(sx \supset px)$ ", and the latter as " $(x)(sx \supset \sim px)$ ". (x) is called the "universal quantifier" and means that "For all x..." or "For every x...". The universal quantifier and the existential quantifier (There exists an x...) have been crucial in the development of modern predicate logic and the philosophy dependent upon it. The universal quantifier is also symbolised as " $\forall(x)$ ".

"The universal quantifier (x) may be read 'each object x is such that...'. " — Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981.

看法,但却被现代语言学家忽略了。他重新提出这个观念,并且相信,没有这样一种普遍语法的补充说明,任何具体语言的语法都无法全面地说明说者与听者的能力。把普遍语法看做是使语言成为可能的必要条件,就相当于康德把先天的直觉和范畴看做是使经验成为可能的先验必要条件。

"这种'普遍语法'(略微改变了一下传统的用法)提供了一种图式,它明确地定义了这类非限定的'可得到的语法';它所形成的原理,确定了每个这样的系统是如何与声音和意义联系起来的;它为恰当形式的语法提供了一种评价步骤。"——乔姆斯基:《生成语法的语义学研究》,1972年,第11页。

全称命题

在传统逻辑中,"所有S是P"或"所有S不是P"形式的命题叫做全称命题,以与特称命题相区别,后者具有形式"有些S是P"和"有些S不是P"。形式"所有S是P"等值于"每一个S是P",是全称肯定命题的形式,用符号表示为"A"。形式"所有S不是P"等值于"没有S是P",是全称否定命题的形式,用符号表示为"E"。

在谓词演算中,全称肯定命题"所有S是P"被分析为"对于所有x,如果x是S则x是P"。与特称命题不同,全称命题并不含有指称表达式,因此缺少存在含义。

"全称命题的语法主词,无论怎样表达,都不是指称表达式。"——米切尔:《逻辑导论》,1962年,第82页

全称量词

弗雷格提出,传统逻辑的全称直言陈述,即是"所有的s是p"和"所有的s不是p",可以分别读作"对于所有的x,如果x是s,那么x是p"和"对于所有的x,如果x是s,那么x不是p"。前者可用符号表示为" $(x)(sx \rightarrow px)$ ",后者可表示为" $(x)(sx \rightarrow \sim px)$ "。(x)叫做"全称量词",意为"对于所有的x……"或"对于每一个x……"。全称量词和存在量词(存在一个x……)在现代谓词逻辑的发展中以及依赖于它的哲学中是至关重要的。全称量词也用符号表示为" $\forall(x)$ "。

"全称量词(x)可以读作'每个对象x是这样的……'。"——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981

Universal symbolistic

Also called universal characteristic, Leibniz's project for providing a system of symbols or an artificial language for overcoming the deficiencies of natural language and for representing rational thought more accurately and effectively. For Leibniz it is a universal system of writing and an "alphabet of human thought". Through the combination of the letters of this alphabet and through the analysis of the words produced from them, we can discover and judge everything. To establish a universal language for communication among different languages was not a new idea, but Leibniz attempted to extend the notion of such a language to form an art of discovery and an art of judgement. He believed that it would be one of the greatest inventions if it succeeded. There is much dispute among scholars about the scope, nature and significance of this project. On one reading, the universal symbolistic is intended to be a type of ideal language, a language composed of real characters capable of expressing symbolically the contents of thought. On this reading, it is the predecessor of the ideal language proposed by some modern analytical philosophers. On another reading, this project is concerned only with the form, not the content, of rational thought. It is a plan for a general science of form and for expressing the logical relations among concepts and propositions. On this reading, the universal characteristic is a precursor of modern symbolic logic. On a further reading, Leibniz's thought developed from the ambitious project of constructing a system representing content to a less ambitious project which was only concerned with the form of logical reasoning.

"I should still hope to create a kind of universal symbolistic in which all truths of reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus." Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters* (ed Loemker), 1969, p. 654.

Universalia, ante rem, see universalia, in rebus

Universalia, in rebus

[Latin: universals existing within particular things, also called *in rebus universalia*]. A position held by the Aristotelians about the ontological status of universals. It contrasts with the Platonist position *universalia, ante rem* [Latin: universals existing prior to or independently of the particular things that instantiate them, also called *ante res universalia*]. It is also contrasted with *post rem universalia* [Latin: universals existing after or derived from particulars things, also called *post res universalia*], a view held by both nominalism and conceptualism.

"We can adopt the view whose Latin tag is *universalia in rebus*, 'universals in things'. We can think of a thing's

年。

普遍符号语言

也称“普遍语言”，是莱布尼茨的一个方案，该方案为了克服自然语言的缺陷，为了更准确有效地描述理性思想，提出了一个符号体系，或者说，一套人工语言。莱布尼茨认为它是一个通用的书写体系，一个“人类思想的字母表”。通过对该字母表中的字母的结合，通过对这些字母造出的词的分析，我们就可以发现和判断一切事情。为了在不同语言中进行交流而建立一个普遍语言并不是一个新思想，只是莱布尼茨试图将这样一个语言概念推广开来，以形成一种发现术和判断术。他相信，如果这件事真能成功，那将是最伟大的发明之一。对于这一方案的范围、性质和意义，学者中有许多争论。一种看法是，莱布尼茨打算使普遍符号语言成为理想语言的一个类型，一个由能以符号表达思想内容的“真正文字”构成的语言。根据这种看法，这个语言是现代一些分析哲学家提出的理想语言的前驱。另一种看法是，这个方案只与理性思想的形式有关，与内容无关。它是为普遍的形式科学，为表达概念和命题的逻辑关系而制定的一个规划。根据这种看法，普遍语言是现代符号逻辑的先导。还有一种看法是，莱布尼茨的思想有一个发展过程，开始他有一个宏大规划，要构造一个内容表述体系，后来这个规划缩小为只与逻辑推理的形式相关。

“我仍然希望创造一种普遍的符号语言，在此语言中，一切理性真理都被还原为一种演算。”——莱布尼茨：《哲学论文和书信》（莱姆克编），1969年，第654页。

在物之先的共相

见“在物之中的共相”条。

在物之中的共相

「拉丁文，意为“存在于特殊物之中的共相”（也写作 *in rebus universalia*）」亚里士多德主义者所持有的关于共相的本体论地位的立场。这相对于柏拉图主义的在物之先的共相[拉丁文，意为先于或独立于体现它们的特殊物的共相，也写作 *ante res universalia*]。它也相对于在物之后的共相[拉丁文，意为存在于特殊物之后或从它们中得出的共相，也写作 *post res universalia*]。后一观点为唯名论和概念论所持有。

“我们可采用一种观点，其拉丁标签是 *universalia in rebus*，‘在物之中的共相’。当我们可以把事物的属性看做事物的组成部分，也

properties as constituents of the thing and think of the properties as universals. This may have been the position of Aristotle." — Armstrong, *Universals*, 1989, p. 77.

Universalia, post rem, see *universalia, in rebus*

Universalizability

The idea that moral judgements should be universalizable can be traced to the Golden Rule and Kant's ethics. In this century it was elaborated by Hare and became a major thesis of his prescriptivism. The principle states that all moral judgements are universalizable in the sense that if it is right for a particular person A to do an action X, then it must likewise be right to do X for any person exactly like A, or like A in the relevant respects. Furthermore, if A is right in doing X in this situation, then it must be right for A to do X in other relevantly similar situations. Hare takes this feature to be an essential feature of moral judgements. An ethical statement is the issuance of a universal prescription. Universalizability is not the same as generality, for a moral judgement can be highly specific and detailed and need not be general or simple. The universalizability principle enables Hare to avoid the charge of irrationality which is usually lodged against noncognitivism to which his prescriptivism belongs, and his theory is thus a great improvement on emotivism.

"I have been maintaining that the meaning of the word 'ought' and other moral words is such that a person who uses them commits himself thereby to a universal rule. This is the thesis of universalizability." — Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, 1963, p. 30.

Universals of language, another expression for linguistic universals

Unknown entities, another term for metaphysical entities

Unmoved mover

The substance which initiates movement without itself being moved, also called the prime mover. In the later part of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* XII, Aristotle developed a cosmological argument attempting to show that there must be an unmoved mover. Because time is eternal, without beginning and end, change, which is a concomitant of time, must also be eternal. The eternal and continuous change is the circular movement of the outer heavenly sphere. What produces this eternal motion? On analogy with our desires and thoughts and the intentional movements of our bodies for which they account, Aristotle inferred that there must be some ultimate object of desire and thought in the universe, a

可以把属性看做共相。这可能一直是亚里士多德的观点。”——阿姆斯特朗：《普遍》，1989年，第77页。

在物之后的共相

见“在物之中的共相”条。

可普遍化

道德判断应是可普遍化的这一观念可追溯至“金规”和康德伦理学。在20世纪，得到黑尔的阐发并成为他的“规定主义”的主要论点。这个原则所说的是，所有的道德判断在如下意义上是可普遍化的：如果某个人A有行为X是正当的，那么对于另一完全像A或在某些方面像A一样的人来说必定同样是正确的；或者如果A在这种情形下做了X是正当的，那么在另外的极相类似的环境条件下也必定是正当的。黑尔把这看做是道德判断的本质特征。一种伦理陈述是做出一种普遍的规定。可普遍化与一般化不是等同的，一个道德判断可以是很具体很详细的，不必非得要是抽象的、一般的。可普遍化原则能使黑尔避免非理性的指责，而非理性一般被用来攻击他的规定主义所属的非认知主义，因而他的理论是对于情感主义的很大的改进。

“我一直坚持，‘应当’和其他伦理词汇的意义使得一个使用它们的人因此而承诺起一种普遍规则，这就是可普遍化的论点。”——黑尔：《自由与理性》，1963年，30页。

语言的共相

“语言共相”的另一个名称。

未知实体

“形而上学实体”的另一说法。

不动的推动者

引起运动而自身不被推动的本体，也叫“第一推动者”。在《物理学》的后半部分和《形而上学》卷十二中，亚里士多德建立了一类宇宙论论证，力图表明必定存在一个不动的推动者。因为时间是永恒的，没有开端和终点，所以变化作为时间的伴随物也一定是永恒的。永恒的和连续的变化是外层天体的圆周运动。是什么产生了这种永恒运动？根据我们的欲望和思想以及它们所表明的我们身体的意向动作这一事实，亚里士多德类推说，宇宙中必有一欲望和思想的终极对象，一种作用于外在空间并间接作用于整个宇宙秩序的本体。这种本体运动不是因

substance which acts on the outer sphere and then indirectly on the order of the whole universe. This substance moves not because it intends, but because it is loved and thought. Thus it is an unmoved mover, which is immune to change and thus has no matter or potentiality. It is pure actuality, pure contemplation of itself as its object and the thought of thought. The unmoved mover is also called God. But the Aristotelian God itself does not care or think about changes in the world, although the harmony and order of the world are due to the imitation of the unmoved mover. While Aristotle's God is a passive object of admiration, medieval philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, attempted to transform it into a conscious agent.

"And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something, which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance and actuality." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072a24.

Unqualified good, see qualified good

Unsaturated

Frege's distinction between saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions corresponds to the distinction between objects and concepts. A saturated expression refers to an object or argument and has a complete sense in itself, while an unsaturated expression refers to a concept or function and does not have a complete sense. For example, in the sentence "Socrates is the teacher of Plato", "Socrates" and "Plato" are proper names and are saturated, while "— is the teacher of —" is unsaturated, for it has empty spaces that must be filled with saturated expressions before it gains a complete sense.

"Statements in general, ... can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one complete in itself, and the other in need of supplementation, or 'unsaturated'." — Frege, "Function and Concept", in P. Geach and M. Black (eds), *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, 1966, p. 31.

Unwritten doctrines

Doctrines ascribed to Plato, which he is said not to have written down but only to have taught to his pupils orally. Remarks by Aristotle are our chief source for these doctrines. The ideas are difficult and even impossible to reconstruct, but they are roughly like this. There are two ultimate principles, the one and the indefinite dyad, which generate the Forms, and through the Forms become the causes of everything. Forms are numbers, and between Forms and particulars there are indeterminate mathematical entities. While most Platonic scholars do not pay much attention to these ideas, the Tübingen school, headed by K. Gaiser and H. Kramer claim that the unwritten doctrines represent the real

of it intent thus, but because it is loved and thought. Thus it is an unmoved mover, which is immune to change and thus has no matter or potentiality. It is pure actuality, pure contemplation of itself as its object and the thought of thought. The unmoved mover is also called God. But the Aristotelian God itself does not care or think about changes in the world, although the harmony and order of the world are due to the imitation of the unmoved mover. While Aristotle's God is a passive object of admiration, medieval philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, attempted to transform it into a conscious agent.

"由于那既被推动又推动它物的事物是居间的, 故必有不动的推动者、永恒的本体和现实。" ——亚里士多德:《形而上学》, 1072a24.

无条件的善

见“有条件的善”条。

不饱和的

弗雷格提出的与对象和概念之间的区分相应的饱和的表达式和不饱和的表达式之间的区分。一个饱和的表达式指的是一个对象或一个自变量并且本身具有完整意思, 而一个不饱和的表达式指的是一个概念或一个函项并且不具有完整的意思。例如, 在“苏格拉底是柏拉图的老师”这个句子中, “苏格拉底”和“柏拉图”是专有名词, 是饱和的, 而“是……的老师”则是不饱和的, 因为它有一个空位, 这一空位必须以饱和表达式填补, 而后它才具有完整的意思。

“一般说来, 陈述……可被设想分成两部分, 一部分本身是完整的, 另一部分需要补充, 或者说是‘不饱和的’。”——弗雷格:《函项和概念》, 载吉奇和布莱克(编):《G. 弗雷格哲学文集》, 1966年, 第31页。

未著文字的学说

据说是柏拉图没有写下来而只是口头教他的学生的学说。亚里士多德的有关言论是我们关于这些学说的主要来源。要重构这些学说相当困难, 甚至是完全不可能的。大致的纲要是这样的: 有两条终极的原则, 一与不定之二, 它们产生了形式, 并通过形式而成为一切事物的原因。形式是数, 在形式与殊相之间存有居间的数理本体。大多数柏拉图学者对这些学说并不很注意, 而以 K. 盖塞和 H. 克拉麦尔为首的图宾根学派却认为, 未著文字的学说代表了柏拉图哲学的真正本质, 而对话只不过是通往这一严肃哲学的初级阶段。

essence of Plato's philosophy and the dialogues are only a preliminary stage towards this serious philosophy.

"It is true, indeed, that the account he gives in the *Timaeus* of the participant is different from what he says in his so-called 'unwritten doctrines'." —Aristotle, *Physics*, 209b.

Use theory of meaning

The later Wittgenstein criticised the view that language has a single function which explains meaning and observed that language has a variety of uses. He claimed that the meaning of a word has to be understood in terms of its employment in the context of different language games. To give the meaning of an expression is to show how that expression enters into the language games in which it functions. He held that the meaning of a word is its use in a language. Instead of asking what a word means, we should ask how the word is used. An expression's role in language determines its sense, and the sense of a sentence is its employment. Accordingly, to determine the meaning of an expression one must invoke the conditions under which it is appropriate to use it, including the states of mind of speakers or hearers in a given context. This account, which contrasts with Wittgenstein's earlier picture theory of meaning, has been widely influential and has developed into many versions after Wittgenstein. Critics suggest that while a use account of meaning helps our understanding of the various roles of linguistic expressions, it is preliminary to a theory of meaning rather than a theory in its own right.

"As a tool of analysis, the use theory of meaning can provide us only with certain data, i. e. raw material for philosophical analysis." —John Searle, *Speech Act*, 1969, p. 148.

Utilitarianism

A major modern ethical theory, advanced by Bentham, J. S. Mill, Sidgwick, and many others, which suggests, broadly speaking, that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by its utility, that is the good (pleasant or happy) or bad (painful or evil) consequences it produces. The morally right action which one should choose is the one which will provide the greatest pleasure and least pain of all the alternatives. Because utilitarianism judges actions in terms of their consequences, it is a major representative of consequentialism.

There are many species of utilitarianism, based on different understandings of action and consequences. There is a distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism; the former judges in terms of the consequences of particular actions, and the latter in terms of the consequence of adopting some general rules for sorts of actions. There is a distinction between egoistic and universalistic utilitarianism; the

"他〔柏拉图〕在《蒂迈欧篇》中所给出的关于参与者的叙述，确实不同于他在他所谓的‘未著文字的学说’中的论述。”——亚里士多德：《物理学》，209b。

意义的用法理论

后期维特根斯坦批判这样一种观点：语言具有一种可以解释意义的单一功能。维特根斯坦看到，语言具有多种不同的用法。他声称一个语词的意义必须依其在不同语言游戏语境中的用法来理解。给出一个表达式的意义就是表明那一表达式如何进入它行使功能的语言游戏中。他主张语词的意义就是其在语言中的用法。我们所要问的不是一个语词意味着什么而是一个语词是怎样被使用的。一个表达式在语言中的作用决定其意义，而句子的意义是其使用。因此，要决定一个表达式的意义，一个人必须援引它被适当使用的条件，包括听者与说者在一定语境中的心的状态。这与维特根斯坦早期主张的“意义的图像论”相对，它具有广泛的影响并在维特根斯坦以后被发展为多种不同形式。但有人批评说，尽管意义的用法描述有助于我们理解语言表达式的各种作用，但它只是一种意义理论的开端，而不是该理论本身。

“作为一个分析工具，意义的用法理论只能为我们提供某些材料，即供哲学分析的原材料。”——塞尔：《言语行为》，1969年，第148页。

功利主义

为边沁、密尔、西奇威克和其他许多人所发展的一种主要的现代伦理学理论。宽泛地说，这个理论认为，一个行为的正当与错误是为它所产生的善的、好的（快乐、幸福）或坏的、恶的（痛苦、罪恶）后果所决定的。一个人应该选择的道德上正当的行为，是在所有能选择物中可产生最大的愉快最少的痛苦的行为。由于功利主义判断道德行为依据它们的后果，因而它是效果论的典型代表。

基于对“行为”和“效果”的不同理解，有多种形式的功利主义。行为功利主义和规则功利主义就有所不同：前者依据具体行为的后果加以判断，后者则依据某种行为采用某种一般原则的后果。利己主义的功利主义和普遍主义的功利主义之间也有所不同：前者考虑后果对行为者而言的善与恶，后者则考虑行为所涉及的所有人，也有快乐的功利主义和理想的功

former considers the goodness or badness of the consequences for the agent himself, and the latter for all individuals involved. There is also a distinction between hedonistic and ideal utilitarianism; the former takes the goodness or badness of a consequence to depend only on its pleasure or pain, and the latter (represented by G. E. Moore) takes into account things other than pleasure, such as intellectual and aesthetic qualities. There is also a distinction between normative and descriptive utilitarianism. These various distinctions cut across one another. A recent version, called motive utilitarianism, defines the morality of actions in terms of the motives which give rise to them.

Utilitarianism has played a great role in modern English and American society as the basic principle of morality and legislation. However, it has also been a subject of criticism in moral and political philosophy. The various versions of utilitarianism have weaknesses. Concentrating on its consequentialism, the main objections are: first, it is difficult to determine what consequences various possible actions would have; secondly, the action which will produce the greatest happiness is often not the morally right action; thirdly, utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of actions, but ignores the integrity of moral agents. All these and other criticisms suggest that utilitarianism should be employed together with other moral principles, although its fundamental viewpoint is unlikely to be completely removed.

"The chief reason for adopting the name 'Utilitarianism' was, indeed, merely to emphasise the fact that right and wrong conduct must be judged by its results." — Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, p. 106.

Utilitarianism, act

Act-utilitarianism judges the validity of a moral action in terms of the good or bad consequences that the action itself can produce. We should pursue the action which will produce the greatest happiness in every circumstance. It contrasts to rule-utilitarianism which judges the validity of a moral action in terms of the good or bad consequences which ensue from following general moral rules of conduct, such as "keep promises" and "never lie", rather than from a particular action. According to rule-utilitarianism, we should pursue the action which conforms to a set of moral rules whose general observance would maximise utility. Classical utilitarians such as Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick are generally considered as act utilitarians, though they themselves were not aware of this distinction. Act-utilitarianism can also be defined in terms of expectable utility rather than the utility of actual consequences. The basic difficulty for act-utilitarianism is how to assess with certainty the consequences of an action considered in itself. It is also criticised for ignoring the agent's integrity or desires. Sometimes it is disputed whether the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarian-

ism之间的区分:前者把后果的善与恶看做是仅仅取决于它带来的愉快或不愉快,后者(以 G. E. 摩尔为代表)则把与快乐不同的诸如各种理智的或审美的质量考虑进去。在规范的和描述的功利主义之间也有区分。这些区分是相互交叉的。一个最近的形式是动机功利主义,它依据产生这些行为的动机来界定道德行为。

在现代英国和美国社会中,功利主义作为道德和立法的基本原则起了重大作用。不过,它一直是道德哲学和政治哲学的批评对象。不同的功利主义学说各有不同的弱点。集中于它的效果论的特征而言,主要的反对意见是:第一,很难确定各种可能的行为各有什么后果;第二,在许多情况下,产生最大快乐的行为不是在道德上正当的行为;第三,功利主义集中注意于行为的后果上,但忽视了道德行为者的整合性。所有这些及其他的批评隐含着,功利主义应该与其他的道德原则相协调,虽然它的基本原则不太可能完全丢掉。

"采用'功利主义'名称的主要理由,只是要强调这个事实,正当与错误的行为是为它的结果来判别的。"——摩尔:《伦理学原理》,1903年,第106页。

行为功利主义

行为功利主义依据行为本身所产生的后果的善(好)与恶(坏)来判断道德行为的有效性,所以我们应该追求在每一种环境条件下能产生最大快乐(幸福)的行为。这是与规则功利主义相对的,后者判断一个道德行为的正当性依据的是那行为遵循的普遍道德规则,诸如"遵守诺言"、"从不撒谎"等,而不是根据一个具体行为所能产生的好或坏的后果。根据规则功利主义,我们应该追求的行为是那对规则的遵从可产生最大功利的行为。古典的功利主义者如边沁、密尔、西奇威克一般被认为是行为功利主义者,虽然他们自己没有意识到这个区分。行为功利主义也能依据可期望的功利而不是实际功利后果来界定。行为功利主义的难题在于怎样确切地评估行为本身的后果。它也因忽视行为者的整合性或欲求而受到批评。有时人们也争议,是否行为功利主义和规则功利主义的区分是有道理的。道德理论家例如黑尔相信,如果有某种行为是正当的,那么,任何在相关方面类似于它的行为也将是正当的。

ism is sound. Moral theorists such as Hare believe that if a certain action is right, it must be the case that any action just like it in relevant aspects will also be right.

"Assuming that the objections to act-utilitarianism are conclusive, the choice of a general theory of obligation seems to lie between some kind of formalism and at least something like rule-utilitarianism."—Brandt, *Ethical Theory*, 1959, p. 400.

Utilitarianism, ideal

W. D. Ross' term, for the type of utilitarianism initiated by Moore. In contrast to classical or hedonistic utilitarianism, which claims that consequences are good or bad depending only on pleasure or pain, Moore claims that things other than pleasure, such as knowledge and the enjoyment of beautiful objects, also determine the goodness of consequences.

"In fact the theory of 'Ideal utilitarianism', if I may for brevity refer so to the theory of Professor Moore, seems to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows."—Ross, *The Right and the Good*, 1930, p. 19.

Utility

What is useful or good and leads to pleasure or happiness. Utility is the property which generates happiness or felicity, but more often it is directly identified with happiness. Utility has been an important consideration in ethics since the ancient Greeks. Hume believed that it is the measure of all virtues. Since Bentham advanced the principle of utility, there has been a specific ethical theory called utilitarianism. For utilitarianism, utility is the sole criterion for judging whether an act is right or wrong. If an act produces utility, it is right; otherwise, it is wrong. Bentham also proposed a calculus of felicity to determine the amount of utility or happiness produced by an action and to allow comparisons between actions. In many circumstances, however, an act which brings about the greatest utility is not the act which we morally approve. Furthermore, there are many problems in measuring and comparing different kinds of utilities. Attempts to identify happiness and utility might involve a misunderstanding of happiness. Problems also arise because utilitarians seek to maximise utility without regard to its distribution among people or among different periods in an individual life.

"By utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, . . . or . . . to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."—Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1, 3.

"假定对于行为功利主义的拒斥是决定性的,那么,对于一种有关义务的一般理论的选择似乎就在某种形式主义和某种至少是类似于规则功利主义的东西之间。"——布朗特,《伦理理论》,1959年,第400页。

理想的功利主义

W. D. 罗斯的词汇,指为摩尔所倡导的一种功利主义。与主张后果的善(好)或恶(坏)的性质取决于愉快或痛苦的古典的或快乐主义的功利主义相对照,摩尔不是把快乐,而是把诸如知识和对美的对象的享受等看做是对后果的善具有决定性的事情。

"事实上,理想的功利主义的理论,如果我可以以此简明地指称摩尔教授的理论,似乎是把我们与邻人的关系过分简单化了。"——罗斯:《正当与善良》,1930年,第19页。

功利

有用的或好的并带来快乐或幸福的东西。功利是产生幸福或幸运的性质,但它更多地被直接等同于幸福。从古希腊起,功利在伦理学中就一直受到重视。休谟认为它是所有德性的尺度。自从边沁提出功利原则以来,就出现了一种被称之为功利主义的独特的伦理学理论。对功利主义而言,功利是判断一个行为正确与否的惟一标准。如果一个行为产生了功利,它就是正确的,否则,它就是错误的。边沁还提出了对幸福的计算方法以确定一个行为产生的功利或幸福的数量和在行为之间进行比较。可是,在很多情况下,一个带来最大功利的行为并不是我们在道德上赞同的行为。此外,计算和比较不同的功利也还存在很多问题。试图将幸福与功利等同起来可能包含着对幸福的一种误解。还有一些问题的出现是因为功利主义者只追求最大的功利而没有考虑它在不同人之中和在个人生活的不同时期的分配。

"就功利而言,它指的是这样一种性质,靠它能在任何问题上给利益相关的当事人带来利益、好处、快乐、好事或幸福,……或……阻止损害、痛苦、邪恶或不幸福的发生。"——边沁:《道德与立法原则导论》,1, 3。

Utility calculus, see hedonistic calculus

Utopia

[from Greek: *ou*, not + *topos*, place, literally, a place that does not exist] A word first used in Sir Thomas More's book *Utopia*, in which he depicts an ideal state that has perfect economic, social, political, legal and religious structures. Similar descriptions of an imaginary ideal state can be found in such works as Plato's *Republic*, Tommaso Campanella, *The City of the Sun* (1612), Francis Bacon, *New Atlantis* (1627), Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward* (1888), William Morris, *News from Nowhere* (1890) and H. G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia* (1905). Utopia is generally conceived to be an unrealisable, impractical and purely imaginary ideal state. Unrealistic political and social theories are described as utopian, especially those proposing fanciful schemes of education to change human nature or placing the hope of realizing the ideal state upon the character of great rulers. Utopian theories are often criticised as being based on something going beyond human experience. Nevertheless they represent human aspirations and have always served as an instrument for political criticism. Marx called the work of his predecessors utopian socialism, in contrast to his own scientific socialism, which was grounded on analysis of the existing class conflicts in capitalism.

"The ideal of utopia, the perfect society, has long exerted a powerful influence upon the thinking, feeling, and action of human beings."—Richter (ed), *Utopias*, 1971, p. 1.

Utopian engineering

Popper's term for a methodological approach to bringing about social and political change. Utopian engineers draw up an initial blueprint of society as a whole and then attempt to realise this ideal state by deciding the best means to achieve the predetermined ends. This approach entails large-scale social revolution and is represented by the programme for society in Plato's *Republic*. In contrast, piecemeal engineering focuses on existing social problems and practices to propose a series of relatively modest individual changes. According to Popper, piecemeal engineering is a rational means of pursuing change, while utopian engineering, because it aims at a perfect state, will demand centralised rule and lead to dictatorship. Although utopian engineering starts with an apparently good plan, it can lead to disaster because of the complex realities of human nature and of social life. All change produces unintended as well as intended consequences. With piecemeal engineering it is easier to recognise when unintended consequences are negative and to trace these consequences to their origins in order to eliminate or to control them.

"The Platonic approach I have in mind can be described

功利演算

见“快乐主义的演算”条。

乌托邦

[源自希腊词: *ou* (没有) 和 *topos* (地方), 字面的意思是, 并不存在的地方] T. 莫尔在其《乌托邦》一书中首先使用的一个词。在该书中, 他描绘了那具有完善的经济、社会、政治、法律和宗教结构的理想国家。在柏拉图的《国家篇》、T. 康帕内拉的《太阳城》(1612)、F. 培根的《新大西岛》(1627)、E. 贝拉米的《向后看》(1888)、W. 莫里斯的《来自乌有之乡的消息》(1890) 和 H.G. 威尔斯的《现代乌托邦》(1905) 这些著作中都能发现对想像的理想国家的类似描述。乌托邦一般被设想为不可实现的、不切实际的和纯粹想像的理想状态。非现实的政治的和社会的理论都被说成是乌托邦, 特别是那些提出改变人类本性的幻想的教育方案或把实现理想国家的希望寄托在伟大统治者性格上的计划。乌托邦理论常常被批评为是一种建立于某种超越人类经验的东西的基础上的空想。但是它们仍然体现了人类的渴求, 并且总是作为政治批判的工具。马克思把他的先驱者的工作成果称为乌托邦式的社会主义, 以对比于他自己的科学社会主义, 它根基于对资本主义中现存阶级冲突的分析。

“乌托邦的理想、完善的社会, 对人类的思想、感情和行为已产生了长远的、强有力的影响。”——里希特(编):《乌托邦》, 1971年, 第1页。

乌托邦工程

波普的术语, 用来表示一种带来社会和政治变革的方法论意义上的方法。乌托邦工程先为整个社会勾画一幅最初的蓝图, 然后再通过确定达到预定目的的最好方法来实现这种理想的状态。这种方法需要大范围的社会革命, 并且以柏拉图《国家篇》中的社会方案为代表。相比之下, 渐进工程着眼于现存的社会问题, 经常提出一系列相对温和的个别的变革。按照波普的意见, 渐进的工程是一种追求变革的理性方法, 而乌托邦工程则要求集权的统治并会导致专政, 因为它的目标是一个完美的社会。虽然乌托邦工程始于一个貌似美好的计划, 但由于人的本质和社会生活的复杂的现实情况, 它能导致灾难。所有的变革都产生无意及有意的后果。当无意的后果是消极的时候, 采用渐进工程就比较容易识别它们, 并且比较容易查出这些后果的根源以便消除或控制它们。

“我想到的柏拉图式的思考方法可以描述为乌托邦工程的思考方法, 这种乌托邦工程与另一种在我看来是惟一合理的社会工程相对

as that of utopian engineering, as opposed to another kind of social engineering which I consider as the only rational one, and which may be described by the name of piecemeal engineering." — Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 1, 1945, p. 157.

立,后者可以名之为渐进工程。”——波普:《开放的社会及其敌人》,1945年,第一卷,第157页。

V

Vacuous occurrence

If replacing a descriptive term t in a proposition p by other grammatically appropriate constants does not affect the truth-value of p , then t occurs vacuously in p . If a change of meaning of a term in an argument α does not affect the validity of the argument, then the term occurs vacuously in α . In a tautology or a self-contradictory proposition, the occurrence of all descriptive terms are vacuous. Vacuous occurrence contrasts with "essential occurrence". With essential occurrence, the replacement of a term t will affect the truth-value of the proposition in which it occurs, and a change of meaning of a term in an argument will affect the validity of the argument.

"By vacuous occurrence of a descriptive constant (i. e. either individual constant or predicate constant) is meant that the truth-value of the sentence does not change if any other admissible descriptive constant is substituted." —Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, 1949, p. 365.

Vagueness

The indeterminacy of the field of application of a term, in contrast to precision. For instance, the expression "young man" is vague since the points at which its appropriate application to a person begins and ends cannot be precisely defined. Vagueness should be distinguished from ambiguity, by which a term has more than one meaning. That a term is vague is due to a semantic feature of the term itself, rather than to the subjective conditions of its user. Vagueness gives rise to borderline cases, and propositions with vague terms lack a definite truth-value. In light of this consequence, Frege rejected the possibility of vague concepts, although they are tolerated in recent work in vague or fuzzy logic. Various paradoxes arise due to the vagueness of words, including the ancient sorites paradox. It is because of its intrinsic vagueness that some philosophers seek to replace ordinary language with an ideal language. But ordinary language philosophers hold that this proposal creates a false promise of eliminating vagueness. Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance in part is a model of meaning which tolerates vagueness. As a property of expressions, vagueness extends to all sorts of cognitive representations. Some philosophers hold that there can be vagueness in things as well as in the representation of things.

"A representation is vague when the relation of the rep-

空现

如果在命题 p 中用一语法上合适的常项代替一摹状词项 t 而不影响 p 的真值, 那么 t 在 p 中就是空现。如果在一论证 α 中改变一词项的意义而不影响论证的有效性, 那么该词项在 α 中就是空现。在重言式或自相矛盾的命题中, 所有的摹状词项都是空现。空现与“实现”相反。对实现来说, 对词项 t 的替换将影响它出现于其中的命题的真值, 改变一论证中词项的意义要影响论证的有效性。

“一个摹状常项 (即要么是个体常项, 要么是谓词常项) 的空现指的是, 如果其他合适的摹状常项被替换, 句子的真值不变。”——帕普: 《分析哲学原理》, 1949 年, 第 365 页。

含糊性

一个词的应用范围的不确定性, 与“精确性”相对。例如, 表达式“年轻人”是含糊的, 因为我们无法精确规定将这个表达式恰当地用于一个人时的起止点在何处。含糊性一词应当与“歧义性”一词相区别, 后者指一个词不止有一种意义。一个词是含糊的是由于这个词本身的语义特征, 而非由于该词使用者的主观条件。含糊性造成了一种两可情况, 而且带有模糊词项的命题是没有确切真值的。由于这一结果, 弗雷格拒斥含糊概念的可能性, 尽管这些概念为近来的含糊逻辑或模糊逻辑所容忍。由于词的含糊性, 产生了各种各样的悖论, 其中包括古代的累积悖论。正因为日常语言固有的含糊性, 所以某些哲学家力图用一种理想语言取代它。然而在日常语言哲学家看来, 这个建议所提出的关于排除含糊性的允诺是错误的。维特根斯坦所说的“家族相似”概念在某种程度上就是一个样板, 它意味着对含糊性的容忍。作为表达式的一个特性, 含糊性扩展到各种认知表征上。有些哲学家认为含糊性既可以出现在对事物的表征上, 也可以包含在事物本身。

“一个表征是含糊的, 当表征系统和被表征系统的关系不是一一对应, 而是一多对应的。”——罗素: 《罗素文集》, 第九卷, 第 153 页。

representing system to the represented system is not one-one, but one-many." —Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, IX, p. 153.

Validity

A property attributed to an inference or an argument, which can be defined both syntactically in terms of the axioms or rules of the system and semantically in terms of interpretations or models. Suppose that A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots are premises, and A_0 is a conclusion. Syntactic validity means that A_0 is derivable from A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots , that is the inference complies with the rules of logic. Semantic validity means that A_0 is true if according to interpretations or models in non-logical language A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots are true. The task of traditional logic is to establish the rules of syntactic validity. Validity is not the same as truth, for truth is a property ascribed to propositions or statements rather than to inferences or arguments.

"An argument is valid if and only if it is logically impossible for all the premises to be true yet the conclusion false." —Sainsbury, *Logical Form*, 1991, p. 15.

Value

[from Latin: *valere*, to have worth, to be strong] Its original sense, the worth of a thing, is mainly in economics. In the nineteenth century German philosophers such as the neo-Kantians, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche expanded the sense of value and used it as a major technical notion in their philosophy. Marx's distinction between use-value and exchange-value was a basic feature of his account of economy and society. The conception of value can be traced to the idea of Good in Socrates and Plato. Its use has become increasingly widespread with the recognition of the distinction between value and fact, between what ought to be and what is, in modern philosophy. The general study of value is called axiology.

"Value" has the same range of application as "good" or "worthwhile", and is used as a philosophical equivalent of goodness. Generally speaking, value means the quality of a thing that makes it desirable, useful or an object of interest. Value has been understood in terms of the subjective appreciation by a subject or as something projected onto objects by a subject. In this sense "value" amounts to "being judged to have value". On this view, objects can have different values for different individuals, groups or nations. However, it has also been debated whether there is objective value, that is value independent of the appreciation by a subject. If there is objective value, philosophers ask in what sense and in what way it is objective.

There are various classifications of value. Most commonly, there is a division between extrinsic or instrumental value, which is not itself good but is good as a means for

有效性

有效性属于推理或论证的性质。它既可以从语法上根据该系统的公理或规则加以确定,也可以从语义上根据该系统的解释或模型加以确定。假设 A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots 是前提, A_0 是结论,语法有效性意味着 A_0 可从 A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots 中推出,并且推理遵守了逻辑规则。语义有效性意味着,若根据非逻辑的语言中的解释或模型 A_1, A_2, A_3, \dots 为真,则 A_0 亦真。传统逻辑的任务是确立语法有效性的规则。有效性与真不是一回事,因为真归属于命题或陈述的性质,而不是推理或论证的性质。

"一论证是有效的,当且仅当,它的所有前提真而结论假在逻辑上是不可能的。"—塞斯伯里:《逻辑形式》,1991年,第15页。

价值

[源自拉丁词 *valere*, 意为“值得的”、“有力量的”]它的原始意义是一件事物的价值,并主要是在经济学中使用。在19世纪,德国哲学家诸如新康德主义者、叔本华、尼采扩展了价值的意义,在他们的哲学中把它用作一个主要的专门概念。马克思关于使用价值与交换价值的区分是其经济社会学说的一个基本特征。这个概念可以追溯到苏格拉底和柏拉图的善的理念。由于在现代哲学中对事实与价值的区分、应当是什么和是什么的区分的承认,它的使用变得越来越广泛。对于价值的一般性研究叫做“价值论”。

“价值”一词与“善的”或“值得”有着同样范围的应用,实际上被用作“善”这词的哲学上的等同词。一般而言,价值意味着那使一东西成为值得欲求的、有用的或成为兴趣的目标的性质。价值也被看做是主体的主观欣赏或是主体投射入客体的东西。在这个意义上,“价值”等同于“被判定为有价值”。据此,同一对象对不同的个体、群体及国家有不同的价值。不过,对是否有客观价值,即与主体的偏好无关的价值这个问题,是有争议的。如果有客观价值,哲学家要问的是在什么意义上,在什么方面它是客观的。

价值分为不同类型。最通行的一种是把价值分为内在价值、内含价值和外在或工具价值。工具价值本身不是善的,只是就其作为某种目的的工具而言是善的;内在价值是作为目的或其本身就是善的;内含价值是我们把某物看做

some ends; intrinsic value, which is good as an end in itself; and inherent value, which is the basis for our seeing something as desirable.

In logic, value is the result of applying a function to an argument. For instance, "7" is the value of applying the function " $x + y$ " to the arguments "3" and "4". See function and argument.

"Values express the objective will. Ethical values in particular result from the combination of many lives and sets of interests in a single set of judgements." —Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, p. 136.

Value, instrumental, see extrinsic value

Value, intrinsic

In its ordinary sense, intrinsic value is the value a thing has to most people in normal circumstances, in contrast to the value which the same thing has for special persons in special circumstances. This latter might be called sentimental value. For instance, a lover's gift might have little intrinsic value, but great sentimental value to the loved one.

In another sense, intrinsic value is objective value, that is the value a thing has independent of anything else, so that it would have its value even if it were the only thing that existed. This sense seems to be proposed by Moore.

In its standard wider use, which can be traced to Aristotle's notion of final good, intrinsic value is synonymous with what is intrinsically desirable or intrinsically good. This value is desirable for its own sake and worth pursuing in itself without reference to any other objects. In this sense, intrinsic value contrasts to extrinsic or instrumental value, which is not pursued for itself.

"To say that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." —Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 1922, p. 260.

Value, theory of, see axiology

Value of a variable

A variable ranges over the members of a set. Any entity which falls within the range of the variable as a member of the set and can hence be substituted for the variable is a value of the variable. In the sentential function " x is wise", x is a variable, and "Socrates" is a member of its range and hence one of its values. We may substitute "Socrates" for x , and get the true closed sentence or proposition "Socrates is wise".

"Specific terms within the range of meaning of a variable

是所欲求的东西的基础。

在逻辑上,“值”是把一个函项运用于一个主目的结果。例如,“7”是把函项“ $X \cdot Y$ ”应用于主目“3”和“4”的值。见“函项与主目”条。

“价值表达着客观的意愿。伦理价值尤其是来自于在一种单—的判断中把许多生命和多种利益结合在一起。”——内格尔:《出自无处的观点》,1986年,第136页。

工具价值

见“外在价值”条。

内在价值

在它的一般意义上,内在价值指的是一个事物在正常情况下对于多数人具有的价值,与此相对的是,同一事物对于特定的人们在特定条件下具有的价值,后者也许可称为情感价值。例如,一个情人的礼物也许没有什么内在价值,但对于被爱的人来说,则有巨大的情感价值。

在另一种意义上,内在价值是客观价值,即一个事物所有的独立于其他任何事物的价值,以至于即使只有这一个事物存在,它仍将有价值。价值的这种意义似乎是摩尔阐发的。

在对它的标准的宽泛用法中,“内在价值”的概念可追溯到亚里士多德的终极善,是与“内在所欲求的”或“内在的善”同义的。这一价值就它本身而言即是所欲求的,它本身就是值得追求的,而不需参照任何他物。在这种意义上,内在价值相对立于外在价值或工具价值,后者不是因它自身的缘故人们才去追求。

“说一种价值是内在的,仅仅意味着一个事物是否具有它,在什么程度上具有它这样的问题,只取决于所谈及的事物的内在性质。”——摩尔:《哲学研究》,1922年,第260页。

价值理论

见“价值论”条。

变元的值

变元以—集合中的元素为值。任何作为该集合的元素处于该变元的值域内,并因此能用来替换该变元的实体,都是此变元的值。在语句函项“ x 是聪明的”中, x 是变元,“苏格拉底”是其值域内的元素,因此是它的值。我们可以用“苏格拉底”替换 x ,得到真的闭语句或命题“苏格拉底是聪明的”。

“处在一函项中变元的意义域内的特定的项,叫做该变元的值。”——奎因:《集合论及其

in a function are called 'values' of that variable." —Quine, *Set Theory and its Logic*, 1963.

Value words

The words which are used to express taste and preferences, to express decisions and choices, to criticise and evaluate, to advise, warn, persuade, to praise and encourage. Their function is to guide our own choices and those of other people by commending or prescribing. Typical examples are "good", "right" and "ought", but any word, if used evaluatively might count as a value word. Value words can be negative or positive. The judgements which contain value-words are value judgements. Value words form the web of moral discourse, and the analysis of their implications and connections is one of the main jobs of moral philosophers, especially those concerned with meta-ethic.

"The words with which moral philosophers have especially to do, which are usually called 'value-words', play many important parts." —Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, 1954, p. 98.

Variable

In predicate logic, x is called a variable in a general statement like " x is white" because it ranges over a domain of objects and can be replaced by anything to which the predicate is applied. Generally, " x, y, z, \dots " are used in predicate logic as individual variables representing individuals. The domain of objects a variable ranges over is called the range of the variable. Any member within this range can replace or substitute for the variable to produce a sentence. Variables can be divided into bound variables and free variables (Russell and Whitehead called them respectively real and apparent variables). A variable inside the scope of a quantifier is said to be bound, for example " x " in $(\exists x)Fx$ is bound by the quantifier " \exists " (some). A variable not bound by any quantifier is free, for example " x " in Fx . In propositional logic, " p, q, r, \dots " are used as propositional variables, representing propositions.

"Those expressions in formulae, the replacement of which by a word or phrase would result in a sentence, are called free variables, or simply, variables." —P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 28.

Veganism, see vegetarianism

Vegetarianism

The moral attitude that we should not eat the meat of animals. Vegetarianism has existed for a long time in some religious traditions, but the term "vegetarian" did not become popular until the foundation of the Vegetarian Society in England in 1847. The issue of vegetarianism became more

逻辑》，1963年。

价值词汇

被用来表达爱好、偏好、表达决定和选择、批评和评价、告诫、劝说、警告、赞扬、鼓励的词汇；它们的功能在于通过称赞或规定来指导我们的和其他人的选择。价值词汇的典型例子是“善”〔好〕、“正当”和“应当”，但任何词汇，如果作评价性使用，也可算作价值词。价值词汇可以是否定的或肯定的。包含着价值词汇的判断是价值判断。所以，这些词汇构成了一个道德语言的体系。对它们的蕴含意义和关联的分析是道德哲学家、尤其是元伦理学家的主要工作之一。

“尤其需要道德哲学家处理的词汇，一般被称为‘价值词汇’，起了许多重要的作用。”——诺威尔·史密斯：《伦理学》，1954年，第98页。

变元

在谓词逻辑中，“ x 是白的”这样一个一般陈述中的 x 叫做变元，因为它以对象域为值域，能够被该谓词适用的任何事物所替换。一般来说，“ x, y, z, \dots ”在谓词逻辑中用作个体变元，表示个体。变元所涉及的对象域叫做变元的值域。此值域内的任何元素都可以替换或代换该变元以生成一语句。变元能够分为约束变元和自由变元（罗素和怀特海分别称它们为真实变元和表面变元）。处于量词辖域内的变元被说成是约束的，例如 $(\exists x)Fx$ 中的 x 被量词 \exists （有些）所约束。不被任何量词约束的变元是自由的，例如 Fx 中的 “ x ”。在命题逻辑中，“ p, q, r, \dots ”用作命题变元，表示命题。

“公式中的这样一些表达式，若用词或短语替换它们后生成语句，叫做自由变元，或者简单地叫做变元。”——斯特劳森：《逻辑理论导论》，第28页。

严格素食论

见“素食主义”条。

素食主义

我们不应食用动物肉的一种道德态度。在某些宗教传统中，素食主义的存在已有很长时间了，但“素食者”这个词汇直到1847年英国的“素食者协会”成立才流行。这个问题因动物解放运动的兴起而成为热门话题。素食主义者

prominent with the rise of the animal liberation movement. Vegetarians argue that eating meat takes animals as a means to an end, and thus fails to respect them as beings with inherent value or with a right to respect. Different theorists provide different sorts of a moral basis for vegetarianism. Some argue that animals have interests, others emphasise that they have rights. All of these are controversial views. Vegetarian arguments depend on the criterion one takes as the basis of moral consideration. Tom Regan claims that an animal is a subject-of-a-life and that one is not permitted to eat anything that is a subject-of-a-life. Peter Singer considers that sentience is the basis of moral thinking and that no sentient being can be used as food. For the animal liberation movement, the vegetarian lifestyle is fundamental as a personal means for shifting our moral consciousness towards animals. Generally vegetarianism prohibits meat eating, but not animal products such as milk and eggs. An extreme form of vegetarianism which advocates the avoidance of all animal products is called veganism.

"Killing animals for food normally means not only that the animals die but that they must be exploited throughout their lives in order to reduce the costs of production. Thus, the case for vegetarianism is strong whatever view we take of the value of animal life." —Singer, in Regan (ed.), *Matters of Life and Death*, 1993, p. 316.

Veil of appearance, see veil of perception

Veil of ignorance

The major condition that Rawls imposes in his original position on participants who are to determine the principles of justice governing the basic structure of society. All participants are situated behind a veil of ignorance, where they have no knowledge of their particular characteristics, abilities, religious beliefs and personal histories. They do not know the economic condition or political situation of their society or their own social status or class position. They have general theoretical knowledge about society and know that they are rational and will pursue primary goods whatever their circumstances and plan of life. The veil of ignorance is meant to guarantee that the choice made by the participants will not be biased by their specific interests or advantage and to oblige them to determine principles impartially and objectively. It is not clear that persons behind the veil of ignorance would have enough knowledge to choose any conception of justice. If they know more about themselves and their society, the demand that they are unanimous in their conception of justice is at risk. It is also possible that individuals can be biased by their history even if they are ignorant of that history.

"The veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous

认为,把动物作为餐桌上的食物就是把它们作为一种目的的工具,就没有把它们作为具有内在价值的存在物、或具有权利的存在物来尊重。不同的理论家对于素食主义提供了不同种类的道德基础。有人主张动物有利益,其他人则强调它们有权利。所有这些都是有争议的观点。素食主义的论证取决于把什么当做是道德考虑基础的标准。T. 里根把动物看做是生命的主体,所以一个人不能被允许吃任何是生命主体的东西。P. 辛格把感受性看做是道德思考的基础,所以没有任何具有感受性的存在物能被用作食物。对于动物解放运动来说,素食主义的生活方式是基本的,也是转换我们的道德意识的个人性的工具。一般而言,素食主义禁止食用肉类,而不是动物的产品,诸如牛奶和蛋。提倡避开所有的动物产品的素食主义的极端形式称作严格素食论。

"杀死动物作为食物,一般不仅是指动物之死,而且还意味着它们终身都要受剥削,以减少生产费用。因此,不论我们对于动物生命的价值持有什么观点,在这里,素食主义就是强有力的。"——辛格,见里根编:《生命与死亡的问题》,1993年,第316页。

外观之幕

见“知觉之幕”条。

无知之幕

罗尔斯强加给原初状态下的参加者的主要条件。这些参加者要确定支配社会基本结构的正义原则。所有的参加者都处在无知之幕背后,他们对他们的特性、能力、宗教信仰及个人的历史一无所知。他们不知道他们所处社会的经济条件和政治状况,不知道他们的社会身份或阶级地位。他们有对社会的一般的理论知识,也知道他们是理性的,并且不管他们的环境和生活计划如何都将追求基本的善。无知之幕意味着可以保证参加者做出的选择不被他们的特殊利益和好处所歪曲,可以使他们公正客观地确定原则。无知之幕背后的人是否有足够的知识选择正义的观念,这一问题还不清楚。如果他们对自己和他们的社会了解得更多,那要求他们在正义观念上取得一致就有风险。个人会因为他们的历史、甚至因为对他们的历史的无知而产生偏见,这也是可能的。

"无知之幕使对一特殊正义观念的一致选择成为可能。"——罗尔斯:《正义论》,1971年,第140页。

choice of a particular conception of justice.”—Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 140.

Veil of perception

Also called the veil of appearance. Locke and many later empiricists have claimed that what we perceive are not external objects themselves, but are sensory ideas or sense-data which are produced in our minds by external things. These ideas, like a veil, stand as intermediaries between the conscious subjects and external objects. Our senses can only show us sense-data or appearances. Such a theory is different from Platonism, which claims that perception and appearance are unreliable and that reality can be known only through the intellect. The view also differs from naive realism, which holds that what we sense is the object itself rather than its appearance, and from phenomenism, which holds that external objects are constructed out of actual and possible sense-data. Because appearances can hide the real nature of things and prevent us from knowing reality as it is, the theory of the veil of perception has led to sceptical challenges to our knowledge of the external world.

“We are restricted to the passing show on the veil of perception, with no possibility of extending our knowledge to the world beyond.”—Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, 1984, p. 33.

Verification theory of meaning

The theory of meaning advocated by the Logical Positivists and associated with the criterion of verifiability. The latter provides a criterion of meaningfulness for sentences, while the verification theory of meaning specifies the nature of meaning. According to the criterion, a sentence is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is logically possible for it to be verified. The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, that is, the way in which it can be verified or falsified, particularly by experience. The theory has been challenged because the best formulations still exclude meaningful sentences and allow meaningless sentences. Critics also claim that the theory is a test for meaningfulness rather than a theory of meaning proper. Further, they claim that it fails to take into account the interconnectedness of language.

“The verification theory of meaning, which dominated the Vienna Circle, was concerned with the meaning and meaningfulness of sentences rather than words.”—Quine, *Theories and Things*, 1981, p. 70.

Verificationism

A position fundamental to logical positivism claiming that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification. Accordingly, apparent statements lacking a method of verification, such as those of religion and metaphysics, are meaningless. Theoretical terms can be defined in terms of the phe-

知觉之幕

又称“外观之幕”。洛克以及许多后来的经验论者声称,我们所知觉到的并非对象本身,而是外部的东西在我们心中所产生的感觉观念或感觉材料。这些观念像屏幕一样作为中介物竖立在意识主体和外部客体之间。我们的感官只能向我们显示感觉材料或表象。这一理论与柏拉图主义不同,后者认为知觉和表象是不可靠的,现实只能通过智力来了解。这一观点也不同于朴素实在论,后者认为我们所感觉到的就是对象本身而不是其表象。它也不同于现象论,后者主张外部对象建构于实际的或可能的感觉材料。由于表象会隐藏事物的真实本质而使得我们不能知道事物本来的样子,知觉之幕理论便导致对我们关于外部世界知识的怀疑论的挑战。

“我们被局限于知觉之幕的短暂显示,不可能将知识扩展到这以外的世界。”——斯特罗德:《哲学怀疑论的意义》,1984年,第33页。

意义的证实论

这是逻辑实证主义者所提倡的意义理论,与可证实性标准密切相关。后者提供了语句有意义性的标准,而意义证实论则规定了意义的本性。根据可证实性标准,一语句是认知上有意义的,当且仅当它被证实是逻辑上可能的。语句的意义就是它的证实方法,也就是它能被(特别是经验)证实或证伪的方式。这一理论已受到挑战,因为即使是它的最好的表述也排除有意义语句并允许无意义语句。批评家们还断言,该理论是对有意义性的检验,而不是意义理论本身。而且,他们断言它没有考虑到语言的内部联系。

“支配着维也纳学派的意义证实论,所关注的是语句而不是语词的意义和有意义性。”——奎因:《理论与事物》,1981年,第70页。

证实主义

一种逻辑实证主义中的基本立场,主张一个陈述的意义在于其证实方法。相应地,那些显然缺乏证实方法的断言,如宗教的和形而上学的断言,则是没有意义的。理论名词只能用这样的现象条件来定义,采用了这些现象条件的断

nomenal conditions by means of which assertions employing them can be verified. In the philosophy of mind, behaviourism, which tries to reduce unobserved inner states to patterns of behaviour turns out to be a version of verificationism. Some philosophers require conclusive verification for a statement to be meaningful, while others allow any positive evidence to confer meaning. There are disputes whether every statement must be verified separately or theories can be verified as a whole even if some of their statements cannot be verified separately. Attempts to offer a rigorous account of verification have run into difficulties because statements which should be excluded as meaningless nevertheless pass the test of verification.

"For over a hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the philosophy of science has been verificationism, that is, the doctrine that to know the meaning of a scientific proposition... is to know what would be evidence for that proposition." —Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality*, 1975, vii.

Verisimilitude

[from Latin: *verisimilar*, like the truth] The degree of approximation or closeness to truth of a statement or a theory. Popper defined it in terms of the difference resulting from truth-content minus falsity-content. The truth-content of a statement is all of its true consequences, while the falsity-content of a statement is all of its false consequences. The aim of science is to find better verisimilitude. One theory has a better verisimilitude if it can explain the success of competing theories and can also explain cases where other theories fail. Popper emphasised that verisimilitude is different from probability. Probability is the degree of logical certainty abstracted from content, while verisimilitude is degree of likeness to truth and combines truth and content.

"This suggests that we combine here the ideas of truth and content into one: the idea of a degree of better (or worse) correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to truth; or to use a term already mentioned above (in contradistinction to probability) the idea of (degrees of) verisimilitude." —Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1972, pp. 232-3.

Verstehen

[German: understanding] Because understanding is a general notion, many English translations and philosophers leave the theoretical term *Verstehen* untranslated. In German philosophy of history, *Verstehen* is used for a cognitive mode peculiar to the social sciences. It is an empathic or participatory understanding of a subject's point of view by imaginatively putting oneself into the place of the subject. It is a reconstruction of the subject's purposes, values and meaning. In contrast, explanation (German: *Erklären*), which seeks

言藉此是可证实的。在心的哲学中,行为主义试图把未观察到的内在状态还原为行为模式,这表明其为证实主义的一种形式。有些哲学家要求完整的证实才使一个陈述有意义,而其他人则认为任何肯定证据都可授予意义。关于是否每个命题必须分别证实,或是一个理论即使其某些陈述不能分别证实,它作为整体也是能证实的,依然存在分歧。力图对证实提供一严格的叙述会产生种种困难,因为应作为无意义而排斥的陈述,也可以通过证实检验。

"一个世纪以来,科学哲学中的一种支配性倾向是证实主义,即这么一种学说:要知道一个科学命题的意义,就是去认识这个命题的证据是什么。"——普特南:《心智、语言与实在》,1975年,vii。

逼真性

[源自拉丁文 *verisimilar*, "像真", "似真性"] 指对一个陈述或理论的真的近似或接近程度。波普用真内容减假内容的差来定义它。一个陈述的真内容为其所有的真结论,而其假内容为其所有的假结论。科学的目的是发现更好的逼真性。一个理论如果既能说明其竞争理论成功的事例,也能说明其他理论不能说明的事例,它就有更好的逼真性。波普强调,逼真性不同于概然性。概然性是从内容中抽象出的逻辑确定性程度,而逼真性则是把真与内容结合起来的似真性程度。

"这表明我们在这里把真与内容合而为一,即合为更加(或更不)符合真理的观念,与真理更为(或更不)相像或相似的观念;或者用前已提及的术语说,即与概然性相反的逼真性(程度)的观念。"——波普:《猜想与反驳》,1972年,第232—233页。

理解

[德文:理解]由于理解是一个普通的概念,很多英文翻译和英国哲学家对理论术语 *Verstehen* 没有做翻译。在德国历史哲学中,它常被用来表示社会科学特有的一种认识方式。它是通过将自己想像地置身于一个主体所处的位置而对这一主体的观点做强调性的或分享的理解。它是对主体的目的、价值和意图的一种重建。相比之下,寻求因果关系和求助普遍法则的解释(德文: *Erklären*) 则具有自然科学特有的

causal relations and appeals to general laws, is the method characteristic of the natural sciences. Proponents of classical *Verstehen* theory rejected the claim that the social sciences should follow the natural sciences by searching for the objective meaning of the social world. The claims of *Verstehen* are opposed to scientism and positivism, although Max Weber argued that both *Verstehen* and *Erklären* belong to the methodology of social science. The notion of *Verstehen* can be traced to Giambattista Vico and J. G. von Herder, but it was fully elaborated by Dilthey in order to demonstrate that the human sciences have a distinct methodology. Heidegger and Gadamer, however, view *Verstehen* not as a cognitive mode but as the essential feature of human beings situated in a world that projects infinite possibilities.

"A *Verstehen* approach to the study of human beings is any which assumes that the inquiry cannot be modelled on natural sciences; any 'humanistic' or 'non-scientist' approach, to use other terms in common employment; an *Erklären* approach is one which makes the contrary assumption." —Macdonald and Pettit, *Semantics and Social Science*, 1981, P. 55.

Via antiqua, see *via moderna*

Via moderna

[Latin: the modern way] A term for the nominalist movement that arose in the fourteenth century, influenced by the writings of William of Ockham. It was opposed to the *via antiqua* (the old way), that is the realist schools which were dominant in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries, including Thomism, Scotism, and Augustinianism. The movement emphasised logic and direct experience and rejected empty speculation and abstraction. Ockham's razor, the principle that plurality is never to be posited without need, was the basic spirit of the movement. The advocates of the *via moderna* believed in the principle of the uniformity of nature, and engaged actively in scientific research. The *via moderna* exerted a great impact on the later development of modern physics.

"Ockham's teachings had, rather, a stimulating effect. They awakened many somewhat independent thinkers who were united at least against the realism of the older scholastics. These 'nominales' (in the medieval sense) constituted the *via moderna*, which was not so much a school as a trend of thought." —Boehner (ed.), *Ockham: Philosophic Writing*, 1959, introduction li.

Via negativa

A way of describing God who transcends human experience by denying limited qualities to God by the use of such adjectives as incorporeal and uncreated. It is claimed that we

方法。经典的理解理论的倡导者反对这样一种主张，即社会科学应通过探究社会领域的客观意义去效仿自然科学。*Verstehen* 的主张是与科学主义和实证主义相对立的，尽管 M. 韦伯论证说 *Verstehen* 和 *Erklären* 都属于社会科学的方法。对 *Verstehen* 的见解可追溯到 G. 维柯和 J. G. 冯·赫尔德，但对它做详尽阐述的是狄尔泰，其目的是为了论证人文科学有独特的方法。不过，海德格尔和伽达默尔把 *Verstehen* 不仅视为一种认识方式，而且视为处在呈现无数可能性的世界中的人类的本质特征。

“对人类研究而言，*Verstehen* 的方法就是任何假定探究不能模仿自然科学的方法，用其他通常使用的术语讲就是那些‘人本主义的’或‘非科学主义的’的方法；*Erklären* 的方法是一种做出相反假定的方法。”——麦克唐纳和彼特：《语义学和社会科学》，1981 年，第 55 页。

古路

见“新路”条。

新路

[拉丁语，新近之路] 这个词指在奥康的威廉的著作影响下，兴起于 14 世纪的唯名论运动。它与在 12 至 13 世纪占统治地位的“*via antiqua*”（古路），包括托马斯主义、司各脱主义和奥古斯丁主义的唯实论学派相对立。该运动强调逻辑和直接经验，拒绝空洞的玄思和抽象。所谓“奥康剃刀”，即“如无必要，不应设置复数”的原则，是这个运动的基本精神。“新路”的拥护者们相信自然的齐一原则，并积极投身于科学研究。“新路”对近代物理学的后来发展产生了很大影响。

“奥康的教导多少具有一种刺激作用。它们唤醒了许多稍微有些独立的思想家，至少使得他们联合起来，反对老经院学者们的唯实论。这些‘唯名论者’（中世纪意义上的）建构了新路，但这与其说是一个学派，还不如说是一种思想倾向。”——伯霍尔（编）：《奥康：哲学著作》，1959 年，“绪论” li。

否定方法

否认用有限的性质指称上帝，通过使用诸如“无形的”、“非创造的”等形容词来描述超越于人类经验的上帝的一种方法。这种方法主张，

can come to know God by knowing what he is not. *Via negativa* is contrasted to *via positiva*, which ascribes to God positive attributes, such as omnipotence, omniscience and absolute goodness.

"The idea of God can be approached through the use of imagination (the *via imaginative*) and varies to the extent that it employs positive attributions (the *via positiva*) or negative (the *via negativa*). " — C. Taliaferro, in N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 1995, P. 452.

Via positiva, see *via negativa*

Vicious circle

Circular reasoning, also called begging the question or *petitio principii*, makes use of the conclusion to be proved as a premise, and hence renders the argument invalid. A circular definition explains the *definiens* in terms of the *definiendum* and renders the definition empty. Circularity in these cases is vicious. According to Russell, paradoxes in the foundations of mathematics are due to vicious circularity, for they violate the vicious circle principle that "whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection". His theory of types is established on the basis of this principle and attempts to avoid all paradoxes of this sort.

Not all circularities in argument or definition, however, are vicious. All deductions mean to derive the conclusion from the premises and hence the conclusion must have been implied in the premises. If the circle is large enough, and the argument or definition can still provide new knowledge, it is considered to be a virtuous circle.

"The vicious circles in question all arise from supposing that a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole." — Russell, *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, VI, P. 4.

Vicious circle principle

Before Russell, Poincaré noticed that many paradoxes stem from viciously circular definitions, which he called impredicative definitions. Russell formulates a vicious circle principle to solve the various paradoxes at the foundation of mathematics. It has several versions, including "whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection", "if, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have a member only definable in terms of that total, then the said collection is not total" or "whatever contains an apparent variable must not be a possible value of that variable". For Russell, all set theories which violate this principle are unintelligible and unsound. Corresponding to this principle, Russell established his theory of the hierarchy of types, according to which, whatever contains an apparent variable belongs

我们只有通过知道上帝不是什么, 才能最后认识他。否定方法与用诸如全能、全知、绝对的善等肯定属性来描述上帝的肯定方法相对应。

"上帝的观念能够通过想像(the *via imaginative*) 的使用来把握, 至于达到这个观念的途径, 则因使用肯定方法 (the *via positiva*) 还是否定方法 (the *via negativa*) 而有所不同。" ——塔里亚斐洛, 见布宁和崔-詹姆斯编:《布莱克韦尔哲学指南》, 1995 年, 第 452 页。

肯定方法

见“否定方法”条。

恶性循环

循环推理, 亦称“窃取论题”或 *petitio principii*, 即用待证的结论作为前提, 因而使证明无效。循环定义用“被定义项”说明“定义项”, 使定义变得空洞。这些情况下的循环都是恶的。根据罗素所说, 数学基础中的悖论是由恶性循环造成的, 因为它们违反了恶性循环原理, 即“凡是包含一个集合的全部元素者, 不得为该集合中的一个元素”。他的类型论是建立在这个原则的基础上的, 并试图避免所有这类悖论。

不过, 并非所有证明或定义中的循环都是恶性的。一切演绎都意味着从前提中引出结论, 因而结论必定已经蕴涵在前提中。如果循环足够大, 证明或定义仍然可以提供新知识的话, 那么, 这个循环可以被定义为“良性循环”。

“这里所说的恶性循环都出自如下假定: 一个对象的集合可以包含只能用整个集合来规定的元素。”——罗素:《罗素文集》, 第六卷, 第 4 页。

恶性循环原理

在罗素之前, 彭加勒注意到, 许多悖论起源于恶性循环定义, 他称之为非直谓定义。罗素制定了一个恶性循环原理, 以解决数学基础上的各种悖论。这个原理有几种说法, 包括如下: “凡是包含一个集合的全部元素者, 不得为该集合中的一个元素”; “如果假定某个集合有整体, 它就本应有一个只能根据那个整体来定义的元素, 这样一来, 所说的这个集合就不是完整的”; “凡是包含一个显变元的集合, 不得为该变元的一个可能值”。在罗素看来, 所有违反这条原理的集合论都是难以理解的和靠不住的。与这条原理相一致, 罗素建立了他的类型分级理论, 根据这个理论, 凡是包含一个显变元的集合都属于与该变元的可能值不同的类型。因此, 没有任

to a different type from the possible values of that variable. Hence no paradox will arise.

"These fallacies, ... are to be avoided by what may be called the 'vicious circle principle'; that is 'no totality can contain members defined in terms of itself'."—Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, 1956, P. 75.

Vienna Circle

A philosophical and scientific movement originated in the 1920s under the leadership of Professor Moritz Schlick of the University of Vienna by a group of philosophers and scientists who shared many basic ideas. The name derived from the manifesto of the movement "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle", published in 1929. Leading members of the circle included M. Schlick, R. Carnap, O. Neurath, F. Waismann, H. Feigl and K. Gödel. Its philosophy, which is called "Logical Positivism" or "Logical Empiricism", was introduced to English readers by A. J. Ayer's book *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936). The Vienna Circle's journal *Erkenntnis* was its main medium of publicity, but it also published a series of monographs under the general title "Unified Science" (*Einheitswissenschaft*, German), and organised many international congresses. The Vienna Circle disintegrated after the death in 1936 of Schlick, who was shot by an insane student, and with the German invasion of Austria. Many members emigrated to United States, England and the Scandinavian countries, and exerted great influence in their new countries. Neurath made great effort to keep the movement going. He changed the title of *Erkenntnis* into *The Journal of Unified Science*. Together with Carnap he initiated publication of a series of works at the University of Chicago under the general title *The Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. In spite of these efforts, the Vienna Circle was no longer a school.

"The philosophers with whom I am in the closest agreement are those who compose the 'Viennese circle', under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, and are commonly known as logical positivists."—Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1946, P. 32.

Vinculum substantiale

[Latin: substantial bond or chain] A controversial doctrine in Leibniz's later thought. Only monads are real in nature, and everything else is composed of them. A plurality of monads constitutes a corporeal substance if and only if they are united by a *vinculum substantiale* (a substantial chain); otherwise things would be mere phenomena. Thus, *vinculum substantiale* is necessary for the substantiality and unity of corporeal substance. It is itself a substantial thing, but not a monad or an accident. Leibniz introduced this doctrine in order to account for the miracle of transubstantiation, but it was criticised by Russell and others as being inconsistent

何悖论会出现。

"这些谬误……可以用所谓的'恶性循环原理'来避免,这个原理即'任何整体都不能包含由该整体本身规定的元素'。"——罗素:《逻辑和知识》,1956年,第75页。

维也纳小组

起源于20世纪20年代,由维也纳大学的M. 石里克教授领导,由一群共同有着许多基本看法的哲学家和科学家发起的哲学和科学运动。此名称得自于1929年发表的运动宣言“科学的世界观,维也纳小组”。该小组的主要成员包括M. 石里克、R. 卡尔纳普、O. 纽拉特、F. 魏斯曼、H. 费格尔和K. 哥德尔。该小组的哲学——叫做“逻辑实证主义”或“逻辑经验主义”——由A. J. 艾耶尔的《语言、真理和逻辑》(1936)介绍给英国读者。维也纳小组的杂志《认识》是其主要的公共媒介,但它还出版了一系列冠以总名称“统一科学”(德文为 *Einheitswissenschaft*)的专著,还组织了很多学术会议。在石里克于1936年死后(他为一个神经不正常的学生所枪杀),以及随着德国入侵奥地利,维也纳小组解散了。很多成员移居到了美国、英国和斯堪的纳维亚国家,并在这些新的国家产生了极大的影响。纽拉特作出巨大努力来使运动继续前进。他把《认识》的名称改为《统一科学杂志》,他和卡尔纳普一道共同发起在芝加哥大学出版总题目为《统一科学百科全书》的系列著作。尽管有这些努力,维也纳小组不再是一个学派。

“我与之观点密切一致的哲学家是在石里克领导之下组成‘维也纳小组’的那些人,他们以逻辑实证主义者而广为人知。”——艾耶尔:《语言、真理和逻辑》,1946年,第32页。

实体链

[拉丁文,实体纽带或实体链] 莱布尼茨晚期思想中颇有争议的一个学说。只有单子在性质上是实在的,一切事物都由单子构成。许多单子构成一个物质实体,当且仅当这些单子是由 *vinculum substantiale* 联结起来的;否则事物就只是现象。因而, *vinculum substantiale* 对于物质实体的实体性和统一性是必不可少的。它本身是实体性的东西,但不是单子,也不是偶性。莱布尼茨提出这个学说是为了说明基督教的化体奇迹,但遭到了罗素等人的批判,认为这个学说与他的单子论的基本原则不一致,在单子论

with the general tenet of his theory of monads within which monads themselves are responsible for the unity of corporeal substances.

"If that substantial chain (*vinculum substantiale*) for monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena."—Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Aricew and Garber), 1989, p. 198.

Virtue

[Greek: *arete*, also translated as excellence. In English, virtue is a transliteration from Latin; *virtus*, manliness.] In Greece, virtue was not only human excellence or moral virtue, but also the excellence of anything in performing its essential function. Excellence at cutting is the virtue of a knife; excellence at seeing is the virtue of eyes. The traditional Greek human virtues are generally thought to include courage, temperance, piety, justice and wisdom, but there were conflicting beliefs about them. Socrates devoted all of his life to clarifying the meaning of these virtues, claiming crucially that virtue is knowledge. One main aspect of Plato's theory of ideas was to establish the metaphysical foundation for moral virtues and to determine how a man should live.

Aristotle inferred on the basis of its original meaning that virtue is a thing's good performance of its functions that human virtue is the excellence of man in performing his rational function. A good man performs well activities involving thought. Since a man not only has the ability to think, but also has the ability to control his desire and conduct by reason, Aristotle divides virtue into intellectual virtue, including, among others, practical wisdom (*phronesis*) and theoretical wisdom (*theoria* or contemplation), and moral or ethical virtues (excellence of character). These latter are internalised dispositions of action, desire and feeling closely connected with practical wisdom. Aristotle's ethics is essentially a theory of virtue.

For Epicurus, virtue is necessary for happiness not because it is an essential ingredient, but because it is a means to its attainment. For Stoicism, virtue is a pattern of behaviour that follows from a disposition perfectly in tune with Nature's rationality, and it is the only choiceworthy good. In its later development, moral virtue is understood differently in different cultures. The seven Christian cardinal virtues include Plato's four virtues in the *Republic* (courage, temperance, wisdom and justice), plus faith, hope and love.

In addition to the nature of virtues, philosophers have explored relations among the virtues themselves, relations between virtues and non-virtuous states, the place of virtues in our psychology and their role in achieving happiness. Virtues offer a basis for ethical life rivalling those provided by Kantian principles or utilitarian calculation of happiness,

中, 单子本身对物质实体的统一性负责。

“如果用于各种单子的实体链 (*vinculum substantiale*) 不存在, 那么, 一切物体, 连同它们的全部性质都不过是有可靠根据的现象。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译), 1989年, 第198页。

德性

[希腊词 *arete*, 也可译为“卓越”。在英语中, “德性”是对拉丁词 *virtus* (意为“男子气概”) 的字母直译。在希腊, 德性不仅指人的卓越或道德德性, 也指任何东西在履行它的本质功能中的卓越。在切割上的卓越是刀子的德性, 在观看上的卓越是眼睛的德性。传统希腊人所认定的人类德性一般被认为包括勇敢、节制、虔敬、正义和智慧。但对于这些德性有着冲突性的信念。苏格拉底终身致力于澄清这些德性的意义, 庄重地宣称德性就是知识。柏拉图理念论的一个主要方面就在于为道德德性确立形上学的基础和确定一个人应怎样生活。

德性的原来意义是一物在履行其功能时的卓越, 依此为基础, 亚里士多德推论道, 人类的德性是履行其理性的功能的卓越。一个好的人出色地从事一切需要思想的活动。既然一个人不仅有思想的能力, 也有通过理性控制自己的欲望和引导行为的能力, 亚里士多德把德性划分为理智的德性(包括实践智慧 *phronesis* 和理论智慧 *theoria* 或沉思)和道德的或伦理的德性(性格的卓越)。这后者是与实践智慧密切相关的内在化的行为、欲望和感情的性情。亚里士多德的伦理学在本质上是一种德性论。

对于伊壁鸠鲁, 德性对于幸福是必要的, 不是因为它是—一个实质性的组成成分, 而是因为它是达到幸福的一个工具。对于斯多亚派来说, 德性是行为的范式, 它来自于与自然理性完善地和谐的一种性情, 并且它是惟一可选择的善。在它的后来的发展中, 道德德性在不同的文化中有不同理解。七种基督教的主要德性包括柏拉图在《国家篇》中的四种德性(勇敢、节制、智慧和正义), 加上信、望、爱。

在德性的性质之外, 哲学家们也研究了诸德性之间的关系, 德性与非德性的状态的关系, 德性在我们的心理学中的位置以及在获得幸福中的作用。德性为伦理生活提供了一个基础, 可与康德主义原则所提供的基础或为功利主义的对幸福的计算所提供的东西所媲美, 虽然对于伦理的说明也许应合理地包括原则、后果和德性。德性伦理学在近来的复苏, 部分原因是出于对其他主要伦理观点的抽象普遍性质的不满, 并打算通过强调在具体的个人那里培育德性来

although an account of ethics might reasonably include principles, consequences and virtues. A recent revival of virtue ethics has been motivated in part by dissatisfaction with the abstract universal nature of the main alternative views and is intended to correct this through the emphasis on cultivating virtues in concrete human individuals.

"Virtue, then, is a state that decides, [consisting] in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, i. e., to the reason by reference to which the intelligent person could define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a1-4.

Virtue (Kant)

In contrast to the Aristotelian tradition which defined virtue as a settled habit or disposition, Kant defined virtue as a struggle and as a moral strength of will in overcoming temptation to transgress the law, that is in resisting urges and inclination opposed to the demands of duty. A virtuous person has a strong sense of duty or a strong reverence for the moral law. Kant claimed that the traditional virtues are valuable only as a means to the ends of a good will, but he also ascribed to virtue an important place in his moral theory. He divided his *Metaphysics of Morals* into two parts: the doctrine of rights, which is a doctrine of morality in general, and the doctrine of virtue, which concerns duties that do not come under external laws. The doctrine of virtue is also divided into two parts. The first deals with duties of virtues to oneself as both an animal being and as a moral being, and the second deals with the duties of virtues to others.

"The capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust opponent is fortitude, and with respect to what opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (moral fortitude)." —Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, II, introduction.

Virtue ethics

An ethical theory which takes virtue as primary and asserts that the central question of ethics, "how should I live?", can be construed as "what kind of person should I be?". Its goal is to describe types of character which are admired within a certain culture or society. For the ancient Greeks, ethics was something concerned with character (*ethos*), and hence ethics was understood as virtue ethics. Most Socratic dialogues examine the common beliefs about what virtue is. Plato in his *Republic* discussed four cardinal virtues and connected them to different parts of the soul. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is the most celebrated system of virtue ethics. He connected virtue with human function and *telos*, divided virtue into intellectual and moral virtues, and argued that a full virtue is a disposition to choose and act and is the mean state between deficiency and excess relative

修正它。

“德性因而是一种决定状态,是一种相对我们的中道,是为理性所界定,即参照那据此明智的人能够界定它的理性。它是两恶——一个是过度,一个是不足之间的中道。”——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1107a1-4。

德性(康德)

与亚里士多德把德性定义为稳定的习惯或性情的传统不同,康德把德性定义为意志的一种斗争和道德力量,表现于在克服那些违反法则的诱惑,也就是在对抗那种与职责相对立的冲动和偏向中。一个有德性的人是有强烈职责感的人,或对道德法则高度尊重的人。一方面,康德主张,传统德性之所以有价值只是由于作为善良意志这个目的的手段。另一方面,他也在他的道德理论中对德性赋予重要地位。他把他的《道德形而上学》分为两个部分:作为道德一般学说的权利学说,和关于不受外部法则支配的责任的德性学说。德性学说依次划分为两个部分:一是论述对于自己既作为一动物存在又作为一道德存在的德性职责,另一部分论述对于他人的德性职责。

“反抗一个强大而不公正的对手的能力和有意识的决心是坚忍,如果与我们之中的道德倾向相关,则是德性(道德坚忍)。”——康德:《道德形而上学》,II,导言。

德性伦理学

把德性看成是主要的伦理理论,它提出伦理学的中心问题“我应该怎样生活”可以建构为“我应该是哪一种人?”它的目的在于描述在一定的文化或社会之中受到敬重的品格类型。因为在古希腊,伦理学是与品格相关的,因此,伦理学被建构为德性伦理学。大多数的苏格拉底对话考察了对德性的一般信念。柏拉图在他的《国家篇》中讨论了四种主要的德性,并把它们与灵魂的不同部分连接起来。亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》是德性伦理学的最著名的体系。他把德性与人的功能和目的连接起来,把德性分为理智的和道德的德性,并且主张一种完备的德性是一种选择和行动的性情(品质),是为实践理性所规定的相对于人的过度与缺失之间的中道。对于斯多亚派而言,德性在于与自然一

to a person that is prescribed by practical reason. For the Stoics, virtue lay in conformity to nature and the virtuous life was self-sufficient. Virtue ethics continued to develop in the medieval era, especially in Aquinas, but declined with the rise of modern ethical theories, in particular utilitarianism and deontology, which take it that morality must be determined by the calculation of utility of the consequences of action or by the rules and principles governing moral actions. In this century there has been a revival of virtue ethics, represented by Anscombe, MacIntyre, Williams, Foot, von Wright, and Annette Baier. It claims that modern ethical theories cannot help us to deal with many moral problems and that the focus of ethical consideration must shift from the agent's action to the agents themselves and to their ambitions and projects. Virtue ethics is essentially a neo-Aristotelian position. However, while some virtue theorists tend to give up all modern principle based ethics, others argue that Aristotelian ethics fails to deal with the moral problems regarding the relationship among human beings and must be revised.

The major issues discussed in virtue ethics include the formation of characters, practical reason, moral education, connections between character and friendship, and the analysis of specific traits such as courage, loyalty, shame, guilt and many traditional vices. This is a newly exploited area and much discussion is still going on. Although such an approach cannot do all the work of ethics, it is valuable for uncovering the character-forming area of life which has long been ignored by other moral theories.

"Whether criticisms will emerge that eventually undercut virtue-ethics only time will tell. But the problems of other views and the richness and distinctiveness of an ethics of virtue that discards moral notions without falling into egoism may at least assure us that virtue ethics must be taken seriously as a theoretical option." —Michael Slote, *From Morality to Virtue*, 1994, P. 263.

Virtuous circle, see vicious circle

Visual field

The totality of a person's visual sense-impressions or immediate perceptions at a given time. This field includes all true or false visual data immediately acquired without any element of inference. It is a mental field of vision, rather than the range of external spatial things that are available to a person's eye. Parallel notions include other sensory fields connected with touch, hearing, taste and smell. All these together form the notion of a sense-field.

"Whenever I open my eyes I am aware of a coloured field of view, which I will call a 'visual field'." —Broad, *Scientific Thought*, 1969, P. 285.

致,而有德的生活就是自足的生活。在中世纪,德性伦理学继续发展,特别是在阿奎那那里,但它随着现代伦理理论的兴起而衰落,特别是功利主义和道义论的兴起而衰落。在这两者里,道德为对行为后果的功利计算所确定,或为支配道德行为的原则或规则所确定。在20世纪,德性伦理学得到复兴,代表人物有:安斯康、麦金太尔、威廉姆斯、福特、冯·赖特、A. 培尔等。它认为现代伦理理论不能帮助我们解决许多道德问题,伦理考虑的焦点应当从行为者的行为转到行为者本身,转到行为者的志向和规划。德性伦理学实质上是一种新亚里士多德主义的观点。不过,当某些德性伦理学家倾向于放弃所有的现代以原则为基础的伦理学时,有人则认为,亚里士多德的伦理学不能处理涉及到人们之间关系的道德问题,所以必须被修正。

德性伦理学讨论的主要问题包括,品格的建构、实践理性、道德教育、品格与友谊的连接,具体品质诸如勇敢、忠诚、羞愧、负罪以及传统的恶的多种形式。这是一个全新的探讨领域,许多讨论仍在进行。虽然这样一种伦理方式不能做所有的伦理研究,但对于揭示生活的品格形成领域——这一长期被其他道德理论所忽视的领域——是有价值的。

"是否会出现一些批评,最终将把德性伦理学彻底推翻,那只有时间能告诉我们。但是其他观点所存在的问题以及德性伦理学的明显长处,即它摒弃道德观念而不落入利己主义,就至少使我们应严肃地把德性伦理学看做一种理论选择。"——斯洛特:《从道德到德性》,1994年,第263页。

良性循环

见“恶性循环”条。

视域

一个人在特定时刻的全部视觉印象或直接知觉。它包括所有直接获得的没有任何推理成分的或真或伪的视觉材料。它是一个心的视觉域,而不只是一个人的眼睛能够看到的外部空间范围。与之平行的概念包括与触觉、听觉、味觉和嗅觉相连的感觉域,所有这些一起构成感觉域概念。

"每当我睁开眼睛,我就看到一个有色彩的视觉领域,我将称之为'视域'。"——布劳德:《科学思想》,1969年,第285页。

Vitalism

The doctrine which holds that living organisms owe their characteristics to some special vital principle, which is subject to different laws from those governing physical matter, so the behaviour of living things cannot be sufficiently explained in mechanistic or materialistic terms. Thus this doctrine, in opposition to mechanistic explanations of life, insists on a fundamental distinction between organic and inorganic phenomena. Aristotle, as the ancestor of vitalism, claims that the life of an animal consists in a *psyche* (Greek, soul) which by teleological causation accounts for the morphological development of the organism. In modern times, the French philosopher Bergson forcefully argued for vitalism, using the concept of *élan vital* (life force). Vitalism is challenged by the development of molecular genetics which tends to support the view that physiological processes also follow the laws of physics and chemistry.

"Aristotle thought that there was a vegetable soul in every plant or animal, and something similar has been widely believed by vitalists." —Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 1948, p. 46.

Void

A term introduced by the Greek atomists Leucippus and Democritus for empty space. Earlier Greek thinkers held that what is must have a bodily form, but the atomists argued that what has no bodily form also really exists, and that is the void. On Aristotle's interpretation, the void is not a continuous space, but is rather what occurs in between bodies, while Epicurus described the void simply as the space that bodies may and may not occupy. The conception of the void enabled atomism to explain how plurality and movement are possible and in this way reacted to the Eleatic challenge which denied the possibility of plurality and movement. It was also the first abstract conception of passive and empty space, which was indispensable to classical physics, although discarded by quantum mechanics.

"Democritus ... calls space by these names - 'the void', 'nothing' and 'the infinite', while each individual atom he calls 'hing' ('nothing' without 'not'), the compact and being." - Aristotle, *On Democritus* (fragments).

Volition

The act of will which precedes a bodily movement, sometimes used as a synonym for choosing, determining or preferring. Volition is presented as the ground of the distinction between intentional or voluntary action and mere behaviour. On this basis, we infer that many actions are voluntary, willed or caused by volition. According to the Cartesian tradition, the will is an entity which acts to translate our ideas into voluntary actions. This doctrine came under fire from Ryle who claimed that there is neither direct nor indi-

活力论

这种学说主张活的有机体应将其特性归之于某种特殊的活力原理,它隶属于与支配物质的定律不同的定律,因此生物的行为不能用机械论的或唯物论的术语来作充分说明。因此,这一学说与对生命的机械论说明相反,坚持在有机现象和无机现象之间作出根本的区分。亚里士多德是活力论的开山祖师,他认为动物的生命在于 *psyche* (希腊文,灵魂),它根据目的论的因果性说明有机体形态学的发展。在现代,法国哲学家柏格森竭力主张活力论,他使用了 *élan vital* (生命力) 这个概念。活力论受到分子遗传学发展的挑战,它倾向于支持这样的观点:生理过程也遵循物理和化学定律。

"亚里士多德认为,在每一植物或动物之中都有一植物性灵魂,活力论者一直广泛地相信某种类似的观点。"——罗素:《人类的知识》,1948年,第46页。

虚空

由希腊原子论者留基波和德谟克利特引入的术语,指无内容的空间。古希腊早期思想家认为,一切存在物必定有一物体形式,可原子论者认为,无物体形式的东西也是真实存在的,那便是虚空。根据亚里士多德的解释,虚空不是连续的空间,而是出现在物体之间的东西。伊壁鸠鲁则把虚空描绘成物体可能占有也可能不占有的空间。虚空的概念使原子论能够解释多样性与运动是如何可能的,因而是对埃里亚学派挑战的一种回应。埃里亚学派否认多样性与运动的可能性。虚空也是第一个关于被动的和无内容的空间的抽象概念。后者对于经典物理学是不可或缺的,虽然为量子力学所否决。

"德谟克利特以这些名称来称呼空间: '虚空'、'无'和'无定',而把每个单个原子叫做'hing' (将'无'(nothing)去掉前缀'not')、凝聚物则是(存在)。"——亚里士多德:《论德谟克利特》(残篇)。

意志

在身体运动之前的意愿活动,有时与选择、决定和偏爱通用。意志被认为是意向活动或自愿活动与纯粹的行为之间的区分的基础。在此基础上,我们推断许多活动是主动的、意愿的或由意志所引起的。在笛卡尔的传统中,意愿是一个存在物,它将我们的观念转译为意志活动。这一学说遭到赖尔的攻击,赖尔声称既没有直接的证据也没有间接的证据表明意志的存在。而且,如果意志被说成是一个心的活动并且是意

rect evidence to prove the existence of volitions. Furthermore, if volitions are said to be mental acts and are the basis of voluntary actions, we may ask whether volitions are voluntary or involuntary. If they are voluntary, then the voluntary acts are themselves preceded by a voluntary act, and we enter an infinite regress; if they are involuntary, there will be an absurd result that voluntary acts are based on involuntary mental acts. There are various attempts to solve this dilemma, but none has gained general approval. The later Wittgenstein also claimed that if we view volitions as acts of willing, we will be confronted with the consequence that one could will willing. It is uncertain whether new theoretical approaches to the mind and mental states will revive interest in volitions and the will.

"Volitions have been postulated as special acts, or operations, 'in the mind', by means of which a mind gets its ideas translated into facts." —Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1949, p. 62.

Voluntarism

[from Latin *voluntas*, will] Any philosophical position which holds the concept of will as the central explanatory principle. Will is the origin of all order of essence and moral laws. To be meaningful is to be willed. In contrast, reason is subordinate to will and is even rejected as idle. Will is a higher faculty than the intellect. The tradition of voluntarism in Western philosophy is associated with the tradition of irrationalism. It was a predominant aspect of fourteenth-century and fifteenth-century medieval thought and has been a trend in modern and contemporary philosophy. In different fields, it is presented in different forms, including doxastic voluntarism, which claims that believing is willing; ethical voluntarism, which proposes that the will is the ultimate source of moral value; metaphysical voluntarism, which claims that the will is the ultimate principle of reality and rejects determinism and intellectualism; and theological or theistic voluntarism, which holds that religious beliefs are not determined by reason and claims that God's will is the moral law.

"This term [of voluntarism], classical but in need of clarification, was applied to both man and God. We know it in its application to man — that is, in terms of the problem of beatitude, one asks by what power of the intellect or the will the soul enters into the possession of the absolute good, into the enjoyment of the divine trinity." —Vignaux, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 1959, p. 204.

Voluntary-involuntary

[Greek: *hekousia-akousia*, although these terms, employed by Aristotle, are more comprehensive than their English counterparts] A voluntary action is done by an agent who has the initiative in himself and involves neither compulsion nor reluctance. The agent knows the important circum-

志活动的基础,那我们就可以问:“意志是由意志控制的还是不由意志控制的?”如果它是由意志控制的,那么意志活动本身又须后继于一个意志活动,而这样就会包含一个无限后推;如果它是不受意志控制的,那就会得出这样的荒谬结果:不受意志控制的活动是意志活动的基础。有各种不同的尝试来解决这一两难,但没有哪一个得到普遍的认可。后期维特根斯坦也声称,如果我们将意志看做意愿活动,那么我们就面对这样的问题:一个人可以意愿意愿,很难说关于心与心的状态的新的理论研究能否复兴对意志和意愿的兴趣。

“意志被假定为‘在心中’的特殊的活动和操作,通过意志,一个心将观念转变为事实。”——赖尔:《心的概念》,1949年,第62页。

意志论

[源自拉丁语 *voluntas*, “意志”] 指把意志概念作为核心解释原则的哲学立场。意志是一切本质秩序和道德规则的根源。有意义的都是被意欲的。相反,理智从属于意志,甚至被当做无用的东西而被否定。意志是比理智更高的一种能力。在西方哲学中,意志论传统和非理性主义传统紧密相连。它是14至15世纪的中世纪思想中的主导方面,在近现代和当代哲学中,也是一种倾向。在不同领域,它有不同的表现形式,例如,宣扬相信就是意志的“信念意志论”;提出意志是道德价值最终来源的“伦理意志论”;主张意志是实在的终极本原,并否定决定论和理智论的“形而上学意志论”;认为宗教信念不由理智决定,并断言上帝的意志是道德律令的“神学意志论”或“有神论意志论”。

“[意志论]这个词虽然古典,但需要澄清,它既适用于人,也适用于上帝。我们知道它适用于人的方面——即依据至福问题,人祈求通过理智或意志的什么力量,灵魂进入绝对善的拥有状态,进入神圣的三位一体的快乐。”——韦格劳克斯:《中世纪哲学》,1959年,第204页。

自愿与非自愿

[希腊文 *hekousia-akousia*, 虽然亚里士多德对这些术语的运用远比它们的英语对应词的含义来得复杂] 一个自愿行为是一个行为者自己主动做的,既不是强迫也不是不情愿,行为者知道将影响他的行为结果的重要环境。非自愿

stances which will affect the result of his action. An involuntary action is done under threat of force or owing to ignorance. Sometimes Aristotle ascribes voluntary actions also to animals and children, although generally he confines them to those agents he believes to be capable of rational desire. The voluntary-involuntary distinction is used to determine the conditions for ascribing responsibility. A man is responsible only for what he has done voluntarily.

"These receive praise or blame when they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, when they are involuntary." — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1109b30-1.

Vorstellung

[German; literally, putting forward; normally translated as representation] In addition to being a term for representation, *Vorstellung* is employed as a counterpart of the British empiricist terms "idea" or "sense-datum" and is used in a variety of ways by different philosophers. For these reasons, many authors prefer not to translate it into English. For Kant, representations include sensations, intuition, concepts and ideas and thus appear in sensibility, understanding and reason. Representations provide the elements which are combined in judgement. The categories are representations, and the "I think" which must be able to accompany all my representations is a representation. Representations can be as ephemeral and subjective as sensations and as robust and objective as spatiotemporal objects, that is Kantian appearances. Ideas, which for Kant differ radically from empiricist ideas, are representations which go beyond the possibility of experience. Hegel contrasted *Vorstellung* with "concept". Schopenhauer claimed that "the world is my *Vorstellung* (representation)".

"Kant in effect makes his philosophical starting-point a notion of *Vorstellung* or an 'idea'. This 'idea' or experience can be thought of as the interface between the experiencing mind, the subject, and something in the world, an object." — Podro, *The Manifold in Perception*, 1972, p. 9.

Voting paradox

A paradox relating to social choice discovered by Condorcet in 1785. It is a special case of "Arrow's paradox". Suppose that three voters, John, Smith and David, vote to choose one among three candidates A, B, C. John's sequential ordering of preference is $A \succ B \succ C$; Smith's ordering is $B \succ C \succ A$; and David's ordering is $C \succ A \succ B$. The consequence of voting according to these preferences will be that a majority prefers A to B, a majority prefers B to C, and a majority prefers C to A. Hence although each individual has an ordering of choice, no ranking in society which is consistent with this will emerge. This indicates the difficulty of transmitting the aggregation of individual preferences into a social choice. It also shows that the majority rule principle, which

行为是在强力威逼下或无知的情况下做的。有时亚里士多德把自愿行为归于动物和儿童,虽然一般他把自愿行为限定在那些他认为有理性欲望能力的行为者上。自愿与非自愿的区分亦被用作确认责任归属的条件。一个人只对他自愿地做的事负责。

"当他们是自愿时,就要受到赞扬或责备;而当他们是非自愿时,就要受到宽恕,有时甚至怜悯。"——亚里士多德:《尼各马可伦理学》,1109b30-31。

表象

[德语词,字面意思是“提出”,通常英译为 representation] 除了表象这个词的意义外, *vorstellung* 也用作英国经验论的“观念”或“感觉材料”的对等词,并且被不同的哲学家以各种方式使用。为此,许多作者宁可不把它翻译为英语。对于康德来说,表象包括感觉、直观、概念和理念,因此存在于感性、知性和理性中。表象提供了在判断中被结合的要素。范畴是表象,那必须可伴随我的一切表象的“我思”也是一个表象。表象可以像感觉一样是短暂的和主观的,像时空中的对象一样是坚实的和客观的,那就是康德的所谓现象。理念,对康德来说与经验主义的观念截然不同,是超越经验可能性的表象。黑格尔以“概念”来与表象相对比。叔本华主张:“世界是我的表象。”

“康德实际上使表象或‘观念’的概念成为他的哲学起点,这个‘观念’或经验可被思维为经验着的心灵即主体和世界中的事物即对象之间的相互作用。”——波卓:《杂多的知觉》,1972年,第9页。

选举悖论

由孔多塞于1785年发现的与社会选择有关的一个悖论。它是“飞矢悖论”的特殊情况。假设有三个选民,约翰、斯密斯和戴维,他们要从三个候选人A, B, C中选择一个。约翰喜欢的排列顺序是 $A \succ B \succ C$;斯密斯的顺序是 $B \succ C \succ A$;戴维的顺序是 $C \succ A \succ B$ 。根据这种排列得出的选举结果就会是,一部分赞同A而不太赞同B,而一部分则赞同B而不赞同C,剩下的一部分是赞同C而不赞同A。这样,虽然每个人都有自己的选择顺序,但却没有出现整个社会一致的排列。这表明要把所有的个人偏好转变为一种社会的选择非常困难。这还表明,被看做是民主本质的大多数人准则的原则并没有人们

is supposed to be the essence of democracy, is less clear than is supposed to be the case. For if election is sequential, the majority preferences would be cyclic.

“The best known example of a voting procedure’s producing an irrational result is given in the so-called ‘paradox of voting’ which had already been fully characterised in the nineteenth century.” — Philip Pettit, *Judging Justice*, 1980, p. 146.

所想像的那样清楚。因为，一旦选举是连续不断的，那么大多数人的偏好就会是循环的。

“选举过程产生非理性结果的著名例证是所谓的‘选举悖论’，这在19世纪就已经得到了充分的描述。”——彼替特：《评判正义》，1980年，第146页。

W

Warranted assertibility

A term introduced by John Dewey as a substitute for knowledge or truth in order to indicate that knowledge is gained as result of an ongoing, self-correcting process of inquiry, rather than as a result of internal mental activity. An assertion is a judgement arrived at after determining the significance of the related data. If this assertion does the work which it is supposed to do, it is warranted. Any warranted assertion must be refined and justified by being subjected to continuous testing through public experience. From the viewpoint of warranted assertibility, there is no absolute truth known by rational insight with certainty and knowledge is not a system of truths.

"If inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated by the words belief and knowledge. For reasons that I shall state later I prefer the words 'warranted assertibility'." —Dewey, *Logic*, 1938, p. 7.

Wayward causal chain

Also called a deviant causal chain or causal deviance. In normal causation, if a person performs an action because he intends to do it, then his intention is the cause of his doing it. But sometimes causation can go astray and deviate from the normal route in intentional action, perception, meaning or memory. For example, because Smith is angry with Jones, Smith decides to go to Jones' home to injure him. On the way, he drives recklessly and hurts somebody. The injured person happens to be Jones. In such a case, Smith realises his intention to hurt Jones, but that occurs only as an accidental consequence. Does this mean that Smith does the hurting intentionally in this case? The existence of wayward causal chains creates problems for the analysis of normal causal chains.

"Since there may be wayward causal chains, we cannot say that if attitudes that would rationalise x cause an agent to do x, then he does x intentionally." —Davidson, *Essays on Actions and Events*, 1980, p. 79.

Weakness of will, see will

得证的可断言性

由 J. 杜威用来取代知识或真理的术语, 以表明知识的获得是一种不断发展和自我校正的探索过程的结果, 而不是内心心理活动的结果。断言是在确定了相关资料的意义后达到的判断。如果这种断言做到了假设它能做的, 它就是得到证明的。任何得证的断言必须经受持续的公众经验的检验以修改和辩护。从得证的可断言性的观点看, 不存在理性洞察力可以确切知晓的绝对真理, 知识并非一个真理系统。

“如果探究起始于疑问, 则它终止于对不再需要疑问的条件之制定。后一种事态可用信念和知识等词来标明。出于后面将要陈述的理由, 我喜欢用‘得证的可断言性’来表示。”——杜威: 《逻辑》, 1938 年, 第 7 页。

无常因果链

又称“变异因果链”或“因果异常”。在正常的因果关系中, 如果一个人做出一个活动是因为他有此意向, 则他的意向是其活动的原因。但有时在意向活动、知觉、意义、记忆中, 因果关系会偏离正常的路线。例如, 司密斯因为某事而生琼斯的气, 他决定到他的家里去打他。在路上, 他开车不小心撞伤了某人, 而这个被撞伤的人恰好就是琼斯。在这样一个个案中, 司密斯实现了他伤害琼斯的意向, 但这个伤害的发生却只是一个偶然的结果。司密斯在这个个案中故意进行了伤害吗? 无常因果链的存在对正常的因果分析提出了问题。

“因为可能有无常因果链, 我们就不能说, 如果将 x 理性化的态度导致一个行为者做 x, 那么他就是意向性地做 x。”——戴维森: 《关于行动与事件的论文集》, 1980 年, 第 79 页。

意志薄弱

见“意愿”条。

Wedge argument

A species of the slippery slope argument, elaborated by Bishop Sullivan against legalising active euthanasia. Once a single instance of direct killing is approved of by society, we have admitted the thin edge of a wedge. We will then inevitably concede more cases by pressing the wedge forward and eventually put all life at risk. To avoid this terrible consequence, we should outlaw from the very beginning any mercy killing. But many philosophers reject this argument on the grounds that we are reasonable enough to distinguish between justifiable killing and unjustifiable killing.

"...to permit in a single instance the direct killing of an innocent person would be to admit a most dangerous wedge that might eventually put all life in a precarious condition."—Sullivan, in Kohl (ed.), *Beneficent Euthanasia*, p. 14.

Welfare

Welfare and its relations to rights, needs and equality are familiar topics in contemporary political philosophy. Welfare can be discussed regarding individuals and regarding society. Individual welfare concerns good for the individual, but there is debate concerning whether individual good should be understood in terms of the satisfaction of actual preferences, of needs or of well-informed, long term interests. Social welfare concerns the overall good for society. Some believe that all social goods can be reduced to individual goods and that every aspect of social goods can be derived from individual goods. It follows from this view, which is called welfarism, that a state should focus on individual goods. Others argue that some types of social goods are irreducible. This debate leads to a further difference. Unlike traditional political thinking for which the primary goal of a state is the security of its citizens, contemporary political philosophy considers that the main function of a modern state is to promote welfare and justice. According to some, however, the state should promote individual goods, while others believe that the state should maximise social welfare. A welfare state takes a basic minimum of material welfare for its citizens to be a primary concern of policy-making.

"'Welfare' is a vague term. It may refer only to means to physical well being, such as food, housing, and medical care. Or it may include also some means to mental or spiritual well being, such as education, art galleries, museum, and theatres."—Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy*, second edition, 1990, p. 49.

Welfarism

If the overall good of society is a function of the individual welfare of its members, the state can promote its welfare by promoting the welfare of its citizens. According to welfarism, all social goods can be reduced to individual goods.

楔子论证

沙利文主教为反对把主动安乐死合法化而提出的一种“滑坡论证”。一旦一个社会允许直接杀人的某个个案，我们就已经容纳了楔子的锋利边沿，而我们将不可避免地推进这个楔子，在更多的例子上让步，最终把所有的生命推到危险的处境。为了避免这个可怕的后果，我们应在一开始就应该宣布安乐死为非法。但许多哲学家认为，我们有足够的理由区分正当杀人和不正当杀人，故拒斥这一论证。

“……允许在某个例案中直接杀死一个无辜的人，将允许一个最危险的楔子，它将最终把所有生命推到一个危险的处境。”——沙利文，见科尔编：《仁慈安乐死》，第14页。

福利

福利以及它与权利、需要和平等的关系是当代政治哲学的热门话题。对福利的讨论可以联系到个人也可联系到社会。个人福利涉及的是个人的利益，但在个人的利益是否应理解为对实际偏好的满足，理解为对全面、长远利益的需要这一问题上存在争议。社会福利涉及的是全面的社会利益。一些人认为，全部社会利益可以分解为个人利益，社会利益的每一方面都可由个人利益导出。这种观点被人们称为福利主义，由这种观点又可进而得出一个国家应关注个人利益的结论。另一些人则争论说，某些类型的社会福利是不能分解的。对这一问题的争论又导致了进一步的分歧。与一个国家的首要目的是保护其公民的安全这一传统的政治思想不同，当代政治哲学认为现代国家的主要功能是促进福利和正义。可是，在一些人看来，国家应当促进个人的利益，而另一些人则认为国家应最大限度地增加社会的福利。一个福利国家把其公民的基本的和最低的物质福利作为制定政策的首要问题。

“‘福利’是一个含义模糊的概念。它可仅指物质福利的条件，如食品、住房及医疗。或许它还包括一些智力或精神福利的设施，如教育、艺术画廊、博物馆及剧院。”——拉菲尔：《政治哲学问题》，第二版，1990年，第49页。

福利主义

如果全部社会利益是其成员个人利益的一个功能，那国家就能通过促进其公民的福利来促进它的福利。福利主义认为，全部社会利益可以分解为个人的利益，社会利益的每一方面都

and every aspect of social goods can be derived from individual goods. Hence, a state should focus on individual goods, through means such as health insurance, free education, unemployment benefits and children allowance, to promote the good of society. This account of the role of the state contrasts with the eighteenth and nineteenth century view that the main function of the state is to protect the security of its citizens from both outward invasion and internal instability. The idea of welfarism, which is considered by some to be state paternalism, has been adopted more in Western European than in the United States. In recent years, with a shortage of funding and misgivings about the alleged negative effects of welfare on its recipients, the positive picture of welfare has come under pressure.

"Welfarism, requiring that the goodness of a state of affairs be a function only of the utility information regarding that state." — Sen, *On Ethics and Economics*, 1987, p. 39.

Well-being

[Greek: *eudaimonia*, usually translated as happiness] Some philosophers prefer the translation "well-being" to "happiness" to catch the peculiarity of what Plato and Aristotle called *eudaimonia* in contrast to the modern notion of happiness. *Eudaimonia* as a state of satisfaction is not for one moment or one day, but a matter for one's whole life. As an important independent notion in modern ethics, well-being roughly means what it is for a single life to go well.

"I shall use the expression well-being for such a state." — B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, 1985, p. 34.

Well-formed formula

An expression or a string of symbols in a logical system which conforms to the formation rules of that system. It is equivalent to a grammatical sentence in natural languages. A simple well-formed formula is formed out the basic vocabulary of the formal system and its deductive rules, while a complicated well-formed formula is constructed out of simple well-formed formulae. All well-formed formulae can be explained within that system. If the formula contains a variable not bound by a quantifier (a free variable), it is an open well-formed formula; otherwise, it is a closed one. Well-formed formula is generally abbreviated as wff. Since there is no interest in ill-formed formulae, well-formed formulae are often simply called formulae. Axioms and theorems of a system are among its well-formed formulae.

"Consider the class of all permutations of some set of elements of a language we shall use 'L'. The formation rules of L divide the class of all possible permutations into two mutually exclusive subclasses, one of which will comprise all of the grammatically permissible or well-formed formulations (for short, 'wffs') of L; the other subclass will comprise the

可由个人利益导出。因此,一个国家应关注个人的利益,通过诸如健康保险、免费教育、失业救济和儿童津贴等方式促进社会利益。对国家作用的这一说法与18世纪、19世纪的观点形成对照,那时的观点认为,国家的主要功能是保护其公民不受外来侵略和内部动乱的危害。福利主义的思想在一些人看来是国家的家长式统治,它在西欧比在美国得到更多的接受。近些年来,随着福利基金的短缺及对所谓的福利对其享受者的负面作用的担忧,福利的积极的前景已受到压力。

"福利主义,要求事态的良好只是关于这一事态的有效信息的功能。"——森:《论伦理学和经济学》,1987年,第39页。

好生活

[希腊词 *eudaimonia*, 一般被译成“幸福”]某些哲学家为了抓住柏拉图和亚里士多德称之为 *eudaimonia* 的特征,而宁可用“好生活”而不用“幸福”,因为它不同于我们现在所说的“幸福”。*Eudaimonia* 作为一种满意的状态,不是某一时某一天,而是一个人一生的事情。在现代伦理学中,好生活成了一个重要的独立的概念,它的大致意思是一个人的生活过得好。

"对这样一种状态,我将用‘好生活’这个词。"——威廉姆斯:《伦理学与哲学的限度》,1985年,第34页。

合式公式

在一种逻辑体系中的一种表达式或一串符号,它与这一体系的构成规则相符合。它相当于自然语言中一个语法句子。一个简单的合式公式由那种形式系统的基本词汇及它的推论规则构造出来,而一个复杂的合式公式由简单的合式公式构造出来。所有的合格公式都可在那个体系中得到解释。如果这一公式包含一个变项而不被一个量词(自由变元)限制,它就是一个开放的合式公式,否则,它就是一个封闭的合式公式。合式公式通常缩写为“wff”。由于没有人对不合式公式感兴趣,合式公式常常被简称为公式。一个体系的公理和定理都属于合式公式。

"我们将使用‘L’来考虑一种语言的某组因素全部排列的集合。L的构成规则将全部可能的排列集合分为两个相互排斥的子集。其中一个将包含所有L在语法上所允许的或合式的公式(简称‘wffs’),另一个子集将包括由L的因素构成的表达式,然而却不是L的语法上正确的表达式。"——朗德:《社会科学哲学》,1966年,第13页。

expressions which, made up of elements of L, are nevertheless not grammatically correct expressions of L." — Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science*, 1966, p. 13.

Well founded phenomena

Also called true phenomena or real phenomena. Leibniz's term for material bodies. In his later metaphysics, only monads exist in nature, and all other things are not true substances but only phenomena. Their unity cannot be explained merely in terms of the modification of extension. Thus, material bodies do not form a part of the Leibniz's fundamental ontology. Instead they are composed of monads and their individual modifications. Their existence is to be explained in terms of the existence of monads and their properties, which are the foundations of the phenomenal derivative force exerted by material things in motion. Material bodies are aggregates of true substances (or monads). On this basis, Leibniz called material bodies well-founded phenomena or the result of monads.

"I showed that bodies are only aggregates that constitute a unity accidentally, or by extrinsic denomination and, to that extent, are all well-founded phenomena." — Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (eds. and trans. Ariew and Garber), 1989, p. 319.

Wff, abbreviation of well-formed formula

What-it-is

[Greek: *ti esti*, the essential nature of a thing or the object of a definition, from the question *ti esti*, what is this thing? what is it? as used to seek the general and essential nature of a thing] The philosophy of Socrates consists in seeking the what-it-is of such things as justice and courage. Finding out what-it is depends on is. Only when a thing is, can one ask what it is.

Aristotle classified ten kinds of being or categories. In the broad sense, each kind of being has its what-it-is. For example Socrates is a man or white is a kind of colour. In a narrow sense, what-it-is is only used for the category of substance because in Aristotle's theory of being, the existence of all secondary categories depends on substance. Just as he distinguished being in its primary sense from being in secondary senses, he also distinguished what-it-is in its primary sense from what-it-is in its subordinate senses. The primary sense belongs to substance, and the subsidiary senses belong to the other categories. On this basis Aristotle usually used what-it-is as a synonym of substance.

"For in one sense the being meant is what it is or a this." — Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028a12.

有可靠根据的现象

莱布尼茨的用语,亦称“真的现象”或“实在的现象”,指物质体。在他晚期的形而上学中,自然中只有单子存在,其他一切东西都不是真正实体,而只是现象。它们的统一性不可能仅仅用广延的变形来说明。因而物质体并不构成莱布尼茨的基本本体论的一部分,它们反倒是由单子和单子的个别变形构成的。它们的存在是用单子的存在和单子的性质来说明的,这些单子和性质是活动的物质东西所运用的现象派生力的基础。物质体是真实体(或单子)的聚集。根据于此,莱布尼茨称物质体是“有可靠根据的现象”,或单子的“结果”。

“我曾表明,物体只是聚集物,这些聚集物偶然地或根据外在的类别而构成统一体,在此范围内,物体全都是有可靠根据的现象。”——莱布尼茨:《哲学文集》(阿瑞和加伯编译),1989年,第319页。

合式公式

“合式公式”的缩写。

是什么

[源自希腊语 *ti esti* (事物的本性或定义的对象), 来自问题 *ti esti* (“这事是什么?”“它是什么?”), 被用来寻求一物的一般性质和本质] 苏格拉底的哲学在于寻求诸如正义、勇敢等事物的“是什么”。寻找“是什么”依赖于“是”。只有当一个事物“是”,人们才能问它是什么。

亚里士多德划分了十类“是”或范畴。在其广义上,每一类“是”都有其“是什么”。例如,“苏格拉底是人”,“白是一类颜色”,但在狭义上,“是什么”只是用来指本体的范畴。因为在亚里士多德的“是”〔存在〕论中,所有第二范畴的存在依赖于本体。正如亚里士多德区分了第一义的“是”和第二义的“是”一样,他也区分了第一义的“是什么”和第二义的“是什么”。前者属于本体,后者属于其他范畴。在这一基础上,亚里士多德常常把“是什么”用作是本体的同义词。

“在一种意义上,‘是’〔存在〕意为‘是什么’或‘这一个’。”——亚里士多德:《形而上学》,1028a12。

Wide content, see narrow content

Wide states, see narrow states

Will

The human ability to desire something, to choose and decide courses of action and to initiate actions according to one's choice or decision. The will is a wish which we believe we are capable of realising through effort. The act of will, or volition, contains both cognitive and conative elements. Will has been a puzzling topic for philosophers. Plato first characterises it as a part of the soul, along with reason and appetite (or bodily desire), although philosophers disagree whether Greek philosophy had a fully developed conception of the will. Descartes also considered the will to be a faculty of mind. This traditional faculty view was rejected by Ryle, who provided a behaviourist account instead. Consistency between will and reason is often seen to be a virtue. If will fails to follow reason, it is called weakness of will [Greek: *akrasia*]. Weakness of will, free will and determinism and free will and moral responsibility have been major issues in ethics. Hume claimed that will rather than reason mainly determines one's behaviour. On his view, reason alone could never be a motive to any action of the will. For Kant, a good will, which is reason in its practical employment, is the basis for rational ethics. Schopenhauer sets will as the first principle in his *The World as Will and Idea*. Will remains a subject of intense interest and controversy in contemporary philosophy.

"Willing, then, can be defined as wishing, involving a decision, that has as its object something that is to be realized by ourselves and that we confidently expect to take place as a result of our desiring it." —Brentano, *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics*, 1952, p. 201.

Will (Kant)

Kant distinguished between *Wille* and *Willkür*, although both are translated as will in English. As the power of self-determination, *Wille* is the source of ought and obligation. It is not a product or discovery of the understanding, but is a faculty of acting according to a conception of law. It is generally associated with freedom, autonomy and spontaneity, and as practical reason itself it is home of the moral law. *Willkür* is the capacity for decision or choice, which is both determined by *Wille* and affected by sensuous impulses. It is thus heteronomous. It chooses between the imperatives stemming from *Wille* and the desires. By this distinction, Kant set aside the traditional problem about the relation between free will and determinism. His separation between the will as practical reason and the capacity for choice was

宽内容

见“狭内容”条。

广状态

见“狭状态”条。

意愿（或译“意志”）

指人类欲望某物、选择并决定行为过程、按照自己的选择或决定来采取行动的能力。这意愿是我们相信自己能够通过努力来实现的愿望。意愿或意志的行为既包含认知的也包含意动的因素。意愿是个让哲学家们迷惑的话题。柏拉图首先将它说成是灵魂的一部分，另外的部分是理性与欲望（或身体的欲望）；不过，哲学家们关于古希腊中是否有了充分发展的意愿概念，还有各自的不同意见。笛卡尔也将意愿视为心灵的一种能力。赖尔拒绝这种传统的能力观，并对意愿提出行为主义的解释。意愿与理性的一致常被看做是一种美德。如果意愿没有能跟从理性，就被称之为“意志薄弱”（希腊文是 *akrasia*）。意志薄弱、自由意愿（意志）与决定论、自由意愿与道德责任是伦理学中讨论的主要问题。休谟认为，意愿而非理性首要地决定一个人的行为。在他看来，理性独自绝不能成为任何意愿行为的动机。对于康德说来，善的意愿做为在实践运用中的理性是理性伦理学的基础。叔本华在他的《作为意志和表象的世界》一书中将意愿当做是第一原则。在现代哲学里，意愿仍然是个引起强烈兴趣和争论的话题。

“因此，意愿可以被定义为涉及某个决定的愿望；这愿望将那要被我们自身实现的某物当做自己的对象，我们信心十足地期待着它的出现，而且就是作为我们渴望它的那种结果而出现。”——布伦塔诺：《伦理学的基础和构造》，1952年，第201页。

意志（康德）

康德区分了 *(Die) Wille* 和 *(Die) Willkür*，尽管这两个词在英文中都被译作“Will”。 *(Die) Wille* 是指自我决定的能力，是应当和义务的源泉。它不是知性的产物或发现物，而是按照法则概念而活动的官能。它一般相联于自由、自律和自发性，并且与实践理性自身同一。它是道德法则的发源地。 *(Die) Willkür*（任意，决意）则是决定或选择的能力，它既被 *(Die) Wille*（意志）所决定，又受感性冲动的影响。因此它是他律的。它在出于意志的绝对命令与欲望之间做出选择。通过这种区别，康德撇开了自由意志和决定论之间关系的传统问题。然而他把作为实践理性的意志和选择的能力分离开来，使尼采认为他使意志只是作为实体化的东西。

claimed by Nietzsche to make the will only a hypostatisation.

"Insofar as it is combined with the consciousness of the capacity of its action to produce its object, it is called will, or choice [Willkür], if not so combined, its act is called a wish. The faculty of desire whose internal ground of determination and consequently, even whose likings are found in the reason of the subject is called the Will [der Wille]." —Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, introduction.

Will of all

Rousseau's term for the aggregate of the private and individual wills of members of a society. The will of all is the total of what all persons individually want. A particular will involves what one wants for oneself alone and does not take into consideration the interests of others. Since each private will conflicts with other private wills, a civil society needs a general will which is directed to the common interest. A general will is not the will of all, but Rousseau claims that it can be determined from the will of all by finding what is common to all once the conflicting elements in the will of all are cancelled. It is not clear that we can determine the general will in this way or that the general will is a good basis for deciding the policy of a state. Possibly a state should allow a certain amount of conflict. Critics of Rousseau argue that his emphasis on the general would allow intolerance through a form of totalitarian democracy.

"There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particulars." —Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, II, 3.

Will to believe

A term introduced by William James in 1897 as the title for one of his most influential essays. He argued that on many occasions we are forced to choose one of two alternatives, and that there is no intellectual ground for choosing one rather than the other. Then we must let emotion or passion determine our decision in terms of the effect that each choice would have upon our states of mind or subsequent life. Accordingly, we have no rational basis for deciding the question whether God exists, but we tend to believe in God's existence because this would provide us with a ground for optimism. The same applies to the choice between believing in free will and believing in determinism. Critics argue that the lack of a rational basis for choice does not legitimate a non-rational basis and that the burden of proof is not satisfied by emotional consequences.

"I have brought with me tonight ... an essay in justification of faith, a defence of our right to develop a believing attitude in religious matter, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. 'The will

"就它与其产生其对象的活动能力的意识相结合而言,它被称为意志,或选择[Willkür],如果不是这样结合的,它的活动被称为意愿。欲望官能可以在主体理性中找到它做出决定的内部根据,甚至爱好,这种官能被称为意志[der Wille]。"——康德:《道德形而上学》,导言。

众意

卢梭用来表示社会成员私人和个人意志的总和的术语。众意是所有人的个人要求的东西的总和。个别意志包含的是一个人为自身所要求的东西,它不考虑其他人的利益。由于每一私人意志都与其他私人意志相冲突,因而一个市民社会需要一种由共同利益指引的公意。公意不是众意,但卢梭认为,一旦众意中相互冲突的因素被取消,就可通过发现对所有的人是共同的东西而根据众意来确定它。我们能否以这种方式确定公意,或者说公意是否是决定一个国家政策的良好基础,这些都还不清楚。一个国家也许应当允许一定数量的冲突的存在。卢梭的批评者认为,他对公意的强调会导致以极权主义的民主形式出现的偏执。

"众意与公意之间经常总有很大的差别;后者只考虑公共的利益,而前者考虑私人的利益,众意不过是个别意志的总和。"——卢梭:《社会契约论》,II, 3。

相信意愿

W. 詹姆斯于1897年作为其最有影响的论文之一的题目而引进的术语。他论辩说,在许多情况下,我们被迫在两者之间作出选择,而又没有理智的基础来决定选择这个而不是那个。那么我们就让情绪或冲动根据每一选择对我们的心的状态或以后的生活的影响来决定我们的选择。据此,我们没有理性的根据决定上帝是否存在,但我们倾向于相信上帝的存在,因为这给我们的乐观精神提供依据。这同样也适用于在相信自由意志与相信决定论之间所作的选择。而批评者们认为缺乏一种选择的理性基础并没有使一种非理性的基础合法化;证明的任务不能由情绪后果来完成。

"我今晚带来了一篇关于信仰辩护的论文,辩护我们在宗教事物中发展一个相信态度的权利。尽管我们的纯粹的逻辑智力并未被强制这样做。因此,‘相信意愿’是本文的题目。"——詹姆斯:《相信意愿及其他》,1897年,第2页。

to believe', accordingly, is the title of my paper." — James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, 1897, p. 2.

Will to power

Nietzsche's term for the most basic human drive to attain a higher and more perfect state, an insatiable desire to manifest power and a drive to employ and exercise power. For him, life itself is the will to power. This drive is characterised by self-overcoming and sublimation. It is a disposition to get power in self-control, art and philosophy. It is life-affirming rather than a desire to dominate others. For Nietzsche, philosophy is the most spiritual expression of the will to power. Nietzsche's book *The Will to Power* was edited by his sister from a series of fragments, headings and reflections. It was once regarded as a source of fascist ideology, but this view is untenable upon serious scholarly examination.

The will to power as an hypothesis to explain the world and the nature of reality is also a metaphysical doctrine. Nietzsche claimed that the world is the will to power. The world is viewed as a monster of energy, eternally self-creating and eternally self-destroying. The will of power is meant to be the basis for explaining all changes. It is neither being nor becoming, but is a tendency of all forces to extend their influence in relation to all other forces in determining the intelligible character of the world. The will to power is also called "efficient force", "quanta of force", or "driving force". Despite Nietzsche's attack on metaphysics, Heidegger held that the will to power is Nietzsche's answer to the metaphysical question about the essence of what is.

"Indeed life itself has been defined as an increasingly efficient inner adaptation to external circumstances (Herbert Spencer). But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, its will to power. We overlook the prime importance which the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, re-interpreting, re-directing and formative powers have, which 'adaptation' follows only when they have had their effect." — Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Sect. 12.

Wisdom

[Greek: *sophia*] In a popular sense, skilfulness in some craft. A wise person is the master of any skill, in contrast to an unskilled labourer, and this is a practical aspect to its meaning. However, Aristotle offered a technical account of wisdom as knowledge of general principles and absolutely first causes. This wisdom is concerned with permanent truths, including both demonstrative knowledge and knowledge of undemonstrable premises. In this use, wisdom is contrasted with craft and practical reason. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle claimed that he was seeking wisdom in this sense. Hence, *sophia* is equivalent to first philosophy. In the

对力量的意愿〔或译“权力意志”〕

尼采使用的一个词，表示最基本的人类冲动，即要进入更高的和更完美的状态的冲动；又表示一种永不会被满足的去表现力量的欲望和一种去使用和行使力量的冲动。在他看来，生命或生活本身就是对力量的意愿。这种冲动的特点是战胜自身和升华。它是要在自身控制、艺术和哲学中得到力量的那种倾向。它是对生命的肯定，而不是要控制他人的欲望。在尼采看来，哲学是对于这种力量意愿的最富精神性的表达。尼采的书《对力量的意愿》〔一般译作《权力意志》〕是他妹妹依据他留下的散篇、摘记和反思记录编辑而成。它曾被认为是德国法西斯意识形态的一个来源，但这种看法经不住严肃的学术检验。

对力量的意愿既是解释世界和现实的本质的一种假设，也是一种形而上学的学说。尼采认为世界就是对于力量的意愿。这世界被视为一个充满能量的魔鬼，在永恒地创造自身和毁灭自身。对力量的意愿的说法旨在成为解释一切变化的基础。这种意愿既非存在，亦非生成，而是一切要扩张其影响的力量所具有的倾向；这些力量在决定这个世界的可理解性时与所有其他的力量相关联。对力量的意愿也被称为“有效力”、“力的总量”或“冲力”。尽管尼采攻击形而上学，海德格尔还是认为对力量的意愿是尼采对于存在者本质这样一个形而上学问题的回答。

“的确，生命本身已被定义为对于外部环境不断增加的有效内适应(H. 斯宾塞)。但这种说法误解了生命的本质，也就是其对于力量的意愿。我们忽视了自发的、进取的、扩张的、重新解释的、重新定向的和构造性的力量所具有的重要性；只有当这些力量产生出了效果，‘适应’才跟着出现。”——尼采：《论道德的谱系》，第12节。

智慧

〔源自希腊词 *sophia*〕在一般用法上，意为娴熟于某种技艺。与一个无技艺的劳工相比，任何技艺的掌握者都是有智慧的人。这是其意义的实践性方面。不过，亚里士多德将智慧用作一个专门术语，指对一般原则和绝对第一原因的知识。这一意义上的智慧关注永恒真理，包括证明知识和对不可证明的前提的知识。在这一用法上，智慧与技艺和实践理性相对。在《形而上学》中，亚里士多德声称他是在寻求这种意义上的智慧。因而，智慧等同于第一哲学。在《尼各马可伦理学》中，亚里士多德认为智慧是高于实

Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle considered wisdom to be a higher kind of intellectual virtue than practical reason.

"Wisdom is the most exact form of knowledge." —Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141a16.

World 1, see world 3

World 2, see world 3

World 3

According to Popper, traditional philosophy has recognise two worlds. The first is material and the second is conscious and mental. Popper developed a new conceptual schema of a three-fold world. World 1 is the material world, which includes all physical objects and states. World 2 is the mental world, which includes immediate perceptual experiences, other mental states and behavioural dispositions. World 3 includes objective contents of thought, including problems, theories, criticisms and their unintended consequences. World 3 is essentially a world of storage, including the records of human intellectual efforts that are preserved in libraries and museums. The content of thought is the product of individual human minds, but once thoughts are produced, they transcend their producers, and are independent of anybody who thinks or expresses them. They bring with themselves all sorts of consequences and problems which are unintended and unforeseen by us, their makers, and are beyond our control. They causally affect us and become objects of our knowledge and even the main object of World 2. In this sense the contents of thought are autonomous and have their own logic of development which can be reduced to neither World 1 nor World 2. Although World 3 is human-made, its autonomy makes it similar to Plato's world of forms or ideas. This world is timeless and results in the evolution of human language. Through his account of World 3, Popper developed not only a new ontological classification, but also a new justification for the objectivity of knowledge. World 3 provides an argument against sociological relativism and psychologism. The account of the nature and existence of such a separate world has provoked critical discussion, with some concerning the relation between World 3 and World 2.

"We can call the physical world 'World 1', the world of our conscious experience 'World 2', and the world of the logical contents of books, libraries, computer memories, and suchlike 'World 3'." —Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, 1972, p. 74.

World-soul

[Latin: *anima mundi*] Some philosophers argue that if

实践性的理智德性。

"智慧是知识的最精确的形式。"——亚里士多德：《尼各马可伦理学》，1141a16。

世界 1

见“世界 3”条。

世界 2

见“世界 3”条。

世界 3

根据波普的观点，传统哲学一直承认两个世界：一个是物质的，另一个是意识的和精神的。波普提出了一种新的三重世界的概念框架。他称物质世界为“世界 1”，包括所有的物理对象和状态，称精神世界为“世界 2”，包含当下的感知经验，其他心理状态和行为意向。此外还有一个第三世界，或世界 3，由思想的客观内容所组成，包括问题，理论，批评，以及它们的未曾想到的结论。世界 3 本质上是一个贮藏的世界，记录着保存在图书馆和博物馆中的人类智力成果。思想的内容是单个人心灵的产物，但一旦思想产生出来，就超越其生产者，独立于表达或思考它们的任何人。它们给自己带来各种为我们、它们的生产者所未曾意想和预料到的后果和问题，超脱出我们的控制。它们反过来因果地影响着我们，成为我们知识的对象，甚至是世界 2 的主要对象。在这种意义上，思想的内容是自主的，有着它们自身的发展逻辑，既不能还原为世界 1，也不能还原为世界 2。尽管世界 3 是人造的，但它的自主性使它类似于柏拉图的形式世界或理念世界。这个世界是永恒的，导致了人类语言的进化。通过确立起世界 3，波普不仅提出了一种新的本体论分类，也为知识的客观性提供了一种新的辩护。世界 3 是他用以反对社会学相对主义和心理主义的有力工具。然而，围绕着是否存在这种分离的世界，尤其是它与世界 2 的关系，存在着种种讨论和批评。

"我们称物理世界为‘世界 1’，称我们意识经验的世界为‘世界 2’，而称书本、图书馆、计算机记忆以及这类东西的逻辑‘内容’的世界为‘世界 3’。"——波普：《客观知识》，1972 年，第 74 页。

世界灵魂

〔拉丁语为 *anima mundi*〕有些哲学家认

the universe is in harmonious celestial motion, there must an animating principle or soul to control it, just as the human soul controls the human body. Accordingly, the world should be viewed as an animated living organism, the soul of which is the world-soul. The idea of a world soul was popular in Pre-Socratic philosophy and was well elaborated in Plato's *Timaeus* in which the world is endowed with a soul by a creator or *Demiurge*. The human soul should be modelled on the world-soul to achieve harmony among its different parts. This doctrine of the world soul was developed in Stoicism and Neoplatonism and through them in medieval philosophy. It was revived by Schelling and plays role in contemporary environmental philosophy.

"Already in the most ancient times it was believed that the world was pervaded by an animating principle, called the world-soul." —Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, introduction.

为,如果宇宙处于和谐的天体运动中,就必定存在一个有生命的本原或灵魂在支配它,犹如人的灵魂支配人的肉体一样。因此,世界应被看成一个活的生命有机体,它的灵魂就是世界灵魂。世界灵魂的观念在前苏格拉底哲学中很流行,柏拉图在其著作《蒂迈欧篇》里又作了精心阐述,按该书的说法,创造者或“造物主”(Demiurge)给世界赋予了灵魂。人的灵魂应摹仿世界灵魂,以实现其各个不同部分的和谐。这种世界灵魂学说在斯多亚学派和新柏拉图主义那里,并通过它们,在中世纪哲学中得到了发展。它被谢林在近代复活,并在当代环境哲学中起作用。

“在久远的古代,人们就已经相信,世界由一种有生命的原则,即所谓的世界灵魂所充满。”——谢林:《自然哲学观念》,“导言”。

Z

Zeno's paradoxes

Zeno of Elca established a series of arguments against plurality and motion; these arguments are mutually related, with the aim of defending the thesis of his teacher Parmenides that what is is one and unchanging. These arguments are preserved by Aristotle in the *Physics* and by the Greek commentators on this book. Most of these discussions, however, are very compressed and this has given rise to very diverse interpretations. As a result there are various versions of each argument.

The two main arguments against plurality are as follows: (1) If there is a plurality of things, they are both (a) so small as to have no magnitude, and (b) so large as to be infinite. The proof of (a) is: the plurality must be composed of a number of indivisible units; but if the unit has magnitude, it must be divisible; if it is indivisible, it has no magnitude; and the composite of a number of non-magnitude units has no magnitude. The proof of (b) is: if there are many things, each must have magnitude; otherwise neither their addition nor their subtraction will make any difference to another thing, and will be nothing at all; if then, it must have at least two separate magnitudes, and each of them has magnitude and can be further divisible; since this process can go on forever, a thing will be unlimitedly large. (2) If there is a plurality of things, they must be both (a) limited and (b) unlimited. The proof of (a) goes: if there are many things, there must be just as many of them as they are, and neither more nor less; but if there are just as many as they are, they are limited. The proof of (2) goes: if there are many things, there are always other things between things that are there; and between these in turn other things; thus the things that are are unlimited.

The paradoxes against motion are four: the Dichotomy, Achilles and the Tortoise, the Flying Arrow and the Moving Rows; the so-called Stadium paradox is ambiguous in that some think it is a reworking of the Dichotomy, and others that it is a reworking of the Moving Rows. Sometimes just these four paradoxes are called Zeno's Paradoxes.

The general implication of Zeno's paradoxes is that they expose the intrinsic difficulties in the instinctive assumptions of ordinary human experience about plurality, motion, space and time, though some argue that he has a particular target which is the confusion between the geometrical point, arithmetical unit and physical magnitude in the Pythagoreans.

芝诺悖论

古希腊埃利亚学派的哲学家芝诺提出了一系列反对多与动的论点; 这些论点是彼此相关的, 旨在为其老师巴门尼德建立的万物为一旦永不变化的学说辩护。在亚里士多德的《物理学》中, 以及在对此书的古希腊注释家那里, 都保存了芝诺的这些论点。然而, 其中大部分论述都被大幅度压缩了, 这便引发了五花八门的解释。结果, 原来的每个论点到现在都有不同的说法。

反对多的两大论点如下: (1) 假如有许多事物, 那么它们都是 (a) 小得不能再小或者 (b) 大得不能再大 (即无限之小或无限之大)。前者 (a) 的证据是: 多必须是由一些不可分割的单元构成的; 但是, 如果每个单元具有量值或大小, 那肯定是可分割的; 如果它是不可分割的, 那它就没有量值或大小; 一些无量值的单元的组合是没有量值的。后者 (b) 的证据是: 如果有许多事物, 各个必须有量值或大小; 否则, 它们的增减与另一事物将会没有什么差异, 也就是说不会成为任何东西; 然而, 如果它肯定有至少两个可分的量值, 那么各个都有量值, 并且可以进而分割; 由于这一过程可以永远继续下去, 所以一物将是无限之大。 (2) 倘若有许多事物, 那么它们必须都是 (a) 有限的或者 (b) 无限的。前者 (a) 的证据在于: 假如有许多事物, 那么它们必然像现有事物一样多, 既不多也不少; 然而, 如果有像事物本身一样多的事物, 那么它们就是有限的。后者 (b) 的证据在于: 假如有许多事物, 那么在这些事物之间总有其他事物; 在这些其他事物中又有其他事物; 因此事物是无限的。

反对动的悖论有如下四个: 二分法悖论, 阿基里斯与乌龟悖论, 飞矢悖论与运动列悖论; 所谓竞技场悖论是歧义性的, 因为有人认为那是二分法悖论的重复, 也有人认为那是飞矢悖论的重复。有时所谓的“芝诺悖论”只是指这四个悖论。

芝诺悖论的基本含义是它们揭示了一些内在的难题, 这些难题存在于有关多、动和时空的普通人类经验之本能性假设之中; 当然, 也有一些人认为芝诺的特定目标是针对毕达哥拉斯学派所提出的几何点、算术单位与物理量值之间所存在的混乱现象的。这些悖论包括时空是否

These paradoxes involve the problem of whether space and time are infinitely divisible, and whether they are composed of indivisibles. These are basic philosophical conceptions and are also the fundamental mathematical conceptions, so Zeno's paradoxes attract endless interest from both philosophers and mathematicians; and there is still dispute as to whether Zeno's arguments are valid, and how to refute them. The method used by Zeno in these paradoxes is *reductio ad absurdum* which had great influence on the development of dialectic and philosophical reasoning.

"At some time in the first half of the fifth century BC, Zeno invented the set of paradoxes on which his successors have sharpened their wits."—G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, 1986, p. 45.

Zero Method

A method manifesting the underlying form of language by constructing a tautology through a combination of signs. Because of their tautologous form, these signs completely cancel out the significance of their material content. The zero method is a logical method of constructing a model on the assumption of complete rationality. Someone who is imperfectly rational might consider that the propositions have content even though they are tautologies.

"The proposition of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing. This method could also be called Zero-method."—Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.121.

Zoroastrianism

A Persian religion that started in the sixth century BC and whose dominance in that area was not replaced until the rise of Islam in the seventh century AD. Its scriptures are called the *Avesta*, and its founder was the prophet Zarathustra (Greek: *Zoroaster*). Its characteristic feature is its dualism. The force of darkness and evil (*Angra Mainyu*) is equally matched with the force of light and goodness (*Ahura Mazda*), and they are locked in a struggle from the beginning of the world to its end. Hence Zoroastrianism is not troubled by the paradox which arises from attempting to reconcile God's omnipotence and evil in the world. Parts of its teachings were assimilated by Mithraism and Manicheanism. There are still Zoroastrian believers around Bombay, India. The term is familiar in the contemporary philosophical world largely because Nietzsche employed Zarathustra as his spokesman in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

"The religion of struggle is dualistic. Zoroastrianism is the classic example, and in this type man participates in the cosmic conflict."—J. Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, 1971, p. 221.

可以无限分割、时空是否由不可分割之物构成等等问题。这些均是基本的哲学概念，也是基本的数学概念，所以芝诺悖论引起了哲学家和数学家们的无穷兴趣；关于芝诺悖论是否有效以及如何对其进行驳斥等方面依然存在争议。在这些悖论中，芝诺使用的方法是归谬法，此方法对发展辩证的和哲学的理性思维产生了巨大的影响。

“公元前5世纪上半叶的某个时期，芝诺发明了一套悖论，在此基础上他的思想继承者们使各自的机智变得更加敏锐了。”——欧文：《逻辑、科学和辩证法》，1986年，第45页。

置零法

一种显明语言深层结构的方法，它通过符号的结合构成一重言式。这些符号因为其重言式的形式而完全消除了其实质内容的意义。置零法是基于完全合理性假设来构造一模型的逻辑方法。一个不完全理性的人可能会认为，命题尽管是重言式也有内容。

“逻辑命题通过把命题结合成无所言说的命题而表明其逻辑性质。这种方法也可以称为置零法。”——维特根斯坦：《逻辑哲学论》，6.121。

祆教

波斯宗教，始于公元前6世纪，直到公元7世纪伊斯兰教兴起并取而代之时止，它在该地区居统治地位。它的圣经被称为“阿维斯塔”(*Avesta*)，它的创立者是先知查拉图斯特拉(希腊语 *Zoroaster*)。它的根本特征是二元论。黑暗和恶(*Angra Mainyu*)的力量与光明和善(*Ahura Mazda*)的力量势均力敌，从世界的开始到结束，它们都交织在一起，进行着斗争。因此，祆教没有被源于企图协调上帝的全能和世界的邪恶之间关系的那个悖论所困扰。它的部分教义被同化进米特拉教和摩尼教。在印度的孟买一带，现今仍有祆教信徒。祆教这个词之所以为当代哲学界所熟悉，很大程度上是因为尼采在《查拉图斯特拉如是说》中把查拉图斯特拉作为他的代言人。

“斗争的宗教是二元论的。祆教就是古典例证，按这个范例，人参与了宇宙冲突。”——马库阿里：《20世纪的宗教思想》，1971年，第221页。

附录

西方主要哲学家及其代表作

A

- Abelard, Peter (1079-1142) P. 阿布拉**
French medieval logician. *Dialectica; Concerning Genera and Species*.
法国中世纪逻辑学家。《辩证法》;《关于种和属》。
- Adorno, Theodor W. (1903-69) T. W. 阿多尔诺**
German philosopher of the Frankfurt School. *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* (with Horkheimer, 1947); *Negative Dialectics* (1966).
德国法兰克福学派哲学家。《启蒙辩证法》(与霍克海默合著, 1947);《否定辩证法》(1966)。
- Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz (1890-1963) K. 阿吉图库威茨**
Polish analytical philosopher. *Language and Knowledge*, 2 vols (1960-5).
波兰分析哲学家。《语言与知识》(2卷本, 1960-1965)。
- Albert the Great (c. 1206-80) 大阿尔伯特**
Medieval Aristotelian, teacher of Aquinas. *Opera Omnia*.
中世纪亚里士多德主义者, 阿奎那的老师。《小著作》。
- Albo, Joseph (c. 1360-1444) J. 阿波**
Jewish philosopher. *The Book of Principle* (1425).
犹太哲学家。《原理书》(1425)。
- Alexander, Samuel (1859-1938) S. 亚历山大**
Australian-British philosopher of science and of religion. *Space, Time and Deity* (1920).
澳裔英国科学哲学与宗教哲学家。《空间、时间与神性》(1920)。
- Alston, William (1921-) W. 阿尔斯通**
American epistemologist and philosopher of religion. *Divine Nature and Human Language* (1989), *Epistemic Justification* (1989), *Perceiving*

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美国知识论与宗教哲学家。《神性与人类语言》(1980);《认知辨明》(1989);《知觉神》(1991)。

Althusser, Louis (1918-90) L. 阿尔杜塞

French structural Marxist. *For Marx* (1965).

法国结构马克思主义者。《保卫马克思》(1965)。

Anaxagoras (500-428 BC) 阿那克萨戈拉

Pre-Socratic natural Philosopher.

前苏格拉底自然哲学家。

Anaximandros of Miletus (flourished. c. 550 BC) 阿那克西曼德

Pre-Socratic natural philosopher, member of the Ionian School.

前苏格拉底自然哲学家, 伊奥尼亚学派成员。

Anaximenes of Miletus (fl. c. 550 BC) 阿那克西美尼

Pre-Socratic natural philosopher, member of the Ionian School.

前苏格拉底自然哲学家, 伊奥尼亚学派成员。

Anderson, John (1893-1962) J. 安德森

Scottish-Australian philosopher. *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* (1962).

苏格兰裔澳大利亚哲学家。《经验哲学研究》(1962)。

Anscombe, G (ertrude) E (lizabeth) M (argaret) (1919-) G. E. M. 安斯康

British analytical philosopher. *Intention* (1957); *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (1959); *Collected Philosophical Papers* (3 vols, 1981).

英国分析哲学家。《意向》(1957);《维特根斯坦〈逻辑哲学论〉导论》(1959);《哲学论文集》(3卷本, 1981)。

Anselm of Canterbury, St (1033-1109) 安瑟尔谟

Medieval philosopher, father of Scholasticism and author of the ontological argument. *Monologion*; *Proslogion*.

中世纪哲学家, 经院哲学之父, 本体论证明的发明者。《独白》;《宣讲》。

Antichus of Ascalon (c. 130 BC-68 BC) 安提贡

Hellenistic philosopher, leader of Middle Platonism.

希腊化时代哲学家,中期柏拉图主义领袖。

Antisthenes (c. 444BC-c. 366 BC) 安提斯泰尼

Greek philosopher, a prototype of the Cynics.

希腊哲学家,犬儒学派奠基人之一。

Aquinas, St Thomas (1224/5-74) T. 阿奎那

Medieval philosopher. *Summa Contra Gentiles*; *Summa Theologiae*

中世纪哲学家。《反异端大全》;《神学大全》。

Arceilaus of Pitane (c. 315-240 BC) 阿西塞劳

Hellenistic philosopher, Platonist and Sceptic.

希腊化时代哲学家,柏拉图主义者,怀疑论者。

Arendt, Hannah (1906-75) H. 阿伦特

German-American political philosopher, a pupil of Heidegger. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951); *The Human Condition* (1958), *The Life of the Mind*, 2 vols (1978).

德裔美国政治哲学家,海德格尔的学生。《极权主义的起源》(1951);《人类条件》(1958);《心灵生活》(2卷本,1978)。

Aristippus (c. 435-356 BC) 亚里斯提卜

Greek philosopher, the traditional founder of the Cyrenaic school of hedonism.

希腊哲学家,居勒尼快乐主义学派的奠基人。

Aristotle (384-322 BC) 亚里士多德

Greek philosopher. *Metaphysics*; *Nicomachean Ethics*; *Eudemian Ethics*; *Magna Moralia*; *Politics*; *Categories*; *De Interpretatione*; *Prior and Posterior Analytics*; *Topics*; *De Sophisticis Elenchis*; *Physics*; *De Anima*; *De Partibus Animalium*; *De Motu Animalium*; *De Generatione Animalium*; *Rhetoric*; *Art of Poetry*.

希腊哲学家。《形而上学》;《尼各马可伦理学》;《欧德谟伦理学》;《大伦理学》;《政治学》;《范畴》;《解释》;《前分析》;《后分析》;《正位篇》;《驳诡辩》;《物理学》;《论灵魂》;《动物的部分》;《动物的运动》;《动物的生成》;《修辞学》;《诗学》。

Armstrong, David (1926-) D. 阿姆斯特朗

Australian philosopher of mind and metaphysician. *A Materialist Theory of Mind* (1968); *Universals and Scientific Realism* (1978).

澳大利亚心智哲学家和形而上学家。《唯物主义的心的理论》(1968);《共相和科学实在论》(1978)。

Arnauld, Antoine (1612-94) A. 阿尔诺

French theologian and philosopher, a leading figure among the Port-Royal Jansenists. *Port-Royal Logic* (with Pierre Nicole, 1662).

法国神学家和哲学家,波尔-罗亚尔学派的主要代表。

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Arrow, Kenneth (1921-) K. 阿罗

American economist and theorist of social choice. *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951).

美国经济学家和社会选择理论家。《社会选择与个体价值》(1951)。

Augustine of Hippo, St (354-430) 奥古斯丁

Medieval theologian and philosopher. *Confessions* (397-400); *City of God* (413-26).

中世纪神学家和哲学家。《忏悔录》(397-400);《上帝之城》(413-426)。

Austin, John (1790-1859) J. 奥斯汀

English moral and legal philosopher, legal positivist. *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (1832).

英国道德与法哲学家,法律实证主义者。《法理学的既定范围》(1832)。

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British ordinary language philosopher. *Philosophical Papers* (1961); *How to Do Things with Words* (1961); *Sense and Sensibilia* (1962).

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Avenarius, Richard (1843-96) R. 阿芬那留斯

German positivist, leading exponent of empirio-criticism. *Critique of Pure Experience* (1888-90).

德国实证主义者,经验批判主义的主要阐述者。《纯粹经验批判》(1888-1890)。

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Ibn Rushd, medieval Islamic philosopher and Aristotelian commentator. *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*.

伊本·路西德,中世纪伊斯兰哲学家和亚里士多德注释家。《矛盾的矛盾》。

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Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules (1910-89) A.J. 艾耶尔

British logical positivist. *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936); *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940); *The Problem of Knowledge* (1954); *The Central Questions of Philosophy* (1973).

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B**Bachelard, Gaston (1884-1962) G. 巴什拉**

French philosopher of science and critic. *The New*

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法国科学哲学家与评论家。《新科学精神》(1934);《火的心理分析》(1938)。
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English empiricist philosopher. *The Advancement of Learning* (1605); *Novum Organum* (1620).
英国经验主义哲学家。《学问的进步》(1605);《新工具》(1620)。
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English medieval philosopher, scientist and theologian. *Opus Maius*.
英国中世纪哲学家、科学家与神学家。《大著作》。
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American moral philosopher. *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals* (1985).
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American moral philosopher. *From a Moral Point of View* (1955).
美国道德哲学家。《从道德观点看》(1955)。
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Scottish philosopher of psychology. *The Senses and the Intellect* (1855); *The Emotions and the Will* (1859).
苏格兰心理哲学家。《感知与理智》(1855);《情绪与意志》(1859)。
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Russian political thinker, exponent of anarchism. *Revolutionary Catechism* (1865); *Federalism, Socialism and Anti-Theologism*.
俄国政治思想家,无政府主义的倡导者。《革命问答》(1865);《联邦主义,社会主义与反神道论》。
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Swiss dialectical theologian. *The Epistles to the Romans* (1919); *Church Dogmatics* (1932).
瑞士辩证神学家。《罗马书简》(1919);《教会教条》(1932)。
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French Nietzschean thinker. *Theory of Religion* (1948); *Literature and Evil* (1957); *Eroticism* (1957).
法国尼采主义思想家。《宗教理论》(1948);《文学与恶》(1957);《爱欲主义》(1957)。
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German theologian and historian. *The Good Cause of Freedom* (1842).
德国神学家与史学家。《自由的善因》(1842)。
- Baumgarten, Alexander** (1714-62) **A. 鲍姆加登**
German aesthetician. *Aesthetica*, 2 vols (1750-8).
德国美学家。《美学》(2卷本,1750-1758)。
- Bayes, Thomas** (1702-61) **T. 贝叶斯**
English clergyman and theorist of probability. *An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances* (1763).
英国牧师和或然性理论家。《试论对机遇学说中一个问题的解决》(1763)。
- Bayle, Pierre** (1647-1706) **P. 贝尔**
French sceptic. *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697).
法国怀疑论者。《历史的与批判的词典》(1697)。
- Beauvoir, Simone de** (1908-86) **西蒙·波伏娃**
French existentialist and feminist. *The Second Sex* (1949).
法国存在主义者与女性主义者。《第二性》(1949)。
- Benjamin, Walter** (1892-1940) **W. 本杰明**
German Marxist cultural and literary theorist, a member of the Frankfurt School. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (1928); *Illuminations* (1968).
德国马克思主义文化及文学理论家,法兰克福学派成员。《德国悲剧戏剧起源》(1928);《启示》(1968)。
- Bennett, Jonathan** (1930-) **J. 伯纳特**
New Zealander analytical philosopher of language, metaphysician and historian of philosophy. *Kant's Analytic* (1966); *Kant's Dialectic* (1974); *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984); *Events and Their Names* (1988).
新西兰语言分析哲学家,形而上学家及哲学史家。《康德的分析论》(1966);《康德的辩证法》(1974);《斯宾诺莎伦理学研究》(1984);《事件及其名称》(1988)。
- Bentham, Jeremy** (1748-1832) **J. 边沁**
English political, moral and legal philosopher, founder of utilitarianism. *A Fragment on Government* (1776); *An Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation* (1789).
英国政治、道德及法哲学家,功利主义的奠基人。《关于政府的残简》(1776);《道德与立法原则导论》(1789)。
- Berdyaev, Nikolai** (1874-1948) **N. 贝提埃乌**
Russian religious philosopher. *The Meaning of History* (1923); *The Destiny of Man* (1931).
俄国宗教哲学家。《历史的意义》(1923);《人的命运》(1931)。
- Bergson, Henri-Louis** (1859-1941) **H. -L. 柏格森**
French metaphysician and philosopher of creative evolution. *Time and Free Will* (1889); *The Creative Evolution* (1907).
法国形而上学家及创造进化哲学家。《时间与自由意志》(1889);《创造的进化》(1907)。
- Berkeley, George** (1685-1753) **G. 巴克莱**

Anglo-Irish idealist empiricist. *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709); *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710); *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713).

英裔爱尔兰唯心主义的经验主义者。《视觉新论》(1709);《人类知识原理》(1710);《希勒斯和斐洛诺斯的三篇对话》(1713)。

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Latvian born British political and moral philosopher and historian of ideas. *Four Essays on Liberty* (1969); *Vico and Herder; Two Essays in the History of Ideas* (1976); *Against the Current* (1980); *The Crooked Timber of Humanity; Chapters in the History of Human Ideas* (1991).

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罗马哲学家,他对亚里士多德《范畴》及《解释》的注译和翻译是中世纪逻辑的主要来源。《哲学的慰藉》。

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L. E. J. 布劳维尔

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Italian Renaissance hermetic philosopher, astrologer, magus and poet. *On the Cause, Principle and One* (1584); *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast* (1584); *Of the Infinite Universe and Worlds* (1584); *On Heroic Enthusiasms* (1585).

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Hellenistic sceptic, member of the later Academy. 希腊化时代的怀疑论者, 晚期学园派成员。

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Pen name of Charles Dodson, English mathematician, logician and writer. *Alice in Wonderland* (1865); *Through The Looking-Glass* (1871); *The Hunting of the Snark* (1876).

查尔斯·道森的笔名, 英国数学家、逻辑学家、作家。《爱丽丝奇境游记》(1865); 《透过有色眼镜》(1871); 《猎蛇鲨》(1876)。

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Stoic philosopher.
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French enlightenment mathematician and philosopher. Co-editor of the *Encyclopédie* (with Diderot).

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意大利哲学诗人。《共生》;《论君主制》;《神曲》。

Danto, Arthur (1924-) **A. 丹托**
American philosopher of art, history, action, epistemology. *Analytic Philosophy of History* (1965); *Analytic Philosophy of Action* (1973); *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (1981).

美国艺术、历史、行为及知识论哲学家。《分析的历

史哲学》(1965);《分析的行动哲学》(1973);《常识的升华》(1981)。

Darwin, Charles (1809-82) **C. 达尔文**
English biologist and theorist of evolution. *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859); *The Descent of Man* (1871).

英国生物学家与进化理论家。《通过自然选择的物种起源》(1859);《人的起源》(1871)。

Davidson, Donald (1917-) **D. 戴维森**
American analytic philosopher of mind and language. *Essays on Actions and Events* (1980); *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (1984).

美国分析心灵哲学家和语言哲学家。《关于行动与事件的论文集》(1980);《真理与解释的探究》(1984)。

de Finetti, Bruno (1906-85) **B. 德费内底**
Italian personalist philosopher of mathematics. *Forecast: its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources* (1937); *Theory of Probability*, 2 vols (1970).

意大利人格主义数学哲学家。《前见:其逻辑法则及其主观源泉》(1937);《概率论》(2卷本, 1970)。

Deleuze, Gilles (1925-) **G. 德勒兹**
French post-structuralist. *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962); *Difference and Repetition* (1968); *The Logic of Sense* (1969).

法国后结构主义者。《尼采与哲学》(1962);《差异与重复》(1968);《感知的逻辑》(1969)。

Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-371 BC) **德谟克利特**
Greek atomist philosopher.
希腊原子主义哲学家。

De Morgan, Augustus (1806-71) **A. 德摩根**
British mathematician and logician. *Essay on Probabilities* (1838); *Formal Logic* (1847); *On the Syllogism* (1864); *Budget of Paradoxes* (1872).
英国数学家和逻辑学家。《论或然性》(1838);《形式逻辑》(1847);《论三段论》(1864);《悖论集》(1872)。

Dennett, Daniel (1942-) **D. 丹奈特**
American philosopher of mind. *Content and Consciousness* (1969); *Brainstorms* (1978); *The Intentional Stance* (1987); *Consciousness Explained* (1991).

美国心智哲学家。《内容与意识》(1969);《奇思妙想》(1978);《意向性姿态》(1987);《解释意识》(1991)。

Derrida, Jacques (1930-) **J. 德里达**
Algerian-born French post-structuralist and phenomenologist deconstructionist philosopher of language, metaphysics and aesthetics. *Speech and Phenomena* (1967); *Of Grammatology* (1967); *Writing and Difference* (1967); *Margins of Philosophy* (1972).

生于阿尔及利亚的法国后结构主义者与现象学解构

- 论语言哲学家、形而上学家和美学家。《言语与现象》(1967);《论书写学》(1967);《写作与差异》(1967);《哲学的边缘》(1972)。
- Descartes, René** (1596-1650) **R. 笛卡尔**
French philosopher and mathematician, a chief architect of modern philosophy. *Discourse on Method* (1637); *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641); *Replies to Objections to the Meditations* (1641-2); *Principles of Philosophy* (1644); *Passions of the Soul* (1649).
法国哲学家与数学家,近代哲学的主要奠基者之一。《方法谈》(1637);《第一哲学沉思》(1641);《对沉思的反驳的回答》(1641-1642);《哲学原理》(1644);《灵魂的激情》(1649)。
- Dewey, John** (1859-1952) **D. 杜威**
American pragmatist. *Experience and Nature* (1925); *The Quest for Certainty* (1929); *Art as Experience* (1933); *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935).
美国实用主义者。《经验与自然》(1925);《寻求确定性》(1929);《作为经验的艺术》(1933);《自由主义与社会行动》(1935)。
- Diderot, Denis** (1713-84) **D. 狄德罗**
French enlightenment philosopher, writer and critic, the principal editor of the *Encyclopédie*. *Philosophical Thoughts* (1746); *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature* (1754); *Rameau's Nephew* (1767).
法国启蒙派哲学家、作家与评论家,《百科全书》的主要编者。《哲学思想录》(1746);《关于自然解释的思想》(1754);《拉摩的侄儿》(1767)。
- Dilthey, Wilhelm** (1833-1911) **W. 狄尔泰**
German philosopher of history, hermeneutics, and the methodologist of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (1883); *Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (1910).
德国历史哲学家、解释学家及人文科学方法论家。《人文科学导论》(1883);《人文科学中历史世界的形成》(1910)。
- Diodorus Cronus** (flourished, c. 284 BC) **第欧多鲁·克罗纳**
Greek philosopher of the Megarian school.
希腊麦加拉学派哲学家。
- Diogenes Laërtius** (c. 3rd century) **第欧根尼·拉尔修**
Greek biographer. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.
希腊传记作者。《名哲言行录》。
- Diogenes of Apollonia** (5th century BC) **阿波罗尼亚的第欧根尼**
Greek natural philosopher.
希腊自然哲学家。
- Diogenes of Sinope** (c. 400-c. 325 BC) **西诺班的第欧根尼**
Greek philosopher, founder of the Cynics.
希腊哲学家,犬儒学派的奠基人。
- Donagan, Alan** (1925-91) **A. 唐那根**
Australian-American moral philosopher and historian of philosophy. *The Theory of Morality* (1977); *Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action* (1987).
澳大利亚裔美国道德哲学家与哲学史家。《道德理论》(1977);《选择:人类行为的本质要素》(1987)。
- Donnellan, Keith** (1931-) **K. 唐纳兰**
American philosophical logician. "Reference and Definite Descriptions" (1966).
美国哲学逻辑学家。《指称和限定的摹状词》(1966)。
- Dray, William** (1921-) **W. 德莱**
Canadian philosopher of history. *Laws and Explanation in History* (1957); *Perspectives on History* (1980).
加拿大历史哲学家。《历史中的规律与解释》(1957);《关于历史的视角种种》(1980)。
- Dretske, Fred** (1932-) **F. 德雷斯克**
American philosopher of mind, epistemologist, philosopher of science. *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (1981); *Explaining Behaviour: Reason in a World of Causes* (1988).
美国心智哲学家、知识论家和科学哲学家。《知识与信息流》(1981);《解释行为》;《因果世界中的理性》(1988)。
- Ducasse, Curt** (1881-1969) **C. 杜卡锡**
French-American philosopher. *Truth, Knowledge and Causation* (1969).
法裔美国哲学家。《真理、知识与因果性》(1969)。
- Duhem, Pierre** (1861-1916) **P. 杜恒**
French philosopher of science. *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (1906); *To Save the Phenomena* (1908).
法国科学哲学家。《物理理论的目的与结构》(1906);《拯救现象》(1908)。
- Dummett, Michael** (1925-) **M. 达米特**
English anti-realist philosopher of language and mathematics. *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (1973); *Truth and Other Enigmas* (1978); *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics* (1991); *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (1993).
英国反实在论语言哲学家和数学家。《弗雷格:语言哲学》(1973);《真理与其他谜》(1978);《形而上学的逻辑基础》(1991);《分析哲学的起源》(1993)。
- Duns Scotus, John** (c. 1266-1308) **邓斯·司各脱**
Scottish-born scholastic philosopher and theologian. *Ordinatio*; *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*.
苏格兰出生的经院哲学家和神学家。《秩序》;《争辩

的神学问题》。

Durkheim, Emile (1858-1917) E. 杜克海姆

French sociologist, moral philosopher and social philosopher. *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895); *Suicide* (1897); *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912).

法国社会学家、道德哲学家和社会哲学家。《社会学方法的规则》(1895);《自杀》(1897);《宗教生活的基本形式》(1912)。

Dworkin, Ronald (1931-) R. 德沃金

American political and legal philosopher. *Taking Rights Seriously* (1977); *A Matter of Principle* (1985); *Law's Empire* (1986).

美国政治与法律哲学家。《认真对待权利》(1977);《原则问题》(1985);《法的帝国》(1986)。

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Edwards, Jonathan (1703-58) J. 爱德华兹

American philosopher and theologian. *A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections* (1746); *Freedom of the Will* (1754); *The Nature of True Virtue* (1765).

美国哲学家与神学家。《论宗教情感》(1746);《意志自由》(1754);《真实德性的本性》(1765)。

Einstein, Albert (1879-1955) A. 爱因斯坦

German-Swiss-American physicist and philosopher. *The Meaning of Relativity* (1921); *The Born-Einstein Letters* (1971); *Collected Papers*, 2 vols (1987-9).

德国—瑞士—美国物理学家和哲学家。《相对性的意义》(1921);《玻恩—爱因斯坦通信》(1971);《文集》(2卷, 1987-1989)。

Elster, Jon (1940-) J. 爱尔斯特

Norwegian analytical Marxist social and political philosopher. *Sour Grapes* (1983); *Making Sense of Marx* (1985).

挪威分析马克思主义社会与政治哲学家。《酸葡萄》(1983);《理解马克思》(1985)。

Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1803-82) R. W. 爱默生

American New England transcendentalist author and philosopher. *Nature* (1836); *Essays* (1841, 1844); *Representative Men* (1850); *Society and Solitude* (1870).

美国新英格兰超验主义哲学家。《自然》(1836);《文集》(1841, 1844);《代表性的人》(1850);《社会与孤独》(1870)。

Empedocles (c. 495-c. 435 BC) 恩培多克勒

Greek natural philosopher.

希腊自然哲学家。

Engels, Friedrich (1820-95) F. 恩格斯

German philosopher. *The Communist Manifesto*

(with Marx, 1848); *Anti-Dühring* (1878); *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884).

德国哲学家。《共产党宣言》(与马克思合著, 1848);《反杜林论》(1878);《家庭、私有制和国家的起源》(1884)。

Epictetus (c. 55-135) 爱比克泰德

Roman Stoic philosopher, born as a slave. *Discourses*; *Manual*.

罗马斯多亚哲学家, 奴隶出身。《论谈》;《手册》。

Epicurus (341-270 BC) 伊壁鸠鲁

Hellenistic Greek atomist.

希腊化时代的希腊原子论者。

Epimenides (6th century BC) 爱披门尼特

Greek logician, possibly author of the liar paradox. 希腊逻辑学家, 一说是撒谎者悖论的作者。

Erasmus, Desiderius (1466-1536) D. 爱拉斯谟

Dutch Renaissance humanist and scholar. *In Praise of Folly* (1509); *On Free Will* (1524).

荷兰文艺复兴人文主义者与学者。《愚神颂》(1509);《论自由意志》(1524)。

Eriugena, John Scot (c. 810-c. 877) J. S. 爱留根纳

Irish-born medieval philosopher. *De Praedestinatione*; *De Divisione Naturae*.

爱尔兰出生的中世纪哲学家。《论预定》;《论自然的区分》。

Eubulides 欧布里德

Ancient Greek logician, member of the Megarian school, possibly author of the liar paradox.

古希腊逻辑学家, 麦加拉学派成员, 一说是撒谎论悖论的作者。

Evans, Gareth (1946-80) G. 埃文斯

British philosopher of language and philosopher of mind. *The Varieties of Reference* (1982); *Collected Papers* (1985).

英国语言哲学家与心灵哲学家。《指称的多样性》(1982);《文集》(1985)。

F

Feigl, Herbert (1902-88) H. 费格尔

Austro-Hungarian logical positivist philosopher of science and philosopher of psychology, a founder of the Vienna Circle. "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'" (1958); *Inquiries and Provocations; Selected Writings 1929-74* (1981).

奥匈匈牙利逻辑实证主义科学哲学家和心理学家, 维也纳学派奠基人之一。《“心智的”与“物理的”》(1958);《研究与争议: 选集 1929-1974》(1981)。

Feinberg, Joel (1926-) J. 芬伯格

American moral, political and legal philosopher. *Doing and Deserving* (1970); *Rights, Justice and*

- the Bounds of Liberty* (1980); *The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law* (4 vols, 1984-8).
- 美国道德、政治和法哲学家。《做与应得》(1970); 《权利、正义与自由的界限》(1980); 《刑法的道德界限》(4卷本, 1984-1988)。
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- Scottish common sense moral and political philosopher. *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767). 苏格兰常识学派道德与政治哲学家。《论市民社会的历史》(1767)。
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- German left Hegelian naturalistic humanist. *The Essence of Christianity* (1841); *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843). 德国左翼黑格尔派, 自然主义人文主义者。《基督教本质》(1841); 《未来哲学原理》(1843)。
- Feyerabend, Paul** (1924-94) **P. 费耶阿本德**
- Austrian philosopher and historian of science. *A against Method* (1974); *Science in a Free Society* (1978); *Philosophical Papers*, 2 vols (1981); *Farewell to Reason* (1987). 奥地利哲学家和科学史家。《反对方法》(1974); 《自由社会中的科学》(1978); 《哲学文集》(2卷, 1981); 《向理性告别》(1987)。
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- German ethical idealist philosopher. *Critique of all Revelation* (1792); *The Science of Knowledge* (1794 and later revised editions); *The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge* (1796); *The Vocation of Man* (1800); *The Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806). 德国伦理唯心论哲学家。《一切天启的批判》(1792); 《知识学》(1794, 多次修订); 《基于知识科学上的伦理科学》(1796); 《论人的使命》(1800); 《当前时代的基本特征》(1806)。
- Ficino, Marsilio** (1433-99) **M. 费其诺**
- Italian Platonist and founder of the Academy of Florence. *Symposium* (1469); *Theologia Platonica* (1473). 意大利柏拉图主义者, 佛罗伦萨学园的创始人。《会饮》(1469); 《柏拉图神学》(1473)。
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- American logician and philosopher of mathematics. *Science without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism* (1980); *Realism, Mathematics and Modality* (1989). 美国逻辑学家与数学哲学家。《没有数目的科学: 捍卫唯名论》(1980); 《实在论, 数学和模态》(1989)。
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- English royalist political philosopher. *Patriarchia* (1680). 英国保皇主义政治哲学家。《家长制》(1680)。
- Finnis, John** (1940-) **J. 芬尼斯**
- British legal and moral philosopher. *Natural Laws and Natural Rights* (1980); *Fundamentals of Ethics* (1983); *Moral Absolutes* (1991). 英国法与道德哲学家。《自然法与自然权利》(1980); 《伦理学基础》(1983); 《道德绝对》(1991)。
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- American philosopher of mind and language. *The Language of Thought* (1975); *The Modularity of Mind* (1983); *Psychosemantics* (1987); *A Theory of Content and Other Essays* (1990); *Holism: A Shopper's Guide* (with Ernest Lapore) (1992). 美国心智与语言哲学家。《思维语言》(1975); 《心的组合性》(1983); 《心理语义学》(1987); 《关于内容的一种理论及其他论文》(1990); 《整体论: 导游手册》(与拉普合著, 1992)。
- Føllesdal, Dagfinn** (1932-) **D. 福莱斯达尔**
- Norwegian philosopher of language and Husserl scholar. *Referential Opacity and Modal Logic* (1966). 挪威语言哲学家及胡塞尔专家。《指称的晦暗性与模态逻辑》(1966)。
- Foot, Philippa** (1920-) **P. 福特**
- English moral philosopher. *Virtues and Vices* (1978). 英国道德哲学家。《德性与邪恶》(1978)。
- Foucault, Michel** (1926-84) **M. 福柯**
- French post-structuralist philosopher and historian of ideas. *Madness and Civilisation* (1961); *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1966); *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969); *Discipline and Punish* (1975); *The History of Sexuality I-III* (1976-84). 法国后结构主义哲学家及思想史家。《疯狂与文明》(1961); 《事物的秩序: 人文科学考古学》(1966); 《知识考古学》(1969); 《纪律与惩罚》(1975); 《性史 I - III》(1976-84)。
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- American moral philosopher and philosopher of education. *Perspective on Morality* (1976); *Thinking About Morality* (1980). 美国道德哲学家与教育哲学家。《道德视角》(1976); 《道德思考》(1980)。
- Frankfurt, Harry** (1929-) **H. 法兰克福**
- American Descartes scholar, metaphysician and philosopher of action. *Demons, Dreamers and Madmen* (1970); *The Importance of What We Care About* (1988). 美国笛卡尔学者、形而上学家和行为哲学家。《神灵、梦与狂人》(1970); 《我们所关心的事物的重要性》(1988)。
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German logician and philosopher of mathematics and language. *Begriffsschrift* (1879); *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, 2 vols (1884); *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893); "The Thought" in Strawson, ed., *Philosophical Logic* (1967); *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (1980).

德国逻辑学家、数学家与语言哲学家,《概念文字》(1879);《算术的基础》(2卷,1884);《算术的基本法则》(1893);《思想》,见斯特劳森编《哲学逻辑》(1967);《G. 弗雷格哲学著作译文集》(1980)。

Freud, Sigmund (1856-1939) **S. 弗洛伊德**

Austrian founder of psychoanalysis. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900); *The Ego and the Id* (1923); *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1930); *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933).

奥地利心理分析的创始人。《梦的解释》(1900);《自我与本我》(1923);《文明与不满》(1930);《心理分析新论》(1933)。

G

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900-) **H. -G. 伽达默尔**

German hermeneutic philosopher. *Truth and Method* (1960); *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (1976).

德国解释学哲学家。《真理与方法》(1960);《哲学解释学》(1976)。

Galen of Pergamum (c. 129-c. 200 AD) **加仑**

Greek empiricist and biologist.
希腊经验主义者与生物学家。

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) **伽利略**

Italian astronomer and physicist, a profound influence on modern science and philosophy. *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* (1632); *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences* (1638).

意大利天文学家与物理学家,对近代科学与哲学影响甚巨。《关于两大世界体系的对话》(1632);《关于两门新科学的对话》(1638)。

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655) **P. 伽桑狄**

French atomist philosopher, who presented important objections to Descartes' *Meditations*. *Disquisitiones Metaphysicae* (1644).

法国原子论哲学家,对笛卡尔的《沉思》提出重要诘难,《形而上学探讨》(1644)。

Gauthier, David (1932-) **D. 高塞**

Canadian moral and political philosopher. *The Logic of Leviathan* (1969); *Morals by Agreement* (1986).

加拿大道德与政治哲学家。《利维坦的逻辑》(1969);《约定的道德》(1986)。

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British philosopher of logic, metaphysics, mind, religion and ethics. *Mental Acts* (1956); *Reference and Generality* (1962); *God and the Soul* (1969).
英国逻辑、形而上学、心灵、宗教及伦理学哲学家。《心智行为》(1956);《指称与概括》(1962);《神与灵魂》(1969)。

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Italian idealist philosopher and supporter of the fascism regime. *The General Theory of the Spirit as Pure Act* (1916); *Genesis and Structure of Society* (1946).

意大利唯心论哲学家,法西斯政府的支持者。《关于精神作为纯行为的一般理论》(1916);《社会的生成与结构》(1946)。

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German natural deduction logician. *Collected Papers* (1969).

德国自然推演论逻辑学家。《文集》(1969)。

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古希腊学者, 医学之父。

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古希腊智者。

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女性新柏拉图主义者。

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Greek sophist.
希腊智者。

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Hellenistic philosopher, founder of scepticism.
希腊化时代哲学家, 怀疑主义的创始人。

Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570-495 BC) **毕达哥拉斯**

Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher.
前苏格拉底希腊哲学家。

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W. V. O. 奎因

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J. J. C. 斯马特

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First Western philosopher, founder of the Ionian school.
第一个西方哲学家, 伊奥尼亚学派的创始人。

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X

Xenocrates (396-314) 克塞诺克拉底

Greek Platonist, a head of Plato's Academy.

希腊柏拉图主义者, 柏拉图学园一任首领。

Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 560-c. 470 BC) 克塞诺芬尼

Pre-Socratic philosopher; precursor of the Eleatic school.

前苏格拉底哲学家, 埃利亚学派先驱。

Z

Zeno of Citium (334-262 BC) (基底恩的) 芝诺

Hellenistic philosopher, founder of Stoicism.

希腊化时代哲学家, 斯多亚主义的奠基人。

Zeno of Elea (c. 470 BC) (埃利亚的) 芝诺

Greek philosopher, member of the Eleatic school.

希腊哲学家, 埃利亚学派成员。

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